Chapter II: Front Matter (2)

It has been said that the Stoic philosophy first showed its real value when it passed from Greece to Rome. The doctrines of Zeno and his successors were well suited to the gravity and practical good sense of the Romans; and even in the Republican period we have an example of a man, M. Cato Uticensis, who lived the life of a Stoic and died consistently with the opinions which he professed. He was a man, says Cicero, who embraced the Stoic philosophy from conviction; not for the purpose of vain discussion, as most did, but in order to make his life conformable to the Stoic precepts. In the wretched times from the death of Augustus to the murder of Domitian, there was nothing but the Stoic philosophy which could console and support the followers of the old religion under imperial tyranny and amidst universal corruption. There were even then noble minds that could dare and endure, sustained by a good conscience and an elevated idea of the purposes of man's existence. Such were Paetus Thrasae, Helvidius Priscus, Cornutus, C. Musonius Rufus,[A] and the poets Persius and Juvenal, whose energetic language and manly thoughts may be as instructive to us now as they might have been to their contemporaries. Persius died under Nero's bloody reign; but Juvenal had the good fortune to survive the tyrant Domitian and to see the better times of Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian.[B] His best precepts are derived from the Stoic school, and they are enforced in his finest verses by the unrivalled vigor of the Latin language.

[A] I have omitted Seneca, Nero's preceptor. He was in a sense
a Stoic, and he has said many good things in a very fine way.
There is a judgment of Gellius (xii. 2.) on Seneca, or rather a
statement of what some people thought of his philosophy, and it
is not favorable. His writings and his life must be taken
together, and I have nothing more to say of him here. The
reader will find a notice of Seneca and his philosophy in
"Seekers after God," by the Rev. P. W. Farrar. Macmillan and
Co.

[B] Ribbeck has labored to prove that those Satires, which
contain philosophical precepts, are not the work of the real,
but of a false Juvenal, a Declamator. Still the verses exist,
and were written by somebody who was acquainted with the Stoic
doctrines.

The best two expounders of the later Stoical philosophy were a Greek slave and a Roman emperor. Epictetus, a Phrygian Greek, was brought to Rome, we know not how, but he was there the slave and afterwards the freedman of an unworthy master, Epaphroditus by name, himself a freedman and a favorite of Nero. Epictetus may have been a hearer of C. Musonius Rufus, while he was still a slave, but he could hardly have been a teacher before he was made free. He was one of the philosophers whom Domitian's order banished from Rome. He retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, and he may have died there. Like other great teachers he wrote nothing, and we are indebted to his grateful pupil Arrian for what we have of Epictetus' discourses. Arrian wrote eight books of the discourses of Epictetus, of which only four remain and some fragments. We have also from Arrian's hand the small Enchiridion or Manual of the chief precepts of Epictetus. This is a valuable commentary on the Enchiridion by Simplicius, who lived in the time of the emperor Justinian.[A]

[A] There is a complete edition of Arrian's Epictetus with the
commentary of Simplicius by J. Schweighaeuser, 6 vols. 8vo.
1799, 1800. There is also an English translation of Epictetus
by Mrs. Carter.

Antoninus in his first book (i. 7), in which he gratefully commemorates his obligations to his teachers, says that he was made acquainted by Junius Rusticus with the discourses of Epictetus, whom he mentions also in other passages (iv. 41; xi. 34, 36). Indeed, the doctrines of Epictetus and Antoninus are the same, and Epictetus is the best authority for the explanation of the philosophical language of Antoninus and the exposition of his opinions. But the method of the two philosophers is entirely different. Epictetus addressed himself to his hearers in a continuous discourse and in a familiar and simple manner. Antoninus wrote down his reflections for his own use only, in short, unconnected paragraphs, which are often obscure.

The Stoics made three divisions of philosophy,--Physic ([Greek: phusikon]), Ethic ([Greek: êthikon]), and Logic ([Greek: logikon]) (viii. 13). This division, we are told by Diogenes, was made by Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic sect, and by Chrysippus; but these philosophers placed the three divisions in the following order,--Logic, Physic, Ethic. It appears, however, that this division was made before Zeno's time, and acknowledged by Plato, as Cicero remarks (Acad. Post. i. 5). Logic is not synonymous with our term Logic in the narrower sense of that word.

Cleanthes, a Stoic, subdivided the three divisions and made six,--Dialectic and Rhetoric, comprised in Logic; Ethic and Politic; Physic and Theology. This division was merely for practical use, for all Philosophy is one. Even among the earliest Stoics Logic, or Dialectic, does not occupy the same place as in Plato: it is considered only as an instrument which is to be used for the other divisions of Philosophy. An exposition of the earlier Stoic doctrines and of their modifications would require a volume. My object is to explain only the opinions of Antoninus, so far as they can be collected from his book.

According to the subdivision of Cleanthes, Physic and Theology go together, or the study of the nature of Things, and the study of the nature of the Deity, so far as man can understand the Deity, and of his government of the universe. This division or subdivision is not formally adopted by Antoninus, for, as already observed, there is no method in his book; but it is virtually contained in it.

