Chapter V: Appendix (1)

CONTAINING

FOUR OCCASIONAL TRACTS

ON

DIFFERENT SUBJECTS AND OCCASIONS.

OCCASIONAL TRACTS,

CHIEFLY

CONTROVERSIAL.

_ADVERTISEMENT._

_The controversial Tracts, which make up this Volume, were written and published by the Author at different times, as opportunity invited, or occasion required. Some sharpness of style may be objected to them; in regard to which he apologizes for himself in the words of the Poet_:

——Me quoque pectoris
Tentavit in dulci juventâ
Fervor——
——nunc ego mitibus
Mutare quæro tristia.

R. W.

REMARKS

ON

MR. WESTON’S “ENQUIRY

INTO

THE REJECTION OF THE

CHRISTIAN MIRACLES

BY THE HEATHENS.”

FIRST PRINTED IN 1746.

ADVERTISEMENT

IN 1746.

The following Remarks were drawn up within a few weeks after the publication of Mr. Weston’s Book; but without any intention of printing them at that time, when it was conceived not unlikely that some more elaborate Answer might come out. But nothing of that kind appearing, and it being now no longer probable that there is in fact any such design, the Author has been induced to review his papers, and to give them, with some small additions and alterations, to the Public. How far that _Public_ will esteem itself obliged to him for having suppressed them thus long, he presumes not to say; but believes himself well intitled to the thanks of the learned _Inquirer_, as having _still_ this merit, that he is the FIRST who has paid his respects to him.

REMARKS

ON A LATE BOOK, ENTITLED,

AN ENQUIRY

INTO

THE REJECTION OF THE

CHRISTIAN MIRACLES

BY THE HEATHENS.

REMARKS ON A LATE BOOK, &c.

The Writer of the _Inquiry into the Rejection of the Christian Miracles by the Heathens_[50] having, as he is well assured[51], an undoubted claim to one of the two reasons for making a work public, _that what it contains_ SHOULD _be new_, and not willing that so uncommon a merit should be thrown away upon his reader, is careful to advertise us of this point himself, and accordingly flourishes upon it with much apparent alacrity and satisfaction through a great part of his Preface. For, not content with this bare assertion of his claim, he grows so elate, as to wonder this important theme should be reserved for him[52], and that no sagacity of former times had been blessed in the discovery. Nay, lest his very Patron should neglect him, or as if he suspected my Lord might look no farther than the Dedication, he scruples not to mention even there the excellency of his work; and is very frank in declaring his own _good opinion_ of it[53].

An exordium like this, we know, is generally inauspicious. However, it may serve to one end, not the least considerable, it may be, in an author’s views, to engage the public attention. For it is indeed but natural to inquire into the peculiar merit of a work that could inspire its writer with such boasts, and fill a place in it, till now sacred to a real or pretended modesty, with such unusual confidence and triumph. And this, we are told, consists in _the discovery of a new solution of a difficulty about miracles[54], which had long perplexed the Inquirer more than all the rest put together_. For, taking into his consideration the argument for the divinity of our holy Religion, as arising therefrom, _he could not help thinking it extremely odd, that such numbers of men, for so long a time, could reject what to Christians in general, and himself in particular, seemed to be of so great weight_[55]. And the embarras he was under from this difficulty put him _upon looking for some solution of it amongst the variety of authors on this subject, both ancient and modern_; but to no purpose, it seems, till the felicity of his own genius had struck out a new route, and led him to seek it _in the low opinion which the heathens entertained of miracles_.

And now the whole discovery is out; and, to say the truth, is every way so surprizing, that an author of less modesty than ours had assumed a still farther merit upon it. For, wherefore else should he rest in the honour of a new _solution_, when the _objection_ itself is _his_? And surely at this time of day, when every species of hostility has been tried, and the whole armoury of the enemy been exhausted in the service, it must be deemed a higher praise of _invention_ to have furnished new arms, than to counteract the use of them. Nor do I pay the author too great a compliment in supposing the objection _his_, since he fairly owns _it has always been passed over_[56], which, in an age like this, when every difficulty relating to Revealed Religion has been sedulously urged, and honestly examined, is in effect saying it was never _started_. And, indeed, this is so much the case, that, instead of dreaming of any objection from this quarter, Christian writers have universally agreed in representing the quick and speedy conversion of the heathen world, as an undeniable evidence of its divinity. And, for the truth of the fact, they appeal to the testimony of the heathens themselves complaining of the enormous growth of the _new sect_; which had spread itself over at orders and degrees of men, insomuch that their altars were neglected, and the temples of their gods left in a manner desolate[57]. Nay, the Christian apologists, we know, braved them to their very face with the incredible progress of Christianity[58]. And thus, instead of its being true, as the Inquirer candidly insinuates, _that there was something so exceedingly perplexed and intricate in the subject itself, or something so critical and dangerous in the solution of it, that it was always thought proper to be kept from view_[59], nothing, on the contrary, can be more evident than that there is no difficulty to be accounted for at all; or, if some more forward projector should affect to make one of it, the pretence might easily, and without any danger, admit a _solution_. So that, upon the whole (if a dealer in novelties were not too much disgraced by so _stale_ an allusion), one should be apt to regard the learned writer as having been pushed on to this Inquiry by much the same spirit as, in an evil hour, led the valorous Knight of _Manca_ out upon his rambles. For, struck with the conceit of his own superior prowess, and considering withal the loss the world might sustain by his not appearing in it, he marched forth into the land of Religious Disputation, in quest of adventures; where, finding no _real_ objections to encounter, he was determined however to create _imaginary_ ones, and so, converting the next innocent thing he came at into a monster, laid out his whole strength and force in the combat. Where too the success of the adventurers is not unlike. For the difficulty, if it be one, is much too hard for the abilities of our Inquirer; as, whatever his antagonist was, the unlucky Knight had always the worst of it. For, in examining the other part of the author’s discovery, his answer to the supposed objection, we shall find that as he set out with a difficulty without grounds, so he will salve it by a fact without proof. And this, it will be owned, consistently enough: for, where a phantom only is to be engaged, the hero but exposes himself that goes against it in _real armour_.

