Chapter XIII: The Committee on the Conduct of the War (1)

During the Congressional recess of the autumn of 1861 gross mismanagement led to the annihilation at Ball's Bluff of a brigade of Union troops, led by Senator Edward D. Baker of Oregon. They had been sent across the Potomac in flat-boats and skiffs, were left without adequate support, and, being surrounded by a vastly superior force of rebels, were driven to the edge of the river, and there either killed, wounded, captured, or driven into hiding places along the banks. Their commanding officer, who displayed throughout a high order of personal courage, was shot at the head of his line before the final rout. General Baker was a man of eloquence and many gallant qualities, and his death created a profound impression; that he was sacrificed by military incapacity cannot be doubted.

Congress met on Dec. 2, 1861, and on the first business day of the session Mr. Chandler offered a motion for the expulsion of John C. Breckenridge, who had at last joined the rebels, and it was unanimously adopted. On December 5 he introduced this resolution:

_Resolved_, That a committee of three be appointed to inquire into
the disasters at Bull Run and Edward's Ferry (subsequently changed
to Ball's Bluff), with power to send for persons and papers.

Mr. Chandler said, in explanation of his motion, that these reverses had been attributed to politicians, to civilians, to everything but the right cause, and that it was due to the Senate and to the country that they should be investigated and that the blame should rest where it belonged. After some discussion the Senate adopted the resolution with only three dissenting votes, first amending it by providing for a joint committee of both branches, and by enlarging the scope of its inquiries so as to include "the conduct of the war." The House concurred in the action, and the famous "Committee on the Conduct of the War" was thus created. On December 17, Mr. Chandler moved that the Vice-President should appoint the Senate members, adding: "I do not know what the parliamentary usage may be in a case of this kind. If that usage would give me the position of chairman, I wish to say that, under the circumstances, I do not wish to accept it." Mr. Chandler had also privately requested Mr. Hamlin to appoint Senator Wade to the chairmanship, saying it was important that a lawyer should be given that place, and his desires were followed in both respects. The first committee, as announced at that time, consisted of the following Congressmen: On the part of the Senate, Benjamin F. Wade, Zachariah Chandler and Andrew Johnson; on the part of the House, Daniel W. Gooch of Massachusetts, John Covode of Pennsylvania, George W. Julian of Indiana, and Moses F. Odell of New York. Of the original committee, George W. Julian is the only one who survived Mr. Chandler. When Andrew Johnson was appointed Military Governor of Tennessee, he resigned his position upon the committee, and Senator Joseph A. Wright of Indiana took his place. Mr. Wright served but a year, and after the expiration of his term the Senate branch of the committee in the Thirty-seventh Congress consisted of only Mr. Chandler and Mr. Wade. William Blair Lord, now one of the official reporters of the House of Representatives, was appointed its clerk and stenographer.

The tone of the Congressional discussion upon Mr. Chandler's proposition shows that this was regarded as an exceedingly important step, for the resolution clothed the committee with powers of very unusual magnitude, which, if abused, must have seriously embarrassed the Administration. Mr. Lincoln and Secretary Cameron, as well as General Scott and General McClellan, opposed its appointment at the outset, but Mr. Chandler took prompt and successful measures to assure the President that, if the plans of its projectors were carried out, the committee would be used only to strengthen the hands of the Executive, and promised that it should be made a help and not a hindrance to the vigorous prosecution of the war. On this point the Hon. James M. Edmunds, who was thoroughly informed as to the secret history of that period, has said:

The writer knows that the Administration was not without fear
that this was an unfriendly measure. A member of the Cabinet
expressed such fears to him, and said that the President had not
only expressed doubts as to the wisdom of the movement, but also
fears that the committee might, by unfriendly action, greatly
embarrass the Executive. On being told by the writer that the
measure was not so intended, but, on the contrary, that it was the
intention of the mover to bring the committee to the aid of the
Administration, he expressed much gratification, and said it was
of the utmost importance to bring such purpose to the knowledge
of the President in some authoritative way, and at the earliest
moment possible. This conversation was at once reported to Senator
Chandler, whereupon both he and Senator Wade went immediately to
the President and the Secretary of War, and assured them that it
was their purpose to bring the whole power of the committee to the
aid of the Executive. From this moment the most cordial relations
existed between the committee and the Administration.[22]

President Lincoln and Secretaries Cameron and Stanton ultimately placed great reliance upon the committee, and constantly, throughout the war, it gave them the most valuable assistance. Mr. Wade and Mr. Chandler were deeper in the confidence of Secretary Stanton, from their connection with it, than were any other members of Congress, and differences of aim and opinion between them were exceedingly rare.

