Chapter M (8)

The Marquis de la Fayette, the brave and generous nobleman, whose services command the gratitude of every American, had been dispatched with about two thousand light infantry, from the main army, to watch the motions of lord Cornwallis in Virginia. He prosecuted this expedition with the greatest military ability. Although his force was much inferior to that of the enemy, he obliged them to leave Richmond and Williamsburgh, and to seek protection under their shipping.

About the last of August, Count de Grasse arrived with a large fleet in the Chesapeak, and blocked up the British troops at Yorktown. Admiral Greaves, with a British fleet, appeared off the Capes, and an action succeeded; but it was not decisiv.

General Washington had before this time moved the main body of his army, together with the French troops, to the southward; and as soon as he heard of the arrival of the French fleet in the Chesapeak, he made rapid marches to the head of Elk, where embarking, the troops soon arrived at Yorktown.

A close siege immediately commenced, and was carried on with such vigor, by the combined forces of America and France, that lord Cornwallis was obliged to surrender. This glorious event which took place on the 19th of October, 1781, decided the contest in favor of America; and laid the foundation of a general peace.[46]

[46] It has been controverted whether the capture of General
Cornwallis was the result of a plan preconcerted between
General Washington and Count de Grasse; or rather whether the
arrival of the Count in the Chesapeak was predetermined and
expected by General Washington, and consequently all the
preparations to attack New York a mere finesse to deceive the
enemy; or whether the real intention was against New York,
and the siege of Yorktown planned upon the unexpected arrival
of the French fleet in the bay. The following letter will let
the matter in its true light.

_Mount Vernon, July 31, 1788._

SIR,

I duly received your letter of the 14th instant, and can only
answer you briefly and generally from memory; that a combined
operation of the land and naval forces of France in America,
for the year 1781, was preconcerted the year before; that the
point of attack was not absolutely agreed upon,[b] because it
could not be foreknown where the enemy would be most
susceptible of impression; and because we (having the command
of the water with sufficient means of conveyance) could
transport ourselves to any spot with the greatest celerity;
that it was determined by me, nearly twelve months before
hand, at all hazards, to give out and cause it to be believed
by the highest military as well as civil officers, that New
York was the destined place of attack, for the important
purpose of inducing the eastern and middle States to make
greater exertions in furnishing specific supplies, than they
otherwise would have done, as well as for the interesting
purpose of rendering the enemy less prepared elsewhere; that
by these means, and these alone, artillery, boats, stores,
and provisions, were in seasonable preparation to move with
the utmost rapidity to any part of the continent; for the
difficulty consisted more in providing, than knowing how to
apply the military apparatus; that before the arrival of the
Count de Grasse, it was the fixed determination _to strike
the enemy in the most vulnerable quarter_, so as to ensure
success with moral certainty, as our affairs were then in the
most ruinous train imaginable; that New York was thought to
be beyond our effort, and consequently that the only
hesitation that remained, was between an attack upon the
British army in Virginia and that in Charleston: And finally,
that, by the intervention of several communications, and some
incidents which cannot be detailed in a letter, the hostile
post in Virginia, from being a _provisional and strongly
expected_, became the _definitiv and certain object_ of the
campaign.

[b] Because it would be easy for the Count de
Grasse, in good time before his departure from the
West Indies, to giv notice, by expressing at what
place he could most conveniently first touch to
receive advice.

I only add, that it never was in contemplation to attack New
York, unless the garrison should first have been so far
degarnished to carry on the southern operations, as to render
our success in the siege of that place, as infallible as any
future military event can ever be made. For I repeat it, and
dwell upon it again, some splendid advantage (whether upon a
larger or smaller scale was almost immaterial) was so
essentially necessary, to revive the expiring hopes and
languid exertions of the country, at the crisis in question,
that I never would have consented to embark in any
enterprise, wherein, from the most rational plan and accurate
calculations, the favorable issue should not have appeared as
clear to my view as a ray of light. The failure of an attempt
against the posts of the enemy, could, in no other possible
situation during the war, have been so fatal to our cause.

