Chapter LXX: Part VI: Miscellaneous Papers (10)

5th. Prizes taken after the dates at which hostilities were to cease.

6th. Subsistence of prisoners.

7th. The Eastern boundary.

Which of these shall be taken into the present discussion?

Which of them shall be left to arrangement through the ordinary channels of our ministers, in order to avoid embarrassing the more important points with matters of less consequence?

On the subject of commerce shall Mr. Hammond be desired to produce his powers to treat, as is usual, before conferences are held on that subject?

XXI.

_Memorandum of communications made to a committee of the Senate on the subject of the diplomatic nominations to Paris, London, and the Hague. January 4th, 1792._

The Secretary of State having yesterday received a note from Mr. Strong, as chairman of a committee of the Senate, asking a conference with him on the subject of the late diplomatic nominations to Paris, London, and the Hague, he met them in the Senate-chamber in the evening of the same day, and stated to them in substance what follows:--

That he should on all occasions be ready to give to the Senate, or to any other branch of the government, whatever information might properly be communicated, and might be necessary to enable them to proceed in the line of their respective offices: that on the present occasion, particularly, _as the Senate had to decide on the fitness of certain persons to act for the United States at certain courts, they would be the better enabled to decide, if they were informed of the state of our affairs at those courts, and what we had to do there_: that when the bill for providing the means of intercourse with foreign nations was before the legislature, he had met the committees of each House, and had given them the ideas of the executive as to the courts with which we should keep diplomatic characters, and the grades we should employ: that there were two principles, which decided on the courts, viz., 1, _vicinage_; and 2, _commerce_: that the first operated in the cases of London and Madrid, and the second in the same cases, and also in those of France and Portugal; perhaps, too, of Holland: that as to all other countries, our commerce and connections were too unimportant to call for the exchange of diplomatic residents: that he thought we should adopt the lowest grades admissible, to wit, at Paris that of minister plenipotentiary, because that grade was already established there; the same at London, because of the pride of that court, and perhaps the sense of our country and its interests, would require a sort of equality of treatment to be observed towards them; and for Spain and Lisbon, that of chargé des affaires only; the Hague uncertain: that at the moment of this bill, there was a complete vacancy of appointments between us and France and England, by the accidental translations of the ministers of France and the United States to other offices, and none as yet appointed to, or from England: that in this state of things, the legislature had provided for the grade of minister plenipotentiary, as one that was to be continued, and showed they had their eye on that grade only, and that of chargé des affaires; and that by the sum allowed, they approved of the views then communicated: that circumstances had obliged us to change the grade at Lisbon to minister resident, and this of course would force a change at Madrid and the Hague, as had been communicated at the time to the Senate; but that no change was made in the salary, that of resident being made the same as had been established for a chargé des affaires.----He then added, the new circumstances which had supervened on those general ones in favor of these establishments, to wit, with Paris, the proposal on their part to make a liberal treaty, the present situation of their colonies which might lead to a freer commerce with them, and the arrival of a minister plenipotentiary here; with London, their sending a minister here in consequence of notorious and repeated applications from us, the powers given him to arrange the differences which had arisen about the execution of the treaty, to wit, the posts, negroes, &c., which was now in train, and perhaps some authority to talk on the subject of arrangements of commerce, and also the circumstances which had induced that minister to produce his commission; with Madrid, the communication from the king, that he was ready to resume the negociations on the navigation of the Mississippi, and to arrange that, and a port of deposit on the most friendly footing, if we would send a proper person to Madrid for that purpose: he explained the idea of joining one of the ministers in Europe to Mr. Carmichael for that purpose; with Lisbon, that we had to try to obtain a right of sending flour there, and mentioned Del Pinta's former favorable opinion on that subject: he stated, also, the interesting situation of Brazil, and the dispositions of the court of Portugal with respect to our warfare with the Algerines; with Holland, the negotiating loans for the transfer of the whole French debt there, an operation which must be of some years, because there is but a given sum of new money to be lent to any one nation. He then particularly recapitulated the circumstances which justified the President's having continued the grade of minister plenipotentiary; but added, that whenever the biennial bill should come on, each House would have a constitutional right to review the establishment again, and whenever it should appear that either House thought any part of it might be reduced, on giving to the executive time to avail themselves of the first convenient occasion to reduce it, the executive could not but do it; but that it would be extremely injurious now, or at any other time, to do it so abruptly as to occasion the recall of ministers, or unfriendly sensations in any of those countries with which our commerce is interesting.

That a circumstance, recalled to the recollection of the Secretary of State this morning, induced him immediately to add to the preceding verbal communication a letter addressed to Mr. Strong in the following words:--

PHILADELPHIA, January 4th, 1792.