Upon organizing for work the committee found itself confronted with an enormous task, inquiries into every phase of the organization and management of the Union armies being referred to it for consideration. "Upon the conduct of the war," to quote from its own report, "depended the issue of the experiment inaugurated by our fathers, after the expenditure of so much blood and treasure--the establishment of a nation founded upon the capacity of man for self-government. The nation was engaged in a struggle for its existence; a rebellion, unparalleled in history, threatened the overthrow of our free institutions, and the most prompt and vigorous measures were demanded by every consideration of honor, patriotism, and a due regard for the prosperity and happiness of the people." And its sphere of duty was the constant watching of the details of movements, upon whose result depended such vast interests, as well as the safety of thousands of lives. The committee, in laying out its work, followed the suggestion of Mr. Chandler, which was, first, to obtain such information in respect to the conduct of the war as would best enable them to point out the mistakes which had been made in the past, and the course that promised to ensure the avoidance of their repetition; second, to collect such information as the many and laborious duties of the President and Secretary of War prevented them from obtaining, and to lay it before them with those recommendations and suggestions which the circumstances seemed to demand. Working in such a field, the committee soon became a second Cabinet council, and its proceedings were constantly at the President's hand. Its sessions were nearly perpetual, and almost daily its members were in consultation with the President or the Secretary of War. Many of its transactions were never committed to paper, and, as the members were sworn to the strictest secrecy, will never be revealed. Secretary Stanton was frequently present while the committee was in session, and its door was always open to him. There was never any lack of harmony between him and its chief members, but, on the contrary, the utmost confidence was exchanged, and this committee was the right arm of the War Department in the darkest days of the rebellion. Repeatedly, after the examination of some important witness, did Mr. Chandler or Mr. Wade go at once to the White House with the official stenographer, when Mr. Stanton would be sent for and the stenographic notes of the evidence would be read to the President and Secretary of War for their information and guidance. From such conferences there sprang many important decisions, and the files and records of the committee were constantly referred to and relied upon as sources of exceedingly useful knowledge and hints both at the White House and at the War Department.

Many subjects presented themselves for investigation, any one of which would, in ordinary times, have required the exclusive attention of a separate committee, and to follow out every line of inquiry suggested was manifestly a practical impossibility. Therefore the committee decided not to undertake any investigations into what might be considered side issues, but to keep their attention directed entirely to the essential features of the war, so that they could ascertain and comprehend the necessities of the armies and the causes of disaster or complaint, and the methods of supplying the one and remedying the other. Attempts were made repeatedly to use its power to punish enemies or to avenge private grievances, but its members adhered resolutely to the straightforward course originally marked out as the path of its duty.

The first subject which the committee carefully inquired into was the defeat at Bull Run. Many witnesses were examined, chiefly officers who were engaged in the battle--Generals Scott, McDowell, Meigs, Heintzelman, Butterfield, Fitz-John Porter, and others. The testimony was very voluminous, but the committee reached an early and unanimous opinion as to the causes of the disaster. Their report, written by Mr. Wade, said: "That which now appears to have been the great error was the failure to occupy Centreville and Manassas at the time Alexandria was occupied, in May. The position at Manassas controlled the railroad connections in all that section of the country.... The next cause of disaster was the delay in proceeding against the enemy until the time of the three months' men was nearly expired. The enemy were allowed time to collect their forces and strengthen their position by defensive works.... There had been but little time devoted to disciplining the troops and instructing them, even in regiments; hardly any instruction had been given them in brigade movements, and none at all as divisions." General McDowell prepared a plan of campaign, which was approved by the Cabinet, and the 9th of July was fixed upon as the day for the advance; but the movement did not commence until a week later than the appointed time. Transportation was deficient, and there was much delay resulting from lack of discipline among the troops, and when the battle came the Union forces were fatigued and not in good fighting condition. "But," said the report, "the principal cause of the defeat was the failure of General Patterson to hold the troops of General Johnston in the valley of the Shenandoah." Patterson had 23,000 men, while Johnston had but 12,000. Still, Patterson disobeyed the orders of General Scott, which were to make offensive demonstrations against General Johnston so as to detain his army at Winchester, and if he retreated to follow him and keep up the fight. Those orders were repeated every day for more than a week in the telegraphic correspondence between Scott and Patterson. Finally, General Scott heard of a large force moving from Patterson's front, and telegraphed, "Has not the enemy stolen a march on you?" To this Patterson replied, "The enemy has stolen no march upon me," while at that very time his large army was watching an empty camp and Johnston was far on his way to reinforce the rebels at Manassas. Patterson did not discover that Johnston had gone until he was miles distant, and the consequence was that McDowell had both Beauregard and Johnston to fight, while Patterson, with 23,000 men, was lying idle in his camp. This is the substance of the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War on the battle of Bull Run, and was the official announcement to the country of the inefficiency of the organization and generalship of the Army of the Potomac.

But before the committee was organized the men who were responsible for this failure had been displaced, and General McClellan had been made the commander-in-chief. He had taken the reins of authority amid national acclamations, and was then at the height of a remarkable popularity, which it is now known was adroitly stimulated for political purposes by the conservative press. But on the investigation into the second subject taken up by the committee (the disaster at Edward's Ferry or Ball's Bluff) facts came to the knowledge of its members which created the suspicion in their minds that General Stone, who was charged with the blame of that defeat, and who, as the scape-goat, was arrested and imprisoned in Fort Lafayette, was not alone responsible for the calamity, but that the real fault would be found higher up. This suspicion they were never able to substantiate by absolute proof, and it was not expressed in any of their reports.