Cleanthes also connects Ethic and Politic, or the study of the principles of morals and the study of the constitution of civil society; and undoubtedly he did well in subdividing Ethic into two parts. Ethic in the narrower sense and Politic; for though the two are intimately connected, they are also very distinct, and many questions can only be properly discussed by carefully observing the distinction. Antoninus does not treat of Politic. His subject is Ethic, and Ethic in its practical application to his own conduct in life as a man and as a governor. His Ethic is founded on his doctrines about man's nature, the Universal Nature, and the relation of every man to everything else. It is therefore intimately and inseparably connected with Physic, or the Nature of Things, and with Theology, or the Nature of the Deity. He advises us to examine well all the impressions on our minds ([Greek: phantasiai]) and to form a right judgment of them, to make just conclusions, and to inquire into the meanings of words, and so far to apply Dialectic; but he has no attempt at any exposition of Dialectic, and his philosophy is in substance purely moral and practical. He says (viii. 13), "Constantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every impression on the soul,[A] apply to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic, and of Dialectic:" which is only another way of telling us to examine the impression in every possible way. In another passage (iii. 11) he says, "To the aids which have been mentioned, let this one still be added: make for thyself a definition or description of the object ([Greek: to phantaston]) which is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, in its complete entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the names of the things of which it has been compounded, and into which it will be resolved." Such an examination implies a use of Dialectic, which Antoninus accordingly employed as a means toward establishing his Physical, Theological, and Ethical principles.

[A] The original is [Greek: epi pasês phantasias]. We have no word
which expresses [Greek: phantasia], for it is not only the sensuous
appearance which comes from an external object, which object is
called [Greek: to phantaston], but it is also the thought or feeling
or opinion which is produced even when there is no
corresponding external object before us. Accordingly everything
which moves the soul is [Greek: phantaston], and produces a
[Greek: phantasia].

In this extract Antoninus says [Greek: physiologein, pathologein,
dialektikeuesthai]. I have translated [Greek: pathologein] by using
the word Moral (Ethic), and that is the meaning here.

There are several expositions of the Physical, Theological, and Ethical principles, which are contained in the work of Antoninus; and more expositions than I have read. Ritter (Geschichte der Philosophie, iv. 241), after explaining the doctrines of Epictetus, treats very briefly and insufficiently those of Antoninus. But he refers to a short essay, in which the work is done better.[A] There is also an essay on the Philosophical Principles of M. Aurelius Antoninus by J.M. Schultz, placed at the end of his German translation of Antoninus (Schleswig, 1799). With the assistance of these two useful essays and his own diligent study, a man may form a sufficient notion of the principles of Antoninus; but he will find it more difficult to expound them to others. Besides the want of arrangement in the original and of connection among the numerous paragraphs, the corruption of the text, the obscurity of the language and the style, and sometimes perhaps the confusion in the writer's own ideas--besides all this, there is occasionally an apparent contradiction in the emperor's thoughts, as if his principles were sometimes unsettled, as if doubt sometimes clouded his mind. A man who leads a life of tranquillity and reflection, who is not disturbed at home and meddles not with the affairs of the world, may keep his mind at ease and his thoughts in one even course. But such a man has not been tried. All his Ethical philosophy and his passive virtue might turn out to be idle words, if he were once exposed to the rude realities of human existence. Fine thoughts and moral dissertations from men who have not worked and suffered may be read, but they will be forgotten. No religion, no Ethical philosophy is worth anything, if the teacher has not lived the "life of an apostle," and been ready to die "the death of a martyr." "Not in passivity (the passive effects) but in activity lie the evil and the good of the rational social animal, just as his virtue and his vice lie not in passivity, but in activity" (ix. 16). The emperor Antoninus was a practical moralist. From his youth he followed a laborious discipline, and though his high station placed him above all want or the fear of it, he lived as frugally and temperately as the poorest philospher. Epictetus wanted little, and it seems that he always had the little that he wanted and he was content with it, as he had been with his servile station! But Antoninus after his accession to the empire sat on an uneasy seat. He had the administration of an empire which extended from the Euphrates to the Atlantic, from the cold mountains of Scotland to the hot sands of Africa; and we may imagine, though we cannot know it by experience, what must be the trials, the troubles, the anxiety, and the sorrows of him who has the world's business on his hands, with the wish to do the best that he can, and the certain knowledge that he can do very little of the good which he wishes.

[A] De Marco Aurelio Antonino ... ex ipsius Commentariis.
Scriptio Philologica. Instituit Nicolaus Bachius, Lipsiae,
1826.