"SIR,--I am just now made to recollect a mistake in one
of the answers I gave last night in the committee of the
Senate, and which, therefore, I beg leave to correct. After
calling to their minds the footing on which Mr. Morris
had left matters at the court of London, and informing
them of what had passed between the British minister here
and myself, I was asked whether this was all that had
taken place? Whether there had been no other or further
engagement? I paused, you may remember, to recollect. I
knew nothing more had passed on the other side the water,
because Mr. Morris' powers there had been determined,
and I endeavored to recollect whether anything else had
passed with Mr. Hammond and myself. I answered that this
was all, and added in proof, that I was sure nothing had
passed between the President and Mr. Hammond, personally,
and so I might safely say this was all. It escaped me that
there had been an informal agent here, (Colonel Beckwith,)
and so informal that it was thought proper that I should
never speak on business with him, and that on a particular
occasion, the question having been asked whether if a
British minister should be sent here, we would send one
in exchange? It was said, through another channel, that
one would doubtless be sent. Having only been present when
it was concluded to give the answer, and not having been
myself the person who communicated it, nor having otherwise
had any conversation with Colonel Beckwith on the subject,
it absolutely escaped my recollection at the moment the
committee put the question, and I now correct the error
I committed in my answer, with the same good faith with
which I committed the error in the first moment. Permit me
to ask the favor of you, sir, to communicate this to the
other members of the committee, and to consider this as
a part of the information I have had the honor of giving
the committee on the subject.

I am with the most perfect esteem, sir, Your most obedient
and most humble servant."

Which letter, with the preceding statement, contains the substance of what the Secretary of State has communicated to the committee, as far as his memory enables him to recollect.

XXII.

_Considerations on the subjects of Ransom, and Peace with the Algerines. April 1st, 1792._

I. The Ransom of our captive citizens, being fourteen in number.

For facts on this subject refer to the Reports of December 28th, 1790, on the same ransom, and on the Mediterranean trade, and to Mr. Short's letter of August 21st, 1791, sent to the Senate.

The probable cost will be one thousand five hundred dollars for the common men, and half as much more for officers: adding presents, duties, and other expenses, it will be little short of forty thousand dollars. This must be ready money, and consequently requires a joint, but secret vote of both houses. An agent must be sent for the purpose.

II. Peace, how best to be obtained?

1st. By war; that is to say, by constant cruises in the Mediterranean. This proved practicable by the experiment of M. de Massiac, by the Portuguese cruise. The co-operation of Portugal, Naples, Genoa, and Malta, could possibly be obtained, but the expense would be considerable. Vessels mounting one hundred guns in the whole, would probably be wanting on our part. These would cost in the outset four hundred thousand dollars, and annually afterwards one hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars. It may be doubted if this expense could be met during the present Indian war. If it could, it is the most honorable and efficacious way of having peace.

2d. By paying a gross sum for a peace of fifty years. Respectable opinions vary from three hundred thousand to one million dollars, as to the first cost. Then are to follow frequent occasional presents; and with all this, the peace will not be respected unless we appear able to enforce it; and if able to enforce it, why not rely on that solely? The same question arises here, to wit: are we able to meet this expense at present?

3d. By tribute annually.

The Dutch, Danes, Swedes, and Venetians, pay about twenty-four thousand dollars a year. We might, perhaps, obtain it for something less. If for ten or fifteen thousand dollars, it might be eligible. And by a tariff for the ransom of the captives they shall take from us. If low, this might do for the present. The agent to be sent for the purpose of ransom might be authorized to treat; but should also make himself acquainted with their coast, harbor, vessels, manner of fighting, &c. On either of these plans a vote of the Senate will be requisite.

On the 1st or 2d the Representatives should be consulted, and perhaps on the 3d or 4th. It will be best to bring it on by a message from the President.

XXIII.

_Notes of a conversation with Mr. Hammond. June 3d, 1792._

Having received Mr. Hammond's letter of June 2d, informing me that my letter of May 29th should be sent to his court for their instructions, I immediately went to his house. He was not at home. I wrote him a note, inviting him to come and dine with me alone, that we might confer together in a familiar way on the subject of our letters, and consider what was to be done. He was engaged, but said he would call on me any hour the next day. I invited him to take a solo dinner the next day. He accepted and came. After the cloth was taken off, and the servants retired, I introduced the conversation by adverting to that part of his letter wherein he disavowed any intentional deception, if he had been misinformed, and had misstated any facts, assuring him that I acquitted him of every suspicion of that kind: that he had been here too short a time to be acquainted with facts himself, or to know the best sources for getting at them: that I had found great difficulty myself in the investigation of facts, and with respect to the proceedings of the courts particularly, had been indebted to the circumstance of Congress being in session, so that I could apply to the members of the different States for information respecting their States. I told him that each party having now stated the matters between the two nations in the point of view in which they appeared to each, had hoped that we might by the way of free conversation abridge what remained: that I expected we were to take for our basis, that the treaty was to be fully executed: that, on our part, we had pronounced our demands explicitly, to have the upper posts delivered up, and the negroes paid for: that they objected infractions on our part, which we denied: that we ought to proceed to investigate the facts on which we differed: that this was the country in which they could alone be investigated; and if it should be found we had _unjustifiably_ broken the treaty, the case was of a nature to admit of a proper compromise.