The third topic taken up by the committee was the military management of the Western Department, under General Fremont. This was an inquiry of special importance, for the reason that that officer, upon taking command at St. Louis, issued a proclamation declaring free all slaves whose masters were engaged in rebellion against the United States. This order caused a great excitement throughout the country, and the Republican party was widely divided in opinion as to its legality and propriety. President Lincoln was conservative on the question, and revoked the Fremont order, much to the disappointment of Mr. Chandler and the other more "advanced" Republicans. Hence the committee approached the subject with unusual interest, and, after a thorough investigation, made an elaborate report. That part of this document which relates to General Fremont's order in regard to slaves was signed by Messrs. Wade, Chandler, Julian, and Covode, and showed the ground on which these gentlemen then stood with regard to emancipation; it was as follows:

But that feature of General Fremont's administration which
attracted the most attention, and which will ever be most prominent
among the many points of interest connected with the history of
that department, is his proclamation of emancipation. Whatever
opinion may be entertained with reference to the time when the
policy of emancipation should be inaugurated, there can be no doubt
that General Fremont at that early day rightly judged in regard
to the most effective means of subduing this rebellion. In proof
of that, it is only necessary to state that his successor, when
transferred to another department, issued a proclamation embodying
the same principle, and the President of the United States has
since applied the same principle to all the rebellious States; and
few will deny that it must be adhered to until the last vestige of
treason and rebellion is destroyed.

The committee heartily endorsed General Fremont's administration, declaring it to have been "eminently characterized by earnestness, ability, and the most unquestionable loyalty." They also examined into various minor military matters and movements, including, particularly, rebel barbarities and the return of slaves to their masters by the army.

It was as a member of the Committee on the Conduct of the War in the Thirty-seventh Congress, and from the evidence taken in its inquiries, that Mr. Chandler obtained the mass of information which enabled him to make the most important of his war speeches, that of July 16, 1862, in which he exposed so conclusively General McClellan's utter incompetence. Ample as was the foundation of facts upon which rested this effective arraignment of conspicuous incapacity, the attack was one requiring genuine boldness, for it defiantly invited a storm of denunciation and, if it had failed of justification by the event, would have certainly ended its maker's political career. Notwithstanding his tardiness, his timidity, his inefficiency as a commander in the field, and his political sympathy with the more unpatriotic classes of the Northern people, General McClellan was still strong with the people and entrusted with great powers. The Democracy warmly commended his sentiments and methods, and labored incessantly to prevent any diminution of his hold upon the public confidence. The Army of the Potomac yet regarded him as "the young Napoleon," and its corps commanders were, with but few exceptions, his personal adherents. The long-suffering President was submitting with patience to his unjust complaints, after having labored incessantly to stimulate into activity his chronic sluggishness, fearful, with characteristic over-caution, lest his summary removal should divide the North and breed a dangerous disaffection in the face of the enemy among his troops. Many who did not believe in the sincerity or ability of the man also smothered their distrust, for fear that criticism would only weaken the common cause and with the hope that even in his nerveless hands the mighty weapon of the national resources would at last fall--even if by its own weight only--on the enemy with decisive force. At this juncture, and under these circumstances, Mr. Chandler, with characteristic vigor of statement and plainness of speech, placed before the Senate and the country the demonstration of McClellan's imbecility.

Originally Mr. Chandler believed that McClellan's selection as the practical successor of General Scott was a wise one, and hoped to see his organizing capacity in camp supplemented by enterprise and courage in the field. Distrust first sprang up with the persistent inaction of the Army of the Potomac throughout the last months of 1861, and it was strengthened by contact with the man himself and the study of his character and his plans. An illustration of how this change of opinion was brought about is given in an incident which occurred in the room of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. That committee sent for General McClellan as soon as they took up matters relating to his command, in order to consult with him informally as to the situation. This was in January, 1861, while he was in Washington "organizing" his army, and while there was no little impatience felt because he did not move. He was not formally summoned before the committee then, but simply called in for general consultation. After the regular business was finished, Mr. Chandler asked him bluntly why he did not attack the rebels. General McClellan replied that it was because there were not sufficient means of communication with Washington; he then called attention to the fact that there were only two bridges and no other means of transportation across the Potomac.

Mr. Chandler asked what the number of bridges had to do with an advance movement, and McClellan explained with much detail that it was one of the most important features of skillful strategy that a commander should have plenty of room to retreat before making an attack. To this Mr. Chandler's response was:

"General McClellan, if I understand you correctly, before you strike at the rebels you want to be sure of plenty of room so that you can run in case they strike back!"

"Or in case you get scared," added Senator Wade.

The commander of the Army of the Potomac manifested indignation at this blunt way of putting the case, and then proceeded at length to explain the art of war and the science of generalship, laying special stress upon the necessity of having lines of retreat, as well as lines of communication and supply, always open. He labored hard to make clear all the methods and counter-methods upon which campaigns are managed and battles fought, and, as he was an accomplished master of the theory of war, succeeded in rendering himself at least interesting. After he had concluded, Mr. Wade said:

"General, you have all the troops you have called for, and if you haven't enough, you shall have more. They are well organized and equipped, and the loyal people of this country expect that you will make a short and decisive campaign. Is it really necessary for you to have more bridges over the Potomac before you move?"

