Chapter III: Part 3

The 9th Brigade attacked at "zero" hour with the 43rd and 58th Battalions, and at first reports were good, and the Canadians appeared to be making excellent progress up the difficult slopes of Bellevue Spur. But by 8.30 a.m. the news had changed, weary parties of survivors came straggling back in twos and threes to the jumping-off line, and the 52nd Battalion troops were aware that their services would be required in short order. Colonel Foster, the Commanding Officer, went forward to the front line and returned with news of a critical situation. On the right the 58th had encountered terrible machine-gun fire and had been unable to make any progress, while some forty men of Lieutenant Shankland's company of the 43rd had managed to fight their way to the crest of the spur, had roughly entrenched themselves, being able to advance no more, and were still holding out after four hours of steady fighting, under heavy close-range fire from pill-boxes on the ridge, and in constant danger of a flanking move by the enemy on either hand. Lieutenant O'Kelly, in charge of "A" Company, was ordered to move at once to their assistance, advancing on the left flank of the 43rd Battalion post upon the hill, and filling the gap between the 8th and 9th Brigades.

Drenched by the steady rain and pounded by the enemy's shells, the men of the 52nd were very bored indeed with inaction. They went forward strongly, penetrating the German barrage on the flank without losing very heavily, and making good progress up the low northern slope towards the crest of the spur, where their comrades of the 43rd were not only doing most effective shooting on their own account, but were preventing the Germans from paying very much attention to the manoeuvres of the 52nd. The top of the hill was defended by numerous concrete machine-gun forts, and these fired spasmodically upon the advancing troops, causing a number of casualties but no delays. Lieutenant O'Kelly had brought his men up well, and sweeping over the brow, they caught the flank of the enemy advancing against the 43rd Battalion post, driving the Germans before them and shooting them down as they ran. For a moment it was a most successful rout, but then the fire from the pill-boxes grew heavier, and there ensued a series of gallant attacks upon the strong points before them. Our troops rushed pill-box after pill-box, small parties of men striving to win close to the walls of each fort, while sections to the rear bombarded every opening and loop-hole with bullets and rifle-grenades. This made it very difficult indeed for the Germans to take aim, and allowed the actual assailants an opportunity of gaining the dead ground close beneath the walls and hurling their bombs inside through any aperture. The effect of quite a small bomb upon the mass of men in the confined space of a pill-box is very terrible, and usually the treatment requires no second application before the surrender of the garrison. However, the reduction of these forts is a very costly business, and many a time the attacking section would be caught within the zone of fire of a machine-gun and practically wiped out, though on more than one occasion the attack was carried to a successful conclusion by two or three survivors, who would compel the garrison of thirty or forty men to surrender to them. Through all this fighting Lieutenant O'Kelly led his men with wonderful judgment, selecting the point and method of attack with cool precision, and never losing sight of his main object--to gain ground and consolidate the ridge. Finally his force was joined by "B" Company, and the two companies of the 52nd set out to advance their line. The buildings of Bellevue Farm proved excellent cover for the retiring Germans, and there was stubborn fighting about the ruined outhouses before our fellows got through. A clear half-mile of ground was captured and consolidated, our men reaching the Wallemolen-Bellevue Road and driving the enemy before them from the country west of it. For a time the hostile bombardment was vague and uncertain, though on occasion a barrage would be placed before our advancing men, the enemy's gunners appearing to be supremely indifferent to the scattered parties of their own troops who were still holding out bravely enough before the Canadians. But directly our new line was in process of formation the German shelling became intense. For an hour the countryside was hammered and pounded, and then the inevitable counter-attack developed at two points of our thinly-held line. However, O'Kelly's men felt that they had saved the situation, his pluck and initiative had pulled a victory from a defeat, and the men of the 52nd had no intention of giving up a foot of the ground they had won. So heavy a fire was developed upon the attacking enemy that the counter-attack was shrivelled and dispersed two hundred yards from our line. The shelling began again, but our position was strong and clear, and consolidation was continued, while during the night Lieutenant O'Kelly's men went forward again, and raided several strong points that might have hampered the advance of our men in the next phase of the offensive. The men of the 52nd Battalion have great reason to be pleased with themselves for that day's work, for they captured 9 officers and 275 men, no less than 21 machine-guns, and more important still, saved a very critical situation indeed.

CAPTAIN (ACTING MAJOR) GEORGE RANDOLPH PEARKES, M.C., 5TH C.M.R.

There are many wonderful deeds recorded in the history of the Canadian Corps at Passchendaele, but for stubborn endurance carried far beyond previous standards of physical limitations, for cool pluck and pertinacity under very terrible conditions, the story of the 5th Canadian Mounted Rifle Battalion on October 30th, 1917, is remarkable.

