Chapter I: Front Matter

Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this
file which includes the original illustrations.
See 48185-h.htm or 48185-h.zip:
(https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/48185/pg48185-images.html)
or
(https://www.gutenberg.org/files/48185/48185-h.zip)

Transcriber's note:

Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).

Text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face (=bold=).

Michelin's Illustrated Guides to the Battle-Fields (1914-1918)

VERDUN

Argonne-Metz

1914-1918

Michelin & Cie--Clermont-Ferrand

Michelin Tyre Co Ltd--London

Michelin Tire Co--Milltown, N.J., U.S.A.

MEMORIAL FUND

TO THE

DEFENDERS OF VERDUN

MORTUARY OF DOUAUMONT

(_A War Fund authorised by Ministerial decree dated 3/12/19_)

On the battlefield of Verdun, millions of men engaged in a battle of giants; 400,000 French soldiers fell there on a front of 20 kilometres.

A fund has been established with the object of erecting a Mortuary in the centre of the battlefield, at a point whence the whole field may be viewed.

The site chosen is situated between the Fort of Douaumont and the Thiaumont redoubt (_See pages 96-99 of this Guide_).

The Patrons are Marshal FOCH, M. Raymond POINCARÉ, and His Excellency, the cardinal DUBOIS.

The executive Committee, under the honorary presidency of Marshal PÉTAIN, is presided over by S. G. Mgr GINISTY, Bishop of Verdun, General BOICHUT, commanding the 12th Infantry Division, the Commandant of Verdun, General VALANTIN, formerly commanding the town and forts of Verdun and the Hauts-de-Meuse.

The names of all subscribers will be registered in a golden Book to be kept in the basilica. At the top of the list will be the names of the Founder members who have subscribed 500 francs or more. On the inside walls of the monument will be carved inscriptions which families may wish to place in memory of their dead.

An artistic diploma by Georges SCOTT is sent to every subscriber of 20 francs, on which there is a reproduction of Marshal PÉTAIN'S autograph and an acknowledgement of the subscriber's interest in the memorial (_Photo. herewith_).

Subscriptions may be sent: to Verdun, to S. G. Mgr GINISTY, Bishop of Verdun, and to Me SCHLEITER, solicitor; to Paris, to Princess Henri DE POLIGNAC, 26, avenue Montaigne.

The =Michelin= Road Map
and Guide.

=The Guide=, for the town.
=The Map=, for the country.

_They complete one another, without overlapping._

_Use them together._

IN MEMORY
OF THE MICHELIN EMPLOYEES
AND WORKMEN WHO DIED GLORIOUSLY
FOR THEIR COUNTRY

VERDUN

Argonne-Metz

(1914-1918)

Copyright 1919 by Michelin & Cie.

_All rights of translation, adaptation or reproduction (in part or whole)
reserved in all countries._

VERDUN

ORIGIN AND POLITICAL HISTORY

=Verdun=, one of France's most ancient cities, was first a Gallic, then under the name of _Virodunum Castrum_, a Roman fortress. In 843 the celebrated treaty which divided the Carolingian Empire and annexed Verdun to the Kingdom of Lorraine was signed there. From 870 to 879 Verdun became part of France, but in 923 it was incorporated in the German Empire. As a county, it was governed under the feudal system by the hereditary counts, the last of whom was Godefroy de Bouillon, and later by the episcopal counts and bishops.

In the 10th century, Bishop Haimont, of Verdun, persuaded the Count of Verdun to transfer his rights to him. The arrangement was confirmed by Emperor Othon III, but the count's heirs disputed the bishops' title to the town. Later, the burgesses revolted against the authority of the bishops, and after a sanguinary struggle succeeded in throwing off their yoke about the middle of the 13th century. After a long occupation by the Germans, Henri II, King of France, retook Verdun in 1552 and granted it privileges which were confirmed by François II in 1559. During the Religious Wars, the town was for the Leaguers, and only agreed to receive Henry IV's envoy, after that prince's conversion to the Roman Faith. The burgesses did not take the oath of allegiance to the King of France until 1601.

CHIEF MILITARY EVENTS

Both in respect of its geographical position and history, Verdun is a typical fortified town. From time immemorial it has played an important part in resisting invasion, as witness its fortified camp and citadel. Since 1870 it has been the centre of a stronghold formed by a rough semi-circle of hills and slopes bristling with defensive works and batteries.

Since the year 450, when Attila left it "like a field ravaged by wild beasts", it has been besieged at least ten times.

Charles the Fifth besieged and took it in 1544, but after a seven years occupation it was retaken by Henry II of France in 1552. The Huguenots tried to take it by surprise in 1589, but were unable to overcome the resistance of the citizens.

=Siege of 1792.=--In 1792, the Prussians attacked and bombarded the town, defended by Beaurepaire with only thirty-two guns and forty-four artillerymen. The Council of Defence, urged thereto by the Anti-Republican section of the population, decided to capitulate, in spite of opposition on the part of Beaurepaire, who died soon afterwards at the Town Hall by his own hand, according to some, others holding that he was assassinated. The Prussians occupied the town for six weeks, after the garrison had left. Although it is true that a few women went to the Camp of Bras with an offering of sweetmeats for the King of Prussia, it has not been established that the latter gave a ball at Regret, at which the women of Verdun danced. The victory of Valmy forced the Prussians to leave Verdun. On October 13th, Kellermann took possession of the Citadel, and on the 14th the troops of the Republic entered the town. Several of the visitors to the Camp of Bras expiated their regrettable act on the scaffold.

