Chapter XIX (2)

2. And as for concealing the fault, the case is the same; you ought not to deceive your neighbour, but to do as you would be done by; and therefore must not conceal any fault which he desireth or is concerned to know. Except it be when you deal with one who maketh a far greater matter of that fault than there is cause, and would wrong you in the price if it were known: yea, and that exception will not hold neither, except in a case when you must needs sell, and they must buy it: because, 1. You may not have another man's money against his will, though it be no more than the thing is worth. 2. Because it will be scandalous when the fault is known by him that buyeth it.

_Quest._ VI. What if the fault was concealed from me when I bought it, or if I were deceived or over-reached by him that sold it me, and gave more than the worth, may I not repair my loss by doing as I was done by?

_Answ._ No: no more than you may cut another's purse, because yours was cut; you must do as you would be done by, and not as you are done by. What you may do with the man that deceived you, is a harder question; but doubtless you may not wrong an honest man, because you were wronged by a knave.

_Object._ But it is taken for granted in the market, that every man will get as much as he can have, and that _caveat emptor_ is the only security; and therefore every man trusteth to his own wit, and not to the seller's honesty, and so resolveth to run the hazard.

_Answ._ It is not so among christians, nor infidels who profess either truth or common honesty. If you come among a company of cut-purses, where the match is made thus, Look thou to thy purse, and I will look to mine, and he that can get most let him take it! then indeed you have no reason to trust another. But there are no tradesmen or buyers who will profess that they look not to be trusted, or say, I will lie or deceive you if I can. Among thieves and pirates such total distrust may be allowed; but among sober persons in civil societies and converse, we must in reason and charity expect some truth and honesty, and not presume them to be all liars and deceivers, that we may seem to have allowance to be such ourselves. Indeed we trust them, not absolutely as saints, but with a mixture of distrust, as fallible and faulty men: and so as to trust our own circumspection above their words, when we know not the persons to be very just. But we have no cause to make a market a place of mere deceit, where every one saith, Trust not me, and I will not trust thee; but let us all take one another for cheats and liars, and get what we can! Such censures savour not of charity, or of just intentions.

_Quest._ VII. What if I foresee a plenty and cheapness in a time of dearth, which the buyer foreseeth not, (as if I know that there are ships coming in with store of that commodity which will make it cheap,) am I bound to tell the buyer of it, and hinder my own gain?

_Answ._ There may be some instances in trading with enemies, or with rich men, that regard not such matters, or with men that are supposed to know it as well as you, in which you are not bound to tell them. But in your ordinary equal trading, when you have reason to think that the buyer knoweth it not, and would not give so dear if he knew it, you are bound to tell him; because you must love your neighbour as yourself, and do as you would be done by, and not take advantage of his ignorance.

_Quest._ VIII. If I foresee a dearth, may I not keep my commodity till then?

_Answ._ Yes, unless it be to the hurt of the commonwealth; as if your keeping it in be the cause of the dearth, and your bringing it forth would help to prevent it.

_Quest._ IX. May one use many words in buying and selling?

_Answ._ You must use no more than are true, and just, and useful: but there are more words needful with some persons who are talkative and unsatisfied than with others.

_Quest._ X. May I buy as cheap as I can get it, or give less than the thing is worth?

_Answ._ If it be worth more to you than the market price, (through your necessity,) you are not bound to give above the market price. If it be worth less to you than the market price, you are not bound to give more than it is worth to you, as suited to your use. But you must not desire nor seek to get another's goods or labour for less than it is worth in both these respects (in common estimate, and to you).

_Quest._ XI. May I take advantage of another's necessity to buy for less than the worth, or sell for more: as e. g. a poor man must needs have money suddenly for his goods, though he sell them but for half the worth; and I have no need of them: am I bound to give him the worth when I have no need? and when it is a great kindness to him to give him any thing in that strait? So also when I have no desire to sell my horse, and another's necessity maketh him willing to give more than he is worth, may I not take it?

_Answ._ To the first case: you must distinguish between an act of justice and of charity; and between your need of the thing and the worth of it to you. Though you have no need of the poor man's goods, yet if you buy them, both justice and charity require that you give him as much as they are worth to you, though not so much as they are worth in the market: yea, and that you buy them of him in his necessity; for if you give him but what they are worth to you, you are no loser by it; and you should do another good, when it is not to your own hurt or loss. By what they are worth to you, I mean so much as that you be no loser. As, if it be meat or drink, though you have no present need, perhaps you will shortly have need, and if you buy not that, you must buy as much of somewhat else. In strict justice you may be a saver, but not a gainer, by buying of the poor in their necessity. 2. But if you buy a durable commodity for less than it is worth, you should take it but as a pledge, and allow the seller liberty to redeem it if he can, that he may get more after of another. 3. And to the poor in such necessity, charity must be exercised as well as justice. Therefore if you are able to lend them money to save them the loss of underselling, you should do it. (I account that man only able who hath money which no greater service of God requireth.) And if you are not able yourself, you should endeavour to get some others to relieve him, if you can without a greater inconvenience.

