Chapter VIII (2)

These pretences he might have made yet more plausible, by professing and avouching that he intended to worship no idols, but the Lord only; that he had not fallen from anything which was fundamental and essential in divine faith and religion, that the changes which he had made were only about some alterable ceremonies which were not essential to the worship of God, and that even in these ceremonies he had not made any change for his own will and pleasure, but for important reasons which concerned the good of his kingdom and safety of his subjects. Notwithstanding of all this, the innovations which he made about these ceremonies of sacred signs, sacred places, sacred persons, sacred times, are condemned for this very reason, because he devised them of his own heart, 1 Kings xii. 33, which was enough to convince him of horrible impiety in making Israel to sin. Moreover, when king Ahaz took a pattern of the altar of Damascus, and sent it to Urijah the priest, though we cannot gather from the text that he either intended or pretended any other respect beside the honouring and pleasuring of his patron and protector, the king of Assyria, 2 Kings xvi. 10, 18 (for of his appointing that new altar for his own and all the people’s sacrifices, there was nothing heard till after his return from Damascus, at which time he began to fall back from one degree of defection to a greater), yet this very innovation of taking the pattern of an altar from idolaters is marked as a sin and a snare. Last of all, whereas many of the kings of Judah and Israel did either themselves worship in the groves and the high places, or else, at least, suffer the people to do so, howsoever they might have alleged(952) specious reasons for excusing themselves,—as namely, that they gave not this honour to any strange gods, but to the Lord only; that they chose these places only to worship in wherein God was of old seen and worshipped by the patriarchs, that the groves and the high places added a most amiable splendour and beauty to the worship of God, and that they did consecrate these places for divine worship in a good meaning, and with minds wholly devoted to God’s honour,—yet notwithstanding, because this thing was not commanded of God, neither came it into his heart, he would admit no excuses, but ever challengeth it as a grievous fault in the government of those kings, that those high places were not taken away, and that the people still sacrificed in the high places; from all which examples we learn how highly God was and is displeased with men for adding any other sacred ceremonies to those which he himself hath appointed.(953)

_Sect._ 20. Now as touching the other sort of things which we consider in the worship of God, namely, things merely circumstantial, and such as have the very same use and respect in civil which they have in sacred actions, we hold that whensoever it happeneth to be the duty and part of a prince to institute and enjoin any order or policy in these circumstances of God’s worship, then he may only enjoin such an order as may stand with the observing and following of the rules of the word, whereunto we are tied in the use and practice of things which are in their general nature indifferent.

Of these rules I am to speak in the fourth part of the dispute. And here I say no more but this: Since the word commandeth us to do all things to the glory of God, 1 Cor. x. 31; to do all things to edifying, 1 Cor. xiv. 29; and to do all things in faith, and full persuasion of the lawfulness of that which we do, Rom. xiv. 5, 23, therefore there is no prince in the world who hath power to command his subjects to do that which should either dishonour God, or not honour him; or that which should either offend their brother, or not edify him; or, lastly, that which their conscience either condemneth or doubteth of. For how may a prince command that which his subjects may not do? But a wonder it were if any man should so far refuse to be ashamed that he would dare to say we are not bound to order whatsoever we do according to these rules of the word, but only such matters of private action wherein we are left at full liberty, there being no ordinance of superiors to determine our practice, and that if such an ordinance be published and propounded unto us, we should take it alone for our rule, and no longer think to examine and order our practice by the rules of the word;

For, 1. This were as much as to say, that in the circumstances of God’s worship we are bound to take heed unto God’s rules, then only and in that case when men give us none of their rules, which, if they do, God’s rules must give place to men’s rules, and not theirs to his.

2. If it were so, then we should never make reckoning to God, whether that which we had done in obedience to superiors was right or wrong, good or bad, and we should only make reckoning of such things done by us as were not determined by a human law.

3. The law of superiors is never the supreme but ever a subordinate rule, and (as we said before) it can never be a rule to us, except in so far only as it is ruled by a higher rule. Therefore we have ever another rule to take heed unto beside their law.

4. The Scripture speaketh most generally, and admitteth no exception from the rules which it giveth: “Whatsoever ye do (though commanded by superiors) do all to the glory of God. Let all things (though commanded by superiors) be done to edifying. Whatsoever is not of faith (though commanded by superiors) is sin.”