=Siege of 1870.=--In 1870, Verdun offered a more stubborn resistance. When the Saxon troops, about 10,000 in number, appeared to the east of the town, the garrison of the latter comprised only 1,500 regular troops, including fifty artillerymen, 2,000 untrained men and 1,400 men of the National Sedentary Guard, while its armament consisted of twenty mortars, twenty-one howitzers and ninety-six guns, of which the barrels of only forty-six were rifled. Under the command of General Guérin de Waldersbach, seconded by General Marmier, this small garrison repulsed a violent attack on August 24th, and refused to surrender. After being reinforced by 2,600 men who had escaped from Sedan, several sallies were made. By September 23rd the enemy had completely encircled the town, and were forcing the inhabitants of the surrounding villages to help with the siege-works. On the night of October 19th, thirty sappers, twenty-five artillerymen and 100 foot soldiers surprised the two German batteries on Heyvaux Hill, between Thierville and Regret, on the left bank, and after hand-to-hand fighting, spiked all the guns.

After the fall of Metz, Verdun, besieged by 15,000 men with 140 heavy guns, in addition to field artillery, surrendered on November 8th with the honours of war.

The town had been bombarded three times. On August 24th it received about 2,000 shells; on September 26th the Citadel received 1,000 to 1,200 shells in five hours; on October 13th, 14th and 15th 20,000 to 25,000 shells fell in the town, severely damaging the upper part and the Citadel.

The name of the German Prefect who governed Verdun and the Meuse province was Von Bethmann Hollweg.

_After the attack of the German right wing by Maunoury's army, the English army and Franchet d'Esperey's army threatened to break the communication between the first and second German armies and cause their hasty retreat which was reflected gradually all along the front._]

VERDUN DURING THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

After the French manoeuvre at the frontiers was checked and with the threat of a German envelopment in the West, General Joffre steadfastly withdrew from the battle and ordered a general retreat until the moment when the French troops were reunited. As soon as a favourable moment offered, it would be possible to take up a position and then to drive back the enemy.

The plan was as follows: to carry out on the left a mass movement (6th Army under Maunoury) to outflank, at the propitious moment, the German right, while a general attack or at any rate a desperate resistance should take place on all the rest of the front, from Paris to the Vosges.

The enemy's objective was first of all to wipe out the allied forces, the right having instructions to pursue the French left and the English army, before turning upon Paris which was to be seized like a plum ready to be picked! In the centre, the Crown Prince was in command of the pursuit: he saw his fourth cavalry corps pushing out their scouts towards the line, Dijon-Besançon-Belfort.

Here were dreams of triumph destined to give place to surprise, then doubt and finally the bitterness of defeat.

On September 5th, Gallieni reported the Germans creeping towards the South-East. The moment for the French manoeuvre had arrived and Joffre launched the general offensive.

On September 6th-7th, the Sixth Army attacked the German right wing. To guard himself against this flank menace, Von Kluck brought up three army corps in succession from his frontal attack.

September 7th-8th. This diminution of strength allowed the English Army and the second French Army under Franchet d'Esperey to advance.

September 9th-10th. The Second Army threatened to cut off the contact between the First and Second German Armies and to take them in rear. Under this threat they determined upon a hasty retreat the effect of which made itself gradually felt along the whole of the German front (September 10th-13th).

=The part played by Verdun in the defence and by the Third Army in the battle.=

After the battle of the Frontiers, the Third Army likewise beat a retreat. Having reached the left bank of the Meuse, the army pivoted on its right which rested on the fortress of Verdun, stopping frequently to delay the pursuit of the Crown Prince's army.

=September 6th, 7th and 8th.= While the Duke of Wurtemburg pressed heavily upon the right of the Fourth Army (under Langle de Cary), the Crown Prince vigorously set upon the left of Sarrail in an attempt to break completely through the pivot by Trouée de Revigny, valleys of Ornain and Saulx. He hoped to cut off Sarrail who, when attacked at the same time in rear on the Heights of the Meuse, would find himself surrounded and forced to surrender. But these ambitious plans were thwarted by the vigorous action of the left of the Fifth Corps and the Fifteenth which was withdrawn en masse from the Army of Lorraine (under Castelnau).

=September 9th.= On its left the Third Army continued to engage the Germans on the flank, while the right wing, though vigorously holding its ground before frontal attacks, remained in a precarious position owing to the standing menace of the German forces in rear on the Hauts-de-Meuse. Sarrail received permission from the General-in-Chief to withdraw his right, if need be, and to leave the permanent garrison of Verdun to secure the defence of the Fortress. But the General of the Third Army held fast with heroic determination and would not give up his entrenched position as long as the Meuse was not liberated and while a ray of hope appeared.

=September 10th.= The forts of Troyon and Genicourt, on the Hauts-de-Meuse, continued to hold out against heavy artillery bombardment. The barrier of the Meuse was not cleared but, to guard against any eventuality, Sarrail transferred two divisions to the West of Saint-Mihiel.

=September 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th.= Coming from the German right, the advancing wave gradually overtook the armies of the Prince of Wurtemburg and the Crown Prince. The two latter, mad with rage, were forced to withdraw their forces in echelon, while Sarrail's army pivoting round Verdun harassed the enemy as far as Argonne. Thus the battle of the Marne was won by the same troops who had just undergone the repulse of the battle of the Frontiers and, when overwrought with fatigue, had successfully accomplished a retreat unprecedented in history. The undaunted spirit of Commander-in-Chief Joffre, the well-defined and masterful strategy which he planned and carried out in strict collaboration with his highly courageous army commanders, above all the superhuman bravery of the rank and file, to these factors is due what to-day we call "The Miracle of the Marne".

"The fate of the War was settled at its commencement, in 1914, on the Marne, where the French General indeed saved France against the fierce onslaught of a whole nation."

So wrote the _Berliner Tageblatt_ after the War.

