Chapter VII: Part 7

Having established his point thus far he now goes on to prove that it is the greatest of evils for one who has committed injustice not to be punished. To suffer punishment and to be justly chastised, are one and the same thing. But all just things are beautiful. Moreover wherever there is an agent there must also be a patient; and the patient suffers what the agent does; so that if the agent punishes justly the patient also suffers justly. But it has been just admitted that all just things are beautiful; and it was proved before that all beautiful things are good, either because they are pleasant or useful; whence it follows that he who is punished suffers that which is good, and is benefited in being freed from the greatest evil, which is depravity in the soul. From all this it is evident that rhetoric can be of no use whatever: for it is generally employed for the purpose of excusing injustice, and screening men from the punishment they deserve, which on the contrary they ought rather to court than to shun[53].

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Footnote 53:

§ 70-80

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Polus having been thus completely silenced, Callicles takes up the argument and begins by asking whether Socrates is really in earnest. Finding that he is so, he blames Polus for having granted that it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it; for that there is a difference between nature and law, which Socrates perceiving, confounded that which is more base by nature with that which is so by law, and so made that which is more base by law appear to be more so by nature: whereas by nature it is more base to suffer injustice than to commit it. For the weak and the many make laws with a view to their own advantage, but nature herself avows that it is just that the better should have more than the worse, and the more powerful than the weaker. Callicles then proceeds to inveigh against philosophy and philosophers, and when he has done, Socrates, after having indulged in a vein of pleasant irony at his expense, returns to the subject, and asks what he means by the superior, the better, and the stronger, whether they are the same or different. Callicles says they are the same. Socrates objects, that if that is the case the many being stronger are also the better, and so, inasmuch as they make the laws, law and nature are not contrary to each other. Callicles therefore is compelled to change his ground, and next says that by the better and superior he means the more wise: and at last he says that they are those who are skilled and courageous in administering the affairs of a city. He adds that it is just that the governors should have more than the governed. Socrates, hereupon, asks whether they ought not to govern themselves also and be temperate, which elicits from Callicles the shameless avowal that a man should have as large desires as he can, and indulge them without restraint[54].

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Footnote 54:

§ 81-103.

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Socrates having in vain endeavoured to persuade Callicles to change his opinion by two similitudes of a perforated cask, and a full and an empty one, to which he compares the soul, proceeds to combat his assertion that a happy life consists in having and indulging as large desires as possible. If happiness consists in being hungry and eating, thirsty and drinking, it must follow that to be scabby and itch and scratch one’s self is to live happily. Callicles is forced to admit that this is to live pleasantly, and then if pleasantly, happily; and at length is driven to assert that the pleasant and the good are the same. In order to confute this opinion, Socrates leads him to maintain that science and courage differ from each other and from the good; and then by a series of most subtle questions, too minute to be abbreviated, forces him to this absurd conclusion, that if the pleasant and the good are the same, a bad man, inasmuch as he oftentimes receives more pleasure than a good man, must be accounted better than a good one[55].

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Footnote 55:

§ 104-117.

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Callicles to evade this absurdity is compelled to admit that some pleasures are better than others. From this concession Socrates shews that the end of all human actions is the good and not the pleasant; for that so far is it from being the case that we do any thing merely for the sake of pleasure, that we pursue pleasure itself for the sake of the good[56].

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Footnote 56:

§ 118-119.

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Having established this point, Socrates brings back the discussion to the original subject, and proposes to enquire whether it is better to live in such a manner as Callicles advises, namely to devote one’s self to public business and to study rhetoric, or in such a manner as philosophy persuades. He recurs therefore to his own former arguments, in which he stated that as there are certain skills, not arts, employed for the gratification of the body, so there are other corresponding ones made use of to please the soul, such as flute-playing, harp-playing, dithyrambic and even tragic poetry; now take from these last melody, rhythm and measure, and what else remains but words, that is to say a kind of flattery addressed to the multitude? And is not popular rhetoric similar? Callicles answers that there is a difference to be observed in this respect, for that some do, as Socrates has observed, speak only in order to please, but that others look to the interest of the citizens. “That is enough,” says Socrates. At all events one part of rhetoric is flattery, and when has an instance of that which is honourable, which strives to speak what is best, whether it be pleasant or unpleasant to the hearers, ever been seen? Callicles instances Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades and Pericles, but Socrates will by no means admit that any of these really endeavoured to make the people better. But before this, Callicles, being hard pressed in argument, breaks off the discussion, and Socrates, at the request of Gorgias, carries it on by himself, and shews at length and with great force and perspicuity the advantages of a virtuous and well regulated life; and in conclusion he describes the future judgment when each man will give account of himself in another world, and be rewarded or punished according as he has lived a good or a bad life.

GORGIAS,

OR,

ON RHETORIC.

CALLICLES, SOCRATES, CHÆREPHON, GORGIAS, AND POLUS.

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_Cal._ They say, Socrates, that we should thus take part in war and battle[57].

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Footnote 57:

That is, come too late, and so take no part at all.

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_Socr._ Have we then, as the saying is, come after the feast, and are we too late?

_Cal._ And a very elegant feast. For Gorgias has just now exhibited many fine things to us.

_Socr._ Chærephon here, Callicles, is the cause of this, by having compelled us to waste our time in the forum.