And for the second case, it is answered before: you may not take more than it is worth, ever the more for another's necessity; nor in any other case than you might have done it in, if there had been no such necessity of his.

_Quest._ XII. May I not make advantage of another's ignorance or error in bargaining?

_Answ._ Not to get more than your commodity is worth, nor to get his goods for less than the worth; no, nor to get the true worth against his will, or with scandal: but if it be only to get a true worth of your own commodity when he is willing, but would be offended if his ignorance in some point were cured, you may so far make use of his ignorance to a lawful end, as is said before in the case of concealing faults.

_Quest._ XIII. May I strive to get before another, to get a good bargain which he desireth?

_Answ._ Yes, if you do it not out of a greedy mind, nor to the injury of one that is poorer than yourself: you should rather further the supply of your neighbour's greater needs; otherwise speed and industry in your calling is no fault, nor yet the crossing of a covetous man's desires: you are not bound to let every man have what he would have.

_Quest._ XIV. May I buy a thing out of another's hand, or hire a servant which another is about or is treating with? Or may I call a chapman from another to buy of me?

_Answ._ There are some cases in which you may not do it, and some in which you may. You may not do it out of a greedy covetousness; nor to the injury of the poor: nor when the other hath gone so far in the bargain that it cannot be honestly broken; for then you injure the third person, and tempt the other to a sin: nor may you do it so as to disturb the due and civil order, which should be among moderate men in trading. And it is a great matter how the thing is accounted of by the custom of the country or market where you bargain; for where it is of ill report, and accounted as unjust, the scandal should make you avoid such a course. But yet in some cases it is lawful, and in some a needful duty. It is lawful when none of the foresaid reasons (or any such other) are against it: it is a duty when charity to the poor or oppressed doth require it. As e. g. a poor man must needs sell his land, his horse, his corn, or goods: a covetous oppressor offereth him less than it is worth. The poor man must take his offer if he can get no more: the oppressor saith that it is injustice for any one to take his bargain out of his hand, or offer money till he have done: in this case it may be a duty, to offer the poor man the worth of his commodity, and save him from the oppressor. A covetous man offereth a servant or labourer less than their service or labour is worth; and will accuse you, if you interrupt his bargain and would offer his servant more: in this case it may be your duty to help the servant to a better master. A chapman is ready to be cheated by an unconscionable tradesman, to give much more for a commodity than its worth: charity may oblige you in such a case to offer it him cheaper. In a word, if you do it for your own gain, in a greedy manner, it is a sin; but if you do it when it is not scandalous or injurious, or do it in charity for another's good, it is lawful, and sometimes a duty.

_Quest._ XV. May I dispraise another's commodity to draw the buyer to my own?

_Answ._ This case is sufficiently answered in the former: 1. You may not use any false dispraise: 2. Nor a true one out of covetousness, nor in a scandalous manner. 3. But you may help to save another from a cheater, by opening the deceit in charity to him.

_Quest._ XVI. What should I do in doubtful cases, where I am uncertain whether the thing be just or not?

_Answ._ Causeless, perplexing, melancholy scruples, which would stop a man in the course of his duty, are not to be indulged: but in rational doubts, first use your utmost diligence (as much as the nature of the cause requireth) to be resolved; and if yet you doubt, be sure to go the safer way, and to avoid sin rather than loss, and to keep your consciences in peace.

_Quest._ XVII. If the buyer lose the commodity between the bargain and the payment, (as if he buy your horse, and he die before payment, or presently after,) what should the seller do to his relief?

_Answ._ If it were by the seller's fault, or by any fault in the horse which he concealed, he is to make the buyer full satisfaction. If it were casually only, rigorous justice will allow him nothing; and therefore if it be either to a man that is rich enough to bear it without any great sense of the loss, or in a case where in common custom the buyer always standeth to the loss, mere justice will make him no amends. But if it be where custom makes some abatement judged a duty, or where the person is so poor as to be pinched by the loss, that common humanity, which all good men use in bargaining, which tempereth justice with charity, will teach men to bear their part of the loss; because they must do as they would be done by.

_Quest._ XVIII. If the thing bought and sold prove afterward of much more worth than was by either party understood, (as in buying of ambergris and jewels it oft falleth out,) is the buyer bound to give the seller more than was bargained for?