5. We may do nothing for the sole will and pleasure of men, for this were to be the servants of men, as hath been shown. The Bishop of Salisbury also assenteth hereunto.(954) _Non enim_ (saith he) _Deus vult, ut hominis alicujus voluntatem regulam nostrae voluntatis atque vitae faciamus: sed hoc privilegium sibi ac verbo suo reservatum voluit._ And again,(955) _Pio itaque animo haec consideratio semper adesse debet, utrum id quod praecipitur sit divino mandato contrarium necne: atque ne ex hac parte fallantur, adhibendum est illud judicium discretionis, quod nos tantopere urgemus._

_Sect._ 21. These things if Saravia had considered,(956) he had not so absolutely pronounced that the power of the kings may make constitutions of the places and times, when and where the exercises of piety may be conveniently had, also with what order, what rite, what gesture, what habit, the mysteries shall be more decently celebrated. But what! thought he this power of kings is not astricted to the rules of the word? Have they any power which is to destruction and not to edification? Can they command their subjects to do anything in the circumstances of divine worship which is not for the glory of God, which is not profitable for edifying, and which they cannot do in faith? Nay, that all the princes in the world have not such power as this, will easily appear to him who attendeth unto the reasons which we have propounded. And because men do easily and ordinarily pretend that their constitutions are according to the rules of the word, when they are indeed repugnant to the same, therefore we have also proved that inferiors may and must try and examine every ordinance of their superiors, and that by the judgment of private discretion, following the rules of the word. I say following the rules of the word, because we will never allow a man to follow Anabaptistical or Swenckfeldian-like enthusiasms and inspirations.

_Sect._ 22. Touching the application of what hath been said unto the controverted ceremonies, there needs nothing now to be added. For that they belong not to that sort of things which may be applied to civil uses, with the same respect and account which they have being applied to religious uses, the account I mean of mere circumstances serving only for that common order and decency which is and should be observed in civil no less than in sacred actions, but that they belong to the substance of worship, as being sacred significant ceremonies, wherein both holiness and necessity are placed, and which may not without his sacrilege be used out of the compass of worship, we have elsewhere plainly evinced. And this kind of things, whensover they are men’s devices, and not God’s ordinances, cannot be lawfully enjoined by princes, as hath been showed.

But if any man will needs have these ceremonies in question to go under the name of mere circumstances, let us put the case they were no other, yet our conforming unto them, which is urged, cannot stand with the rules of the word.

It could not be for the glory of God, not only for that it is offensive to many of Christ’s little ones, but likewise for that it ministereth occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme; to atheists, because by these naughty observances they see the commandments of God made of little or no effect, and many godly both persons and purposes despised and depressed, whereat they laugh in their sleeve and say, Aha! so would we have it; to Papists, because as by this our conformity they confirm themselves in sundry of their errors and superstitions, so perceiving us so little to abhor the pomp and bravery of their mother of harlots, that we care not to borrow from her some of her meretricious trinkets, they promise to themselves that in the end we shall take as great a draught of the cup of the wine of her fornications as they themselves.

Neither yet can our conforming unto the ceremonies pressed upon us be profitable for edifying, for we have given sufficient demonstration of manifold hurts and inconveniences ensuing thereon.

Nor, lastly, can we conform to them in faith; for as our consciences cannot find, so the word cannot afford, any warrant for them. Of all which things now I only make mention, because I have spoken of them enough otherwhere.

_Sect._ 23. The second distinction which may help our light in this question about the power of princes, is of times; for when the church and ministers thereof are corrupted and must be reformed, princes may do much more in making laws about things ecclesiastical than regularly they may, when ecclesiastical persons are both able and willing to do their duty, in rightly taking care of all things which ought to be provided for the good of the church, and conservation or purgation of religion. “For (saith Junuis(957)) both the church, when the joining of the magistrate faileth, may extraordinarily do something which ordinarily she cannot; and again, when the church faileth of her duty, the magistrate may extraordinarily procure that the church return to her duty; that is, in such a case extraordinarily happening, these (ecclesiastical persons) and those (magistrates) may extraordinarily do something which ordinarily they cannot. For this belongeth to common law and equity, that unto extraordinary evils, extraordinary remedies must also be applied.” We acknowledge that it belongeth to princes(958) “to reform things in the church, as often as the ecclesiastical persons shall, either through ignorance, disorder of the affection of covetousness, or ambition, defile the Lord’s sanctuary.” At such extraordinary times, princes, by their coactive temporal power, ought to procure and cause a reformation of abuses, and the avoiding of misorders in the church, though with the discontent of the clergy, for which end and purpose they may not only enjoin and command the profession of that faith, and the practice of that religion which God’s word appointeth, but also prescribe such an order and policy in the circumstances of divine worship as they in their judgment of Christian discretion, observing and following the rules of the word, shall judge and try to be convenient for the present time and case, and all this under the commination of such temporal losses, pains, or punishments as they shall deprehend to be reasonable. But at other ordinary times, when ecclesiastical persons are neither through ignorance unable, nor through malice and perverseness of affection unwilling, to put order to whatsoever requireth any mutation to be made in the church and service of God, in that case, without their advice and consent, princes may not make an innovation of any ecclesiastical rite, nor publish any ecclesiastical law.

