Chapter VIII (2)

Rosenkranz, i. 203 n., ii. 29, 36, 117, 120, 121, 146‐148, 204 n., 212,
217, 225, 377.

Rosini, ii. 447.

Rousseau, i. 247, 343, ii. 136, 353, iii. 106, 325, 338, 397.

Ruins, sublime effect of, i. 267;
analogous to _cadenza_ in music, iii. 241.

Ruisdael, i. 255.

St. Hilaire, August, iii. 55.

St. Hilaire, Geoffroi, ii. 318, iii. 82.

Sakya Muni, iii. 168, 434.

Salvation, the way of, iii. 460‐467.

Sangermano, iii. 301, 308 n.

Sannyasis, i. 496, ii. 352.

Saphir, ii. 274.

Sceptics, i. 123, 124.

Schelling, i. 187, ii. 22, 31, 116, 169, 176, 236, 261, iii. 62, 471.

Schiller, i. 79, 318, ii. 148, 276, 321, iii. 215, 217.

Schleiermacher, i. 67, 262, iii. 394.

Schlegel, iii. 75.

Schmidt, J. J., ii. 371, iii. 308 n.

Schnürrer, iii. 301.

Scholastics, Scholasticism, i. 82, 146, 162, 198 n., ii. 12, 13, 35, 100,
125, 126, iii. 125.

Scholiast, ii. 319.

Schultz, ii. 480.

Schulze, ii. 312.

Science, nature of, i. 36, 58, 80‐90, 105, 106, 229, 238, ii. 53, 252,
267.

Scott, Sir Walter, ii. 427, 457, iii. 328, 386, 399.

Scopas, iii. 195.

Sculpture, as opposed to painting, i. 292, iii. 193;
æsthetic effect of, iii. 200, 201;
significance of drapery in, i. 296;
antique, i. 309, iii. 194, 195;
modern, iii. 195.

Secundus, Johannes, iii. 195.

Selfishness. See _Egoism_.

Self‐knowledge, ii. 423.

Self‐renunciation, meaning of, iii. 423;
the appearance of freedom in the phenomenon, i. 388, 389.

Seneca, i. 75, 246, 379, ii. 149, 234, 347, 350, 355‐358, 458.

Sensation, ii. 186‐191.

Senses, ii. 193‐200.

Sensibility, i. 13.

Sentimentality, i. 512, 513.

Serenity, i. 422, iii. 376.

Seriousness, as the opposite of laughter, ii. 280;
as determining the tendency of life, iii. 149.

Sex, degree of, iii. 356.

Sextus Empiricus, i. 62, 93, 343, ii. 127.

Sexual impulse, difference between man and brute with reference to, i.
171, iii. 309;
significance and power of, i. 423, 425, 310, 312‐314, 376;
physiological correlative of, iii. 314;
its relation to happiness of life, iii. 376;
voluntary renunciation of satisfaction of, i. 430, iii. 376.

Shaftesbury, iii. 397.

Shakers, iii. 449.

Shakspeare, i. 21, 268, 511, ii. 239, 254, 306, 315, iii. 210, 214, 216,
321, 363, 369, 400, 457.

Shame, i. 424, iii. 379.

Shenstone, ii. 275.

Siècle, iii. 112 n.

Sight, sense of, ii. 193 _seq._

Simonists, iii. 305.

Simplicius, ii. 157.

Sirach, Jesus, iii. 352.

Sketches, value of, iii. 178.

Skull, explained from vertebræ iii. 85.

Slavery, as a wrong, i. 432.

Sleep, necessity of, ii. 337, 428, 462, 463, 466;
action of vital force in, ii. 463, 466;
positive character of, ii. 464;
relation to brain life, ii. 465;
relation to death, i. 358, iii. 267 _seq._

Socialists, iii. 250.

Socrates, i. 288, 343, ii. 107, 281, 363, iii. 299, 249, 252, 405.

Somnambulism, ii. 467, iii. 98 _seq._

Sömmering, iii. 21.

Sophist, distinguished from philosopher, ii. 362, 363.

Sophistry, i. 63, ii. 263, 264.

Sophocles, i. 21, 295, 328, iii. 214.

