Chapter VIII: Great Britain Blocks the Way (2)

Another British imperialist who believed that Great Britain was pursuing entirely the wrong course in obstructing German economic penetration in Turkey was Sir Harry Johnston, novelist, explorer, lecturer, former member of the consular service. He believed in “The White Man’s Burden,” in the inevitable overrunning of the habitable globe by the Caucasian race. But he believed that the task of spreading white civilization to the four corners of the earth was such an herculean task, that “what we white peoples ought to strive for, with speech and pen, is unity of purpose; an alliance throughout all the world in this final struggle for mastery over Nature. We ought to adjust our ambitions and eliminate causes of conflict.” His program for the settlement of the Near Eastern question was: “the promotion of peace and goodwill among white nations, to start with; and when the ambitions and the allotment of spheres of influence have been nicely adjusted, then to see that the educational task of the Caucasian is carried out in a right, a Christian, a practical, and sympathetic fashion towards the other races and sub-species of humanity.” Sir Harry believed that Great Britain was the last country in the world which ought to oppose the legitimate colonial aspirations of any other nation. There was every reason for the recognition of the economic and moral bases of German expansion, and any dog-in-the-manger attitude on the part of British statesmen, he was sure, would defeat the highest interests of the Empire.[44]

Applying his principles to the problem of Teutonic aggrandizement in the Ottoman Empire, Sir Harry Johnston advocated that the western European nations should acknowledge the Austrian _Drang nach Osten_ as a legitimate and essential part of the German plans for a Central European Federation and for the economic development of Turkey. “The Turkish Sultanate would possibly not come to an end, but would henceforth, within certain limits, be directed and dominated by German councils. Germany in fact would become the power with the principal ‘say’ as to the good government and economic development of Asia Minor. Syria might be constituted as a separate state under French protection, and Judea might be offered to the Jews under an international guarantee. Sinai and Egypt would pass under avowed British protection, and Arabia (except the southern portion, which already lies within the British sphere of influence) be regarded as a federation of independent Arab States. For the rest, Turkey-in-Asia—less Armenia, which might be handed over to Russia—would, in fact, become to Germany what Egypt is to England—a kingdom to be educated, regenerated, and perhaps transfused and transformed by the renewed percolation of the Aryan Caucasian. Here would be a splendid outlet for the energies of both Germany and Austria, sufficient to keep them contented, prosperous, busy, and happy, for at least a century ahead.” Sir Harry believed that obstructionist tactics on the part of Great Britain would promote Prussianism within Germany, whereas, on the other hand, a frank recognition of Germany’s claims in the Near East would provide Central Europe with a safety valve which would “relieve pressure on France, Belgium, and Russia, paving the way for an understanding on Continental questions. Let us—if we wish to be cynical—welcome German expansion with Kruger’s metaphor of the tortoise putting out his head. Germany and Austria are dangerous to the peace of the world only so long as they are penned up in their present limits.”[45]

One obvious disadvantage of the solution suggested by Sir Harry Johnston was its total indifference to the wishes of the Ottoman Turks. Apparently it was out of place to consider the welfare of Turkey in a discussion of the Bagdad Railway question! Certainly there were very few European statesmen who cared the least about the opinions of Turks in the disposition of Turkish property. Among the few was Viscount Morley, one of the old Gladstonian Liberals. Answering Lord Curzon, in the House of Lords, March 22, 1911, Lord Morley, a member of the Asquith cabinet, asserted the right of the Turks to determine their own destinies: “A great deal of nonsense,” he said, “is talked about the possible danger to British interests which may be involved some day or other when this railway is completed, and there have been whimsical apprehensions expressed. One is that it will constitute a standing menace to Egypt ... because it would establish [by junction with the Syrian and Hedjaz railways] uninterrupted communication between the Bosporus and Western Arabia. _That would hardly be an argument for Turkey to abandon railway construction on her own soil_, whereas it overlooks the fact that the Sinai Peninsula intervenes. You cannot get over this plain cardinal fact, that this railway is made on Turkish territory by virtue of an instrument granted by the Turkish Government.... I see articles in newspapers every day in which it is assumed that we have the right there to do what we please. That is not so. It is not our soil, it is Turkish soil, and the Germans alone are there because the Turkish Government has given them the right to be there.”[46]

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES

[1] Sir William Andrew, _Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route_ (London, 1857), _passim_; also _The Euphrates Valley Route to India_ (London, 1882); F. R. Chesney, _Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition_ (London, 1868); _The Proposed Imperial Ottoman Railway_, a prospectus issued by the promoters (London, 1857); F. von Koeppen, _Moltke in Kleinasien_ (Hanover, 1883).

