Chapter I (3)

18. Let us look next at the passage: “So, then, it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.”[535] For they who find fault say: If “it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy,” salvation does not depend upon ourselves, but upon the arrangement[536] made by Him who has formed[537] us such as we are, or on the purpose[538] of Him who showeth mercy when He pleases. Now we must ask these persons the following questions: Whether to desire what is good is virtuous or vicious; and whether the desire to run in order to reach the goal in the pursuit of what is good be worthy of praise or censure? And if they shall say that it is worthy of censure, they will return an absurd answer;[539] since the saints desire and run, and manifestly in so acting do nothing that is blameworthy. But if they shall say that it is virtuous to desire what is good, and to run after what is good, we shall ask them how a perishing nature desires better things;[540] for it is like an evil tree producing good fruit, since it is a virtuous act to desire better things. They will give [perhaps] a third answer, that to desire and run after what is good is one of those things that are indifferent,[541] and neither beautiful[542] nor wicked. Now to this we must say, that if to desire and to run after what is good be a thing of indifference, then the opposite also is a thing of indifference, viz. to desire what is evil, and to run after it. But it is not a thing of indifference to desire what is evil, and to run after it. And therefore also, to desire what is good, and to run after it, is not a thing of indifference. Such, then, is the defence which I think we can offer to the statement, that “it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.”[543] Solomon says in the book of Psalms (for the song of Degrees[544] is his, from which we shall quote the words): “Unless the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it; except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh in vain:”[545] not dissuading us from building, nor teaching us not to keep watch in order to guard the city in our soul, but showing that what is built without God, and does not receive a guard from Him, is built in vain and watched to no purpose, because God might reasonably be entitled the Lord of the building; and the Governor of all things, the Ruler of the guard of the city. As, then, if we were to say that such a building is not the work of the builder, but of God, and that it was not owing to the successful effort of the watcher, but of the God who is over all, that such a city suffered no injury from its enemies, we should not be wrong,[546] it being understood that something also had been done by human means, but the benefit being gratefully referred to God who brought it to pass; so, seeing that the [mere] human desire is not sufficient to attain the end, and that the running of those who are, as it were, athletes, does not enable them to gain the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus—for these things are accomplished with the assistance of God—it is well said that “it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.” As if also it were said with regard to husbandry what also is actually recorded: “I planted, Apollos watered; and God gave the increase. So then neither is he that planteth anything, neither he that watereth; but God that giveth the increase.”[547] Now we could not piously assert that the production of full crops was the work of the husbandman, or of him that watered, but the work of God. So also our own perfection is brought about, not as if we ourselves did nothing;[548] for it is not completed[549] by us, but God produces the greater part of it. And that this assertion may be more clearly believed, we shall take an illustration from the art of navigation. For in comparison with the effect of the winds,[550] and the mildness of the air,[551] and the light of the stars, all co-operating in the preservation of the crew, what proportion[552] could the art of navigation be said to bear in the bringing of the ship into harbour?—since even the sailors themselves, from piety, do not venture to assert often that they had saved the ship, but refer all to God; not as if they had done nothing, but because what had been done by Providence was infinitely[553] greater than what had been effected by their art. And in the matter of our salvation, what is done by God is infinitely greater than what is done by ourselves; and therefore, I think, is it said that “it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.” For if in the manner which they imagine we must explain the statement,[554] that “it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy,” the commandments are superfluous; and it is in vain that Paul himself blames some for having fallen away, and approves of others as having remained upright, and enacts laws for the churches: it is in vain also that we give ourselves up to desire better things, and in vain also [to attempt] to run. But it is not in vain that Paul gives such advice, censuring some and approving of others; nor in vain that we give ourselves up to the desire of better things, and to the chase after things that are pre-eminent. They have accordingly not well explained the meaning of the passage.[555]

FROM THE LATIN.

19. After this there followed this point, that “to will and to do are of God.”[556] Our opponents maintain that if to will be of God, and if to do be of Him, or if, whether we act or desire well or ill, it be of God, then in that case we are not possessed of free-will. Now to this we have to answer, that the words of the apostle do not say that to will evil is of God, or that to will good is of Him; nor that to do good or evil is of God; but his statement is a general one, that to will and to do are of God. For as we have from God this very quality, that we are men,[557] that we breathe, that we move; so also we have from God [the faculty] by which we will, as if we were to say that our power of motion is from God,[558] or that the performing of these duties by the individual members, and their movements, are from God. From which, certainly, I do not understand this, that because the hand moves, _e.g._ to punish unjustly, or to commit an act of theft, the act is of God, but only that the power of motion[559] is from God; while it is our duty to turn those movements, the power of executing which we have from God, either to purposes of good or evil. And so what the apostle says is, that we receive indeed the power of volition, but that we misuse the will either to good or evil desires. In a similar way, also, we must judge of results.