Soul, historical, iii. 2, 3, 13;
opposition between soul and body, ii. 102‐104, 378;
in what sense the word should be used, iii. 105;
a motive which has led to the assumption of, ii. 409;
theoretical and practical results of assumption, ii. 77, 409, 494.

Southey, ii. 427.

Space, ideality of, ii. 201‐204, 221;
opposition between space and time with reference to abstract knowledge,
i. 69, 70;
union of space and time the condition of duration and matter, i. 10‐13,
ii. 78;
the framework of the phenomenal world, i. 187, 188;
whether the world is limited in space, ii. 109
(Cf. _Principium individuationis_).

Spallanzani, ii. 469.

Species, iii. 123.

_Spectator_, ii. 233.

Spinal cord, ii. 483‐484.

Spinoza, on benevolence, i. 486;
biography of, i. 497;
explanation and use of concepts, i. 111, ii. 241, 266;
ethical teaching of, i. 114, 367, iii. 403;
God of, iii. 106;
on knowledge of Ideas, i. 231, 232 n.;
on immortality, iii. 280, 291;
on love, iii. 338;
method of, i. 100 n., 108, ii. 212;
his place in western philosophy, ii. 13 n.;
rejection of spiritualism, ii. 177;
conception of substance, i. 33, ii. 373, 391;
rejection of teleology, iii. 91, 93, 94;
on will, i. 164, 377, 385, ii. 120.

Spiritualism, ii, 177.

Stahl, i. 64.

State, the, i. 442‐448, 451, iii. 409‐411.

Statics, ii. 226.

Stewart, Dugald, ii. 226, 240.

Stobæus, i. 114, 117, 118, 378, 506 n., ii. 137, 319, 350.

Stoics, Stoicism, i. 113‐120, ii. 453.

Strauss, D. F., iii. 437, 457.

Stupidity, i. 30.

Style, ii. 44, 246, 247.

Suarez, i. 146, 162, 198 n., ii. 13, 89, 100.

Subject, the, has two parts, i. 132;
of will, iii. 126;
of knowing, i. 3, 6, 16, 123, 124, ii. 166‐169, 170 _seq._;
pure, will‐less subject of knowing, i. 253 _seq._, iii. 128 _seq._

Sublime, the, i. 259‐268.

Substance, origin and content of concept, ii. 103, 104;
principle of permanence of, ii. 78 _seq._;
and accident, i. 12 _seq._, ii. 79, 80.

Succession, i. 9.

Suetonius, iii. 321.

Suffering, universality of, i. 399 _seq._;
sanctifying power of, i. 511;
of life, i. 401‐407, 417, iii. 114.

Sufism, iii. 423, 432.

Suicide, i. 408, 514‐520, iii. 117.

Suidas, ii. 98.

Sulzer, ii. 141.

Supernaturalism, ii. 369

Swift, iii. 399.

Swoon, the twin‐brother of death, iii. 256.

Sybarites, ii. 199.

Syllogism, ii. 292‐304.

Symbolism, i. 308 _seq._

Symmetry, analogy with rhythm iii. 240, 241.

Sympathy, definition and division, iii. 419.

Systems, philosophical, ground of interest in, ii. 360, 361;
contrast between Schopenhauer’s and others, i. 32, ii. 180, 393;
division of those starting from object, i. 33;
error of those which proceed historically, i. 352;
criteria of truth of, ii. 391.

Tatianites, iii. 439.

Tauler, iii. 434, 435.

Teleology, i. 201‐210, iii. 77‐95.

Tennemann, i. 67, ii. 12.

_Termini technici_, iii. 312.

Tersteegen, i. 496.

Tertullian, ii. 368, iii. 305, 439.

Thales, i. 33.

Theodicy, iii. 394, 404.

Theon of Smyrna, iii. 313.

Thilo, iii. 158.

Thing in itself, as opposed to phenomenon, i. 40, 44, 128, 142 145, 157,
166, ii. 31, 168, 169, 402, 403, iii. 292;
how knowledge of it can be attained, i. 41, 128, ii. 31, 174, 175, 404,
405;
in what sense it is the _will_, i. 142, ii. 407;
why our knowledge of it is not exhaustive, i. 157, ii. 406, iii. 9, 24,
25, 27, 286 _seq._;
in history of philosophy, i. 220, ii. 30, 117, 174, 185, 380, 390, iii.
45.

Tholuk, iii. 432.