_Answ._ Yes, if it were the seller's mere ignorance and insufficiency in that business which caused him so to undersell it (as if an ignorant countryman sell a jewel or ambergris, who knoweth not what it is, a moderate satisfaction should be made him). But if it were the seller's trade, in which he is to be supposed to be sufficient, and if it be taken for granted beforehand, that both buyer and seller will stand to the bargain whatever it prove, and that the seller would have abated nothing if it had proved less worse than the price, then the buyer may enjoy his gain; much more if he run any notable hazard for it, as merchants use to do.

_Quest._ XIX. What if the title of the thing sold prove bad, which was before unknown?

_Answ._ If the seller either knew it was bad, or through his notable negligence was ignorant of it, and did not acquaint the buyer with so much of the uncertainty and danger as he knew, or if it was any way his fault that the buyer was deceived, and not the buyer's fault, he is bound to make him proportionable satisfaction. As also in case that by law or bargain he be bound to warrant the title to the buyer. But not in case that it be their explicit or implicit agreement that the buyer stand to the hazard, and the seller hath done his duty to make him know what is doubtful.

_Quest._ XX. What if a change of powers or laws do overthrow the title, almost as soon as it is sold, (as it oft falls out about offices and lands,) who must bear the loss?

_Answ._ The case is near the same with that in quest. xvii. It is supposed that the seller should have lost it himself if he had kept it but a little longer; and that neither of them foresaw the change; and therefore that the seller hath all his money, rather for his good hap, than for his lands or office (which the buyer hath not). Therefore except it be to a rich man that feeleth not the loss, or one that expressly undertook to stand to all hazards, foreseeing a possibility of them, charity and humanity will teach the seller to divide the loss.

The same is the case of London now consumed by fire; where thousands of suits are like to rise between the landlords and the tenants. Where the providence of God (permitting the burning zeal of some papists) hath deprived men of the houses which they had hired or taken leases of, humanity and charity requireth the rich to bear most of the loss, and not to exact their rents or rebuilding from the poor, whatever the law saith, which could not be supposed to foresee such accidents. Love your neighbours as yourselves; do as you would be done by; and oppress not your poor brethren; and then by these three rules you will yourselves decide a multitude of such doubts and difficulties, which the uncharitable only cannot understand.

_Tit. 4. Cases of Conscience about Lending and Borrowing._

_Quest._ I. May a poor man borrow money, who knoweth that he is unable to repay it, and hath no rational proof that he is very likely to be able hereafter?

_Answ._ No: unless it be when he telleth the lender truly of his case, and he is willing to run the hazard; else it is mere thievery covered with the cheat of borrowing; for the borrower desireth that of another, which he would not lend him, if he expected it not again; and to take a man's money or goods against his will is robbery.

_Object._ But I am in great necessity.

_Answ._ Begging in necessity is lawful; but stealing or cheating is not, though you call it borrowing.

_Object._ But it is a shame to beg.

_Answ._ The sin of thievish borrowing is worse than shame.

_Object._ But none will give me if I beg.

_Answ._ If they will give but to save your life at the present, you must take it, though they give you not what you would have: the poorest beggar's life is better than the thief's.

_Object._ But I hope God may enable me to pay hereafter.

_Answ._ If you have no rational way to manifest the soundness of that hope to another, it is but to pretend faith and hope for thievery and deceit.

_Object._ God hath promised, that those that fear him shall want no good thing. And therefore I hope I may be able to repay it.

_Answ._ If you want not, why do you borrow? If you have enough to keep you alive by begging, God maketh good all his promises to you; yea, or if you die by famine. For he only promiseth you that which is best; which for aught you know may be beggary or death. God breaketh not promise with his servants who die in common famine, no more than with them who die in plagues or wars. Make not God the patron of sin; yea, and your faith a pretence for your distrust. If you trust God, use no sinful means; if you trust him not, this pleading of his promise is hypocrisy.

_Quest._ II. May a tradesman drive a trade with borrowed money, when his success, and so his repayment, is utterly an uncertain thing?

_Answ._ There are some trades where the gain is so exceeding probable, next to certain, as may warrant the borrowing of money to manage them, when there is no rational probability of failing in the payment. And there are some tradesmen, who have estates of their own, sufficient to repay all the money which they borrow. But otherwise, when the money is rationally hazardous, the borrower is bound in conscience to acquaint the lender fully with the hazard, that he may not have it against his will. Otherwise he liveth in constant deceit or thievery. And if he do happen to repay it, it excuseth not his sin.

_Quest._ III. If a borrower be utterly unable to pay, and so break while he hath something, may he not retain somewhat for his food or raiment?

_Answ._ No: unless it be in order to set up again in hope to repay his debts: for all that he hath being other men's, he may not take so much as bread to his mouth, out of that which is theirs, without their consent.