FROM THE GREEK.

19. Besides these, there is the passage, “Both to will and to do are of God.”[560] And some assert that, if to will be of God, and to do be of God, and if, whether we will evil or do evil, these [movements] come to us from God, then, if so, we are not possessed of free-will. But again, on the other hand, when we will better things, and do things that are more excellent,[561] seeing that willing and doing are from God, it is not we who have done the more excellent things, but we only appeared [to perform them], while it was God that bestowed them;[562] so that even in this respect we do not possess free-will. Now to this we have to answer, that the language of the apostle does not assert that to will evil is of God, or to will good is of Him (and similarly with respect to doing better and worse); but that to will in a general[563] way, and to run in a general way, [are from Him]. For as we have from God [the property] of being living things and human beings, so also have we that of willing generally, and, so to speak, of motion in general. And as, possessing [the property] of life and of motion, and of moving, _e.g._ these members, the hands or the feet, we could not rightly say[564] that we had from God this species of motion,[565] whereby we moved to strike, or destroy, or take away another’s goods, but that we had received from Him simply the generic[566] power of motion, which we employed to better or worse purposes; so we have obtained from God [the power] of acting, in respect of our being living things, and [the power] to will from the Creator,[567] while we employ the power of will, as well as that of action, for the noblest objects, or the opposite.

FROM THE LATIN.

20. But with respect to the declaration of the apostle, “Therefore hath He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth He yet find fault? For who hath resisted His will? Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?”[568] Some one will perhaps say, that as the potter out of the same lump makes some vessels to honour, and others to dishonour, so God creates some men for perdition, and others for salvation; and that it is not therefore in our own power either to be saved or to perish; by which reasoning we appear not to be possessed of free-will. We must answer those who are of this opinion with the question, Whether it is possible for the apostle to contradict himself? And if this cannot be imagined of an apostle, how shall he appear, according to them, to be just in blaming those who committed fornication in Corinth, or those who sinned, and did not repent of their unchastity, and fornication, and uncleanness, which they had committed? How, also, does he greatly praise those who acted rightly, like the house of Onesiphorus, saying, “The Lord give mercy to the house of Onesiphorus; for he oft refreshed me, and was not ashamed of my chain: but, when he had come to Rome, he sought me out very diligently, and found me. The Lord grant unto him that he may find mercy of the Lord in that day.”[569] Now it is not consistent with apostolic gravity to blame him who is worthy of blame, _i.e._ who has sinned, and greatly to praise him who is deserving of praise for his good works; and again, as if it were in no one’s power to do any good or evil, to say that it was the Creator’s doing that every one should act virtuously or wickedly, seeing He makes one vessel to honour, and another to dishonour. And how can he add that statement, “We must all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one of us may receive in his body, according to what he hath done, whether it be good or bad?”[570] For what reward of good will be conferred on him who could not commit evil, being formed by the Creator to that very end? or what punishment will deservedly be inflicted on him who was unable to do good in consequence of the creative act of his Maker?[571] Then, again, how is not this opposed to that other declaration elsewhere, that “in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth, and some to honour, and some to dishonour. If a man therefore purge himself from these, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified, and meet for the Master’s use, prepared unto every good work.”[572] He, accordingly, who purges himself, is made a vessel unto honour, while he who has disdained to cleanse himself from his impurity is made a vessel unto dishonour. From such declarations, in my opinion, the cause of our actions can in no degree be referred to the Creator. For God the Creator makes a certain vessel unto honour, and other vessels to dishonour; but that vessel which has cleansed itself from all impurity He makes a vessel unto honour, while that which has stained itself with the filth of vice He makes a vessel unto dishonour. The conclusion from which, accordingly, is this, that the cause of each one’s actions is a pre-existing one; and then every one, according to his deserts, is made by God either a vessel unto honour or dishonour. Therefore every individual vessel has furnished to its Creator out of itself the causes and occasions of its being formed by Him to be either a vessel unto honour or one unto dishonour. And if the assertion appear correct, as it certainly is, and in harmony with all piety, that it is due to previous causes that every vessel be prepared by God either to honour or to dishonour, it does not appear absurd that, in discussing remoter causes in the same order, and in the same method, we should come to the same conclusion respecting the nature of souls, and [believe] that this was the reason why Jacob was beloved before he was born into this world, and Esau hated, while he still was contained in the womb of his mother.

FROM THE GREEK.