Thorwaldsen, iii. 195.

Thracians, iii. 398.

Tiedemann, ii. 470.

Tien, ii. 97.

Time, nature of, i. 9, 44, ii. 205, iii. 12;
ideality of, ii. 201, 204;
_prædicabilia a priori_ of, 121 _seq._ (Cf. _Space_).

_Times_, the, i. 178 n., ii. 459, iii. 304, 450.

Tourtual, ii. 187.

Tragedy, i., 326‐330, iii. 212‐216. 454.

Transcendent, ii. 387.

Transcendental knowledge, i. 224;
philosophy, ii. 11.

Travelling, æsthetic effect of, iii. 131.

Trent, decrees of Council of, iii. 441.

Treviranus, ii. 470, iii. 35.

Truth, definition, i. 30, ii. 308;
foundation of, i. 100‐103;
difference between conceivability and truth, ii. 278;
relation to proof, i. 83, 84;
power of, i. 45, 179.

Understanding, function of, i. 13, 14;
identity of nature at different grades, i. 26, 28, 29;
why sensibility is everywhere accompanied by, i. 30, 31, 228;
misuse of word, ii. 241;
defects and advantages of knowledge of, ii. 253;
keenness of, i. 27, 245.

Ungewitter, iii. 304.

Universal, two kinds of, i. 301‐303, iii. 124, 125;
knowledge of, ii. 335, 336;
universal truths, ii. 308.

Upham, iii. 282.

Utopias, i. 451, iii. 331.

Valentinians, iii. 305, 438.

Vaninus, Jul. Cæsar, iii. 32, 106.

Vauvenarque, ii. 251.

Vedas, 9, 21, 114, 234, 266, 364 n., 458, 501, ii. 108 n., 362, iii. 303,
307, 426, 427, 433, 467.

Velocity, ii. 226, 227.

Virgil, i. 293, 295.

Virtue, source of genuine, i. 475, 477, ii. 149, 252;
cannot be taught, i. 475, ii. 149;
relation to happiness, i. 466, iii. 420;
distinguished from reasonableness, ii. 134;
transition to asceticism, iii. 424, 425.

Voltaire, i. 327, 329, ii. 157, 277, 428, 469, iii. 178, 252, 368, 395.
398, 404.

Vyaso, iii. 282.

Weeping, i. 486‐488, iii. 406.

Weighing, two ways of, ii. 227.

Whewell, ii. 323.

Wieland, i. 246, ii. 427, iii. 200.

Will, subject of, iii. 126;
identity of subject of will and knowledge, 132;
as the thing in itself, i. 142, ii. 407;
contrast between will and its phenomenal appearance, i. 145, 166,
213‐215, iii. 69‐71;
objectification of, i. 130, 166‐168, ii. 468;
assertion of, i. 421‐427, iii. 376‐381;
denial of, i. 488‐514, iii. 420‐459.

Windischmann, iii. 307, 425 n.

Winkelmann, i. 289, 290, 292, 295, 309, 318, ii. 153.

Winkelried, Arnold von, ii. 134.

_Wirklichkeit_, i. 10.

Wit, i. 77, ii. 268, 277.

Wolf, i. 111, ii. 70 n., 90, 97, 102, 127, 225, 479, iii. 85.

Wordsworth, ii. 427.

Wrong, conception of, i. 431‐437.

Xenophanes, ii. 220, iii. 8.

Xenophon, i. 288.

Yama, iii. 258.

Yang, i. 187.

Yin, i. 187.

Y‐King, i. 188, 343.

Youth, i. 324, iii. 304.

Yunghahn, iii. 112.

Zaccaria, Abbé, iii. 441.

Zend Avesta, 111. 391, 446.

Zeno, i. 117 118.

CORRIGENDA AND ADDENDA IN VOL. I.

Page xxxii. _insert_

Preface to the Third Edition.

What is true and genuine would more easily gain room in the world if it were not that those who are incapable of producing it are also sworn to prevent it from succeeding. This fact has already hindered and retarded, when indeed it has not choked, many a work that should have been of benefit to the world. For me the consequence of this has been, that although I was only thirty years old when the first edition of this work appeared, I live to see this third edition not earlier than my seventy‐ second year. Yet for this I find comfort in the words of Petrarch: _Si quis tota die currens, pervenit ad vesperam satis est_ (_de vera Sapientia_, p. 140). If I also have at last arrived, and have the satisfaction at the end of my course of seeing the beginning of my influence, it is with the hope that, according to an old rule it will endure long in proportion to the lateness of its beginning.

