Chapter XVII: Appendix: (manuscript Sources) 565 (15)

He was a counsellor far more to Stockton's taste than Larkin; and, in addition to believing the Californians dangerous and unreliable, and entertaining deep resentment on account of the March episode, he doubtless could see that California, reposing contentedly under the American flag, would make a poor background for his violent operations. The outcome was a ridiculous address,[17.17] which ranted at length against Castro, especially for his treatment of Frémont, explained Sloat's action as due to this, declared that Stockton's only object was to protect life and property, and announced that when Castro should be put down and the duties of government be assumed by responsible officials, he would remove the American forces.[17.20]

July 23, with a view to the conquest of the whole province, Frémont's men were taken into the naval service as the California Battalion, with himself as major and Gillespie as captain; and they sailed promptly for San Diego to gain Castro's rear. A few days later Stockton followed in the _Congress_, raised the American flag at Santa Barbara, and anchored at San Pedro, some eighteen miles from Los Angeles. Larkin, still most anxious to bring about a peaceful arrangement, came with him. Believing that war had not been and would not be declared, he urgently recommended through Stearns of Los Angeles that Pico and the legislature meet the dubious emergency, prevent the country from falling a prey to disorder, save the interests of all officials, and ensure lasting prosperity by declaring California independent under American protection; and Castro proposed that Stockton halt at San Pedro with a view to negotiations.[17.20]

Alvarado said later that a satisfactory arrangement could probably have been made, but the Commodore haughtily insisted that Castro should begin by accepting independence and the American flag.[17.18] To do this would have left him nothing to trade upon; and hence, apparently overestimating Stockton's military strength, lacking money, and finding round him no popular enthusiasm or even genuine harmony, he retired hastily on August 10 with a handful of men toward Sonora, leaving behind him a cloud of eloquence;[17.19] and the governor also left the country.[17.20]

[CALIFORNIA IN AMERICAN HANDS]

On their disappearance all military opposition vanished. Larkin with a couple of friends took Los Angeles on the twelfth of August; the Commodore with his marines and sailors, headed by a brass band, and Frémont with a part of his battalion arrived the next day; and on the seventeenth, when positive information that war had begun reached the town, Stockton issued another proclamation. California now belongs to the United States, he announced in effect, and is under military law; all who adhere to the new régime will be protected, but no others may remain in the country. Some of the Californian leaders were arrested and a number surrendered, but all of them were given their liberty on parole. Friends rallied of course to the winning side; the Commodore became attentive and kindly toward the people; and Larkin soon reported that matters were settling down.[17.20]

Stockton realized that under the law of nations and the law of humanity a conqueror had the right and the duty of softening military rule, and felt that pursuing such a course here would tend to confirm the victory. Already, with his assistance, the first schoolhouse and the first newspaper of California had made their appearance; steps were now taken to establish postal facilities; and this very proclamation announced, that officials elected by the people might govern according to the prevailing usages. In September regular municipal elections took place, and good results were obtained.[17.20]

The reign of justice began to dawn. Chaplain Colton, appointed alcalde of Monterey, gave general satisfaction. American officers recovered a large number of horses driven off by the Indians, and astonished the Californians by returning them to their owners. The Commodore, besides adjusting disputes in a manner that gratified the people, made and forwarded to Washington for approval what he called laws; announced that a legislative council would be created, and called himself governor. This office, however, it was not his intention to hold long. The fantastic idea of landing at Acapulco and moving upon the capital had taken possession of his mind. He therefore sent Frémont north to enlist men for him on the Sacramento, proposed to set out for Mexico in October, and promised to inaugurate that officer as governor on leaving California.[17.20]

But he did not leave so promptly. In arranging for the security of the country he divided it into three military districts, appointing Frémont commandant at the north and Gillespie at the south. Gillespie's task was peculiarly important, because news and troops from Mexico would arrive first at Los Angeles, and because that section had the largest percentage of restless people, the smallest percentage of Americans, and the weakest pro-American sentiment. He seems to have been an elegant, precise man with a stiff, pointed beard and a temper of the same description; but at any rate he was a soldier, understood his responsibility, and knew what military government signified.[17.27]

Larkin urged that a respectable command should be given him, but Stockton had neither men nor funds for land service, and only about fifty of the disdainful and intolerant volunteers, perhaps including some of the detested Sonoma "brigands," could be spared for Los Angeles. A garrison of that strength, far from support, was almost an insult and certainly a provocation to the people. Though told by Stockton to temper military law, Gillespie doubtless felt that his only safety lay in maintaining strict order; and if, unfamiliar with Californian character and ways, he extended his discipline too rigidly over the free and easy natives, as he seems to have done, the mistake was but natural. Stockton himself had given the cue, declaring in his proclamation of August 17 that men found in arms outside their houses were to be banished, ordering that all must be at home from ten o'clock at night until sunrise, and indulging in a general tone that has been thought supercilious. Here were causes enough of trouble; and behind them lay an inevitable clash of races, temperaments and customs, unavoidable friction resulting from a forcible change of flags, and a restlessness due to the ambition of would-be leaders.[17.27]

[INSURRECTION]