The night of the 29th was clear and fine, and the moon was nearly full, the light helping our men to pick their way through to the assembly on the comparatively firm ground between the flooded shell-holes. Soon after 5 o'clock on the morning of the 30th the troops were in position, and at ten minutes to six "A" and "C" Companies went over the top and forward to the attack on Vapour Farm and the outlying defences of Passchendaele. The ground immediately before the 5th C.M.R. was very swampy, and owing to this it had been previously found impossible to send troops straight through Woodland Plantation. Accordingly the waves of our attacking infantry divided, and "A" Company went forward and round the south of the Plantation, while "B" Company attacked on the north. For nearly an hour the smoke covering the plantation prevented any observation of our progress, but soon a wounded runner stumbled into Headquarters with a report that the left of our attack had reached the intermediate objective. On the right the men of "A" Company had encountered the enemy south of the wood, and fierce hand-to-hand fighting was still going on, with the Canadians steadily making their way forward. In this bayonet work, with the opponents waist deep in mud and water, our men won the advantage, for the knowledge that a mis-step or a disabling wound meant a peculiarly unpleasant death in suffocating mud was an incentive to desperate fighting, and the Germans hated it from the start.

By the time the smoke had cleared our troops had won their way around the copse, and the two companies, now barely half their original strength, had joined and were resting while our barrage hammered the line of the intermediate objective. But this halt was a mistake. The Germans, retreating before our advance, were given time to re-form, and in a moment or two machine-gun and rifle fire became terribly heavy from the high ground to the east. However, led by Major Pearkes and reinforced by the remaining companies, the 5th C.M.R. went forward again, until our observers lost sight of them as they went over the ridge. Then occurred a time of anxious suspense for the men at Headquarters, until half an hour later a message came through from Major Pearkes saying that he was holding a line near to his final objectives with some fifty men, that the fighting was close and desperate, and that help was required.

Major Pearkes was in a very difficult situation. He had taken his men forward, fighting his way through obstacle after obstacle until he had reached his objective, and now he was holding a hastily improvised line with both his flanks exposed to any German attack. The troops attacking with him on each side had been unable to make any headway, and only the well-directed and aggressive shooting of his men prevented a flanking move that might have cut him off completely. On his left the Artists Rifles had been unable to capture Source Farm, and from this point heavy enfilading fire was poured upon his exposed line. It was impossible to maintain any position under such fire, and the major realized that the only hope of holding his ground lay in the capture of this strong point. With the few men at his command he organized and led an attack, and the gallant recklessness of the assaulting party carried the place by storm. Now he could get forward again, and he did so, only halting to establish his line when it became obvious that his handful of men, though willing enough, could hardly fight their way through an entire army corps.

He withdrew his men from Vanity House, consolidated a line of shell-holes from Source Farm to Vapour Farm and prepared to meet a strong counter-attack. His fighting strength was now twenty men. It is hard to conceive how so small a party may hold a previously unprepared position against a determined attack, but these men did so, and beat the Germans back in disorder. However, it was scarcely possible to withstand another such attack--ammunition was running short, the rate of casualties was much too high for so slight a garrison, and a flanking attack by the enemy could hardly fail to be successful--but Major Pearkes and his men held on, praying for reinforcements and determined to see it through.

A company of the 2nd C.M.R. had been sent forward to reinforce the original assailants, and finally, as the fresh troops advanced, they came within sight of the weary garrison. Most of the ground behind the latter was low and swampy, and all of it was swept by the enemy's machine-gun fire, but the supporting company came over the heavy ground in splendid style. The men in the shell-holes could see the casualties occurring in the wave of men, but never for a moment was there any hesitation, and at last the reinforcements tumbled into Pearkes' rough line of defence.

Affairs were still in a serious condition. The shell-fire was very heavy and counter-attacks were imminent, and it was not until after dusk that sufficient supports were available to cover the flanks and enable the successful consolidation of our new line.

LIEUTENANT ROBERT SHANKLAND, 43RD BATTALION

The attack made by the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions on October 26th formed an essential preliminary to the capture of the whole Passchendaele Ridge and town. It was necessary to establish a good jumping-off line for the attack on the village itself, and this was accomplished, though our men went through some very stiff fighting indeed before the position was won. The troops of the 9th Brigade had as their objectives Bellevue Spur and the high ground about it, and after the fighting a captured German officer remarked that the Spur was considered to be the key of Passchendaele town, and that its capture by the Canadians was a notable feat of arms, considering the efforts made by the German Higher Command to ensure its successful defence. One does not know if the officer was merely endeavouring to alleviate the mild rigours of his captivity, but in any case the fighting was most difficult and critical, and too much praise cannot be given to the scattered parties of men who hung on to isolated positions in shell-holes and ditches along the crest of the hill, under the most intense shell-fire, and held back the enemy until reinforcements arrived and consolidated the line.

The 43rd Battalion held the centre of the 3rd Divisional front, on the left of the Gravenstafel-Bellevue Road, with the 58th Battalion on the right and the 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles on the left. At 5.40 a.m. the troops went forward in the steady rain, advancing splendidly over the muddy, wet ground, and by half-past six men of the 43rd were seen against the sky-line going over the crest of Bellevue Spur. The German artillery fire had been immediate and heavy, and formidable pill-boxes on the top and flanks of the hill maintained steady fire upon our troops, causing many gaps in the waves of infantry stumbling and slipping upon the muddy slopes. "D" Company, led by Captain Galt and Lieutenant Shankland, made good progress up the hill, until checked by the heavy fire of a machine-gun in a strong emplacement to the right front. Collecting a few men, Captain Galt attempted its capture, while Lieutenant Shankland continued the advance with the remainder of the company. He gained the crest of the hill, and here close fighting won our men more ground. The pill-boxes were captured, but a trench some fifty yards beyond them checked the advance, and the weary survivors of the attack dug themselves in as well as possible.

