Chapter V: Negotiators and Negotiations (2)

We have already shown (Chap. II) how Italy became a member of the Triple Alliance, and how, in spite of its apparent frailty and of the somewhat divergent aims of its members, that alliance has endured for thirty-two years. It remains to consider what policy Italy adopted in the critical situation created by the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and to appreciate the significance of that policy. It is supremely significant that Italy, though a member of the Triple Alliance, was not consulted about the terms of the Austrian note to Servia; that she worked persistently side by side with England in endeavouring to prevent an outbreak of war, and, when that failed, to induce the states actually at war, or on the brink of war, to suspend all military operations in order to give diplomatic intervention an opportunity; and it is equally significant that, when the great war broke out, Italy remained neutral, in spite of the pressure from her allies and the tempting bait of a share of the spoil, which, it is said, is even now being offered to her.[159] This is but a bald description of Italy's policy, but it can be substantiated in detail from official documents. As early as July 25th the Italian Ambassador in a conversation with Sir Edward Grey 'made no secret of the fact that Italy was desirous to see war avoided',[160] and he cordially approved the idea of mediation by the four Powers. Two days later Italy again approved the proposed conference of four to be held immediately in London. The Italian Foreign Minister promised to recommend most strongly to the German Government the idea of asking Russia, Austria, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, and went even further in undertaking to ask what procedure Germany thought most likely to be successful at Vienna.[161] He thought it very doubtful whether Germany would consent to ask Austria to suspend military operations, but made a further suggestion that

'Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice
of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable
her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary
alone'.[162]

Next day the Marquis di San Giuliano called attention to a point in Servia's reply to Austria which might form a starting-point for mediation.[163] On July 29th he tried to get over Germany's objection to the idea of a 'Conference' by suggesting adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London.[164] Next day he added to this the practical suggestion that

'Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she
would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would
neither deprive her of independence, nor annex territory.... We
might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would
accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries,
discussions could be commenced at once.'[165]

Moreover the Italian Ambassador at Vienna, in the hope of pacifying Russia, made the useful suggestion that Austria should

'convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which
has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires
neither to destroy the independence of Servia, nor to acquire
Servian territory'.[166]

All efforts to preserve peace proved futile; Germany delivered her ultimatum to France and to Russia. Then arose the question, what was Italy to do? The answer to this was given by the Italian Foreign Minister:--

'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might
result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an
aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely
defensive character of the Triple Alliance; in such circumstances
Italy would remain neutral.'[167]

The German White Book says 'Russia began the war on us'[168] and 'France opened hostilities'[169]; if these statements were true, Italy would have been obliged, if she were to remain faithful to her engagements, to take part in the war side by side with her colleagues of the Triple Alliance. Impartial readers can draw their own conclusions.

NOTE

_Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and Servia's reply_.

On July 23rd the Austro-Hungarian Government presented an ultimatum to Servia, demanding unconditional acceptance within 48 hours, an ultimatum which the _Temps_ next day described as 'unprecedented in its arrogance and in the extravagance of its demands'. Of it Sir Edward Grey said:--

'I had never before seen one State address to another independent
State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be
hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent
sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that
Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials
who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia.'[170]

It may be true, as the Austrian Ambassador explained,[171] that the Austro-Hungarian Government did not intend this step to be regarded as an ultimatum, but as a _démarche_ with a time-limit.

In this extraordinary document[172] the Austro-Hungarian Government demanded:--

A. That Servia should publish on the front page of its 'Official Gazette', and in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army, and should communicate to the Army as the order of the day a declaration

(1) condemning Serb propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

(2) regretting that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the propaganda;

(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations.

B. That Servia should undertake

(1) to suppress any publication inciting to hatred and contempt of Austria-Hungary;

(2) to dissolve the society styled Narodna Odbrana and similar societies and to confiscate their means of propaganda;

(3) to eliminate from public instruction in Servia all teachers and all methods of instruction responsible for fomenting opinion against Austria-Hungary;

(4) to remove from the military service and from the administration all officers and functionaries guilty of such propaganda, whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserved to itself the right of communicating;

(5) to accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of Austria-Hungary in the suppression of the subversive anti-Austrian movement;

(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the Serajevo plot, with the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian delegates;

(7) to proceed immediately to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employé, who have been compromised by the results of the inquiry at Serajevo;

(8) to stop co-operation of Servian authorities in illicit traffic in arms and explosives, and to dismiss and punish those officials who helped the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime;

(9) to explain the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, at home and abroad, after the Serajevo crime.