——Frustra _ferro_ diverberet _umbras_.

But let us hear the fact itself. It is maintained then as the basis of the Inquirer’s whole work, _that the heathens in general had a very low opinion of miracles; and that this was not put on by them to serve some particular purposes, but was really a principle that influenced their actions on the most interesting and trying occasions_[60]. The Inquirer has more than once[61] expressed his apprehensions that the _novelty_ of his doctrine would, at least with many of his readers, be a prejudice against its reception; but not once, that I can find, does he appear to have entertained any the least distrust or concern about the truth of it. And yet the public will be apt to think this the fitter object of his fears. For, allowing the utmost weight and force to the several testimonies he has put together, the whole amount of their evidence is this:—_that a few particular persons, many of them under inveterate prejudices against Christianity, expressed but a low opinion of miracles, which they knew to be_ FALSE, _or of certain_ REAL _ones, which they did not believe_. And where is the wonder? Or how has the Inquirer, with all his sagacity, been able to collect a proof of the _low opinion of miracles amongst the heathen in general_ from the unavailing evidence of such witnesses? For, is it strange that the Roman præfects[62] were not the immediate converts of Jesus and Paul, on account of the wonders said to have been done by them? If the Inquirer believes such testimonies to his purpose, I will engage to furnish a long list of them, even as many as there were unconverted heathens, who had the means and opportunity of informing themselves of the truth of his history. Is it remarkable that the miracles of one impostor[63] are not spoken of with _much_ esteem by writers, who were not delivering the popular opinion concerning them, and who had plainly too much sense to believe them themselves? Or is it so much as _true_, either of him, or the others he mentions, that they were then negligently treated by their professed admirers and encomiasts[64]? Or, were it _true_, could any thing more be collected from it than that the miracles imputed to them were too trifling in themselves, or too weakly supported, to be believed?

But we have not yet done with the writer’s negative testimonies. For he thinks _that_ of _Marcellinus_ should not be passed over; though the most he can make of it is, that the historian _dissembles_ a miracle[65] wrought to the utter confusion of his Master, and _relates an event, which he was not at liberty to confute_.