AFTER THE MARNE, THE BATTLE FOR VERDUN

OCTOBER 1916-AUGUST 1917.--_Three French attacks drove the enemy back to their original attacking positions._]

THE STABILISATION OF THE FRONT BEFORE VERDUN

(_September-October 1914_)

=The formation of the Saint-Mihiel salient.=

After the battle of the Marne, the Crown Prince established his lines of resistance north of the fortress, on the line Avocourt-Melancourt-Brabant-Ornes.

On September 20th, the third Bavarian Corps attacked the 75th reserve division, advanced rapidly on the 22nd as far as the line Combres-Vigneulles-Thiaucourt and bombarded the forts of the Hauts-de-Meuse. This line was defended by mobile troops outnumbered by two to one.

On the 25th, the Germans succeeded in getting a footing on the Hauts-de-Meuse in the region of Vigneulles. From there they pushed on to Saint-Mihiel and entered the town, without however being able to cross the Meuse. But on the following day, the river which was only defended at this point by a battalion of territorials was cleared, and the Germans started to climb again towards the valley of Aire, in the direction of Verdun. At this dangerous moment, the sixteenth corps which had left Nancy met the German forces, harassing them and forcing them to fall back on the suburbs of Saint-Mihiel. It did not, however, succeed in forcing them to withdraw on the right bank of the Meuse. On September 29th the line ran through Combres, Chauvoncourt, Apremont, Flirey, Le Bois le Prêtre.

The salient was made.

The enemy were attacked without cessation during the months of October, November and December. Towards Saint-Mihiel the enemy held their position on the left bank of the stream.

The crest of Les Éparges, after being held firmly by the enemy from September 1914, was strongly attacked on April 6th by the twelfth Infantry Division who struggled obstinately for over a month before they wrested from the Germans the observation posts which from this crest, gave near views towards the North. This brilliant action was followed by counter-attacks by the Fifth German Corps, which were particularly violent during the day-time of April 24th and May 5th. Starting from this moment, the struggle assumed a less stubborn character, but none the less keen and murderous. (_See page 129._)

_A footbridge of wagons crossing the stream of Forges._]

_During a period of quiet, a plant for making rings has been installed at the entrance of a dug-out._]

_In the middle a company in Indian file is going up to the line._]

THE STRUGGLE IN ARGONNE

=The battle in the forest= (_October 1914-October 1915_).

The stationary warfare assumed a special character in the Argonne. Lanes and footpaths formed the only breaks in the impenetrable thickets. There were no gentle slopes, no convenient firing positions for the infantry, no observation posts for the artillery--everything was concealed by the thick foliage.

Springs rose everywhere and rivulets ran over the clayey soil. Mud made the paths impassable, and filled up the trenches as soon as they were made. French and German trenches intersected. Firing was continuous, snipers perched here and there in trees taking careful aim, while at night rifle and machine gun fire at random continued uninterruptedly, sweeping the forest in order to prevent surprise and to make movement dangerous. But the rifle was merely an auxiliary weapon, as each army rained showers of grenades and bombs upon the other all day long.

Apart from actual battles, there were hundreds of casualties, killed and wounded, every day. In the attack or defence of a trench, the fighting immediately became a hand-to-hand struggle, with knives and revolvers. Underground there was a continuous digging of saps and mines; it was a contest of speed and skill between the opposing sappers. It was a case of blowing up the enemy first or being blown up by him. Over the wrecked trenches, destroyed by mines, through smoke and under a rain of earth thrown up by the explosions, the soldiers dashed forward to occupy the crater or to fight for it if the enemy had reached it first.

_French foot-soldiers throwing back at the enemy bombs which they have captured from them._]

During the first three months of 1915, between Four-de-Paris and the valley of the Aire, the French sappers excavated over 3,000 metres of mine galleries and fired 52 mine chambers, using nearly 16,000 lbs of explosives.

Later on, the mine warfare developed considerably in other directions, and mine-chambers charged with more than 130,000 lbs of explosives were fired.

=The German pushes towards Four-de-Paris=

(_October 1914-May 1915_).

The enemy wanted to reach the valley of the Biesme across the wood of Grurie and Bolante.

In October, advancing to the sap, the Germans of von Mudra's army corps took Bagatelle and Saint-Hubert. At the end of November the Four-de-Paris--Varennes road was abandoned by the French.

At the end of December, the Second French Corps cleared Four-de-Paris.

In January, the Garibaldians (Italian volunteers) attacked in the direction of Bolante.

On January 8th, the Germans hurled themselves upon the outskirts of Bolante. For three whole days the foot soldiers of the 31st, 46th, 76th and 89th regiments as well as the Garibaldians were at close grips with the Silesian and Hessian chasseurs, fierce struggles taking place.

In spite of all their furious attacks, the enemy could not get to the Biesme, but they succeeded in driving a deep and narrow wedge in the French lines in the direction of Four-de-Paris.

=French attacks in the valley of the Aire.=

While these obstinate encounters were going on in the forest of Argonne, the 9th and 10th French Divisions (5th Corps) attacked in the valley of the Aire and set out to storm Vauquois, a village perched on a mound commanding all the valley, which the enemy had constituted a defensive centre and a first class observation post.

From December to February, on ground that was transformed into a sea of mud, attacks on Boureuilles carried the French lines to 250 metres from the village.

From October 28th 1914 to March 1st 1915, four attacks were launched against Vauquois, the summit of which was reached by the French troops of the 10th Division. The struggle extended around the mine craters until 1916. (_See page 144._)

=The big German attacks= (_June-July 1915_).

In June and July 1915, the German commander gave up local attacks and had recourse to massed attacks of men and material on fronts of 3 to 4 kilometres.

The first attack (on June 20th) was on the North side and then (July 2nd) on the East side of the salient of Fontaine-Madame.

