Chapter X: Preface (8)

Egoism and its problem! The Christian gloominess of La Rochefoucauld, who saw egoism in everything, and imagined that he had therefore _reduced_ the worth of things and virtues! In opposition to him, I first of all tried to show that nothing else _could_ exist save egoism,--that in those men whose _ego_ is weak and thin, the power to love also grows weak,--that the greatest lovers are such owing to the strength of their _ego,_--that love is an expression of egoism, etc. As a matter of fact, the false valuation aims at the interest of those who find it useful, whom it helps--in fact, the herd; it fosters a pessimistic mistrust towards the basis of Life; it would fain undermine the most glorious and most well-constituted men (out of fear); it would assist the lowly to have the upper hand of their conquerors; it is the cause of universal dishonesty, especially in the most useful type of men.

363.

Man is an indifferent egoist: even the cleverest regards his habits as more important than his advantage.

364.

Egoism! But no one has yet asked: _what_ is the _ego_ like? Everybody is rather inclined to see all _egos_ alike. This is the result of the slave theory, of _universal suffrage,_ and of "equality."

365.

The behaviour of a higher man is the result of a very complex set of motives: any word such as "pity" _betrays_ nothing of this complexity. The most important factor is the feeling, "who am I? who is the other relative to me?"--Thus the valuing spirit is continually active.

366.

To think that the history of all moral phenomena may be simplified, as Schopenhauer thought,--that is to say, that _pity_ is to be found at the root of every moral impulse that has ever existed hitherto,--is to be guilty of a degree of nonsense and ingenuousness worthy only of a thinker who is devoid of all historical instincts and who has miraculously succeeded in evading the strong schooling in history which the Germans, from Herder to Hegel, have undergone.

367.

_My "pity."_--This is a feeling for which I can find no adequate term: I feel it when I am in the presence of any waste of precious capabilities, as, for instance, when I contemplate Luther: what power and what tasteless problems fit for back-woodsmen! (At a time when the brave and light-hearted scepticism of a Montaigne was already possible in France!) Or when I see some one standing below where he might have stood, thanks to the development of a set of perfectly senseless accidents. Or even when, with the thought of man's destiny in my mind, I contemplate with horror and contempt the whole system of modern European politics, which is creating the circumstances and weaving the fabric of the _whole_ future of mankind. Yes, to what could not "mankind" attain, if----! This is my "pity"; despite the fact that no sufferer yet exists with whom I sympathise in this way.

368.

Pity is a waste of feeling, a moral parasite which is injurious to the health, "it cannot possibly be our duty to increase the evil in the world." If one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self and not one's neighbour that one is succouring. Pity does not depend upon maxims, but upon emotions. The suffering we see infects us; pity is an infection.

369.

There is no such thing as egoism which keeps within its bounds and does not exceed them--consequently, the "allowable," the "morally indifferent" egoism of which some people speak, does not exist at all.

"One is continually promoting the interests of one's '_ego_' at the cost of other people "; "Living consists in living at the cost of others"--he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step towards truth to himself.

370.

The "subject" is a piece of fiction: the _ego_ of which every one speaks when he blames egoism, does not exist at all.

371.

Our "ego"--which is _not_ one with the unitary controlling force of our beings!--is really only an imagined synthesis; therefore there can _be_ no "_egoistic_" _actions_.

372.

Since all instincts are unintelligent, utility cannot represent a standpoint as far as they are concerned. Every instinct, when it is active, sacrifices strength and other instincts into the bargain: in the end it is stemmed, otherwise it would be the end of everything owing to the waste it would bring about. Thus: that which is "unegoistic," self-sacrificing, and imprudent is nothing in particular --it is common to all the instincts; they do not consider the welfare of the whole _ego_ (_because they simply do not think!_), they act counter to our interests, against the _ego_: and often _for_ the _ego--_innocent in both cases!

373.

_The origin of moral values._--Selfishness has as much value as the physiological value of him who possesses it. Each individual represents the whole course of Evolution, and he is not, as morals teach, something that begins at his birth. If he represent the _ascent_ of the line of mankind, his value is, in fact, very great; and the concern about his maintenance and the promoting of his growth may even be extreme. (It is the concern about the promise of the future in him which gives the well-constituted individual such an extraordinary right to egoism.) If he represent _descending_ development, decay, chronic sickening, he has little worth: and the greatest fairness would have him take as little room, strength, and sunshine as possible from the well-constituted. In this case society's duty is to _suppress egoism_ (for the latter may sometimes manifest itself in an absurd, morbid, and seditious manner): whether it be a question of the decline and pining away of single individuals or of whole classes of mankind. A morality and a religion of "love," the _curbing_ of the self-affirming spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, resignation, helpfulness, and co-operation in word and deed may be of the highest value within the confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers: for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and of envy,--feelings which are only too natural in the bungled and the botched,--and it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of obedience, of slave-life, of being ruled, of poverty, of illness, and of lowliness. This explains why the ruling classes (or races) and individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness, the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the Cross."