_Quest._ IV. But if a man have bound himself to his wife's friends upon marriage to settle so much upon her or her children, and this obligation was antecedent to his debts, may he not secure that to his wife or children, without any injury to his creditors?

_Answ._ The law of the land must much decide this controversy. If the propriety be actually before transferred to wife or children, it is theirs, and cannot be taken from them; but if it were done after by a deed of gift to defraud the creditors, then that deed of gift is invalid, till debts be paid. If it be but an obligation and no collation of propriety, the law must determine who is to be first paid; and whether the wife be supposed to run the hazard of gaining or losing with the husband: and though the laws of several countries herein differ, and some give the wife more propriety than others do, yet must they in each place be conscientiously observed, as being the rule of such propriety. But we must see that there be no fraudulent intent in the transaction.

_Quest._ V. May not a tradesman retain somewhat to set up again, if his creditors be willing to compound for a certain part of the debt?

_Answ._ If he truly acquaint them with his whole estate, and they voluntarily allow him part to himself, either in charity, or in hope hereafter to be satisfied, this is no unlawful course; but if he hide part from them, and make them believe that the rest is all, this is but a thievish procurement of their composition or consent.

_Quest._ VI. May a borrower lawfully break his day of promised payment, in case of necessity?

_Answ._ True necessity hath no law: that is, a man is not bound to do things naturally impossible; but if he might have foreseen that necessity, or the doubtfulness of his payment at the day, it was his sin to promise it, unless he put in some limitation, If I be able, and acquainted the lender with the uncertainty. However it be, when the time is come, he ought to go to his creditor, and tell him of his necessity, and desire further time, and endeavour to pay it as soon as he is able: and if he be not able, to make him what satisfaction he can, by his labour, or any other lawful way.

_Quest._ VII. May I borrow of one to pay another, to keep my day with the first?

_Answ._ Yes, if you deal not fraudulently with the second, but are able to pay him, or acquaint him truly with your case.

_Quest._ VIII. Suppose that I have no probability of paying the last creditor, may I borrow of one to pay another, and so live upon borrowing; or must I rather continue in one man's debt?

_Answ._ If you truly acquaint your creditors with your state, you may do as is most to your convenience. If the first creditor be able and willing rather to trust you longer, than that you should borrow of another to pay him, you may continue his debtor, till you can pay him without borrowing, but if he be either poor or unwilling to bear with you, and another that is able be willing to venture, you may better borrow of another to pay him. But if they be all equally unwilling to stand to any hazard by you, then you must rather continue in the first man's debt, because if you wrong another you will commit another sin: nay, you cannot borrow in such a case, because it is supposed that the other will not lend, when he knoweth your case. And you must not at all conceal it from him.

_Object._ But it may be my ruin to open my full state to another.

_Answ._ You must not live upon cheating and thievery to prevent your ruin: and what can it be less to get another man's money against his will, if you hide your case, which if he knew he would not lend it you.

_Object._ But what if I tell him plainly, that I will pay him certainly by borrowing of another, though I cannot pay him for mine own, and though I be not like to pay the last?

_Answ._ If you truly thus open your case to every one that you borrow of, you may take it, if they will lend it; for then you have their consent: and it is supposed, that every one is willing to run the hazard of being the last creditor.

_Quest._ IX. May I lend upon pledges, pawns, or mortgages for my security?

_Answ._ Yes, so you take not that from a poor man for a pledge, which is necessary to his livelihood and maintenance: as the bed which he should lie on, the clothes which he should wear, or the tools which he should work with; and be not cruel on pretence of mercy.

_Quest._ X. May I take the forfeiture and keep a pledge or mortgage upon covenants?

_Answ._ If it be among merchants and rich men, an act of merchandise, and not of mere security for money lent, then it is another case: as if they make a bargain thus, Take this jewel or this land for your money; and it shall be yours if I pay you not at such a day: I am willing to stand to the hazard of uncertainty; if I pay you not, suppose it is for my own commodity, and not through disability. In this case it is lawful to take the forfeiture, or detain the thing. But if it be properly but a pledge to secure the money, then the final intent is but that your money may be repaid; and you may not take the advantage of breaking a day, to take that from another which is none of your own. Justice will allow you only to take so much as your money came to, and to give the overplus (if there be any) to the debtor. And mercy will require you rather to forgive the debt, than to keep a pledge which he cannot spare, but to his ruin and misery, (as his food, his raiment, his tools, his house, &c.) unless you be in as great necessity as he.

_Quest._ XI. May I take the bond or promise of a third person as security for my money?