That much trouble was taken and finesse used to misguide and
bewilder Sir Henry Clinton, in regard to the real object, by
fictitious communications, as well as by making a deceptiv
provision of ovens, forage, and boats, in his neighborhood,
is certain: Nor were less pains taken to deceive our own
army; for I had always conceived, where the imposition did
not completely take place at home, it could never
sufficiently succeed abroad.

Your desire of obtaining truth, is very laudable; I wish I
had more leisure to gratify it, as I am equally solicitous
the undisguised verity should be known. Many circumstances
will unavoidably be misconceived and misrepresented.
Notwithstanding most of the papers, which may properly be
deemed official, are preserved; yet the knowlege of
innumerable things, of a more delicate and secret nature, is
confined to the perishable remembrance of some few of the
present generation.

With esteem, I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

G. WASHINGTON.

To ----.

A few months after the surrender of Cornwallis, the British evacuated all their posts in South Carolina and Georgia, and retired to the main army in New York.

The next spring, (1782) Sir Guy Carleton arrived in New York, and took the command of the British army, in America. Immediately on his arrival, he acquainted General Washington and Congress, that negociations for a peace had been commenced at Paris.

On the 30th of November, 1782, the provisional articles of peace were signed at Paris; by which Great Britain acknowleged the independence and sovereignty of the United States of America; and these articles were afterwards ratified by a definitiv treaty.

Thus ended a long and arduous conflict, in which Great Britain expended near an hundred millions of money, with an hundred thousand lives, and won nothing. America endured every cruelty and distress from her enemies; lost many lives and much treasure; but delivered herself from a foreign dominion, and gained a rank among the nations of the earth.

Holland acknowleged the independence of the United States on the 19th of April, 1782; Sweden, February 5th, 1783; Denmark, the 25th of February; Spain, in March, and Russia in July, 1783.

No sooner was peace restored by the definitiv treaty, and the British troops withdrawn from the country, than the United States began to experience the defects of their general government. While an enemy was in the country, fear, which had first impelled the colonies to associate in mutual defence, continued to operate as a band of political union. It gave to the resolutions and recommendations of Congress the force of laws, and generally commanded a ready acquiescence on the part of the State legislatures. Articles of confederation and perpetual union had been framed in Congress, and submitted to the consideration of the States, in the year 1778. Some of the States immediately acceded to them; but others, which had not unappropriated lands, hesitated to subscribe a compact, which would giv an advantage to the States which possessed large tracts of unlocated lands, and were thus capable of a great superiority in wealth and population. All objections however had been overcome, and by the accession of Maryland in March, 1781, the articles of confederation were ratified, as the frame of government for the United States.

These articles, however were framed during the rage of war, when a principle of common safety supplied the place of a coerciv power in government; by men who could have had no experience in the art of governing an extensiv country, and under circumstances the most critical and embarrassing. To have offered to the people at that time, a system of government armed with the powers necessary to regulate and control the contending interests of thirteen States, and the possessions of millions of people, might have raised a jealousy between the States or in the minds of the people at large, that would have weakened the operations of war, and perhaps have rendered a union impracticable. Hence the numerous defects of the confederation.

On the conclusion of peace, these defects began to be felt. Each State assumed the right of disputing the propriety of the resolutions of Congress, and the interest of an individual State was placed in opposition to the common interest of the union. In addition to this source of division, a jealousy of the powers of Congress began to be excited in the minds of people.

This jealousy of the privileges of freemen, had been roused by the oppressiv acts of the British parliament; and no sooner had the danger from this quarter ceased, than the fears of people changed their object, and were turned against their own rulers.