As the signs of disaffection began to show themselves, Gillespie naturally arrested suspicious persons, and punished those whom he deemed conspirators. This precipitated an outburst. In the night of September 22 some turbulent fellows made an attack on the American quarters. In a military way it was contemptible; but, as such affairs often do, it crystallized popular sentiment. Within a few days about four hundred Californians were in arms; and when the surrender of Lieutenant Wilson with some twenty-five men at the Chino farm to about one hundred and ten insurgents heightened confidence, the movement spread still more. Some of the malcontents were persons of standing, who felt that self-respect called upon them to break a lance against the invader, even though sure to be defeated; but the great majority appear to have been irresponsible characters ready for anything except work. Lieutenant Colonel Flores, the leader, and nearly all of his officers had violated their paroles, of course; but breaking an oath seemed to them a trivial matter, for they knew they could make another equally good on a moment's notice.[17.21] Without fortifications, adequate equipment or supplies, Gillespie could see no hope of resisting such odds, and September 29 he capitulated on favorable terms.[17.22] The next day he proceeded to San Pedro with his men, and they soon embarked there on a merchant ship, the _Vandalia_.[17.27]

About the first of October Stockton, then at San Francisco, learned of the insurrection. By his order Mervine sailed promptly for San Pedro in the _Savannah_, and on October 7 with sailors, marines and Gillespie's command--all on foot--the captain marched for Los Angeles. Stockton, however, had provided him with no artillery, while the Californians were supported by a small field piece. When the Americans charged, this gun was hurried beyond their reach by mounted men with lariats; but as soon as the Americans halted from exhaustion, it was drawn back and set at work. The case appeared hopeless, and after losing about a dozen men, killed or wounded, Mervine found it necessary to retreat. Naturally the Californians felt immensely encouraged, and large numbers gathered on the hills behind San Pedro.[17.27]

Late in October Stockton, after lingering a while at San Francisco to attend a glorification meeting and stopping at Monterey to land ordnance and men for the defence of that point, arrived at San Pedro and undertook to accomplish something; but the attempt proved a failure, and he sailed for San Diego, at that day a small group of adobe houses about four miles northeast of the present city.[17.23] Insurgents were now besieging the place, and neither provisions nor horses could be obtained in the vicinity; but Stockton procured both from lower California, and began to make ready for land operations.[17.27]

By this time Flores had been elected provisional governor and comandante general by the legislature, and martial law had been declared; but the insurgent leader found himself without adequate resources. Foreigners aided him with a little money at an exorbitant rate of interest, but on October 24 he stated that only some forty rounds of cannon ammunition remained, and a thousand for the muskets of his four hundred men. Campaigning without supplies or funds and driving stock to the interior were found extremely irksome by the indolent Californians; a general discouragement prevailed; and the legislature could not obtain a quorum. Soon disaffection showed itself; and being a Mexican, Flores dared not adopt strong measures. Finally, in the night of December 3 he was imprisoned by malcontents; and although the legislature and people soon extinguished the revolt, much confusion grew out of it. Moreover, Stockton's troops outnumbered his; other Americans were gathering in northern California, he knew; and thousands of immigrants were expected at New Helvetia, he was informed.[17.27]

[KEARNEY'S ARRIVAL]

None of these forces, however, gave him the first blow. May 26 Polk had proposed an overland expedition to California, and a week later it was decided upon. Accordingly Kearny was ordered to advance after securing New Mexico, should the season permit; and on September 25, as we have seen, he left Santa Fe for the coast. Soon meeting Stockton's bearer of despatches, he learned that California had been occupied, sent back all but about one hundred of his dragoons, and with these and a pair of mountain howitzers marched on. At the beginning of December he reached Warner's ranch (_Agua Caliente_), the frontier settlement of California, and, having learned of the insurrection, wrote on to Stockton for aid and information. Gillespie was therefore sent forward with a brass 4-pounder and thirty-eight men, met him December 5, and told him among other news that a party of insurgents lay at San Pascual, about eight miles distant on the road to San Diego. Probably the force numbered rather less than one hundred. A capable man, however, Andrés Pico, brother of the ex-governor, commanded them.[17.24]

Kearny sent off a scouting party, which not only saw but was seen, and reported to him at two o'clock the next morning. An attack upon the Californians was highly inadvisable. The Americans and the pack-mules that many of them rode were almost worn out. Some horses recently bought or captured were accustomed to the terrible Mexican bits, and could not be controlled by their new riders. Kearny had had no experience in fighting lancers or California horsemen, and did not know how many were before him. It was clear that the enemy were aware of his presence. The dampness of the night made firearms unreliable, and the men were so chilled they could not use them quickly. Finally, it would not have been difficult to hold the insurgents off with his three cannon, and march safely in a compact body to San Diego, now only about forty miles distant. Kearny decided, however, to attack before daybreak, and advanced.[17.24]

Pico had not desired nor expected a battle; but, perceiving what kind of troops were in his front, he did not flinch. Kearny's advance guard fared very badly, and when his main body came into action, the enemy adopted the familiar ruse of a pretended flight. In pursuing, the Americans became separated according to the speed of their mounts; and then Pico turned furiously upon them. The net result was that Kearny, Gillespie and thirteen other Americans received ugly wounds, and eighteen were killed, while the enemy's loss appears to have been trifling. After ten or fifteen minutes, however, the Californians drew off, expecting guns and large reinforcements, which Flores had promised. As one consequence of the revolt against his authority, these did not arrive. Hence Pico, who had not been prepared for either the fight or the revolt, made no serious efforts to follow up his advantage; and Kearny, though he lost his cattle, had to live on mule meat, and was burdened with his wounded, succeeded, with additional aid sent him by Stockton, in reaching San Diego on December 12.[17.24]

