Chapter XXXI: Unofficial Publication of "official" Information 361 (8)

There is, of course, the ready explanation that old countries are very conservative, and do not take kindly to change. Their joints are stiff with age, and they creak along well-worn paths slowly and painfully, but they lack the suppleness of limb that tempts younger communities to sprint across untrodden country. That is the argument. I am afraid this explanation will not hold. Old countries when thoroughly moved can leap like the hart. The French Revolution demonstrated how vigorously one of the oldest nations of Europe could tear along unbroken tracks when impelled by a new passion. And I saw Britain spring to arms in 1914, when five millions of men joined the colours without the lash of compulsion to stir their blood. England renewed her youth, and her movements had the energy, the audacity, and the endurance of a people untired by a march of centuries. This people, if stirred by a call which reaches its heart or conscience, is capable of action as bold as that which wrested Magna Charta out of a despot in the twelfth century, overthrew an ancient religion in the fifteenth century, led a king to the scaffold in the seventeenth century, or challenged the greatest military empires in the world in the sixteenth, the nineteenth, and the twentieth centuries. And if they were convinced that the liquor traffic must be destroyed, they would execute it with as little compunction or hesitation as they displayed in suppressing the mass or in decapitating Charles I.

At the present moment the British people are not in the least persuaded that the evils of alcohol for a minority of the population cannot be dealt with effectively without resorting to the very drastic expedient of forbidding its consumption by the majority who use it in moderation. Are they likely to be convinced? That depends on the failure or success of all other expedients to exterminate the evil of alcoholism.

That brings me to another explanation. America reached prohibition by the path of experiment. The federal system lent itself to the trial of every form of remedy, including prohibition. For well over half a century you have had almost every form of temperance expedient ever suggested in actual working in some State or other of the American republic.

When I was a lad I heard debates and addresses in Welsh about the comparative merits of the "Maine Law" and high license. High license, reduction of licenses, local option, prohibition, have all been tried. They have all been in operation quite long enough to enable the American public to form a judgment on their merits. Statistical results over long periods constitute a reliable basis for inference. American federalism furnished the opportunity, and the States took full advantage of it. Hence the prohibition law.

To the practical man the figures in the prohibition States looked attractive from a business point of view. He hesitated, but the moral wave that swept over America carried him over the bar. But without the experience at his door I doubt whether the American business man would have assented to prohibition.

The British constitution does not lend itself to these valuable experiments. Otherwise, London might have tried one experiment, Lancashire another, Yorkshire a third, Scotland a fourth, and Wales a fifth. The whole legislative power of the United Kingdom was until quite recently vested in the imperial Parliament. Ireland has now a legislature of its own. In theory, what suited one part of the kingdom must do for the whole, and what did not suit the more populous parts could not be permitted to others.

As far as Scotland, Ireland, and Wales are concerned, there was in practice a certain relaxation of this rule. But as far as the liquor laws went, any serious alteration in any part of the kingdom was difficult to secure if it offended the prejudices or damaged the interests of the rest. It took years to get it through Parliament even in a mutilated condition.

There was no real freedom of experiment. The Scottish local veto act is a compromise modified to suit English sentiment. Even as it is, it took thirty years of Scottish insistence to carry. Wales has been unable to secure local option, although it has been demanded by four-fifths of its representatives for over a generation. We have, therefore, in this country been denied the practical experience which has guided America to so dramatic a conclusion.

In the absence of such experience it has been found impossible to educate and organise public opinion throughout Britain to the point of concentrating attention and pressure on this one issue. Other issues always cut across and jam the current.

You cannot secure unanimity of action on temperance reform even amongst the religious forces. If they were united in their demand, and prepared to enforce it at elections, nothing could resist their power. Between elections they seem agreed in their policy; but no sooner does the party bugle sound than they all fall into rank in opposite armies, and the temperance banner is hurriedly packed into the cupboard for use after the polls have been declared. It is then once more brought out to wave over the tabernacle, and its wrinkles are straightened out in the breeze.