What comes next is indeed _positive_, but still less to the writer’s purpose. We can scarce think him serious, when he would urge the testimony of Hierocles, Celsus, and Julian, the avowed and virulent opposers of Christianity[66], as an evidence of a general contempt of miracles in the heathen world. Nor has he better luck with his philosophers. For, is the opinion of a few atheistical speculatists[67], and perhaps one or two more of better fame, of the least weight in deciding this matter; especially when it is plain, from the very passage referred to[68], that they saw through the imposture of the heathen miracles; and rejected them _merely_ on that account? Can his Ægyptian Gymnosophists, piqued, as they were, at the reputation of the Indian miracles[69], and yet, in effect, confessing their esteem of them by pretending to work such themselves, can these witnesses be thought deserving the least credit? Above all, is the wonder-working _Apollonius_ brought in to disclaim miracles, and that too in a passage intended only to express his contempt of some fooleries in witchcraft[70]? But what the _philosophers_ could not do for him, the _law-givers_ he resolves shall, and therefore brings in a long list of sages[71], all of them, as he thinks, concurring to establish this point. But how? Why, in his _negative_ way of witnessing, _in their making no pretence to miracles_—that is, as every body sees, in their making no pretence to what they _durst not_ counterfeit, or _did not_ want; and when it is certain they _did pretend_ to them in the only safe way of a secret intercourse and communication[72]. But the cause is growing still more desperate. For, are the Christian Apologists to be charged with this _evil principle_[73]? and that only for maintaining, in their occasional disputes with the heathens; what the ablest Divines have ever done, and still continue to maintain, the insufficiency of miracles _alone_, and if taken _by themselves_, to establish the divinity of any revelation? an opinion founded, as it should seem, on the express testimony of Jesus Christ[74]; or, if _false_, which has not been made appear, excusable enough in their situation, when _real_ miracles were owned to be in the power of evil spirits, or when at least the general prevalency of this persuasion amongst their heathen adversaries might render it expedient for the Christian writers to argue on the concession of it. But, ill as this treatment is, the venerable Apologists have no cause of complaint. They share but the same fate, as ONE much their better. For, the _dignity_ of the writer’s witnesses, whatever becomes of their _evidence, is still increasing_[75]; and having made free with the _Fathers_ of the Church (for I say nothing of his _Jews_, not only because he confesses them nothing to his purpose[76], but because, if their evidence has any weight at all, it _determines_ the contrary way[77]), having, as I said, made free with the _Fathers_ of the Church, he next claims the sanction of an _Apostle_. Has then the Inquirer one _sure_ and _certain_ retreat? And is his novelty at last, all spent and wearied as it is, to elude our hopes by finding refuge in the sacred writings[78]? So indeed he would persuade himself or his readers. And this, it must be owned, is _no novel practice_. It is ever the last expedient of a sinking cause, when forsaken of all human help, and fearing the just vengeance of indignant reason, to strive to support itself by laying hold on the altar. But the Scriptures are no _sanctuary_ for falshoods. We shall therefore esteem it no irreverence to approach the holy place, and, as we are instructed in a like case, to take the _fugitive_ from it. The case appears to have been this: In the Apostle’s design of breaking an unchristian faction in the Church of Corinth, which had arose, it seems, from a vain ostentation of human science, his business was to discredit their misapplied learning with the people, and to check the arrogance of these _perverse disputers_ themselves. To this end, he sets himself to shew that it was not on account of any advantage of skill in human learning or eloquence that God was pleased to make choice of the preachers of the Gospel; but that, on the other hand, he rather chose the _foolish_, i. e. the illiterate and uneducated, the better to expose the weakness of human wisdom, and to display, with greater force, the power and excellency of the _Cross of Christ_[79]. And this, he proceeds to observe, is but agreeable to the general œconomy of God’s providence, which doth not conform itself to our views of fitness or expediency; but most commonly by the choice of such instruments and means as to us seem _unfit_ or _inexpedient_, _destroys the wisdom of the wise, and brings to nothing the understanding of the prudent_[80]. A remarkable example of which method of dealing with mankind, continues the Apostle[81], we have in the dispensation of the Gospel, _introduced_ in such a manner, and _established_ by such means, as both to _Jew_ and _Gentile_ appear absurd and unaccountable. _For the Jews ask after a sign_, i. e. look for an outward ostentatious display of worldly power and pre-eminence going along with, and attending on the Messiah; and, under the influence of such prepossession, make that a _sign_ or test of his coming, and even refuse to acknowledge his Divine mission without it[82]. Whilst the Greeks, on the contrary, seduced by the charms of a studied eloquence, or inslaved to the tenets of a conceited philosophy, require the Gospel to be preached in agreement to their notions and prejudices; and reject a Redeemer, whose method of salvation is not conformable to the conclusions of their schools, and whose doctrine is unadorned by the graces of their learning. Whereas, in fact, proceeds the Apostle, our commission is to publish, in all plainness, a religion to the world, fundamentally opposite to the prejudices of both. For its main doctrine, and on which hangs all the rest, is that of a _crucified Saviour_; which therefore, as being offensive to the fond hopes and expectations of the Jew, and not suited to his ideas of the _Divine power_ and greatness, is to him a _stumbling-block_: And being a method of salvation neither agreeing to their conceptions of the Divine _wisdom_, nor set off with the colours of heathen wit, is to the Greeks _foolishness_. Though yet it is to both these _Jews and Greeks_, when rightly instructed in the ways of God’s Providence, _both the power of God and the wisdom of God_[83]. Thus we see, at length, what the writer’s sacred authority is come to; which, having no foundation but in the groundless comment a mistaken passage is thus easily overturned and confuted. For from hence it appears, that the Apostle, far from attesting his whimsy of _the low opinion of miracles amongst the heathens_, does not so much as of Miracles at all: or, if he must be made an evidence in the cause, gives judgment against him; as plainly enough expressing his opinion, that it was not a _contempt of miracles_, but the _conceit of wisdom_, which made the great difficulty to converting the Pagan world.

And now having dispersed his _cloud of witnesses_ (which, unlike the _sacred_ one it would seem to resemble, instead of illustrating and reflecting a fuller light on the _fact_ it surrounds, serves only to obscure and conceal it) having shewn, I say, if not the falshood of his _fact_, at least the insufficiency of his _evidence_ to support it, I might fairly dismiss the remainder of his book without any confutation; the following chapters, as he tells us, being intended to account for this fact, which he presumes to have fully established. But, as he appears unwilling to rest the whole of his cause on the merit of so slight an evidence, and has therefore engaged for a further confirmation of it in the following pages[84], it will be proper to collect in a few words, what additional evidence may arise from that quarter: And in doing this, I shall think it sufficient to examine, not his premises, but conclusion; and so, leaving him in full possession of his _facts_, to argue with him, in agreement to the design of these slight sheets, on the weight and force of his deductions. And here,

1. Allowing him to have proved _the vanity of the heathen pretensions to miracles_, c. iv. v. vi. in the fullest sense he can wish; and that no _real wonder_ was ever wrought, or _oracle_ delivered, by any of the numerous pretenders to either, what will the author say is the proper inference from it?—That therefore the heathens _could_ not but have a low opinion of miracles? That, indeed, would be to his purpose; but nothing can be less supported. For were not such miracles and oracles at least generally believed? Or, if several impostures were detected, does the author imagine that such detection would utterly sink the credit of all future miracles[85]? A writer, so skilled in the workings of superstition, and who appears to have taken much pains to pry into the dark corners of humanity, ought to know, that the passion for wonder is a foible too _intimately_ connected with our nature to be thus easily driven out from it. And the history of mankind gives the strongest confirmation of this, in relating, as it does, notwithstanding the presumed effect of such discoveries, the very ready reception, which Miracles have ever met with. The truth is, the Inquirer might as well have set himself to prove _the vanity of the Popish pretension to miracles_, and then have inferred, from the frequent detection of impostures amongst them, that therefore the Papists cannot but have _a very low opinion of miracles_. This, I say, had been as logically inferred; and yet, I believe the first traveller from Rome, or next account he should look into of Italy, or Spain, would infallibly spoil the argument, and confute his conclusion. And, to do the author justice, he seems not unconscious of this, when, after all the learned pains he had taken to establish this point, he allows, _that though his argument had shewn, what little reason the heathens had to think, that miracles had ever been wrought amongst them at all, yet it does not of consequence follow, that they would certainly make use of the light, that was held out to them_; but observes, _that whether they did or not, their esteem of miracles will be but little increased; for if ever they were alarmed by an appearance, which they could not tell how to account for, or over-borne by the weight of such testimony, as they could not tell how to invalidate, the principle of magic was one general recourse_.