Stockton's preparations to do something were then resumed. Sailors felt strongly averse to shore duty, but he overcame their repugnance. The ships furnished them pikes, carbines and pistols, and shoes were manufactured out of canvas; and so with Kearny's dragoons, Gillespie's detachment, some friendly Californians and about four hundred sailors and marines, drilled somewhat for their new work, the Commodore had a respectable force.[17.25] It was not, however, his intention to attack the main body of the insurgents, for he felt afraid the enemy would then get behind him. His plan was to move up the coast and make a diversion, expecting Frémont and his riflemen to take the bull by the horns; but Kearny urged him to march for Los Angeles, about one hundred and forty miles distant, and at length on December 29, after having brushed away the Californians operating against San Diego, he set out, greatly embarrassed by having to drag miserable ox-carts through the deep sand. Kearny declined the chief command, but finally asked for and was given the post of lieutenant or executive officer under Stockton.[17.27]

Flores now found himself in a desperate situation. Naturally officers who knew they had violated their paroles dreaded to give up; but most of his troops felt half-hearted, people hid to avoid serving, and some of the Indians were in arms against him. In order to gain time for a blow at Frémont, he tried to inveigle Stockton into a truce, holding out as a reason that Mexico and the United States had probably adjusted their differences; but the Commodore refused to treat with an officer guilty of breaking his parole. Then, having some four hundred and fifty badly armed men, though not enough powder for a long fight, he set an ambuscade where he supposed the Americans would pass; but Stockton avoided it by turning to the right, and made for the Bartolo ford of the San Gabriel River, twelve miles from Los Angeles, where the stream was only knee-deep. The Californians followed suit, and occupied an eminence fifty feet high, parallel to the stream and about six hundred yards beyond it.[17.27]

As the Americans crossed--the first of them deploying and waiting behind the bank, here breast-high and masked with trees--Flores greeted them from the top of the hill with four small guns; but his inferior powder and sometimes ill-fitting balls proved ineffective.[17.26] When the Americans were mostly across the river and formed in a square, he undertook to charge. But the movement seems to have been rather faint-hearted or badly managed; his left was demoralized by hearing one of the aides--who seems to have been seized with a panic--shout "Halt!" as it was advancing; and his right accomplished nothing. Stockton then cannonaded the hill, particularly with his two 9-pounders, for about forty minutes, while most of his troops lay down; and finally he charged. Crying "New Orleans!" in memory of Jackson's great victory, gained on the same day of the year, January 8, the men rushed on, and easily took possession of the ground. The Californians made a fruitless attack on their rear, and then most of them dispersed.[17.27]

[STOCKTON MOVES AGAINST LOS ANGELES]

The next morning Stockton, leaving the road in order to avoid the danger of ambuscades, pushed slowly on toward Los Angeles; and after a time some three hundred Californians, whom Flores had managed to rally, placed themselves upon his line of march. An ineffective cannonade from a ravine used up the rest of their ammunition, while the Americans replied with equally meagre results. As a last effort, Flores now ordered a charge, giving the signal for it--as he himself reported--by sending forward a white flag.[17.27]

The attack was made with considerable spirit but no success at all on both of the American flanks, and then Flores took post at a point on the road to Mexico, where Pasadena now stands. He admitted losing only five killed and twenty-two wounded during the two days, but probably these figures needed to be multiplied by three; while Stockton lost one killed and fourteen wounded. That night the Americans encamped near Los Angeles; and the next day, January 10, after a deputation had come to arrange matters, they took possession of the town--annoyed a little by drunken bullies--and replaced Gillespie's flag on the government house. Most of the California troops now scattered, and those who remained were insubordinate. Flores could see there was no hope; and the following night, leaving to Andrés Pico the chief command and probably about one hundred men, he set out hastily with a few others for Sonora.[17.27]

[FRÉMONT'S OPERATIONS]

Up to this time nothing had been heard of Frémont's operations during almost three months. Probably that officer did not wish to take part in the hostilities. Expecting to be governor and seeing before him a prospect of brilliant opportunities, he desired to conciliate the people. Stockton, on learning of the revolt in the south, had ordered him back from the Sacramento, and about October 12 he sailed for Santa Barbara with instructions to march from that place to Los Angeles. Learning on the way, however, that Mervine had been defeated, and that all the horses and cattle had been driven away from Santa Barbara by insurgents, he returned on his own responsibility to the Sacramento, and began to collect not only horses but men.[17.28] By the end of November he found at his back about four hundred mounted riflemen and at least three guns, the strongest force in California.[17.32]

The _Savannah_ had been sent north expressly to assist him;[17.29] but, with little reference to his army commission or his naval obligations, he now proceeded slowly by land to San Luis Obispo, where he fortunately captured Jesús Pico, a cousin of Andrés; and after his prisoner had been sentenced to death for breaking parole, he assumed the authority of pardoning him. Then, for no discoverable reason unless to spare about sixty insurgents, whom he could have scattered in ten minutes, he led his command through the mountains, where it suffered terribly in the stormy weather. At Santa Barbara he took a week for repose; and finally, with a nicety of calculation or felicity of luck that excites wonder, he arrived near the scene of action--three months after receiving orders to go there--precisely as the Americans were entering Los Angeles.[17.30] Then with his devotee, Jesús Pico, he betook himself to the camp of Andrés, and finally, although he knew that American forces had beaten the Californians and entered Los Angeles, and understood that a superior officer was near, he arranged with the insurgents a capitulation, which Stockton had refused to grant.[17.32]