=On June 20th= in the morning, after a violent bombardment of gas shells, two Prussian and Wurtemburg divisions attacked in the wood of Grurie. The foot-soldiers of the 32nd Corps, though gassed and almost buried in their trenches, put up a fierce resistance. Their positions were subjected to a veritable siege. The enemy, however, captured Fontaine-aux-Charmes.

Up to June 28th, French counter-attacks succeeded in recapturing part of the lost ground.

=On June 30th=, the Germans extended their attack up to the north of Four-de-Paris. The enemy advanced to within 8 kilometres of their objective, the railway station of Les Islettes. The fire of the 75's, however, barred the road and the French reserves counter-attacked.

=On July 2nd=, there was an artillery bombardment of even greater violence.

The famous 42nd Division of Fère-Champenoise and the Yser withstood the attack with a heroism that won admiration even from the enemy.

The Germans could not capture the valley of the Biesme, in spite of their terrific efforts and heavy sacrifices.

In July 1915, the French front in the sectors of Bolante and Fille-Morte, followed the ridge which dominates the ravine of the Meurrissons, and passed over perpendicularly the Haute-Chevauchée road, comprising the dominating hills 285 and further to the East 263.

From this line which was provided with good observation posts, a French attack could take in rear the German lines that were established in front of Four-de-Paris.

This attack after being fixed for July 11th was postponed to July 14th. The enemy, however, forestalled it by himself attacking on =July 13th=.

After a bombardment of exceptional ferocity (nearly 50,000 shells) and the blowing up of several mines, 5 regiments of the Metz army attacked. They came out from saps which had been run up to within a short distance of shell-shattered French trenches.

The enemy crept in by small columns and surrounded the front lines. Under an avalanche of heavy shells, which annihilated a large number of men in their dug-outs, the French gave ground, to avoid being overwhelmed or outflanked. The enemy patrols then crossed the second French line.

The reserves of the 5th Corps, 131st, 82nd, 89th Infantry Regiments and the 66th battalion of chasseurs were brought up along ravines infested with gas, to the counter-attack. Without artillery preparation, they deployed under heavy rifle fire and then proceeded to clear the forest at the point of the bayonet and retook part of the first position.

=From October 1915 To September 1918.=

In October the Argonne front suddenly became as calm as it had previously been active. The Germans were content with a defensive policy. The struggle for the saps was renewed, trenches were blown up by mines and the mine craters were disputed by short bombing engagements.

In 1916, during the battle of Verdun, the Argonne was especially the scene of artillery duels and of mine warfare on the plateau of Bolante, at Hill 285 and at Vauquois.

_E._ Site of the church.--_L. F._ French lines.--_L. A._ German lines.

The German mine opposite the church had been charged with 60 tons of explosives. Notice on the German side, the entrances to the galleries excavated under the mound.]

--1916--

THE BATTLE OF VERDUN

During 1915, Germany was particularly on the defensive, in Artois (May-June) and in Champagne (September-October). Her successes in Serbia and Russia had not brought the final victory which could only be won on the Western front.

Germany feared an allied offensive and was anxious over the continual increase of their forces in men and material. To forestall this offensive would cause it to miscarry and keep the initiative in her own hands.

The Germans wanted too, to make an impression on the world at large which began to have doubts about her ultimate victory. Finally they were influenced by political considerations at home. The rationing of the population had lowered the general morale, and the prestige of the Crown Prince had slumped heavily on account of his failure in Argonne. A grand victory was necessary to strengthen the German morale, to appease dissension and to rehabilitate the prestige of the Imperial family. The German High Command chose Verdun. Was this choice of ground as paradoxical as it has been said?

"_Verdun in all the war is the hinge of the door which swings open sometimes on France, sometimes on Germany_". (L. GILLET.)

To capture Verdun was to threaten the whole French right wing, to gain an important stake, a stronghold fronting the rich basin of Briey, and to get the benefit of a great moral effect.

The Verdun salient lent itself to converging enemy attacks and concentrated fire. On the right bank the defenders of Verdun would be fighting with their backs to the Meuse. The neighbourhood of Verdun with its valleys and woods, facilitated the moving of troops and the concentration of artillery screened from view.

The enemy too had fourteen railways at his disposal and Metz close at hand from which to bring up troops and supplies.

On the French side, there was only one broad gauge railway connecting Verdun, via Saint-Menehould, with the rest of France. This railway, too, was always liable to be cut off by shell-fire. (_See illustration opposite_).

=Geographical Sketch.=

The table-lands of Verdun where the battle was to be fought are the last of the series of heights which form the top of the basin in which Paris lies. The Meuse which often overflows in winter divides them from North to South.

The terrace of the table-lands of the right bank, for some ten kilometres in width, separates the valley of the Meuse from the marshy plain of the Woëvre.

Numerous streams flow at a depth of more than a hundred metres for a very short distance, thus hollowing out deep ravines which give to the hills of the Meuse a contour "jagged, cut in festoons, as though it was hand-modelled in a clay substance". The summit line, where not indented, contains the highest points (388 m.), keys to the battle field.

"_All this country with its partitions and compartments seemed built like a natural fortress. The sheltered ways and ravines provided covered approaches and first-rate artillery positions. Every wood and copse could be converted into a redoubt._

"_If the branching off of the valleys and their innumerable ramifications added to the dangers of movement or manoeuvre or facilitated surprise attacks, the ridges, on the other hand, made marvellous observation posts. On all sides were the very slopes, banks and flank protection which engineers could desire._" (L. GILLET: _La Bataille de Verdun_).

=German plans for a decisive attack.=

Following the lesson of the offensives in Artois (May 1915) and Champagne (September 1915), the German commander intended to put into practice the French offensive methods but to add, by means of artillery fire, an unparalleled ferocity. To concentrate masses of artillery, to cut by shell fire the only broad-gauge railway that connected Verdun with France (_see plan p. 18_), to flatten out the French defences, to isolate the occupants by barrages of heavy shells, then to rush headlong on the town and crush the last resistance, at the same time sending forward overwhelming masses of troops, without regard to losses: such was the plan which the Germans carried out on February 21st, 1916.