"Not that," was the answer, "not that exactly, but we must bear in mind the necessity of having everything ready in case of a defeat, and keep our lines of retreat open."

With this remark General McClellan left the room, whereupon Mr. Wade asked:

"Chandler, what do you think of the science of generalship?"

"I don't know much about war," was the reply, "but it seems to me that this is infernal, unmitigated cowardice."

The committee, after this interview, made a careful inquiry into the strength of the rebel forces confronting the elaborate intrenchments about Washington, and became convinced that the army at and about Manassas was a handful compared with the magnificent body of troops under McClellan's command. They submitted these facts to the President and his Cabinet at a special session held for that purpose, and urged the importance of an instant advance. With one single exception (a Cabinet officer) the heads of the departments and the committee agreed that an offensive movement from the line of the Potomac into Virginia was important and must be made. General McClellan promised that his army should start, but it did not. Toward the close of the winter the President ordered a general advance, but the Army of the Potomac still remained immobile. Finally, on March 10, under the peremptory orders of the President, it did advance to Centreville and found there deserted camps, wooden guns, weak intrenchments, and traces of the retreat of not more than a single full corps of rebel troops. It was during this most aggravating delay that members of the committee had another characteristic interview with General McClellan. On the 19th of February a sub-committee waited upon the Secretary of War[23] to ask why the army was idle, and why the city of Washington and the North side of the Potomac river were crowded with troops when the enemy was all in Virginia. Mr. Wade said that it was a disgrace to the nation that Washington was thus allowed to remain to all intents and purposes in a state of siege. To this Secretary Stanton replied that the committee could not feel more keenly upon this subject than did he, that he did not go to bed at night without his cheek burning with shame at this disgrace, and that the subject had received his earnest attention, but he had not been able to change the situation as he wished. General McClellan was then sent for, and Secretary Stanton stated to him the object of the visit, and repeated the inquiries as to why an advance movement was not made into Virginia, the rebels driven away from Washington, and the soldiers who were idle in their camps in and around the city sent to active duty.

General McClellan answered that he was considering the matter, but that instant action was impossible, although he hoped that he would soon be able to decide what ought to be done. The committee asked what time he would require to reach a decision. He replied that it depended upon circumstances; that he would not give his consent to have the troops about Washington sent over to the Virginia side of the Potomac without having their rear protected more fully, and better lines of retreat open; that he designed throwing a temporary bridge across the river as soon as possible, and making a permanent structure of it at his leisure. That would make three bridges, and then the requisite precautions would be completed.

Mr. Wade replied, with great impatience, that with 150,000 of the best troops the world ever saw, there was no need of more bridges; that the rebels were inferior in numbers and condition, and that retreat would be treason. "These 150,000 men," Mr. Wade said, "could whip the whole Confederacy if they were given a chance; if I was their commander I would lead them across the Potomac, and they should not come back until they had won a victory and the war was ended, or they came in their coffins." Mr. Wade spoke strongly and plainly throughout the interview, and the Secretary of War endorsed every word he uttered. The committee had another conference with Secretary Stanton on the following day at his residence, at which it was decided that they should co-operate with him in an effort to persuade President Lincoln either to displace McClellan or to compel him to commence an active campaign at once. On the 25th of February this conference with the President was held, and it was followed by others, Senators Chandler and Wade finally threatening to make the laggardness of the commander of the Army of the Potomac a subject of debate in the Senate, and to offer a resolution directing the President to order an advance forthwith. The first result was what the committee were so anxious to accomplish. In March, the armies commenced to move, and McClellan, at last taking the field in person, pushed out to Centreville, and then followed up this delayed advance by his flank movement to the Peninsula, driving the rebels out of Yorktown by a month's work with the shovel, and following General Johnston up to Williamsburg, where a bloody victory was won, but its fruits were left ungathered. This campaign was short, bloody, and blundering, ending with the battle of Malvern Hill, which was also deprived of its proper importance by McClellan's failure to follow up his advantage with a prompt advance upon Richmond, and which thus in the end amounted to but little more than another Union reverse. Mr. Chandler always firmly believed that had McClellan moved toward the rebel capital and not toward his gunboats after Malvern Hill, the war would have been shortened by two years.

When it first became evident that General McClellan was, by sullenness and incapacity, throwing away advantages gained by the heroism of his troops on the Peninsula, Mr. Chandler determined to denounce him on the floor of the Senate, but was restrained by Mr. Stanton, who urged that, while the campaign was still in active progress, there was yet some hope of a change for the better, and that to destroy confidence in a commanding officer under such circumstances might injure the army in the field. After Malvern Hill these reasons ceased to have force, and Mr. Chandler commenced the careful preparation of his speech. This time the Secretary of War endorsed the timeliness as well as the truth of the _expose_, and the Committee on the Conduct of the War by formal vote authorized the use of the testimony taken before it and not yet made public. After he had gathered and grouped the facts which formed the basis of his arraignment, Mr. Chandler submitted them to a friend upon whose good judgment and sincerity he greatly relied, and asked:

"Knowing all these facts, as I do, what is my duty?"