_Sect._ 24. When Dr Field(959) speaketh of the power of princes to prescribe and make laws about things spiritual or ecclesiastical, he saith, That the prince may, with the advice and direction of his clergy, command things pertaining to God’s worship and service, both for profession of faith, ministration of the sacraments, and conversation fitting to Christians in general, or men of ecclesiastical order in particular, under the pains of death, imprisonment, banishment, confiscation of goods, and the like; and by his princely power establish things formerly defined and decreed, against whatsoever error and contrary ill custom and observation. In all this the Doctor saith very right; but I demand, further, these two things: 1. What if the thing have not been decreed before? and what if the free assent of the clergy be not had for it? Would the Doctor have said that in such a case the prince hath not power by himself, and by his own sole authority, to enjoin it, and to establish a law concerning it? For example, that king James had not power by himself to impose the controverted ceremonies upon the church of Scotland at that time when as no free assent (much less the direction) of the clergy was had for them, so neither had they been formerly decreed, but laws and decrees were formerly made against them. If the Doctor would have answered affirmatively that he had this power, then why did he, in a scornful dissimulation, so circumscribe and limit the power of princes, by requiring a former decree, and the free assent of the clergy? If he would have answered negatively, that he had no such power, we should have rendered him thanks for his answer. 2. Whether may the clergy make any laws about things pertaining to the service of God which the prince may not as well by himself, and without them, constitute and authorise? If the affirmative part be granted unto us, we gladly take it. But we suppose Dr Field did, and our opposites yet do, hold the negative. Whereupon it followeth that the prince hath as much, yea, the very same power, of making laws in all ecclesiastical things which the clergy themselves have when they are convened in a lawful and free assembly, yet I guess from the Doctor’s words that he would have replied, namely, that the difference is great betwixt the power of making laws about things ecclesiastical in the prince, and the same power in the clergy assembled together; for he describeth the making of a law to be the prescribing of something, under some pain or punishment, which he that so prescribeth hath power to inflict. Whereby he would make it appear that he yieldeth not unto princes the same power of spiritual jurisdiction, in making of ecclesiastical laws, which agreeth to the clergy; because, whereas a council of the clergy may frame canons about things which concern the worship of God, and prescribe them under the pain of excommunication, and other ecclesiastical censures, the ordinance of princes about such matters is only under the pain of some external or bodily punishment. But I answer, _potestas_ διατακτικὴ is one thing, and _potestas_ κειτικὴ is another thing. When the making of a law is joined either with the intention, or with the commination of a punishment, in case of transgression, this is but accidental and adventitious to the law, not naturally nor necessarily belonging to the essence of the same; for many laws there hath been, and may be, which prescribe not that which they contain under the same pain or punishment. Gratian distinguisheth three sorts of laws: _Omnis_, &c. “Every law (saith he(960)) either permits something; for example, let a valorous man seek a reward: or forbids; for example, let it be lawful to no man to seek the marriage of holy virgins: or punisheth; for example, he who committeth murder let him be capitally punished.” And in this third kind only there is something prescribed under a pain or punishment. It is likewise holden by schoolmen,(961) that it is a law which permitteth something indifferent, as well as it which commandeth some virtue, or forbiddeth some vice. When a prince doth statute and ordain, that whosoever, out of a generous and magnanimous spirit, will adventure to embark and hazard in a certain military exploit against a foreign enemy, whom he intendeth to subdue, shall be allowed to take for himself in propriety all the rich spoil which he can lay hold on,—there is nothing here prescribed under some pain or punishment, yet it is a law, and properly so termed. And might not the name of a law be given unto that edict of King Darius, whereby he decreed that all they in his dominions should fear the God of Daniel, forasmuch as he is the living and eternal God, who reigneth for ever, Dan. vi.; yet it prescribed nothing under some pain or punishment to be inflicted by him who so prescribed. Wherefore, though the prince publisheth ecclesiastical laws under other pains and punishments than the clergy doth, this showeth only that _potestas_ κειτικὴ is not the same, but different, in the one and in the other; yet if it be granted that whatsoever ecclesiastical law a synod of the clergy hath power to make and publish, the prince hath power to make and publish without them, by his own sole authority, it followeth, that the power of the church to make laws which is called _potestas_ διατακτικὴ, doth agree as much, as properly, and as directly to the prince, as to a whole synod of the church.