20. Still the declaration of the apostle will appear to drag us to the conclusion that we are not possessed of freedom of will, in which, objecting against himself, he says, “Therefore hath He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth He yet find fault? For who hath resisted His will? Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?”[573] For it will be said: If the potter of the same lump make some vessels to honour and others to dishonour, and God thus form some men for salvation and others for ruin, then salvation or ruin does not depend upon ourselves, nor are we possessed of free-will. Now we must ask him who deals so with these passages, whether it is possible to conceive of the apostle as contradicting himself. I presume, however, that no one will venture to say so. If, then, the apostle does not utter contradictions, how can he, according to him who so understands him, reasonably find fault, censuring the individual at Corinth who had committed fornication, or those who had fallen away, and had not repented of the licentiousness and impurity of which they had been guilty? And how can he bless those whom he praises as having done well, as he does the house of Onesiphorus in these words: “The Lord give mercy to the house of Onesiphorus; for he oft refreshed me, and was not ashamed of my chain: but, when he was in Rome, he sought me out very diligently, and found me. The Lord grant to him that he may find mercy of the Lord in that day.”[574] It is not consistent for the same apostle[575] to blame the sinner as worthy of censure, and to praise him who had done well as deserving of approval; and again, on the other hand, to say, as if nothing depended on ourselves, that the cause was in the Creator[576] why the one vessel was formed to honour, and the other to dishonour. And how is this statement correct:[577] “For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad,”[578] since they who have done evil have advanced to this pitch of wickedness[579] because they were created vessels unto dishonour, while they that have lived virtuously have done good because they were created from the beginning for this purpose, and became vessels unto honour? And again, how does not the statement made elsewhere conflict with the view which these persons draw from the words which we have quoted (that it is the fault of the Creator that one vessel is in honour and another in dishonour), viz. “that in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some to honour, and some to dishonour. If a man therefore purge himself, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified, and meet for the Master’s use, and prepared unto every good work;”[580] for if he who purges himself becomes a vessel unto honour, and he who allows himself to remain unpurged[581] becomes a vessel unto dishonour, then, so far as these words are concerned, the Creator is not at all to blame. For the Creator makes vessels of honour and vessels of dishonour, not from the beginning according to His foreknowledge,[582] since He does not condemn or justify beforehand[583] according to it; but [He makes] those into vessels of honour who purged themselves, and those into vessels of dishonour who allowed themselves to remain unpurged: so that it results from older causes[584] [which operated] in the formation of the vessels unto honour and dishonour, that one was created for the former condition, and another for the latter. But if we once admit that there were certain older causes [at work] in the forming of a vessel unto honour, and of one unto dishonour, what absurdity is there in going back to the subject of the soul, and [in supposing] that a more ancient cause for Jacob being loved and for Esau being hated existed with respect to Jacob before his assumption of a body, and with regard to Esau before he was conceived in the womb of Rebecca?

FROM THE LATIN.

21. Nay, that very declaration, that from the same lump a vessel is formed both to honour and to dishonour, will not push us hard; for we assert that the nature of all rational souls is the same, as one lump of clay is described as being under the treatment of the potter. Seeing, then, the nature of rational creatures is one, God, according to the previous grounds of merit,[585] created and formed out of it, as the potter out of the one lump, some persons to honour and others to dishonour. Now, as regards the language of the apostle, which he utters as if in a tone of censure, “Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?” he means, I think, to point out that such a censure does not refer to any believer who lives rightly and justly, and who has confidence in God, _i.e._ to such an one as Moses was, of whom Scripture says that “Moses spake, and God answered him by a voice;”[586] and as God answered Moses, so also does every saint answer God. But he who is an unbeliever, and loses confidence in answering before God owing to the unworthiness of his life and conversation, and who, in relation to these matters, does not seek to learn and make progress, but to oppose and resist, and who, to speak more plainly, is such an one as to be able to say those words which the apostle indicates, when he says, “Why, then, does He yet find fault? for who will resist His will?”—to such an one may the censure of the apostle rightly be directed, “Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?” This censure accordingly applies not to believers and saints, but to unbelievers and wicked men.