In this situation, there were not wanting men of industry and talents, who had been enemies to the revolution, and who embraced the opportunity to multiply the apprehensions of people and increase the popular discontents. A remarkable instance of this happened in Connecticut. As soon as the tumults of war had subsided, an attempt was made to convince the people, that the act of Congress passed in 1778, granting to the officers of the army, half pay for life, was highly unjust and tyrannical; and that it was but the first step towards the establishment of pensions and an uncontrolable despotism. The act of Congress, passed in 1783, commuting half pay for life for five years full pay, was designed to appease the apprehensions of people, and to convince them that this gratuity was intended merely to indemnify the officers for their losses by the depreciation of the paper currency; and not to establish a precedent for the granting of pensions. This act, however, did not satisfy the people, who supposed that the officers had been generally indemnified for the loss of their pay, by the grants made them from time to time by the legislatures of the several States. Besides the act, while it gave five years full pay to the officers, allowed but one year's pay to the privates; a distinction which had great influence in exciting and continuing the popular ferment, and one that turned a large share of the public rage against the officers themselves.

The moment an alarm was raised respecting this act of Congress, the enemies of our independence became activ in blowing up the flame, by spreading reports unfavorable to the general government, and tending to create public dissensions. Newspapers, in some parts of the country, were filled with inflammatory publications; while false reports and groundless insinuations were industriously circulated to the prejudice of Congress and the officers of the late army. Among a people feelingly alive to every thing that could affect the rights for which they had been contending, these reports could not fail of having a powerful effect; the clamor soon became general; the officers of the army, it was believed, had attempted to raise their fortunes on the distresses of their fellow citizens, and Congress become the tyrants of their country.

Connecticut was the seat of this uneasiness; altho other States were much agitated on the occasion. But the inhabitants of that State, accustomed to order and a due subordination to the laws, did not proceed to outrages; they took their usual mode of collecting the sense of the State; assembled in town meetings; appointed committees to meet in convention, and consult what measures should be adopted to procure a redress of their grievances. In this convention, which was held at Middletown, some nugatory resolves were passed, exploiting a disapprobation of the half pay act, and the subsequent commutation of the grant for five years whole pay. The same spirit also discovered itself in the assembly, at their October session, in 1783. A remonstrance against the acts in favor of the officers, was framed in the house of representativs, and notwithstanding the upper house refused to concur in the measure, it was sent to Congress.

During this situation of affairs, the public odium against the officers, was augmented by another circumstance. The officers, just before the disbanding of the army, had formed a society, called by the name of the _Cincinnati_, after the Roman Dictator, Cincinnatus, which, it was said, was intended to perpetuate the memory of the revolution, the friendship of the officers, and the union of the States; and also to raise a fund for the relief of poor widows and orphans, whose husbands and fathers had fallen during the war, and for their descendants. The society was divided into State societies, which were to meet on the 4th of July, and with other business, depute a number of their members to convene annually in general meeting. The members of the institution were to be distinguished by wearing a medal, emblematical of the design of the society, and the honors and advantages were to be hereditary in the eldest male heirs, and in default of male issue, in the collateral male heirs. Honorary members were to be admitted, but without the hereditary advantages of the society, and provided their number would never exceed the ratio of one to four of the officers or their descendants.

Whatever were the real views of the framers of this institution, its design was generally understood to be harmless and honorable. The ostensible views of the society could not however skreen it from popular jealousy. A spirited pamphlet appeared in South Carolina, the avowed production of Mr. Burke, one of the judges of the supreme court in that State, in which the author attempted to prove that the principles, on which the society was formed, would, in process of time, originate and establish an order of nobility in this country, which would be repugnant to the genius of our republican governments, and dangerous to liberty. This pamphlet appeared in Connecticut, during the commotions raised by the half pay and commutation acts, and contributed not a little to spread the flame of opposition. Nothing could exceed the odium which prevailed at this time, against the men who had hazarded their persons and properties in the revolution.

Notwithstanding the discontents of the people were general, and ready to burst forth in sedition, yet men of information, viz. the officers of government, the clergy, and persons of liberal education, were mostly opposed to the unconstitutional steps taken by the committees and convention at Middletown. They supported the propriety of the measures of Congress, both by conversation and writing, proved that such grants to the army were necessary to keep the troops together, and that the expense would not be enormous nor oppressiv. During the close of the year 1783, every possible exertion was made to enlighten the people, and such was the effect of the arguments used by the minority, that in the beginning of the following year, the opposition subsided, the committees were dismissed, and tranquillity restored to the State. In May, the legislature were able to carry several measures which had before been extremely unpopular. An act was passed, granting the import of five per cent. to Congress; another giving great encouragement to commerce, and several towns were incorporated with extensiv privileges, for the purpose of regulating the exports of the State, and facilitating the collection of debts.