This capitulation, the "treaty" of Cahuenga, conceded substantially all the insurgents could have asked. They promised to give up the public arms, go home, obey the laws of the United States, and help restore tranquillity; but on the other hand they and the rest of the Californians were to be protected in person and property, to enjoy the same rights as Americans, to be excused from serving under arms or taking an oath of allegiance during the war, and to leave the country freely should they wish to do so.[17.31] Naturally such a settlement was displeasing to Stockton, but he felt extremely anxious to resume his proper work as a naval officer, and of course was glad to have this difficult business off his hands; so after hesitating for a time he confirmed the pact.[17.32]

It was a singular dénouement. Men defeated, without a hope left, and in danger of execution for breaking parole, virtually dictated terms to the conquerors. A brevet captain, just blossoming into a lieutenant colonel, eclipsed a commodore and a brigadier general; and the arch-ruffian of the Bear cult reappeared as a fairy godmother to save and bless the Californians, who detested him. But the ending was after all a happy one. The Americans felt a new respect for the people, and they were able to see that, although destitute of gunpowder, the insurgents, if driven to extremities, could have done much harm with lance, dagger and torch, and could have sown the seeds of perennial hate.[17.32]

On the other hand, while the Californians felt well pleased with their own audacity and valor, they not only realized that it was impossible to fight the United States, but were thoroughly disgusted with Flores, who took away hundreds of horses and mules belonging to his friends, and with Mexico, which in three and a half months had sent neither a man nor a peso to encourage and sustain them. Indeed, as their agent in Mexico frankly said, their political attitude had completely changed. Most of them intended to abide by the terms. They were disposed to look forward instead of back. And the curtain was already beginning to rise on the Golden West that we know.[17.32]

XVIII

THE GENESIS OF TWO CAMPAIGNS

July, 1846-February, 1847

The operations described in the preceding chapters were all favorable to American arms, and they placed under our control a very large portion of the territory belonging to Mexico; but as they proceeded, it became evident that she had no thought of consenting to negotiate. Indeed Santa Anna's course and the utterances of the press were unflinchingly warlike; and our consul at Mexico wrote, "Nothing but some very severe blow will ever bring them to their senses." The policy and expectations of the American government were therefore palpably wrong. The programme of a short and a brisk war was a mistake and a failure. The nation found itself in a contest of unforeseen duration and extent.[18.4]

Heedless enthusiasm was consequently sobered, if not exactly chilled. By the end of September, 1846, Pakenham, the British minister at Washington, reported that a growing distaste for the war could be seen more clearly each day. Large expenses had to be faced, and heavy losses of men seemed inevitable. Many believed that neither troops nor money enough could be raised; many, besides deploring the loss of precious lives, complained that needed laborers had already been drawn away; and many others asked themselves whether the outlay would be really worth while. Taylor's famous letter to Gaines expressed the opinion that even complete success would be of no advantage; and his idea of simply fixing and holding a boundary north of which there would be enough territory to pay all fair claims for indemnity, and throwing upon Mexico the responsibility for offensive operations naturally appealed to not a few. Moreover, he argued, no other sort of a peace could be made, since the enemy had no government sufficiently stable to treat with. Calhoun took up eagerly the defensive idea. Buchanan favored it; and Polk himself, dreading to alarm the country by demanding great numbers of men and fearful that the credit of the nation would not bear the strain of active warfare, did the same.[18.4]

On the other hand such a plan was clearly unsuited to the enterprising temper of the American people, and precisely what the Mexicans, whose ancestors had fought the Moors of Spain for hundreds of years, desired. It reminded one of the menaces and forays that had been the policy of Mexico against the Texans. It would have been received by her as a cheering confession, on our part, of military impotence. Had it been adopted, her people would have found a chain of profitable markets established for them; and at any time she could have dashed either with regular or with irregular troops upon any part of our line, done what harm she could, and retired like a wave on the beach, to prepare fresh assaults in a perpetual series. Only one campaign of the sort now proposed was on record, said Cass--that of Sisyphus. Besides, every mile of the boundary would have required its guard; even at that a broad space along the frontier would have become practically uninhabitable; expenses approaching those of offensive operations would have mounted up; we could have laid no contributions upon the enemy; national honor would have been tarnished and national spirit exasperated by a succession of small defeats; and no progress whatever toward conquering a peace would have been made.[18.4]

Politically and commercially the unfavorable condition of things which the United States had been so anxious to end, would have become chronic. European nations would soon have gained a monopoly of trade and influence in Mexico; they would have protested against an endless blockade; and what further steps they would have taken in regard to a vexatious and apparently aimless contest it was easy to imagine. Furthermore, simply to seize and hold, with no legal title, provinces which Mexico had not been able to protect against the Indians would have seemed to place the United States in the class of mere pilferers. Honor--at least military honor--demanded that we should meet the enemy, whom we had challenged, at the centre of their pride and power. Finally, the weakness exhibited in "backing out" of a war with Mexico, begun without a question of triumph, would have excited ridicule abroad, and compromised our international position. Confronted with such objections to the defensive plan, Polk was "extremely distressed," said Pakenham. Evidently some decisive achievement was needed to save the administration, the party and the country; but he dared not face the cost nor incur the risk of a still more signal failure.[18.4]

[BOLDER IDEAS]