The preponderance of an altruistic way of valuing is the result of a consciousness of the fact that one is botched and bungled. Upon examination, this point of view turns out to be: "I am not worth much," simply a psychological valuation; more plainly still: it is the feeling of impotence, of the lack of the great self-asserting impulses of power (in muscles, nerves, and ganglia). This valuation gets translated, according to the particular culture of these classes, into a moral or religious principle (the pre-eminence of religious or moral precepts is always a sign of low culture): it tries to justify itself in spheres whence, as far as it is concerned, the notion "value" hails. The interpretation by means of which the Christian sinner tries to understand himself, is an attempt at justifying his lack of power and of self-confidence: he prefers to feel himself a sinner rather than feel bad for nothing: it is in itself a symptom of decay when interpretations of this sort are used at all. In some cases the bungled and the botched do not look for the reason of their unfortunate condition in their own guilt (as the Christian does), but in society: when, however, the Socialist, the Anarchist, and the Nihilist are conscious that their existence is something for which some one must be _guilty,_ they are very closely related to the Christian, who also believes that he can more easily endure his ill ease and his wretched constitution when he has found some one whom he can hold _responsible_ for it. The instinct of _revenge_ and _resentment_ appears in both cases here as a means of enduring life, as a self-preservative measure, as is also the favour shown to _altruistic_ theory and practice. The _hatred of egoism,_ whether it be one's own (as in the case of the Christian), or another's (as in the case of the Socialists), thus appears as a valuation reached under the predominance of revenge; and also as an act of prudence on the part of the preservative instinct of the suffering, in the form of an increase in their feelings of co-operation and unity.... At bottom, as I have already suggested, the discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging, rejecting, and punishing egoism (one's own or that of others) is still a self-preservative measure on the part of the bungled and the botched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of egoism, which regularly appears under certain definite physiological circumstances.

When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for "justice," "rights," "equal rights," it only shows that he is oppressed by his inadequate culture, and is unable to understand why he suffers: he also finds pleasure in crying;--if he were more at ease he would take jolly good care not to cry in that way: in that case he would seek his pleasure elsewhere. The same holds good of the Christian: he curses, condemns, and slanders the "world"--and does not even except himself. But that is no reason for taking him seriously. In both cases we are in the presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find relief in slander.

374.

Every society has a tendency to reduce its opponents to _caricatures,_--at least in its own imagination,--as also to starve them. As an example of this sort of caricature we have our "_criminal._" In the midst of the Roman and aristocratic order of values, the _Jew_ was reduced to a caricature. Among artists, "Mrs. Grundy and the bourgeois" become caricatures; while among pious people it is the heretics, and among aristocrats, the plebeian. Among immoralists it is the moralist. Plato, for instance, in _my_ books becomes a caricature.

375.

All the instincts and forces which morality praises, seem to me to be essentially the same as those which it slanders and rejects: for instance, justice as will to power, will to truth as a means in the service of the will to power.

376.

The _turning of_ man's _nature inwards._ The process of turning a nature inwards arises when, owing to the establishment of peace and society, powerful instincts are prevented from venting themselves outwardly, and strive to survive harmlessly inside in conjunction with the imagination. The need of hostility, cruelty, revenge, and violence is reverted, "it steps backwards"; in the thirst for knowledge there lurks both the lust of gain and of conquest; in the artist, the powers of dissimulation and falsehood find their scope; the instincts are thus transformed into demons with whom a fight takes place, etc.

377.

_Falsity._--Every _sovereign instinct_ makes the others its instruments, its retainers and its sycophants: it never allows itself to be called by its more hateful name: and it brooks no terms of praise in which it cannot _indirectly_ find its share. Around every sovereign instinct all praise and blame in general crystallises into a rigorous form of ceremonial and etiquette. This is _one_ of the causes of falsity.

_Every_ instinct _which aspires to dominion,_ but which finds itself under a yoke, requisitions all the most beautiful names and the _most generally accepted_ values to strengthen it and to support its self-esteem, and this explains why _as a rule_ it dares to come forward under the name of the "master" it is combating and from whom it would be free (for instance, under the domination of Christian values, the desires of the flesh and of power act in this way). This is the _other_ cause of falsity.

In both cases _complete ingenuousness_ reigns: the falseness _never_ even occurs to the mind of those concerned. It is the sign of a _broken_ instinct when man sees the motive force and its "expression" ("the mask") as separate things--it is a sign of inner contradiction and is much less formidable. Absolute _innocence_ in bearing, word, and passion, a "good conscience" in falseness, and the certainty wherewith all the grandest and most pompous words and attitudes are appropriated--all these things are necessary for victory.

In the _other case_: that is to say, when _extreme clearsightedness_ is present, the genius of the _actor_ is needful as well as tremendous discipline in self-control, if victory is to be achieved. That is why priests are the cleverest and _most conscious_ hypocrites; and then come princes, in whom their position in life and their antecedents account for a certain histrionic gift. Society men and diplomatists come third, and women fourth.

_The fundamental thought_: Falsity seems so deep, so many-sided, and the _will_ is directed so inexorably against perfect self-knowledge and accurate self-classification, that one is _very probably right in supposing that Truth_ and _the will to truth_ are perhaps something quite different and only _disguises._ (The need of _faith_ is the greatest obstacle in the way of truthfulness.)

378.

"Thou shalt not tell a falsehood": people insist upon truthfulness. But the acknowledgment of facts (the refusal to allow one's self to be lied to) has always been greatest with liars: they actually recognised the reality of this popular "truthfulness." There is too much or too little being said continually: to insist upon people's _exposing themselves_ with every word they say, is a piece of naïveté.

People say what they think, they are "truthful"; but _only under certain circumstances_: that is to say, provided they be _understood_ (_inter pares_), and understood with good will into the bargain (_once more inter pares_). One conceals one's self in the presence of the _unfamiliar_: and he who would attain to something, says what he would fain have people think about him, but _not_ what he thinks. ("The powerful man is always a liar.")