In the meantime the battle was going badly enough. On the right the troops of the 58th Battalion, held up by determined resistance and the concentrated fire of many machine-guns at Snipe Hall, had been unable to make good their objective, and were drifting back in twos and threes to the comparative shelter of the jumping-off line. But a few parties of men held out with Shankland's company on the crest, and maintained a rough and disjointed line of shell-holes, of which there were many, across the hill top. Upon this line the Germans poured a relentless stream of lead. At no time previously had our men experienced such shelling. The mud and water dispersed by the bursting shells clogged the weapons of the Canadians, and, in spite of instant attention, in many cases rendered them temporarily useless. The going was terribly hard, but Lieutenant Shankland held his battered line for four hours along the crest of the Spur, keeping his men together and in good spirits, recruiting those soldiers of other companies who had gained the hill but were left without officers, and maintaining against heavy counter-attack the Canadian position that had cost so much to win. But here a new danger asserted itself. On his left Shankland had established rough connection with the 8th Brigade, but now these troops were forced to withdraw, while on the right his flank was completely exposed, and German troops were advancing from the direction of Snipe Hall, enfilading his line, and threatening to cut him off altogether. After a careful survey of the whole position, he handed over the command to the Machine-gun Officer, who, though wounded, had refused to leave the line while his guns were in action, and making the best of his way back to Headquarters, handed in a very valuable report, giving a clear summary of a critical situation, and enabling steps to be taken that previous lack of information had rendered unwise. While the men of the 52nd and 58th Battalions drove back the enemy on the flanks, the Lieutenant got back through the mud and shell-fire to his own company on the hill top. The Germans had attempted to rush this precarious position, and had been beaten back by our machine-gun fire with heavy losses. They had continued to lose, for the 52nd Battalion, advancing in splendid style, drove many of them back across the fire of Shankland's company of the 43rd upon the crest of the Spur. Finally, the flanks were firmly established, and our troops consolidated the new line, with the object of our attack accomplished, though they had not penetrated as far into enemy country as they had hoped.

PRIVATE CECIL JOHN KINROSS, 49TH BATTALION

On October 28th, 1917, the 49th Canadian Infantry Battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. Palmer, moved from Wieltje area and relieved three companies of the 116th Battalion in the front line south-east of Wolf Copse, on the left of the Gravenstafel-Bellevue Road, the P.P.C.L.I, relieving the remaining company on the right of the road. The strength of the Battalion consisted of twenty-one officers and 567 other ranks. The relief was a difficult business, the enemy very alert, and the bad weather and heavy going rendering the operation exceedingly arduous. However, by 1.50 a.m. on the 29th the relief was effected, and preparations for the morrow's offensive were immediately undertaken.

The 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions were to continue the attack on the outlying defences of Passchendaele; to capture Vapour Farm, Vanity House, Meetcheele, Friesland, the high ground about Crest Farm, and other strong points; and to establish a line approximately from Goudberg Copse in the north to the railway line just south of Vienna Cottages in the south. Six battalions were to attack at zero hour, 5.50 a.m. on the 30th, the 5th Canadian Mounted Rifles, the 49th Battalion, P.P.C.L.I., 72nd, 78th, and 85th Battalions, in order from left to right.

The troops of the 49th Battalion had as their objective Furst Farm and the pill-boxes about and beyond, and the strong points to the north of Meetcheele. Late in the afternoon the barrage maps were received at Battalion Headquarters, and Colonel Palmer found it would be necessary to evacuate the front-line positions occupied by "A" and "D" Companies and establish a jumping-off line to the rear, as the conformation of the ground rendered the establishment of a really effective barrage a most delicate task. Of late the enemy had developed a mischievous habit of keeping very close indeed to our front line, making his way inside our barrage at the moment of its inception, and so being enabled to meet our attacking troops with a volume of fire quite unmitigated by the curtain of lead designed to eliminate such resistance.

About midnight October 29th-30th the troops moved to the assembly, the evacuation of the forward positions being postponed until the very last possible moment. The night was very clear, and as it was possible to discern almost any movement from a distance of two hundred yards it is probable that German patrols were aware of the gathering. At any rate, about 4.30 a.m. two green flares went up near Furst Farm, were repeated in a moment from the rear, and at once the hostile shelling became more local and intense. By a quarter past five assembly was complete, and at 5.48 a.m., two minutes before zero hour, our barrage opened on the right and the troops went forward.

The morning was clear and bright, a strong wind drying the ground somewhat during the night and making better foothold possible for the men; but such a hurricane of fire encountered the troops as they advanced that only slow progress was possible. "B" Company, on the right, lost most of its effective strength before crossing the Wallemolen-Bellevue Road. "B" and "C" Companies, forming the first wave, were met at once by intense rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire, and progressed in a series of rushes, going forward indomitably in spite of their heavy losses. The supporting waves, "A" and "D" Companies, fared little better, and it was painfully evident that the advance would be brought to an early conclusion through sheer lack of the men to force a passage. Considering the resistance, however, good progress was made, the men taking no heed of their losses and fighting every inch of the way. Near Furst Farm the first real check occurred, a well-mounted machine-gun covering our whole local advance and holding up the assailants, who took what cover the torn ground afforded, continuing to reply as well as might be expected to the heavy fire, until the situation was lightened by the heroic action of a private soldier.