On July 25th the Servian reply[173] was presented to the Austro-Hungarian Government. Even to a reader with Austrian sympathies this reply seems to go a long way towards meeting the demands. The Servian Government agreed

A. that Servia should, as demanded, publish a declaration

(1) condemning all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary;

(2) regretting that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, Servian officers and officials participated in the propaganda;

(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against all persons who are guilty of such acts.

B. That Servia would undertake

(1) to introduce a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of Austria-Hungary and to introduce an amendment to the Constitution providing for the confiscation of such publications;

(2) to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and similar societies;

(3) to remove at once from their public educational establishments all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda, whenever the Austro-Hungarian Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda;

(4) to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary;

(5) though they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand, to accept the collaboration of Austro-Hungarian officials so far as is consistent with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure and with good neighbourly relations;

(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the Serajevo plot; but they cannot admit the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian officials, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure;

(7) On this they remark that Major Tankositch was arrested as soon as the note was presented, and that it has not been possible to arrest Ciganovitch, who is an Austro-Hungarian subject, but had been employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways;

(8) to reinforce and extend the measures for preventing illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier;

(9) to give explanations of the remarks made by Servian officials, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian Government have communicated the passages and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials.

The Austro-Hungarian Government regarded this reply as unsatisfactory and inadequate; they withdrew their Minister from Belgrade the same evening, and on July 28th declared war on Servia. Meanwhile they published a long official explanation[174] of the grounds on which the Servian reply was considered inadequate; in it they criticized and found unsatisfactory every single article of the reply, except that to demand No. 8. It is not worth while to analyze the whole of this; one sample may be sufficient. Sir Edward Grey commented on demand No. 5 and pointed out[175] that it

'would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's
independent sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed that it
might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to
appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of
Servia.'

Obviously he was in doubt about the meaning and scope of this demand, and the next was equally vague. The Servian reply to these two demands was necessarily guarded: yet the Austro-Hungarian Government treated this as deliberate misrepresentation:--

'The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to
do with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of state
police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The
reserved attitude of Servia is therefore incomprehensible, and on
account of its vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable
difficulties.

...

'If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is done
deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between
"enquête judiciaire" and simple police researches. As it desired to
escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if
correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as it
possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the co-operation
of our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in
great number), it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our
demands as impossible.'[176]

It would have been fairer to Servia to assume that there had been a genuine misunderstanding, and that the explanation here given by Austria might prove satisfactory to Servia, as the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested.[177] The persistent refusal of Austria-Hungary to permit any discussion on the basis of the Servian reply goes far to justify Sir Maurice de Bunsen's impression

'that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war
inevitable, that their Government are fully resolved to have war
with Servia, that they consider their position as a Great Power to
be at stake, and that until punishment has been administered to
Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of
mediation'.[178]

Notes:

[Footnote 57: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, No. 2. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 22, 1914.]

[Footnote 58: German White Book, p. 4.]

[Footnote 59: _Correspondence_, No. 10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 24.]

[Footnote 60: _Correspondence_, No. 18. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir E. Grey, July 25.]

[Footnote 61: Ibid. No. 32. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 26. See also German White Book, p. 5.]

[Footnote 62: Ibid. No. 54. M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff, July 15/28, 1914 (communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28).]

[Footnote 63: _Correspondence_, No. 139. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, August 1.]

[Footnote 64: _Ibid_. No. 141. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, August 1.]

[Footnote 65: _Ibid_. No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]

[Footnote 66: _Correspondence_, No. 94. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]

[Footnote 67: German White Book, p. 4 (see _infra_ Appendix I).]

[Footnote 68: _Ibid_. No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold, and Sir R. Rodd, July 26.]

[Footnote 69: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]

[Footnote 70: _Ibid_. No. 60. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]

[Footnote 71: _Ibid_. No. 84. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]

[Footnote 72: p. 8 and Exhibit 12 (see _infra_ Appendix I).]

[Footnote 73: _Correspondence_, No. 11. Sir E. Grey to Sir II. Rumbold, July 24.]

[Footnote 74: _Correspondence_, No. 46. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 27.]