Now, to those who introduce souls of different natures,[587] and who turn this declaration of the apostle to the support of their own opinion, we have to reply as follows: If even they are agreed as to what the apostle says, that out of the one lump are formed both those who are made to honour and those who are made to dishonour, whom they term of a nature that is to be saved and destroyed, there will then be no longer souls of different natures, but one nature for all. And if they admit that one and the same potter may undoubtedly denote one Creator, there will not be different creators either of those who are saved, or of those who perish. Now, truly, let them choose whether they will have a good Creator to be intended who creates bad and ruined men, or one who is not good, who creates good men and those who are prepared to honour. For the necessity of returning an answer will extort from them one of these two alternatives. But according to our declaration, whereby we say that it is owing to preceding causes that God makes vessels either to honour or to dishonour, the approval of God’s justice is in no respect limited. For it is possible that this vessel, which owing to previous causes was made in this world to honour, may, if it behave negligently, be converted in another world, according to the deserts of its conduct, into a vessel unto dishonour: as again, if any one, owing to preceding causes, was formed by his Creator in this life a vessel unto dishonour, and shall mend his ways and cleanse himself from all filth and vice, he may, in the new world, be made a vessel to honour, sanctified and useful, and prepared unto every good work. Finally, those who were formed by God in this world to be Israelites, and who have lived a life unworthy of the nobility of their race, and have fallen away from the grandeur of their descent, will, in the world to come, in a certain degree[588] be converted, on account of their unbelief, from vessels of honour into vessels of dishonour; while, on the other hand, many who in this life were reckoned among Egyptian or Idumean vessels, having adopted the faith and practice of Israelites, when they shall have done the works of Israelites, and shall have entered the church of the Lord, will exist as vessels of honour in the revelation of the sons of God. From which it is more agreeable to the rule of piety to believe that every rational being, according to his purpose and manner of life, is converted, sometimes from bad to good, and falls away sometimes from good to bad: that some abide in good, and others advance to a better condition, and always ascend to higher things, until they reach the highest grade of all; while others, again, remain in evil, or, if the wickedness within them begin to spread itself further, they descend to a worse condition, and sink into the lowest depth of wickedness. Whence also we must suppose that it is possible there may be some who began at first indeed with small offences, but who have poured out wickedness to such a degree, and attained such proficiency in evil, that in the measure of their wickedness they are equal even to the opposing powers: and again, if, by means of many severe administrations of punishment, they are able at some future time to recover their senses, and gradually attempt to find healing for their wounds, they may, on ceasing from their wickedness, be restored to a state of goodness. Whence we are of opinion that, seeing the soul, as we have frequently said, is immortal and eternal, it is possible that, in the many and endless periods of duration in the immeasurable and different worlds, it may descend from the highest good to the lowest evil, or be restored from the lowest evil to the highest good.

FROM THE GREEK.

21. And at the same time, it is clearly shown that, as far as regards the underlying nature,[589] as there is one [piece of] clay which is under the hands of the potter, from which piece vessels are formed unto honour and dishonour; so the one nature of every soul being in the hands of God, and, so to speak, there being [only] one lump of reasonable beings,[590] certain causes of more ancient date led to some being created vessels unto honour, and others vessels unto dishonour. But if the language of the apostle convey a censure when he says, “Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?” it teaches us that he who has confidence before God, and is faithful, and has lived virtuously, would not hear the words, “Who art thou that repliest against God?” Such an one, _e.g._, as Moses was, “For Moses spake, and God answered him with a voice;”[591] and as God answers Moses, so does a saint also answer God. But he who does not possess this confidence, manifestly, either because he has lost it, or because he investigates these matters not from a love of knowledge, but from a desire to find fault,[592] and who therefore says, “Why does He yet find fault? for who hath resisted His will?” would merit the language of censure, which says, “Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?” Now to those who introduce different natures, and who make use of the declaration of the apostle [to support their view], the following must be our answer. If they maintain[593] that those who perish and those who are saved are formed of one lump, and that the Creator of those who are saved is the Creator also of them who are lost, and if He is good who creates not only spiritual but also earthy [natures] (for this follows from their view), it is nevertheless possible that he who, in consequence of certain former acts of righteousness,[594] had now been made a vessel of honour, but who had not [afterwards] acted in a similar manner, nor done things befitting a vessel of honour, was converted in another world into a vessel of dishonour; as, on the other hand, it is possible that he who, owing to causes more ancient than the present life, was here a vessel of dishonour, may after reformation become in the new creation “a vessel of honour, sanctified and meet for the Master’s use, prepared unto every good work.” And perhaps those who are now Israelites, not having lived worthily of their descent, will be deprived of their rank, being changed, as it were, from vessels of honour into those of dishonour; and many of the present Egyptians and Idumeans who came near to Israel, when they shall have borne fruit to a larger extent, shall enter into the church of the Lord, being no longer accounted Egyptians and Idumeans, but becoming Israelites: so that, according to this view, it is owing to their [varying] purposes that some advance from a worse to a better condition, and others fall from better to worse; while others, again, are preserved in a virtuous course, or ascend from good to better; and others, on the contrary, remain in a course of evil, or from bad become worse, as their wickedness flows on.

FROM THE LATIN.