The opposition to the Congressional acts in favor of the officers, and to the order of the Cincinnati, did not rise to the same pitch in the other States as in Connecticut; yet it produced much disturbance in Massachusetts, and some others. Jealousy of power had been universally spread among the people of the United States. The destruction of the old forms of governments, and the licentiousness of war had, in a great measure, broken their habits of obedience; their passions had been inflamed by the cry of despotism; and like centinels, who have been suddenly surprised by the approach of an enemy, the rustling of a leaf was sufficient to giv them an alarm. This spirit of jealousy, which has not yet subsided, and which will probably continue visible during the present generation, operated with other causes to relax the energy of our federal operations.

During the war, vast sums of paper currency had been emitted by Congress, and large quantities of specie had been introduced, towards the close of the war, by the French army, and the Spanish trade. This plenty of money enabled the States to comply with the first requisitions of Congress; so that during two or three years, the federal treasury was, in some measure, supplied. But when the danger of war had ceased, and the vast importations of foreign goods had lessened the quantity of circulating specie, the States began to be very remiss in furnishing their proportion of monies. The annihilation of the credit of the paper bills had totally stopped their circulation, and the specie was leaving the country in cargoes, for remittances to Great Britain; still the luxurious habits of the people, contracted during the war, called for new supplies of goods, and private gratification seconded the narrow policy of State interest in defeating the operations of the general government.

Thus the revenues of Congress were annually diminishing; some of the States wholly neglecting to make provision for paying the interest of the national debt; others making but a partial provision, until the scanty supplies received from a few of the rich States, would hardly satisfy the demands of the civil list.

This weakness of the federal government, in conjunction with the flood of certificates or public securities, which Congress could neither fund nor pay, occasioned them to depreciate to a very inconsiderable value. The officers and soldiers of the late army were obliged to receive for wages these certificates, or promissary notes, which passed at a fifth, or eighth, or a tenth of their nominal value; being thus deprived at once of the greatest part of the reward due for their services. Some indeed profited by speculations in these evidences of the public debt; but such as were under a necessity of parting with them, were robbed of that support which they had a right to expect and demand from their countrymen.

Pensylvania indeed made provision for paying the interest of her debts, both State and federal; assuming her supposed proportion of the continental debt, and giving the creditors her own State notes in exchange for those of the United States. The resources of that State are immense, but she has not been able to make punctual payments, even in a depreciated paper currency.

Massachusetts, in her zeal to comply fully with the requisitions of Congress, and satisfy the demands of her own creditors, laid a heavy tax upon the people. This was the immediate cause of the rebellion in that State, in 1786. But a heavy debt lying on the State, added to burdens of the same nature, upon almost every incorporation within it; a decline, or rather an extinction of public credit; a relaxation and corruption of manners, and a free use of foreign luxuries; a decay of trade and manufactures, with a prevailing scarcity of money; and, above all, individuals involved in debt to each other: These were the real, though more remote causes of the insurrection. It was the tax which the people were required to pay, that caused them to feel evils which we have enumerated: This called forth all their other grievances; and the first act of violence committed, was the burning or destroying of a tax bill. This sedition threw the State into a convulsion which lasted about a year; courts of justice were violently obstructed; the collection of debts was suspended; and a body of armed troops, under the command of General Lincoln, was employed during the winter of 1786, to disperse the insurgents. Yet so numerous were the latter in the counties of Worcester, Hampshire and Berkshire, and so obstinately combined to oppose the execution of law by force, that the Governor and Council of the State thought proper not to intrust General Lincoln with military powers, except to act on the defensiv, and to repel force with force, in case the insurgents should attack him. The leaders of the rebels however were not men of talents; they were desperate, but without fortitude; and while they were supported with a superior force, they appeared to be impressed with that consciousness of guilt, which awes the most daring wretch, and makes him shrink from his purpose. This appears by the conduct of a large party of the rebels before the magazine at Springfield; where General Shepard with a small guard, was stationed to protect the continental stores. The insurgents appeared upon the plain, with a vast superiority of numbers, but a few shot from the artillery made the multitude retreat in disorder, with the loss of four men. This spirited conduct of General Shepard, with the industry, perseverance and prudent firmness of General Lincoln, dispersed the rebels, drove the leaders from the State, and restored tranquillity. An act of indemnity was passed in the Legislature for all the insurgents, except a few leaders, on condition they should become peaceable subjects, and take the oath of allegiance. The leaders afterwards petitioned for pardon, which, from motivs of policy, was granted by the Legislature.