There was, however, no lack of bolder ideas. Not only did every newspaper come forward with a "cut and dried" plan, as Marcy rather bitterly said, but the government itself knew what needed to be done. In fact mere animal instinct was enough to suggest that a blow should be struck at the enemy's heart, and as the project of maintaining a line of operations from the Rio Grande to the capital--more than 800 miles--was out of the question, the idea of attacking Mexico City by the way of Vera Cruz came forward early. On July 4, 1846, Benton formally suggested landing beyond the range of Ulúa, the island fortress which guarded that port, attacking the town in the rear, and after its fall advancing to the capital. Santa Anna advised through Mackenzie almost exactly that method of approach, adding that three or four thousand men could easily capture the port; and at nearly the same time a letter from Taylor, arguing that a lunge from the Rio Grande base would be unwise, reinforced this project;[18.1] but there was no certainty that an army could be placed in the rear of Vera Cruz, and a number of other difficulties had to be considered.[18.4]

In 1838 a French squadron had been unable in six hours to injure Ulúa seriously, though it had been permitted to choose its positions unmolested. Such an advantage could not be expected now, and besides, as Conner reported, the number of guns in the fortress had been increased fourfold. The parapet of the main work had an elevation of forty feet above the water; three 10-inch guns throwing shells were twenty feet higher, and there were outworks--connected with the principal fort only by drawbridges--commanded so thoroughly by the gun and musketry fire of the garrison that it would be fatal to enter them, reported the Commodore.[18.2] In short, said that prudent officer, Ulúa could certainly, if well garrisoned, resist successfully any naval force brought against it; while in the opinion of Pakenham, formerly the British minister to Mexico, a combined army and naval attack on Ulùa and Vera Cruz would be "a very hazardous undertaking," and, in consequence of "the deadly nature of that Climate to foreign constitutions, success would probably prove in the end as disastrous as failure." Moreover, Conner pointed out, Vera Cruz would be of value solely as a dépôt, and from that point of view he considered Tampico preferable. Consequently, although at the end of August Polk brought up the subject of attacking Mexico City by way of Vera Cruz, nothing was done about it save to ask the Commodore for additional information.[18.4]

Not long before October 10, however, it was ascertained beyond a doubt that Vera Cruz could be approached in the rear by a landing force, and beginning immediately Polk and his advisers, aided by Dimond, recently our consul at that city, and by other experts, labored on the question of future operations for nearly two weeks. The result was, first, a decision that since a farther advance in the north would be hazardous and would accomplish nothing towards bringing about peace, Monterey and its vicinity should be the limit of serious operations in that quarter. Such was the deliberate and unanimous conclusion of the President and his official family after long discussions. Instructions to General Taylor were then carefully drafted, studied, amended and agreed upon. To make sure that he should understand their significance, Major McLane, son of the minister to England and a graduate from West Point, was taken into the full confidence of the Executive regarding this matter, and was then despatched to Monterey with the letter of October 22, which, as well as the explanations of the envoy, Taylor interpreted, we have already learned, according to his own ideas. So much for the first point.[18.4]

The second was a decision to attack Vera Cruz. This did not mean, however, a decision to proceed against the capital. Though Scott argued, as Conner had, that gaining possession of the city and then reducing or starving out Ulúa would practically be sterile triumphs, unless the army should go farther, it was intended at this time to do no more in that quarter, and three or four thousand men were thought sufficient for the undertaking.[18.4]

[A NEW PLAN OF CAMPAIGN]

November 7, however, Benton made an evening call at the White House, drew the President's attention to the unfavorable results of the Congressional elections, declared that a bold stroke must be delivered upon the Mexicans at once, and urged that after capturing Vera Cruz and Ulúa the army should execute "a rapid crushing movement" against the capital. Two days later he repeated the lesson, and on the tenth he amplified it. Polk began to realize now that while it might be dangerous to call for men and funds, it was even more dangerous not to do so.[18.4]

Benton kept on calling, and finally he submitted a written plan. Scott presented a memorial of the same tenor. Taylor wrote that in order to strike a decisive blow troops must land at Vera Cruz or near that point; and Conner reported that a descent could be made under cover of the fleet, batteries could be planted on sand-hills behind the city, and Ulúa, if not Vera Cruz also, could probably be reduced by starvation. As early as November 14 Polk decided to call out 6750 men--that is to say, nine volunteer regiments--for the duration of the war, and to capture Vera Cruz immediately.[18.3] Yet even this involved no determination to strike at the capital. Polk was distinctly in favor of so doing, should that course be necessary to obtain peace; but Buchanan strongly opposed it, insisting upon the cost of such an expedition, the chances of failure, and the danger that by leading to a national, racial and religious conflict it would militate against a settlement; Marcy had no faith in the project; others of the Cabinet agreed with him; and hence this question remained open, to be answered by circumstances.[18.4]

The next problem was the choice of a commander. In October Patterson, a good Democrat, had been selected; but it had been found that, as he was not a native American, he could not be developed into a Presidential candidate, that his experience had not been adequate, that his appointment would involve the retiring of both Taylor and Scott, and that, as Buchanan learned at this time from Slidell, he did not possess the confidence of the army. Butler, another Democrat, was Polk's next choice, but he clearly held no titles to the position.[18.9]