[2] _Cf._ article “Suez Canal” in _Encyclopedia Britannica_, Volume 26, p. 23. How similar were these objections to those subsequently advanced in opposition to the Bagdad Railway! _Cf._, _e. g._, a statement by Lord Curzon, _Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, fifth series_, Volume 7 (1911), pp. 583 _et seq._

[3] Andrew, _Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route_, p. 225.

[4] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords_, fourth series, Volume 121 (1903), p. 1345; “The Bagdad Railway Negotiations,” in _The Quarterly Review_, Volume 228 (1917), pp. 489–490; Baron Kuhn von Kuhnenfeld, _The Strategical Importance of the Euphrates Valley Railway_ (English translation by Sir C. W. Wilson, London, 1873); V. L. Cameron, _Our Future Highway to India_, 2 volumes (London, 1880); A. Bérard, _La route de l’Inde par la vallée du Tigre et de l’Euphrate_ (Lyons, 1887); F. Jones, _The Direct Highway to the East considered as the Perfection of Great Britain’s duties toward British India_ (London, 1873).

[5] _Supra_, pp. 66–67.

[6] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, Volume 120 (1903), pp. 1247–1248, 1358, 1361, 1364–1367, 1371–1374.

[7] Lord Mount Stephen had been president of the Canadian Pacific Railway and of the Bank of Montreal. Lord Revelstoke was senior partner in the firm of Baring Brothers & Company and a director of the Bank of England.

[8] The participation of the three Great Powers was to be on the basis of 25–25–25%, 15% was to be reserved for minor groups, and 10% for the Anatolian Railway Company. The provisions of Article 12 of the concession of 1903 were to be amended to establish a board of directors of 30, upon which each of the principal participants should be represented by 8 members. The remaining 6 members of the board were to be designated by the Ottoman Government and the Anatolian Railway Company. The directors were to be appointed by the original subscribers so that sale or transfer of shares could not alter the proportionate representation thus agreed upon.

[9] For the facts in this and the succeeding paragraph the author is indebted to Dr. Arthur von Gwinner, managing director of the _Deutsche Bank_; and to Sir Henry Babington Smith, erstwhile chairman of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, a partner of Sir Ernest Cassel, president of the National Bank of Turkey, and a director of the Bank of England. Dr. von Gwinner placed at the disposal of the author many of the records of the _Deutsche Bank_ and of the Bagdad Railway Company, and Sir Henry Babington Smith graciously volunteered to answer many puzzling questions.

[10] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, Volume 121 (1903), pp. 271–272.

[11] The British banking houses interested in the Bagdad enterprise were Baring Brothers, Sir Ernest Cassel, and Morgan-Grenfell Company. _Cf._ _The Westminster Gazette_, April 24, 1903; _Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, Volume 260 (1910), p. 2181d. The bankers, of course, were not bound by the decision of the Cabinet to withdraw from the negotiations; they still would have been at liberty to invest in Bagdad Railway securities, as did the French bankers. However, it has been the practice of British financiers to accept the “advice” of the Foreign Office in the case of loans which may lead to international complications. An analogous case in American experience was the decision of prominent New York financial institutions to withdraw from the Chinese consortium in 1913 because of the avowed opposition of President Wilson to the terms of the loan contract.

[12] _The Nineteenth Century_, Volume 65 (1909), pp. 1090–1091.

[13] _Supra_, pp. 30, 59–60.

[14] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, Volume 120, pp. 1360–1361; Volume 126, p. 108. The opinions of Mr. Gibson Bowles were not cordially received by _The Scotsman_, which said, April 9, 1903, “Mr. Gibson Bowles carried the House in imagination to the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris. Germany is there seeking by means of a railway to supersede our trade, and to serve herself heir to the wealth and empire of ancient Babylon and Assyria. The member for King’s Lynn was, as usual, not very well posted up on his facts. On this occasion he was so entirely wrong-headed that no one on the opposition bench would agree with him.... The outstanding moral of the debate was, indeed, that the honorable member for King’s Lynn was much in want of a holiday.”