In this third edition the reader will miss nothing that was contained in the second, but will receive considerably more, for, on account of the additions that have been made in it, it has, with the same type, 136 pages more than the second.

Seven years after the appearance of the second edition I published two volumes of “Parerga and Paralipomena.” What is included under the latter name consists of additions to the systematic exposition of my philosophy, and would have found its right place in these volumes, but I was obliged to find a place for it then where I could, as it was very doubtful whether I would live to see this third edition. It will be found in the second volume of the said “Parerga,” and will be easily recognised from the headings of the chapters.

FRANKFORT‐ON‐THE‐MAINE, _September 1859_.

Page xiv. line 9, _for_ “pancorum” _read_ “paucorum.” " xix. " 17, _for_ “alchemists” _read_ “adepts.” " xx. " 10, _after_ “there” _insert_ “unanimous.” " xxi. " 3, _for_ “will appeal to any thinking mind no matter when it comprehends it” _read_ “will also some time be comprehended by another thinking mind.” " xxii. last line, _after_ “not” _insert_ “in this case.” " xxiii. line 26, _for_ “conceptions” _read_ “conception.” " " " 32, _for_ “origin” _read_ “stem.” " xxiv. " 20, _for_ “a chromatic” _read_ “an achromatic.” " 6, line 15, _for_ “universality” _read_ “common or reciprocal nature.” " 21, " 31, _for_ “Σιδωλ” _read_ “Ειδωλ.” " 31, " 7, _for_ “micrometre” _read_ “micrometer.” " 41, " 11, _for_ “θαυμαξειν” _read_ “θαυμαζειν.” " 45, " 22, _after_ “its” _insert_ “iron.” " 45, " 23, _for_ “extend to” _read_ “quench.” " 48, " 31, _for_ “λογιμον” _read_ “λογικον.” " 49, " 22, _after_ “to” _insert_ “abstract”. " 50, " 14, _after_ “function” _insert_ “the construction of the concept.” " 62, " 26, _for_ “Kallisthenes” _read_ “Callisthenes.” " 75, " 1, _for_ “fictum” _read_ “fictam.” " 91, " 18, _for_ “latter” _read_ “former.” " 93, lines 8 and 33, _for_ “νουμενον” _read_ “νοουμενον.” " 99, line 17, _for_ “42” _read_ “32.” " 114, " 7, _for_ “ευδαι μονειν” _read_ “ενδαιμονειν.” " 116 note, _for_ “εφαρμοεξειν” _read_ “εφαρμοζειν.” " 117, line, 30, _for_ “ψνχης” _read_ “ψυχης.” " 118, lines 10, 12, _for_ “Kleanthes” _read_ “Cleanthes.” " 119, line 7, _for_ “philospher” _read_ “philosopher.” " 141, " 18, _for_ “Σστιν” _read_ “Εστιν.” " 146, " 23, _for_ “became” _read_ “become.” " 157, line 4, _for_ “casuality” _read_ “causality.” " 166, " 3, _insert_ § 25. " 169, " 5, _for_ “Laertes” _read_ “Laertius.” " 172, " 32, _for_ “casuality” _read_ “causality.” " 182, " 8, _for_ “quidities” _read_ “quiddities.” " 184, " 30, _for_ “this” _read_ “thus.” " 205, " 35, _for_ “casuality” _read_ “causality.” " 220, " 32, _for_ “ειδη” _read_ “ειδη.” " 222, " 24, _for_ “casuality” _read_ “causality.” " 223, lines 4 and 33, _for_ “casuality” _read_ “causality.” " 224, line 8, _for_ “casuality” _read_ “causality.” " 230, " 19, _for_ “Apollo of Belvedere” _read_ “Apollo Belvedere.” " 231, last line, _for_ “Meus” _read_ “Mens.”