22. But since the words of the apostle, in what he says regarding vessels of honour or dishonour, that “if a man therefore purge himself, he will be a vessel unto honour, sanctified and meet for the Master’s service, and prepared unto every good work,” appear to place nothing in the power of God, but all in ourselves; while in those in which he declares that “the potter hath power over the clay, to make of the same lump one vessel to honour, another to dishonour,” he seems to refer the whole to God,—it is not to be understood that those statements are contradictory, but the two meanings are to be reduced to agreement, and one signification must be drawn from both, viz. that we are not to suppose either that those things which are in our own power can be done without the help of God, or that those which are in God’s hand can be brought to completion without the intervention of our acts, and desires, and intention; because we have it not in our own power so to will or do anything, as not to know that this very faculty, by which we are able to will or to do, was bestowed on us by God, according to the distinction which we indicated above. Or again, when God forms vessels, some to honour and others to dishonour, we are to suppose that He does not regard either our wills, or our purposes, or our deserts, to be the causes of the honour or dishonour, as if they were a sort of matter from which He may form the vessel of each one of us either to honour or to dishonour; whereas the very movement of the soul itself, or the purpose of the understanding, may of itself suggest to him, who is not unaware of his heart and the thoughts of his mind, whether his vessel ought to be formed to honour or to dishonour. But let these points suffice, which we have discussed as we best could, regarding the questions connected with the freedom of the will.

FROM THE GREEK.

22. But since the apostle in one place does not pretend that the becoming of a vessel unto honour or dishonour depends upon God, but refers back the whole to ourselves, saying, “If, then, a man purge himself, he will be a vessel unto honour, sanctified, meet for the Master’s use, and prepared unto every good work;” and elsewhere does not even pretend that it is dependent upon ourselves, but appears to attribute the whole to God, saying, “The potter hath power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour and another to dishonour;” and as his statements are not contradictory, we must reconcile them, and extract one complete statement from both. Neither does our own power,[595] apart from the knowledge[596] of God, compel us to make progress; nor does the knowledge of God [do so], unless we ourselves also contribute something to the good result; nor does our own power, apart from the knowledge of God, and the use of the power that worthily belongs to us,[597] make a man become [a vessel] unto honour or dishonour; nor does the will of God alone[598] form a man to honour or dishonour, unless He hold our will to be a kind of matter that admits of variation,[599] and that inclines to a better or worse course of conduct. And these observations are sufficient to have been made by us on the subject of free-will.

Footnote 353:

The whole of this chapter has been preserved in the original Greek,
which is _literally_ translated in corresponding portions on each
page, so that the differences between Origen’s own words and the
amplifications and alterations of the paraphrase of Rufinus may be at
once patent to the reader.

Footnote 354:

Natura ipsius arbitrii voluntatisque.

Footnote 355:

περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου.

Footnote 356:

τὴν ἔννοιαν αὐτοῦ ἀναπτύξαι.

Footnote 357:

Quæcunque hujusmodi sunt, quæ solo habitu materiæ suæ vel corporum
constant.

Footnote 358:

Non tamen animantia sunt.

Footnote 359:

Phantasia.

Footnote 360:

Voluntas vel sensus.

Footnote 361:

Mella, ut aiunt, aeria congregandi. Rufinus seems to have read, in the
original, ἀεροπλαστεῖν instead of κηροπλαστεῖν,—an evidence that he
followed in general the worst readings (Redepenning).

Footnote 362:

ὑπὸ ἕξεως μόνης.

Footnote 363:

φαντασίας.

Footnote 364:

φύσεως φανταστικῆς.

Footnote 365:

καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου μετὰ τὴν φανταστικὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν πεπιστευμένου τοῦ
ζώου.

Footnote 366:

Ordinatior quidem motus.

Footnote 367:

Incentivo quodam et naturali motu.

Footnote 368:

ποσῶς.

Footnote 369:

παρὰ τὰς ἀφορμὰς.

Footnote 370:

Ita ut etiam verisimilibus quibusdam causis intra cordis nostri
tribunalia velut judici residenti ex utrâque parte adhiberi videatur
assertio, ut causis prius expositis gerendi sententia de rationis
judicio proferatur.

Footnote 371:

Causa ei perfecta et absoluta vel necessitas prævaricandi.

Footnote 372:

διὰ τάσδε τὰς πιθανότητας.

Footnote 373:

αὐτοτελής.

Footnote 374:

ἠσκηκότι.

Footnote 375:

ἐγγύς γε τοῦ βεβαιωθῆναι γεγενημένος.

Footnote 376:

Naturalem corporis intemperiem; ψιλὴν τὴν κατασκευήν.

Footnote 377:

Contra rationem totius eruditionis. In the Greek, “contra rationem” is
expressed by παρὰ τὸ ἐναργές ἐστι; and the words λόγου παιδευτικοῦ
(rendered by Rufinus “totius eruditionis,” and connected with “contra
rationem”) belong to the following clause.

