Chapter VIII: Introduction (6)

WITNESS--I am acquainted with both William Brodie and George Smith, the prisoners at the bar, and also with John Brown _alias_ Humphry Moore. I remember that the Excise Office was broke into upon Wednesday, the 5th of March last. I knew before that that it was to be broken into, but how long I cannot tell. Brown and the prisoners and I frequently talked of it before, and Brown and I went often to the Excise Office in the evenings in order to observe at what hour the people left it, and in consequence of repeated observations we discovered that the door was usually locked about eight o’clock, and that there were two men, an old and a younger man, who came night about to watch the office about ten o’clock. Afterwards Brown and I went out one afternoon to a house at Duddingston, where we drank a bottle of porter, and saw a woman whom I took to be the landlady. We then went to a field in the neighbourhood, from which we took the coulter of a plough and two iron wedges, which we carried to the Salisbury Crags and hid there. At this time there was a black dog in company with us. We had fixed on Wednesday, the 5th of March, for committing the said robbery, and we allowed the coulter to remain in Salisbury Crags until about six o’clock of the evening of that day, when Brown and I, it being then dusk, went out and brought the coulter of the plough to the house of the prisoner, George Smith, on purpose to use it in breaking into the Excise Office. We found Smith at home, and we expected Mr. Brodie to join us and to accompany us to the Excise Office. Brodie did not come until a good while after, when he joined us in the room above-stairs in Smith’s house. Mr. Brodie was at this time dressed in a light-coloured great-coat, with black clothes below (in which I had often seen him before), and a cocked hat. When he came in he had a pistol in his hand, and was singing a verse of what I understood to be a flash song. By a flash song I mean a highwayman’s song. We spoke together concerning the Excise Office; and it was settled upon that I should go before to the Excise Office and get within the rails and observe when the people went out. I went there accordingly a little before eight o’clock, carrying the coulter of the plough with me, and waited till I saw the porter come out with a light and lock the outer door. In a short while thereafter Smith came to me and asked if the people were all gone, and when I informed him that they were gone out Smith then went forward and opened the door with a key, which, I had heard him say, he had previously made for it, and went into the office. In about five minutes thereafter Brodie came down the close, and when I told him that Smith had gone in, but that Brown was not yet come, he went up the close again towards the street, and returned in a little with Brown, who said he had been dogging the old man who watched the office in order to see where he went, and that he had gone home. Brown then asked me whether or not I had “Great Samuel”--by which he meant the coulter. I told him I had, and gave it him through the rails, and he and Brodie then went down towards the door of the office and went in, as I supposed. I had no arms myself, excepting a stick, but Smith had three loaded pistols, Brown two, and Brodie one; at least, I saw Brodie, when he came into Smith’s house, have one in his hand. It had been previously settled amongst us, before leaving Smith’s house, that Brodie was to stand in the inside of the outer door, and that Brown and Smith were to go into the office. I was to remain without to watch, and in case of danger, to give an alarm to Brodie, which Brodie was to communicate to Brown and Smith. The signal of alarm agreed upon was to be given by me in this manner--A single whistle if one man appeared, so that they might be prepared to secure him; but if more than one man, or any appearance of danger, I was to give three whistles, in order that those within might make their escape by the door or by the back windows, as they thought best. I had an ivory whistle prepared for the purpose, which was given me by Mr. Brodie in Smith’s house in the afternoon. I took my station within the rail and leaned down, so that no person either going in or coming out could see me. Some short while after Brodie and Brown went into the office, a man came running down the close and went in also. I gave no alarm, for before I had time to think what I should do another man came immediately running out at the door and went up the court. In a very little afterwards, to my great surprise, a second man came out from the office. I got up and looked at him through the rails, and perceived that he was none of my three companions. I had not seen the other man who came out first so distinctly, owing to my lying down by the side of the parapet wall on which the rail is placed, in order that I might not be observed. I was afraid that we were discovered; and, as soon as the second man had gone up the close, I gave the alarm by three whistles as the agreed-on signal of retreat and ran up the close myself. I went down St. John’s Street and came round opposite to the back of the Excise Office, thinking to meet my companions coming out by the back way, having escaped from the windows. I remained there for some little time, and, not meeting with them, I then went directly to Smith’s house. Finding none of them there, and Mrs. Smith telling me that they were not yet come in, I went back to the Excise Office by the street, went down the close, saw the door open, and, finding everything quiet, I returned to Smith’s, where I saw him and Brown. They accused me of not having given the alarm as I promised, and said that when they came out they found that Brodie had gone from his place. I told them what I had observed, and that I had given the alarm. I remained in Smith’s only a few minutes, and I did not see Brodie again that night.[9] Brown and I then went over to the house of one Fraser in the New Town, and sent for Daniel Maclean, Mr. Drysdale’s waiter. We spent the evening with him there. There was one Price likewise in company with us, and we remained together till about two o’clock in the morning. It was near eight o’clock when I went first to the Excise Office, and it was about half-an-hour afterwards that I quitted my station. Brodie called next morning at our room--the room occupied by Brown and me. He came in laughing, and said that he had been with Smith, who had accused him of running away the previous evening. I told him that I also thought he had run off; but he said that he had stood true. Brodie had no great-coat on when he came to the Excise Office and spoke to me at the rails; he was dressed in black. When the whistle was given me by him in Smith’s house in the afternoon Brodie had on the white-coloured clothes which he usually wore. He afterwards changed them before we went to the Excise Office. Before I left Smith’s I saw Brodie have a pick-lock in his hands, and I think we all had it in our hands looking at it. Brodie was in his own hair. I did not observe him have a wig. We had prepared three crapes to disguise our faces; one of them was intended for Brown, another for Smith, and the remaining one for myself, but I did not see either Brown or Smith put a crape in their pockets that night. [Here the pistols libelled on were shown to the witness.] These pistols belonged to Mr. Brodie, and Smith had them with him at the Excise Office. They were given to him by me, and I had borrowed them from Mr. Brodie a month or two before for another purpose. That same evening Brown told me, as we went over to the New Town, that they had found sixteen pounds and some silver in the Excise Office; and on the Friday evening following, when I called at Smith’s house, in the room above stairs I found Smith and Brodie, and saw the money lying on a chair. I got a fourth share of it in small notes, and at the same time I got some gold from Mr. Brodie in payment of money he owed me. Brodie and Smith also each got a fourth share of it. There were two five-pound notes amongst the money that was on the chair, and I signified a desire to have one of them. I accordingly gave back some of the small notes I had received and some of the gold and got one of them in exchange. I afterwards gave the note to Smith, and saw him change it at Drysdale’s in the New Town the same evening, when he was purchasing a ticket for his wife in the mail-coach to Newcastle for the next day.[10] Brown and one Price were then present.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL--Have you any particular mark by which you could know the said note again?