He said that he believed the question had never been understood by his court;--admitted they had as yet heard only one side of it, and that from a party which entertained strong feelings against us (I think he said the Refugees): that the idea would be quite new to his court, of their having committed the first infraction, and of the proceedings on the subject of their debts here being on the ground of retaliation: that this gave the case a complexion so entirely new and different from what had been contemplated, that he should not be justified in taking a single step: that he should send my letter to the ministers--that they would be able to consider facts and dates, see if they had really been the first infractors, and say what ground they would take on this new state of the case: that the matter was now for the first time carried into mutual discussion: that the close of my letter contained specific propositions, to which they would of course give specific answers adapted to the new statement of things brought forward. I replied, that as to the fact of their committing the first infraction, it could not be questioned: confessed that I believe the ministers which signed the treaty, meant to execute it: that Lord Shelburne's plan was to produce a new coalescence by a liberal conduct towards us: that the ministry which succeeded thought the treaty too liberal, and wished to curtail its effect in the course of executing it; but that if every move and counter-move was to cross the Atlantic, it would be a long game indeed. He said, no: that he thought they could take their ultimate ground at once, on having before them a full view of the facts, and he thought it fortunate that Mr. Bord, from whom he got most of his information, and Lord Dorchester, would be on the spot to bring things to rights, and he imagined he could receive his instructions before November.

I told him that I apprehended that Lord Dorchester would not feel a disposition to promote conciliation, seeing himself marked personally as an infractor; and mentioned to him the opinions entertained here of the unfriendliness of Mr. Bord's mind towards us. He justified Mr. Bord. He had received information from their other consuls, and the factors of the merchants, who assured him that they could furnish proofs of the facts they communicated to him, and which he had advanced on their authority, and that he should now write to them to produce their authority. He admitted that the debt to British subjects might be considered as liquidated from the Potomac northward: that South Carolina was making a laudable effort to pay hers; and that the only important object now was, that of Virginia, amounting by his list to two millions sterling: that the attention of the British merchants from North to South was turned to the decision of the case of Jones and Walker, which he hoped would take place at the present session, and let them see what they had to depend on. I told him that I was sorry to learn that but two judges had arrived in Richmond, and that unless the third arrived they would not take it up. I desired him to observe that the question in that case related only to that description of debts which had been paid into the treasury: that without pretending to know with any accuracy what proportion of the whole debt of Virginia had been paid into the treasury, I believed it was a small one; but the case of Jones and Walker would be a precedent for those debts only: that as to the great residuary mass, there were precedents enough, as it appeared they were in a full course of recovery, and that there was no obstacle, real or apparent. He did not appear to have adverted to the distinction, and showed marks of satisfaction on understanding that the question was confined to the other portion of the debts only. He thought that the collection, there being one under a hopeful way, would of itself change the ground on which our difference stands. He observed that the treaty was of itself so vague and inconsistent in many of its parts, as to require an explanatory convention. He instanced the two articles, one of which gave them the navigation of the Mississippi, and the other bounded them by a due west line from the Lake of the Woods, which being now understood to pass beyond the most northern sources of the Mississippi, intercepted all access to that river: that to reconcile these articles, that line should be so run as to give them access to the navigable waters of the Mississippi, and that it would even be for our interest to introduce a third power between us and the Spaniards. He asked my idea of the line from the Lake of the Woods, and of now settling it. I told him I knew of no objection to the settlement of it: that my idea of it was, that if it was an impassable line, as proposed in the treaty, it should be rendered passable by as small and unimportant an alteration as might be, which I thought would be to throw in a line running due north from the northernmost source of the Mississippi, till it should strike the western line from the Lake of the Woods: that the article giving them a navigation in the Mississippi did not relate at all to this northern boundary, but to the southern one, and to the secret article respecting that: that he knew that our Provisional Treaty was made seven weeks before that with Spain: that at the date of ours, their ministers had still a hope of retaining Florida, in which case they were to come up to the thirty-second degree, and in which case also the navigation of the Mississippi would have been important; but that they had not been able, in event, to retain the country to which the navigation was to be an appendage. (It was evident to me that they had it in view to claim a slice on our north-western quarter, that they may get into the Mississippi; indeed, I thought it presented as a sort of make-weight with the posts to compensate the great losses their citizens had sustained by the infractions charged on us.)

I had hinted that I had not been without a hope, that an early possession of the posts might have been given us as a commencement of full execution of the treaty.