I have seen the fiercest champions of local option supporting brewers at elections because they were the official opponents of Irish Home Rule in the contest. I remember being told by an eminent Scottish divine, who was a strong temperance advocate, but who had hitherto supported anti-temperance candidates because of his inveterate opposition to Gladstone's Home Rule, that, unless his party carried a measure of local option for Scotland soon, he would have to abandon them, home rule or no home rule. He died without redeeming his promise. The time never came for him. The Irish issue dominated elections for nearly a generation. Free trade played a great part also.

If the exigencies of party conflict had permitted the same consistent propaganda work, extending over the same number of years, to be devoted to the drink problem as was given to the wrongs of Ireland or free trade, no doubt public opinion could have been educated up to the point of supporting drastic reform. But this has not been found practicable by political parties owing to the distraction of other issues.

This is the main reason why British opinion is so far behind American opinion on the temperance question. In America the battle of sobriety was fought on the State platform, whilst the national platform was left free for other conflicts.

The war, however, enabled the British government to effect reforms which have materially reduced the consumption of alcohol in this kingdom. These results have been achieved by an enormous increase in the taxation of alcoholic liquors, and by a considerable reduction in the hours of sale. The taxation of beer was raised from £13,000,000 in 1913 to £123,000,000 in 1921. The duty on spirits in 1913 yielded £22,000,000, in 1921 it gave the revenue £71,000,000.

One of the effects has been an appreciable reduction in the alcoholic strength of the beverage sold. The hours of sale in the morning and afternoon have been curtailed appreciably. By this measure the workman is prevented from starting his day by drinking alcohol, and the afternoon break prevents the drinker from soddening all day.

The effect of these combined measures has been highly beneficial. The quantity of beer sold fell from 34,152,739 barrels of 36 gallons at standard gravity of 10.55 in 1913, to 23,885,472 standard barrels in 1921. Spirits fell from 30,736,088 proof gallons in 1913 to 20,162,395 in 1921. These figures represent a remarkable and almost sensational reduction in the quantity of alcohol consumed by the population. Convictions for drunkenness fell from 188,877 in 1913 to 77,789 in 1921. Deaths from alcoholic diseases were more than halved during the same period. This is the most distinct advance in the direction of effective temperance reform hitherto taken by the British Parliament, and the effect is striking in its encouragement.

It would be a serious national misfortune if the admirable results attained by these war measures were lost by relaxations. Most of the pressure exerted upon Parliament has up to the present been in the direction of easing the grip of the state on the traffic. Most candidates in all parties at the last election were forced to pledge themselves to support reduction in the beer duty. Clubs, even more than "pubs," have urged extensions in drinking hours. The beer duty has already been reduced. It is anticipated that the reduction will have the effect of increasing consumption. This is regrettable, for it means so much reclaimed land once more sinking into the malarial swamp.

There is one consolation, however, that the women will claim the next turn in reduction of taxation. Sugar and tea will then provide effective barriers in the way of a further cheapening of alcoholic liquors just yet. But all this is a long, long way off prohibition. A majority of 20 to 1 against Mr. Scrymgeour's prohibition bill, and a majority of 4 to 1 in favour of cheaper beer--both recorded in the same parliamentary week--is not encouraging to those who would suppress alcohol in Britain.

Temperance reformers here are, therefore, watching the progress of America's bold bid for sobriety with hopeful, if anxious, eyes, and with longing hearts. What Britain does next will depend entirely on the success or failure of what America is doing now.

XXXI

UNOFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF "OFFICIAL" INFORMATION

A storm is working up over the publication by public servants of information which came into their possession in the course of their official careers. The immediate occasion is Mr. Winston Churchill's story of the war. Angry questions are being asked in parliament, and it is publicly announced that the Cabinet have appointed a committee of its members to consider the whole problem.

It is rather late in the day to make all this fuss about the publication of war documents, for generals, admirals, and ministers in all lands, including ours, have during the last three years been inundating the European and American public with a flood of reminiscences, explanations, criticisms, attacks and defences on the conduct of operations, either of the Great War or the Great Peace, in which they were engaged. Warriors on land and on sea have displayed an unprecedented eagerness to inform the public as to their own share in the great victory, and as to how much more brilliant that share would have been but for the wrongheadedness or stupidity of some collaborator. Like Julius Cæsar, they mean to live in history not merely through their battles, but also through their commentaries upon them. On the other hand, statesmen have been engaged in disclaiming responsibility for particular parts of the Treaty of Versailles, and where blame has been attached to them, either by opponents or supporters, for the form in which those parts were cast, they have striven hard to prove that it was attributable to pressure which they were unable to resist from other actors in the drama. In each case highly confidential information is disclosed, secret documents are used, cabinet and council proceedings are published, without the slightest regard to precedent. One disclosure has led to another, one revelation has rendered another inevitable.