Taylor had to be considered then; but he was regarded by the Executive and his advisers as professionally unequal to the task and personally unfitted for it, and both of these opinions were fully warranted. While events had proved him a born leader of men and a splendid fighter, they had also demonstrated plainly his lack of generalship and executive efficiency. He distrusted, loathed and misconstrued the administration, failed to supply it with plans and information, endeavored to throw upon it the responsibility for mistakes of his own, lectured it harshly for misdeeds it had not committed, and frustrated the cardinal intent of its policy and orders by failing to press the campaign with all possible vigor during the summer and autumn.[18.5] "I have not the slightest respect," he wrote, for any member of the Cabinet except the secretary of the navy. "Evil men bear sway," was another of his remarks.[18.9]

Indeed, the General's natural kindliness and sober judgment seem to have become largely perverted by this time. He knew that for several months friends of his had been at work to gain for him the political place long occupied by Scott, and to use him as a battering ram against the party in power;[18.6] and it was easy to assume that he would be repaid in kind. Stories of intrigues and machinations, doubtless exaggerated in his mind through inexperience and remoteness from the scene, must have been a constant subject of thought, and he seems to have fallen gradually into an abnormal state of sensitiveness and suspicion.[18.9]

His private correspondence contained the harshest opinions regarding nearly all of the chief men thus far prominent in the war. Of Commodore Perry he entertained "a contemptable opinion." Shields, who was a good man and officer as men and officers went, he described as "without one particle of principle to restrain him, save the laws of his country and ready to minister body and soul to the vilest passions of a vile administration." Quitman, who deserved high respect, appeared to him unreliable, of mediocre ability and "afflicted with unbounded vanity." The quartermaster general, he said, was partially deranged. Of Scott he had written in August, "He means well on all occasions," but now he was able to view his superior officer as a military "humbug" and low politician, eager to advance himself and ruin others by the most nefarious arts; and he could no longer see, what the administration fully recognized, that it was essentially for its advantage to have the generals win victories. So far as the government was concerned, Taylor had some grounds for apprehension, perhaps. In all probability it entertained by this time unfriendly feelings toward him. The veteran F. P. Blair had warned Marcy distinctly that, as even the novice could see, a Democratic administration was waging war to make a Whig President, and under our system it was legitimate as well as natural to look for an avenue of escape. Scott, however, seems to have been his friend, privately exerting a strong influence in his favor on several occasions; and while the lawful rights of superior rank were made use of by the commander-in-chief, the same thing was done by Taylor himself with far less considerateness.[18.9]

Finally Taylor had a particular moral disability, for he did not believe in the Vera Cruz expedition actually contemplated. The season of yellow fever--in his opinion a worse enemy than 100,000 Mexican bayonets--was now too near, he wrote, and an army besieging that port would be swept away by the pestilence.[18.7] He lacked, therefore, some of the most necessary qualifications, and was not in a state of mind to work harmoniously and effectively with the administration, the commander-in-chief or his own principal subordinates in the exceedingly difficult and delicate situations which the proposed expedition was liable to create.[18.9]

[A COMMANDER SELECTED]

Gaines being out of the question, there was but one man left, and he moreover, as an officer of experience and the head of the army, possessed exceptional claims to the appointment. Scott seems to have accepted his professional and political reverses of May very quietly, illustrating that fine aphorism of King Stanislaus, "A man greater than his misfortunes shows that he does not deserve them." Friends fell away rapidly, yet he kept up his courage. To one of them indeed he wrote, "Perhaps you might do well to imitate the example of that heathen who touched his hat to the fallen statue of Jupiter--saying, 'Who knows but he may be replaced upon his pedestal?'" and about the middle of September, having learned through several channels that his presence in Mexico had been desired by Taylor, to whom he generously referred as "that gallant and distinguished commander," he reminded the government that he was ready still to serve at the front.[18.8] This merely brought him another curt rebuff; but when the Vera Cruz expedition became a practical question he took part in the discussion without pique, and he suggested incidentally that he, as the highest officer in the service, was the proper individual to divide the troops between the two fields of activity, and to command personally in the more important one.[18.9]

Taylor having pronounced it Scott's duty after the battles of May to assume the leadership in the field, could not logically object now to his acting according to his rank; but, though time had vindicated Scott's military policy and he now was viewed--Marcy admitted--as politically harmless, Polk still deemed him scientific and visionary, and still resented his allusion to fire from the rear. Long discussions were held, but Marcy felt satisfied that Scott was the only fit commander in sight. By rather cunning management he brought Senator Benton to that opinion; others of the Cabinet reached the same conclusion; and finally the President admitted with "reluctance" that such was "the only alternative." Very likely, too, as many believed, Polk saw a chance to play one Whig leader against the other. Anyhow, after demanding "Scott's confidence," which--in view of the intention to grant his dearest wish--Scott easily gave, he appointed him on the eighteenth of November to command the expedition. An apparently heartfelt and complete reconciliation followed. Scott almost shed tears of emotion, recorded the President; and he received assurances in turn that his confidence would be reciprocated, and that bygones were to be considered bygones. A new David and a new Jonathan seemed to have discovered each other.[18.9]

[SCOTT'S VIEWS]