379.

The great counterfeit coinage of Nihilism concealed beneath an artful abuse of moral values:--

_(a)_ Love regarded as self-effacement; as also pity.

_(b)_ The _most impersonal intellect_ ("the philosopher") can know the _truth_, "the true essence and nature of things."

_(c)_ Genius, _great men_ are _great,_ because they do not strive to further their own interests: the _value_ of man _increases_ in proportion as he effaces himself.

_(d)_ Art as the work of the "_pure free-willed subject_"; misunderstanding of "objectivity."

_(e)_ Happiness as the object of life: _virtue_ as a means to an end.

The pessimistic condemnation of life by Schopenhauer is a _moral_ one. Transference of the gregarious standards into the realm of metaphysics.

The "individual" lacks sense, he must therefore have his origin in "the thing in itself" (and the significance of his existence must be shown to be "error"); parents are only an "accidental cause."--The mistake on the part of science in considering the individual as the result of all past life instead of the epitome of all past life, is now becoming known.

380.

1. Systematic _falsification of history,_ so that it may present a proof of the moral valuation:

_(a)_ The decline of a people and corruption. _(b)_ The rise of a people and virtue. _(c)_ The zenith of a people ("its culture") regarded as the result of high moral excellence.

2. Systematic falsification of _great men, great creators,_ and _great periods._ The desire is to make _faith_ that which distinguishes great men: whereas carelessness in this respect, scepticism, "immorality," the right to repudiate a belief, belongs to greatness (Cæsar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon; but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe). The principal fact--their "free will"--is always suppressed.

381.

A great _lie_ in history; as if the _corruption of the Church were the cause_ of the Reformation! This was only the pretext and self-deception of the agitators--very strong needs were making themselves felt, the brutality of which sorely required a spiritual dressing.

382.

Schopenhauer declared high intellectuality to be the _emancipation_ from the will: he did not wish to recognise the freedom from moral prejudices which is coincident with the emancipation of a great mind; he refused to see what is the typical immorality of genius; he artfully contrived to set up the only moral value he honoured--self-effacement, as the one _condition_ of highest intellectual activity: "objective" contemplation. "Truth," even in art, only manifests itself after the withdrawal of the _will_....

Through all moral idiosyncrasies I see a _fundamentally different valuation._ Such absurd distinctions as "genius" and the world of will, of morality and immorality, _I know nothing about at all._ The moral is a lower kind of animal than the immoral, he is also weaker; indeed--he is a type in regard to morality, but he is not a type of his own. He is a copy; at the best, a good copy--the standard of his worth lies _without_ him. I value a man according to the _quantum of power and fullness of his will_: not according to the enfeeblement and moribund state thereof. I consider that a philosophy which _teaches_ the denial of will is both defamatory and slanderous.... I test the _power_ of a _will_ according to the amount of resistance it can offer and the amount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn to its own advantage; I do not point to the evil and pain of existence with the finger of reproach, but rather entertain the hope that life may one day be more evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been.

The zenith of intellectuality, according to Schopenhauer, was to arrive at the knowledge that all is to no purpose--in short, to recognise what the good man already _does_ instinctively.... He denies that there can be higher states of intellectuality--he regards his view as a _non plus ultra.._.. Here intellectuality is placed much lower than goodness; its highest value (as art, for instance) would be to lead up to, and to advise the adoption of, morality, the absolute predominance of _moral values._

Next to Schopenhauer I will now characterise _Kant_: there was nothing Greek in Kant; he was quite anti-historical (cf. his attitude in regard to the French Revolution) and a moral fanatic (see Goethe's words concerning the radically evil element in human nature[8]). _Saintliness_ also lurked somewhere in his soul.... I require a criticism of the saintly type.

Hegel's value: "Passion."

Herbert Spencer's tea-grocer's philosophy: total absence of an ideal save that of the mediocre man.

Fundamental instinct of all philosophers, historians, and psychologists: everything of _value_ in mankind, art, history, science, religion, and technology must be shown to be _morally valuable_ and _morally conditioned,_ in its aim, means, and result. Everything is seen in the light of this highest value; for instance, Rousseau's question concerning civilisation, "Will it make man grow better?"--a funny question, for the reverse is _obvious,_ and is a fact which speaks _in favour_ of civilisation.

[Footnote 8: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--This is doubtless a reference to a passage in a letter written by Goethe to Herder, on 7th June 1793, from the camp at Marienborn, near Mainz, in which the following words occur:--"_Dagegen hat aber auch Kant seinen philosophischen Mantel, nachdem er ein langes Menschenleben gebraucht hat, ihn von mancherlei sudelhaften Vorurteilen zu reinigen, freventlich mit dem Schandfleck des radikalen Bösen beschlabbert, damit doch auch Christen herbeigelockt werden den Saum zu küssen?--_("Kant, on the other hand, after he had tried throughout his life to keep his philosophical cloak unsoiled by foul prejudices, wantonly dirtied it in the end with the disreputable stain of the 'radical evil' in human nature, in order that Christians too might be lured into kissing its hem.") From this passage it will be seen how Goethe had anticipated Nietzsche's view of Kant; namely, that he was a Christian in disguise.]

383.

_Religious morality.--_Passion, great desire; the passion for power, love, revenge, and property: the moralists wish to uproot and exterminate all these things, and "purify" the soul by driving them out of it.