WITNESS--It was a Glasgow note, and battered on the back with paper.

[Here the Solicitor-General proposed to show the witness the bank-note libelled on.]

The DEAN OF FACULTY--My Lords, here I must interrupt the witness. It is stated in the libel that a five-pound bank-note is to be produced in evidence against the pannels; but the witness says that the note given him to change was a Glasgow five-pound note, and the paper on your Lordship’s table is a promissory note for five pounds issued by John Robertson in name of Spiers, Murdoch & Company, a private banking company in Glasgow. This cannot in propriety of language be termed a bank-note. In Lombard Street, where such notes as that on the table are daily negotiated, they never think of calling them bank-notes. This term, my Lords, is exclusively appropriated to the notes issued by a bank constituted by a Royal Charter, such as the Bank of England, and the notes of a private banker are distinguished by the name of banker’s notes. Neither does such a note come under the description of money, as it is not a legal tender in payment. I hold in my hand this objection in writing, which, to save the time of the Court, I shall read, and I crave that it may be entered on the record.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL--This objection appears to me to be so entirely frivolous as hardly to be worthy of an answer. The note in question is one issued by a very respectable banking company in Glasgow, and well known in this country by the name of the Glasgow Arms Bank. Such notes are commonly held to be bank-notes, and are so described in common language every day. Many instances might likewise be given of their being described in the same manner in criminal indictments, nor was it ever before objected that the description was insufficient. We need not go so far off as Lombard Street; there is no necessity for going further than the Parliament Close, where thousands of these notes are issued, known by no other name than that of bank-notes. The honourable counsel on the other side of the table, as well as myself, have received the greatest part of our fees in bank-notes of this kind, and both of us would have reason to complain, I believe, if what we received in that manner were not really bank-notes or considered as money.