The answer was: "Beyond all question, these facts ought to be laid before the country, for the knowledge of them is essential to its safety. But they will create a storm that will sweep either you or McClellan from public life, and it is more than probable that you will be the victim."

Mr. Chandler said: "I did not ask your opinion of the consequences, but of my duty."

To this it was replied: "The speech ought to be made, and no one else will make it."

Mr. Chandler simply said: "It will be made to-day; come and hear it." And he did make it, in the midst of a running discussion on a bill "to provide for the discharge of state prisoners and others," which was the special order in the Senate for that day (July 16, 1862).

Mr. Chandler commenced by briefly reciting the history of the appointment of the committee, and then gave from the evidence taken at its sessions a compact summary of the causes of the Bull Run disaster, fortifying each point with citations from the testimony. After closing this part of his speech he proceeded to review the Ball's Bluff catastrophe, saying:

Were the people discouraged, depressed? Not at all. Untold
thousands rushed into the shattered ranks, eager to wipe out
the stain and stigma of that defeat (Bull Run). From the East,
the West, the North, and the Middle States, thousands and tens
of thousands and hundreds of thousands came pouring in, until
the government said, "Hold, enough." The Army of the Potomac,
denuded in August of three-months' men and scarcely numbering
50,000 efficient men, swelled in September to over 100,000, in
October to 150,000, in November to 175,000 and upward, until,
on the 10th day of December, the morning rolls showed 195,400
men, and thirteen regiments not reported, chiefly intended for
the Burnside expedition, but all under the command of General
McClellan. During the months of October, November, and December,
the weather was delightful and the roads fine. The question began
to be asked in October, when will the advance take place? All had
the most unbounded confidence in the army and its young general,
and were anxiously waiting for a Napoleonic stroke. It came, but
such a stroke! That a general movement was being prepared the
whole country had known for weeks; but when the terrific blow was
to be struck no one knew save the commander of the Army of the
Potomac. The nation believed in its young commander; the President
relied upon him, and all, myself included, had the most unbounded
confidence in the result of the intended movement. It came! On the
21st of October, McCall's division, 12,000 strong, was ordered
to Drainesville upon a reconnoissance. Smith's division, 12,000
strong, was ordered to support him. McCall's reconnoissance
extended four miles beyond Drainesville, and to within nine miles
of Leesburg. Stone, on Sunday, was informed of McCall's and Smith's
advance, and directed to make a slight demonstration upon Leesburg.
How? He could do it in but one way, and that was by crossing the
river and moving upon it. [Mr. Chandler here introduced a mass of
testimony and official orders to show that Col. E. D. Baker, whom
General Stone sent across the Potomac at Ball's Bluff, had ample
reasons to believe that he would be sustained in that advance,
and reinforced if necessary. He proceeded:] Thus it is shown that
Colonel Baker had reason to expect reinforcements, for the enemy
were to be pushed upon their flank by General Gorman.

At two o'clock on Monday morning Colonel Devens crossed the river
upon a reconnoissance with 400 men at Ball's Bluff, opposite
Harrison's Island, as directed by General Stone. At daylight
Colonel Baker was ordered to cross to the support of Colonel
Devens. I have read his orders. One scow and two small boats were
their only means of transportation. At eight o'clock on Monday
morning the fight commenced by Colonel Devens, and Colonel Baker
was placed in command, as is alleged, with discretionary orders.
Colonel Baker knew that Smith and McCall were at Drainesville,
or within striking distance, that our troops were crossing at
Edward's Ferry, or, in other words, that 40,000 effective men
were within twelve miles of him, and that at least 30,000 were
upon the Virginia side of the Potomac, and that, in the nature of
things, he must be reinforced. He did not know that at half-past
ten A.M., of Monday, or two and one-half hours after Colonel Devens
commenced the fight, the divisions of Smith and McCall commenced
their retreat by the express orders of General McClellan. He knew
that Colonel Devens was contending with greatly superior forces,
and, like a gallant soldier as he was, he hastened to his relief
with all the force he could cross with his inadequate means of
transportation.