In the midst of war, pestilence, conspiracy, general corruption, and with the weight of so unwieldy an empire upon him, we may easily comprehend that Antoninus often had need of all his fortitude to support him. The best and the bravest men have moments of doubt and of weakness; but if they are the best and the bravest, they rise again from their depression by recurring to first principles, as Antoninus does. The emperor says that life is smoke, a vapor, and St. James in his Epistle is of the same mind; that the world is full of envious, jealous, malignant people, and a man might be well content to get out of it. He has doubts perhaps sometimes even about that to which he holds most firmly. There are only a few passages of this kind, but they are evidence of the struggles which even the noblest of the sons of men had to maintain against the hard realities of his daily life. A poor remark it is which I have seen somewhere, and made in a disparaging way, that the emperor's reflections show that he had need of consolation and comfort in life, and even to prepare him to meet his death. True that he did need comfort and support, and we see how he found it. He constantly recurs to his fundamental principle that the universe is wisely ordered, that every man is a part of it and must conform to that order which he cannot change, that whatever the Deity has done is good, that all mankind are a man's brethren, that he must love and cherish them and try to make them better, even those who would do him harm. This is his conclusion (ii. 17): "What then is that which is able to conduct a man? One thing and only one, Philosophy. But this consists in keeping the divinity within a man free from violence and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's doing or not doing anything; and besides, accepting all that happens and all that is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he himself came; and finally waiting for death with a cheerful mind as being nothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which every living being is compounded. But if there is no harm, to the elements themselves in each continually changing into another, why should a man have any apprehension about the change and dissolution of all the elements [himself]? for it is according to nature; and nothing is evil that is according to nature."

The Physic of Antoninus is the knowledge of the Nature of the Universe, of its government, and of the relation of man's nature to both. He names the universe ([Greek: hê tôn hylôn ousia], vi. 1),[A] "the universal substance," and he adds that "reason" ([Greek: logos]) governs the universe. He also (vi. 9) uses the terms "universal nature" or "nature of the universe." He (vi. 25) calls the universe "the one and all, which we name Cosmos or Order" ([Greek: kosmos]). If he ever seems to use these general terms as significant of the All, of all that man can in any way conceive to exist, he still on other occasions plainly distinguishes between Matter, Material things ([Greek: hylê, hylikon]), and Cause, Origin, Reason ([Greek: aitia, aitiôdes, logos]).[B] This is conformable to Zeno's doctrine that there are two original principles ([Greek: archai]) of all things, that which acts ([Greek: to poioun]) and that which is acted upon ([Greek: to paschon]). That which is acted on is the formless matter ([Greek: hylê]): that which acts is the reason ([Greek: logos]), God, who is eternal and operates through all matter, and produces all things. So Antoninus (v. 32) speaks of the reason ([Greek: logos])which pervades all substance ([Greek: ousia]), and through all time by fixed periods (revolutions) administers the universe ([Greek: to pan]). God is eternal, and Matter is eternal. It is God who gives form to matter, but he is not said to have created matter. According to this view, which is as old as Anaxagoras, God and matter exist independently, but God governs matter. This doctrine is simply the expression of the fact of the existence both of matter and of God. The Stoics did not perplex themselves with the in-soluble question of the origin and nature of matter.[C] Antoninus also assumes a beginning of things, as we now know them; but his language is sometimes very obscure. I have endeavored to explain the meaning of one difficult passage (vii. 75, and the note).

[A] As to the word [Greek: ousia], the reader may see the
Index. I add here a few examples of the use of the word;
Antoninus has (v. 24), [Greek: hê sumpasa ousia], "the
universal substance." He says (xii. 30 and iv. 40), "there is
one common substance" ([Greek: ousia]), distributed among
countless bodies. In Stobaeus (tom. 1, lib. 1, tit. 14) there
is this definition, [Greek: ousian de phasin tôn ontôn hapantôn
tên prôtên hylên]. In viii. II, Antoninus speaks of [Greek: to
ousiôdes kai hyulikon], "the substantial and the material;" and
(vii. 10) he says that "everything material" ([Greek: enulon])
disappears in the substance of the whole ([Greek: tê tôn holôn
ousia]). The [Greek: ousia] is the generic name of that existence
which we assume as the highest or ultimate, because we conceive
no existence which can be coordinated with it and none above
it. It is the philosopher's "substance:" it is the ultimate
expression for that which we conceive or suppose to be the
basis, the being of a thing. "From the Divine, which is
substance in itself, or the only and sole substance, all and
everything that is created exists" (Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom,
198).

[B] I remark, in order to anticipate any misapprehension, that
all these general terms involve a contradiction. The "one and
all," and the like, and "the whole," imply limitation. "One" is
limited; "all" is limited; the "whole" is limited. We cannot
help it. We cannot find words to express that which we cannot
fully conceive. The addition of "absolute" or any other such
word does not mend the matter. Even the word God is used by
most people, often unconsciously, in such a way that limitation
is implied, and yet at the same time words are added which are
intended to deny limitation. A Christian martyr, when he was
asked what God was, is said to have answered that God has no
name like a man; and Justin says the same (Apol. ii. 6), "the
names Father, God, Creator, Lord, and Master are not names, but
appellations derived from benefactions and acts." (Compare
Seneca, De Benef. iv. 8.) We can conceive the existence of a
thing, or rather we may have the idea of an existence, without
an adequate notion of it, "adequate" meaning coextensive and
coequal with the thing. We have a notion of limited space
derived from the dimensions of what we call a material thing,
though of space absolute, if I may use the term, we have no
notion at all; and of infinite space the notion is the same--no
notion at all; and yet we conceive it in a sense, though I know
not how, and we believe that space is infinite, and we cannot
conceive it to be finite.