Footnote 378:

Quibus nihil ad turpitudinem deest.

Footnote 379:

παραχαράττειν.

Footnote 380:

ψιλὴν τὴν κατασκευήν.

Footnote 381:

λόγου παιδευτικοῦ.

Footnote 382:

ἡμερότητος.

Footnote 383:

ἐξεταστήν.

Footnote 384:

Mic. vi. 8.

Footnote 385:

Deut. xxx. 15.

Footnote 386:

Isa. i. 19, 20.

Footnote 387:

Ps. lxxxi. 13, 14.

Footnote 388:

Matt. v. 39.

Footnote 389:

Matt. v. 22.

Footnote 390:

Matt. v. 28.

Footnote 391:

Matt. vii. 24.

Footnote 392:

Matt. vii. 26.

Footnote 393:

Matt. xxv. 34 sq.

Footnote 394:

The words in the text are: His qui secundum patientiam boni operis,
gloria et incorruptio, qui quærunt vitam eternam.

Footnote 395:

Rom. ii. 4-10.

Footnote 396:

Mic. vi. 8.

Footnote 397:

Cf. Deut. xxx. 15, 16, cf. 19.

Footnote 398:

Isa. i. 19, 20.

Footnote 399:

Ps. lxxx. 13, 14.

Footnote 400:

Matt. v. 39.

Footnote 401:

Matt. v. 22.

Footnote 402:

Matt. vii. 24.

Footnote 403:

εὐλόγως.

Footnote 404:

Cf. Matt. vii. 26.

Footnote 405:

Matt. xxv. 34.

Footnote 406:

Matt. xxv. 35.

Footnote 407:

διαλέγεται.

Footnote 408:

Rom. ii. 4-10.

Footnote 409:

Secundum pietatis regulam.

Footnote 410:

Ex. iv. 21, etc.

Footnote 411:

Ezek. xi. 19, 20.

Footnote 412:

Justificationes.

Footnote 413:

The word “now” is added, as the term “flesh” is frequently used in the
New Testament in a bad sense (Redepenning).

Footnote 414:

Mark iv. 12.

Footnote 415:

Rom. ix. 16.

Footnote 416:

Phil. ii. 13.

Footnote 417:

Rom. ix. 18 sq.

Footnote 418:

Ex. iv. 21, cf. vii. 3.

Footnote 419:

Ezek. xi. 19, 20.

Footnote 420:

Cf. Matt. iv. 12 and Luke viii. 10.

Footnote 421:

Rom. ix. 16.

Footnote 422:

Cf. Phil. ii. 13.

Footnote 423:

Gal. v. 8.

Footnote 424:

Rom. ix. 20, 21.

Footnote 425:

Rom. ix. 18.

Footnote 426:

Obstupefactus.

Footnote 427:

Naturaliter.

Footnote 428:

Commentitias fabulas introducunt.

Footnote 429:

Cf. Rom. ix. 18.

Footnote 430:

χρῄζει δὲ αὐτοῦ ὁ Θεὸς ... ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἀπειθοῦντος.

Footnote 431:

Quid faciente vel quid prospiciente.

Footnote 432:

Prospectus et intuitus Dei. Such is the rendering of ἔννοια by
Rufinus.

Footnote 433:

Ex. ix. 17, cf. xi. 5 and xii. 12.

Footnote 434:

ἐννοίαν.

Footnote 435:

Cf. Ex. iv. 23 and ix. 17.

Footnote 436:

Cf. Ex. xii. 12.

Footnote 437:

εὐγνωμονῇ.

Footnote 438:

τρανῶς.

Footnote 439:

ἀπογραψάμενός τις γυμνῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ ἵστατο πρὸς τὸ πονηρὸν εἶναι τὸν
δημιουργόν.

Footnote 440:

Heb. vi. 7, 8.

Footnote 441:

Ex personâ imbrium.

Footnote 442:

Dure.

Footnote 443:

Bonitas et æquitas imbrium.

Footnote 444:

Propositum.

Footnote 445:

ἐνεργείᾳ.

Footnote 446:

διὰ τὸ τῆς κακίας ὑποκείμενον τοῦ παρ’ ἑαυτοῖς κακοῦ.

Footnote 447:

Heb. vi. 7, 8.

Footnote 448:

δύσφημον.

Footnote 449:

Limum.

Footnote 450:

Cum utique secundum naturam unum sit.

Footnote 451:

Malitiæ suæ intentione conceperat.

Footnote 452:

Cf. Ex. viii. 27-29.

Footnote 453:

Tropum vel figuram sermonis.

Footnote 454:

Rom. ii. 4, 5.

Footnote 455:

παρὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

Footnote 456:

καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὸ βραχὺ δὲ ἀναγεγράφθαι.