2. His strong-hold, then, we see, at last, is Magic. We shall follow him therefore one step further, and try if we cannot dislodge him from it. The fact conceded to him is, _that the persuasion was pretty general in the heathen world, that by means of magic, that is, of certain superstitious rites, and sacrifices, and by certain words and invocations of dæmons, many things could be done exceeding the power of man; and that accordingly many seeming miracles, wrought amongst them, were imputed to this power of magic_. But then to infer from hence, as the Inquirer would have us, that therefore the heathens under the persuasion of these principles, must necessarily entertain a very low opinion of _all_ miracles, is sure concluding too fast. For, though I could admit this to be a tolerable reason for the rejection of _some Pagan_ miracles, it does not, we see, at all affect the _Christian_; which _only_ are, or ought to be, the concern of his book. So that the argument, fairly stated, confutes itself. For it stands thus: The heathens conceived many miraculous appearances, produced for some _trifling_ or _noxious_ purpose, to be in the power of certain persons, acting under the power of _bad dæmons_[86], and by the means of certain _magical, and superstitious rites_.—THEREFORE they of necessity entertained a low opinion of _all_ miracles, though wrought by pawns, claiming their power and pretensions from _God_ himself, for purposes the most _momentous_ and _benevolent_, and without the interposition of _any_ sacrificial or superstitious rites[87]. But this is not all: We learn from the history of the propagation of Christianity, that in certain places (and who can doubt in all where the pretended powers of magic were opposed to the genuine workings of the Spirit of God?) such methods were used by Christ and his Apostles, as were sufficient to manifest the difference of their miracles from those of magicians, and to assert the divinity of their mission, in the very judgment of the magicians themselves[88]. And this, as it seems, always with such illustrious evidence, as to render it inexcusable in those, who had the opportunity of seeing and examining the difference, to remain unsatisfied of it. For I cannot but think it worthy the Inquirer’s regard, though no _novelty_, that the Heathen charge of _magic_, was but in other words the Jewish accusation of _Beelzebub_; either of them the genuine result of pure unallayed malice, and, concerning which, our Saviour’s determination is well known. And therefore when the learned writer contends, that the Heathens had a low opinion of miracles in general, on account of the supposed power and efficacy of charms, and magical incantations, he might with equal reason here have taken upon him to shew, that the Jews also had it low opinion of miracles in general on account of the supposed power of their diviners, and sorcerers, of which we likewise bear much amongst them, and from their ascribing, as we know they did, many miraculous effects and operations to them: an opinion, which, I presume, the learned writer will not find it to his purpose to maintain.

3. As to the author’s argument from the _multiplication of the Heathen Gods_ (which is the only remaining part of his book I think myself concerned in[89]) if he means to conclude from it, that in consequence of the multitude of pretended miracles, flowing from such belief, miracles themselves must of necessity _lose their force, and sink in their esteem_[90], it is very frivolous, and admits an easy answer. For, besides its inherent weakness of bad logic, in concluding from a cause of possible efficiency to a _certain_ effect, it has the misfortune, in common with his other reasonings on this subject, to be confuted by plain matter of fact. And, for his satisfaction in this point, I refer him once more to the case of the Romanists; who, notwithstanding the multiplicity of their saints, all of them dealers in miracles, and swarming in such numbers as to equal, if not exceed, the rabble of Pagan divinities, do not yet appear to have contracted from thence and disrelish, or disesteem for miracles. The truth is, the whole additional evidence arising from the main of his book in confirmation of his pretended fact, _that the Heathens entertained a low opinion of miracles_, is so very inconsiderable, that, as we now see, it hardly amounts to a bare probability. For, after all, the reader will perhaps incline to think, contrary to what the learned writer directs him, that such prevalency of magic, and multiplicity of gods, is no bad proof of the esteem and credit, that miracles were in amongst them. At least, ’tis no unfair presumption, that a people could not be so averse to miracles, as the author pretends, nor generally be possessed by a thorough contempt of them, when, notwithstanding the frequent detection of _false_ miracles, and more than one degrading solution at hand for the _true_, they should yet be able to maintain their ground, and take such footing in the popular belief, as to be continually affording fresh occasion to imposture, and fresh encouragement to the dealers in this traffic to practise on the wonder and credulity of mankind.

2. And whoever sets out with this surmise, (which is apparently not ill-founded) will find it greatly strengthened in observing, that of all the reproaches cast upon the Heathen world, and of all the prejudices objected to them by the first propagators of Christianity, this of the contempt of miracles was not so much as once mentioned, there not being the least hint, or remotest intimation in the sacred writings of their labouring under any peculiar prepossession of this kind. A circumstance perfectly unaccountable, if what the Inquirer contends for be true, since such prepossession could not but greatly obstruct the Apostolic labours, and make it necessary for them to bend their first care and application that way.