_The enemy concentration round the fortress of Verdun._]

=Character of the battle of Verdun=

The battle of Verdun was a battle of annihilation, mutual annihilation. The method was to concentrate the fire of all the guns, not over a line but on a zone, and not only on the position to be captured but also as far as possible in rear on everything that could support the position. The simile that best expresses it is no longer that of a battering ram striking against a wall, but that of a rammer falling perpendicularly and hammering an encircled zone. The encircled zone was the part where the old territorials who were screening from observation a road behind the lines, ran almost as great a danger as men in other battles did in an attacking wave. Here, while the shells continued to fall, no fatigue party of men or munitions could go three hundred metres without being wiped out entirely. Here the wounded in deep-dug aid-posts went mad from lack of air. Here often a mug of water meant life or death to a man. This encircled zone was bounded by a narrow stretch of ground which the opposing artilleries tried to spare because the infantry were fighting there hand to hand, with bombs, machine guns, and flame-throwers; every square yard of ground being hotly disputed.

"In front of Verdun, one day, the O. C. of a new force asks the officer of the chasseurs whom he has just relieved: "Where does our line run here?--I'll show you. There where you will find on the ground my dead chasseurs, lying side by side, that is where our line runs".

"In front of Verdun, one day, a battalion commander being completely cut off sends twenty runners one after another, to the Colonel's headquarters. These runners are bound to follow a certain track to go and another to return. Not one comes back and on the next day he finds the bodies of all twenty, ten lying on the path there and ten on the path back.

"In front of Verdun, one day, at nightfall, a battalion commander goes up towards the front line to see his men and cheer them on. The front line is a string of shell holes and in these holes, one by one, the men are crouched. He leans over one of these pits of darkness, for the night was pitch black, and in a low voice so that the enemy may not hear asks: "How goes it?". There is no movement but a voice replies in muffled tones as though telling a secret: "All well, Colonel, they shall not pass". He goes on his way continuing his rounds "How goes it?" and from each dark shell-hole rises the same secret whisper.

THEIR PRIVATIONS AND SUFFERINGS ARE WRITTEN ON THEIR WAN FACES.]

"Where was that? At Mort-Homme or Froideterre? At Haudromont farm or Chapelle Sainte-Fine? It makes no difference! It was "in front of Verdun, one day" any day you like in this battle, in which so many days were alike, and these innumerable stories, so magnificent that no poet could have had the genius to invent one of them, these stories--each one so immortal--are all as alike in their essentials as were the countless actions in this "battle of annihilation" (JOSEPH BÉDIER: _L'Effort français_).

THE IMPORTANT PHASES OF THE BATTLE OF VERDUN

_The central attack (February 21st-25th) endangered the position of Verdun but the arrival of the first French reinforcements saved the place._

_The enemy widened his attacking front, but his effort to outflank the position was a failure._

_The defence was reorganised, road and rail taking their part in the battle. The enemy's attempts at attrition on the spot were a failure._

_On July 1st the allied offensive was launched on the Somme._

_As soon as this new engagement allowed him, the French Commander intended to turn the enemy's failure before Verdun into defeat._

_Three operations were prepared with the greatest skill and most energetically carried out, by which the enemy were driven out of the positions they had captured. These were the three victories of October 24th 1916 (Douaumont-Vaux), December 15th 1916 (Louvemont-Bezonvaux) and finally August 20th, 1917 (Samogneux-Mort-Homme, Hill 304)._

_This attack was carried on from February 21st to 26th on the right bank of the Meuse and narrowed its front as it advanced, finally stopping on the sixth day at Poivre Hill and Douaumont._]

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE

(_February-August 1916_).

1. =The central attack.=

=On February 21st 1916=, at 7.15 a.m., the enemy opened fire on the two banks of the Meuse, over a front of 40 kilometres. Simultaneously Verdun was systematically bombarded, the last residents being evacuated by the military authority at midday on the 25th.

For nine hours, all the enemy guns and trench mortars kept up a running fire without intermission. In all the woods adjoining the front it was a regular fire-work display. A feature of this overwhelming bombardment was the enormous proportion of heavy calibre shells, 150's and 210's coming over like hailstones.

Under this deluge of projectiles all trenches were levelled, the woods became a twisted mass of trunks and branches, and villages collapsed and were blotted out.

The infantry attack was launched at 4.15 p.m. just before dusk, from the Haumont-Ornes wood.

Three army corps, the 7th, 18th and 3rd advanced. They thought that they had only to march, with their rifles slung, over ground like a ploughed field.

The 51st (Boulengé) and 72nd Divisions (Bapst) of the 30th Corps (Chrétien) sustained the first shock and for three days covered the arrival of French reinforcements.

A heroic combat followed the most formidable artillery preparation hitherto known. The chasseurs of Colonel Driant resisted the attack, inch by inch, in the wood of Caures. By nightfall the advance of the enemy was insignificant compared with their losses. They succeeded, however, in capturing the wood of Haumont.

=On the 22nd=, with snow falling, the bombardment was resumed with, if possible, greater intensity. Colonel Driant in the wood of Caures was outflanked on both sides and died fighting, after first evacuating his chasseurs to Beaumont.

Meanwhile the sectors of Woëvre and the left bank of the Meuse were subjected to violent bombardment.