Private Kinross, completely indifferent to the bullets directed upon him, surveyed the whole position coolly and carefully, deciding upon a plan of action that pleased him thoroughly.

Returning for a moment to cover, he cleared himself of all unnecessary equipment and made his way by devious courses to a point as near as possible the vicious machine-gun. Arrived there, he rushed the position, against point-blank fire, alone and in broad daylight, killing the six men of the crew and finally destroying the gun. It is impossible to tell properly of such deeds, but the daring of it, and the complete success, so heartened our men that in their immediate advance our line was carried forward a full three hundred yards and two strong positions stormed without a halt. This brought our men to the intermediate objectives, where the line was cleared of the enemy, held and consolidated.

By this time the strength of the Battalion had decreased to four officers and 125 men, and no further advance was possible, incessant fighting being necessary to maintain the position already gained. Throughout the day and night the troops held on, several platoons of the Royal Canadian Regiment reinforcing the sadly depleted ranks of the 49th, and assisting in the defeat of three strong counter-attacks. By the evening of the 31st all our wounded had been removed from the forward area and the tired troops were relieved by the 42nd Battalion. In the fighting of October 30th the 49th Battalion gained more glory than German ground, yet a great deal of German ground was captured.

LIEUTENANT HUGH MACKENZIE, CANADIAN MACHINE GUN CORPS

The 7th Machine Gun Company had been in the line for eight days before the second phase of the Canadian operations against Passchendaele, and the continual heavy rain that had fallen before the 30th of October made offensive preparations very difficult indeed. But on the 29th, the day before the attack, the weather cleared, and a strong west wind made footing somewhat easier upon the higher ground--the lower ground was all flooded, or consisted of almost impenetrable swamp. The night was very clear, and the moon full, and our fellows blessed the welcome light as they moved their guns to the forward positions; the enemy, too, took advantage of the change in the weather, and there was some fairly heavy shelling of our lines and communications, though few casualties were caused among the machine-gunners.

Lieutenant MacKenzie, in charge of the four guns of his company, was covering the 7th Brigade in the attack upon the difficult country about Friesland, Meetcheele and Graf. With his gun-positions on the high ground, he was prepared to bring direct fire upon the enemy as our troops advanced, and to lay an effective barrage before our line upon the occupation of the objectives.

At ten minutes to six on the morning of the 30th, the P.P.C.L.I. and the 49th Battalion attacked, the troops for a time keeping close to our barrage and going forward wonderfully well, in spite of the terribly heavy hostile fire. But soon after zero our communications were cut by the intense shelling, and then came the usual anxious time in the support areas, when news is vague and contradictory, and there is no information available save that afforded by some wounded soldier stumbling back to safety. At last at 7 o'clock a message came through saying that all was going well, and subsequent communications were fairly regular.

Lieutenant MacKenzie took forward his guns, two behind the Princess Pat's, and two with the 49th Battalion, finding many opportunities for effective fire. The casualties amongst his men were pretty heavy as they advanced, but they stuck close to the infantry, and took advantage of every piece of rising ground from which direct fire might be delivered. But the critical point of the attack was still to come.

About the intermediate objective before Meetcheele the rising ground supplied much natural cover to the German riflemen and machine-gunners retreating before our men. In addition to the enemy's supplementary defences of pill-boxes and concrete emplacements, the difficulties of the assailants were enhanced by the swampy ground on each side of the spur, limiting the field of attack to a narrow strip of ground, every foot of which was exposed to the fire of the machine-guns upon the slope.

One pill-box in particular on the crest of the hill maintained such a murderous fire that the attacking company of the Princess Pat's was brought to a halt upon the slope of the hill, with every officer and N.C.O. shot down, and the men remaining seeking what cover they could, unable to advance and unwilling to retreat. All this time MacKenzie had been ploughing forward with his guns, seeking good positions and finding them, rendering a German emplacement untenable, wiping out some hostile formation that threatened a sudden counter-attack, and endeavouring to keep down the heavy fire of the Germans immediately before our advancing infantry. Noting the hesitation of our men on the slope of the hill, he left a corporal in charge of his guns, and made his way through the heavy fire to our fellows in their terribly exposed position. The Company had been very hard hit, two thirds of its effectives were gone, but still the men were determined enough. Taking command of the company, he cheered them by his good spirits, and instantly set about arranging a plan for the downfall of the pill-box above them. Not only was there the pill-box to deal with, but the upper hill was a veritable nest of machine-guns, and MacKenzie had to make a daring reconnaissance before he could effect a suitable scheme of attack.

Detailing small parties, he sent them off to work their way round the flanks, overcoming any hostile resistance they might encounter, and to be prepared at a given moment to make an attack from the rear upon the pill-box that was holding up the advance. Then he arranged the frontal attack, choosing himself to lead a small party of men directly up the slope to the fort, while the remainder of his men attacked the same front from a different angle. At the word they went forward, MacKenzie leading the forlorn hope on the most exposed front of the attack. It was not possible to win through such fire unharmed, and he was shot through the head and killed at the moment of the capture of the pill-box by the flanking parties he had detailed. One may hope that he saw his object attained.