He asked me if I had conceived that he was authorized to write to the Governor of Canada to deliver us the posts? I said I had. He smiled at that idea, and assured me he had by no means any such authority. I mentioned what I had understood to have passed between him and General Dickinson, which was related to me by Mr. Hawkins, to wit: that the posts might be delivered upon the assurance of the recovery of their debts in Virginia. He said, that if any such thing as that had dropped from him, it must have been merely as a private and unauthorized opinion, for that the opinion of his court was, that the retention of the posts was but a short compensation for the losses which their citizens had sustained, and would sustain by the delay of their admission into our courts. (Putting together this expression and his frequent declarations that the face of the controversy was now so totally changed from what it was understood to be at his court, that no instructions of his could be applicable to it, I concluded that his court had entertained no thought of ever giving up the posts, and had framed their instructions to him on a totally different hypothesis.) He asked what we understood to be the boundary between us and the Indians? I told him he would see by recurring to my report on the North Western Territory, and by tracing the line there described on Hutchins' map. What did I understand to be our right in the Indian soil? 1st. A right of preëmption of their lands; that is to say, the sole and exclusive right of purchasing from them whenever they should be willing to sell. 2d. A right of regulating the commerce between them and the whites. Did I suppose that the right of preëmption prohibited any individual of another nation from purchasing lands which the Indians should be willing to sell? Certainly. We consider it as established by the usage of different nations into a kind of Jus gentium for America, that a white nation settling down and declaring that such and such are their limits, makes an invasion of those limits by any other white nation an act of war, but gives no right of soil against the native possessors. Did I think the right of regulating the commerce went to prohibit the British traders from coming into the Indian territory? That has been the idea. He said this would be hard on the Indians. I observed that whichever way the principle was established, it would work equally on both sides the line. I did not know whether we would gain or lose by mutual admission or exclusion. He said they apprehended our intention was to exterminate the Indians and take the lands. I assured him that, on the contrary, our system was to protect them, even against our own citizens: that we wish to get lines established with all of them, and have no views even of purchasing any more lands of them for a long time. We consider them as a maze chaussee, or police, for scouring the woods on our borders, and preventing their being a cover for rovers and robbers.

He wished the treaty had established an independent nation between us to keep us apart. He was under great apprehensions that it would become a matter of bidding as it were, between the British and us, who should have the greatest army there, and who should have the greatest force on the lakes: that we, holding posts on this side the water, and they on the other, soldiers looking constantly at one another, would get into broils and commit the two nations in war. I told him we might perhaps regulate by agreement the force to be kept on each side.

He asked what was our view in keeping a force there: that he apprehended if we had these posts, we should be able to hinder vessels from passing. I answered that I did not know whether the position of the present posts was such as that no vessel could pass but within their gun-shot; but that each party must have a plenty of such positions on the opposite sides, exclusively of the present posts: that our view in possessing these posts was to awe the Indians, to participate in the fur trade, to protect that trade. Protect it against whom? Against the Indians. He asked what I imagined to be their motives for keeping the posts? To influence the Indians, to keep off a rival nation and the appearance of having a rival nation, to monopolize the fur trade. He said he was not afraid of rivals if the traders would have fair play. He thought it would be better that neither party should have any military posts, but only trading houses. I told him that the idea of having no military posts on either side was new to me: that it had never been mentioned among the members of the executive: that therefore I could only speak for myself and say that, _primâ facie_, it accorded well with two favorite ideas of mine, of leaving commerce free, and never keeping an unnecessary soldier; but when he spoke of having no military posts on either side, there might be difficulty in fixing the distance of the nearest posts. He said that though his opinion on this subject was only a private one, and he understood mine to be so also, yet he was much pleased that we two seemed to think nearly alike, as it might lead to something. He said that their principal object in the fur trade was the consumption of the goods they gave in exchange for the furs. I answered that whether the trade was carried on by English or Americans, it would be with English goods, and the route would be, not through Canada, but by the shorter channels of the Hudson or Potomac.

It is not pretended that the above is in the exact order, or the exact words of the conversation. This was often desultory, and I can only answer for having given generally the expression, and always the substance of what passed.

XXIV.

_Extempore thoughts and doubts, on very superficially running over the Bankrupt Bill._

The British statute excepts expressly farmers, graziers, drovers, as such, though they buy to sell again. This bill has no exception.

The British adjudications exempt the buyers and sellers of bank-stock, government papers, &c. What feelings guided the draughtsman in adhering to his original in this case, and departing from it in the other?

The British courts adjudge that any artists may be bankrupts if the materials of their art are bought, such as shoemakers, blacksmiths, carpenters, &c. Will the body of our artists desire to be brought within the vortex of this law? It will follow as a consequence that the master who has an artist of this kind in his family, whether hired, indentured, or a slave, to serve the purposes of his farm or family, but who may at leisure times do something for his neighbors also, may be a bankrupt.