The argument is: the passions often lead to disaster--therefore, they are evil and ought to be condemned. Man must wring himself free from them, otherwise he cannot be a _good_ man....

This is of the same nature as: "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out." In this particular case when, with that "bucolic simplicity," the Founder of Christianity recommended a certain practice to His disciples, in the event of sexual excitement, the result would not be only the loss of a particular member, but the actual castration of the whole of the man's character.... And the same applies to the moral mania, which, instead of insisting upon the control of the passions, sues for their extirpation. Its conclusion always is: only the emasculated man is a good man.

Instead of making use of and of _economising_ the great sources of passion, those torrents of the soul which are often so dangerous, overwhelming, and impetuous, morality--this most shortsighted and most corrupted of mental attitudes--would fain make them _dry up._

384.

_Conquest over the passions?_--No, not if this is to mean their enfeeblement and annihilation. _They must be enlisted in our service_: and to this end it may be necessary to tyrannise them a good deal (not as individuals, but as communities, races, etc.). At length we should trust them enough to restore their freedom to them: they love us like good servants, and willingly go wherever our best interests lie.

385.

_Intolerance on the part of morality_ is a sign of man's _weakness_: he is frightened of his own "immorality," he must _deny_ his strongest _instincts,_ because he does not yet know how to use them. Thus the most fruitful quarters of the globe remain uncultivated longest: the power is lacking that might become master here....

386.

There are some very simple peoples and men who believe that continuous fine weather would be a desirable thing: they still believe to-day in _rebus moralibus,_ that the "good man" alone and nothing else than the "good man" is to be desired, and that the ultimate end of man's evolution will be that only the good man will remain on earth (and that it is only to that end that all efforts should be directed). This is in the highest degree an _uneconomical_ thought; as we have already suggested, it is the very acme of simplicity, and it is nothing more than the expression of the _agreeableness_ which the "good man" creates (he gives rise to no fear, he permits of relaxation, he gives what one is able to take).

With a more educated eye one learns to desire exactly the reverse--that is to say, an ever greater _dominion of evil,_ man's gradual emancipation from the narrow and aggravating bonds of morality, the growth of power around the greatest forces of Nature, and the ability to enlist the passions in one's service.

387.

The whole idea of the hierarchy of the _passions_: as if the only right and normal thing were to be led by _reason_--whereas the passions are abnormal, dangerous, half-animal, and moreover, in so far as their end is concerned, nothing more than _desires for pleasure...._

Passion is deprived of its dignity (1) as if it only manifested itself in an unseemly way and were not necessary and always the _motive force_, (2) inasmuch as it is supposed to aim at no high purpose--merely at pleasure....

The misinterpretation of passion and _reason,_ as if the latter were an independent entity, and not a state of relationship between all the various passions and desires; and as though every passion did not possess its quantum of reason....

388.

How it was that, under the pressure of the dominion of an ascetic and _self-effacing morality,_ it was precisely the passions--love, goodness, pity, even justice, generosity, and heroism, which were necessarily misunderstood?

It is the _richness of a personality,_ the fullness of it, its power to flow over and to bestow, its instinctive feeling of ease, and its affirmative attitude towards itself, that creates great love and great sacrifices: these passions proceed from strong and godlike personalism as surely as do the desire to be master, to obtrude, and the inner certainty that one has a right to everything. The _opposite_ views, according to the most accepted notions, are indeed common views; and if one does not stand firmly and bravely on one's legs, one has nothing to give, and it is perfectly useless to stretch out one's hand either to protect or to support others....

How was it possible to _transform_ these instincts to such an extent that man could feel that to be of value which is directed against himself, so that he could sacrifice himself for another self! O the psychological baseness and falseness which hitherto has laid down the law in the Church and in Church-infected philosophy!

If man is thoroughly sinful, then all he can do is to hate himself. As a matter of fact, he ought not to regard even his fellows otherwise than he does himself; the love of man requires a justification, and it is found in the fact that _God commanded it._--From this it follows that all the natural instincts of man (to love, etc.) appear to him to be, in themselves, prohibited; and that he re-acquires a right to them only after having _denied_ them as an obedient worshipper of God. ... Pascal, the admirable _logician_ of Christianity, _went as far as this_! let any one examine his relations to his sister. "Not to make one's self loved," seemed Christian to him.

389.

Let us consider how dearly a moral canon such as this ("an ideal") makes us pay. (Its enemies are--well? The "egoists.")

The melancholy astuteness of self-abasement in Europe (Pascal, La Rochefoucauld)--inner enfeeblement, discouragement, and self-consumption of the non-gregarious man.

The perpetual process of laying stress upon mediocre qualities as being the most valuable (modesty in rank and file, Nature converted into an instrument).

Pangs of conscience associated with all that is self-glorifying and original: thus follows the unhappiness--the _gloominess_ of the world from the standpoint of stronger and better-constituted men!

Gregarious consciousness and timorousness transferred to philosophy and religion.

Let us leave the psychological impossibility of a purely unselfish action out of consideration!

390.