This pill-box, in its dominating position upon the crest of the hill, commanded the lines of our attack for many hundred yards. By its capture Lieutenant MacKenzie and his men saved the lives of many soldiers, and enabled the successful consolidation of our objectives upon the whole local front.

SERGEANT GEORGE HARRY MULLIN, M.M., P.P.C.L.I.

The conformation of the country about Graf and Meetcheele made the arrangements of a really effective barrage a highly technical affair. In that district of swamps and hills and copses it was impossible that our line should be straight, and on the night before their offensive the men of the P.P.C.L.I. were compelled to establish their assembly position close in rear of the front line. This enabled our artillery to place a heavy barrage just before our attacking troops without too much risk of casualties among our own men.

On the morning of October 30th, when the Princess Pat's went forward to the attack upon Graf and Meetcheele, our artillery fire was effective enough, and good progress was made, though our casualties were heavy. Stubborn bayonet fighting took place about the enemy's pill-boxes on the flanks of the hill, and along the valley of the Ravebeek, where the heavy smoke barrage covered the right of our advance.

For a time all went well: but the enemy's fire was close and intense, and our men suffered so heavily that for a time it seemed as if our advance might die out through sheer numerical weakness. But we kept on, and reached the foot of the hill at Meetcheele before a really serious check was encountered. A German pill-box was situated upon the top of the hill, and all the higher ground was dotted with the machine-gun emplacements of the enemy. From the commanding position of the concrete fort upon the crest, direct observation could be obtained over our whole local advance, and the sweeping fire of its guns inflicted casualties upon our men attacking half-a-mile away, who were in complete ignorance of the existence of such a strong point.

As in many cases during the Passchendaele fighting, the front of this attack was dangerously narrowed by marshy ground on each side of a dry spur leading direct to the top of the hill.

It is an interesting fact to consider that the Germans, after the first Canadian attack, altered the zones of fire of a number of their machine-guns so as to cover swamps and marshy ground that previously had been considered impregnable from their natural difficulties. This was a real compliment to our men--for apparently the enemy thought the Canadians quite capable of attacking over ground impassable to other troops.

However, in this case, the Princess Pat's fought their way up the slope until most of their effective strength was gone; and then Sergeant Mullin went forward to reconnoitre the possibilities of a flanking attack. Finding a place where one man could advance unobserved, but where the movement of a party would certainly bring disaster, he made his way forward alone.

Crawling through the brush, he reached a point close to a sniper's post just before the master pill-box on the top of the hill. He destroyed this post and its garrison with bomb-fire, then made straight for the pill-box. It must have appeared most heroically absurd--this attack by one man upon a concrete fort bristling with men and guns--but Mullin knew very well what he was about. It was all done before the eyes of our men, who were swarming up the slope, regardless of the heavy fire in their anxiety to be in at the finish. Mullin climbed on to the roof of the pill-box. Crawling to the centre, he fired down upon the German machine-gunners inside, laying them out across their weapons. Then, sliding down the roof, he landed beside the entrance just in time to receive the surrender of the thoroughly demoralized garrison.

The capture of this fort decided the issue upon the local front, for the offensive capacity of the pill-box proved as great in the hands of the Canadians as it had in those of the enemy. Our objective was gained and consolidated, and excellent positions assured for the next attack.

PRIVATE JAMES PETER ROBINSON, 27TH BATTALION

Late in the afternoon of November 5th, the 27th (City of Winnipeg) Battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel P. J. Daly, D.S.O., left Hill 37 and began the weary tramp along the duckboard trail to the front line. The village of Passchendaele was to be captured by the 2nd Canadian Division on the morrow, and all along the Corps front soldiers, weary with long days in the trenches, were being replaced by fresh men. The relief of the 29th Battalion was completed early in the evening, but the move to the assembly position was not made for several hours, Colonel Daly contenting himself with establishing a line of posts some fifty yards in advance of the front line, to intercept any inquisitive Hun. Soon after midnight the men moved to the assembly, and by 3 a.m. the gathering was complete and the troops resting in the mud after their long tramp from the reserve area.

The night was very dark, and, though the enemy did not spare his artillery, few casualties were caused. On the left of the 27th Battalion lay the troops of the 31st, and on the right those of the 26th. Their objective this time was the village of Passchendaele itself, and the men were pleased because it was their part to attack the real objective of the whole offensive, after the stubborn preliminary operations of the 26th and 30th of October.

Promptly at 6 a.m. our barrage came down, 150 yards in advance of our front line, and from there it advanced, at a rate of 100 yards in eight minutes, with our men close behind. The morning was dull and overcast, and the attack appeared to be a complete surprise, the assailants following so close upon the curtain of shell-fire that they were amongst the enemy and using their bayonets freely before the surviving Germans had recovered from the whirl of flame and explosions that had so suddenly enveloped them.

The German front line of defence consisted of fortified shell-holes, and many of the machine-guns established there were knocked out at once by our heavy fire; the occupants stood no chance against our men with the bayonet, and the Canadians swept over with scarcely a halt, catching up the barrage and reaching the outskirts of Passchendaele town just behind it. The troops holding the enemy's main line before the village had no desire to try conclusions with the owners of those free-swinging bayonets, and without hesitation they bolted, unfortunately for themselves, arriving in the middle of the ruined town simultaneously with our barrage, which had been arranged to play on this portion of the objective for a double space of time. But strong emplacements amongst the masonry still gave our men pause.