3. And it raises the wonder still higher to observe, that whilst the Heathens escape uncensured in this respect, the Jews are severely rebuked for their incredulity and disregard miracles[91]; where too, by the very cast and turn of the reproof, the Heathens are to be understood as less chargeable on this head, than the Jews.

4. But, what has still the worst aspect on the writer’s scheme, is, that whilst the Apostles are quite silent as to this charge upon the Gentile, nor appear once to rank it in the list of such impediments, as retarded the conversion of the Pagan world, they are at the same time very express in declaring to us, what the chief of those _impediments_ were. They in part have been already suggested[92], and were, if St. Paul may be credited, in reality, these: 1. _A conceit of superior wisdom_ amongst the men of letters and education[93]. And, 2. _The corruptions and gross idolatries_ of the people at _large_[94].

5. But what! it will after all be asked, Is there then no truth in what the leaned writer has advanced concerning the Heathen contempt of miracles; and in particular, is his long detail of principles and circumstances, concurring, as it should seem, to produce such contempt, utterly without all force or meaning?

This has no where been said; and the contrary is what I am now ready to affirm. For, to do the Inquirer justice, it was upon the basis of a good, old truth, that this wondrous novelty was erected. A fine writer[95] will tell us what it was. “We may observe,” (says he, in accounting for the silence of Pagan writers in respect of our Saviour’s history) “that the ordinary practice of MAGIC in those times, with the many pretended PRODIGIES, DIVINATIONS, APPARITIONS, and LOCAL MIRACLES amongst the Heathens, made them less attentive to such news from Judæa, till they had time to consider the NATURE, the OCCASION, and the END of our Saviour’s Miracles, and were awakened by many surprizing events to allow them any consideration at all.” We see here the ground-work of our author’s performance, and have determined to our hands with great accuracy, how far his general position is true, and to what extent the particular circumstances and situation of the Heathens would in _reality_ affect their opinion of miracles. Had the learned writer confined himself within these limits, he would, I conceive, have had reason and history on his side, and, whatever alarm he may be in _from the froward and contentious spirit of party in religion_, no _enemies_ to oppose him. But then this, it must be owned, had been saying nothing _new_: The world had lost the benefit of a discovery, and the author, what of all things he would most regret, the glory of INVENTION.

THE

OPINION

OF AN

EMINENT LAWYER, &c.

FIRST PRINTED IN 1751.

THE

OPINION

OF AN

EMINENT LAWYER,

CONCERNING

THE RIGHT OF APPEAL

FROM THE VICE-CHANCELLOR OF CAMBRIDGE,
TO THE SENATE;

Supported by a short historical Account of
the JURISDICTION of the UNIVERSITY.

In Answer to a late Pamphlet, intitled,

“_An Inquiry into the Right of Appeal from
the Chancellor or Vice-Chancellor of the
University of Cambridge_,” &c.

_Is ne erret, moneo, et desinat lacessere._
_Habeo alia multa, nunc quæ condonabitur;_
_Quæ proferentur post, si perget lædere._

BY A FELLOW OF A COLLEGE.

THE OPINION OF AN EMINENT LAWYER[96], &c.

The dispute _concerning Appeals_, which at present engages the attention of the University of _Cambridge_, is apparently of such importance to the peace and welfare of that great body; that it could not but be expected from any one, who proposed to deliver his thoughts upon it to the world, that he should at least have taken care to inform himself perfectly of the merits of the question, before he presumed, in so public a manner, to concern himself in it.

It must, therefore, surprize the reader of a late _Inquiry into the Right of Appeal, &c._ to find, that the writer of it, whoever he be (for as he chuses to conceal name, I shall not take the liberty to conjecture of it) should adventure to treat a matter of this consequence, without any distinct knowledge of the state of the case itself, or indeed without appearing to possess one single qualification, which is required to do justice to it. For the question, discussed, is of such a nature, that it cannot be determined, nor indeed tolerably treated by any one, who hath not a pretty exact knowledge of the _History_, _Customs_, and _Statutes_, of the University; and who is not, besides, at least competently skilled in the _Civil and Ecclesiastical Laws_. And yet this writer, as though nothing else was required of him, besides a confident face, and willing mind, boldly undertakes to decide upon it, under a perfect incapacity in all these respects. Instead of an accurate acquaintance with the Practice and Usages of the University, it appears he had no further knowledge of them, than what a few hasty and ill-considered extracts from the Register had supplied him with. So far is he from being conversant in the Statutes of the University, that he blunders in every attempt to explain the very easiest of them. And, as to his _Law_, he has only skimmed the surface of it for a few frothy terms, without giving the least proof of his being possessed, in any degree, of the sense and substance of it. This utter inability to discuss a point, he had voluntarily undertaken, must be thought the more extraordinary in a person, who, throughout the whole, assumes an air of authority; and though he professes modestly in his title page to _enquire_, yet, in effect, _prescribes and dictates_ from one end of his _pamphlet_ to the other. The tone of this disputer, whatever becomes of his reasoning, is all along decisive; and he _does and must insist_, as if he thought his very word of force enough to bear down all the reason and argument, that could be opposed to him.