Page 247, line 17, _for_ “Great wits to madness sure are near allied” _read_ “Great wits are sure to madness near allied.” The lines are not from Pope, as Schopenhauer says, but from Dryden’s “Absalom and Achitophel,” Pt. i., l. 163. " 251, " 15, _for_ “appear” _read_ “appears.” " 258, " 18, _for_ “Ahrimines” _read_ “Ahriman.” " 276, lines 9 and 11, _for_ “casuality” and “casual” _read_ “causality” and “causal;” line 23, _for_ “Timaus” _read_ “Timæus.” " 382, line 32, _for_ “as” _read_ “but.” " 396, " 5, _for_ “αναγκη” _read_ “αναγκῃ.” " 423, " 35, _for_ “principiu mindividuationis” _read_ “principium individuationis.” " 425, " 7, _no comma after_ “βασιλειαν.” " 429, " 25, _after_ “chapter” _insert_ “of his.” " 445, last line, _for_ “ζην” _read_ “ζῃν.” " 453, lines 4 and 5, _for_ “παρ” _read_ “πας.” " 455, line 10, _for_ “prineipium” _read_ “principium.” " 463, " 27, _for_ “ever” _read_ “every.” " 467, " 5, _for_ “πρως” _read_ “προς.” " 496, " 25, _for_ “Wiedergeborennen” _read_ “Wiedergeborenen.” " 520, " 9, _for_ “though this is hard to find out” _read_ “which is certainly hard to explain.” " 531, " 16, _for_ “wish to fruition” _read_ “desire to aversion.”

FOOTNOTES

1 This chapter is connected with the last half of § 27 of the first
volume.

2 _De Augm. Scient._, L. vi. c. 3.

3 This chapter is connected with § 23 of the first volume.

4 This chapter and the following one are connected with § 28 of the
first volume.

5 Let me here remark in passing that, judging from the German
literature since Kant, one would necessarily believe that Hume’s
whole wisdom had consisted in his obviously false scepticism with
regard to the law of causality, for this alone is everywhere
referred to. In order to know Hume one must read his “Natural
History of Religion” and his “Dialogues on Natural Religion.” There
one sees him in his greatness, and these, together with Essay 21 “Of
National Characters,” are the writings on account of which—I know of
nothing that says more for his fame—even to the present day, he is
everywhere hated by the English clergy.

6 This chapter is connected with § 29 of the first volume.

7 In the _Siècle_, 10th April 1859, there appears, very beautifully
written, the story of a squirrel that was magically drawn by a
serpent into its very jaws: “Un voyageur qui vient de parcourir
plusieurs provinces de l’ile de Java cite un exemple remarqueable du
pouvoir facinateur des serpens. Le voyageur dont il est question
commençait à gravir Junjind, un des monts appelés par les Hollandais
Pepergebergte. Après avoir pénétré dans une épaisse forêt, il
aperçut sur les branches d’un kijatile un écureuil de Java à tête
blanche, folâtrant avec la grâce et l’agilité qui distinguent cette
charmante espèce de rongeurs. Un nid sphérique, formé de brins
flexible et de mousse, placé dans les parties les plus élevées de
l’arbre, a l’enfourchure de deux branches, et une cavité dans le
tronc, semblaient les points de mire de ses jeux. A peine s’en
était‐il éloigné qu’il y revenait avec une ardeur extrême. On était
dans le mois de Juillet, et probablement l’écureuil avait en haut
ses petits, et dans le bas le magasin à fruits. Bientôt il fut comme
saisi d’effroi, ces mouvemens devinrent désordonnés, on eut dit
qu’il cherchait toujours à mettre un obstacle entre lui et certaines
parties de l’arbre: puis il se tapit et resta immobile entre deux
branches. Le voyageur eut le sentiment d’un danger pour l’innocente
bête, mais il ne pouvait deviner lequel. Il approcha, et un examen
attentif lui fit découvrir dans un creux du tronc une couleuvre
lieu, dardant ses yeux fixes dans la direction de l’écureuil. Notre
voyageur trembla pour le pauvre écureuil. La couleuvre était si
attentive à sa proie qu’elle ne semblait nullement remarquer la
présence d’un homme. Notre voyageur, qui était armé, aurait donc
prevenir en aide à l’infortuné rongeur en tuant le serpent. Mais la
science l’emporta sur la pitié, et il voulut voir quelle issue
aurait le drame. Le dénoûment fut tragique. L’écureuil ne tarda
point à pousser un cri plaintif qui, pour tous ceux qui le
connaissent, dénote le voisinage d’un serpent. Il avança un peu,
essaya de reculer, revint encore en avant, tâche de retourner en
arrière. Mais s’approcha toujours plus du reptile. La couleuvre,
roulée en spirale, la tête au dessus des anneaux, et immobile comme
un morceau de bois, ne le quittait pas du regard. L’écureuil, de
branche en branche, et descendant toujours plus bas, arriva jusqu’à
la partie nue du tronc. Alors le pauvre animal ne tenta même plus de
fuir le danger. Attiré par une puissance invincible, et comme poussé
par le vertige, il se précipita dans la gueule du serpent, qui
s’ouvrit tout à coup démesurément pour le recevoir. Autant la
couleuvre avait été inerte jusque là autant elle devint active dès
qu’elle fut en possession de sa proie. Déroulant ses anneaux et
prenant sa course de bas en haut avec une agilité inconcevable, sa
reptation la porta en un clin d’œil au sommet de l’arbre, où elle
alla sans doute digérer et dormir.”