_Sect._ 25. Now, therefore, we firmly hold, 1. That the prince may not innovate any custom or rite of the church, nor publish any ecclesiastical law, without the free assent of the clergy, they being neither unable for, nor unwilling unto, their ecclesiastical functions and duties; yea, further, that so far as is possible, the consent of the whole church ought to be had whensoever any change is to be made of some order or custom in the church; for that which toucheth the whole church, and is to be used by the whole church, _ab omnibus etiam merito curatur_.(962) Therefore, when there is any change to be made in the rites of the church, _merito fit hoc cum omnium ordinum ecclesiae consensu_.(963) Neither was there ever a rightly reformed church which was helped and not hurt by such rites and customs as, to their grief and miscontentment, princes did impose upon them. Whence it was, that “they who were orthodox did ever withstand such a magistrate as would have, by his commandments, tied the church to that which was burdensome to their consciences.”(964) That such inconveniences may be shunned, it is fit, that, when any change is to be made in the policy of a church, not the clergy alone, but the elders also, and men of understanding among the laity, in a lawful assembly, freely give their voices and consent thereunto. Good reason have our writers to hold against Papists, that laymen ought to have place in councils wherein things which concern the whole church are to be deliberated upon. 2. Lest it be thought enough that princes devise, frame, and establish, ecclesiastical laws as them best liketh, and then, for more show of orderly proceeding, some secret and sinistrous way extort and procure the assent of the synod of the church; therefore we add, that it belongeth to the synod (the clergy having the chief place therein, to give direction and advice), not to receive and approve the definition of the prince in things which concern the worship of God, but itself to define and determine what orders and customs are fittest to be observed in such things, that thereafter the prince may approve and ratify the same, and press them upon his subjects by his regal coactive power. To me it is no less than a matter of admiration how Camero could so far forget himself as to say,(965) that in things pertaining unto religion, _dirigere atque disponere penes magistratum est proprie, penes ecclesiasticos ministerium atque executio proprie_, telling us further, that the directing and disposing of such things doth then only belong to ecclesiastical persons when the church suffereth persecution, or when the magistrate permitteth that the matter be judged by the church.

Our writers have said much of the power of the church to make laws, but this man (I perceive) will correct them all, and will not acknowledge that the church hath any power of making laws about things pertaining to religion (except by accident, because of persecution or permission), but only a power of executing what princes please to direct. More fully to deliver our mind, we say, that in the making of laws about things which concern the worship of God, the prince may do much _per actus imperatos_, but nothing _per actus elicitos_. For the more full explanation of which distinction, I liken the prince to the will of man; the ministers of the church to man’s particular senses; a synod of the church to that internal sense which is called _sensus communis_; the fountain and original of all the external things and actions ecclesiastical, or such as concern the worship of God, to the objects and actions of the particular senses; and the power of making ecclesiastical laws to that power and virtue of the common sense, whereby it perceiveth, discerneth, and judgeth of the objects and actions of all the particular senses. Now as the will commandeth the common sense to discern and judge of the actions and objects of all the particular senses, thereafter commandeth the eye to see, and the ear to hear, the nose to smell, &c., yet it hath not power by itself to exercise or bring forth any of these actions, for the will can neither see nor yet judge of the object and action of sight, &c. So the prince may command a synod of the church to judge of ecclesiastical things and actions, and to define what order and form of policy is most convenient to be observed in things pertaining to divine worship, and thereafter he may command the particular ministers of the church to exercise the works of their ministry, and to apply themselves unto that form of church regiment and policy which the synod hath prescribed, yet he may not by himself define and direct such matters, nor make any laws thereanent.

_Sect._ 26. For proof of these things I add, 1. Politic government, _versatur circa res terrenas et hominem externum_ (saith one of our writers(966)); _magistratus_ (saith another(967)) _instituti sunt à Deo rerum humanarum __ quae hominum societati necessariae sunt respectu, et ad carum curam_; but they are ecclesiastical ministers who are “ordained for men in things pertaining to God,” Heb. v. 1, that is, in things which pertain unto God’s worship. It belongeth not therefore to princes to govern and direct things of this nature, even as it belongeth not to pastors to govern and direct earthly things which are necessary for the external and civil society of men, I mean ordinarily and regularly, for of extraordinary cases we have spoken otherwise. But according to the common order and regular form we are ever to put this difference betwixt civil and ecclesiastical government, which one of our best learned divines hath excellently conceived after this manner:(968) _Altera differentia_, &c., “The other difference (saith he) taken from the matter and subject of the administrations. For we have put in our definition human things to be the subject of civil administration, but the subject of ecclesiastical administration we have taught to be things divine and sacred. Things divine and sacred we call both those which God commandeth for the sanctification of our mind and conscience as things necessary, and also those which the decency and order of the church requireth to be ordained and observed for the profitable and convenient use of the things which are necessary; for example, prayers, the administration of the word and sacraments, ecclesiastical censure, are things necessary, and essentially belonging to the communion of saints; but set days, set hours, set places, fasts, and if there be any such like, they belong to the decency and order of the church, without which the church cannot be well edified, nor any particular member thereof rightly fashioned and fitly set in the body. But human things we call such duties as touch the life, the body, goods, and good name, as they are expounded in the second table of the Decalogue, for these are the things in which the whole civil administration standeth. Behold how the very circumstances which pertain to ecclesiastical order and decency are exempted from the compass of civil government.”