The DEAN OF FACULTY--My Lords, the common use of language, as well as the technical and legal description of the writing on the table, join in supporting this objection. That there is a distinction in common phrase between a bank-note and a banker’s note there can be no doubt. Every private company which is instituted with a view to the purposes of banking may indeed issue promissory notes, which meet with a voluntary credit from the country; but these are distinguished from the public banks instituted by the authority of Government, and where credit does not depend upon the goodwill of any individual, as every man must accept in payment their notes when tendered to him. These notes are alone properly termed bank-notes as the notes of a bank which is a public corporation, while the notes of a private company are termed banker’s notes, or those of an individual. Although the one may, in common discourse, be sometimes confounded with the other by those who are ignorant of the real distinction, there is no doubt that that distinction exists and is acknowledged by any one acquainted with the subject; and where they are best acquainted with it there the distinction is most explicitly acknowledged, as in Lombard Street, where no other term is known for the note of a private banker than a banker’s note. The inaccuracy of the description in the indictment is therefore evident, and can by no means be defended by the vulgar error which sometimes, I admit, is fallen into of confounding it with the note of a public bank.

My Lords, it will be allowed me that accuracy is at least as necessary for an indictment as to proceedings in the civil Courts; and your Lordships cannot have forgotten the late decision upon the application of the Bankrupt Act, when it was found that money belonging to creditors could not be lodged in the Bank of Dundee, in respect, the Act declares, that the bankrupt funds recovered should be lodged in a bank. And if the Bank of Dundee, my Lords, was held in that judgment not to be a bank under the meaning of the Act, with what propriety could your Lordships determine in a criminal case that their notes were bank-notes? No case can be figured more precisely in point; and if your Lordships approve of that decision, you will necessarily find that the note on the table is improperly described, and cannot be used in evidence.

I might safely admit, my Lords, that if this note had been described as a five-pound bank-note of a certain company, supposing it had been a bank-note of Sir William Forbes & Company, that this would have been a good description, for then it would have appeared by the indictment that the writing meant was a promissory note of that company. But from its being termed generally a bank-note, I could never suppose that it was not a note issued by one of the public banks, as that is the description that applies to no other species of document known in this country. For these reasons I hope your Lordships will not allow any questions concerning this paper to be put to the witness.

Lord HAILES--When I had the honour to serve the Crown as a depute-advocate, I learned from a most eminent judge, Lord Tinwald, Justice-Clerk, from whom I derived much instruction in the principles of law, that the note of a private banking company could not be termed in law a bank-note, nor could it be considered in any respect as money. On one occasion he obliged me to correct an indictment where I had fallen into the same error which I perceive here. The word bank-note, in legal acceptation, is applied exclusively to the notes issued by a bank instituted by Royal Charter, and I remember well the case alluded to by the Dean of Faculty, which was determined on the same principles. I am therefore clear for sustaining the objection.

Lord ESKGROVE--My Lords, I am clearly of the opinion that has been given by my honourable brother. The promissory note of a private banking company is not held in the language of our law to be a bank-note, and therefore I am for sustaining the objection.

The LORD JUSTICE-CLERK--I suppose there are none of your Lordships of a different opinion? The Lords therefore sustain the objection.

The Court then pronounced the following interlocutor:--

The Lord Justice-Clerk and Lords Commissioners of Justiciary having
considered the objection, with the answers thereto, they sustain
the objection to this piece of evidence libelled on, and refuse to
allow the same to be produced.

ROBT. M‘QUEEN, I.P.D.

[Here the witness was shown a false key, a pair of curling irons, a small iron crow, and the coulter of a plough.]

WITNESS--I know these articles; they were all used in the breaking into the Excise Office. The coulter we called “Great Samuel,” and the iron crow, “Little Samuel.” When I gave the coulter to Brown through the rails at the Excise Office he asked me if I had “Little Samuel,” and I said that I believed that Smith had it in his pocket.

Lord HAILES--Andrew Ainslie, you gave an account of this matter formerly before the Sheriff; but you have been very properly told by the Court that what you said there is now of no avail, and that your declarations are destroyed. You have this night, in presence of the Court and the jury, given evidence against the prisoners at the bar. Before you leave the Court, I desire you to consult your own breast whether or not you have said anything to the prejudice of these men that is not true. You have it still in your power to correct any mistakes you have made, but this opportunity will never recur to you. If, therefore, you are conscious of having said anything against the prisoners contrary to truth, and if you leave this house without informing the Court and the jury of you having done so, you will commit a most heinous offence against the Almighty God, and you will be guilty of perjury and of murder.

Cross-examined by the DEAN OF FACULTY--At what hour went you first to the Excise Office on the night in which you say it was broke into?

WITNESS--I left Smith’s house about a quarter before eight o’clock; I went away before the rest.

The DEAN OF FACULTY--What o’clock was it when you returned the last time to Smith’s that evening?

WITNESS--I cannot say, but I think it would be about an hour from the time I went first to the Excise Office.

The DEAN OF FACULTY--How long were you at the Excise Office before Brodie came to you?

WITNESS--About a quarter of an hour; he came to the Excise Office just about eight o’clock.