Scott believed that Ulúa, if properly garrisoned, could not be taken with naval batteries, or even with naval batteries and an escalade, except at a disproportionate sacrifice of life, and a loss of time that might subject the troops to the yellow fever, quadruple the waste of men, and ruin the campaign. He therefore planned to make a landing near Vera Cruz, capture the town, reduce the fortress--unless, as appeared quite probable, it could soon be starved out--by naval operations and land attacks based upon the city, and then escape the pestilence by advancing promptly toward the capital. In his opinion the Mexicans were likely to have 20-30,000 troops on the ground, and therefore he thought 15,000 men desirable. Relying necessarily on the figures of the adjutant general, he reckoned (November 16) that 7000 regulars and 13,500 volunteers were, or soon would be, under Taylor's command, making with the new volunteers and recruits for the regular army over 27,000,[18.10] and he therefore proposed (November 21) to take about 5000 of these regulars, 6000 of the volunteers, and the first 4000 of the new regiments. But he deemed 10,000--to be increased later to double that number--an adequate minimum, and he felt willing, for the sake of gaining time, to launch the campaign with the first 8000 soldiers that could be set afloat off Brazos Island. Anticipating a stubborn resistance at the point of disembarkation, he desired to have 140 surf-boats in order to land 5000 men and eight guns at once, and he made ample requisitions for transports, ordnance and ordnance stores.[18.11] As for Taylor, the General proposed that he should retain forces enough to defend Monterey and his communications,[18.12] and stand for a time on the defensive.[18.16]

Scott of course desired official instructions of this tenor, and even drafted them, but Marcy only wrote as follows (November 23): You have been ordered by the President himself to go to Mexico, take command there, and set on foot a Gulf expedition, "if on arriving at the theatre of action you shall deem it to be practicable. It is not proposed to control your operations by definite and positive instructions, but you are left to prosecute them as your judgment, under a full view of all the circumstances, shall dictate. The work is before you, and the means provided, or to be provided, for accomplishing it, are committed to you, in the full confidence that you will use them to the best advantage. The objects which it is desirable to obtain have been indicated, and it is hoped that you will have the requisite force to accomplish them. Of this you must be the judge when the preparations are made, and the time for action has arrived."[18.16]

Marcy seldom laughed, but occasionally he shook like a bowlful of jelly, and as he signed this letter he must have shaken prodigiously. Assuming no responsibility, making no promises, the government simply unloaded the whole burden of the expedition upon Scott.[18.13] Should he succeed, a Democratic administration would reap a great profit; should he fail, a Whig general would have to bear a great reproach. In order to obtain the essential troops it would be necessary for him to incur the odium of taking many of them from Taylor, who in Polk's opinion was not willing to give them up; and thus not only would Taylor's rising star become clouded, but a bitter quarrel between these two Whig leaders and their friends would almost certainly be precipitated. Besides, Taylor might throw up his command in a fit of temper, and relegate himself to obscurity. No wonder the President felt remarkably in spirits just after this.[18.16]

[TAYLOR'S WINTER OPERATIONS]

Scott, however, was determined to forestall the danger of a quarrel. Immediately on suggesting to the government that as head of the army he was the proper individual to command the Vera Cruz expedition, he notified Taylor of this action, and only two days after receiving his appointment he drafted a letter informing that officer about the matter; but the President, regarding absolute secrecy as a prime requisite, would not permit him to mention it.[18.14] A few days later (November 25) he wrote from New York to this effect: I am going to Mexico and shall conduct operations in a new field; where that is to be I cannot safely state, but with the aid of advices received from Washington you can imagine; new forces have been called out, yet--as the season of yellow fever is at hand--I shall have to take most of your troops; your victories, however, have placed you on such an eminence that you can afford to act on the defensive for a time, and before spring I think you will be able to resume active operations; I desire to consult with you, and plan to be at Camargo for that purpose about the twenty-third of December.[18.15] The letter was confidential and cordial; and having now done what he could to conjure the tempest, as well as to prepare for his work, the General sailed from New York the last day of November. The voyage to New Orleans, hindered by the weather, took nearly three weeks. He made a brief and busy stay in that city, and two days after Christmas he reached Brazos Island.[18.16]

Certain steps tending to facilitate his enterprise had now been taken by General Taylor. December 10 the temporary Field Division organized at Camargo was broken up--the Georgia, Mississippi and First Tennessee regiments reporting to Quitman, and the Ohio and Kentucky regiments to Butler; the First Division (regulars) under Twiggs was reorganized;[18.17] on December 13 and 14, a day apart, this division and Quitman's brigade set out for Victoria, nearly 200 miles distant; and on the fifteenth Taylor himself, leaving Butler behind to command at Monterey, followed them.[18.23]

It was not pleasant marching, for a long drought had burned everything up, the sun blazed with intense heat, and the road, when not covered with small, sharp stones, was ankle-deep in light dust; but the inspiring Saddle Mountain seemed to keep company with the troops all day, Cerralvo Mountain hung like a dark shadow on the left, the cool blue line of the Sierra Madre extended on the right farther than the eye could see, and the town first reached--Cadereita, about twenty-five miles from Monterey--burying its white houses in orange groves, looking out over gardens, and looking down from a low bluff into the clear waters of the Topo Grande, was delightful. December 17 the infantry arrived at Montemorelos, a small town at the foot of the sierra, planted beside a swift, cool stream, full of trout, that watered a beautiful valley, and suggesting at a distance under the blue sky--wrote a surgeon--a pearl set in an azure stone. Here the command absorbed the Second Infantry and the Second Tennessee; and it now amounted to some 3500 men, of whom rather more than a third were regulars.[18.23]