[C] The notions of matter and of space are inseparable. We
derive the notion of space from matter and form. But we have no
adequate conception either of matter or space. Matter in its
ultimate resolution is as unintelligible as what men call mind,
spirit, or by whatever other name they may express the power
which makes itself known by acts. Anaxagoras laid down the
distinction between intelligence [Greek: nous] and matter, and
he said that intelligence impressed motion on matter, and so
separated the elements of matter and gave them order; but he
probably only assumed a beginning, as Simplicius says, as a
foundation of his philosophical teaching. Empedocles said, "The
universe always existed." He had no idea of what is called
creation. Ocellus Lucanus (i, § 2) maintained that the Universe
([Greek: to pan]) was imperishable and uncreated. Consequently
it is eternal. He admitted the existence of God; but his
theology would require some discussion. On the contrary, the
Brachmans, according to Strabo (p. 713, ed. Cas.), taught that
the universe was created and perishable; and the creator and
administrator of it pervades the whole. The author of the book
of Solomon's Wisdom says (xi. 17): "Thy Almighty hand made the
world of matter without form," which may mean that matter
existed already.

The common Greek word which we translate "matter" is [Greek:
hylê]. It is the stuff that things are made of.

Matter consists of elemental parts ([Greek: stoicheia]) of which all material objects are made. But nothing is permanent in form. The nature of the universe, according to Antoninus' expression (iv. 36), "loves nothing so much as to change the things which are, and to make new things like them. For everything that exists is in a manner the seed of that which will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast into the earth or into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion." All things then are in a constant flux and change; some things are dissolved into the elements, others come in their places; and so the "whole universe continues ever young and perfect" (xii. 23).

Antoninus has some obscure expressions about what he calls "seminal principles" ([Greek: spermatikoi logoi]). He opposes them to the Epicurean atoms (vi. 24), and consequently his "seminal principles" are not material atoms which wander about at hazard, and combine nobody knows how. In one passage (iv. 21) he speaks of living principles, souls ([Greek: psychahi]) after the dissolution of their bodies being received into the "seminal principle of the universe." Schultz thinks that by "seminal principles Antoninus means the relations of the various elemental principles, which relations are determined by the Deity and by which alone the production of organized beings is possible." This may be the meaning; but if it is, nothing of any value can be derived from it.[A] Antoninus often uses the word "Nature" ([Greek: physis]), and we must attempt to fix its meaning, The simple etymological sense of [Greek: physis] is "production," the birth of what we call Things. The Romans used Natura, which also means "birth" originally. But neither the Greeks nor the Romans stuck to this simple meaning, nor do we. Antoninus says (x. 6): "Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms or Nature [is a system], let this first be established, that I am a part of the whole which is governed by nature." Here it might seem as if nature were personified and viewed as an active, efficient power; as something which, it not independent of the Deity, acts by a power which is given to it by the Deity. Such, if I understand the expression right, is the way in which the word Nature is often used now, though it is plain that many writers use the word without fixing any exact meaning to it. It is the same with the expression Laws of Nature, which some writers may use in an intelligible sense, but others as clearly use in no definite sense at all. There is no meaning in this word Nature, except that which Bishop Butler assigns to it, when he says, "The only distinct meaning of that word Natural is Stated, Fixed, or Settled; since what is natural as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, _i.e._, to effect it continually or at stated times, as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it at once." This is Plato's meaning (De Leg., iv. 715) when he says that God holds the beginning and end and middle of all that exists, and proceeds straight on his course, making his circuit according to nature (that is by a fixed order); and he is continually accompanied by justice, who punishes those who deviate from the divine law, that is, from the order or course which God observes.

[A] Justin (Apol. ii. 8) has the words [Greek: kata
spermatikou logou meros], where he is speaking of the Stoics;
but he uses this expression in a peculiar sense (note II). The
early Christian writers were familiar with the Stoic terms, and
their writings show that the contest was begun between the
Christian expositors and the Greek philosophy. Even in the
second Epistle of St. Peter (ii. I, v. 4) we find a Stoic
expression, [Greek: Ina dia toutôn genêsthe theias koinônoi
physeôs.]

When we look at the motions of the planets, the action of what we call gravitation, the elemental combination of unorganized bodies and their resolution, the production of plants and of living bodies, their generation, growth, and their dissolution, which we call their death, we observe a regular sequence of phenomena, which within the limits of experience present and past, so far as we know the past, is fixed and invariable. But if this is not so, if the order and sequence of phenomena, as known to us, are subject to change in the course of an infinite progression,--and such change is conceivable,--we have not discovered, nor shall we ever discover, the whole of the order and sequence of phenomena, in which sequence there may be involved according to its very nature, that is, according to its fixed order, some variation of what we now call the Order or Nature of Things. It is also conceivable that such changes have taken place,--changes in the order of things, as we are compelled by the imperfection of language to call them, but which are no changes; and further it is certain that our knowledge of the true sequence of all actual phenomena, as for instance the phenomena of generation, growth, and dissolution, is and ever must be imperfect.