Footnote 457:

Cf. Ex. viii. 28, 29.

Footnote 458:

οὐκ ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ συνηθείας τὰ τοιαῦτα παραμυθήσασθαι.

Footnote 459:

συκοφαντεῖν.

Footnote 460:

Rom. ii. 4, 5.

Footnote 461:

Et apostolicæ similitudinis parum munimenti habere adhuc videtur
assertio.

Footnote 462:

Isa. lxiii. 17, 18. Here the Septuagint differs from the Masoretic
text.

Footnote 463:

Jer. xx. 7.

Footnote 464:

Morali utique tropo accipiendum.

Footnote 465:

Ferratum calcem.

Footnote 466:

Frenis ferratis.

Footnote 467:

Heb. xii. 6.

Footnote 468:

Rom. viii. 35.

Footnote 469:

Rationabilibus cœlestibusque virtutibus.

Footnote 470:

Primatus.

Footnote 471:

Immaculatus.

Footnote 472:

Luke xviii. 14.

Footnote 473:

1 Cor. i. 29.

Footnote 474:

δυσπειθεῖς.

Footnote 475:

βίαιοι.

Footnote 476:

Isa. lxiii. 17, 18.

Footnote 477:

Jer. xx. 7.

Footnote 478:

ἰδιότητος.

Footnote 479:

φυσίωσιν.

Footnote 480:

ἄμωμος.

Footnote 481:

Cf. Luke xiv. 11.

Footnote 482:

Cf. 1 Cor. i. 29.

Footnote 483:

Non tamen sine certâ ratione.

Footnote 484:

Digeri. The rendering “dispersed” seems to agree best with the meaning
intended to be conveyed.

Footnote 485:

In the Greek the term is πεντηκονταετίαν.

Footnote 486:

τὸν ἄπειρον αἰῶνα.

Footnote 487:

συνεργηθῆναι.

Footnote 488:

ἀναστοιχειωθῆναι.

Footnote 489:

πεντηκονταετίαν. Rufinus has “_sexaginta_ annos.”

Footnote 490:

ἀπέραντον αἰῶνα.

Footnote 491:

Cf. Matt. xiii. 5, 6.

Footnote 492:

Hæc.

Footnote 493:

Perscrutationis improbitas.

Footnote 494:

Substantialiter.

Footnote 495:

Wisd. vii. 16.

Footnote 496:

Capitulum.

Footnote 497:

Rom. ix. 18.

Footnote 498:

εἰκόνι.

Footnote 499:

τάχιον.

Footnote 500:

προπετέστερον, καὶ οὐχὶ ὁῷω ἐπ’ αὐτὰ ὁδευσάσῃ.

Footnote 501:

Cf. Wisd. vii. 16.

Footnote 502:

Ezek. xi. 19, 20.

Footnote 503:

Ezek. xi. 19, 20.

Footnote 504:

ἀπὸ τῶν ψιλῶν ῥητῶν τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἀναιρῶν.

Footnote 505:

χειραγωγήσειν.

Footnote 506:

Mark iv. 12.

Footnote 507:

Mark iv. 12.

Footnote 508:

ὠμότης.

Footnote 509:

δημιουργοῦ.

Footnote 510:

ἡ ἀμυντικὴ καὶ ἀνταποδοτικὴ τῶν χειρόνων προαίρεσις.

Footnote 511:

εὐγνωμόνως.

Footnote 512:

οὐδενὸς ἔλαττον.

Footnote 513:

Prospera sanitas.

Footnote 514:

Aula.

Footnote 515:

Mentes.

Footnote 516:

Evidentissimâ assertione pietatis regulam teneamus.

Footnote 517:

Dispensatio humana.

Footnote 518:

Futuri status causam præstat semper anterior meritorum status.

Footnote 519:

ἑωραμένους οὐ βεβαίους ἔσεσθαι ἐν τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ.

Footnote 520:

τῶν βαθυτέρων.

Footnote 521:

ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐμφορηθέντας.

Footnote 522:

ὡς εἰκὸς μᾶλλον πόρρω ὄντες τῆς ἀξίας τῶν ἔξω.

Footnote 523:

εἰ μὴ μᾶλλον ἡμεῖς πρὸς τῷ ἐξεταστικῷ καὶ τὸ εὐσεβὲς πάντη ἀγωνιζόμεθα
τηρεῖν περὶ Θεοῦ, etc.

Footnote 524:

διαθέσεις.

Footnote 525:

Rom. ix. 16.

Footnote 526:

Ad finem boni.

Footnote 527:

Medium est velle bona.

Footnote 528:

Rom. ix. 16.

Footnote 529:

Ps. cxxvi. 1.