The DEAN OF FACULTY--You have said that you had resolved to break into the Excise Office a considerable while before you carried that design into execution, and you have told us that it was broke into upon a Wednesday night? Now, you will inform the Court and the gentlemen of the jury what your reason was for fixing upon that night more than any other?

WITNESS--Brown and I having seen, in consequence of frequent observations, that an old man watched night about with the other porter, and knowing that it was his turn to watch on Wednesday night, we therefore fixed upon that night for carrying our design into execution. We knew that there was usually nobody in the office from eight to ten o’clock for the purpose of watching it. I do not remember who it was that first proposed robbing the Excise Office.

[Sidenote: John Brown]

27. JOHN BROWN _alias_ HUMPHRY MOORE, sometime residing in Edinburgh, present prisoner in the Tolbooth of Canongate of Edinburgh, called.

Mr. WIGHT, for the pannel, William Brodie--My Lords, before this witness, who is also a _socius criminis_, is called in, I have to object to his being received as a witness upon grounds which, I imagine, are insuperable. This man, my Lords, was convicted at the General Quarter Sessions for the county of Middlesex, by the verdict of a jury, of stealing twenty-one guineas and fourteen doubloons, in consequence of which he was adjudged to be transported beyond the seas for the term of seven years, in April, 1784, and this is instantly instructed by a copy of the said conviction, under the hand of the proper officer, now produced; and further, the witness, under the name of John Brown, was banished by the Justices of Peace for Stirlingshire from that county in September, 1787, upon his confessing a theft committed at Falkirk, as appears from a certified copy of the said sentence under the hand of the Clerk of the Peace of the said shire. I shall not take up your Lordships’ time in proving that a man thus infamous is altogether inadmissible as a witness in any cause, especially where life is concerned, and I have no doubt that your Lordships will sustain the objection.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL--My Lords, in answer to this objection, I here produce His Majesty’s most gracious pardon in behalf of this witness, under the Great Seal of England, dated 28th July last, which, by the law of England, renders the witness habile and testable.

Mr. WIGHT--The production of this pardon, my Lords, will by no means answer the objection which I have stated. The infamy attending the commission of the crimes of which Brown has been convicted is not, cannot be, done away by the King’s pardon. He still remains a man unworthy of credit, in whom the gentlemen of the jury can place no confidence. His situation, in short, is just the same as it was before the granting of the pardon, unless that the pardon saves him from the punishment awarded against his crimes. This doctrine is delivered by Sir George Mackenzie in very strong terms, and it is the doctrine of common sense.

[During this time some desultory conversation took place about what was the felony for which Brown was sentenced, the Lord Advocate saying it was only swindling.[11]]

The LORD ADVOCATE--My Lords, as to the sentence against Brown, supposed to have been pronounced by the Justices of Peace for Stirlingshire, it does not appear with certainty, nor do I know whether Brown, the witness, be the same person who was the subject of that sentence or not, as the certified copy of the sentence of banishment produced is against one John Brown from Ireland. I admit, my Lords, that if he had been tried by a proper Court and convicted in consequence of the verdict of a jury that the objection would have been a very good one; but the sentence of the Justices of Peace here produced cannot afford an objection which your Lordships can sustain in bar of his evidence. Granting him to be the same person, there is here no trial or verdict of a jury. It appears that a petition was presented for him to avoid the trouble of a trial, and the Clerk of Court has most improperly taken down an acknowledgment of his guilt. There was no occasion for his accusing himself, it was sufficient for him to state that he wished to avoid the consequences of a trial; and therefore, my Lords, this sentence can in no view of the matter be held to infer his actual guilt of the crime laid to his charge before the Justices. My Lords, I admit in the fullest manner the effect of the first sentence against Brown for the felony, but I maintain that it is completely taken off by the subsequent pardon.

I do not reckon myself obliged to answer to the general objection of _socius criminis_: that is fully answered by the practice and the uniform course of your Lordships’ decisions. A specialty was argued in the case of Ainslie; but this witness is in a situation very different. He never was charged with this crime, nor was he ever liable to the temptation which it was alleged, for the pannels, might have influenced the former witness.