We do not fare much better when we speak of Causes and Effects than when we speak of Nature. For the practical purposes of life we may use the terms cause and effect conveniently, and we may fix a distinct meaning to them, distinct enough at least to prevent all misunderstanding. But the case is different when we speak of causes and effects as of Things. All that we know is phenomena, as the Greeks called them, or appearances which follow one another in a regular order, as we conceive it, so that if some one phenomenon should fail in the series, we conceive that there must either be an interruption of the series, or that something else will appear after the phenomenon which has failed to appear, and will occupy the vacant place; and so the series in its progression may be modified or totally changed. Cause and effect then mean nothing in the sequence of natural phenomena beyond what I have said; and the real cause, or the transcendent cause, as some would call it, of each successive phenomenon is in that which is the cause of all things which are, which have been, and which will be forever. Thus the word Creation may have a real sense if we consider it as the first, if we can conceive a first, in the present order of natural phenomena; but in the vulgar sense a creation of all things at a certain time, followed by a quiescence of the first cause and an abandonment of all sequences of Phenomena to the laws of Nature, or to the other words that people may Use, is absolutely absurd.[A]

[A] Time and space are the conditions of our thought; but time
infinite and space infinite cannot be objects of thought,
except in a very imperfect way. Time and space must not in any
way be thought of when we think of the Deity. Swedenborg says,
"The natural man may believe that he would have no thought, if
the ideas of time, of space, and of things material were taken
away; for upon those is founded all the thought that man has.
But let him know that the thoughts are limited and confined in
proportion as they partake of time, of space, and of what is
material; and that they are not limited and are extended, in
proportion as they do not partake of those things; since the
mind is so far elevated above the things corporeal and worldly"
(Concerning Heaven and Hell, 169).

Now, though there is great difficulty in understanding all the passages of Antoninus, in which he speaks of Nature, of the changes of things and of the economy of the universe, I am convinced that his sense of Nature and Natural is the same as that which I have stated; and as he was a man who knew how to use words in a clear way and with strict consistency, we ought to assume, even if his meaning in some passages is doubtful, that his view of Nature was in harmony with his fixed belief in the all-pervading, ever present, and ever active energy of God. (ii. 4; iv. 40; x. 1; vi. 40; and other passages. Compare Seneca, De Benef., iv. 7. Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 349-357.)

There is much in Antoninus that is hard to understand, and it might be said that he did not fully comprehend all that he wrote; which would however be in no way remarkable, for it happens now that a man may write what neither he nor anybody can understand. Antoninus tells us (xii. 10) to look at things and see what they are, resolving them into the material [Greek: hylê], the casual [Greek: aition], and the relation [Greek: anaphora], or the purpose, by which he seems to mean something in the nature of what we call effect, or end. The word Caus ([Greek: aitia]) is the difficulty. There is the same word in the Sanscrit (hétu); and the subtle philosophers of India and of Greece, and the less subtle philosophers of modern times, have all used this word, or an equivalent word, in a vague way. Yet the confusion sometimes may be in the inevitable ambiguity of language rather than in the mind of the writer, for I cannot think that some of the wisest of men did not know what they intended to say. When Antoninus says (iv. 36), "that everything that exists is in a manner the seed of that which will be," he might be supposed to say what some of the Indian philosophers have said, and thus a profound truth might be converted into a gross absurdity. But he says, "in a manner," and in a manner he said true; and in another manner, if you mistake his meaning, he said false. When Plato said, "Nothing ever is, but is always becoming" ([Greek: aei gignetai]), he delivered a text, out of which we may derive something; for he destroys by it not all practical, but all speculative notions of cause and effect. The whole series of things, as they appear to us, must be contemplated in time, that is in succession, and we conceive or suppose intervals between one state of things and another state of things, so that there is priority and sequence, and interval, and Being, and a ceasing to Be, and beginning and ending. But there is nothing of the kind in the Nature of Things. It is an everlasting continuity (iv. 45; vii. 75). When Antoninus speaks of generation (x. 26), he speaks of one cause ([Greek: aitia]) acting, and then another cause taking up the work, which the former left in a certain state, and so on; and we might perhaps conceive that he had some notion like what has been called "the self-evolving power of nature;" a fine phrase indeed, the full import of which I believe that the writer of it did not see, and thus he laid himself open to the imputation of being a follower of one of the Hindu sects, which makes all things come by evolution out of nature or matter, or out of something which takes the place of Deity, but is not Deity. I would have all men think as they please, or as they can, and I only claim the same freedom which I give. When a man writes anything, we may fairly try to find out all that his words must mean, even if the result is that they mean what he did not mean; and if we find this contradiction, it is not our fault, but his misfortune. Now Antoninus is perhaps somewhat in this condition in what he says (x. 26), though he speaks at the end of the paragraph of the power which acts, unseen by the eyes, but still no less clearly. But whether in this passage (x. 26) lie means that the power is conceived to be in the different successive causes ([Greek: aitiai]), or in something else, nobody can tell. From other passages, however, I do collect that his notion of the phenomena of the universe is what I have stated. The Deity works unseen, if we may use such language, and perhaps I may, as Job did, or he who wrote the book of Job. "In him we live and move and are," said St. Paul to the Athenians; and to show his hearers that this was no new doctrine, he quoted the Greek poets. One of these poets was the Stoic Cleauthes, whose noble hymn to Zeus, or God, is an elevated expression of devotion and philosophy. It deprives Nature of her power, and puts her under the immediate government of the Deity.