[Footnote 75: Ibid. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]

[Footnote 76: Ibid. No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]

[Footnote 77: Although the German White Book attempts to make out that Russia mobilized on July 26th, it produces no evidence more satisfactory than the information of the German Imperial attaché in Russia, whose account of the Russian military preparations supports only in part the allegations made at Berlin. See German White Book, Exhibits 6 and 7; also _Correspondence_, No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29. For the Austrian decree of general mobilization, see the Russian Orange Book No. 47 (_infra_ in Appendix VI).]

[Footnote 78: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]

[Footnote 79: _Ibid_. No. 76. The same to the same, July 29.]

[Footnote 80: _Correspondence_, No. 78. Sir George Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29, 1914.]

[Footnote 81: German White Book, p. 38, and Exhibit No. 7, July 26.]

[Footnote 82: _Correspondence_, No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28. See also quotation in _Times_ of July 29, p. 8, col. 2, from the _Militär-Wochenblatt_: 'The fighting power of Russia is usually over-estimated, and numbers are far less decisive than _moral_, the higher command, armaments.... All military preparations for war, of whatever sort, have been taken with that attention to detail and that order which marks Germany. It can therefore be said, without exaggeration, that Germany can face the advent of grave events with complete calm, trusting to God and her own might.']

[Footnote 83: _Correspondence_, No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]

[Footnote 84: _Ibid_. No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 30. Cf. Russian Orange Book, Nos. 61, 62 (_infra_ in Appendix VI).]

[Footnote 85: _Ibid_.]

[Footnote 86: _Correspondence_, No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]

[Footnote 87: _Ibid_. No. 113. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]

[Footnote 88: _Ibid_.]

[Footnote 89: _Ibid_. No. 112. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]

[Footnote 90: _Ibid_. No. 113, _ut sup_. On August 1 _The Times_ published a semi-official telegram from Berlin, dated Eydtkuhnen, July 31, that 'the second and third Russian cavalry divisions are on the frontier between Wirballen, Augustof, and Allenstein'.]

[Footnote 91: _Ibid_. No. 111. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 31.]

[Footnote 92: _Ibid_. No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]

[Footnote 93: See German White Book, pp. 12 and 13, and Exhibits 20, 21, 22, 23, 23a (see _infra_ Appendix I).]

[Footnote 94: _Correspondence_, No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]

[Footnote 95: _Ibid_. Nos. 131, 133, 135.]

[Footnote 96: Russian Orange Book, No. 58 (_infra_ Appendix VI).]

[Footnote 97: _Ibid_. No. 133. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 1, encloses a telegram of July 31, to the effect that 'The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.']

[Footnote 98: German White Book, p. 8.]

[Footnote 99: _Ibid_. p. 9, Exhibit No. 17.]

[Footnote 100: _Correspondence_, No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29: 'His Excellency denied German Government had done this. Nevertheless it is true.']

[Footnote 101: Ibid. No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]

[Footnote 102: _Correspondence_. Enclosure 3 in No. 105. French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon.]

[Footnote 103: _Ibid_.]

[Footnote 104: German White Book, p. 48 (see _infra_, Appendix I).]

[Footnote 105: _Correspondence_, No. 138. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, Aug. 1.]

[Footnote 106: _Correspondence_, No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25.]

[Footnote 107: _Correspondence_, No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 27.]

[Footnote 108: _Ibid_. No. 89. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]

[Footnote 109: _Correspondence_, No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29 (received July 29).]

[Footnote 110: _Ibid_. No. 101. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30.]

[Footnote 111: _Correspondence_, No. 109. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]

[Footnote 112: _Ibid_. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]

[Footnote 113: _Correspondence_, No. 114. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir E. Goschen, July 31.]

[Footnote 114: _Ibid_. No. 125. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]

[Footnote 115: _Ibid_. No. 122. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31. It may be observed that by the Hague Convention of 1907, Belgium was bound to impose this embargo after the ultimatum of Germany to Russia (Art. 2).]

[Footnote 116: _Correspondence_, No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 1.]

[Footnote 117: _The Times_, August 28, 1914, p. 9, cols. 5 and 6.]

[Footnote 118: See _The Times_, August 27, 1914. The Imperial Chancellor telegraphed to Prince Lichnowsky: 'Germany is ready to take up the English proposal if England guarantees with her forces the absolute neutrality of France in a Russo-German conflict.... We promise that the French frontier shall not be passed by our troops before 7 p.m. on Monday, August 3, if England's consent is given in the meantime.']

[Footnote 119: _Correspondence_, No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 2.]