My Lords, many daring robberies have been committed in this city, and, in spite of the utmost vigilance of the police, no discovery could be made of the perpetrators. At length, upon the Friday after the robbery of the Excise Office, Brown went to Mr. Middleton, a person employed by the Sheriff, and told him such circumstances as led to a discovery. From this, my Lords, I am bound to suppose that he had repented of what he had done, and I conceived it to be my duty not to prosecute him, but, on the contrary, to make use of his evidence as a means of discovery of the rest of his accomplices. After this, my Lords, it was found that he had been convicted at the Old Bailey. I then applied for advice to those whom I thought were best enabled to assist me concerning the law of England on this subject, and I learned, my Lords, that the proper method to be followed was to apply for a pardon. There is no occasion for making a mystery of the matter, it was the Recorder of London I did apply to. He is a gentleman necessarily more versant in these matters than any other man in the kingdom. By his advice, I applied for a pardon and accordingly obtained it.

But, my Lords, there was no occasion for a pardon in this case; the witness, in my opinion, would have been just as admissible without it. The sentence by which he was condemned is to us entirely a foreign sentence, and, therefore, upon the universally received principle of law, that _statuta non obligant extra territorium statuentis_, it can be of no force with us, unless from that politeness, termed _comitas_ by the law, which civilised nations pay to the decrees of each other, and, accordingly, unless your Lordships shall, _ex comitate_, be disposed to give effect to the decree of a foreign Court, this objection is such as cannot even be listened to in the first instance, the crime said to be committed by Brown having been committed in England, and the sentence pronounced against him being the sentence of an English Court.

My Lords, your Lordships in another capacity, in the civil Court, do not as a matter of course give effect to foreign decrees. In every instance you must be satisfied that the decree is consistent with equity and justice before you interpone your authority. And this holds more particularly in such decrees as infer a penalty, in which case, indeed, some lawyers think, and my Lord Kames declares himself to be clearly of that opinion, that no weight whatever is attached to a foreign decree.

But, my Lords, even laying this out of the question, His Majesty’s most gracious pardon, which I hold in my hand, puts an end to all objection at once. There is not, indeed, a clearer point than that a pardon from the King takes away the effects of any former sentence, and makes the person pardoned precisely the same person he was before the sentence was pronounced against him.

This question must be judged of according to the law of England, and English authorities are express to this purpose. Thus Blackstone, B. iv. ch. 31, in fine says, “The effect of such pardon by the King is to make the offender a new man, to acquit him of all corporeal penalties and forfeitures annexed to that offence for which he obtains his pardon, and not so much to restore his former as to give him a new credit and capacity.” And another authority, my Lords, equally respectable--I mean Bacon’s Abridgment, p. 809--lays down exactly the same doctrine. This witness, therefore, is and must be admissible, notwithstanding the sentence pronounced against him. He has a new credit and capacity given him by this pardon, which enables him to be adduced as a witness, whatever may have been his character previous to obtaining it.

The authority of Sir George Mackenzie has, indeed, been stated as in opposition to this argument. But things have varied so much since his days, and his opinions are frequently so loose and confused, that no weight can be given to his opinion in opposition to such direct and recent authorities as I have quoted. It is perhaps no great authority, my Lords; but I hold a newspaper in my hand, from which it would appear that a case in England exactly in point was determined in July last in consistency with the authorities I have mentioned; and another case in the year 1782 was determined in the same manner.

As to the sentence of the Justices of Peace, I confess I was surprised, my Lords, that the counsel on the other side of the bar should have urged it, when in so late a case as that of _Brown and Wilson_, in the year 1774, your Lordships found that a sentence of the Justices of Peace was no bar against the admissibility of a witness, nor any sentence which proceeded without a jury. I therefore sit down, my Lords, in the full conviction that your Lordships will over-rule the objection against this witness.

The DEAN OF FACULTY--My Lords, this case, so far as I know, has never yet been decided by your Lordships. The witness is in a new situation, and in one so extraordinary that it well deserves your Lordships’ serious consideration, whether he ought, in law or in common justice to the pannels, to be allowed to give evidence. My Lord Advocate is mistaken in saying that Brown was not under the same apprehension with Ainslie when he accused the pannels; for I cannot conceive that any man could have better ground than he to be afraid of the justice of his country; and certainly no man ever spoke under more strong and immediate fears of a halter.

When he made his confession he was under sentence of death, at least he knew well that he was liable to a capital conviction for not having transported himself conformable to the sentence at the Old Bailey. He knew that a pardon was necessary to preserve his life, and that it was impossible for him to remain in safety without it in this country. The game he played, therefore, was very evident--he did not accuse Mr. Brodie at first, and gave no information whatever but against the pannel Smith. My Lords, was it unnatural for a man of his complexion in such circumstances to have recourse to fiction? Accordingly, whenever Mr. Brodie was taken, a strong accusation against him was for the first time made by Brown, and this pardon was the immediate consequence. Let your Lordships reflect upon the whole of his conduct; let the jury take it into their most serious consideration; and I will aver that no evidence was ever offered under more suspicious circumstances.