2. “Natural reason (saith the Bishop of Salisbury) telleth,(969) that to judge of everything, and to instruct others, belongeth to them who before others take pains and study to the care and knowledge of the same, so physicians judge which meat is wholesome, which noisome. Lawyers declare what is just, what unjust, and in all arts and sciences, they who professedly place their labour and study in the polishing and practising of the same, both use and ought to direct the judgments of others.” Since therefore(970) the ministers of the church are those _quibus ecclesiae cura incumbit vel maxime_, since they do above and before the civil magistrate devote themselves to the care and knowledge of things pertaining to God and his worship, whereabout they profess to bestow their ordinary study and painful travail, were it not most repugnant to the law of natural reason to say that they ought not to direct, but be directed by, the magistrate in such matters?

3. The ministers of the church are appointed to be “watchmen in the city of God,” Mic. vii. 4, and “overseers of the flock,” Acts xx. 28; but when princes do, without the direction and definition of ministers, establish certain laws to be observed in things pertaining to religion, ministers are not then watchmen and overseers, because they have not the first sight, and so cannot give the first warning of the change which is to be made in the church. The watchmen are upon the walls, the prince is within the city. Shall the prince now view and consider the breaches and defects of the city better and sooner than the watchmen themselves? Or shall one, within the city, tell what should be righted and helped therein, before them who are upon the walls? Again, the prince is one of the flock, and is committed, among the rest, to the care, attendance, and guidance of the overseers; and, I pray, shall one of the sheep direct the overseers how to govern and lead the whole flock, or prescribe to them what orders and customs they shall observe for preventing or avoiding any hurt and inconvenience which may happen to the flock?

4. Christ hath ordained men of ecclesiastical order, not only “for the work of the ministry,”(971) that is, for preaching the word and ministering the sacraments, for warning and rebuking them who sin, for comforting the afflicted, for confirming the weak, &c., but also for providing whatsoever concerneth either the private spiritual good of any member of the church, which the Apostle calleth “the perfecting of the saints,” or the public spiritual good of the whole church, which he calleth the “edifying of the body of Christ,” Eph. iv. 12. Since, therefore, the making of laws about such things, without which the worship of God cannot be orderly nor decently (and so not rightly) performed, concerneth the spiritual good and benefit of the whole church, and of all the members thereof, it followeth that Christ hath committed the power of judging, defining, and making laws about those matters, not to magistrates, but to the ministers of the church.

5. The Apostle, speaking of the church ministers, saith, “Obey them that have the rule over you, and submit yourselves for they watch for your souls as they that must give account,” Heb. xiii. 17. Whence we gather, that in things pertaining to God, and which touch the spiritual benefit of the soul, the ministers of the church ought to give direction, and to be obeyed, as those who, in things of this nature, have the rule over all others of the church (and by consequence over princes also), so that it be in the Lord. And lest this place and power which is given to ministers, should either be abused by themselves to the commanding of what they will, or envied by others, as too great honour and pre-eminence, the Apostle showeth what a painful charge lieth on them, and what a great reckoning they have to make. They watch for your souls, saith he, not only by preaching and warning every one, and by offering up their earnest prayers to God for you, but likewise by taking such care of ecclesiastical discipline, order, and policy, that they must provide and procure whatsoever shall be expedient for your spiritual good, and direct you in what convenient and beseeming manner you are to perform the works of God’s worship, as also to avoid and shun every scandal and inconveniency which may hinder your spiritual good. And of these things, whether they have done them or not, they must make account before the judgment seat of the great Bishop of your souls. Surely, if it belong to princes to do fine and ordain what order and policy should be observed in the church, what forms and fashions should be used, for the orderly and right managing of the exercises of God’s worship, how scandals and misorders are to be shunned, how the church may be most edified, and the spiritual good of the saints best helped and advanced, by wholesome and profitable laws, concerning things which pertain to religion, then must princes take also upon them a great part of that charge of pastors, to watch for the souls of men, and must liberate them from being liable to a reckoning for the same.

_Sect._ 27. 6. Constantine the Great, Theodosius, both the one and the other, Martianus, Charles the Great, and other Christian princes, when there was any change to be made of ecclesiastical rites, did not, by their own authority, imperiously enjoin the change, but convocate synods for deliberating upon the matter, as Balduine noteth.(972) The great Council of Nice was assembled by Constantine, not only because of the Arian heresy, but, also (as Socrates witnesseth(973)), because of the difference about the keeping of Easter; and though the bishops, when they were assembled, did put up to him libels of accusation, one against another, so that there could be no great hope of their agreement upon fit and convenient laws; yet, notwithstanding, he did not interpone his own definition and decree, for taking up that difference about Easter, only he exhorted the bishops convened in the council to peace, and so commended the whole matter to be judged by them.