"Thee all this heaven, which whirls around the earth, Obeys, and willing follows where thou leadest. Without thee, God, nothing is done on earth, Nor in the ethereal realms, nor in the sea, Save what the wicked through their folly do."

Antoninus' conviction of the existence of a divine power and government was founded on his perception of the order of the universe. Like Socrates (Xen. Mem., iv. 3, 13, etc.) he says that though we cannot see the forms of divine powers, we know that they exist because we see their works.

"To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods, or how dost thou comprehend that they exist and so worshipest them? I answer, in the first place, that they may be seen even with the eyes; in the second place, neither have I seen my own soul, and yet I honor it. Thus then with respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of their power, from this I comprehend that they exist, and I venerate them." (xii. 28, and the note. Comp. Aristotle de Mundo, c. 6; Xen. Mem. i. 4, 9; Cicero, Tuscul. i. 28, 29; St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, i. 19, 20; and Montaigne's Apology for Raimond de Sebonde, ii. c. 12.) This is a very old argument, which has always had great weight with most people, and has appeared sufficient. It does not acquire the least additional strength by being developed in a learned treatise. It is as intelligible in its simple enunciation as it can be made. If it is rejected, there is no arguing with him who rejects it: and if it is worked out into innumerable particulars, the value of the evidence runs the risk of being buried under a mass of words.

Man being conscious that he is a spiritual power, or that he has such a power, in whatever way he conceives that he has it--for I wish simply to state a fact--from this power which he has in himself, he is led, as Antoninus says, to believe that there is a greater power, which, as the old Stoics tell us, pervades the whole universe as the intellect[A] ([Greek: nous]) pervades man. (Compare Epictetus' Discourses, i. 14; and Voltaire à Mad^e. Necker, vol. lxvii., p. 278, ed. Lequien.)

[A] I have always translated the word [Greek: nous],
"intelligence" or "intellect." It appears to be the word used
by the oldest Greek philosophers to express the notion of
"intelligence" as opposed to the notion of "matter." I have
always translated the word [Greek: logos] by "reason," and
[Greek: logikos] by the word "rational," or perhaps sometimes
"reasonable," as I have translated [Greek: noeros] by the word
"intellectual." Every man who has thought and has read any
philosophical writings knows the difficulty of finding words to
express certain notions, how imperfectly words express these
notions, and how carelessly the words are often used. The
various senses of the word [Greek: logos] are enough to perplex
any man. Our translators of the New Testament (St. John, c. 1.)
have simply translated [Greek: ho logos] by "the word," as the
Germans translated it by "das Wort;" but in their theological
writings they sometimes retain the original term Logos. The
Germans have a term Vernunft, which seems to come nearest to
our word Reason, or the necessary and absolute truths which we
cannot conceive as being other than what they are. Such are
what some people have called the laws of thought, the
conceptions of space and of time, and axioms or first
principles, which need no proof and cannot be proved or denied.
Accordingly the Germans can say, "Gott ist die höchste
Vernunft," the Supreme Reason. The Germans have also a word
Verstand, which seems to represent our word "understanding,"
"intelligence," "intellect," not as a thing absolute which
exists by itself, but as a thing connected with an individual
being, as a man. Accordingly it is the capacity of receiving
impressions (Vorstellungen, [Greek: phantasiai],) and forming
from them distinct ideas (Begriffe), and perceiving
differences. I do not think that these remarks will help the
reader to the understanding of Antoninus, or his use of the
words [Greek: nous] and [Greek: logos]. The emperor's meaning
must be got from his own words, and if it does not agree
altogether with modern notions, it is not our business to force
it into agreement, but simply to find out what his meaning is,
if we can.

Justinus (ad Diognetum, c. vii.) says that the omnipotent,
all-creating, and invisible God has fixed truth and the holy,
incomprehensible Logos in men's hearts; and this Logos is the
architect and creator of the Universe. In the first Apology (c.
xxxii.), he says that the seed ([Greek: sperma]) from God is
the Logos, which dwells in those who believe in God. So it
appears that according to Justinus the Logos is only in such
believers. In the second Apology (c. viii.) he speaks of the
seed of the Logos being implanted in all mankind; but those who
order their lives according to Logos, such as the Stoics, have
only a portion of the Logos ([Greek: kata spermatikou logou
meros]), and have not the knowledge and contemplation of the
entire Logos, which is Christ. Swedenborg's remarks (Angelic
Wisdom, 240) are worth comparing with Justinus. The modern
philosopher in substance agrees with the ancient; but he is
more precise.