[Footnote 120: _Correspondence_, No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir E. Grey, August 2.]

[Footnote 121: _Ibid_. No. 153. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 4.]

[Footnote 122: _Ibid_.]

[Footnote 123: _Ibid_. No. 155. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Villiers, August 4.]

[Footnote 124: _Correspondence_, No. 157. German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, August 4.]

[Footnote 125: _Ibid_. No. 159. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 4.]

[Footnote 126: _Correspondence_, No. 116, July 31.]

[Footnote 127: _Ibid_. Nos. 130, 143, 145.]

[Footnote 128: _Ibid_. Nos. 149, 150, August 2 and 3.]

[Footnote 129: _The Times_, August 11, p. 5, col. 1.]

[Footnote 130: _Thoughts on Various Subjects, Moral and Diverting_ (October, 1706).]

[Footnote 131: p. 6.]

[Footnote 132: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24.]

[Footnote 133: _Ibid_. No. 10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 24. Cf. No. 24, Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25: 'The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian _démarche_ makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilized against each other.']

[Footnote 134: _Ibid_. No. 12. Sir E. Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, July 24.]

[Footnote 135: _Ibid_. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24: 'I said ... direct British interests in Servia were _nil_, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion.']

[Footnote 136: _Correspondence_, No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25.]

[Footnote 137: See note at the end of this chapter.]

[Footnote 138: _Correspondence_, No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 26.]

[Footnote 139: _Ibid_. No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29.]

[Footnote 140: _Ibid_. No. 91. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 29.]

[Footnote 141: _Ibid_. No. 13. Note communicated to Sir E. Grey by the Russian Ambassador, July 25.]

[Footnote 142: _Correspondence_, No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24.]

[Footnote 143: _Ibid_.]

[Footnote 144: _Ibid_. No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30. Cf. No. 119, Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]

[Footnote 145: _Correspondence_, No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]

[Footnote 146: _Ibid_. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24.]

[Footnote 147: _Ibid_. No. 44. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 27: 'Their (sc. the German) attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her (sc. Germany) to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace.']

[Footnote 148: _Ibid_. No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29.]

[Footnote 149: _Correspondence_, No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 27.]

[Footnote 150: _Ibid_. No. 116. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]

[Footnote 151: _Ibid_. No. 89. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]

[Footnote 152: _Correspondence_, No. 95. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 30: 'Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it.']

[Footnote 153: But see Appendix IV.]

[Footnote 154: _Correspondence_, No. 4, p. 8.]

[Footnote 155: _Ibid_. No. 48. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 27.]

[Footnote 156: pp. 3 to 5 and Exhibits 1 and 2 (see _infra_ Appendix I).]

[Footnote 157: _Correspondence_, No. 61, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 28; No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29; No. 96, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]

[Footnote 158: _Correspondence_, No. 110, Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 31; No. 137, Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, August 1.]

[Footnote 159: _The Times_, September 3, p. 7. For Italy's ignorance of the contents of the Austrian note, see App. V.]

[Footnote 160: _Correspondence_, No. 29. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 25.]

[Footnote 161: _Ibid_. No. 49. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27.]

[Footnote 162: _Ibid_. No. 57. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 27. Cf. No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]

[Footnote 163: _Correspondence_, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 28. Cf. _supra_, p. 99.]

[Footnote 164: _Ibid_. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29. Cf. No. 92, Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 29.]

[Footnote 165: _Ibid_. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]

[Footnote 166: _Ibid_. No. 79. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]

[Footnote 167: _Ibid_. No. 152. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 3.]

[Footnote 168: p. 15 (see Appendix I _infra_).]

[Footnote 169: p. 16 (_ibid._).]

[Footnote 170: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24. The text is also given in the German White Book (pp. 18-23), which will be found in Appendix I.]

[Footnote 171: _Ibid_. No. 14. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 25.]

[Footnote 172: _Ibid_. No. 4. Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24.]

[Footnote 173: _Correspondence_, No. 39. Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27. See also German White Book (pp. 23-32), _infra_ in Appendix I.]

[Footnote 174: German White Book, pp. 24 _et sqq_.; see _infra_ Appendix I.]

[Footnote 175: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24.]

[Footnote 176: German White Book, pp. 29 _et sqq_.; see _infra_ Appendix I.]

[Footnote 177: _Correspondence_, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]

[Footnote 178: _Ibid_. No. 41. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]