My ultimate conclusion is, that the _real_ man represents a much higher value than the "desirable" man of any ideal that has ever existed hitherto; that all "desiderata" in regard to mankind have been absurd and dangerous dissipations by means of which a particular kind of man has sought to establish _his_ measures of preservation and of growth as a law for all; that every "desideratum" of this kind which has been made to dominate has _reduced_ man's worth, his strength, and his trust in the future; that the indigence and mediocre intellectuality of man becomes most apparent, even to-day, when he reveals a _desire_; that man's ability to fix values has hitherto been developed too inadequately to do justice to the actual, not merely to the "desirable," _worth of man_; that, up to the present, ideals have really been the power which has most slandered man and power, the poisonous fumes which have hung over reality, and which have _seduced men to yearn for nonentity_....

D. _A Criticism of the Words: Improving, Perfecting, Elevating._

391.

The standard _according_ to which the value of moral valuations is to be determined.

The fundamental fact _that has been overlooked_: The contradiction between "becoming more moral" and the elevation and the strengthening of the type man.

_Homo natura_: The "will to power."

392.

Moral values regarded as _values of appearance_ and compared with _physiological_ values.

393.

Reflecting upon generalities is always retrograde: the last of the "desiderata" concerning men, for instance, have never been regarded as problems by philosophers. They always postulate the "_improvement_" of man, quite guilelessly, as though by means of some intuition they had been helped over the note of interrogation following the question, _why_ necessarily "_improve!_" To what extent is it _desirable_ that man should be more _virtuous,_ or more _intelligent,_ or _happier!_ Granting that nobody yet _knows_ the "wherefore?" of mankind, all such desiderata have no sense whatever; and if one aspires to one of them--who knows?--perhaps one is frustrating the other. Is an increase of virtue compatible with an increase of intelligence and insight? _Dubito_: only too often shall I have occasion to show that the reverse is true. Has virtue, as an end, in the strict sense of the word, not always been opposed to happiness hitherto? And again, does it not require misfortune, abstinence, and self-castigation as a necessary means? And if the aim were to arrive at the _highest insight,_ would it not therefore be necessary to renounce all hope of an increase in happiness, and to choose danger, adventure, mistrust, and seduction as a road to enlightenment?... And suppose one will have happiness; maybe one should join the ranks of the "poor in spirit."

394.

The wholesale deception and fraud of so-called _moral improvement._

We do not believe that one man can be another if he is not that other already--that is to say, if he is not, as often happens, an accretion of personalities or at least of parts of persons. In this case it is possible to draw another set of actions from him into the foreground, and to drive back "the older man." ... The man's aspect is altered, but _not_ his actual nature.... It is but the merest _factum brutum_ that any one should cease from performing certain actions, and the fact allows of the most varied interpretations. Neither does it always follow therefrom that the habit of performing a certain action is entirely arrested, nor that the reasons for that action are dissipated. He whose destiny and abilities make him a criminal never unlearns anything, but is continually adding to his store of knowledge: and long abstinence acts as a sort of tonic on his talent.... Certainly, as far as society is concerned, the only interesting fact is that some one has ceased from performing certain actions; and to this end society will often raise a man out of those circumstances which make him _able_ to perform those actions: this is obviously a wiser course than that of trying to break his destiny and his particular nature. The Church,--which has done nothing except to take the place of, and to appropriate, the philosophic treasures of antiquity,--starting out from another standpoint and wishing to secure a "soul" or the "salvation" of a soul, believes in the expiatory power of punishment, as also in the obliterating power of forgiveness: both of which supposed processes are deceptions due to religious prejudice--punishment expiates nothing, forgiveness obliterates nothing; what is done cannot be undone. Because some one forgets something it by no means proves that something has been wiped out.... An action leads to certain consequences, both among men and away from men, and it matters not whether it has met with punishment, or whether it has been "expiated," "forgiven," or "obliterated," it matters not even if the Church meanwhile canonises the man who performed it. The Church believes in things that do not exist, it believes in "Souls"; it believes in "influences" that do not exist--in divine influences; it believes in states that do not exist, in sin, redemption, and spiritual salvation: in all things it stops at the surface and is satisfied with signs, attitudes, words, to which it lends an arbitrary interpretation. It possesses a method of counterfeit psychology which is thought out quite systematically.

395.

"Illness makes men better," this famous assumption which is to be met with in all ages, and in the mouth of the wizard quite as often as in the mouth and maw of the people, really makes one ponder. In view of discovering whether there is any truth in it, one might be allowed to ask whether there is not perhaps a fundamental relationship between morality and illness? Regarded as a whole, could not the "improvement of mankind"--that is to say, the unquestionable softening, humanising, and taming which the European has undergone within the last two centuries--be regarded as the result of a long course of secret and ghastly suffering, failure, abstinence, and grief? Has illness made "Europeans" "better"? Or, put into other words, is not our modern soft-hearted European morality, which could be likened to that of the Chinese, perhaps an expression of physiological _deterioration_?... It cannot be denied, for instance, that wherever history shows us "man" in a state of particular glory and power, his type is always dangerous, impetuous, and boisterous, and cares little for humanity; and perhaps, in those cases in which _it seems otherwise,_ all that was required was the courage or subtlety to see sufficiently below the surface in psychological matters, in order even in them to discover the general proposition: "the more healthy, strong, rich, fruitful, and enterprising a man may feel, the more immoral he will be as well." A terrible thought, to which one should on no account give way. Provided, however, that one take a few steps forward with this thought, how wondrous does the future then appear! What will then be paid for more dearly on earth, than precisely this very thing which we are all trying to promote, by all means in our power--the humanising, the improving, and the increased "civilisation" of man? Nothing would then be more expensive than virtue: for by means of it the world would ultimately be turned into a hospital: and the last conclusion of wisdom would be, "everybody must be everybody else's nurse." Then we should certainly have attained to the "Peace on earth," so long desired! But how little "joy we should find in each other's company"! How little beauty, wanton spirits, daring, and danger! So few "actions" which would make life on earth worth living! Ah! and no longer any "deeds"! But have not all the _great_ things and deeds which have remained fresh in the memory of men, and which have not been destroyed by time, been _immoral_ in the deepest sense of the word?...