God exists then, but what do we know of his nature? Antoninus says that the soul of man is an efflux from the divinity. We have bodies like animals, but we have reason, intelligence, as the gods. Animals have life ([Greek: psychê]) and what we call instincts or natural principles of action: but the rational animal man alone has a rational, intelligent soul ([Greek: psychê logikê noera]). Antoninus insists on this continually: God is in man,[A] and so we must constantly attend to the divinity within us, for it is only in this way that we can have any knowledge of the nature of God. The human soul is in a sense a portion of the divinity, and the soul alone has any communication with the Deity; for as he says (xii. 2): "With his intellectual part alone God touches the intelligence only which has flowed and been derived from himself into these bodies." In fact he says that which is hidden within a man is life, that is, the man himself. All the rest is vesture, covering, organs, instrument, which the living man, the real[B] man, uses for the purpose of his present existence. The air is universally diffused for him who is able to respire; and so for him who is willing to partake of it the intelligent power, which holds within it all things, is diffused as wide and free as the air (viii. 54). It is by living a divine life that man approaches to a knowledge of the divinity.[C] It is by following the divinity within [Greek: daimôn] or [Greek: theos], as Antonius calls it, that man comes nearest to the Deity, the supreme good; for man can never attain to perfect agreement with his internal guide ([Greek: to hêgemonikon]). "Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and that it does all the daemon ([Greek: daimôn]) wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this daemon is every man's understanding and reason" (v. 27).

[A] Comp. Ep. to the Corinthians, i. 3, 17, and James iv. 8,
"Drawnigh to God and he will draw nigh to you."

[B] This is also Swedenborg's doctrine of the soul. "As to what
concerns the soul, of which it is said that it shall live after
death, it is nothing else but the man himself, who lives in the
body, that is, the interior man, who by the body acts in the
world and from whom the body itself lives" (quoted by Clissold,
p. 456 of "The Practical Nature of the Theological Writings of
Emanuel Swedenborg, in a Letter to the Archbishop of Dublin
(Whately)," second edition, 1859; a book which theologians
might read with profit). This is an old doctrine of the soul,
which has been often proclaimed, but never better expressed
than by the "Auctor de Mundo," c. 6, quoted by Gataker in his
"Antoninus," p. 436. "The soul by which we live and have cities
and houses is invisible, but it is seen by its works; for the
whole method of life has been devised by it and ordered, and by
it is held together. In like manner we must think also about
the Deity, who in power is most mighty, in beauty most comely,
in life immortal, and in virtue supreme: wherefore though he is
invisible to human nature, he is seen by his very works." Other
passages to the same purpose are quoted by Gataker (p. 382).
Bishop Butler has the same as to the soul: "Upon the whole,
then, our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly
instruments, which the living persons, ourselves, make use of
to perceive and move with." If this is not plain enough, be
also says: "It follows that our organized bodies are no more
ourselves, or part of ourselves, than any other matter around
us." (Compare Anton, x. 38).

[C] The reader may consult Discourse V., "Of the existence and
nature of God," in John Smith's "Select Discourses." He has
prefixed as a text to this Discourse, the striking passage of
Agapetus, Paraenes. § 3: "He who knows himself will know God;
and he who knows God will be made like to God; and he will be
made like to God, who has become worthy of God; and he becomes
worthy of God, who does nothing unworthy of God, but thinks the
things that are his, and speaks what he thinks, and does what
he speaks." I suppose that the old saying, "Know thyself,"
which is attributed to Socrates and others, had a larger
meaning than the narrow sense which is generally given to it.
(Agapetus, ed. Stephan. Schoning, Franeker, 1608. This volume
contains also the Paraeneses of Nilus.)

There is in man, that is in the reason, the intelligence, a superior faculty which if it is exercised rules all the rest. This is the ruling faculty ([Greek: to hêgemonikon]), which Cicero (De Natura Deorum, ii. 11) renders by the Latin word Principatus, "to which nothing can or ought to be superior." Antoninus often uses this term and others which are equivalent. He names it (vii. 64) "the governing intelligence." The governing faculty is the master of the soul (v. 26). A man must reverence only his ruling faculty and the divinity within him. As we must reverence that which is supreme in the universe, so we must reverence that which is supreme in ourselves; and this is that which is of like kind with that which is supreme in the universe (v. 21). So, as Plotinus says, the soul of man can only know the divine so far as it knows itself. In one passage (xi. 19) Antoninus speaks of a man's condemnation of himself when the diviner part within him has been overpowered and yields to the less honorable and to the perishable part, the body, and its gross pleasures. In a word, the views of Antoninus on this matter, however his expressions may vary, are exactly what Bishop Butler expresses when he speaks of "the natural supremacy of reflection or conscience," of the faculty "which surveys, approves, or disapproves the several affections of our mind and actions of our lives."

Much matter might be collected from Antoninus on the notion of the Universe being one animated Being. But all that he says amounts to no more, as Schultz remarks, than this: the soul of man is most intimately united to his body, and together they make one animal, which we call man; so the Deity is most intimately united to the world, or the material universe, and together they form one whole. But Antoninus did not view God and the material universe as the same, any more than he viewed the body and soul of man as one. Antoninus has 110 speculations on the absolute nature of the Deity. It was not his fashion to waste his time on what man cannot understand.[A] He was satisfied that God exists, that he governs all things, that man can only have an imperfect knowledge of his nature, and he must attain this imperfect knowledge by reverencing the divinity which is within him, and keeping it pure.