In this example we see what spirit animates nature, for it reveals
itself in it, and how very true is the saying of Aristotle quoted
above (p. 106). This story is not only important with regard to
fascination, but also as an argument for pessimism. That an animal
is surprised and attacked by another is bad; still we can console
ourselves for that; but that such a poor innocent squirrel sitting
beside its nest with its young is compelled, step by step,
reluctantly, battling with itself and lamenting, to approach the
wide, open jaws of the serpent and consciously throw itself into
them is revolting and atrocious. What monstrous kind of nature is
this to which we belong!

8 “_Augustini de civit. Dei_,” L. xi. c. 27, deserves to be compared
as an interesting commentary on what is said here.

9 This chapter is connected with §§ 30‐32 of the first volume.

10 This chapter is connected with §§ 33‐34 of the first volume.

11 This chapter is connected with § 36 of the first volume.

12 There is nothing else in the world but the vulgar.

13 In Medwin’s “Conversations of Lord Byron,” p. 333.

14 This chapter is connected with the second half of § 36 of the first
volume.

15 _Rgya Tcher Rol Pa, Hist. de Bouddha Chakya Mouni, trad. du
Tibétain_, p. _Foucaux_, 1848, p. 91 et 99.

16 In German inferiors are sometimes addressed as _Er_ instead of
_Sie_.—_Trs._

17 This chapter is connected with § 38 of the first volume.

18 This chapter is connected with § 49 of the first volume.

19 This chapter is connected with § 43 of the first volume.

20 This chapter is connected with §§ 44‐50 of the first volume.

21 This chapter is connected with § 51 of the first volume.

22 Lichtenberg (“_Vermischte Schriften_,” new edition, Göttingen, 1884,
vol. iii. p. 19) quotes Stanislaus Leszczynski as having said, “_La
modestie devroit être la vertu de ceux, a qui les autres manquent_.”

23 This chapter is connected with § 51 of the first volume.

24 Let me remark in passing that from this opposition of ποιησις and
ἱστορια the origin, and also the peculiar significance, of the first
word comes out with more than ordinary distinctness; it signifies
that which is made, invented, in opposition to what is discovered.

25 This chapter is connected with § 52 of the first volume.

26 It would be a false objection that sculpture and painting are also
merely in space; for their works are connected, not directly, but
yet indirectly, with time, for they represent life, movement,
action. And it would be just as false to say that poetry, as speech,
belongs to time alone: this is also true only indirectly of the
words; its matter is all existent, thus spatial.

27 This chapter is connected with § 54 of the first volume.

28 _In gladiatoriis pugnis timidos et supplices, et, ut vivere liceat,
obsecrantes etiam odisse solemus; fortes et animosos, et se acriter
ipsos morti offerentes servare cupimus_ (_Cic. pro Milone_, c. 34).

29 The suspension of the _animal_ functions is sleep, that of the
_organic_ functions is death.

30 There is only _one present_, and this is always: for it is the sole
form of actual existence. One must attain to the insight that the
_past_ is not _in itself_ different from the present, but only in
our apprehension, which has time as its form, on account of which
alone the present exhibits itself as different from the past. To
assist this insight, imagine all the events and scenes of human
life, bad and good, fortunate and unfortunate, pleasing and
terrible, as they successively present themselves in the course of
time and difference of places, in the most checkered
multifariousness and variety, as _at once and together_, and always
present in the _Nunc stans_, while it is only apparently that now
this and now that is; then what the objectification of the will to
live really means will be understood. Our pleasure also in _genre_
painting depends principally upon the fact that it fixes the
fleeting scenes of life. The dogma of metempsychosis has proceeded
from the feeling of the truth which has just been expressed.