_Chær._ It’s of no consequence, Socrates; for I will also find a remedy; for Gorgias is my friend, so that he will exhibit to us now, if you please, or, if you prefer it, at some future time.

2. _Cal._ What, Chærephon? is Socrates desirous of hearing Gorgias?

_Chær._ We are come for this very purpose.

_Cal._ Whenever you please, then, come to my house; Gorgias lodges with me, and will exhibit to you.

_Socr._ You say well[58], Callicles. But would he be inclined to converse with us? For I wish to learn from him what is the power of his art, and what it is that he professes and teaches: the rest of the exhibition, as you say, he may make at some other time.

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Footnote 58:

Or, “you are very obliging.”

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_Cal._ There is nothing like asking him, Socrates: for this is one part of his exhibition: he just now bade all that were in the house ask what question they pleased, and promised to answer every thing.

3. _Socr._ You say well in truth. Ask him, Chærephon.

_Chær._ What shall I ask him?

_Socr._ What he is.

_Chær._ How mean you?

_Socr._ Just as, if he happened to be a maker of shoes, he would surely answer you, that he is a shoemaker. Do you not understand what I mean?

_Chær._ I understand, and will ask him. Tell me, Gorgias, does Callicles here say truly that you promised to answer whatever any one should ask you?

_Gorg._ Truly, Chærephon: for I just now made that very promise: and I affirm that for many years no one has asked me any thing new.

_Chær._ Without doubt, then, you will answer easily, Gorgias.

_Gorg._ You may make trial of that, Chærephon.

_Pol._ By Jupiter, Chærephon, if you please, _make trial_ of me: for Gorgias appears to me to be fatigued; as he has just now been speaking a great deal.

4. _Chær._ What, Polus, do you think you can answer better than Gorgias?

_Pol._ What matters that, if I answer well enough for you?

_Chær._ Not at all: since you wish it then, answer.

_Pol._ Ask.

_Chær._ I ask then, If Gorgias happened to be skilled in the same art as his brother Herodicus is skilled, what name should we rightly give him? Would it not be the same as his brother?

_Pol._ Certainly.

_Chær._ In calling him a physician, then, we should speak correctly?

_Pol._ Yes.

_Chær._ But if he were skilled in the same art as Aristophon, son of Aglaophon, or his brother, what should we properly call him?

_Pol._ Evidently, a painter.

_Chær._ But now, since he is skilled in a certain art, what can we properly call him?

5. _Pol._ Chærephon, there are many arts among men by experience experimentally discovered: for experience causes our life to proceed according to art, but inexperience according to chance. Of each of these different persons partake of different arts, in different manners; but the best of the best; in the number of whom is Gorgias here, who possesses the finest of the arts.

_Socr._ Polus appears, Gorgias, to be very well prepared for speaking: but he does not do what he promised Chærephon.

_Gorg._ How so, Socrates?

_Socr._ He does not appear to me to answer the question that was asked.

6. _Gorg._ Do you then, if you please, ask him.

_Socr._ No, but if yourself would be willing to answer me, I would much rather ask you. For it is evident to me that Polus, from what he has said, has studied more what is called rhetoric, than conversation.

_Pol._ Why so, Socrates?

_Socr._ Because, Polus, when Chærephon asked you in what art Gorgias was skilled, you praised his art, as if some one had blamed it, but you did not say what the art itself is.

_Pol._ Did I not answer, that it was the finest of all arts?

_Socr._ Certainly. But no one asked you what was the quality of the art of Gorgias, but what it was, and by what name we ought to call Gorgias; just as Chærephon proposed the former questions to you, and you answered him well and in few words. Now, therefore, tell me in the same manner, what art Gorgias professes, and what we ought to call him. Or rather, Gorgias, do you tell us yourself what we ought to call you as skilled in what art.

_Gorg._ In rhetoric, Socrates.

7. _Socr._ Ought we, then, to call you a rhetorician?

_Gorg._ And a good one, Socrates, if you wish to call me, as Homer says, what “I boast myself to be.”

_Socr._ But I do wish.

_Gorg._ Call me so, then.

_Socr._ Shall we say too that you are able to make others rhetoricians?

_Gorg._ I profess this not only here but elsewhere.

_Socr._ Are you willing then, Gorgias, to continue, as we are now doing, partly to ask questions and partly to answer, and to defer to some other occasion that prolixity of speech, such as Polus just now began with? But do not belie what you promised, but be willing to answer each question briefly.

_Gorg._ There are some answers, Socrates, which must necessarily be made at length: however, I will endeavour to make them as short as possible. For this is one of the things which I profess, that no one can say the same things in fewer words than me.

8. _Socr._ There is need of this now, Gorgias; give me therefore a specimen of this very thing, conciseness of speech, and of prolixity at some other time.

_Gorg._ I will do so; and you will admit that you never heard any one speak more concisely.

_Socr._ Well then, since you say that you are skilled in the art of rhetoric, and that you can teach another this art, tell me about what is rhetoric employed? just as the art of weaving is employed in the making of garments, is it not so?

_Gorg._ It is.

_Socr._ And is not music also employed in the composing of melodies?

_Gorg._ Yes.