_Answ._ Yes, in case that other be able and willing to be responsible; for you have his own consent; but great caution should be used, that you take no man that is insufficient, from whom mercy forbiddeth you to take it, in case the principal debtor fail; unless you take his suretiship but _in terrorem_, resolving not to take it of him: and also that you faithfully tell the sureties that you must require it of them in case of non-payment, and therefore try whether indeed they are truly willing to pay it: for if they be such as truly presume that you will not take it of them, or will take it ill to be sued for it, you should not take their suretiship, unless you purpose not to seek it (except in necessity).

_Quest._ XII. Is it lawful to lend upon usury, interest, or increase?

_Answ._ This controversy hath so many full treatises written on it, that I cannot expect that so few words as I must lay out upon it should satisfy the studious reader. All the disputes about the name of usury I pass by; it being, The receiving any additional gain as due for money lent, which is commonly meant by the word, and which we mean in the question. For the questions, Whether we may bargain for it, or tie the debtor to pay it? Whether we may take it after his gain as partaking in it, or before? Whether we must partake also in the loss, if the debtor be a loser? with other such like, are but subsequent to the main question, Whether any gain (called use) may be taken by the lender as his due for the money lent? My judgment is as followeth.

I. There is some such gain or usury lawful and commendable. II. There is some such gain or usury unlawful and a heinous sin. I shall first give my reasons of the first proposition.

I. If all usury be forbidden it is either by the law of nature, or by some positive law of supernatural revelation: if the latter, it is either by some law of Moses, or by some law of Christ: if the former, it is either as against the rule of piety to God, or against justice or charity to men. That which is neither a violation of the natural laws of piety, justice, or charity; nor against the supernaturally revealed laws of Moses or of Christ, is not unlawful. But there is some usury which is against none of all these; _ergo_ there is some usury which is not unlawful.

I will first lay you down the instances of such usury, and then prove it. There is a parcel of land to be sold for a thousand pounds, which is worth forty pounds per annum, and hath wood on it worth a thousand pounds (some such things we have known): John N. is willing to purchase it; but he hath a poor neighbour, T. S. that hath no money, but a great desire of the bargain. J. N. loving his neighbour as himself, and desiring his wealth, lendeth him the thousand pounds upon usury for one year. T. S. buyeth the land, and selleth the wood for the same money, and repayeth it in a year, and so hath all the land for almost nothing; as if J. N. had purchased the land and freely given it him, after a year or two; the gift had been the same.

_Object._ Here you suppose the seller wronged by selling his land almost for nothing.

_Answ._ 1. That is nothing at all to the present case, but a different case by itself. 2. I can put many cases in which such a sale may be made without any wrong to the seller: as when it is done by some prince, or state, or noble and liberal person, purposely designing the enriching of the subjects, or after a war, as lately in Ireland. So that the question is, whether J. N. may not give T. S. a thousand or eight hundred pounds' worth of land, taking a year's rent first out of the land, or a year's use for the money, which cometh to the same sum.

Another: a rich merchant trading into the East Indies, having five thousand pounds to lay out upon his commodities in traffic, when he hath laid out four thousand five hundred pounds, lendeth in charity the other five hundred pounds to one of his servants to lay out upon a commodity, which when it cometh home will be worth two thousand pounds; and offereth him to secure the carriage with his own; requiring only the use of his money at six per cent. Here the taking of thirty pounds' use, is but the giving him one thousand four hundred and seventy pounds, and is all one with deducting so much of the gift.

Another instance: certain orphans having nothing left them but so much money as will by the allowed use of it find them bread and poor clothing; the guardian cannot lay it out in lands for them; and if he maintain them upon the stock, it will be quickly spent, and he must answer for it: a rich man that is their neighbour tradeth in iron works, (furnaces or forges,) or lead works, or other such commodities, in which he constantly getteth the double of the stock which he employeth, or at least twenty pounds or forty pounds in the hundred; the guardian dare not lend the money to any poor man, lest he break and never be able to pay it; therefore he lendeth it this rich man. And if he have it without usury, the poor orphans give the rich man freely twenty pounds or forty pounds a year, supposing their stock to be a hundred; if he take usury, the rich man doth but give the poor orphans some part of his constant gain.

Another instance: in a city or corporation where there is a rich trade of clothing or making silks, there is a stock of money given by legacy for the poor, and intrusted into the hands of the richest of the city, to trade with and give the poor the use of it: and there is another stock left to set up young beginners, who have not a stock to set up themselves; on condition that they give the third part of their gain to the poor, and at seven years' end resign the stock: the question is, Whether the poor should be without this use of their money, and let the rich go away with it? or whether they may take it?

Now I prove that such usury is not forbidden by God.