The effect of the pardon, my Lords, is another point, and it is one which involves the most important consequences.

It is admitted on the other side of the bar, and, indeed, without their admission it is in evidence, that this man John Brown or Humphry Moore was sentenced to transportation by the Courts in England for a felony. It is not denied that a sentence of this nature precludes of itself the admissibility of that person as a witness against whom it is awarded, but it is said that this sentence is a foreign decree, to which we are not bound to pay any respect.

My Lords, are not the Courts of this country in the practice every day of paying respect to foreign decrees? It is true that the decrees of foreign Courts receive effect in this country only _ex comitate_. But it is nothing to me upon what principle the Courts here give effect to such decrees, if effect be really given. And that such respect is paid to foreign decrees, unless where they are contrary to our own law, is a position which no man will contest. To what purpose, then, is it stated, that this is the sentence of a foreign Court, unless it be stated at the same time that it is a sentence which your Lordships would not have pronounced in the same circumstances? The crime of which Brown was convicted is equally punishable in both parts of this island, and the effects of the sentence following upon the crime must, therefore, upon the universal principles by which all nations are now guided, be the same in both parts of the island also. The objection, then, that the decree is foreign, cannot be listened to by your Lordships without overturning those settled maxims by which your decisions, both in this Court and in another Court where all your Lordships sit, are constantly directed.

But His Majesty’s pardon, it is said--this pardon now produced to your Lordships, and obtained for the sole purpose of endeavouring to enable this man to be a witness--has now placed him in the same situation as if he had never been condemned.

My Lords, I have heard it said that the King could make a peer, but that he could not make a gentleman; I am sure that he cannot make a rogue an honest man. This pardon, therefore, at the utmost can only avert the punishment which follows from the sentence. It cannot remove the guilt of this man, though it may save his life. Can it, indeed, my Lords, be supposed that this amiable prerogative, lodged in the hands of the King for the wisest of purposes, and to be exerted by him as the father of his people, should have the effect to let loose persons upon society, as honest, respectable men, as men who may be witnesses, who may be jurymen, and may decide upon your lives or my life to-morrow, although these very persons were yesterday in the eye of the law and the eye of reason held as hardened villains from whom no man was safe, considered as wretches guilty of, and fitted to, perpetrate the most abominable crimes; and that although every man knows them to be the same as they were, and is equally afraid of, and would as little trust them as before they obtained a remission of their crimes?

My Lord Advocate has talked of their obtaining a new credit by the pardon. What is this, my Lords? Can it be a new credit to cheat and rob and plunder? Is this pardon to operate like a settlement in a banker’s books, when he opens a new credit upon the next page, after old scores are cleared off? My Lords, it is impossible. To suppose a pardon to have such effects is to suppose it the most unjustifiable of all things.

My Lords, I am willing to allow that this pardon should have every consequence beneficial to Mr. Brown; that he should derive all the benefit from it which the pardon itself expressly declares to be competent to him, and that no part of the punishment to which he was liable before this extension of His Majesty’s clemency can now be inflicted upon him. But this is very different from the proposition, that he is a good evidence in this or any other cause; it is no part of his punishment that he is not allowed to swear away the life of his neighbour; on the contrary, it is rather a favour to him. That he is intestable was never a punishment even before the pardon was granted; it is only a consequence of the sentence for a crime of an infamous nature which fixes an indelible character upon him, and describes him as a man whose testimony is worthy of no regard; and that character is no more removed by the pardon than the original truth and authenticity of the evidence upon which he was convicted is falsified by it; on the contrary, the pardon contains in itself the most unexceptionable evidence of the guilt and infamy of the person who is obliged to plead it.

Authorities have been quoted on the other side of the bar, but they are not the authorities of our law. The authority of Sir George Mackenzie is expressly in their teeth. This is the second time to-day, my Lords, that I have heard this respectable writer talked lightly of. I cannot but express my surprise at it. He was undoubtedly a man of the highest abilities, and he is our only criminal lawyer. I think he is the most intelligible and clear of all our writers, and I have read him with great profit. But his authority is to be held light in this matter, because his opinion is decisive in favour of this objection--an opinion which, though it were not delivered by such high authority in our law, is yet so much in unison with the common reason and common feelings of mankind that I should deem it to require no other support.

The sentence of the Justices of Peace of Stirlingshire, it has been said, forms no objection to the admissibility of this witness, because it was pronounced without a jury, as all their sentences are. My Lords, this is not the reason. Sorry I am to say that, by a decision of your Lordships, magistrates of burghs and Sheriffs of counties have been found entitled to whip and imprison British subjects without a jury. But will it be maintained that persons so punished will not be accounted infamous and their testimony rejected?