_Socr._ By Juno, Gorgias, I admire your answers, for you answer as briefly as possible.

_Gorg._ I think, Socrates, that I do this well enough.

9. _Socr._ You say well. Come then, answer me thus respecting rhetoric, of what is it the science?

_Gorg._ Of words.

_Socr._ What kind of words, Gorgias? Are they such as inform the sick by what kind of diet they may become well?

_Gorg._ No.

_Socr._ Rhetoric, then, is not concerned with all kinds of words?

_Gorg._ Certainly not.

_Socr._ Yet it makes men able to speak?

_Gorg._ Yes.

_Socr._ And does it not enable men to think on the same things on which it enables them to speak?

_Gorg._ Without doubt.

_Socr._ Does not, then, the medicinal art, of which we just now spoke, make men able to think and speak about the sick?

_Gorg._ Necessarily so.

_Socr._ The medicinal art, then, as it appears, is conversant with words?

_Gorg._ Yes.

_Socr._ And those that concern diseases?

_Gorg._ Just so.

_Socr._ And is not the gymnastic art also conversant with words that relate to the good and bad habit of bodies?

_Gorg._ Certainly.

10. _Socr._ And it is the same with other arts, Gorgias: each of them is conversant with those words that are employed about that particular thing of which each is the art.

_Gorg._ It appears so.

_Socr._ Why, then, do you not call other arts rhetorical, as being conversant with words, since you call that rhetoric which is employed about words?

_Gorg._ Because, Socrates, almost the whole[59] science of other arts is conversant with manual operations and such-like actions; in rhetoric, however, there is no such manual operation, but all its activity and efficiency is by means of words. For this reason, I consider that the art of rhetoric is conversant with words, herein speaking correctly, as I affirm.

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Footnote 59:

The expression ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν qualifies the word πᾶσα, “_almost_ the
whole,” or “the whole, so to speak.”

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_Socr._ Do I understand what kind of art you wish to call it? but I shall soon comprehend it more clearly. However, answer me. We have arts, have we not?

_Gorg._ Yes.

11. _Socr._ Of all the arts, some, I think, consist principally in workmanship, and stand in need of but few words, and others of none at all, but their work may be accomplished in silence, as painting, statuary, and many others. With such arts, you appear to me to say rhetoric has nothing to do? is it not so?

_Gorg._ You apprehend my meaning perfectly, Socrates.

_Socr._ On the other hand, there are other arts which accomplish all by means of words, and require no work at all, or very little, such as theoretical[60] and practical arithmetic, geometry, the game of dice, and many other arts; some of which require almost as many words as actions, and most of them more, so that altogether their whole activity and efficiency is by means of words. You appear to me to say that rhetoric is among arts of this kind.

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Footnote 60:

ἀριθμητική means the theory, λογιστική the practice of arithmetic.

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12. _Gorg._ You say truly.

_Socr._ However, I do not think you mean to call any one of these rhetoric, although in the expression you used you so said, that rhetoric has its efficiency by means of words; and any who wished to catch at your words might reply, Do you say then, Gorgias, that arithmetic is rhetoric? But I do not think that you call either arithmetic or geometry rhetoric.

_Gorg._ You think rightly, Socrates, and apprehend my meaning correctly.

_Socr._ Come then, complete the answer to my question. Since rhetoric is one of those arts which make great use of words, and there are others of the same kind, endeavour to tell me in reference to what rhetoric has its efficiency in words. 13. Just as if any one should ask me respecting any of the arts which I but now mentioned: Socrates, what is the arithmetical art? I should say to him, as you did just now, That it is one of the arts that have their efficiency in words. And if he should further ask me, In reference to what? I should answer, In reference to the knowledge of even and odd, how many there may be of each. But if again he should ask me, What do you mean by the art of computation? I should answer, that this also is one of those arts whose whole efficiency consists in words. And if he should further ask me, In reference to what? I should answer, as they do who draw up motions in the assemblies of the people, That in other respects computation is the same as arithmetic, for it has reference to the same object, that is to say, the even and the odd; but it differs in this respect, that computation considers what relation even and odd have to themselves and to each other in regard to quantity. 14. And if any one should ask me about astronomy, and after I had said that its whole efficiency consists in words, should say, But Socrates, to what do words employed about astronomy refer? I should answer, That they are employed about the course of the stars, and of the sun and the moon, how they are related to each other with respect to velocity.

_Gorg._ And you would answer rightly, Socrates.

_Socr._ Now then do you answer, Gorgias. For rhetoric is one of those arts which accomplish and effect every thing by means of words: is it not so?

_Gorg._ It is so.

_Socr._ Tell me then in reference to what? what is the particular thing about which these words are, which rhetoric uses?

_Gorg._ The greatest of all human concerns, Socrates, and the best.

_Socr._ But, Gorgias, what you say is questionable, and by no means clear. For I think you must have heard at banquets men singing that song in which the singers enumerate that the best thing is health, the second beauty, and the third, as the author of the song says, riches gained without fraud.

_Gorg._ I have heard it; but with what object do you mention this?