A general, admiral or minister criticises on the strength of half-disclosed minutes or documents some other public functionary, military, naval, or political. What is the latter to do? His reputation is at stake. Is he not to be allowed to repair the omission or to correct the misquotation? Take the case of ministers who played an important part in the conduct of the war or the peace, and whose actions have been subjected to malignant and persistent misrepresentation. In attacking these ministers statements are made which, if accepted by the public, would irretrievably damage or even destroy their reputation. In formulating the attack a document is partially quoted, or the report of a council or cabinet meeting is misquoted. The minister knows that a full and fair quotation would clear his good name of the imputation sought to be cast upon it. Is he not to be allowed, in those circumstances, to publish it? A mere denial would carry no weight. A full revelation would settle the dispute in his favour. The publication cannot conceivably affect any public interest, it would supply no information which could serve any possible enemy of his country. Is he not to be allowed to use the only means available to redeem his credit from the ruin of accepted calumny? His critic has been allowed to disclose secret information without protest. Is he to be forbidden to do so in self-defence? He claims that he served his country faithfully to the best of his powers in time of crisis and peril. For that he is defamed by men who had access to secret information and use it freely without criticism, censure or demur. Why should his country deny him the same privilege for his protection? That is the case which the cabinet committee will have to consider. Whatever general rules may be laid down they must in all fairness take into account these exceptional circumstances. Those who are now taking a prominent part in emphasising the enormity of giving to the public documents which were acquired in the public service had not a word to say when portions of those documents were used for purposes with which they were in sympathy. Is it not rather late for them to protest now? There is such a thing as fair play even when politicians are attacked.

So far as the British are concerned the writing of the books of the type alluded to was started, I think, by Field-Marshal Lord French of Ypres, in his book, _1914_. This work is of the nature of an apologia; and the writer, to assist in establishing his case, alludes to discussions with the cabinet and does not hesitate to quote textually secret memoranda and dispatches written by himself and others. The late Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Fisher, gives in his book, _Memories_, examples of his own intervention at the war council meetings. In his autobiography, _From Private to Field-Marshal_, which appeared some time later, Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, who was for over two years the confidential adviser of the cabinet and as such attended all war councils and most war cabinet meetings, when it suits his argument gives to the public his version of what passed at these highly secret conclaves. Though he does not quote secret documents textually, he describes the proceedings and deliberations of the supreme war council, inter-Allied conferences and the war cabinet, and refers to the opinions of individuals. In his recent speeches he has gone even further. A still more recent work, _Sir Douglas Haig's Command_, is the result of collaboration by two authors of whom one, at least, held an official position during the war, being Sir Douglas Haig's private secretary when he was Commander-in-Chief of the British army in France. This book is even less reticent. It, also, is essentially an apologia and justification of an individual. To establish their case, the writers not only summarise some of the secret proceedings of the supreme war council and war cabinet, but give extracts of their decisions. These extracts are freely used as the basis of animadversion on the council and cabinet of that day. It is true that some of the quotations are stated to be taken from French books previously published, but others are not, which arouses curiosity as to the source of the knowledge displayed.

In addition there have been endless articles in magazines and newspapers, some signed, some written anonymously, all attacking either ministers, generals or admirals, and most of them clearly supplied with secret information by men who must have acquired it in their official capacity. As to all these disclosures protest has hitherto been silent. But when it is indicated that replies are forthcoming and that these replies will reveal the real nature of the misquoted documents or proceedings, the wrath of the assailants and their sympathisers knows no bounds.