The British law makes a departure from the realm, i. e. out of the mediation of British law, an act of bankruptcy. This bill makes a departure from the _State wherein he resides_, (though into a neighboring one where the laws of the United States run equally,) an act of bankruptcy.

The commissioners may open houses, break open doors, chests, &c. Are we really ripe for this? Is that spirit of independence and sovereignty which a man feels in his own house, and which Englishmen felt when they denominated their houses their castles, to be absolutely subdued? and is it expedient that it should be subdued?

The lands of the bankrupt are to be taken, sold, &c. Is not this a predominant question between the general and State Legislatures?

Is commerce so much the basis of the existence of the United States as to call for a bankrupt law? On the contrary, are we not almost merely agricultural? Should not all laws be made with a view essentially to the poor husbandmen? When laws are wanting for particular descriptions of other callings, should not the husbandmen be carefully excused from their operation, and preserved under that of the general system only; which general system is fitted to the condition of husbandmen?

XXV.

_Heads of conversation with Mr. Hammond._

That I communicated to the President his information of the consent of the Western Indians to hold conferences of peace with us, in the presence of Governor Simcoe:--took care to apprize him of the informality of the conversation;--that it was accidental;--private;--the present to be considered equally so:--unnecessary to note to him that nothing like a mediation was suggested. 1st. Because so informal a conversation could not include so formal a thing as a mediation. 2d. Because, an established principle of public law among the white nations of America, that while the Indians included within their limits retain all other national rights, no other white nations can become their patrons, protectors, or mediators, nor in any shape intermeddle between them and those within whose limits they are. That Great Britain would not propose an example which would authorize us to cross our boundary, and take under our protection the Indians within her limits. 3d. Because, should the treaty prove ineffectual, it would singularly commit the friendship of the two nations.

That the idea of Governor Simcoe's attendance was presented only as a thing desired by the Indians: that the consequences of this had been considered. It is not necessary in order to effect a peace. Our views so just, so moderate, that we have no fear of effecting peace if left to ourselves. If it cannot be effected, it is much better that nobody on the part of England should have been present;--for however our government is persuaded of the sincerity of your assurances that you have not excited the Indians, yet our citizens in general are not so. It will be impossible to persuade them the negotiations were not defeated by British agents: that, therefore, we do not pretend to make the exclusion of Governor Simcoe a _sine quâ non_, provided he be there as a spectator, not as a _party_, yet we should consider his declining to attend, either by himself or any other person, as an instance of their friendship, and as an evidence of it particularly calculated to make due impression on the minds of our citizens. That the place fixed on by the Indians is extremely inconvenient to us, because of the distance and difficulty of transporting provisions there. Three hundred thousand rations will probably be requisite, if three thousand Indians attend. That if we had time, we would have proposed some other place, for example the Maumee towns; but there not being time, we shall do our best to make provision. 1st. We shall collect and carry as much as possible through the Miami channel. 2d. We shall hope for their permission to have purchases made in Upper Canada, and brought along the lake.

XXVI.

_Instructions to Andrew Michaud for exploring the Western Boundary. January, 1793._

Sundry persons having subscribed certain sums of money for your encouragement to explore the country along the Missouri, and thence westwardly to the Pacific ocean, having submitted the plan of the enterprise to the directors of the American Philosophical society, and the society having accepted of the trust, they proceed to give you the following instructions:

They observe to you that the chief objects of your journey are to find the shortest and most convenient route of communication between the United States and the Pacific ocean, within the temperate latitudes, and to learn such particulars as can be obtained of the country through which it passes, its productions, inhabitants, and other interesting circumstances. As a channel of communication between these States and the Pacific ocean, the Missouri, so far as it extends, presents itself under circumstances of unquestioned preference. It has, therefore, been declared as a fundamental object of the subscription (not to be dispensed with) that this river shall be considered and explored as a part of the communication sought for. To the neighborhood of this river, therefore, that is to say, to the town of Kaskaskia, the society will procure you a conveyance in company with the Indians of that town now in Philadelphia.

From thence you will cross the Mississippi and pass by land to the nearest part of the Missouri above the Spanish settlements, that you may avoid the risk of being stopped.

You will then pursue such of the largest streams of that river as shall lead by the shortest way and the lowest latitudes to the Pacific ocean. When, pursuing those streams, you shall find yourself at the point from whence you may get by the shortest and most convenient route to some principal river of the Pacific ocean, you are to proceed to such river, and pursue its course to the ocean. It would seem by the latest maps as if a river called Oregon, interlocked with the Missouri for a considerable distance, and entered the Pacific ocean not far southward of Nootka Sound. But the society are aware that these maps are not to be trusted so far as to be the ground of any positive instruction to you. They therefore only mention the fact, leaving to yourself to verify it, or to follow such other as you shall find to be the real truth.