15. _Socr._ Because the artificers of those things which the author of the song has commended, namely, the physician, the master of gymnastics, and the money-getter, will forthwith present themselves, and the physician will say: Socrates, Gorgias deceives you. For his art is not employed about the greatest good to men, but mine is. If, then, I should ask him, Who are you that say this? he would probably answer, I am a physician. What then do you say? that the object of your art is the greatest good? How can it be otherwise, Socrates, he would probably say, since its object is health? and what greater good can men have than health? And if after him again the master of gymnastics should say, I too should wonder, Socrates, if Gorgias could shew you any greater good from his art than I can from mine, I should again say to him, And who are you, Sir, and what is your employment? A master of gymnastics, he would say, and my employment is to make men beautiful and strong in their bodies. 16. After the master of gymnastics, the money-getter would say, as I imagine, despising all others, Consider, I beg, Socrates, whether there is any greater good than riches, either with Gorgias, or any one else? I should thereupon say to him, What, then, are you the artificer of this good? He would say, I am. Who are you then? A money-getter. What then? Do you consider riches to be the greatest good to men? I shall say. Assuredly, he will answer. However, Gorgias here contends that his art is the cause of greater good than yours. It is clear then that after this he would ask, And what is this good? let Gorgias answer. Come then, Gorgias, suppose that you are asked by them and by me, and answer, What is this, which you say is the greatest good to men, and of which you are the artificer?

_Gorg._ That which is in reality, Socrates, the greatest good, and is at the same time the cause of liberty to men, and of their being able to rule over others in their several cities.

_Socr._ What then do you say it is?

_Gorg._ I say it is the power of persuading by words judges in a court of justice, senators in the senate-house, and the hearers in a public assembly, and in every other convention of a political nature. Moreover, by this power you will make the physician your slave, and the master of gymnastics your slave, and the money-getter will be found to have gained money, not for himself, but for another, for you who are able to speak, and persuade the multitude.

_Socr._ At length you appear to me, Gorgias, to have shewn as nearly as possible what kind of art you consider rhetoric to be; and if I understand you rightly, you say that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, and that its whole employment and the sum of it terminates in this. Can you say that rhetoric has any further power than that of producing persuasion in the minds of the hearers?

_Gorg._ By no means, Socrates; but you appear to me to have defined it sufficiently. For that is the sum of it.

18. _Socr._ Listen then, Gorgias. Be assured that I, as I persuade myself, if there is any one, who in conversing with another, wishes to know the very thing about which the conversation is, be assured, I say, that I am such a person; and I think that you are too.

_Gorg._ What then, Socrates?

_Socr._ I will now tell you. The persuasion which you speak of as resulting from rhetoric, what it is, and with what particulars it is conversant, be assured I do not clearly understand, not but that I have a suspicion of what I suppose you mean, and about what it is employed: yet I will not the less ask you what persuasion you mean results from rhetoric, and with what particulars it is conversant. Why then do I who have a suspicion ask you, and not rather myself speak? Not on your account, but on account of the discussion, that it may proceed in such a manner as to make the subject of the discussion most clear to us. 19. For consider whether I seem to you right in putting the question to you: just as if I should ask you what kind of a painter is Zeuxis? if you were to tell me that he paints animals, might I not justly enquire of you, what kind of animals he paints? is it not so[61]?

_Gorg._ Certainly.

_Socr._ And would it not be for this reason, because there are also other painters who paint many other animals?

_Gorg._ Yes.

_Socr._ But if no one else but Zeuxis painted them, you would have answered properly.

_Gorg._ Assuredly.

_Socr._ Come then, with respect to rhetoric, tell me, whether it appears to you that rhetoric alone produces persuasion, or do other arts produce it likewise? My meaning is this: Does he who teaches any thing persuade what he teaches, or not?

_Gorg._ He does certainly persuade, Socrates.

_Socr._ Again, if we speak of the same arts of which we just now made mention, does not arithmetic teach us such things as relate to number? and does not an arithmetician the same?

_Gorg._ Certainly.

20. _Socr._ Does it not also persuade?

_Gorg._ Yes.

_Socr._ Arithmetic, then, is an artificer of persuasion.

_Gorg._ It appears so.

_Socr._ If, then, any one should ask us, What persuasion it produces, and with respect to what? we should answer, That which teaches about the quantity of even and odd. In like manner we may shew, that all the other arts of which we spoke just now, produce persuasion, and what kind of persuasion, and with respect to what: is it not so?

_Gorg._ Yes.

_Socr._ Rhetoric then, is not alone an artificer of persuasion.

_Gorg._ You say truly.

_Socr._ Since then, it does not alone produce this effect, but other arts do the same, we may justly, as in the case of the painter, next enquire of the speaker; of what kind of persuasion, and of persuasion on what subject rhetoric is the art? Does it not appear to you that this question may fairly be asked?

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Footnote 61:

I have ventured to read ἢ οὔ for καὶ ποῦ, for which my only excuse is
that the usual reading cannot be rendered intelligibly, and that the
alteration I have ventured to import is an expression very commonly
used by Socrates on similar occasions.

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_Gorg._ It does.

_Socr._ Answer then, Gorgias, since this appears to you to be the case.

21. _Gorg._ I speak then, Socrates, of that persuasion which is produced in courts of justice, and in other public assemblies, as I just now mentioned, and with respect to matters that are just and unjust.