[A] "God, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow
capacities" (Locke, Essay concerning the Human Understanding,
ii. chap. 17).

From all that has been said, it follows that the universe is administered by the Providence of God ([Greek: pronoia]), and that all things are wisely ordered. There are passages in which Antoninus expresses doubts, or states different possible theories of the constitution and government of the universe; but he always recurs to his fundamental principle, that if we admit the existence of a deity, we must also admit that he orders all things wisely and well (iv. 27; vi. 1; ix. 28; xii. 5; and many other passages). Epictetus says (i. 6) that we can discern the providence which rules the world, if we possess two things,--the power of seeing all that happens with respect to each thing, and a grateful disposition.

But if all things are wisely ordered, how is the world so full of what we call evil, physical and moral? If instead of saying that there is evil in the world, we use the expression which I have used, "what we call evil," we have partly anticipated the emperor's answer. We see and feel and know imperfectly very few things in the few years that we live, and all the knowledge and all the experience of all the human race is positive ignorance of the whole, which is infinite. Now, as our reason teaches us that everything is in some way related to and connected with every other thing, all notion of evil as being in the universe of things is a contradiction; for if the whole comes from and is governed by an intelligent being, it is impossible to conceive anything in it which tends to the evil or destruction of the whole (viii. 55; x. 6). Everything is in constant mutation, and yet the whole subsists; we might imagine the solar system resolved into its elemental parts, and yet the whole would still subsist "ever young and perfect."

All things, all forms, are dissolved, and new forms appear. All living things undergo the change which we call death. If we call death an evil, then all change is an evil. Living beings also suffer pain, and man suffers most of all, for he suffers both in and by his body and by his intelligent part. Men suffer also from one another, and perhaps the largest part of human suffering comes to man from those whom he calls his brothers. Antoninus says (viii. 55), "Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe; and particularly, the wickedness [of one man] does no harm to another. It is only harmful to him who has it in his power to be released from it as soon as he shall choose." The first part of this is perfectly consistent with the doctrine that the whole can sustain no evil or harm. The second part must be explained by the Stoic principle that there is no evil in anything which is not in our power. What wrong we suffer from another is his evil, not ours. But this is an admission that there is evil in a sort, for he who does wrong does evil, and if others can endure the wrong, still there is evil in the wrong-doer. Antoninus (xi. 18) gives many excellent precepts with respect to wrongs and injuries, and his precepts are practical. He teaches us to bear what we cannot avoid, and his lessons may be just as useful to him who denies the being and the government of God as to him who believes in both. There is no direct answer in Antoninus to the objections which may be made to the existence and providence of God because of the moral disorder and suffering which are in the world, except this answer which he makes in reply to the supposition that even the best men may be extinguished by death. He says if it is so, we may be sure that if it ought to have been otherwise, the gods would have ordered it otherwise (xii. 5). His conviction of the wisdom which we may observe in the government of the world is too strong to be disturbed by any apparent irregularities in the order of things. That these disorders exist is a fact, and those who would conclude from them against the being and government of God conclude too hastily. We all admit that there is an order in the material world, a Nature, in the sense in which that word has been explained, a constitution ([Greek: kataskeuê]), what we call a system, a relation of parts to one another and a fitness of the whole for something. So in the constitution of plants and of animals there is an order, a fitness for some end. Sometimes the order, as we conceive it, is interrupted, and the end, as we conceive it, is not attained. The seed, the plant, or the animal sometimes perishes before it has passed through all its changes and done all its uses. It is according to Nature, that is a fixed order, for some to perish early and for others to do all their uses and leave successors to take their place. So man has a corporeal and intellectual and moral constitution fit for certain uses, and on the whole man performs these uses, dies, and leaves other men in his place. So society exists, and a social state is manifestly the natural state of man--the state for which his nature fits him, and society amidst innumerable irregularities and disorders still subsists; and perhaps we may say that the history of the past and our present knowledge give us a reasonable hope that its disorders will diminish, and that order, its governing principle, may be more firmly established. As order then, a fixed order, we may say, subject to deviations real or apparent, must be admitted to exist in the whole nature of things, that which we call disorder or evil, as it seems to us, does not in any way alter the fact of the general constitution of things having a nature or fixed order. Nobody will conclude from the existence of disorder that order is not the rule, for the existence of order both physical and moral is proved by daily experience and all past experience. We cannot conceive how the order of the universe is maintained: we cannot even conceive how our own life from day to day is continued, nor how we perform the simplest movements of the body, nor how we grow and think and act, though we know many of the conditions which are necessary for all these functions. Knowing nothing then of the unseen power which acts in ourselves except by what is done, we know nothing of the power which acts through what we call all time and all space; but seeing that there is a nature or fixed order in all things known to us, it is conformable to the nature of our minds to believe that this universal Nature has a cause which operates continually, and that we are totally unable to speculate on the reason of any of those disorders or evils which we perceive. This I believe is the answer which may be collected from all that Antoninus has said.[A]

[A] Cleanthes says in his Hymn:--