You will in the course of your journey, take notice of the country you pass through, its general face, soil, rivers, mountains, its productions--animal, vegetable, and mineral--so far as they may be new to us, and may also be useful or very curious; the latitudes of places or material for calculating it by such simple methods as your situation may admit you to practice, the names, members, and dwellings of the inhabitants, and such particulars as you can learn of their history, connection with each other, languages, manners, state of society, and of the arts and commerce among them.

Under the head of animal history, that of the mammoth is particularly recommended to your inquiries, as it is also to learn whether the Lama or Paca of Peru, is found in those parts of this continent, or how far north they come.

The method of preserving your observations is left to yourself, according to the means which shall be in your power. It is only suggested that the noting them on the skin might be best for such as may be the most important, and that further details may be committed to the bark of the paper-birch, a substance which may not excite suspicions among the Indians, and little liable to injury from wet or other common accidents. By the means of the same substance you may perhaps find opportunities, from time to time, of communicating to the society information of your progress, and of the particulars you shall have noted.

When you shall have reached the Pacific ocean, if you find yourself within convenient distance of any settlement of Europeans, go to them, commit to writing a narrative of your journey and observations, and take the best measure you can for conveying it thence to the society by sea.

Return by the same, or some other route, as you shall think likely to fulfil with most satisfaction and certainty the objects of your mission, furnishing yourself with the best proofs the nature of the case will admit of the reality and extent of your progress. Whether this shall be by certificates from Europeans settled on the western coast of America, or by what other means, must depend on circumstances. Ignorance of the country through which you are to pass, and confidence in your judgment, zeal, and discretion, prevent the society from attempting more minute instructions, and even from exacting rigorous observance of those already given, except, indeed, what is the first of all objects, that you seek for and pursue that route which shall form the shortest and most convenient communication between the higher parts of the Missouri and the Pacific ocean.

It is strongly recommended to you to expose yourself in no case to unnecessary dangers, whether such as might affect your health or your personal safety, and to consider this not merely as your personal concern, but as the injunction of science in general, which expects its enlargement from your inquiries, and of the inhabitants of the United States in particular, to whom your report will open new fields and subjects of commerce, intercourse, and observation.

If you reach the Pacific ocean and return, the society assign to you all the benefits of the subscription before mentioned. If you reach the waters only which run into that ocean, the society reserve to themselves the apportionment of the reward according to the conditions expressed in the subscription. If you do not reach even those waters they refuse all reward, and reclaim the money you may have received here under the subscription.

They will expect you to return to the city of Philadelphia to give in to them a full narrative of your journey and observations, and to answer the inquiries they shall make of you, still reserving to yourself the benefit arising from the publication of such parts of them as are in the said subscription reserved to you.

XXVII.

_Memorandum relative to commissioners for laying off the federal city. March 11th, 1793._

_Question 1st._--What sacrifice may be made to retain Mr. Johnson in the office of commissioner for the federal territory?

_Answer._--For such an object, it is worth while to give up the plan of an allowance per diem; to give, instead of that, a sum in gross, and to extend that sum to five hundred dollars per annum, and expenses; the latter to be rendered in account.

If Mr. Johnson persists in resigning, as it is evident Dr. Stewart will not continue even for the above allowance, and Mr. Carroll does not appear to make any conditions, the President will be free as to Mr. Carroll and two new associates, to adhere to the allowance per diem already proposed, or to substitute a sum in gross.

_Question 2d._--May new commissioners be chosen in the town?

_Answer._--It is strongly desirable that the commissioners should not be of the town, nor interested in it; and this objection is thought a counterpoise for a sensible difference in talents; but if persons of adequate talents and qualifications cannot be found in the country, it will be better to take them from the town, than to appoint men of inadequate talents from the country.

_Question 3d._--How compensate them?

_Answer._--If they come from the country, the per diem allowance is thought best; if from the town, a sum in gross will be best, and this might be as far as three hundred dollars a year, and no allowance for expenses. If partly from the town, and partly from the country, then three hundred dollars a year to the former, and the same, with allowance of expenses, to the latter.

Mr. Madison, Mr. Randolph and Thomas Jefferson having consulted together on the preceding questions, with some shades of difference of opinion in the beginning, concurred ultimately and unanimously in the above answers.

XXVIII.

_Note given to the President relative to Genet._

Mr. Genet's declaration to the President at his reception, that France did not wish to engage the United States in the present war by the clause of guarantee, but left her free to pursue her own happiness in peace, has been repeated to myself in conversation, and to others, and even in a public answer, so as to place it beyond question.