_Socr._ I suspected, Gorgias, that you meant that persuasion, and on such matters. But do not be surprised if I shortly ask you a question that may appear to be evident, but which I shall notwithstanding repeat, for, as I before observed, I ask it for the sake of carrying on the discussion in an orderly manner, and not on your account, but that we may not be in the habit of catching up each other’s words on suspicion; but do you finish what you have to say according to your own plan, just as you please.

_Gorg._ You appear to me to act rightly, Socrates.

_Socr._ Come then, let us examine this too. Do you admit that to learn is any thing?

_Gorg._ I do admit it.

_Socr._ Again? to believe?

_Gorg._ I do.

_Socr._ Whether, therefore, does it appear to you, that to learn and to believe, and learning and belief are the same, or different?

_Gorg._ I think, Socrates, that they are different.

22. _Socr._ You think rightly; and you may know from this; if any one should ask you, Is there, Gorgias, a false and true belief? I think you would say there is.

_Gorg._ I should.

_Socr._ Well then, is there a false and true science?

_Gorg._ Certainly not.

_Socr._ It is clear, therefore, that they (belief and science) are not the same.

_Gorg._ You say truly.

_Socr._ Yet both those who learn are persuaded, and those who believe.

_Gorg._ Such is the case.

_Socr._ Are you willing, therefore, that we lay down two kinds of persuasion, one that produces belief without knowledge, but the other science?

_Gorg._ Certainly.

_Socr._ Which kind of persuasion, then, does rhetoric produce in courts of justice and other public assemblies, respecting what is just and unjust? is it that from which belief springs without knowledge, or that from which knowledge arises?

_Gorg._ It is evident, Socrates, that it is that from which belief springs.

_Socr._ Rhetoric then, as it seems, Gorgias, is the artificer of a persuasion which produces belief, and not of that which teaches respecting the just and unjust.

_Gorg._ It is so.

_Socr._ A rhetorician, therefore, does not profess to teach courts of justice and other public assemblies, respecting things just and unjust, but only to produce belief. For surely he could not teach so great a multitude in a short time things of such great importance.

_Gorg._ Certainly not.

23. _Socr._ Come then, let us see now what we ought to say of rhetoric. For I, indeed, am not yet able to understand what I should say. When an assembly is held in a city, for the choice of physicians, or shipwrights, or any other kind of artificer, is it not the case that the rhetorician will refrain from giving his advice? for it is evident that, in each election, the most skilful artist ought to be chosen. Nor _will he be consulted_ when the question is respecting the building of walls, or the construction of ports or docks, but architects only. Nor, again, when a deliberation occurs respecting the choice of generals, or the marshalling an army against enemies, or the occupation of posts,—but on such occasions those who are skilled in military affairs will give advice, and not rhetoricians. What do you say, Gorgias, on such points? For since you say that you are a rhetorician, and are able to make others rhetoricians, it is proper to enquire of you what are the things about which your art is concerned. And consider that I am labouring for your benefit. For, perhaps, some one who is now within the house may wish to become your disciple; for I perceive some, nay several, who probably are ashamed to question you. 24. In being questioned, therefore, by me, consider yourself to be questioned by them, What would be the consequence to us, Gorgias, if we should put ourselves under your instructions? On what subjects shall we be able to give advice to the city? Whether about the just only and the unjust; or on those subjects of which Socrates just now made mention? Endeavour to answer them.

_Gorg._ I will endeavour, Socrates, to develope clearly the whole power of rhetoric: for you have admirably led the way. You doubtless know that these docks and walls of the Athenians, and the structure of the ports, were made partly on the advice of Themistocles, and partly on that of Pericles, but not of artificers.

_Socr._ This is told of Themistocles, Gorgias: and I myself heard Pericles when he gave us his advice respecting the middle wall[62].

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Footnote 62:

The wall which connected the southern extremities of the long walls
and the Phaleric wall.

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_Gorg._ And when there is an election of any such persons as you mentioned, Socrates, you see that the rhetoricians are the persons who give advice, and whose opinion prevails in such matters.

25. _Socr._ It is because I wonder at this, Gorgias, that I have been for some time asking you, what is the power of rhetoric. For when I consider it in this manner, it appears to me almost divine in its magnitude.