1. It is not forbidden us by the law of Moses: (1.) Because Moses's law never did forbid it: for, 1. It is expressly forbidden as an act of unmercifulness; and therefore forbidden only to the poor and to brethren, Exod. xxii. 25; Lev. xxv. 36, 37. Yea, when the poor are not named, it is the poor that are meant; because in that country they did not keep up stocks for merchandise or trading, but lent usually to the needy only: at least the circumstances of the several texts show, that it is only lending to the needy, and not lending to drive on any enriching trades, which is meant where usury is forbidden.[157] 2. And it is expressly allowed to be used to strangers, Deut. xxiii. 19, 20, to whom nothing unjust or uncharitable might be done; only such a measure of charity was not required towards them as unto brethren. And there were more merchants of strangers that traded with them in foreign commodities, than of Jews that fetched them home: so that the prohibition of usury is in the law itself restrained only to their lending to the poor; but in the prophets who do but reprove the sin, it is expressed without that limitation, partly because it supposeth the meaning of the law to be known, which the prophets did but apply, and partly because there was little or no lending used among the Jews, but to the needy as an act of charity.

(2.) And if it had been forbidden in Moses's law only, it would not extend to christians now; because the law of Moses, as such, is not in force: the matter of it is much of the law of nature indeed; but as Mosaical, it was proper to the Jews and proselytes, or at least extended not to the christian gentiles; as is plain in 2 Cor. iii. 7; Gal. iii. 19, 24; v. 3; Ephes. ii. 15; 1 Tim. i. 7; Heb. vii. 12, 16, 19. Moses's law as such never bound any other nations, but the proselytes that joined themselves to the Jews (nor was all the world obliged so to be proselyted as to take up their laws): much less do they bind us that are the servants of Christ, so long after the dissolution of their commonwealth. So much of them as are part of the law of nature, or of any positive law of Christ, or of the civil law of any state, are binding as they are such natural, christian, or civil laws. But not one of them as Mosaical: though the Mosaical law is of great use to help us to understand the law of nature in many particular instances, in which it is somewhat difficult to us.

2. There is no positive law of Christ forbidding all usury: as for Luke vi. 32, 35, it is plainly nothing to the case; for he saith not, Lend, looking for no gain or increase, but looking for nothing again. And the context showeth that the meaning must be one of these two; either, q. d. Lend not only to them that will lend to you again when you are in want; but even to the poor, that you can never hope to borrow of; or else, Lend not only to them that are able to pay you, and where your stock is secured, but to the needy where your money is hazarded; and though they will pay you if they are able, yet you have little or no hope that ever they should be able to repay: lend so, as to be willing to make a gift of it in case the borrower never repay it. And there is no other text that can be pretended against it in the New Testament.

3. And that the law of nature doth not forbid all usury, will appear by examining the several parts of it. The law of nature forbiddeth but three sorts of sins: 1. Those that are against piety to God. 2. Those that are against our own welfare. 3. Those that are against our neighbour's good: and that is, 1. Against justice. 2. Against charity. There is none that falleth not under some of these heads.

1. And that usury is not naturally evil as against piety to God; 2. Or as against ourselves, and our own welfare; I need not prove, because no reason nor reasonable person doth lay any such accusation against it. Though they that think it absolutely unlawful, say that it is consequently against God, as every violation of his law is. But that is nothing to the case.

3. Therefore there is no doubt but the whole controversy is resolved into this last question, Whether all usury be against justice or charity to our neighbour? Justice obligeth me to give him his own; charity obligeth me to give him more than his own, in certain cases, as one that love him as myself. That which is not against justice, may be against charity; but that which is against charity, is not always against justice strictly taken. And that which is an act of true charity, is never against justice; because he that giveth his neighbour more than his own, doth give him his own and more. There is a usury which is against justice and charity; there is a usury which is against charity, but not against mere justice; and there is a usury which is against neither justice nor charity. If I prove it charitable it is superfluous to say more.

All the instances before given are notoriously charitable. That which is for the preservation of the lives and comforts of the poor, and of orphans, or for the enriching of my neighbour, is an act of charity; but such is some usury, past all doubt, as is before declared. Where the contrary is an act of cruelty, the usury is not against charity, but for it. For the rich to deny to the poor and orphans a part of that gain, which they make by the improvement of their own money, is oppression and cruelty; if it be cruel to let a beggar die or starve, when we should feed and clothe him of our own; much more to let the poor and orphans starve and perish rather than give them the increase of their own, or part of it at least. As for them that say, It may be as well improved otherwise, they are unexperienced men; it is a known falsehood as to the most, though some few may meet with such opportunities. At least it is nothing to them that cannot have other ways of improving it; who are very many.

