Chapter I: Front Matter

THE
THEORY
OF
MORAL SENTIMENTS;
OR,
AN ESSAY
TOWARDS
An ANALYSIS of the PRINCIPLES by which MEN naturally judge concerning
the CONDUCT and CHARACTER, first of their NEIGHBOURS, and afterwards of
THEMSELVES.
TO WHICH IS ADDED,
A DISSERTATION
ON THE
ORIGIN OF LANGUAGES.

BY ADAM SMITH, L.L.D. F.R.S.

Formerly Professor of Philosophy in the University of Glasgow; and
Author of the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations.

THE SIXTH EDITION.

DUBLIN:

Printed for J. BEATTY and C. JACKSON, No. 32, SKINNER-ROW.

M,DCC,LXXVII.

CONTENTS.

PART I.

Of the Propriety of Action.

SECTION I.

Of the sense of propriety Page
1.

CHAP. I. _Of Sympathy_ ibid.

CHAP. II. _Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy_ 9

CHAP. III. _Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or
impropriety of the affections of other men, by their concord or
dissonance with our own_ 14

CHAP. IV. _The same subject continued_ 19

CHAP. V. _Of the amiable and respectable virtues_ 27

SECTION II.

Of the degrees of the different passions which are consistent
with propriety 33

CHAP. I. _Of the passions which take their origin from the body_ 34

CHAP. II. _Of those passions which take their origin from a
particular turn or habit of the imagination_ 41

CHAP. III. _Of the unsocial passions_ 46

CHAP. IV. _Of the social passions_ 54

CHAP. V. _Of the selfish passions_ 58

SECTION III.

Of the effects of prosperity and adversity upon the judgment of
mankind with regard to the propriety of action; and why it is
more easy to obtain their approbation in the one state than in
the other 64

CHAP. I. _That though our sympathy with sorrow is generally a
more lively sensation than our sympathy with joy, it commonly
falls much more short of the violence of what is naturally felt
by the person principally concerned_ ibid.

CHAP. II. _Of the origin of ambition, and of the distinction of
ranks_ 74

CHAP. III. _Of the stoical philosophy_ 89

PART II.

Of Merit and Demerit; or of the objects of reward and punishment.

SECTION I.

Of the sense of merit and demerit 97

CHAP. I. _That whatever appears to be the proper object of
gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same
manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment,
appears to deserve punishment_ 98

CHAP. II. _Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment_ 102

CHAP. III. _That where there is no approbation of the conduct of
the person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy
with the gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the
contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives of
the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy
with the resentment of him who suffers it_ 106

CHAP. IV. _Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters_ 109

CHAP. V. _The analysis of the sense of merit and demerit_ 112

SECTION II.

Of justice and beneficence 119

CHAP. I. _Comparison of those two virtues_ ibid.

CHAP. II. _Of the sense of justice, of remorse, and of the
consciousness of merit_ 126

CHAP. III. _Of the utility of this constitution of nature_ 132

SECTION III.

Of the influence of fortune upon the sentiments of mankind, with
regard to the merit or demerit of actions 145

CHAP. I. _Of the causes of this influence of fortune_ 148

CHAP. II. _Of the extent of this influence of fortune_ 154

CHAP. III. _Of the final cause of this irregularity of
sentiments_ 167

PART III.

Of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and
conduct, and of the sense of duty.

CHAP. I. _Of the consciousness of merited praise or blame_ 173

CHAP. II. _In what manner our own judgments refer to what ought
to be the judgments of others: and of the origin of general
rules_ 180

CHAP. III. _Of the influence and authority of the general rules
of morality, and that they are justly regarded as the laws of
the Deity_ 207

CHAP. IV. _In what cases the sense of duty ought to be the sole
principle of our conduct; and in what cases it ought to concur
with other motives_ 223

PART IV.

Of the effect of utility upon the sentiments of approbation.

CHAP. I. _Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows
upon all the productions of art, and of the extensive influence
of this species of beauty_ 237

CHAP. II. _Of the beauty which the appearance of utility bestows
upon the characters and actions of men; and how far the
perception of this beauty may be regarded as one of the
original principles of approbation_ 250

PART V.

Of the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral
approbation and disapprobation.

CHAP. I. _Of the influence of custom and fashion upon our notions
of beauty and deformity_ 261

CHAP. II. _Of the influence of custom and fashion upon moral
sentiments_ 271

PART VI.

Of Systems of Moral Philosophy.

SECTION I.

Of the questions which ought to be examined in a theory of moral
sentiments 291

SECTION II.

Of the different accounts which have been given of the nature of
virtue 294

CHAP. I. _Of those systems which make virtue consist in
propriety_ 295

CHAP. II. _Of those systems which make virtue consist in
prudence_ 311

CHAP. III. _Of those systems which make virtue consist in
benevolence_ 321

CHAP. IV. _Of licentious systems_ 331

SECTION III.

Of the different systems which have been formed concerning the
principle of approbation 345

CHAP. I. _Of those systems which deduce the principle of
approbation from self-love_ 346

CHAP. II. _Of those systems which make reason the principle of
approbation_ 350

CHAP. III. _Of those systems which make sentiment the principle
of approbation_ 356

SECTION IV.

Of the manner in which different authors have treated of the
practical rules of morality 367

_Considerations concerning the first formation of languages, and
the different genius of original and compound languages_ 389