7. We have for us the judgment of worthy divines. A notable testimony of Junius we have already cited. Danaeus will not allow princes by themselves to make laws about ecclesiastical rites,(974) but this he will have done by a synod. _Porro quod ad ritus,_ &c. “Furthermore (saith he), for rites and ceremonies, and that external order which is necessary in the administration of the church, let a synod of the church convene, the supreme and godly magistrate both giving commandment for the convening of it, and being present in it; and let that synod of the church lawfully assembled define what should be the order and external regiment of the church. This decree of the ecclesiastical synod shall the godly and supreme magistrate afterward confirm, stablish, and ratify by his edict.” Joh. Wolphius observeth of king Joash,(975) that he did not by himself take order for the reparation of the temple, nor define what was to be done unto every breach therein, but committed this matter to be directed and cared for by the priests, whom it chiefly concerned, commanding them to take course for the reparation of the breaches of the house, wheresoever any breach should be found, and allowing them money for the work. Whereupon he further noteth, that as the superior part of man’s soul doth not itself hear, see, touch, walk, speak, but commandeth the ears, eyes, hands, feet, and tongue, to do the same; so the magistrate should not himself either teach or make laws, but command that these things be done by the doctors and teachers. Cartwright and Pareus upon Heb. xiii. 17, tell the Papists, that we acknowledge princes are holden to be obedient unto pastors in things that belong unto God, if they rule according to the word, which could not be so, if the making of laws about things pertaining to God and his worship did not of right and due belong unto pastors, but unto princes themselves. Our Second Book of Discipline, chap. 12, ordaineth, “That ecclesiastical assemblies have their place, with power to the kirk to appoint times and places convenient for the same, and all men, as well magistrates as inferiors, to be subject to the judgment of the same in ecclesiastical causes.” Balduine holdeth,(976) that a prince may not by himself enjoin any new ecclesiastical rite, but must convocate a synod for the deliberation and definition of such things. And what mean our writers when they say,(977) that kings have no spiritual but only a civil power in the church? As actions are decerned by the objects, so are powers by the actions: if, therefore, kings do commendably by themselves make laws about things pertaining to God’s worship, which is a spiritual action, then have they also a spiritual power in the church; but if they have no spiritual power, that is, no power of spiritual jurisdiction, how can they actually exercise spiritual jurisdiction? That the making of laws about things pertaining to God’s worship is an action of spiritual jurisdiction, it needeth no great demonstration; for, 1. When a synod of the church maketh laws about such things, all men know that this is an action of spiritual jurisdiction flowing from that power of spiritual jurisdiction which is called _potestas_ διατακτικὴ. And how then can the prince’s making of such laws be called an action of civil, not of spiritual jurisdiction? I see not what can be answered, except it be said, that the making of those laws by a synod is an action of spiritual jurisdiction, because they are made and published with the commination of spiritual and ecclesiastical punishments in case of transgression, but the making of them by the prince is an action of jurisdiction only, because he prescribeth and commandeth, under the pain of some temporal loss or punishment. But I have already confuted this answer, because notwithstanding of the different punishments which the one and the other hath power to threaten and inflict, yet, at least, that part of spiritual jurisdiction which we call _potestas_ διατακτικὴ remaineth the same in both, which power of making laws must not (as I show) be confounded with that other power of judging and punishing offenders. 2. Actions take their species or kind from the object and the end, when other circumstances hinder not. Now, a prince’s making of laws about things pertaining to religion, is such an action of jurisdiction, as hath both a spiritual end, which is the edification of the church and spiritual good of Christians, and likewise a spiritual object; for that all things pertaining to divine worship, even the very external circumstances of the same, are rightly called things spiritual and divine, not civil or human, our opposites cannot deny, except they say, not only that such things touch the lives, bodies, estates, or names of men, and are not ordained for the spiritual benefit of their souls, but also that the synod of the church, whose power reacheth only to things spiritual, not civil or human, can never make laws about those circumstances which are applied unto, and used in the worship of God; and as the prince’s making of laws about things of this nature, is in respect of the object and end, an action of spiritual jurisdiction, so there is no circumstance at all which varieth the kind, or maketh it an action of civil jurisdiction only. If it be said, that the circumstance of the person changeth the kind of the action, so that the making of laws about things pertaining to religion, if they be made by ecclesiastical persons, is an action of spiritual jurisdiction; but if, by the civil magistrate, an action of civil jurisdiction, this were a most extremely unadvised distinction; for so might Uzziah the king have answered for himself, 2 Chron. xxvi. 18, that, in burning incense, he did not take upon him to execute the priest’s office, because he was only a civil person; so may the Pope say, that he might not take upon him the power of emperors and monarchs, because he is an ecclesiastical person. Many things men do _de facto_, which they cannot _de jure_. Civil persons may exercise a spiritual jurisdiction and office, and, again, ecclesiastical persons may exercise a civil jurisdiction _de facto_, though not _de jure_. Wherefore the prince’s making of laws about things spiritual remaineth still an action of spiritual jurisdiction, except some other thing can be alleged to the contrary, beside the circumstance of the person. But some man, peradventure, will object that a prince, by his civil power, may enjoin and command not only the observation of those ecclesiastical rites which a synod of the church prescribeth, but also that a synod (when need is) prescribe new orders and rites, all which are things spiritual and divine. And why then may he not, by the same civil power, make laws about the rites and circumstances of God’s worship, notwithstanding that they are (in their use and application to the actions of worship) things spiritual, not civil.