The fighting =on the 23rd= was even more furious. Brabant fell into the hands of the enemy after a fierce resistance by the 351st Infantry Regiment, which clung desperately to the ruins of Samogneux until nightfall. Further east the battle raged fiercely. The French counter-attacked unsuccessfully at Caures Wood and were attacked at Herbebois. The 51st Infantry Division, fell back, making the enemy pay dearly for his progress towards Fosses Wood. In the evening, the front extended along the Samogneux-Beaumont-Ornes line. Samogneux was captured by the enemy during the night. The situation was very critical.

=On the 24th=, the enemy brought up fresh storm troops and, although harassed by the French artillery on the left bank of the Meuse, they succeeded in taking Hill 344 to the East of Samogneux, Fosses Wood and the village of Ornes. But on the same day French reinforcements arrived, namely the 37th Infantry Division of the 7th Corps, the 31st and 306th Brigades of the 20th Corps under General Balfourier who provisionally took charge from the Meuse to the Woëvre. At the same time also General Pétain took over the command of the army of Verdun from General de Castelnau.

=On the 25th=, the 37th Infantry Division, with orders to defend Talou Hill and Louvemont village, resisted for a long time against incredibly furious attacks, but on their right the enemy succeeded in capturing Vauche Wood and, advancing towards Douaumont, carried the fort by surprise (_see page 88_). However, their efforts to take the village failed before the heroic tenacity of the 31st Brigade, while the 94th Infantry Division, covered itself with glory. The enemy advance from this side had the effect of compelling the 31st Infantry Division to abandon Talou Hill.

During this time, in Woëvre, the front which was a dangerous salient and only very lightly held, was withdrawn to the foot of the Meuse Hills. This falling back was carefully cloaked and under cover of a rearguard action a new front was organised.

Taking over the command on the night of the 25th, General Pétain at once divided the battle-line into four sectors, officered as follows: General Bazelaire, on the left bank, from Avocourt to the river; General Guillaumat, from the Meuse to Douaumont; General Balfourier, from this point to the Woëvre; General Duchesne, on the Meuse Heights.

There were no trenches, but he ordered that the forts should at least be connected by a continuous line of entrenchments to be made while the battle was at its height and which the "poilus", in their disdain for the shovel and pick, called the "Panic Line". The entire 59th Division was told off to build the earthworks on the second and third lines. Thirteen battalions kept in repair the road from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun, via Souilly (the =Sacred Way=), which became the main artery for re-victualling the place in men and munitions, and along which 1,700 motor lorries passed each way daily. Lastly, General Pétain managed to imbue all ranks with his energy and faith, and the enemy's drive was stopped.

Indeed, during =the day of the 26th=, the 39th Division (Nourisson), which had relieved the 37th, repulsed all attacks on Poivre Hill, while the 31st Brigade continued to hold Douaumont until relieved in the evening by the 2nd Division (Guignabaudet).

On the following days the fighting continued about and in the streets of Douaumont, which the enemy finally captured on March 4th. The Germans now began to show signs of weakening. Their effort on the right bank had failed. Checked at Douaumont, they were taken in the rear by the French positions on the left bank, and were obliged to modify their plans. From that time they operated simultaneously or successively on both banks.

_The central attack which was to capture Verdun and force back the French wings failed before it came to a head. The Germans, caught on the flank by the French artillery on the left bank of the Meuse attacked all at once, then alternately on both banks._]

2.--=The battle on the flanks= (_March-April 1916_).

The German offensive was unable on the right bank of the Meuse to yield the expected results. The enemy intended to combine operations on both banks.

=On March 6th=, two German divisions attacked from Bethincourt to Forges, where the French front was held by the 67th Division (Aimé) and succeeded in taking Forges and Regnéville, but were checked by the positions on Oie Hill.

Continuing their advance, =on the 7th=, they succeeded in capturing these positions, as well as Corbeaux Wood. The village of Cumières was the scene of terrible fighting, but remained in the hands of the French, while further to the west the enemy's attacks broke down at Mort-Homme (_See page 112_).

=On March 8th=, while on the left bank French troops retook Corbeaux, on the right bank the Germans brought into line units of five army corps and began a general attack, which failed with very heavy losses, their only gain being the capture of part of Vaux village.

=On the 9th=, they succeeded in getting a footing on the slopes of Mort-Homme, but at the other end of the battle-line their attack on Vaux Fort failed. Their radiograms announcing the capture of the fort were untrue (_See page 68_).

=On the 10th=, Corbeaux Wood was taken by the Germans and the French withdrew to the line Bethincourt-Mort-Homme, south of the Corbeaux and Cumières Woods. The battle continued in the village and in front of Vaux Fort, strongly held by the French. The enemy temporarily ceased his massed attacks. In reality his offensive had failed.

=On March 10th=, Joffre was able to say to the soldiers of Verdun:

_"For three weeks you have withstood the most formidable attack which the enemy has yet made. Germany counted on the success of this effort, which she believed would prove irresistible, and for which she used her best troops and most powerful artillery. She hoped by the capture of Verdun to strengthen the courage of her Allies and convince neutrals of German superiority. But she reckoned without you! The eyes of the country are on you. You belong to those of whom it will be said: "They barred the road to Verdun!"_

=From March 11th to April 9th= the aspect of the battle changed. Wide front attacks gave place to local actions, short, violent and limited in scope. On March 14th the enemy captured, from the 75th Brigade, Hill 265 forming the Western portion of Mort-Homme, but they failed to take the Eastern portion. On the 20th, Avocourt and Malancourt Woods fell into the hands of the Bavarians, and after a fierce struggle the village of Malancourt was lost, and then Bethincourt on April 8th. On the right bank, after powerful attacks near Vaux, the enemy reached Caillette Wood and the Vaux-Fleury railway, only to be driven back by the 5th Division (Mangin).

A furious attack was made along both banks by the Germans at noon =on April 9th=; on the left bank, five divisions were engaged, failing everywhere except at the Mort-Homme, where, despite the heroic resistance of the 42nd Division (Deville), they gained a footing on the N. E. slopes; on the right bank, Poivre Hill was attacked but remained in French hands.