Footnote 530:

Procinctum juvenum.

Footnote 531:

Supernæ vocationis.

Footnote 532:

Valde consequenter.

Footnote 533:

1 Cor. iii. 6, 7.

Footnote 534:

“Nostra perfectio non quidem nobis cessantibus et otiosis efficitur.”
There is an ellipsis of some such words as, “but by activity on our
part.”

Footnote 535:

Rom. ix. 16.

Footnote 536:

κατασκευῆς.

Footnote 537:

κατασκευάσαντος.

Footnote 538:

προαιρέσεως.

Footnote 539:

παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν.

Footnote 540:

τὰ κρείττονα.

Footnote 541:

τῶν μέσων ἐστί.

Footnote 542:

ἀστεῖον.

Footnote 543:

Rom. ix. 16.

Footnote 544:

ᾠδὴ τῶν ἀναβαθμῶν.

Footnote 545:

Ps. cxxvi. 1.

Footnote 546:

οὐκ ἄν πταίοιμεν.

Footnote 547:

1 Cor. iii. 6, 7.

Footnote 548:

ἡ ἡμετέρα τελείωσις οὐχὶ μηδὲν ἡμῶν πραξάντων γίνεται.

Footnote 549:

ἀπαρτίζεται.

Footnote 550:

πνοήν.

Footnote 551:

εὐκρασίαν.

Footnote 552:

ἀριθμόν.

Footnote 553:

εἰς ὑπερβολὴν πολλαπλάσιον.

Footnote 554:

ἐκλαμβάνειν.

Footnote 555:

ἐξειληφάσι τὰ κατὰ τὸν τόπον.

Footnote 556:

Cf. Phil. ii. 13.

Footnote 557:

Hoc ipsum, quod homines sumus.

Footnote 558:

Sicut dicamus, quod movemur, ex Deo est.

Footnote 559:

Hoc ipsum, quod movetur.

Footnote 560:

Cf. Phil. ii. 13.

Footnote 561:

τὰ διαφέροντα.

Footnote 562:

ἡμεῖς μὲν ἐδόξαμεν, ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ταῦτα ἐδωρήσατο.

Footnote 563:

τὸ καθόλου θέλειν.

Footnote 564:

εὐλόγως.

Footnote 565:

τὸ εἰδικὸν τόδε.

Footnote 566:

τὸ μὲν γενικὸν, τὸ κινεῖσθαι.

Footnote 567:

δημιουργοῦ.

Footnote 568:

Rom. ix. 18-21.

Footnote 569:

2 Tim. i. 16-18.

Footnote 570:

2 Cor. v. 10.

Footnote 571:

Ex ipsâ conditoris creatione.

Footnote 572:

2 Tim. ii. 20, 21.

Footnote 573:

Rom. ix. 18-21.

Footnote 574:

2 Tim. i. 16-18.

Footnote 575:

οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ ἀπόστολόν ἐστι.

Footnote 576:

παρὰ τὴν αἰτίαν τοὺ δεμιουργοῦ.

Footnote 577:

ὑγιές.

Footnote 578:

2 Cor. v. 10.

Footnote 579:

ἐπὶ τοῦτο πράξεως.

Footnote 580:

2 Tim. ii. 20, 21.

Footnote 581:

ἀπερικάθαρτον ἑαυτὸν περιϊδών.

Footnote 582:

πρόγνωσιν.

Footnote 583:

προκατακρίνει ἤ προδικαιοῖ.

Footnote 584:

ἐκ πρεσβυτέρων αἰτιῶν.

Footnote 585:

Secundum præcedentes meritorum causas.

Footnote 586:

Ex. xix. 19.

Footnote 587:

Diversas animarum naturas.

Footnote 588:

Quodammodo.

Footnote 589:

ὁσον ἐπὶ τῇ ὑποκειμενῃ φύσει.

Footnote 590:

ἑνὸς φυραμάτος τῶν λογικῶν ὑποστάσεων.

Footnote 591:

Cf. Ex. xix. 19.

Footnote 592:

κατὰ φιλονεικίαν.

Footnote 593:

σώζουσι.

Footnote 594:

ἐκ προτέρων τινῶν κατορθωμάτων.

Footnote 595:

τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν.

Footnote 596:

ἐπιστήμη; probably in the sense of πρόγνωσις.

Footnote 597:

τῆς καταχρήσεως τοῦ κατ’ ἀξίαν τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. “Nec sine usu liberi
nostri arbitrii, quod peculiare nobis et meriti nostri est”
(Redepenning).

Footnote 598:

οὔτε τοῦ ἐπὶ τῷ Θεῷ μόνον.

Footnote 599:

ὕλην τινὰ διαφορᾶς.