On the left flank of the 27th Battalion a German machine gun, surrounded by uncut wire and broken, reinforced walls, formed an ideal point for stubborn defence. The flanking platoon charged this position three times, and on each occasion was driven back. The assaults were met by the point-blank fire of the machine-gun, and by bullets from riflemen in the ruined houses along the main street of the village. Then, while his platoon brought as heavy rifle and Lewis gun fire as possible to bear upon the emplacement, Private Robertson crossed the open line of fire alone, and running round the flank of the position, leapt the barbed wire and got in with his bayonet among the garrison. He had bayoneted several men before the gun crews had gathered their wits to meet the sudden onslaught, and his furious fighting daunted the remainder. They fled, nothing left them but the instinct of self-preservation. But Robertson did not intend to let them escape--he had been told too often at his training camp that his aim in life, nay, his whole ambition and purpose, should be centred on the elimination of the Bosche. Seizing the captured gun, he swung it about and opened fire on the running men, killing most of them before his platoon had arrived at the position he had captured so gallantly. Then, bearing the captured gun with him, he continued on his way towards the final objective, the eastern outskirts of the town, meeting with several opportunities to use his new weapon and wasting none. The troops followed him down the main Passchendaele street, past the broken church, mopping up the enemy's strong points among the masonry as they advanced, and taking few prisoners. About each damaged machine-gun and every ruined cottage they left German dead, almost every man killed with the bayonet.

Little further resistance was encountered. The enemy had no taste for the brand of fighting in vogue, and our snipers, passing through the foremost line, lay out in advance of our busy troops, harassing points of possible hostile observation, and making an end of many Germans who sought refuge in the woods behind the town. But the enemy's shell-fire was intense and destructive. With his range noted to a nicety from his previous occupation of our new line, he pounded the unfortunate village, occasionally revenging himself for our successful shooting with a burst of shrapnel just in advance of our line.

During the consolidation, Private Robertson had been busy with his new machine-gun, but, seeing two of our men lying wounded well in advance of the line, he abandoned the gun and without hesitation went forward to bring them in. He got in successfully enough with the first man, but now the Germans, stiffened by reinforcements, had returned on their tracks and were establishing posts behind every available piece of cover. In spite of a veritable storm of bullets, Robertson went out again. He fell before reaching the second man--he was probably hit--but picking himself up, he continued his way, and secured his wounded comrade. Slipping on the sticky mud, nearly exhausted, he stuck to his man, and had put him down close to our own line, when an unlucky shell exploded near by, killing him instantly. He did not live to know the honour he had won, but the men of his battalion who fought through Passchendaele village will not forget him.

CORPORAL COLIN BARRON, 3RD BATTALION

The two preliminary assaults on the high ground before Passchendaele had secured the Canadians an excellent jumping-off position for the attack on the village itself. The capture of Crest Farm on October 30th by the 4th Division gave our men almost direct observation into the town, and the consequent concentrated fire of our riflemen and machine-gunners rendered the position of the German garrison most uncomfortable.

The 6th of November was the date chosen to justify the costly operations of October 26th and 30th, and at 6 a.m. the Canadians resumed the offensive, the 2nd Division troops on the right going forward to the capture of Passchendaele town, while on the left the 1st Division occupied the hills to the north.

The 1st Division had difficult country to manage. Not only were there many pill-boxes to occupy, but ways and means of progress were terribly limited and clearly defined by the areas of swampy and impassable ground that lay before our advance. In view of the fact that we had so recently driven the Germans from the ground we were to cover, it was too much to hope that they were unaware of our limited attacking fronts, and the subsequent machine-gun barrages that swept our lines of progress proved the contrary.

The 3rd Battalion attacked on the extreme left of the Canadian Corps front, with the intention of reaching the Goudberg Spur. But between our line and the Spur there lay a very formidable strong point indeed, the pill-box at Vine Cottage. Now the pill-box itself was a standing testimonial to the thoroughness of German defensive works, but, in addition to its 18-inch walls of reinforced concrete and its appropriate armament, no less than six machine-guns had been placed in positions commanding every approach to this _chef d'oeuvre_. Our fellows had attempted the reduction of this minor fortress a week before Corporal Barron and his section of the 3rd Battalion took the matter in hand, and had gained no appreciable results beyond a somewhat depressing casualty list and a raised estimation of German defensive ingenuity. However, its capture was imperative, and a special plan of attack was arranged.

At zero hour, Lieutenant Lord's platoon jumped off towards the south-east, intending to capture Vine Cottage and swing round northwards to the final objective. Advancing through the rain, our men got near the strong point and were met at once by heavy fire. Vine Cottage itself, though hardly justifying its name, was a pleasant building enough in its Belgian way, and it was not until the observer had approached it nearly that he could define German handiwork behind the crumbling bricks.

The enemy, with simple cunning, had raised a concrete building within the broken walls, with such successful camouflage that our scouting aeroplanes had not reported it as a pill-box for some time, while the easy unconcern with which the building received a direct hit by an 18-pounder shell had caused our gunners anxiety to a degree. As the Canadians drew near they extended and attacked the position from three sides. Their advance was slow over the sodden ground. It was impossible to win close enough to the building or gun positions to throw bombs with good effect. Time and again our fellows charged, but from every point machine-gun fire drove them back, and finally they were forced to take whatever cover they could find, while a fresh scheme of attack was planned. The going was very heavy, and the mud and constant rain made the condition of the wounded terrible beyond description. Our men started to attack once more, and as they rose to their feet a diversion occurred to the front.