On the following day in his order of the day, General Pétain promulgated his famous message "_Courage ... we shall beat them!_" (_Reproduction page 30_).

=On April 30th=, General Nivelle superseded in supreme command of the Verdun forces General Pétain who had been appointed to the command of the central army group.

"_April 9th was a glorious day for our armies_", General
Pétain declared in his order of the day dated the 10th, "_the
furious attacks of the soldiers of the Crown Prince broke down
everywhere. The infantry, artillery, sappers and aviators of the
2nd Army vied with one another in valour._

"_Honour to all._

"_No doubt the Germans will attack again. Let all work and
watch, that yesterday's success be continued._

"_Courage! We shall beat them!_"

Ch. Pétain

_In the background, the valley of the Forges stream, Bethincourt on the left, Forges wood on the right._]

_The struggle continued obstinately and without interruption on the two banks of the Meuse. The attempt of the enemy to wear down the French forces was in vain, the latter re-organising their defences. Division succeeded division in the defence of Verdun but then were relieved before they were exhausted, so that they came out of the furnace better able to stand its hardships._]

3. =The battle of attrition= (_May-August 1916_).

In May the enemy attacked on the left bank of the Meuse with an assault upon Mort-Homme. Then, widening their attacking front in a Westerly direction, they turned upon Hill 304, a strong key position and valuable observation post. The French lost this Hill =on May 23rd= but retook it the following day. A further month's bitter fighting only gained for the enemy the crest of Mort-Homme and the north slopes of Hill 304.

=On May 22nd=, with the object of clearing the left bank of the Meuse where the enemy were pressing, the 5th Division (Mangin) attacked on the right bank, in the direction of Douaumont. The central attack alone was successful, the enemy holding their ground inside the fort; their numerous reserves, among them the 1st Bavarian Corps, succeeded in dislodging the attackers =on May 24th= (_See page 90_).

Even though Douaumont remained in the enemy's hands, this attack was successful in freeing the left bank by drawing upon the German reserves. The struggle continued without respite or quarter. The Germans, alarmed by the preparations for the Franco-British offensive on the Somme, wished to be finished with Verdun. They, therefore, launched attack after attack but every time they were met by the irresistible will of the French.

The enemy, who in April had captured the village of Vaux, next furiously attacked the fort, and though =on June 2nd= they occupied the superstructure, it took them five days to subdue the garrison (_See page 71_).

At the same time they advanced from Douaumont towards Froideterre. =On June 9th=, Thiaumont Farm was captured, but the redoubt still held out. On the left bank, the enemy resumed their attacks. =On May 31st=, they outflanked Mort-Homme by the Meuse valley and reached Chattancourt station, but were driven back by a counter attack as far as Cumières. Even if they captured the summit of Hill 304, they could not conquer the South slopes, and they were still far from the fortified barrier of Bois Bourrus.

On the right bank, on the other hand, by holding Douaumont and Vaux the enemy were at hand to break through the barrier of Souville and had within view the basin of Verdun. Here it was that the enemy were going to work for the supreme decision.

=On June 23rd=, 70,000 men attacked on the front Thiaumont-Fleury-Vaux. Thiaumont redoubt was captured, waves of attackers being hurled upon the Froideterre redoubt. A counter-attack, however, cleared the plain as far as Thiaumont. In the centre, the enemy by outflanking Fleury on both sides gained a footing there, but in front of Souville they failed utterly (_See page 77_).

=On July 11th=, the enemy narrowed their attacking front, from Fleury to Damloup. Putting 40,000 men into the attack, they went through Fleury and crept round by the ravine to the west of the village. They gained a temporary footing in Souville fort from which they were almost immediately ejected (_See page 80_).

In spite of partial successes, the enemy had failed in their main objectives. Their losses had been enormous and the Franco-British offensive, launched on the Somme on July 1st, took up their reinforcements.

After nearly five month's siege, Verdun was safe. Still bitter fighting raged right on until the middle of August, centreing chiefly round Thiaumont redoubt which changed hands 16 times, Fleury village, recaptured on August 18th after many attempts, and in the woods south of Vaux where the enemy endeavoured to outflank Souville.

_Echelons of artillery on the slope of Houdainville._

_A pinnace, used as a rest billet, hit by a 380._

_Mass being celebrated in the church of Vaubecourt which had been burnt by bombs from aeroplanes._]

_A fatigue party coming from Tavannes tunnel.--Trenches of the Laufée redoubt (June 1916).--Soldiers going to fetch water from shell-holes in the ravine of Tavannes._]

_The French offensives of October 24th and December 15th 1916._]

FRENCH COUNTER-OFFENSIVES AND THE CLEARING OF VERDUN

=The French offensive of October 24th 1916.=

In August 1916, the battle of Verdun was a severe check to Germany. It was about to turn into a French victory.

The object was to link up once again the unbroken line of fortresses round Verdun. The time for small attacks aiming at the recapture of a few hundred yards was past. After having first straightened out the salients which the enemy had driven into the French line during June and July, it was only by a complete and simultaneous forward movement that they could make a really useful gain of ground.

To carry the operations to success, Generals Nivelle and Mangin had a powerful artillery force at their command, consisting of 290 field-guns and over 300 heavy guns. Three picked divisions were to form the front attacking line, the 38th (Guyot de Salins) reinforced on the left by the 11th Line Regiment, the 133rd (Passaga), known as "La Gauloise" and the 74th (de Lardemelle). The front line of the enemy consisted of seven divisions.

The French commander intended to win the day not only by the superiority of the troops under his command, but by giving them training and carrying out with precision a new tactical method of attack. The liaison which is so difficult between artillery and infantry was perfectly arranged, following a carefully pre-arranged time-table.