_Gorg._ If you knew all, Socrates, that it comprehends under itself almost all powers! And I will give you a strong proof of this. For I have often, ere now, gone with my brother and other physicians to various sick persons, who would neither drink their medicine, nor suffer themselves to be cut or cauterized by the physician, and when the physician was unable to persuade them, I have done so by no other art than rhetoric. I say too, that if a rhetorician and a physician should go to any city you please, and it were necessary to contend by argument in a general assembly, or any other convention, which should be chosen, a rhetorician or a physician, the physician would be held in no account, but he that has the power of speaking would be chosen, if he pleased. 26. And if he should contend with any other artist whatever, the rhetorician would persuade that he himself should be chosen in preference to any one else. For there is no subject on which a rhetorician will not speak to the multitude more persuasively than any other artist whatever. Such, then, and so great is the power of this art. It is right however, Socrates, to use rhetoric in the same way as any other exercise employed in contests: for it is not right to use other exercises against all men alike; nor, because any one has learnt pugilism, and the pancratium, and to fight with arms, so as to be superior both to friends and enemies, is it therefore proper to strike, or pierce, or slay one’s friends. 27. Nor, by Jupiter, if some one who, by having frequented the palæstra, has made his body robust, and become a pugilist, should afterwards strike his father or mother, or any other of his relatives or friends, would it on that account be proper to hate, and expel from cities, the training masters and those who teach how to fight with arms. For they instructed their pupils in these exercises, in order that they might make a proper use of them against enemies, and those that do wrong, for self-defence, and not for attack; but they contrariwise, use their strength and skill improperly. The teachers, therefore, are not wicked, nor is their art either to be blamed, or for this reason wicked, but they, I think, who do not use it properly. 28. The same may be said of rhetoric. For a rhetorician is able to speak against all men, and on every subject; so that he can best persuade the multitude, in a word, on whatever subject he pleases: but he ought not any the more on this account to detract from the reputation of physicians, because he is able to do it, nor of other artificers; but he should use rhetoric justly, as well as other exercises. In my opinion, however, if any one having become a rhetorician abuses this power and art, it is not proper to hate the teacher and expel him from cities, for he imparted the knowledge of it for just purposes, but the other makes a contrary use of it. It is just, therefore, to hate, banish, and slay him who does not make a right use of it, but not the teacher.

29. _Socr._ I think, Gorgias, that you as well as I, have been present at many discussions, and that you have observed this in them, that it is not easy for men, on whatever subject they undertake to converse, having propounded their ideas to each other, both learning themselves and teaching one another, then to put an end to the conference; but if they have a controversy about any thing, and one says that the other does not speak correctly or clearly, they are indignant, and each thinks that the other is speaking out of envy, from a love of contention, and not seeking what was proposed in the discussion: and some, at length[63], depart in a most disgraceful manner, having[64] reviled each other, and spoken and heard such things that even the bystanders are vexed at themselves for having deigned to listen to such men. 30. But why do I say this? Because you now appear to me to say what does not follow from, or accord with, what you first said respecting rhetoric. I am afraid, therefore, to proceed with my refutation, lest you should suppose that I do not speak with zeal for the subject, that it may be made clear, but out of opposition to you. If, then, you are of that class of men to which I belong, I should gladly question you: but if not, I would forbear to do so. But to what class of men do I belong? To those who are willingly refuted, if they say any thing that is not true, and who willingly refute if any one says any thing that is not true; and who are not less pleased to be refuted than to refute. For I consider the former to be the greater good, inasmuch as it is a greater good one’s-self to be delivered from the greatest evil than to deliver another. For I think no evil so great to man as false opinion on the subjects we are now discussing. If, then, you say that you are such a man, let us continue our discussion; [31.] but if you think we ought to desist, let us give it up, and put an end to the argument.

-----

Footnote 63:

Ficinus, I think, correctly translates τελευτῶντες, _tandem_.

Footnote 64:

Literally “being reviled.”

-----

_Gorg._ But indeed, Socrates, I profess myself to be such a man as you describe. Perhaps, however, it is right to attend to the wishes of the company who are present. For, some time since, before you came, I explained many things to the present company: and now, perhaps, we shall protract it too far if we continue the discussion. We must, therefore, respect their wishes lest we detain any of them, who have something else to do.

_Chær._ You yourselves, Gorgias and Socrates, hear the noise these men make, from their anxiety to hear, if you say any thing. For my part, may I never have so much business, as to be obliged to leave such a discussion and so conducted, from having any thing else more important to do.

32. _Cal._ By the gods, Chærephon, and I too, though I have been present at many conferences, know not whether I have ever been so delighted as now; so that you will gratify me much, should you even be willing to continue the discussion throughout the whole day.

_Socr._ There is no obstacle on my side, Callicles, if only Gorgias is willing.

_Gorg._ After this, Socrates, it would be shameful in me not to be willing, especially as I myself announced that any one might ask what he pleased. But, if it is agreeable to the company, continue the discussion, and ask any question you please.

_Socr._ Hear then, Gorgias, what I wonder at in what you said. For, perhaps, you spoke correctly, and I did not rightly apprehend you. You say that you can make any one a rhetorician, who is willing to be instructed by you?

_Gorg._ Yes.

_Socr._ So that he can speak persuasively on any subject to the multitude, not teaching, but persuading?

_Gorg._ Exactly so.

_Socr._ You said too, that a rhetorician is able to speak more persuasively than a physician, on the subject of health.

_Gorg._ I did say so, at least to a multitude.

_Socr._ Does not, then, this expression “to a multitude” mean to the ignorant? for, surely, among the well-informed he will not be better able to persuade than the physician.

_Gorg._ You say truly.

33. _Socr._ If then he shall be better able to persuade than the physician, he is better able to persuade than one who possesses knowledge?

_Gorg._ Certainly.

_Socr._ Although he is not a physician? is it not so?

_Gorg._ Yes.

_Socr._ But he who is not a physician must, surely, be unskilled in those things in which a physician is skilled.

_Gorg._ Clearly so.

_Socr._ He, therefore, who is ignorant will be more capable than one who possesses knowledge of persuading the ignorant, since a rhetorician is better able to persuade than a physician. Is this the result, or something else?

_Gorg._ That is the result in this instance.