Colonel Baker has been charged with imprudence and rashness; but
neither the facts nor the testimony support the charge. Instead
of rashly or imprudently advancing into the enemy's lines, as
was alleged, he did not move ten rods from the Bluff, and the
only sustaining witness to this charge was one officer, who swore
that he thought Colonel Baker imprudently exposed himself to the
enemy's bullets. This kind of rashness is usually pardoned after
the death of the perpetrator. At two o'clock P. M. Colonel Baker
found himself in command of about 1,800 men upon Ball's Bluff,
including Devens's men and three guns, and the fighting commenced.
The alternatives were fight and conquer, surrender, or be captured.
That noble band of heroes and their gallant commander understood
these terrible alternatives as well upon that bloody field as we
do now, and nobly did they vindicate their manhood. During all
those long hours, from two o'clock P. M. until the early dusk of
evening, the gallant Baker continued the unequal contest, when he
fell pierced by three bullets and instantly expired. A council
of war was called (after the frightful death-struggle over his
lifeless remains and for them), and it was decided that the only
chance of an escape was by cutting through the enemy and reaching
Edward's Ferry, which was at once decided upon; but, while
forming for the desperate encounter, the enemy rushed upon our
little band of heroes in overpowering numbers, and the rout was
perfect.... How many were killed in battle, how many drowned in
the relentless river, will never be correctly known; suffice it
to say, our little force was destroyed. Why was this little band
permitted to be destroyed by a force little more than double its
numbers in presence of 40,000 splendid troops? Why were McCall and
Smith ordered back at the very moment that Baker was ordered to
cross? If we wanted Leesburg, McCall could have taken it without
the loss of a man, as his movement in mass had already caused its
evacuation, and the enemy did not return in force until after
McCall had retreated. If we did not wish to capture Leesburg, why
did we cross at all? Of what use is "a slight demonstration" even,
without results? These are questions which the people will ask,
and no man can satisfactorily answer. Why were not reinforcements
sent from Edward's Ferry to Colonel Baker? The distance was only
three-and-a-half miles. We had 1,500 men across at two o'clock on
Monday, and the universal concurrent testimony of officers and men
is that a reinforcement of even 1,000 men--some say 500, and one
gallant captain swears that with 100 men he could have struck them
upon the flank,--would have changed the result of the day. Why were
not reinforcements sent? Stone swears, as I have already shown,
that there were batteries between Edward's Ferry and Ball's Bluff
which would have utterly destroyed any force he could have sent to
Baker's relief, and that Baker knew it. But Stone was not sustained
by a single witness; on the contrary, all swear that there were
not, to their knowledge, and that they did not believe there were
any, and a civilian living upon the spot, and in the habit of
passing over the ground frequently, swears there were none; and
again, Stone, when questioned as to the erection of forts under the
range of his guns upon his second examination, swears positively
that there is not a gun now between Edward's Ferry and Ball's
Bluff, and never has been. Why, then, were not reinforcements sent
from Edward's Ferry? Let the men who executed and planned this
horrible slaughter answer to God and an outraged country. General
Banks swears that his orders were such from General McClellan,
that, upon his arrival at Edward's Ferry, although his judgment was
against crossing, he did not feel himself at liberty to decline
crossing, and he remained upon the Virginia side until Thursday....
So much for the wholesale murder at Ball's Bluff.

Mr. Chandler next attacked General McClellan's disastrous procrastination. Describing the lapse of an army of 150,000 men into a state of chronic inaction in its intrenchments about Washington after the Ball's Bluff disaster, he laid before the Senate and the country documents which proved these facts: In October, 1861, the Navy Department requested that 4,000 men might be detailed to hold Matthias Point on the lower Potomac, after the gunboats should have shelled out the rebels, who were then in possession, and thus in control of the navigation of that important river. General McClellan agreed to furnish the infantry; twice the Navy Department prepared its vessels for the expedition, but the troops did not report for duty, so that, finally, the gunboats were necessarily detailed for other service, and the unnecessary, expensive and humiliating blockade of the Potomac continued for months. Mr. Chandler then proceeded:

Why was this disgrace so long submitted to? No man knows or
attempts to explain. Month after month one of the most splendid
armies the world had ever seen, of 200,000 men, permitted itself
and the national capital to be besieged by a force _never_
exceeding one-half its own number.

During the month of December, the nation became impatient. The
time had arrived and passed when we were promised a forward
movement. The roads were good, the weather splendid, the army
in high condition, and eager for the fray. How long the roads
and weather would permit the movement, no man could predict;
still there was no movement. The generals, with great unanimity,
declared that the army had reached its maximum of proficiency
as volunteers, but still there was no movement. Under these
circumstances, the Committee on the Conduct of the War asked an
interview with the President and Cabinet, and urged that the winter
should not be permitted to pass without action, as it would lead
to an incalculable loss of life and treasure by forcing our brave
troops into a summer campaign, in a hot and to them inhospitable
climate. The President and Cabinet were united in the desire that
an immediate advance should be made, but it was not made, although
we were assured by General McClellan that it would be very soon,
that he had no intention of going into winter quarters, and he did
not! While the enemy erected comfortable huts at Centreville and
Manassas for their winter quarters, our brave and eager troops
spent the most uncomfortable winter ever known in this climate
under canvas, as thousands and tens of thousands of invalid
soldiers throughout the length and breadth of the land will attest.
Why did not the army move in all December, or why did it not go
into winter quarters? No man knows, nor is any reason assigned.