The attacking waves kept just behind a running barrage which slowly lifted forward according to programme.

The attack was made with a double line, and a halt was arranged to allow the units engaged to reorganise.

On October 21st, the artillery preparation started, and was carefully controlled and regulated day by day. On the 23rd a fire broke out in Douaumont fort. On the same day a feint attack gave away the position of new enemy batteries which were at once silenced. This feint deceived the Germans, the Crown Prince being actually deluded into announcing that he had broken up a strong French attack.

The enemy were on their guard; on the 23rd, a German officer taken prisoner said positively: "We shall not capture Verdun any more than you will retake Douaumont".

At 11 a.m. =on the 24th=, in a thick fog, the attack succeeded brilliantly, giving the French the Haudromont quarries, Thiaumont redoubts and farm, Douaumont fort and village (_see page 92_), the northern edge of Caillette wood, right up to Vaux pond, the edge of Fumin wood and Damloup battery. On the 24th and 25th more than 6,000 prisoners were taken and 15 guns. On November 2nd, when they re-entered Vaux fort which the enemy had abandoned, the French were practically on their line of February 25th.

On December 12th, General Nivelle took over supreme command. General Guillaumat took his place in command of the Verdun army.

=The French offensive of December 15th, 1916.=

To completely clear Verdun to the east of the Meuse and give greater freedom to the reconquered forts of Vaux and Douaumont, General Mangin organised a new attack. A great amount of preparatory work was done by the army of Verdun, who constructed about eighteen miles of road including one of logs laid transversely for the artillery, besides more than 6 miles of narrow-gauge railway, together with out-going and incoming trenches, and depots for munitions, bombs and material generally. As soon as these very considerable preparations, often carried out under heavy enemy shell-fire, were finished, the attacking troops took up their positions; the 126th Infantry Division (Muteau), 38th Infantry Division (Guyot de Salins), 37th Infantry Division (Garnier-Duplessis) and 133rd Infantry Division (Passaga), with the 123rd, 128th, 21st and 6th Infantry Divisions as reserves. Two lines of artillery prepared and supported the attack. The six-mile German front from Vacherauville to Bezonvaux was held by 5 divisions in the first line with 4 divisions in reserve.

At 10 a.m., =on December 15th=, when Germany was proposing that France should sue for peace, the attacking waves were launched, protected by a moving curtain of artillery fire. Several of the objectives, including Vacherauville, the first and second lines before Louvemont, were reached in a few minutes at a single bound. The woods and ravines before Douaumont took longer to capture, while Vauche wood was carried at the point of the bayonet. Les Chambrettes and Bezonvaux were taken on the following days. The success was considerable, more than 11,000 prisoners, including 300 officers, 115 guns, several hundred machine-guns and important depots of munitions and material, being captured. The enemy who, in July, had been within a few hundred yards of Souville Fort, was now more than three miles away. In June, the _Frankfort Gazette_, celebrating the German successes at Verdun, declared: "We have clinched our victory and none can take it from us", but on December 18th they had lost all the ground it had taken five months and enormous sacrifices to conquer.

In congratulating the troops General Mangin reminded them that Germany had just invited France to sue for peace, adding that they had been "the true ambassadors of the Republic".

_Troops in reserve waiting for the time to move off._]

=The French offensive of August 20th 1917.=

For several months Verdun again became almost quiet, the battle area shifting to the Chemin des Dames, Flanders and the Isonzo. General Pétain decided to shatter the enemy on the Verdun front.

The victory of Louvemont-Bezonvaux, while completely clearing Douaumont, had left the observation posts on Talou Hill in the hands of the enemy, who still held, on the left bank, the excellent positions of Hill 304 and Mort-Homme.

These they had had plenty of time to fortify, and the troops were housed in deep tunnels and properly connected up positions. The enemy had noticed the French preparations for this new offensive and had accordingly considerably strengthened their artillery (to nearly 400 batteries) and their fighting effectives (to nine divisions on the Avocourt-Woëvre line, with five in reserve).

On the French side, the ground had been for several months prepared for the battle. Across the battlefield which had been shockingly cut up by fire, roads had been prepared, liaison strengthened and the question of supplies studied for a long while. Artillery preparations included 2,500 guns of all kinds.

In this battle, artillery was to play the most important part. An army corps of 20,000 infantrymen was to be supported by 40,000 artillerymen. Four corps, 13th (Linder), 16th (Corvisart), 15th (de Fontclare), 32nd (Passaga) comprising 8 divisions in the line and 2 in reserve, took part in this offensive.

The artillery bombardment started on August 13th and systematically flattened out the German positions. On August 20th, at dawn, under the eyes of the officers of the new American Army who from various observation posts followed the course of the battle, 8 divisions attacked. Mort-Homme, Oie Hill and Talou Hill were captured, Hill 304 alone remaining in enemy hands. There was a stream of prisoners and munitions, in the tunnels of Mort-Homme over 1,000 men being unable to escape. On the following day Samogneux and Regnéville fell, and a systematic attack led to the capture of Hill 304 on August 24th.

The booty from August 20th to 26th comprised 9,500 prisoners, 39 guns, 100 trench mortars and 242 machine guns.

On the left bank, the French line was advanced as far as the Forges stream.

On the right bank, the enemy unsuccessfully endeavoured, by strong counter-attacks, over a period of nearly two months, to recapture the lost ground.

Verdun was completely cleared and the first French lines were advanced to approximately 7 miles to the north.

Thus in 3 battles, October 24th, December 15th, August 20-21st, the Germans were driven out of all the positions which they had held since the third day of the battle. There was left in their hands only what had formed, in February 1916, the advance line of the French defence, where, during the first two days of the battle, the covering divisions had been sacrificed.