_Socr._ The case therefore is the same as concerns a rhetorician and rhetoric with respect to all other arts: I mean, there is no need for it to know the subjects themselves, how they are circumstanced, but only to discover some means of persuasion, so as to appear to the ignorant to know more than those who possess knowledge.

_Gorg._ Is it not a great advantage, Socrates, without having other arts, but this one only, to be in no respect inferior to artificers?

34. _Socr._ Whether from this being the case, a rhetorician is inferior, or not inferior to others, we will presently consider, if our argument requires it. But first let us consider this: Whether a rhetorician is in the same condition with reference to the just and the unjust, the base and the honourable, the good and the evil, as he is with reference to health, and other things with which other arts are concerned; I mean, that he does not know them, what is good, or what is evil, what is honourable or what is base, what is just, or what is unjust, but is able to devise some means of persuasion respecting them, so that, though he is ignorant, he appears to the ignorant to know more than one who possesses knowledge; or is it necessary that he should know these, and is it requisite that he who is about to learn rhetoric should have acquired these things before he comes to you; if not, will you, who are a teacher of rhetoric, teach him who comes to you none of these things (for it is not your province), but make him appear to the multitude to know these things, though he does not know them, and to seem to be a good man when he is not so? or shall you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows beforehand the truth respecting these things? What is the case in this respect, Gorgias? And, by Jupiter, as you just now promised, unfold the whole power of rhetoric.

35. _Gorg._ I think, Socrates, that any one, if he did not know, would learn these things from me.

_Socr._ Stay; for you say well. If then you make any one a rhetorician, it is necessary that he should know what is just and unjust, either before, or afterwards from your instructions.

_Gorg._ Certainly.

_Socr._ What then? Is he who has learnt carpentering, a carpenter, or not?

_Gorg._ He is.

_Socr._ And is not he who has learnt music, a musician?

_Gorg._ Yes.

_Socr._ And he who has learnt medicine, a physician? And so, in the same way, with regard to other things, is not he who has learnt any particular art such a person as each science respectively makes its proficient?

_Gorg._ Certainly.

_Socr._ By the same reason, then, does it not follow, that he who has learnt just things is just?

_Gorg._ Assuredly.

_Socr._ And he who is just surely performs just actions.

_Gorg._ Yes.

_Socr._ Is it not, therefore, necessary[65] that the just man should wish to do just actions?

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Footnote 65:

Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη [τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι] τὸν [δὲ] δίκαιον βούλεσθαι
δίκαια πράττειν. I concur with Ast and others in thinking that the
words inserted in brackets have been interpolated, and have therefore
omitted them in the translation. Their insertion would break the chain
of the argument.

-----

_Gorg._ It appears so.

_Socr._ The just man, therefore, will never wish to act unjustly.

_Gorg._ Necessarily.

_Socr._ And it follows from the argument that the rhetorician should be just?

_Gorg._ Yes.

_Socr._ A rhetorician, therefore, will never wish to act unjustly?

_Gorg._ It appears not.

36. _Socr._ Do you remember that you said a little before that we ought not to accuse the trainers of youth, nor expel them from cities, if a pugilist does not make a good use of the pugilistic art, and acts unjustly? And so, likewise, if a rhetorician make an unjust use of rhetoric, that we should not accuse the teacher, nor expel him from the city, but the person who acts unjustly, and does not make a proper use of rhetoric? Were these things said, or not?

_Gorg._ They were said.

_Socr._ But now this very same rhetorician appears incapable of ever acting unjustly. Is it not so?

_Gorg._ It appears so.

_Socr._ And it was said, Gorgias, at the commencement of our discussion, that rhetoric is conversant with words, not those respecting the even and the odd, but those respecting the just and the unjust. Was it not so?

37. _Gorg._ It was.

_Socr._ When, therefore, you spoke thus, I supposed that rhetoric could never be an unjust thing, since it always discourses concerning justice. But when you said shortly afterwards that a rhetorician might use rhetoric unjustly, then, wondering, and thinking that the two statements did not accord, I made that remark, that if you should think it a gain to be confuted, as I do, it was worth while to continue the discussion, but if not, to give it up. Afterwards, however, when we were investigating the matter, you see yourself that it is again allowed to be impossible for a rhetorician to make an unjust use of rhetoric, and to be willing to act unjustly. How the case really stands, by the dog, Gorgias, requires no little discussion to examine it thoroughly.

38. _Pol._ What then, Socrates? Have you really such an opinion of rhetoric as you now say? or do you not think that Gorgias was ashamed not to acknowledge that the rhetorician knows what is just, beautiful, and good, and that, if any one should come to him ignorant of these things, he himself would teach them? Then perhaps from this admission some inconsistency in his arguments followed; the very thing which you love, yourself leading the way to such questions. For who do you think will deny that he knows what is just, and can teach it to others? To lead the discussion to such matters is a piece of great rusticity.

_Socr._ Most excellent Polus! we get ourselves friends and sons, for this express purpose, that when we, through being advanced in years, fall into error, you that are younger, being with us, may correct our life both in deeds and words. If, then, Gorgias and I have fallen into any error in our arguments, do you who are present correct us: you ought to do so. And I wish that if any of the things that have been granted appear to you to have been improperly granted, you would retract whatever you please, only I beg you beware of one thing.