Indeed the superior airs he gives himself, on all occasions, are not without their use. For persons unacquainted, as the generality of his readers must needs be, with the question itself, are readily enough inclined to believe, that a person so _assured_, cannot be so entirely _ignorant_ of the merits of it, as in fact he is. And they who know better, cannot but apprehend somewhat from the assumed authority of a writer, who talks so big; however his total insufficiency might, in other respects, provoke their contempt. For my own part, I could not help considering him as a person of eminent dignity in the University; whose rank in it might give him a right to dictate to the school-boys of the place; for so he gives us to understand, he conceives of _the Members of the University Senate_[97]. In pursuing my conjectures further about him, I was sometimes inclined to think, from the very reverend regard he every where professeth for the Heads of colleges, that he must, himself, be one of that illustrious body and was led to excuse the superiority of his manner from reflecting, that a habit of governing absolutely in his own college (for so he thinks Heads of colleges have a right to govern[98]) had insensibly inspired that despotic style and language, which were so disgustful, and had looked so ungracefully, in any other. But then, again, my profound respect and esteem of that venerable order, and my actual knowledge of the great talents, with which these reverend personages so worthily preside in their high places, would not suffer me to imagine, that any of their number could be _so_ unqualified to treat a matter of a merely academical nature, as this writer had shewn himself to be; and especially, as it immediately concerned their own authority, which they so assiduously study, and so perfectly understand. On the whole, I was forced to dismiss this conjecture, as having no reasonable foundation to rest upon, and, in perfect civility and good manners towards a set of men, for whom I have so sincere an honour, could only conclude him, at last, to be some weak and shallow pedant; unknown and uncountenanced by _them_; whose vanity had done him an ill turn; and thrust him unadvisedly on a weighty office, which he had no warrant, as he had no abilities, to discharge.

Under this opinion, both of the writer and his performance, which, as the reader sees, I took not up upon slight grounds, it was not likely I should ever think of giving myself the least trouble about either; much less that I should believe it worth the while to undertake in form, the examination of a foolish pamphlet, which indeed, I had hardly patience enough to peruse. The truth is, it had lain for ever unnoticed by me among the rubbish, which of late hath so oppressed the publick, on the subject of our academical disputes; or, at least, had been left for some future ACADEMIC to discourse of, at his leisure; had it not been for the _Opinions_ of two truly learned and respectable Lawyers; which the _Inquirer_ had thought fit to intersperse, as a little needful seasoning, in his insipid performance; and which, indeed, give it all the real weight and authority, it can possibly carry with it to men of sense.

The _Inquirer_, as supposing these gentlemen to afford some countenance to the good cause, he is maintaining, thinks fit, on the mention of their names, to drop his crest a little; and, in a lower tone of voice than usual, affects to treat them even with some appearance of respect. Yet this he does in so aukward a manner, as shews it was not usual or familiar to him, to descend to such submissions; for, as the height of that civility, which he was willing to express towards them, he chuses to distinguish them only by the title of the _Gentlemen of the_ LONG ROBE. What impression the idea of a sweeping train may possibly make on the phantasy of this writer, I know not; but I, who am more concerned about the _heads_ than the _tails_ of these learned gentlemen, should have thought it an apter compliment to have turned our attention the other way. Unless, perhaps, he was secretly conscious, that by a little unfair dealing in the proposal of the _Queries_, in relation to which their opinions were asked, their Answers themselves did no real honour to the more essential part of a great lawyer, and so far willing to pin the credit of them intirely on their _gowns_. In plain truth this was the very case, as will appear from the _Queries_ themselves, and the _Answers_; together with a few observations, which I shall beg leave to subjoin to them.

“After stating the _42d_ and _48th_ of Queen _Elizabeth’s_ Statues, some circumstances of Mr. _A—’s_ behaviour, and that an appeal of the same nature with his was not quite unprecedented, the two following Queries were put, [_Inq. p. 28._]

“Qu. I. Whether, in this case, the Vice-Chancellor and his
assessors have not acted solely under the _42d_ Statute; _de
Cancellarii Officio_; and whether any appeal can lie against
the suspension of _A._ by virtue of that Statute? or whether
this case must be deemed one of the _causæ forenses_, and
of consequence subject to an appeal by virtue of the _48th_
Statute, _de Causis Forensibus_?

“Qu. II. Whether, if in the case above stated, the said _A—_
hath a right to appeal from his suspension; the same right
of appeal will not follow to every delinquent scholar, who
shall be punished a trifling mulct or piece of exercise by the
Vice-Chancellor?”

_After stating_, says he, _the 42d_ and _48th Statutes_, &c. Whence it appears, that no other evidence was laid before the Lawyers, with regard to the right of appeals, than certain extracts from Q. _Elizabeth’s_ Statutes: Which was not the most certain method of obtaining an accurate decision. For, though the Queen’s Statutes alone, as we apprehend, afford _sufficient_ evidence of our right, yet they are by no means, as will presently be seen, the _whole_ evidence.

But, waving this consideration, let us come directly to the _Queries_ themselves. The _first_ is a master-piece in its kind, and may be of use to instruct future querists, how to propose their doubts in the most convenient manner.

For instead of asking the Lawyers, whether the powers, given in the _42d_ Statute, are subject to appeal, the question is put to them, whether in suspending Mr. _A—_ they had acted under that Statute? Again; instead of inquiring whether the _jurisdiction_ given in the _two Statutes_ be the same or different, the Query is (on supposition of a difference) to which class of tryals Mr. _A—’s_ case belonged? In short, the Lawyers were made to believe, that this was the main point in dispute, whether the case before them was of a _criminal_ or (as the _Inquirer_ expresses it) of a _forensic_ nature.