396.

The priests--and with them the half-priests or philosophers of all ages--have always called that doctrine true, the educating influence of which was a benevolent one or at least seemed so--that is to say, tended to "improve." In this way they resemble an ingenuous plebeian empiric and miracle-worker who, because he had tried a certain poison as a cure, declared it to be no poison. "By their fruits ye shall know them"--that is to say, "by our truths." This has been the reasoning of priests until this day. They have squandered their sagacity, with results that have been sufficiently fatal, in order to make the "proof of power" (or the proof "by the fruits ") pre-eminent and even supreme arbiter over all other forms of proof. "That which makes good must be good; that which is good cannot lie"--these are their inexorable conclusions--"that which bears good fruit must consequently be true; there is no other criterion of truth." ...

But to the extent to which "improving" acts as an argument, deteriorating must also act as a refutation. The error can be shown to be an error, by examining the lives of those who represent it: a false step, a vice can refute.... This indecent form of opposition, which comes from below and behind--the doglike kind of attack, has not died out either. Priests, as psychologists, never discovered anything more interesting than spying out the secret vices of their adversaries--they prove Christianity by looking about for the world's filth. They apply this principle more particularly to the greatest on earth, to the geniuses: readers will remember how Goethe has been attacked on every conceivable occasion in Germany (Klopstock and Herder were among the first to give a "good example" in this respect--birds of a feather flock together).

397.

One must be very immoral in order to _make people moral by deeds._ The moralist's means are the most terrible that have ever been used; he who has not the courage to be an immoralist in deeds may be fit for anything else, but not for the duties of a moralist.

Morality is a menagerie; it assumes that iron bars may be more useful than freedom, even for the creatures it imprisons; it also assumes that there are animal-tamers about who do not shrink from terrible means, and who are acquainted with the use of red-hot iron. This terrible species, which enters into a struggle with the wild animal, is called "priests."

***

Man, incarcerated in an iron cage of errors, has become a caricature of man; he is sick, emaciated, ill-disposed towards himself, filled with a loathing of the impulses of life, filled with a mistrust of all that is beautiful and happy in life--in fact, he is a wandering monument of misery. How shall we ever succeed in vindicating this phenomenon--this artificial, arbitrary, and _recent_ miscarriage--the sinner--which the priests have bred on their territory?

***

In order to think fairly of morality, we must put two _biological_ notions in its place: the _taming_ of the wild beasts, and the _rearing of a particular species._

The priests of all ages have always pretended that they wished to "_improve_" ... But we, of another persuasion, would laugh if a lion-tamer ever wished to speak to us of his "improved" animals. As a rule, the taming of a beast is only achieved by deteriorating it: even the moral man is not a better man; he is rather a weaker member of his species. But he is less harmful....

398.

What I want to make clear, with all the means in my power, is:--

_(a)_ That there is no worse confusion than that which confounds _rearing_ and _taming_: and these two things have always been confused.... Rearing, as I understand it, is a means of husbanding the enormous powers of humanity in such a way that whole generations may build upon the foundations laid by their progenitors--not only outwardly, but inwardly, organically, developing from the already existing stem and growing _stronger_....

_(b)_ That there is an exceptional danger in believing that mankind as a whole is developing and growing stronger, if individuals are seen to grow more feeble and more equally mediocre. Humanity--mankind--is an abstract thing: the object of _rearing,_ even in regard to the most individual cases, can only be the _strong_ man (the man who has no breeding is weak, dissipated, and unstable).

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS CONCERNING THE CRITICISM OF MORALITY.

399.

These are the things I demand of you--however badly they may sound in your ears: that you subject moral valuations themselves to criticism. That you should put a stop to your instinctive moral impulse--which in this case demands submission and not criticism--with the question: "why precisely submission?" That this yearning for a "why?"--for a criticism of morality should not only be your present form of morality, but the sublimest of all moralities, and an honour to the age you live in. That your honesty, your will, may give an account of itself, and not deceive you: "why not?"--Before what tribunal?

400.

The three _postulates_:--

All that is ignoble is high (the protest of the "vulgar
man").

All that is contrary to Nature is high (the protest of the
physiologically botched).

All that is of average worth is high (the protest of the
herd, of the "mediocre").

Thus in the _history of morality_ a _will to power_ finds expression, by means of which, either the slaves, the oppressed, the bungled and the botched, those that suffer from themselves, or the mediocre, attempt to make those valuations prevail which favour _their_ existence.

From a biological standpoint, therefore, the phenomenon Morality is of a highly suspicious nature. Up to the present, morality has developed at the _cost_ of: the ruling classes and their specific instincts, the well-constituted and _beautiful_ natures, the independent and privileged classes in all respects.

Morality, then, is a sort of counter-movement opposing Nature's endeavours to arrive at a _higher type._ Its effects are: mistrust of life in general (in so far as its tendencies are felt to be immoral), --hostility towards the senses (inasmuch as the highest values are felt to be opposed to the higher instincts),--Degeneration and self-destruction of "higher natures," because it is precisely in them that the conflict becomes _conscious._

401.