What happened in reference to the consultations held in connection with the framing of the peace treaty affords an illustration of the way these revelations occur. The question of the publication of these proceedings was definitely discussed at Versailles, after the signature of the peace treaty with Germany on the 28th June, 1919, by President Wilson, representing the United States, M. Clemenceau and M. Simon, representing France, M. Sonnino, representing Italy, M. Makino, representing Japan, and myself. This is what occurred on that occasion. For the first time I quote from my own notes written at the time:

"President Wilson was strongly of opinion that these documents
ought to be treated as purely private conversation, and he
objected to the communication of the accounts given in the Notes
of the private conversations, in which all present had spoken
their minds with great freedom, as improper use might afterwards
be made of these documents. On the other hand, he did not object
to the Notes being communicated to special individuals in the
personal confidence of members of the Council. Though he looked
upon certain statements, the conclusions and the actions as being
official, and therefore available in the appropriate offices, the
actual conversations were private. In the United States no one
had the right to claim documents of this kind. President Wilson's
view was that each government should take the course traditional
in its own country with the clear and distinct understanding that
no one should under any circumstances make the _procès verbal_
public. M. Clemenceau did not think that such documents should be
regarded as private property, whilst M. Sonnino thought they need
not be considered as official documents.

"For my own part I was anxious to know what the precedents were. I
also felt bound to enter a caveat that if attacks should be made
on the political heads I might be forced in particular cases to
refer to these Notes, and I gave warning that I might have to do
so unless a protest was then made. M. Clemenceau agreed so far,
that it might be impossible to refuse extracts from the _procès
verbaux_ to prove particular facts."

It will be observed from this record that I was the first to safeguard the interest of persons who, I felt certain, would be attacked for their share in the treaty. I am the last to take advantage of the proviso.

What followed? M. Clemenceau was bitterly attacked by his political opponents for surrendering French rights to the treaty. President Wilson was also attacked by his political opponents for his assent to other provisions of the treaty. In self-defence they authorised the publication of the secret reports of the Paris meeting.

M. Clemenceau entrusted his defence to M. Tardieu. M. Tardieu, in his book _The Truth About the Treaty_, gives most of his attention to the drawing up of that international instrument, but deals with the last portion of the war period and quotes from the proceedings of inter-allied conferences, and also of the supreme war council, giving the opinions of individuals. He does the same with the deliberations of the peace conference. In fact the whole book is based on international proceedings of a secret nature. M. Poincaré, in maligning his rivals, has not refrained from making full use of information which came to his knowledge as President of the Republic. For example, in his article, _Souvenirs et Documents_, in the _Temps_ of the 12th September, 1921, he quotes _in extenso_ a letter of April, 1919, from himself as President of the Republic to the President of the Council, M. Clemenceau, and a letter from me in reply to the President of the Council. My consent was not even asked to the publication of my letter. This correspondence referred to the period proposed to be placed on the occupation by the Allies of the left bank of the Rhine. According to Signor Nitti, M. Poincaré makes somewhat similar disclosures in his articles published in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_. All these disclosures were partial, truncated and, therefore, misleading. They did not give the public a complete account of what occurred. The impression created was, therefore, unfair to the other actors in that great drama. That is undoubtedly what impelled ex-President Wilson to hand over his documents to Mr. Ray Baker with a view to the presentation of the case from the standpoint of the American delegation. Hence his book, _Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement_. It is mostly based on the secret minutes of the supreme war council, numerous extracts from which are given. Signor Nitti, the late Italian premier, on the other hand, expressly states that he does not publish any document which was not intended for publication. Nevertheless, he prints a memorandum written by myself for the peace conference in March, 1919, under the title of _Some Considerations for the Peace Conference before they finally Draft their Terms_, and also M. Clemenceau's reply, both of which are secret documents. But he excuses his action in this case because extracts from this memorandum had already been published.

I only mention these matters, not by way of arraignment of these various distinguished men for divulging secrets they ought to have kept under lock and key. That is not in the least my object. I do so in order to point out that general rules as to the conditions under which confidential material can be used are not applicable to circumstances of the Great War and the peace that ensued. Disclosures already made largely for purposes of criticism and aspersion upon individuals or bodies of individuals have given the assailed parties a special position which cannot in justice be overlooked.

_London, March 17th, 1923._