It would have been hard indeed if a design so well laid, and so artfully conducted, had failed of success. Accordingly, we find both the Lawyers expressly declaring, that the case in question belonged to the 42d _Statute_, and from thence seeming to infer, that an appeal is not to be allowed.

Answers to the Queries.

“To Q. I. I am of opinion, the Vice-chancellor’s authority in
the case above stated is well founded by the 42d Statute, _de
Cancellarii Officio_, and that the Vice-chancellor and his
assessors acted under that Statute; and that this case does not
fall under the 48th Statute. And I am of opinion that an appeal
does not lie in the present case.

“To Q. II. This in effect is answered by what I have said upon
the first Question. And if an appeal might be allowed in the
present case, it would be of most fatal consequence to all
discipline in the University; since it would take away all
distinction between the two Statutes; and every scholar, who
should fall under any censure or punishment inflicted by the
Vice-chancellor, might have his appeal; and the 42d Statute
would be entirely of no effect.

“_Dec. the 12th, 1750. W. N—._”

“To Q. I. Upon consideration of the two Statutes above recited,
it seems to me that the first was calculated to give a
jurisdiction and power to the Chancellor, or, in his absence,
to the Vice-chancellor, to interpose in criminal matters, _i.
e._ in matters relating to discipline: the latter gives a
jurisdiction or cognizance in civil matters, _i. e._ matters of
controversy concerning civil rights: and therefore the first
gives power, _contumaces, &c. suspensione graduum, carcere, aut
alio leviori supplicio judicio suo castigare_: by the latter,
power is given to determine _causas et lites_, _viz._ _causas
forenses_, for that is the title of the Statute. As to the
first, I think that the jurisdiction is final in the first
instance: for his power is _judicio suo castigare_; and it must
necessarily be so, for immediate imprisonment seems to be one
of the punishments which he may inflict against which there
can be no appeal, for it may be executed before there can be
any appeal. As to the other, _viz._ the civil jurisdiction,
there the statute requires speedy determinations; but gives an
appeal from his sentences in _foro_, and prescribes the manner
of appealing. Upon these principles, I think that no appeal can
lie, the suspension of _A—_ being grounded, I think, on the
Statute _de Cancellarii Officio_; and that this is not _causa
forensis_ within the latter Statute.

“To Q. II. If all offences against the Statutes are punishable
by this Statute, the punishments for the _minora_, as well as
the _majora delicta_, would be appealable; which I think would
be absurd.

_Linc. Inn, Dec. the 13th, 1750. R. W—._”

It is seen that both these opinions rest on one common foundation, _viz._ that the 42d _Statute_ gives authority in none but _criminal_, the 48th in none but _civil_ causes. Now if this support shall appear to be wholly imaginary, all that is built upon it must fall to the ground. Let us proceed then to examine the Statutes themselves; or rather simply to represent what is contained in them. We shall have no occasion for nice distinctions, or remote inferences; the plain literal sense of the passages to be cited will overthrow at once the principle we are opposing; will afford such an evidence as cannot be resisted, until a method of interpreting shall be found out, wholly independent on the received rules of Criticism and Grammar.

The 42d Statute is entitled _De Cancellarii Officio_, and contains an enumeration of the various powers conferred on him by the University. It gives him a right _to hear and decide controversies_; _to call congregations_; _to give and refuse degrees_; _to punish the transgressors of the Statutes_; _to see that the University officers do their duty_; _to inflict censures on some particular sorts of offenders therein named, in some cases with, in others without, the consent of the Heads_; _to give or refuse leave to Members of the Senate to go out of a Congregation before it is ended, and to impose a mulct on those who depart without leave_; _to require the presence of regents and non-regents at Congregations and_ Conciones ad clerum, _and to punish the absent_; and, lastly, _to make new Statutes, with the consent of the University_.

Now I think I may safely refer it to any reader, whether the single design of this Statute was to convey authority in _criminal causes_? or, whether it be not manifestly an enumeration of the various branches of the Chancellor’s power, intended to give, at once, a general view of the whole?

If any one shall think that the administration of _civil_ justice is not here included, I must desire him to read again the very _first_ clause. _Cancellarius potestatem habebit ad_ OMNES—_controversias—tum audiendas tum dirimendas_. Nothing sure but the most outrageous zeal for a desperate cause can make any one affirm that the word _controversias_ is necessarily confined to the _trials of offenders_. But, if not, then the Statute gives jurisdiction of both sorts, in civil as well as criminal causes.

With as little foundation has it been asserted that the jurisdiction given in the 48th Statute relates only to _civil causes_. The single ground of this assertion is the title of the Statute, _viz. De Causis Forensibus_. It happens that a certain set of men, by endeavouring for a long time to deceive others, have in the end deceived themselves. For I would, in charity, suppose them to be sincere, when they translate _causæ forenses_, _causes between party and party_. It is true, no such use of the words can be found in ancient authors, or, in what might have been more convincing to them, modern Dictionaries. But what then? Admitting that a school-boy would have construed these words _trials in court_, or _public trials_, yet this sure cannot be alledged as a precedent to grave and wise men: much less can it be expected they should reverence quotations drawn from heathen writers, who had no idea at all of the ways of supporting discipline in an University.