My Lords, the reason why the sentence of the Justices of Peace was held not to bar the admissibility of a witness was because they are not a Court of record, and your Lordships could not be legally certified of what was their judgment. Could this information have been legally obtained the _infamia facti_ would have been sustained as sufficient without the _infamia juris_.

A man is equally infamous in either case if his punishment is merited. And why is _infamia facti_ not always admitted in our law as a sufficient bar, but merely because all objections to witnesses must be instantly verified, which would produce an infinite number of trials within trials, and, besides, which is far worse, would be trying a man without a libel, without allowing him time to produce witnesses, and without a jury. But the _infamia facti_, if proved--and in this case the proof is beyond dispute--is equally strong to render a witness inadmissible as any _infamia juris_. For it is not merely the sentence of a Court which makes a man intestable, but the fact that he is a villain. And this is an additional proof that His Majesty’s pardon, which undoubtedly does not justify the act, though it saves the actor, cannot take away the infamy attendant upon the crime of which he stands convicted.

But the matter does not end here. My Lords, supposing that His Majesty really had this incomprehensible prerogative of changing, by a sheet of parchment, a corrupt and dishonest heart, and cleansing it from all its impurities, I still maintain that it has not been exercised. Where is the clause in this pardon restoring Brown to his character and integrity? You have heard the pardon read, and there is no clause in it to that effect. He is screened against punishment and every effect of a prosecution; but it would have required a very express clause indeed to give the pardon the additional force of removing the infamy of his sentence, and surely the warmest advocates for prerogative cannot be offended at its being said that the King must exercise that prerogative before its power can be felt.

My Lords, I shall trouble you with nothing farther upon this subject, which appears to me very clear. The sentence of the English Court is no more foreign than those to which the Courts of Scotland give effect every day. It is such a sentence as your Lordships would have pronounced had the crime been committed in this country. His Majesty’s pardon cannot, by our law, restore this man from the infamy annexed to this sentence, and common reason tells us that it is beyond the power of kings, because it is beyond the power of man, to reinstate a man in his original integrity by their fiat.

Lord HAILES--My Lords, the Dean of Faculty has done more for Sir George Mackenzie than I was ever able to do, though I studied him before the Dean of Faculty was born. Sir George Mackenzie’s work on the criminal law is a medley of opinions formed from the civilians, with what occurred in his own practice, and desultory observations upon them. He is exceedingly inaccurate. He mentions, for instance, an Act of Sederunt which has no existence, and in many other instances talks equally loosely.

With regard to the present objection, my Lords, it is clear that the decree is foreign. By the articles of the Union, our own laws and forms of procedure are secured to us, and we have as little connection with those of England as with the laws of Japan, being as little bound to obey them. At the same time there is always a _comitas_ to foreign decrees, where not inconsistent with our own law. Here, however, there is no necessity to enter into this question, as the sentence in this case is superseded by the pardon. The sentence of the Justices of Peace weighs nothing with me. No such sentence ought ever to render a witness inadmissible, for Justices of Peace are always ready enough to banish a man who is accused from their own territory. I am therefore for repelling the objection.

Lord ESKGROVE--My Lords, I think this a matter of very great importance. I am clearly of opinion that it is beyond the prerogative of the Crown to render a person capable of being a witness by granting him a pardon. I know no such prerogative.

But, my Lords, the decree here is a foreign decree, and in judging of it we must consider the law of the country where it was pronounced, and from the authorities, my Lords, which have been quoted, it appears that a pardon in England does take off the whole consequence of the sentence. And in my opinion it would be highly unjust that the English sentence should be allowed to militate against a person exactly as it would do in England and not at the same time to give the pardon the same effect which it would have in that country. The _comitas_ due to the sentence of an English Court is also due to the pardon, or to the sentence which an English Court would pronounce in consequence of that pardon. I cannot figure a more grievous punishment than that of being held out as a person incapable of giving testimony in any cause; and if by the law of England all the consequences of a sentence are done away by His Majesty’s pardon, then this goes among the rest.

Had the crime been committed, or the sentence pronounced, in Scotland I would have had another opinion. I do not sit here, my Lords, to pass judgment upon authors long since dead. But the same opinion is delivered by Dirleton, which is given by Sir George Mackenzie; and _his_ authority will not, I suppose, be questioned by any lawyer. And I hold it to be the law of Scotland, that a pardon does not restore the person pardoned, so as to free him from the infamy attending his crime. But as the law of England--the law of that country where the crime was committed, and the sentence pronounced--says otherwise, I am bound to repel the objection.