_Pol._ What is that?

39. _Socr._ That you would restrain that prolixity of speech which at first you attempted to employ.

_Pol._ What? shall I not be allowed to speak as much as I please?

_Socr._ You would indeed be very badly treated, my excellent friend, if, having come to Athens, where of all Greece there is the greatest liberty of speech, you alone should here be deprived of this liberty. But set this against it: if you speak in a prolix manner, and will not answer a question put to you, should not I be badly treated, if I am not allowed to go away and not listen to you? But if you feel any interest in the discussion that has taken place, and wish to correct it, as I just now said, retract whatever you please, and questioning and being questioned in turn, as Gorgias and I did, confute and be confuted. For you profess, surely, to know the same things as Gorgias; is it not so?

_Pol._ I do.

_Socr._ Will not you, then, also bid any one ask you what question he pleases, as knowing how to answer him.

_Pol._ Assuredly.

_Socr._ Then do whichever of these you please, ask or answer.

40. _Pol._ I will do so; and do you answer me, Socrates. Since Gorgias appears to you to be in doubt respecting rhetoric, what do you say it is?

_Socr._ Do you ask me what kind of art I say it is?

_Pol._ I do.

_Socr._ To tell you the truth, Polus, it does not appear to me to be an art at all.

_Pol._ What, then, does rhetoric appear to you to be?

_Socr._ A thing which you say produced art, in the treatise which I lately read.

_Pol._ What do you say this is?

_Socr._ A certain skill.

_Pol._ Does rhetoric, then, appear to you to be skill?

_Socr._ To me it does, unless you say otherwise.

_Pol._ Of what is it the skill?

_Socr._ Of procuring a certain gratification and pleasure.

_Pol._ Does not rhetoric, then, appear to you to be a beautiful thing, since it is able to gratify mankind?

_Socr._ What, Polus? Have you already heard from me what I say it is, that you afterwards ask me, if it does not appear to me to be beautiful?

_Pol._ Did I not hear you say that it is a certain skill?

_Socr._ Since, then, you prize giving pleasure, are you willing to give me a little pleasure?

_Pol._ I am.

41. _Socr._ Ask me, then, what kind of art cookery appears to me to be.

_Pol._ I do ask you; what kind of an art is cookery?

_Socr._ None at all, Polus.

_Pol._ What is it? say.

_Socr._ I say, then, it is a certain skill.

_Pol._ Of what? say.

_Socr._ I say, of procuring gratification and pleasure, Polus.

_Pol._ Are cookery and rhetoric the same thing?

_Socr._ By no means, but a part of the same study.

_Pol._ Of what study are you speaking?

_Socr._ I fear it would be too rude to speak the truth, for I hesitate to speak on account of Gorgias, lest he should think that I ridicule his profession. But I know not whether this is the rhetoric which Gorgias studies: for it was not at all clear from our late discussion what his opinion is. But what I call rhetoric is a part of a certain thing which does not rank among things beautiful.

_Gorg._ Of what thing, Socrates? say, without fear of offending me.

_Socr._ It appears to me, then, Gorgias, to be a certain study, that does not belong to art, but to a soul that is sagacious and manly, and naturally powerful in its intercourse with men. The sum of it I call flattery. 42. Of this study there appears to me to be many other divisions, and one of them is that of cookery; which, indeed, appears to be an art, but, as I maintain, is not an art, but skill and practice. I also call rhetoric a division of this, and personal decoration, and sophistry, these four divisions relating to four particulars. If, therefore, Polus wishes to enquire, let him enquire, for he has not yet heard what division of flattery I assert rhetoric to be: but he did not observe that I had not yet finished my answer, nevertheless he asks me, if I do not think that it is beautiful. But I shall not answer him, whether I think rhetoric is beautiful or base, till I have first answered what it is. For that would not be right, Polus. If then you wish to enquire, ask me what division of flattery I assert rhetoric to be.

_Pol._ I ask, then, and do you answer, what division it is.

_Socr._ Will you understand me when I answer? For rhetoric, in my opinion, is a semblance of a division of the political art.

_Pol._ What then? Do you say that it is beautiful, or base?

_Socr._ Base, I say; for I call evil things base: since I must answer you, as now knowing what I mean.

43. _Gorg._ By Jupiter, Socrates, but I do not myself understand what you mean.

_Socr._ Very likely, Gorgias: for I have not yet spoken clearly. But Polus here is young and hasty.

_Gorg._ But leave him alone; and tell me in what way you say that rhetoric is a semblance of a division of the political art.

_Socr._ I will endeavour to tell you what rhetoric appears to me to be. And if it is not such as I describe it, Polus here will confute me. Do you not call body something, and soul something?

_Gorg._ How not?

_Socr._ Do you not, then, think that there is a certain good habit of each of these?

_Gorg._ I do.

_Socr._ What then? an apparent good habit, which is not really so? for instance, to explain my meaning, many appear to have a good constitution of body, whom no one but a physician, and a teacher in gymnastics, could easily perceive not to have a good constitution.

_Gorg._ You say truly.

_Socr._ I say that there is something of this kind both in the body and in the soul, which causes the body and the soul to appear to be in a good condition, when they are any thing but so.

44. _Gorg._ Such is the case.