On the 1st day of January, 1862, and for months previous to that
date, the armies of the republic were occupying a purely defensive
position upon the whole line from Missouri to the Atlantic, until
on or about the 27th of January the President and Secretary of War
issued the order forward. Then the brave Foote took the initiative,
soliciting 2,000 men from Halleck to hold Fort Henry after he had
captured it with his gunboats. They were promptly furnished, and
Henry fell; then Donelson, with its 15,000 prisoners; then Newbern,
and the country was electrified. Credit was given where credit was
due. Do-nothing strategy gave way to an "immediate advance upon
the enemy's works," and the days of spades and pickaxes seemed
to be ended. On the 22d of February a forward movement upon our
whole line was ordered, but did not take place. The Army of the
Potomac was not ready; but on the 10th of March it moved, against
the protest of the commanding general and eight out of twelve of
the commanders of divisions; but the President was inexorable, and
the movement must be made. It proceeded to Centreville, and there
found deserted huts, wooden artillery, and intrenchments which
could and can be successfully charged by cavalry. It proceeded
to Manassas, and found no fortifications worthy of the name,
a deserted, abandoned camp, and dead horses for trophies. The
enemy, less than 40,000 men, had leisurely escaped, carrying away
all their artillery, baggage, arms, and stores. Our Army of the
Potomac, on that 10th day of March, showed by its muster-roll a
force of 230,000 men. Comment is needless! The Grand Army of the
Potomac proceeded toward Gordonsville, found no enemy, repaired the
railroad, and then marched back again.

Why this Grand Army of the Potomac did not march upon Richmond has
never been satisfactorily explained, and probably never will be.
One reason assigned was lack of transportation; but there were two
railroads, one by way of Acquia Creek and Fredericksburg, the
other via Manassas and Gordonsville, which could have been repaired
at the rate of ten miles per day, and our army was ample to guard
it. Had this overwhelming force proceeded directly to Richmond by
these lines, it would have spent the 1st day of May in Richmond,
and ere this the rebellion would have been ended. This grand army,
_ably_ commanded, was superior to any army the world has seen for
five hundred years. Napoleon I. never fought 130,000 men upon
one battle-field. Yet this noble army was divided and virtually
sacrificed by some one. Who is the culprit?

Before the advance upon Manassas, General McClellan changed his
plans, and demanded to be permitted to leave the enemy intrenched
at Centreville and Manassas; to leave the Potomac blockaded, and
to take his army to Annapolis by land, and there embark them for
the rear of the enemy to surprise him. In the council of war
called upon this proposition, the commanding general and eight out
of twelve of the commanders of divisions (and here permit me to
say that I am informed that seven out of the eight generals were
appointed upon the recommendation of General McClellan) voted that
it was not safe to advance upon the wooden guns of Centreville, and
to adopt the new plan of campaign. The President and the Secretary
of War overruled this pusillanimous decision, and compelled
McClellan to "move immediately upon the enemy's works." He marched,
and the trophies of that memorable campaign are known to the Senate
and the country.

At Fairfax, General McClellan changed his plan and decided not to
advance upon the rebels with his whole force, but to return to
Alexandria, divide his army, and embark for Fortress Monroe and
Yorktown. It was decided that 45,000 men should be left for the
defense of the capital, and he was permitted to embark. After much
delay (unavoidable in the movement of so vast a force, with its
enormous material) the general-in-chief himself embarked. Soon
after he sailed it came to the knowledge of the Committee on the
Conduct of the War that the capital, with its vast accumulation
of material of war, had been left by General McClellan virtually
without defense, and the enemy's whole force, large or small, was
untouched in front. [Mr. Chandler here introduced the official
testimony to prove that General McClellan had so denuded Washington
as to compel the President to interpose and detain General
McDowell's corps for its adequate defense. He then said:] The
country has been deceived. It has been led to believe that the
Secretary of War or somebody else has interfered with General
McClellan's plans, when he had an army that could have crushed any
other army on the face of the earth. One hundred and fifty-eight
thousand of the best troops that ever stood on God's footstool were
sent down to the Peninsula and placed under command of General
McClellan; and yet the whole treasonable press of the country has
been howling after the Secretary of War because of his alleged
refusal to send reinforcements to General McClellan. As I said the
other day, he has sent every man, every sabre, every bayonet, every
horse, that could be spared from any source whatever to increase
that grand army under General McClellan in front of Richmond. Why
did he not enter Richmond? We shall see.... It is not for me, sir,
to state the strength of McClellan's army at this time; but I know
it is 158,000 men, less the number lost by sickness and casualties.
Does any man doubt that this army, ably handled, was sufficiently
strong to have captured Richmond and crushed the rebel army? I
think not, if promptly led against the enemy; but instead of that,
it sat down in malarious swamps and awaited the drafting, arming,
drilling, and making soldiers of an army to fight it, and in the
meantime our own army was rapidly wasting away. Unwholesome water,
inadequate food, overwork, and sleeping in marshes, were rapidly
filling the hospitals, and overloading the return boats with the
sick. Sir, we have lost more men by the spade than the bullet,
five to one, since the army started from Yorktown under McClellan.
Had the soldiers been relieved from digging and menial labor by
the substitution of negro laborers, the Army of the Potomac would
to-day, in my estimation, contain 30,000 more brave and efficient
soldiers than it does. Had it been relieved from guarding the
property of rebels in arms, many valuable lives would have been
saved. Yorktown was evacuated after a sacrifice of more men by
sickness than the enemy had in their works when our army landed at
Fortress Monroe. The battle of Williamsburg was fought by a small
fraction of our army, and the enemy routed. During the battle,
General McClellan wrote a dispatch, miles from the field of battle,
saying he should try to "hold them in check" there.... He would try
to "hold them in check!" He could not hold them. He could not stop
his eager troops from chasing them. After a small fraction of his
army had whipped their entire force and had been chasing them for
hours, he penned that dispatch and sent it to the Secretary of War,
and, if I remember aright, it was read in one of the two houses of
Congress. As you may suppose from that dispatch, there was no great
eagerness in following up that victory. Three Michigan regiments
were not only decimated, they were divided in twain, in that
bloody battle at Williamsburg. They fought there all day without
reinforcements. One Michigan regiment went into the trenches and
left sixty-three dead rebels, killed by the bayonet, weltering in
their blood. But who has ever heard, by any official communication
from the head of the army, that a Michigan regiment was in the
fight at Williamsburg? I do not blame him for not giving credit
where credit is due, for I do not believe he knew anything more of
that fight than you or I.