Some days after the reception of Mr. Genet (which was May 17th), I went to his house on business. The Attorney General went with me to pay his first visit. After he withdrew, Mr. Genet told me Mr. Fornant had delivered him my letter of May 15th on the four memorials of Mr. Hammond. He said something first of the case of the Grange, and then of the vessels armed at Charleston. He said that on his arrival there, he was surrounded suddenly by Frenchmen full of zeal for their country, pressing for authority to arm with their own means for its assistance: that they would fit out their own vessels, provide everything, man them, and only ask a commission from him: that he asked the opinion of Governor Moultrie on the subject, who said he knew no law to the contrary, but begged that whatever was to be done, might be done without consulting him: that he must know nothing of it, &c.: that hereupon he gave commission to the vessels: that he was of opinion that he was justified, not only by the opinions at Charleston, but by our treaties. I told him the President had taken full advice on the subject, had very maturely considered it, and had come to the decision expressed in my letter. He said he hoped the President had not so absolutely decided it, but that he would hear what was to be said against it. I told him I had no doubt but that the President, out of respect to him and his country, would receive whatever he should have to urge on the subject, and would reconsider it with candor. He said he would make it his business to write me a letter on the subject: that he thought the arming the privateers was justifiable; but that if the President should finally decide otherwise (though he could not think it would be right), yet he must submit; for that assuredly his instructions were to do whatever would be agreeable to us. He showed, indeed, by his countenance, his manner, and words, that such an acquiescence would be with reluctance; but I was and am persuaded he then meant it.

Mr. Genet called at my office on Tuesday sennight, or fortnight, say (July 16th or 9th), but I think it was Tuesday sennight; and knew it was on a Tuesday, because he went from thence to the President's. He was summing up to me the strength of the French naval force now arrived. I took that occasion to observe to him, that having such great means in his hands, I thought he ought not to hesitate in abandoning to the orders of the government the little pickeroons which had been armed here unauthorized by them, and which occasioned so much embarrassment and uneasiness: that certainly their good dispositions must be worth more than the trifling services these little vessels could render. He immediately declared, that having such a force in his hands, he had abandoned every idea of further armament in our ports: that these small objects were now beneath his notice, and he had accordingly written to the consuls to stop everything further of that kind; but that as to those which had been fitted out before, their honor would not permit them to give them up, but he wished an oblivion of everything which had passed, and that in future the measure so disagreeable to the government should not be pursued, though he thought it clearly justifiable by the treaty. I told him the government was of a different opinion: that both parties indeed had equal right to construe the treaty: that, consequently, he had done his duty in remonstrating against our construction, but that since the government remained finally persuaded of the solidity of its own construction, and had a right to act accordingly within their own limits, it was now his duty, as a diplomatic man, to state the matter to his government, to ask and await their orders, and in the meantime to acquiesce, and by no means to proceed in opposition within our limits.

It was at the same time, he informed me, that he had sent out the Little Democrat, July 26th, 1793, to obtain intelligence of the state of the coast, and whether it was safe for the fleet to proceed round from Norfolk to New York.

XXIX.

_Rules for the regulation of our conduct towards the belligerent Powers recommended to the President for his adoption._

1st. The original arming and equipping of vessels in the ports of the United States by any of the belligerent powers for military service, offensive or defensive, is deemed unlawful.

2d. Equipments of merchant vessels by either of the belligerent parties in the ports of the United States, purely for the accommodation of them as such, is deemed lawful.

3d. Equipments in the ports of the United States of vessels of war in the immediate service of the government of any of the belligerent parties, which, if done to other vessels, would be of a doubtful nature, as being applicable either to commerce or war, are deemed lawful, except those which shall have made prize of the subjects, people or property of France, coming with their prizes into the ports of the United States, pursuant to the seventeenth article of our treaty of amity and commerce with France.

4th. Equipments in the ports of the United States by any of the parties at war with France, of vessels fitted for merchandise and war, whether with or without commissions, which are doubtful in their nature, as being applicable either to commerce or war, are deemed lawful, except those which shall have made prize, &c.

5th. Equipments of any of the vessels of France in the ports of the United States, which are doubtful in their nature, as being applicable to commerce or war, are deemed lawful.

6th. Equipments of every kind in the ports of the United States of privateers of the powers at war with France, are deemed unlawful.

7th. Equipments of vessels in the ports of the United States which are of a nature solely adapted to war, are deemed unlawful; except those stranded or wrecked, as mentioned in the eighteenth article of our treaty with France, the sixteenth of our treaty with the United Netherlands, the ninth of our treaty with Prussia, and except those mentioned in the nineteenth article of our treaty with France, the seventeenth of our treaty with the United Netherlands, the eighteenth of our treaty with Prussia.

8th. Vessels of either of the parties not armed, or armed previous to their coming into the ports of the United States, which shall not have infringed any of the foregoing rules, may lawfully engage or enlist therein their own subjects, or aliens not being inhabitants of the United States, except privateers of the powers at war with France, and except those vessels which shall have made prize, &c.

August 3, 1793. The foregoing rules having been considered by us at several meetings, and being now unanimously approved, they are submitted to the President of the United States.

TH: JEFFERSON. ALEXANDER HAMILTON.
H. KNOX. EDW: RANDOLPH.