Moreover, when it is not an act of charity, yet it may be not against charity in these cases: 1. When the lender is poor and the borrower rich; yea, it may be a sin to lend it freely. "He that oppresseth the poor to increase his riches, and he that gives to the rich, shall surely come to want," Prov. xxii. 16. It is a giving to the rich to lend freely that money which they improve to the increase of their riches. 2. When the lender is not obliged to that act of charity, though the borrower be poorer than himself. Which falleth out in a hundred cases; and may be comprised under this one general, When the lender is obliged to expend that same money in some other greater, better work: as at the same time while a man that is worth but twenty pounds a year, is in debt to a man that hath a thousand pounds a year, there may be a hundred or a thousand poor people worth nothing, ready to perish, whom the rich is rather bound to succour, than him that hath but twenty pounds a year. And there may be works of piety (as to set up a school, or promote the preaching of the gospel) which may be as great as either. And the richest that is, cannot do all the good that is to be done, nor relieve all the persons that are in want; therefore when he must leave much undone, if he would give all his substance, it is (_cæteris paribus_) a sin, to give that to a man that can make shift without it, and pass by a hundred in much deeper necessity and distress; so that he who either exerciseth charity in his usury, or doth nothing against charity and justice, certainly sinneth not by that usury. For all the scriptures which speak against usury, speak against it as a cruel or uncharitable thing.

_Object._ But it is sometimes necessary for a law to forbid that which otherwise would be good, when it cannot be done, without encouraging others to a greater evil; such as ordinary usury is; and then that law must be observed.

_Answ._ This is true _in thesi_, that such cases there are; but it is unproved and untrue in this case; for, 1. There is no such law. 2. There is no such reason or necessity of such a law. For God can as well make laws against unrighteous or uncharitable increase or usury, without forbidding that which is charitable and just, as he can make laws against unrighteous or uncharitable buying or selling without condemning that which was good and just; or as he can forbid gluttony, drunkenness, idleness, pride, without forbidding eating, drinking, apparel, or riches. He can easily tell men of whom and in what case to take use, and when not.

He that would see all other objections answered, and the case fully handled, hath many treatises on both sides extant to inform him.

II. That there is a sort of usury which is evil I know of no man that doubteth, and therefore need not stand to prove.

_Quest._ When is usury sinful?

_Answ._ As is before said, When it is against either justice or charity. 1. When it is like cheating bargaining, which under pretence of consent and a form of justice doth deceive or oppress, and get from another that which is not truly ours but his. 2. When you lend for increase where charity obligeth you to lend freely; even as it is a sin to lend expecting your own again, when charity obligeth you to give it. 3. When you uncharitably exact that which your brother is disabled utterly to pay, and use cruelty to procure it (be it the use or the principal). 4. When you allow him not such a proportion of the gain as his labour, hazard, or poverty doth require; but because the money is yours, will live at ease upon his labours. 5. When in case of his losses you rigorously exact your due without that abatement, or forgiving debts, (whether use or principal,) which humanity and charity require. In a word, when you are selfish, and do not as, according to true judgment, you may desire to be done by, if you were in his case.

_Quest._ But when am I bound to exercise this charity in not taking use?

_Answ._ As I said before, 1. Whenever you have no more urgent, and necessary, and excellent work, to lay out that money on, which you are so to receive. 2. Yea, though another work may be in itself better, (as to relieve many poorer, better men with that money,) yet when you cannot take it, without the utter undoing of the debtor, and bringing him into as bad a case, as any single person whom you would relieve, it is the safer side to leave the other unrelieved, (unless it be a person on whom the public good much dependeth,) rather than to extort your own from such a one to give another. Because that which you cannot get without a scandalous appearance of cruelty, is _quoad jus in re_ not yours to give, till you can better get possession of it; and therefore God will not expect that you should give it to another.

In all this I imply that as you must prefer the lives of others in giving alms, before your own conveniences and comforts, and must not say, I cannot spare it, when your necessity may spare it, though not your pleasure; so also in taking use of those that you are bound to show charity to, the same rule and proportions must be observed in your charity.

Note also, that in all this it appeareth, that the case is but gradually different, between taking the use and taking the principal. For when the reason for remitting is the same, you are as well bound to remit the principal as the use.

But this difference there is, that many a man of low estate may afford to lend freely to a poorer man for a little time, who cannot afford to give it. And prudence may direct us to choose one man to lend freely to for a time, because of his sudden necessity, when yet another is fitter to give it to.

_Quest._ XIII. Is lending a duty? If so, must I lend to all that ask me, or to whom?

_Answ._ Lending is a duty, when we have it, and our brother's necessity requireth it, and true prudence telleth us, that we have no better way to lay it out, which is inconsistent with that. And therefore rich men ordinarily should both lend and give as prudence shall direct. But there is an imprudent and so a sinful lending: as, 1. When you will lend that which is another's, and you have no power to lend. 2. When you lend that which you must needs require again, while you might easily foresee that the borrower is not like to pay. Lend nothing but what you have either great probability will be repaid, or else which you are willing to give in case the debtor cannot or will not pay; or at least when suing for it will not have scandalous and worse effects than not lending. For it is very ordinary when you come to demand it and sue for it, to stir up the hatred of the debtor against you, and to make him your enemy, and to break his charity by your imprudent charity; in such a case, if you are obliged to relieve him, give him so much as you can spare, rather than lend him that which you cannot spare, but must sue for. In such cases, if charity go not without prudence, nor prudence without charity, you may well enough see when to lend, and how much.