[15] Fraser, _op. cit._, pp. 42–43. The senior member of the firm of Lynch Brothers was H. F. B. Lynch (1862–1913), who was widely known as an authority on the Near East and who, as a Liberal member of Parliament, 1906–1910, was able to call official attention to the necessity for safeguarding British interests in Persia and Mesopotamia. That he succeeded in convincing the Government of the importance of his navigation concession is evidenced by the vigorous protests filed by the British Government with the Young Turks in 1909, when the latter attempted to operate competing vessels on the Tigris and the Shatt-el-Arab. On this point see _Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, Volume 260 (1910), pp. 2174d _et seq._ Again in 1913–1914, the British Government refused to consider any settlement of the Bagdad Railway question which did not adequately protect the interests of the Lynch Brothers. _Infra_, pp. 258–265. Mr. Lynch, however, was not an irreconcilable opponent of the _Deutsche Bank_. He took the point of view that the Germans had rendered Turkey a great service by the construction of the Anatolian Railways because of the total lack of natural means of communication in the Anatolian plateau. He urged that they were making a great mistake, however, to extend the Anatolian system into Mesopotamia, where the Tigris and Euphrates provided natural and logical avenues of trade for the Valley of the Two Rivers. In Mesopotamia, he maintained, what was needed was a development of the river traffic, not the construction of railways. _Cf._ H. F. B. Lynch, “The Bagdad Railway,” _Fortnightly Review_, March 1, 1911, pp. 384–386.

[16] It will be recalled that the Hamburg-American Line established a Persian Gulf service in 1906. _Supra_, pp. 108–109. Regarding the activities of British shipping and commercial interests in opposing the Bagdad Railway see _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 2950 (1902), pp. 25 _et seq._, No. 3140 (1904), pp. 24 _et seq._; _The Times_, April 24, 1903.

[17] G. N. Curzon, _Persia and the Persian Question_ (2 volumes, London, 1892), Volume I, p. 635; a similar view was set forth by Sir Thomas Sutherland, of the P. & O., in a letter to _The Times_, April 27, 1903.

[18] E. Banse, _Auf den Spuren der Bagdadbahn_ (Weimar, 1913), Chapter XI, _Die Wahrheit über die Bagdadbahn_, a critical analysis of the value of the Railway in Eastern trade, pp. 145–146. _Cf._, also, Dr. R. Hennig, “Der verkehrsgeographische Wert des Suez- und des Bagdad-Weges,” in _Geographische Zeitschrift_, Volume 22 (1916), pp. 649–656.

[19] _Specifications_, Articles 24–25. It might be added that the Company loyally observed this restriction; C. W. Whittall & Co., largest British merchants in Turkey so testified. _Anatolia_, p. 103; von Gwinner, _loc. cit._, p. 1090. Sir Edward Grey said no complaints of discrimination against British goods had come to the attention of the Foreign Office. _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons,_ 5 Series, Volume 53 (1913), pp. 392–393.

[20] _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 3140, p. 30.

[21] Consider the dedication of Lord Curzon’s _Persia and the Persian Question_: “To the officials, military and civil, in India, whose hands uphold the noblest fabric yet reared by the genius of a conquering nation, I dedicate this work, the unworthy tribute of the pen to a cause, which by justice or the sword, it is their high mission to defend, but whose ultimate safeguard is the spirit of the British people.”

[22] Woolf, _op. cit._, p. 24.

[23] Regarding the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Middle East, _cf._ Rose, _op. cit._, Part II, Chapters I-IV; Curzon, _Persia and the Persian Question_, Volume II, Chapter XXX.

[24] See a statement by Lord Lansdowne, in the House of Lords, _Parliamentary Debates_, fourth series, Volume 121 (1903), p. 1347, and a statement by Lord Curzon, _ibid._, fifth series, Volume 7 (1911), pp. 583–587; also Curzon, _Persia and the Persian Question_, Volume II, Chapter XXVII. The strategic importance of the Persian Gulf to the British Empire was realized by foreign observers, as well as by English statesmen. Writing in 1902, Admiral A. T. Mahan, an American, said, “The control of the Persian Gulf by a foreign state of considerable naval potentiality, a ‘fleet in being’ there based upon a strong military port, would reproduce the relations of Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Malta to the Mediterranean. It would flank all the routes to the farther East, to India, and to Australia, the last two actually internal to the Empire, regarded as a political system; and although at present Great Britain unquestionably could check such a fleet, so placed, by a division of her own, it might well require a detachment large enough to affect seriously the general strength of her naval position.” A. T. Mahan, _Retrospect and Prospect_ (New York, 1902), pp. 224–225. Lord Curzon is said to have remarked that he “would not hesitate to indict as a traitor to his country any British minister who would consent to a foreign Power establishing a station on the Persian Gulf.” A. J. Dunn, _British Interests in the Persian Gulf_ (London, 1907), p. 7. See also _The Persian Gulf_ (No. 76 of the Foreign Office Handbooks); _Handbook of Arabia_, Volume I (Admiralty Intelligence Division, London, 1916); Lovat Fraser, _India under Curzon and After_ (London, 1911).