31 This posthumous essay is to be found in the “Essays on Suicide and
the Immortality of the Soul” by the late David Hume, Basil, 1799,
sold by James Decker. By this reprint at Bâle these two works of one
of the greatest thinkers and writers of England were rescued from
destruction, when in their own land, in consequence of the stupid
and utterly contemptible bigotry which prevailed, they had been
suppressed through the influence of a powerful and insolent
priesthood, to the lasting shame of England. They are entirely
passionless, coldly rational investigations of the two subjects
named.

32 Death says: Thou art the product of an act which should not have
been; therefore to expiate it thou must die.

33 _Sancara, s. de theologumenis Vedanticorum_, ed. F. H. H.
Windischmann, p. 37; “_Oupnekhat_,” vol. i. p. 387 _et_ p. 78;
Colebrooke’s “Miscellaneous Essays,” vol. i. p. 363.

34 The etymology of the word Nirvana is variously given. According to
Colebrooke (“Transact. of the Royal Asiat. Soc.,” vol. i. p. 566) it
comes from _va_, “to blow,” like the wind, and the prefixed negative
_nir_, and thus signifies a calm, but as an adjective
“extinguished.” Obry, also, _Du Nirvana Indien_, p. 3, says:
“_Nirvanam en sanscrit signifie à la lettre extinction, telle que
celle d’un feu_.” According to the “Asiatic Journal,” vol. xxiv. p.
735, the word is really Neravana, from _nera_, “without,” and
_vana_, “life,” and the meaning would be _annihilatio_. In “Eastern
Monachism,” by Spence Hardy, p. 295, Nirvana is derived from _vana_,
“sinful desires,” with the negative _nir_. J. J. Schmidt, in his
translation of the history of the Eastern Mongolians, says that the
Sanscrit word Nirvana is translated into Mongolian by a phrase which
signifies “departed from misery,” “escaped from misery.” According
to the learned lectures of the same in the St. Petersburg Academy,
Nirvana is the opposite of Sanfara, which is the world of constant
re‐birth, of longings and desires, of illusion of the senses and
changing forms, of being born, growing old, becoming sick, and
dying. In the Burmese language the word Nirvana, according to the
analogy of other Sanscrit words, becomes transformed into Nieban,
and is translated by “complete vanishing.” See Sangermano’s
“Description of the Burmese Empire,” translated by Tandy, Rome,
1833, § 27. In the first edition of 1819 I also wrote Nieban,
because we then knew Buddhism only from meagre accounts of the
Burmese.

35 “_Disputatio de corporum habitudine, animæ, hujusque virium
indice._” _Harderov._, 1789, § 9.

36 Lichtenberg says in his miscellaneous writings (Göttingen, 1801,
vol. ii. p. 447): “In England it was proposed to castrate thieves.
The proposal is not bad: the punishment is very severe; it makes
persons contemptible, and yet leaves them still fit for trades; and
if stealing is hereditary, in this way it is not propagated.
Moreover, the courage ceases, and since the sexual passion so
frequently leads to thefts, this cause would also disappear. The
remark that women would so much the more eagerly restrain their
husbands from stealing is roguish, for as things are at present they
risk losing them altogether.”

37 I have not ventured to express myself distinctly here: the courteous
reader must therefore translate the phrase into Aristophanic
language.

38 The fuller discussion of this subject will be found in the
“Parerga,” vol. ii. § 92 of the first edition (second edition, pp.
167‐170).

39 [The appendix to this chapter was added only in the third edition of
the German, and is meant to explain, in consistency with
Schopenhauer’s general principles, the wide prevalence of the
practice of pederasty, among different nations and in different
ages. It is omitted.—_Trs._]

40 This chapter is connected with § 60 of the first volume.

41 This chapter is connected with §§ 56‐59 of the first volume. Also
chapters 11 and 12 of the second volume of the “Parerga and
Paralipomena” should be compared with it.