Corporal Barron, a Lewis gunner, had worked round the flank with his weapon, and was knocking out the German crews one after the other with his well-directed fire. Completely exposed, he directed his gun undisturbed by the point-blank shooting of the enemy, until he had silenced two of the opposing batteries. Then, without waiting for his comrades, he charged the remaining position with the bayonet, getting in among the gunners and killing four of them before the rest of his platoon could arrive. The slackening of the heavy fire gave the Canadians a chance to get well forward, and in a moment they were about the position. The guns Barron had been unable to reach kept up a heavy fire until our fellows were on top of them, when most of the crews surrendered, while others attempted to escape to the rear. But the Canadians had lost too many of their comrades to feel merciful, and they were infuriated at the general morale of men who would maintain murderous shooting until imminent danger pressed, and then calmly sue for mercy. They took few prisoners.

Corporal Barron, however, had not finished his good work. Turning the enemy's guns about, he opened fire upon the retreating Germans, catching the groups upon the hillside, and shooting them down with such good effect that hardly a man escaped.

That was a job well done and the remaining men of the platoon moved northwards to the consolidation of Goudberg Spur with the capture of six machine-guns and a strong pill-box to their credit, and the satisfying knowledge that the German losses were double the number of their own.

LIEUTENANT HARCUS STRACHAN, FORT GARRY HORSE

It is generally admitted that initiative and an aggressive spirit are very necessary concomitants of the successful cavalry leader. Their possession does not prove an infallible rule--cavalrymen claim no monopoly of these qualities--yet on occasion a cavalry officer's possession of them to a degree marks an exploit abnormal in its exceptional dash and daring. Such an exploit was that of Lieutenant Strachan of the Fort Garry Horse, in November, 1917, at Cambrai.

During the morning of November 20th, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade moved forward to the outskirts of Masnieres, and there the troopers halted, awaiting word from the G.O.C. 88th Brigade, whose men were preparing the way for the cavalry. The British infantry and tanks had broken the enemy's line between Gonnelieu and Hermies, and it was the intention of the Higher Command to push the cavalry forward through the gap, and with the mounted men to seize Bourlon Wood and Cambrai, to hold the passages across the Sensee River, and to cut off the enemy's troops between Havrincourt and the Sensee.

Riding forward into Masnieres, General Seely received word that the attacking troops had secured their objectives, and accordingly the brigade advance guard, the Fort Garry Horse, entered the town and managed to get across the river bridge in the main street. The canal bridge beyond, however, had been broken down, either by the weight of a tank or blown up by the enemy during the crossing of one of these machines. At any rate, one of our tanks had plunged through into the canal beneath, and, without very radical repair, the bridge was impassable to mounted men.

Another bridge, in a rather better condition, was discovered to the south-west, and Major Walker, of the Machine Gun Squadron, commandeered the help of every available man, including civilians and German prisoners, and by three o'clock the bridge was strong and practicable. This work was accomplished under very heavy fire.

Upon the completion of the bridge, "B" Squadron of the Fort Garry Horse, under the command of Captain Campbell, pushed forward across the canal and attacked the enemy's line upon the ridge, while the remainder of the regiment prepared to follow. But conflicting statements arrived from the infantry--there had been a check--and before the rest of the mounted men could advance, Colonel Patterson, commanding the Fort Garry Horse, received orders instructing him not only to remain west of the canal, but to withdraw any of his troops that might have crossed.

Colonel Patterson immediately sent messengers after "B" Squadron, but the orderlies were unable to deliver their instructions. The Canadian troopers had wasted no time--opportunity had been denied them too long--and there had been little delay in getting to grips with the enemy. They were well away.

Captain Campbell's men came under machine-gun fire directly they left Masnieres, and for a few minutes the horses were hard put to it in the marshy ground about the canal. Before them the infantry had cut a gap in the German wire, and winning through the swamp they charged for this at the gallop, taking little heed of the heavy fire.

Casualties were rather heavy at the gap. Captain Campbell went down, and command was taken by Lieutenant Strachan. There was no delay. Sweeping through the gap, Strachan led his men north towards Rumilly, and soon encountered the camouflaged road just south-east of the town. This obstacle was negotiated successfully enough, with some slight damage to the screens and an occasional telephone wire, and, forming in line of troop columns, the men went forward at the gallop to an objective dear to any cavalryman's heart. A battery of field-guns lay before them.

A good horse, firm ground and guns to be taken--a cavalryman wants no more. The Canadians charged down upon them, and in a moment were among the guns, riding the gunners down or sabreing them as they stood. Two of the guns were deserted by their crews as our fellows came thundering down, the third was blown up by its gunners, and the crew of the fourth fired a hasty round point-blank at the advancing troopers. This shot might have seriously disorganized the mounted men, but fortunately the gunners were much too demoralized to train their weapon surely. The shell went wide. There was a brief mêlée of plunging horses and stumbling artillerymen. Then the business was finished, and the men hoped for a breathing-space.