XXX.

_Opinion relative to the propriety of convening the Legislature at an earlier period than that fixed by law. August 4th, 1793._

The President having been pleased to propose for consideration, the question whether it be proper or not to convene the Legislature at an earlier period than that at which it is to meet by law, and at what time? I am of opinion it will be proper.

1st. Because the protection of our southern frontiers seems to render indispensable a war with the Creeks, which cannot be declared nor provided for but by the Legislature, nor prudently undertaken by the Executive on account of the consequences it may involve with respect to Spain.

2d. Because several Legislative provisions are wanting to enable the government to steer steadily through the difficulties daily produced by the war of Europe, and to prevent our being involved in it by the incidents and perplexities to which it is constantly giving birth.

3d. Because, should we be involved in it, which is every day possible, however anxiously we endeavor to avoid it, the Legislature, meeting a month earlier, will place them a month forwarder in their provisions for that state of things.

I think the first Monday in November would be a proper time for convening them, because, while it would gain a month in making provisions to prevent or prepare for war, it leaves such a space of time for their assembling as will avoid exciting alarm either at home or abroad.

XXXI.

_Communication relative to our French relations. August 22d, 1793._

Thomas Jefferson has the honor to enclose to the President the letter of the National Assembly to him, of December 22d, 1792. Its most distinct object seems to have been to thank the United States for their measures to St. Domingo. It glances blindly, however, at commercial arrangements, and on the 19th of February, the same Assembly passed the decree putting our commerce in their dominions on the footing of natives, and directing their executive council to treat with us on the subject. On this the following questions arise:

1st. Would the President choose to answer the letter, acknowledging its receipt, thanking them in turn for the favors to our commerce, and promising to consult the constitutional powers (the Senate) on the subject of the treaty proposed?

2d. Would he rather choose to make no reply to the letter, but that Mr. Morris be instructed to negotiate a renewal of Mr. Genet's powers to treat, to his successor?

3d. Or would he choose that nothing be said on the subject to anybody?

If the President would in his judgment be for a treaty on the principles of the decree, or any modification of them, the 1st or 2d measure will be well to be adopted.

If he is against a treaty on those principles or any modification of them, the 3d measure seems to be the proper one.

XXXII.

_Explanation of the origin of the principle that "free bottoms make free goods." Dec. 20th, 1793._

A doubt being entertained whether the use of the word _modern_, as applied to the _law of nations_ in the President's proclamation, be not inconsistent with ground afterwards taken in a letter to Genet, I will state the matter while it is fresh in my mind,--beginning it from an early period.

It cannot be denied that according to the general law of nations, the goods of an enemy are lawful prize in the bottom of a friend, and the goods of a friend privileged in the bottom of an enemy; or in other words, that _the goods follow the owner_. The inconvenience of this principle in subjecting neutral vessels to vexatious searches at sea, has for more than a century rendered it usual for nations to substitute a _conventional_ principle _that the goods shall follow the bottom_, instead of the _natural_ one before mentioned. France has done it in all her treaties; so I believe had Spain, before the American Revolution. Britain had not done it. When that war had involved those powers, Russia, foreseeing that her commerce would be much harassed by the British ships, engaged Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal to arm, and to declare that the conventional principle should be observed by the powers at war, towards neutrals, and that they would make common cause against the party who should violate it; declaring expressly, at the same time, that that Convention should be in force only during the war then existing. Holland acceded to the Convention, and Britain instantly attacked her. But the other neutral powers did not think proper to comply with their stipulation of making common cause. France declared at once that she would conform to the conventional principle. This in fact imposed no new obligation on her, for she was already bound by her treaties with all those powers to observe that principle. Spain made the same declaration. Congress gave similar orders to their vessels; but Congress afterwards gave instructions to their ministers abroad not to engage them in any future combination of powers for the general enforcement of the conventional principle that goods should follow the bottom, as this might at some time or other engage them in a war for other nations; but to introduce the principle separately with every nation by the treaties they were authorized to make with each. It had been already done with France and Holland, and it was afterwards done with Prussia, and made a regular part in every treaty they proposed to others. After the war, Great Britain established it between herself and France. When she engaged in the present war with France, it was thought extremely desirable for us to get this principle admitted by her, and hoping that as she had acceded to it in one instance, she might be induced to admit it as a principle now settled by the common consent of nations, (for every nation, belligerent or neutral, had stipulated it on one or more occasions,) that she might be induced to consider it as now become a _conventional_ law of nations, I proposed to insert the word _modern_ in the proclamation, to open upon her the idea that we should require the acquiescence in that principle as the condition of our remaining in peace. It was thought desirable by the other gentlemen; but having no expectation of any effect from it, they acquiesced in the insertion of the word, merely to gratify me. I had another view, which I did not mention to them, because I apprehended it would occasion the loss of the word.