When that battle was fought and won, all the enemy's works were
cleared away, and we had an open road to Richmond. There was not a
single fortification between Richmond and Williamsburg. All we had
to do was to get through those infernal swamps, march up, and take
possession of Richmond. What did we do? We found the worst swamp
there was between Richmond and Williamsburg, and sat right down
in the center of it and went to digging. We sacrificed thousands
and tens of thousands of the bravest troops that ever stood on
the face of God's earth, digging in front of no intrenchments, and
before a whipped army of the enemy. We waited for them to recruit;
we waited for them to get another army. They had a levy _en masse_.
They were taking all the men and boys between the ages of fifteen
and fifty-five, and magnanimously we waited weeks and weeks and
weeks for them to bring these forced levies into some sort of
consistency as an army. The battle of Fair Oaks was fought. There
the enemy found again a little fraction of our army, very much
less than half, and they brought out their entire force. I have it
from the best authority that they had not a solitary regiment in
or about Richmond that was fit to put in front of an enemy that
they did not bring to Fair Oaks and hurl upon our decimated army.
Again the indomitable bravery of our troops (of the men, of private
soldiers, the indomitable energy of Michigan men and New Jersey
men--but I will not particularize, for all the troops fought like
lions), and the fighting capacity of our army not only saved it
from being utterly destroyed by an overwhelming force, but gave us
a triumphant victory. The enemy went back to Richmond pell-mell.
I have been informed by a man who was there at the time, that two
brigades of fresh troops could have chased the whole Confederate
army through the city of Richmond and into the James river, so
utter was their rout and confusion.

And what did we do then? We found another big swamp, and we sat
down in the center of it and went to digging. We began to throw up
intrenchments when there were no intrenchments in our front, no
enemy that was not utterly broken. We never took advantage of the
battle of Fair Oaks. Again Michigan soldiers were cut to pieces
by hundreds. Go into the Judiciary square hospital in this city,
and you will find more than half the occupants are Michigan men
who were shot at Fair Oaks and Williamsburg, men who stood until
a regiment of 1,000 men was reduced to 105, and even then did not
run. Sir, these men have been sacrificed, uselessly sacrificed.
They have been put to hard digging, and hard fare, and hard
sleeping, and if there was any hard fighting to do they have been
put to that; and, besides all this, at night they have had to guard
the property of rebels in arms. They have been so sacrificed that
two or three of the Michigan regiments to-day cannot bring into the
field 250 men each out of 1,000 with whom they started.

Fair Oaks was lost; that is to say, we won a brilliant victory,
but it did us no good; we did not take advantage of it. Of course
it would have been very unfair to take advantage of a routed army
[laughter]; it would not have been according to our "strategy." We
magnanimously stopped, and commenced digging. There was no army in
our front, there were no intrenchments in our front; but we did not
know what else to do, and so we began to dig and ditch, and we kept
digging and ditching until the rebels had impressed and drilled and
armed and made soldiers of their entire population. But that was
not enough; they sent Jackson up on his raid to Winchester, and
we waited for him to come back with his twenty or thirty thousand
men. We heard that Corinth was being evacuated, and of course
it would have been very unfair to commence an attack until they
brought their troops from Corinth, and so we waited for the army at
Corinth to get to Richmond. After the rebels had got all the troops
they ever hoped to raise from any source, we did not attack them,
but they attacked us, as we had reason to suppose they would. They
attacked our right wing, and, as I am informed upon what I must
deem reliable authority, they hurled the majority of their entire
force upon our right wing of 30,000 men, and during the whole of
that Thursday our right wing of 30,000 men held their ground, and
repulsed that vast horde of the enemy over and over again, and held
their ground at night. Of course you will say a reinforcement of
twenty or thirty thousand men was sent to these brave troops that
they might not only hold their ground the next day, but send this
dastardly army into Richmond a second time, as at Fair Oaks. No,
sir, nothing of the sort was done.