But there was no rest for a while. Behind the guns a body of German infantry appeared, and, swinging his men about, Strachan led the troopers on into the thick of them. A few saddles were emptied, but the firing was vague and ragged. The Germans were not accustomed to this kind of thing and would not stand. They fled, our fellows cutting them down as they ran.

Strachan gathered his men and continued towards Rumilly, under constant fire from block-houses on the outskirts of the town. A sunken road crossed his line about half a mile east of the town, and here the troopers halted and prepared a hasty stronghold. All this time Lieutenant Strachan had been anxiously waiting for news or sight of the main body of the Cavalry Brigade, and as the day passed and there was no sign of his regiment he realized that something had gone wrong. He could not face the German Army with less than a hundred cavalrymen, however determined, but he decided to hold on awhile in the rough cover of the sunken road until it became obvious that no supports were coming to his assistance that night.

The enemy had collected what troops he could, and the band of dismounted troopers were surrounded on three sides. Several tentative rushes had been made, but the steady fire of the Canadians had driven these back in disorder. Still, without rapid support it was impossible for the party to hold out much longer. Only five horses remained unwounded, and the strength of the squadron was under fifty men. Ammunition was none too plentiful, and Strachan called for two volunteers to carry messages back to Headquarters in Masnieres.

The job was risky enough, but there was more difficulty in selecting applicants than procuring them. Two troopers, Privates Morrell and Vanwilderode, were dispatched, and in the meantime the lieutenant set his men to cutting three main telephone cables that ran along the side of the sunken road. This small operation in itself should have caused the enemy some slight annoyance.

The light was going fast, and Strachan decided to abandon his horses and cut his way through to Masnieres. He imagined, shrewdly enough, that though the Germans were in no manner of doubt as to his presence, they were very vague about the strength of his party, and were by no means anxious to try for a definite conclusion until their numbers were assuredly overwhelming.

The light was just strong enough to distinguish the church tower of Rumilly, and taking a compass bearing from the building, Strachan started off to fight his way back to the brigade. First he collected his horses, and with some commotion stampeded them to the eastwards. This manoeuvre drew the fire of every machine-gun in the vicinity upon the unfortunate animals, for the Germans thought that, not content with the havoc that they had already created behind their lines, the irrepressible cavalrymen were starting off again upon their destructive mission.

With the mêlée at its height, Strachan gathered his men, and led them off quietly towards the British lines.

The journey back was hardly less eventful than the outgoing trip, though it was a great deal slower. Leading his men through the dark, Strachan made as straight a line as possible for the town where he had left the brigade. One might have imagined that the military ardour which had fired these troopers throughout the day would have been temporarily damped, but there was no sign of it. No less than four parties of Germans were encountered on the homeward route, and each time attacked and dispersed. On two occasions the enemy was numerically a great deal stronger, but disregarding the obvious, the dismounted troopers went forward with the bayonet, routed the unsuspecting Germans and captured more prisoners than they could conveniently handle.

However, most of them were brought along, and after an hour of somewhat nervous travelling the remainder of the squadron reached the wire. At this point there was some slight difficulty in finding a gap that would admit the passage of the men, and in the search in the darkness the party became separated. Lieutenant Cowen with the prisoners and half the men made the best of his way back to Masnieres, while Strachan sought another road with the rest of his squadron. Both parties were successful and came in without a further casualty.

Comment on the day's action would be superfluous. Strachan had destroyed a battery, inflicted well over a hundred casualties, most effectively tangled German communications over a wide radius, and captured or caused the surrender of a number of the enemy exceeding the original strength of his squadron. Had conditions been favourable for the use of cavalry upon a larger scale a very great victory might have been won.

LIEUTENANT GORDON MURIEL FLOWERDEW, LORD STRATHCONA'S HORSE

March 30th, 1918, dawned full of menace for the Allied line.

Early that morning the Canadian Cavalry Brigade received information that the Germans had captured Mézières and were advancing on Amiens. The brigade was ordered to cut across country and arrest the advance.

Already the Germans had occupied the Bois de Moreuil, the strategic importance of which could hardly be over-estimated. From the wood they could overlook the whole of the valley leading up to Amiens and to the main railroad to Paris. The cavalry decided to attack.

Reaching the north-east edge of the wood, headquarters were established in a small wood adjoining the large one. The smaller wood had not then been occupied by the Germans, but they were sending bursts of rifle and machine-gun fire at the cavalry from their cover and it was imperative that the attack should not be postponed.

The Royal Canadian Dragoons, who were leading, sent an advance-guard squadron, commanded by Captain Nordheimer, around the north-east corner at a gallop. A second squadron, under Captain Newcomen, rode at the south-east face, intending to get into touch with Nordheimer's squadron. A third squadron, under Major Timmis, followed in support of Captain Nordheimer.

Though raked by a heavy fire, Nordheimer's squadron charged into the north-east corner of the wood, and came to grips with the enemy in a hand-to-hand combat. Many of the enemy were killed, for they refused to surrender; but at last a large party, of about three hundred, driven from cover, retired from the wood south of the point at which the cavalry had entered.

It was then that Lord Strathcona's Horse received the order to advance, Lieutenant Flowerdew's squadron in support of Nordheimer, while the remainder of the regiment moved, dismounted, against the southern front of the wood.