Chapter I: Front Matter

With the "Die-Hards" in Siberia

By Col. John Ward C.B., C.M.G., M.P.

With Eight Plates

1920

To MY COMRADES

OFFICERS, N.C.O.s AND MEN OF THE 18th, 19th, 25th AND 26th BATTALIONS OF THE MIDDLESEX REGIMENT

who, on sea and land, in sunshine and snow, so worthily upheld the traditional gallantry and honour of their people and country

FORWARD

Originally written for the private use of my sons in case I did not return, this narrative of events connected with the expedition to Siberia must of necessity lack many of the necessary elements which go to make a history. I wrote of things as they occurred, and recorded the reasons and motives which prompted the participants. Many things have happened since which seem to show that we were not always right in our estimate of the forces at work around us. Things are not always what they seem, and this is probably more evident in the domain of Russian affairs than in any other. It would have been comparatively easy to alter the text and square it with the results, but that would have destroyed the main value of the story.

The statesman and the soldier rarely write history; it is their misfortune to make it. It is quite easy to be a prophet when you know the result. You can, as a rule, judge what a certain set of people will do in a certain set of circumstances, but where you deal with State policy which may be influenced by events and circumstances which have not the remotest connection with the question involved, it is impossible to give any forecast of their conduct on even the most elementary subject.

The recent tragic events played out in the vast domain of Siberia are a case in point. It is certain that Admiral Koltchak would never have gone to Siberia, nor have become the head of the constitutional movement and government of Russia, if he had not been advised and even urged to do so by the Allies. He received the most categorical promises of whole-hearted support and early Allied recognition before he agreed to take up the dangerous duty of head of the Omsk Government. Had these urgings and promises been ungrudgingly performed a Constituent Assembly would be now sitting at Moscow hammering out the details of a Federal Constitution for a mighty Russian Republic or a parliamentary system similar to our own.

On the declaration of the Koltchak Government, General Denikin, General Dutoff, General Hovart, and the North Russian Governments made over their authority to Omsk. There was at once a clear issue--the Terrorist at Moscow, the Constitutionalist at Omsk. Had the Allies at this juncture translated their promises into acts, from what untold suffering Russia and Europe might have been saved!

The mere act of recognition would have created a wonderful impression on the Russian mind, in addition to giving the Allies a lever by which they could have guided the course of events and stabilised the Baltic. It would have given security to Russian finance, and enabled trade relations to have commenced with the wealthiest part of the Russian dominions.

The reconstruction of Russia, about which the Allies talk so glibly, would have gone forward with a bound by natural means, which not even Allied bungling could have prevented. The Omsk Government could have got money on better terms than any of the Allies, because, accepted within the comity of nations, it could have given better security than any of them, even including America. Europe would have been fed, Russia would have been clothed, and the world would have been saved from its greatest tragedies. All this and more would have naturally followed from the barest performance of our promises.

We did worse than this. Breach of promise is only a negative crime. The Allies went to the other extreme; their help took the form of positive wilful obstruction. The Japanese, by bolstering up Semianoff and Kalmakoff, and the Americans, by protecting and organising enemies, made it practically impossible for the Omsk Government to maintain its authority or existence. The most that could be expected was that both would see the danger of their policy in time to avert disaster. One did; the other left when the evils created had got beyond control. Koltchak has not been destroyed so much by the acts of his enemies as by the stupidity and neglect of his Allied friends.

As the Bolshevik rabble again sweeps over Siberia in a septic flood we hear again the question: "How can they do so unless they have a majority of the people behind them?" I answer that by asking: "How did a one-man government exist in Russia from 'Ivan the Terrible' to Nicholas II?" Both systems are autocratic; both exist by the same means--"Terror." There is, however, this difference. The autocracy of the Tsars was a natural product from an early form of human society. The Bolshevik autocracy is an unnatural product, and therefore carries within itself the seed of its own destruction. It is an abortion, and unless it rapidly changes its character cannot hope to exist as a permanent form of organised society. It is a disease which, if we cannot attack, we can isolate until convalescence sets in. There is, however, the possibility that the patient during the progress of the malady may become delirious and run amok; for these more dangerous symptoms it would be well for his neighbours to keep watch and guard. This madness can only be temporary. This great people are bound to recover, and become all the stronger for their present trials.

JOHN WARD.

February, 1920.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

1. FROM HONG-KONG TO SIBERIA 2. BOLSHEVIK SUCCESSES 3. JAPAN INTERVENES 4. THE BATTLE OF DUKOVESKOIE AND KRAEVESK 5. JAPANESE METHODS AND ALLIED FAR-EASTERN POLICY 6. ADMINISTRATION 7. FURTHER INCIDENTS OF OUR JOURNEY 8. BEYOND THE BAIKAL 9. OMSK 10. ALONG THE URALS 11. WHAT HAPPENED AT OMSK 12. THE CAPTURE OF PERM: THE CZECHS RETIRE FROM THE FIGHTING 13. THE DECEMBER ROYALIST AND BOLSHEVIST CONSPIRACY 14. A BOMBSHELL FROM PARIS AND THE EFFECT 15. MORE INTRIGUES 16. RUSSIAN LABOUR 17. MY CAMPAIGN 18. OMSK RE-VISITED 19. IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA 20. MAKING AN ATAMAN 21. HOMEWARD BOUND 22. AMERICAN POLICY AND ITS RESULTS 23. JAPANESE POLICY AND ITS RESULTS 24. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

COL. JOHN WARD, C.B., C.M.G., M.P. _Frontispiece_

LANDING OF THE 25TH MIDDLESEX AT VLADIVOSTOK

ALLIED COMMANDERS IN FRONT OF HEADQUARTERS AT VLADIVOSTOK

GEN. DETRIKS (CZECH) AND COL. WARD AFTER THE ALLIED COUNCIL at VLADIVOSTOK

A CONFERENCE OUTSIDE HEADQUARTERS WAGON.

COL. WARD AND THE CZECH LEADER (COL. STEPHAN) EXAMINING THE USSURIE FRONT

BRITISH PARADE AT OMSK

RUSSIAN HEADQUARTERS "STAFFKA," OMSK

BRITISH STAFF AND C.O.'s WAGON

ARRIVAL OF THE BRITISH AT IRKUTSK

ADMIRAL KOLTCHAK

WITH THE "DIE-HARDS" IN SIBERIA