But Santa Anna was not asleep. Learning of Taylor's proposed march and believing that Wool had left Parras for Chihuahua, he determined to advance about December 24, strike at Saltillo and Monterey in person with 9000 picked infantry, 4000 cavalry and twelve guns, despatch troops from Tula against the Americans at Victoria, and finally close in upon Taylor with his own forces; and a large part of these troops actually set out. Worth got wind of danger, however, on December 16; in accordance with instructions previously given he called for help;[18.18] and in the evening of the next day four grimy troopers burst upon Taylor at Montemorelos with the startling intelligence, that Santa Anna would attack Worth in three days. Ordering Quitman to proceed, Taylor therefore set out on December 18 with his regulars for Saltillo. Butler, calling a regiment from Camargo to Monterey, reached the front with his own forces on December 19, and Wool arrived there two days later. Santa Anna, discovering Wool's march by December 24, countermanded his orders; and Taylor, learning on December 20 while between Monterey and Saltillo, of Wool's advance and the non-appearance of the Mexicans, and concluding there was no danger, turned back.[18.23]

On the twenty-third he again left Monterey, and the next day he received Scott's New York letter.[18.19] His presence with the forces was not at all requisite. No serious fight was in prospect, for Quitman had reported nothing of the sort. There was at least one topographical engineer in the command, who could make better notes of the country than he.[18.20] Probably his military engineers also, among whom figured Robert E. Lee, afterwards the famous Confederate leader, were there; and as for disposing of the troops, General Scott's letter gave him reason to believe, that a superior officer was now on the ground with new plans. His obvious duty was therefore to report at Camargo, the place mentioned by Scott, or at least await instructions at Monterey. But the stout old gentleman in the loose olive-brown frock-coat, wool socks and Mexican sombrero had a temper and several ideas of his own. Probably he did not wish to arrange matters amicably; and he kept straight on for ten days, plunging farther and farther toward the remotest portion of his field, inaccessible from any and every point where Scott might by any reasonable possibility chance to be. Indeed, Scott's letter was not answered for two days, and eight more passed before the answer, which stated that General Taylor was going to Victoria, reached Camargo.[18.23]

[TAYLOR'S MARCH TO VICTORIA]

Beyond Montemorelos a great deal of the country was rough, and it was intersected with chilly streams, waist-deep, that cut like a knife as the hot soldiers plunged in; but an incessant variety of novel scenes kept up their spirits. Groves of ebony sheltered bears and wolves. Wild turkeys and wild hogs abounded; and almost every evening ten or twelve deer were brought in. Here flourished pecans, live-oaks and immense trees of lignum vitæ; there an endless procession of ants wound along their smoothly worn trail; yonder towered a mountain of gleaming porphyry set off with dark green foliage, and at all times fleecy clouds could be seen drifting languidly across the slopes of the curiously wrought sierra. Finally the troops entered the rich valley of Linares. On the one hand lay wide cornfields or perhaps a thousand acres of sugarcane in a single, well-irrigated lot; on the other apple and peach orchards, orange and lemon groves with tempting gleams amidst their dark leaves, and half a mile or so of fig-trees. Then came the gardens and flat houses of the town itself, a dull place, with some smiling and some tearful eyes looking out from the grated windows.[18.23]

Then forward again marched the troops, passing out of the valley into wild country full of chaparral and mesquite, where sometimes wolves trotted along the road ahead of them like dogs. The need of water determined the length of the daily march; but usually there was enough of it, shaded sometimes by noble cypresses dripping with Spanish moss. Once a real norther set in, and the troops choked for twenty miles in a driving cloud of dust;[18.21] but through it they caught glimpses of a high cliff that looked like an immense pink and yellow dome, and another cheering bit of color now and then was Señor Don So-and-so, the alcalde, dressed in white and a red sash, with silver coins all over his clothing, saddle and bridle. Usually the weather held fair, and a blanket supported by four stakes answered the purpose of a tent well enough.[18.23]

But the faces of the people grew dark occasionally, and once they muttered something like "_Fandango poco tiempo_," which signified, "You'll be fighting pretty soon." Then the soldiers cheered till they were hoarse. Fatigue and supper were forgotten. "Turn out, turn out!" was the cry. The column formed, and dashed down the hill at a double quick; but for enemy it found only the trim white cottage of a Frenchman, planted beside a rippling stream amid laden orange trees gilded by the setting sun. There had been rumors of Mexican cavalry ahead, but no cavalry could be seen;[18.22] and as for irregulars, both funds and arms were lacking, and the close wall of prickly pear five or ten feet high, which ran on each side of the road almost without a break for nearly two hundred miles, would have kept them off as it did the breeze. And so on January 4 Taylor and the regulars entered Victoria, a small, neat city at the foot of wooded mountains, which Quitman had occupied with some formality six days before. "Victoria is taken. It was a bloodless victory. But where is Victoria?" said the New York _Herald_.[18.23]

[PATTERSON'S MARCH TO VICTORIA]

Indeed, Victoria was very much taken.[18.24] October 13, when ordering Taylor to cut short the armistice, Marcy notified Patterson of this order, and again directed him to occupy southern Tamaulipas as soon as he could--before December 6 if possible; but Patterson was not able to set out until General Taylor gave him definite instructions, on the twenty-eighth of November, to march with the two Illinois regiments and the regiment of Tennessee horse, about 1500 men, for Victoria. Further delays occurred because transportation was not promptly furnished him, and because vessels conveying supplies were lost; and although a detachment advanced some fifteen miles about the middle of December, the movement from the point then reached did not begin until one day before Christmas.[18.26]