_Which values have been paramount hitherto?_

Morality as the leading value in all phases of philosophy (even with the Sceptics). Result: this world is no good, a "true world" must exist somewhere.

What is it that here determines the highest value? What, in sooth, is morality? The instinct of decadence; it is the exhausted and the disinherited who _take their revenge_ in this way and play the _masters_....

Historical proof: philosophers have always been decadents and always in the pay of Nihilistic religions.

The instinct of decadence appears as the will to power. The introduction of its system of means: its means are absolutely immoral.

General aspect: the values that have been highest hitherto have been a special instance of the will to power; morality itself is a particular instance of _immorality._

***

Why the Antagonistic Values always succumbed.

1. How was this actually _possible!_ Question: why did life and physiological well-constitutedness succumb everywhere? Why was there no affirmative philosophy, no affirmative religion?

The historical signs of such movements: the pagan religion.
Dionysos _versus_ the Christ. The Renaissance. Art.

2. The strong and the weak: the healthy and the sick; the exception and the rule. There is no doubt as to who is the stronger....

_General view of history_; Is man an _exception_ in the history of life on this account?--An objection to _Darwinism._ The means wherewith the weak succeed in ruling have become: instincts, "humanity," "institutions." ...

3. The proof of this rule on the part of the weak is to be found in our political instincts, in our social values, in our arts, and in our _science._

***

The _instincts of decadence_ have become master of the _instincts of ascending_ life.... The _will to nonentity_ has prevailed over the _will to life_!

Is this _true_? is there not perhaps a stronger guarantee of life and of the species in this victory of the weak and the mediocre?--is it not perhaps only a means in the collective movement of life, a mere slackening of the pace, a protective measure against something even more dangerous?

Suppose the _strong_ were masters in all respects, even in valuing: let us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness, suffering, and sacrifice! _Self-contempt on the part of the weak_ would be the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate their kind. And would this be _desirable_?--should we really like a world in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality, the _plasticity_--in fact, the whole influence of the weak--was lacking?[9] ...

We have seen two "wills to power" at war _(in this special case we had a principle_: that of agreeing with the one that has hitherto succumbed, and of disagreeing with the one that has hitherto triumphed): we have recognised the "real world" as a "_world of lies_" and morality as a _form of immorality._ We do _not_ say "the stronger is wrong."

We have understood _what_ it is that has determined the highest values hitherto, and _why_ the latter should have prevailed over the opposite value: it was numerically the _stronger_.

If we now purify _the opposite value_ of the infection, the half-heartedness, _and the degeneration,_ with which we identify it, we restore Nature to the throne, free from moralic acid.

[Footnote 9: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--We realise here the great difference between Nietzsche and those who draw premature conclusions from Darwinism. There is no brutal solution of modern problems in Nietzsche's philosophy. He did not advocate anything so ridiculous as the total suppression of the weak and the degenerate. What he wished to resist and to overthrow _was their supremacy, their excessive power._ He felt that there was a desirable and stronger type which was in need of having its hopes, aspirations, and instincts upheld in defiance of Christian values.]

402.

_Morality,_ a useful error; or, more clearly still, a necessary and expedient lie according to the greatest and most impartial of its supporters.

403.

One ought to be able to acknowledge the truth up to that point where one is sufficiently elevated no longer to require the _disciplinary school of moral error._--When one judges life morally, it _disgusts_ one.

Neither should false personalities be invented; one should not say, for instance, "Nature is cruel." It is precisely when one perceives _that there is no such central controlling and responsible force that one is relieved!_

_Evolution of man._ A. He tried to attain to a certain power
over Nature and over himself. (Morality was necessary in
order to make man triumph in his struggle with Nature and
"wild animals.")

B. If power over Nature has been attained, this power can
be used as a help in our development: Will to Power as a
self-enhancing and self-strengthening principle.

404.

Morality may be regarded as the _illusion of a species,_ fostered with the view of urging the individual to sacrifice himself to the future, and seemingly granting him such a very great value, that with that _self-consciousness_ he may tyrannise over, and constrain, other sides of his nature, and find it difficult to be pleased with himself.

We ought to be most profoundly thankful for what morality has done hitherto: _but now it is no more than a burden_ which may prove fatal. _Morality itself_ in the form of honesty urges us to deny morality.

405.

To what extent is the _self-destruction of morality_ still a sign of its own strength? We Europeans have within us the blood of those who were ready to die for their faith; we have taken morality frightfully seriously, and there is nothing which we have not, at one time, sacrificed to it. On the other hand, our intellectual subtlety has been reached essentially through the vivisection of our consciences. We do not yet know the "whither" towards which we are urging our steps, now that we have departed from the soil of our forebears. But it was on this very soil that we acquired the strength which is now driving us from our homes in search of adventure, and it is thanks to that strength that we are now in mid-sea, surrounded by untried possibilities and things undiscovered--we can no longer choose, we must be conquerors, now that we have no land in which we feel at home and in which we would fain "survive." A concealed "_yea_" is driving us forward, and it is stronger than all our "nays." Even our _strength_ no longer bears with us in the old swampy land: we venture out into the open, we attempt the task. The world is still rich and undiscovered, and even to perish were better than to be half-men or poisonous men. Our very strength itself urges us to take to the sea; there where all suns have hitherto sunk we know of a new world....

III.

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.

1. GENERAL REMARKS.

406.