42 All that we lay hold of resists us because it has its own will,
which must be overcome.

43 This chapter is connected with §§ 55, 62, 67 of the first volume.

44 This chapter is connected with § 68 of the first volume. Chapter 14
of the second volume of the Parerga should also be compared with it.

45 If, on the contrary, asceticism is admitted, the list of the
ultimate motives of human action, given in my prize essay on the
foundation of morals, namely: (1) our own good, (2) the ill of
others, and (3) the good of others, must be supplemented by a
fourth, our own ill; which I merely mention here in passing in the
interests of systematic consistency. In the essay referred to this
fourth motive had to be passed over in silence, for the question
asked was stated in the spirit of the philosophical ethics
prevailing in Protestant Europe.

46 _Cf._ F. H. H. Windischmann’s _Sancara, sive de theologumenis
Vedanticorum_, pp. 116, 117, 121; and also _Oupnekhat_, vol. i. pp.
340, 356, 360.

47 Cf. _Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik_, p. 274 (second edition, p.
271).

48 If we keep in view the essential immanence of our knowledge and of
all knowledge, which arises from the fact that it is a secondary
thing which has only appeared for the ends of the will, it then
becomes explicable to us that all mystics of all religions
ultimately attain to a kind of ecstasy, in which all and every
knowledge, with its whole fundamental form, object and subject,
entirely ceases, and only in this sphere, which lies beyond all
knowledge, do they claim to have reached their highest goal, for
they have then attained to the sphere in which there is no longer
any subject and object, and consequently no more knowledge, just
because there is no more will, the service of which is the sole
destiny of knowledge.

Now, whoever has comprehended this will no longer regard it as
beyond all measure extravagant that Fakirs should sit down, and,
contemplating the tip of their nose, seek to banish all thought and
perception, and that in many passages of the Upanischads
instructions are given to sink oneself, silently and inwardly
pronouncing the mysterious Oum, in the depths of one’s own being,
where subject and object and all knowledge disappear.

49 _S. Bonaventuræ vita S. Francisci_, ch. 8. K. Hase, “_Franz von
Assisi_,” ch. 10. “_I cantici di S. Francesco,_” _editi da Schlosser
e Steinle., Francoforto, s.M._, 1842.

50 _Michælis de Molinos manuductio spiritualis; hispanice 1675, italice
1680, latine 1687, gallice in libro non adeo raro, cui titulus:
Recueil de diverses pièces concernant le quiétisme, ou Molinos et
ses disciples. Amstd., 1688._

51 Matt. xix. 11 _seq._; Luke xx. (1 Thess. iv. 3; 1 John iii. 3); Rev.
35‐37; 1 Cor. vii. 1‐11 and 25‐40, xiv. 4.

52 Cf. “_Ueber den Willen in der Natur_,” second edition, p. 124; third
edition, p. 135.

53 For example, John xii. 25, 31, xiv. 30, xv. 18, 19, xvi. 33; Col.
ii. 20; Eph. ii. 1‐3; I John ii. 15‐17, iv. 4, 5. On this
opportunity one may see how certain Protestant theologians, in their
efforts to misinterpret the text of the New Testament in conformity
with their rationalistic, optimistic, and unutterably shallow view
of life, go so far that they actually falsify this text in their
translations. Thus H. A. Schott, in his new version given with the
Griesbach text of 1805, has translated the word κοσμος, John xv. 18,
19, by _Judœi_, 1 John iv. 4, by _profani homines_; and Col. ii. 20,
στοιχεια του κοσμον by _elementa Judaica_; while Luther everywhere
renders the word honestly and correctly by “_Welt_” (world).

54 _Unusquisque tantum juris habet, quantum potentiâ valet_ (_Tract.
pol._, c. 2 § 8). _Fides alicui data tamdiu rata manet, quamdiu
ejus, qui fidem dedit, non mutatur voluntas_ (_Ibid._, § 12).
_Uniuscujusque jus potentiâ ejus definetur_ (_Eth._ iv., _pr._ 37,
_schol._ 1.) Especially chap. 16 of the _Tractatus theologico‐
politicus_ is the true compendium of the immorality of Spinoza’s
philosophy.

55 [In preparing this Index Frauenstädt’s _Schopenhauer‐Lexikon_ has
been freely used.—_Trs._]