[25] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords_, fourth series, Volume 121 (1903), pp. 1347–1348. Two observations should be made regarding this quotation. First, it is included in every book I have consulted on the Bagdad Railway, written since 1903, but in every instance the last sentence has been omitted—a sentence which considerably alters the spirit of the statement. Second, the German press, at the time, considered that the warning was directed, not at the Bagdad Railway, but at the rapid and alarming advance of Russia in Persia. _Cf._ an analysis of foreign press comments in an article by J. I. de La Tour, “Le chemin de fer de Bagdad et l’opinion anglaise,” in _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 15 (1903), pp. 609–614—an excellent digest.

[26] _Cf._ a statement by Lord Cranborne, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, fourth series, Volume 101 (1902), p. 129. Although he was less than forty years of age at the time of his appointment as Governor-General of India (1898), the Right Honorable George Nathaniel Curzon, Baron Curzon of Kedleston, even at that early age, had had wide experience and training of the type so common among the masters of British imperial destiny. He was educated at Eton and Oxford, and he traveled widely in the Near East. He served as a member of Parliament from 1886 until 1898. He was Under-Secretary of State for India, 1891–1892; Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1895–1898; Privy Councillor, 1895.

[27] _Supra_, p. 34; _The Annual Register_, 1901, pp. 304–305; K. Helfferich, _Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, p. 129.

[28] Viscount Haldane, _Before the War_ (London, 1920), pp. 48–51; Viscount Morley, _Recollections_ (New York, 1917), p. 238.

[29] _Infra_, pp. 239–244; _Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords_, fifth series, Volume 7 (1911), pp. 583–587, 589. It is interesting to contrast this opinion of a German trans-Mesopotamian railway with that held by the same man when it was proposed that British capitalists should construct such a line. Writing in 1892, Lord Curzon had this to say regarding the project: “Its superficial attractions judiciously dressed up in a garb of patriotism, were such as to allure many minds; and I confess to having felt, without ever having succumbed to, the fascination. Closer study, however, and a visit to Syria and Mesopotamia have convinced me both that the project is unsound, and that it does not, for the present, at any rate, lie within the domain of practical politics.” Lord Curzon believed that a Mesopotamian railway would be practically valueless for military purposes: “The temperature of these sandy wastes is excessively torrid and trying during the summer months and I decline to believe that during half the year any general in the world would consent to pack his soldiers into third class carriages for conveyance across those terrible thousand miles, at least if he anticipated using them in any other capacity than as hospital inmates at the end.” _Persia and the Persian Question_, Volume I, pp. 633–635.

[30] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, fifth series, Volume 21 (1911), pp. 241–242.

[31] _Infra_, pp. 258–265.

[32] For the views of a typical British imperialist on the Persian situation, _cf._, Curzon, _Persia and the Persian Question_, Volume II, Chapter XXX; a later account is that of the American, W. Morgan Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_ (New York, 1912); _cf._, also, H. F. B. Lynch, “Railways in the Middle East,” in _Proceedings of the Central Asian Society_ (London), March 1, 1911.

[33] See P. Rohrbach, _Die Bagdadbahn_, p. 18; Reventlow, _op. cit._, pp. 338–343. That Rohrbach’s frank avowal of the menace of the Bagdad Railway to India and Egypt was not without influence in Great Britain is evidenced by the fact that long quotations from _Die Bagdadbahn_ were read into the records of the House of Commons by the Earl of Ronaldshay, on March 23, 1911. _Parliamentary Debates_, fifth series, Volume 23, p. 628.

[34] Herr Scheidemann, in an eloquent speech to the Reichstag, March 30, 1911, pleaded with the German Government to be sympathetic with the position in which Great Britain found herself. No nation with the imperial responsibilities of Great Britain could afford to neglect to take precautionary steps against the possibility of the Bagdad Railway being used as a weapon of offense against Egypt, the Suez Canal, and India. “Complications upon complications,” he said, “are certain to arise as a result of the construction of the Bagdad Railway. But we expect of our Government, at the very least, that in the course of protecting the legitimate German economic interests which are involved in the Bagdad Railway, it will leave no stone unturned to prevent the development of Anglo-German hostility over the matter. We want to do everything possible to effect a thorough understanding with England. Only by such a policy can we hope to quiet the fears of British imperialists that the Railway is a menace to the Empire.” _Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, Volume 266 (1911), pp. 5980c-5984b.