Let us rid ourselves of a few superstitions which heretofore have been fashionable among philosophers!

407.

Philosophers are prejudiced _against_ appearance, change, pain, death, the things of the body, the senses, fate, bondage, and all that which has no purpose.

In the first place, they believe in: absolute knowledge, (2) in knowledge for its own sake,

(3) in virtue and happiness as necessarily related,

(4) in the recognisability of men's acts. They are led by instinctive determinations of values, in which _former_ cultures are reflected (more dangerous cultures too).

408.

What have philosophers _lacked_! (1) A sense of history, (2) a knowledge of physiology, (3) a goal in the future.--The ability to criticise without irony or moral condemnation.

409.

Philosophers have had (1) from times immemorial a wonderful capacity for the _contradictio in adjecto,_ (2) they have always trusted concepts as unconditionally as they have mistrusted the senses: it never seems to have occurred to them that notions and words are our inheritance of past ages in which thinking was neither very clear nor very exact.

What seems to dawn upon philosophers last of all: that they must no longer allow themselves to be presented with concepts already conceived, nor must they merely purify and polish up those concepts; but they must first _make_ them, _create_ them, themselves, and then present them and get people to accept them. Up to the present, people have trusted their concepts generally, as if they had been a wonderful _dowry_ from some kind of wonderland: but they constitute the inheritance of our most remote, most foolish, and most intelligent forefathers. This _piety_ towards that _which already exists in us_ is perhaps related to the _moral element in science._ What we needed above all is absolute scepticism towards all traditional concepts (like that which a certain philosopher may already have possessed--and he was Plato, of course: for he taught _the reverse_).

410.

Profoundly mistrustful towards the dogmas of the theory of knowledge, I liked to look now out of this window, now out of that, though I took good care not to become finally fixed anywhere, indeed I should have thought it dangerous to have done so--though finally: is it within the range of probabilities for an instrument to criticise its own fitness? What I noticed more particularly was, that no scientific scepticism or dogmatism has ever arisen quite free from all _arrières pensées_--that it has only a secondary value as soon as the motive lying immediately behind it is discovered.

Fundamental aspect: Kant's, Hegel's, Schopenhauer's, the sceptical and epochistical, the historifying and the pessimistic attitudes--all have a _moral_ origin. I have found no one who has dared to _criticise the moral valuations,_ and I soon turned my back upon the meagre attempts that have been made to describe the evolution of these feelings (by English and German Darwinians).

How can Spinoza's position, his denial and repudiation of the moral values, be explained? (It was the result of his Theodicy!)

411.

_Morality regarded as the highest form of protection._--Our world is _either_ the work and expression (the _modus_) of God, in which case it must be _in the highest degree perfect_ (Leibnitz's conclusion ...),--and no one doubted that he knew what perfection must be like,--and then all evil can only be _apparent_ (Spinoza is _more radical,_ he says this of good and evil), or it must be a part of God's high purpose (a consequence of a particularly great mark of favour on God's part, who thus allows man to choose between good and evil: the privilege of being no automaton; "freedom," with the ever-present danger of making a mistake and of choosing wrongly.... See Simplicius, for instance, in the commentary to Epictetus).

_Or_ our world is imperfect; evil and guilt are real, determined, and are absolutely inherent to its being; in that case it cannot be the _real_ world: consequently knowledge can only be a way of denying the world, for the latter is error which may be recognised as such. This is Schopenhauer's opinion, based upon Kantian first principles. Pascal was still more desperate: he thought that even knowledge must be corrupt and false--that _revelation_ is a necessity if only in order to recognise that the world should be denied....

412.

Owing to our habit of believing in unconditional authorities, we have grown to feel a profound need for them: indeed, this feeling is so strong that, even in an age of criticism such as Kant's was, it showed itself to be superior to the need for criticism, and, in a certain sense, was able to subject the whole work of critical acumen, and to convert it to its own use. It proved its superiority once more in the generation which followed, and which, owing to its historical instincts, naturally felt itself drawn to a relative view of all authority, when it converted even the Hegelian philosophy of evolution (history rechristened and called philosophy) to its own use, and represented history as being the self-revelation and self-surpassing of moral ideas. Since Plato, philosophy has lain under the dominion of morality. Even in Plato's predecessors, moral interpretations play a most important rôle (Anaximander declares that all things are made to perish as a punishment for their departure from pure being; Heraclitus thinks that the regularity of phenomena is a proof of the morally correct character of evolution in general).

413.

The progress of philosophy has been hindered most seriously hitherto through the influence of moral _arrières-pensées._

414.

In all ages, "fine feelings" have been regarded as arguments, "heaving breasts" have been the bellows of godliness, convictions have been the "criteria" of truth, and the need of opposition has been the note of interrogation affixed to wisdom. This falseness and fraud permeates the whole history of philosophy. But for a few respected sceptics, no instinct for intellectual Uprightness is to be found anywhere. Finally, _Kant_ guilelessly sought to make this thinker's corruption scientific by means of his concept, "_practical reason_". He expressly invented a reason which, in certain cases, would allow one _not_ to bother about reason--that is to say, in cases where the heart's desire, morality, or "duty" are the motive power.

415.

_Hegel_: his popular side, the doctrine of war and of great men. Right is on the side of the victorious: he (the victorious man) stands for the progress of mankind. His is an attempt at proving the dominion of morality by means of history.

Kant: a kingdom of moral values withdrawn from us, invisible, real.