Lord STONEFIELD--My Lords, I am for repelling the objection. It was repelled in the case of Lord Castlehaven in the State trials.

(_After Kay._)]

Lord SWINTON--My Lords, this is a question of so much delicacy and importance that I could have wished more time to have weighed what I have heard from the counsel than the forms of Court will admit of.

The question is--Whether His Majesty’s pardon did so far restore John Brown to the character and reputation he held before his conviction as to make his evidence admissible in the present trial?

In substance, my opinion concurs with that of my brethren, for repelling, in the circumstances of the present case, the objection to the admissibility of the witness, leaving his credit to the consciences and good sense of the jury.

Had John Brown’s conviction proceeded upon a jury trial in Scotland, I would have been of a different opinion. There are, in the first place, several texts in the civil law upon this topic, all clearly purporting that a remission, so far from restoring, even blemished, the reputation of him whom it relieved from punishment. Next, our municipal law is perfectly explicit to the same effect. The statutes of Robert I., among others therein debarred from giving evidence, mentions convicts redeemed from justice. This act is expressly quoted and laid down as law by Sir George Mackenzie, who is, at least, our most ancient author upon the criminal law, and there is no practice or decision to the contrary.

These observations, however, I do not apply to the present case, for here the conviction and sentence are from England. The infamy, therefore, disabling Brown to be a witness arising in the law of that country, and coming here, must bring its character and construction and effects along with it.

I observe that one of these effects was the restoring a criminal pardoned to the state and character that he held previous to the conviction. The authorities referred to by the Lord Advocate prove this, and, in addition to these, I shall only mention to your Lordships Mr. Justice Buller’s Treatise on Trials, a book of great authority, which lays down that if a person found guilty, on an indictment for perjury at common law, be pardoned by the King, he will be a good witness, because the King has power to take off every part of the punishment.

As to the sentence of the Justices of Peace of the county of Stirlingshire, banishing Brown by his own consent from that county, no stress can be laid on it, as it is now a settled point that no sentence of an inferior Court, proceeding without the verdict of a jury, is sufficient to set aside any person from being a witness.

The LORD JUSTICE-CLERK--My Lords, I will not say a word about the sentence of the Justices of Peace, nor of what would have been the case had the crime been committed, or sentence pronounced, in Scotland. I would hold the decree in England _pro veritate_, and give it effect accordingly. But, my Lords, if the pardon frees this man from the penal consequences of his sentence, although I were to hold that it does not rehabilitate him in Scotland, still it leaves only the _infamia facti_, for the _infamia juris_ is, _eo ipso_, done away. And, my Lords, nothing can set aside a witness unless _infamia juris_.

The Dean of Faculty argued this objection with great ingenuity, but he founded his whole argument on the proposition that an _infamia facti_, if it was capable of proof, was a sufficient objection to the admissibility of a witness; and, indeed, unless this proposition were true, his whole argument falls to the ground. But, my Lords, this proposition is evidently fallacious, and I need use no other instance than that of Ainslie, who, like every other King’s evidence, admitted in the very bosom of his deposition an _infamia facti_, in so far as he was concerned in the commission of the crime charged against the pannels, and yet it was not even pretended that this was an objection to his admissibility; and your Lordships every day allow the examination of witnesses in the same situation. I am therefore clear for repelling the objection.

The Court then pronounced the following interlocutor:--

The Lord Justice-Clerk and Lords Commissioners of Justiciary having
considered the foregoing objections with the answers thereto, they
repel the objections stated and allow the witness to be examined,
reserving the credibility of his evidence to the jury.

ROBT. M‘QUEEN, I.P.D.

[The witness was then called in and sworn.]

The LORD JUSTICE-CLERK--John Brown, you are called here to give evidence regarding a matter in which it is generally supposed that you yourself had some concern. You are now informed by the Court that although you may have had such a concern you are in no danger to speak the truth, because, being adduced as a witness against the prisoners at the bar, you cannot be tried for the crime of which they are accused; and you will take notice that whatever you may have said against these men, in the different declarations which you emitted before the Sheriff, which are now destroyed, you are now bound by the great oath which you have sworn to tell the truth; and that if you say anything to the prejudice of these men that is not true or if you conceal any part of the truth, with a view to favour them, you will thereby be guilty of the crime of perjury, for which you will be liable to be tried by this Court, and severely punished, and you will commit a heinous offence in the sight of the Almighty God, and thereby endanger your immortal soul.