_Ans._ The schoolmen say,(978) that an action proceedeth from charity two ways, either _elicitive_ or _imperative_, and that those actions which are immediately produced and wrought out by charity, belong not to other virtues distinct from charity, but are comprehended under the effects of charity itself, such as are the loving of good and rejoicing for it. Other actions, say they, which are only commanded by charity, belong to other special virtues distinct from charity. So, say I, an action may proceed from a civil power either _elicitive_ or _imperative_. _Elicitive_ a civil power can only make laws about things civil or human; but _imperative_ it may command the ecclesiastical power to make laws about things spiritual, which laws thereafter it may command to be observed by all who are in the church.

_Sect._ 28. 8. Our opposites themselves acknowledge no less than that which I have been pleading for. “To devise new rites and ceremonies (saith Dr Bilson(979)), is not the prince’s vocation, but to receive and allow such as the Scriptures and canons commend, and such as the bishops and pastors of the place shall advise.” And saith not the Bishop of Salisbury,(980) _Ceremonias utiles et decoras excogitare, ad ecclesiasticos pertinet; tamen easdem comprobare, et toti populo observandas imponere, ad reges spectat_? Camero saith,(981) that it is the part of a prince to take care for the health of men’s souls, even as he doth for the health of their bodies, and that as he provideth not for the curing or preventing of bodily diseases directly and by himself, but indirectly and by the physicians, so he should not by himself prescribe cures and remedies for men’s spiritual maladies. _Perinde principis est curare salutem animarum, ac ejusdem est saluti corporum prospicere: non est autem principis providere ne morbi grassentur directe, esset enim medicus, at indirecte tamen princeps id studere debet._ Whence it followeth, that even as when some bodily sickness spreadeth, a prince’s part is not to prescribe a cure, but to command the physicians to do it; just so, when any abuse, misorder, confusion, or scandal in the church, requireth or maketh it necessary that a mutation be made of some rite or order in the same, and that wholesome laws be enacted, which may serve for the order, decency, and edification of the church, a prince may not do this by himself, but may only command the pastors and guides of the church, who watch for the souls of men as they who must give account, to see to the exigency of the present state of matters ecclesiastical, and to provide such laws as they, being met together in the name of the Lord, shall, after due and free deliberation, find to be convenient, and which, being once prescribed by them, he shall by his royal authority confirm, establish, and press.

_Sect._ 29. Needs now it must be manifest, that the lawfulness of our conforming unto the ceremonies in question can be no way warranted by any ordinance of the supreme magistrate, or any power which he hath in things spiritual or ecclesiastical; and if our opposites would ponder the reasons we have given, they should be quickly quieted, understanding that, before the prince’s ordinance about the ceremonies can be said to bind us, it must first be showed that they have been lawfully prescribed by a synod of the church, so that they must retire and hold them as the church’s ordinance. And what needeth any more? Let us once see any lawful ordinance of the synod or church representative for them, we shall, without any more ado, acknowledge it to be out of all doubt that his Majesty may well urge conformity unto the same.

Now, of the church’s power we have spoken in the former chapter; and if we had not, yet that which hath been said in this chapter maketh out our point. For it hath been proved, that neither king nor church hath power to command anything which is not according to the rules of the word; that is, which serveth not for the glory of God, which is not profitable for edifying, and which may not be done in faith; unto which rules, whether the things which are commanded us be agreeable or not, we must try and examine by the private judgment of Christian discretion, following the light of God’s word.

_Sect._ 30. Resteth the third distinction, whereof I promised to speak, and that was of ties or bonds. _Quoedam obligatio_, &c. “Some bond (saith Gerhard(982)) is absolute, when the law bindeth the conscience simply, so that, in no respect, nor in no case, without the offence of God and wound of conscience, one may depart from the prescript thereof; but another bond is hypothetical, when it bindeth not simply, but under a condition, to wit, if the transgression of the law be done of contempt,—if for the cause of lucre or some other vicious end,—if it have scandal joined with it.” The former way, he saith that the law of God and nature bindeth, and that the law of the civil magistrate bindeth the latter way; and with him we hold that whatsoever a prince commandeth his subjects in things any way pertaining to religion, it bindeth only this latter way, and that he hath never power to make laws binding the former way, for confirmation wherefore we say,

1. The laws of an ecclesiastical synod, to the obedience whereof, in things belonging to the worship of God, we are far more strictly tied than to the obedience of any prince in the world, who (as hath been showed) in this sort of things hath not such a vocation nor power to make laws. The laws, I say, of a synod cannot bind absolutely, but only conditionally, or in case they cannot be transgressed without violating the law of charity, by contempt showed or scandal given, which, as I have made good in the first part of this dispute, so let me now produce for it a plain testimony of the Bishop of Salisbury,(983) who holdeth that the church’s rites and ordinance do only bind in such sort, _ut si extra_, &c., “That if, out of the case of scandal or contempt, through imprudence, oblivion, or some reasonable cause enforcing, they be omitted, no mortal sin is incurred before God; for as touching these constitutions, I judge the opinion of Gerson to be most true, to wit, that they remain inviolated so long as the law of charity is not by men violated about the same.” Much less, then, can the laws of princes about things spiritual or ecclesiastical bind absolutely, and out of the case of violating the law of charity.