[35] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, fifth series, Volume 21 (1911), pp. 241–242.

[36] _Cf._ H. N. Brailsford, _The War of Steel and Gold_, Chapter III, “The Egyptian Model.”

[37] _Supra_, pp. 181–182.

[38] André Tardieu, _France and the Alliances_ (New York, 1908), p. 46. For M. Tardieu’s analysis of the causes of the growing Anglo-German hostility, _cf._ pp. 48–57. It was in the latter part of April, 1903, that the Bagdad Railway negotiations fell through. In May, Edward VII paid an official visit to Paris; in October, an arbitration agreement was signed by France and Great Britain. The following spring the treaties constituting the Entente Cordiale were executed. Sir Thomas Barclay, _Thirty Years’ Reminiscences_ (London, 1906), pp. 175 _et seq._ For the text of these agreements _cf._ _Parliamentary Papers_, Volume 103 (1905), No. Cd. 2384.

[39] For the text of the Anglo-Russian Entente, _cf._ _British and Foreign State Papers_, Volume 100, pp. 555 _et seq._ Regarding the nature of the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Middle East and the effect of the Bagdad Railway in hastening a settlement of that rivalry, _cf._ Edouard Driault, _La question d’Orient depuis ses origines jusqu’à la paix de Sèvres_ (Paris, 1921), Chapter VIII, and pp. 273 _et seq._; also Tardieu, _op. cit._, pp. 239–252, and Curzon, _op. cit._, Volume II, Chapter XXX.

[40] Ernst Jäckh, _Die deutsch-türkische Waffenbrüderschaft_ (Stuttgart, 1915), pp. 17–18.

[41] Sir William Willcocks (1852- ) is one of the foremost authorities on Egypt, India, and Mesopotamia. As a young man he was employed in India by the Department of Public Works and for a period of eleven years, 1872–1883, was engaged in the construction of the famous irrigation works there. From 1883–1893, he was employed in a similar capacity by the Egyptian Public Works and was largely responsible for the development of irrigation in the Nile Valley. In 1898, he planned and projected the Assuan Dam, which turned out to be the greatest irrigation work in the East. In 1909, Sir William Willcocks became consulting engineer to the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works, and was responsible for the construction, 1911–1913, by the British firm of Sir John Jackson, Ltd., of the famous Hindie barrage, the first step in the irrigation of the Valley of the Two Rivers.

[42] _Mesopotamia_, p. 54, and _The Geographical Journal_, August, 1912.

[43] _The Recreation of Chaldea_ (Cairo, 1902). This suggestion led to the absurd charge by Dr. Rohrbach that Sir William Willcocks was actively promoting the establishment of a British colonial empire in southern Mesopotamia. _German World Policies_, pp. 160–161. _Cf._, also, _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 3140 (1903), p. 27.

[44] H. H. Johnston, _Common Sense in Foreign Policy_ (London, 1913), pp. v-vii. A similar opinion was expressed by Colonel A. C. Yate, at a meeting of the Central Asian Society, May 22, 1911. In answer to an alarmist paper on the Bagdad Railway which had been read to the society by André Chéradame, Colonel Yate made a spirited speech in which he warned his countrymen that M. Chéradame proposed that they should follow the same mistaken policy which had guided Lord Palmerston in resistance to the construction of the Suez Canal. “We cannot pick up every day,” he said, “a Lord Beaconsfield, who will repair the errors of his blundering predecessors.... Because the German Emperor and his instruments have adopted and put into practice the plans which Great Britain rejected [for a trans-Mesopotamian railway], we are now, forsooth, to pursue a policy which savours partly of ‘sour grapes’ and partly of ‘dog-in-the-manger,’ and which in either aspect will do nothing to strengthen British hands and promote British interests.” _Proceedings of the Central Asian Society_ (London), May 22, 1911, p. 19.

[45] Johnston, _op. cit._, pp. 50–51, 61. Sir Harry Johnston made an extended lecture tour through Germany during 1912 for the purpose of promoting Anglo-German friendship. For details of this trip see Schmitt, _op. cit._, pp. 355–356. It is interesting to note how nearly Sir Harry’s proposals corresponded with the terms of the treaties of 1913–1914. _Infra_, Chapter X. For a similar point of view, _cf._ Angus Hamilton, _Problems of the Middle East_ (London, 1909), pp. 178–180.

[46] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords_, fifth series, Volume 7 (1911), pp. 601–602. The italics are mine.