_Quest._ XIV. Is it lawful to take upon usury in necessity, when the creditor doth unjustly or unmercifully require it?

_Answ._ Not in case that the consequents (by encouraging sin or otherwise) be like to do more hurt, than the money will do you good. Else, it is lawful when it is for your benefit; as it is lawful to take part of your wages for your work, or part of the worth of your commodity, when you cannot have the whole; and as it is lawful to purchase your rights of an enemy, or your life of a thief; as is aforesaid. A man may buy his own benefit of an unrighteous man.

_Quest._ XV. Doth not contracting for a certain sum of gain, make usury to be in that case unlawful, which might lawfully be taken of one that is free?

_Answ._ Yes, in case that contracting determine an uncertain case without sufficient cause: as if you agree, that whether the borrower gain or lose, and be poor or rich, I will have so much gain; that is, whether it prove merciful or unmerciful, I will have it. But then in that case, if it so prove unmerciful, it may not be taken without contracting, if freely offered. No contract may tie the debtor to that which is against justice or charity; and no contract may absolutely require that which may prove uncharitable; unless there be a tacit condition or exception of such a case implied. Otherwise I see no scripture or reason, why a contract altereth the case, and may not be used to secure that increase which is neither unrighteous nor unmerciful: it may be the bond of equity, but not of iniquity. As in case of a certain gain by the borrower, a certain use may be contracted for; and in case of uncertain gain to the borrower, a conditional contract may be made. Yea, in case of merchandise, where men's poverty forbiddeth not such bargains, I see not but it is lawful to sell a greater uncertain gain, for a smaller certain gain; and so to make the contracts absolute (as Amesius Cas. Consc. on this question showeth). As all oppression and unmercifulness must be avoided, and all men must do as they would (judiciously) be done by; so it is a bad thing to corrupt religion, and fill the world with causeless scruples, by making that a sin which is no sin. Divines that live in great cities and among merchandise, are usually fitter judges in this case, than those that live more obscurely (without experience) in the country.

_Tit. 5. Cases of Conscience about Lusory Contracts._

_Quest._ 1. Is it lawful to lay wagers upon the credit or confidence of one another's opinions or assertions in discourse? As e. g. I will lay you so much that I am in the right?

_Answ._ Yes, if these three things concur: 1. That the true end of the wager is, to be a penalty to him that shall be guilty of a rash and false assertion, and not to gratify the covetousness of the other. 2. That it be no greater a sum than can be demanded and paid, without breach of charity, or too much hurt to the loser (as above the proportion of his error). 3. That it be no other but what both parties are truly willing to stand to the loss of, if either of them lose, and that beforehand they truly seem so willing to each other.

_Quest._ II. Is it lawful to lay wagers upon horseraces, dogs, hawks, bear-baitings, or such games as depend upon the activity of beast or man?

_Answ._ Yes, upon the two last expressed conditions; and, 3. That it be not an exercise which is itself unlawful, by cruelty to beasts, or hazard to the lives of men, (as in fencing, running, wrestling, &c. it may fall out if it be not cautelously done,) or by the expense of an undue proportion of time in them, which is the common malignity of such recreations.

_Quest._ III. May I lawfully give money to see such sports, as bear-baitings, stage-plays, masks, shows, puppet-plays, activities of man or beast? &c.

_Answ._ There are many shows that are desirable and laudable, (as of strange creatures, monsters, rare engines, activities, &c.) the sight of which it is lawful to purchase, at a proportionable price; as a prospect through one of Galileo's tubes or such another, is worth much money to a studious person. But when the exercise is unlawful, (as all stage-plays are that ever I saw, or had just information of; yea, odiously evil; however it is very possible that a comedy or tragedy might with abundance of cautions be lawfully acted,) it is then (usually) unlawful to be a spectator either for money or on free cost. I say, (usually,) because it is possible that some one that is necessitated to be there, or that goeth to find out their evil to suppress them, or that is once only induced to know the truth of them, may do it innocently; but so do not they, who are present voluntarily and approvingly. 3. And if the recreation be lawful in itself, yet when vain persons go thither to feed a carnal fancy and vicious humour, which delighteth more in vanity, than they delight in piety, and when it wasteth their time and corrupteth their minds, and alienateth them from good, or hindereth duty, it is to them unlawful.