2. If we be not bound to receive and acknowledge the laws of princes as good and equitable, except only in so far as they are warranted by the law of God and nature, then we are not bound in conscience to obey them, except only conditionally, in case the violating of them include the violating of the law of God and nature; but the former is true, therefore the latter. It is God’s peculiar sovereignty, that his will is a rule ruling, but not ruled, and that therefore a thing is good because God will have it to be good. Man’s will is only such a rule as is ruled by higher rules, and it must be known to be _norma recta_ before it can be to us _norma recti_.

3. If we be bound to try and examine, by the judgment of discretion (following the rules of the word), whether the things which princes command be right, and such as ought to be done; and if we find them not to be such, to neglect them, then their laws cannot bind absolutely and by themselves, (else what need were there of such trial and examination?) but only conditionally, and in case they cannot be neglected without violating some other law, which is of a superior bond. But the former we have proved by strong reasons, therefore the latter standeth sure.

4. If neither princes may command, nor we do anything which is not lawful and expedient, and according to the other rules of the word, then the laws of princes bind not absolutely, but only in case the neglecting of them cannot stand with the law of charity and the rules of the word; but the former hath been evinced and made good, therefore the latter necessarily followeth.

5. If the laws of princes could bind absolutely and simply, so that in no case, without offending God and wounding our conscience, we could neglect them, this bond should arise either from their own authority, or from the matter and thing itself which is commanded, but from neither of these it can arise, therefore from nothing. It cannot arise from any authority which they have, for if, by their authority, we mean their princely pre-eminence and dignity, they are princes when they command things unlawful as well as when they command things lawful, and so if, because of their pre-eminence their laws do bind, then their unlawful ordinances do bind no less than if they were lawful; but if by their authority we mean the power which they have of God to make laws, this power is not absolute (as hath been said) but limited; therefore from it no absolute bond can arise, but this much at the most, that “kings on earth must be obeyed,(984) so far as they command in Christ.”

Neither yet can the bond be absolute in respect of the thing itself which is commanded.

When princes publish the commandments of God, the things themselves bind whether they should command them or not, but we speak of such things as God’s word hath left in their nature indifferent, and of such things we say, that if being enjoined by princes they did absolutely bind, then they should be in themselves immutably necessary, even secluding as well the laws of princes which enjoin them, as the end of order, decency, and edification, whereunto they are referred. To say no more, hath not Dr Forbesse told us in Calvin’s words,(985) _Notatu dignum_, &c.? “It is worthy of observation, that human laws, whether they be made by the magistrate or by the church, howsoever they be necessary to be observed (I speak of such as are good and just), yet they do not, therefore, by themselves bind the conscience, because the whole necessity of observing them looketh to the general end, but consisteth not in the things commanded.”

6. Whatsoever bond of conscience is not confirmed and warranted by the word is, before God, no bond at all. But the absolute bond wherewith conscience is bound to the obedience of the laws of princes is not confirmed nor warranted by the word; therefore the proposition no man can deny, who acknowledged that none can have power or dominion over our consciences but God only, the great Lawgiver, who alone can save and destroy, James iv. 12. Neither doth any writer, whom I have seen, hold that princes have any power over men’s consciences, but only that conscience is bound by the laws of princes, for this respect, because God, who hath power over our consciences, hath tied us to their laws. As to the assumption, he who denyeth it must give instance to the contrary. If those words of the Apostle be objected, Rom. xiii. 5, “Ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience’ sake.”

I answer, 1. The Apostle saith not that we must obey, but that we must be subject, for conscience’ sake; and how oft shall we need to tell our opposites that subjection is one thing, and obedience another?

2. If he had said that we must obey for conscience’ sake, yet this could not have been expounded of an absolute bond of conscience, but only of an hypothetical bond, in case that which the magistrate commandeth cannot be omitted without breaking the law of charity. If it be said again, that we are not only bidden be subject, but likewise to obey magistrates, Tit. iii. 1: _Ans._ And who denyeth this? But still I ask, are we absolutely and always bound to obey magistrates? Nay, but only when they command such things as are according to the rules of the word, so that either they must be obeyed or the law of charity shall be broken; in this case, and no other, we are bidden obey.