But if the _title_ of the 48th _Statute_ will not confine the jurisdiction it gives, what shall we say to the Statute itself? It begins with these plain words, never afterwards restrained or limited, OMNES _causæ et lites, quæ ad Universitatis notionem pertinent, tam Procancellarii quam Commissarii judicio subjiciantur_. If this clause be not general, I should be glad to know whether a general clause be possible? whether any words can be invented of sufficient extent to include trials of every sort? But it is not indeed to be thought strange that the same profound critics, who would confine _omnes controversiæ_ to _criminal_ causes, should confine _omnes causæ et lites_ to _civil_ causes only.

After all, I have a good mind to give up this point, for the sake only of trying the experiment, what advantage can be made of it: Let it, then, be supposed that the jurisdiction given in the 48th _Statute_, and the appeals allowed in it, belong only to _civil_ causes; and let it be further supposed that the 42d Statute relates merely to _criminal_ causes. What will follow? That the Queen’s _Statutes_ allow no appeals, for _that the omission in this Statute amounts to a prohibition_? Nothing can be wider from the truth than this conclusion. For, 1st, the powers given to the Chancellor may not be exercised in an arbitrary manner, but in strict conformity to the customs and privileges of the University: If this restriction were not always to be understood, the Chancellor might confer _degrees_ by his _sole_ power; for no mention is made in the Statute of the consent of the University. The powers, then, here given to the Chancellor are to be _limited_ by the known rights of the _Senate_; and among these rights no possible reason can be given why that of _appeals_ should not be included: a right (as will presently appear) of very great antiquity, perhaps not less ancient than the University itself. 2dly. The very same clause which impowers the Chancellor to judge _omnes controversias Scholasticorum_, that is (as we are now to render the words) _all offences committed by Scholars_, requires him to judge _secundum jus civile et eorum privilegia et consuetudines_; and consequently to judge not finally, but under an obligation of having his sentence _re-examined_ on an appeal made to the University.

There is another argument in Mr. _W—’s_ opinion, which seems indeed at first sight, to be more specious. He observes that the Chancellor is to punish _contumacy_ and some other _offences judicio suo_, and seems to think these words might be intended to prevent _appeals_. But the learned person must excuse my differing from him also upon this head. The Queen’s Statute _De Off. Cancell._ is copied, with some alterations, from a Statute upon the same subject in the _first_ collection, she gave the University; as that was _verbatim_ from one of King _Edward’s_. In this Statute the Chancellor was empowered to punish _judicio suo et assensu majoris partis præfectorum collegiorum_; that is, he was appointed _judge_, they _assessors_. But the latter Statute of Queen _Elizabeth distinguished_ these punishments into two sorts, regard being had to the importance of the punishments themselves, and to the rank and condition of the offender. In causes of less moment, and towards offenders of inferior rank, the Chancellor was to proceed _judicio suo_; in others, _non sine consensu præfectorum collegiorum_. These _two_ clauses being so manifestly _opposed_, we cannot surely mistake, if we interpret the former _by his sole judgment_, or _by his single authority_; and suppose that nothing further was intended than to enable him to pass sentence, _without_[99] the concurrence of the Heads; a circumstance which will never shew that his decision ought to be _final_.

There is one point more in which I cannot help dissenting from the gentleman last named. He seems to think there can be no appeal from a sentence of imprisonment; because such sentence is to be executed _immediately_. But I need not observe to so good a judge, that an appeal _apud acta_ may suspend this execution; and he has not favoured us with his reasons why this manner of appealing may not be allowed (as it always has been allowed) in the University.

As to the _second Query_, it is a doubt altogether superfluous; and seems to have been proposed for no other reason than to obtain opinions concerning the _expediency_ of appeals; which is not surely a point of _law_. The learned gentleman, who has declared his sentiments on the question, must therefore pardon us if we do not receive them with the same deference, as if the subject had fallen within the proper limits of his profession.

But I think it unnecessary to dwell any longer on these _Queries_, or the _Answers_ to them; since it is clear that the learned persons were abused by a partial and unfair representation of the case; of which had they been fully informed, as they should have been, by laying before them a just view of the question in debate, and by furnishing them with the proper materials for decide upon it; there is no reason to doubt that persons, so eminently qualified to judge of all disputes of this nature, would have given much more satisfactory opinions about it, and such as the University might safely admit, as decisive in the present case. And I think myself authorized to say this the more confidently, as it luckily happens that the _proper_ Queries concerning this very point were, some years ago, put more honestly by a very excellent person, at that time Vice-chancellor of the University; and therefore answered very _differently_ by the greatest Lawyer[100] of this or any age; from whose decision though there lies an appeal, yet his sentence never _was_, as indeed no good man had ever cause to wish it _should_ be, reversed.

These Queries, together with the Answer of this great person to them, I purpose laying before the Reader, as a full and perfect confutation of all that has been yet advanced against the _right of appeal to the University_; and carrying with it more authority than any thing which the most knowing academical advocate could possibly say for it. But, that the reader may come the better prepared to judge of the merits of his determination, and as some further support to it, for the satisfaction of such as are unacquainted with the state of the case itself, I have judged it not improper, in the first place, to draw together _a brief historical account of the jurisdiction of the University_; collected from authentic monuments, which are well known to such as are versed in academical matters; and which, if there shall be occasion, will be produced at large in a more proper place.