But the loss of public credit, popular disturbances, and insurrections, were not the only evils which were generated by the peculiar circumstances of the times. The emissions of bills of credit and tender laws, were added to the black catalogue of political disorders.

The expedient of supplying the deficiencies of specie, by emissions of paper bills, was adopted very early in the colonies. The expedient was obvious and produced good effects. In a new country, where population is rapid, and the value of lands increasing, the farmer finds an advantage in paying legal interest for money; for if he can pay the interest by his profits, the increasing value of his lands will, in a few years, discharge the principal.

In no colony was this advantage more sensibly experienced than in Pensylvania. The emigrants to that province were numerous; the natural population rapid; and these circumstances combined, advanced the value of real property to an astonishing degree. As the first settlers there, as well as in other provinces, were poor, the purchase of a few foreign articles drained them of specie. Indeed for many years, the balance of trade must have necessarily been greatly against the colonies.

But bills of credit, emitted by the State and loaned to the industrious inhabitants, supplied the want of specie, and enabled the farmer to purchase stock. These bills were generally a legal tender in all colonial or private contracts, and the sums issued did not generally exceed the quantity requisit for a medium of trade; they retained their full nominal value in the purchase of commodities. But as they were not received by the British merchants, in payment for goods, there was a great demand for specie and bills, which occasioned the latter at various times to appreciate. Thus was introduced a difference between the English sterling money and the currencies of the colonies which remains to this day.[47]

[47] A dollar, in sterling money, is 4_s_6. But the price of
a dollar rose in New England currency to 6_s_; in New York to
8_s_; in New Jersey, Pensylvania and Maryland to 7_s_6; in
Virginia to 6_s_; in North Carolina to 8_s_; in South
Carolina and Georgia to 4_s_8. This difference, originating
between paper and specie, or bills, continued afterwards to
exist in the nominal estimation of gold and silver.

_Franklin's Miscel. Works, p. 217._

The advantages the colonies had derived from bills of credit, under the British government, suggested to Congress, in 1775, the idea of issuing bills for the purpose of carrying on the war. And this was perhaps their only expedient. Money could not be raised by taxation; it could not be borrowed. The first emissions had no other effect upon the medium of commerce, than to drive the specie from circulation. But when the paper substituted for specie, had, by repeated millions, augmented the sum in circulation, much beyond the usual sum of specie, the bills began to lose their value. The depreciation continued in proportion to the sums emitted, until seventy, and even one hundred and fifty nominal paper dollars, were hardly an equivalent for one Spanish milled dollar. Still from the year 1775 to 1781, this depreciating paper currency was almost the only medium of trade. It supplied the place of specie, and enabled Congress to support a numerous army; until the sum in circulation amounted to two hundred millions of dollars. But about the year 1780, specie began to be plentiful, being introduced by the French army, a private trade with the Spanish islands, and an illicit intercourse with the British garrison at New York. This circumstance accelerated the depreciation of the paper bills, until their value had sunk almost to nothing. In 1781, the merchants and brokers in the southern States, apprehensiv of the approaching fate of the currency, pushed immense quantities of it suddenly into New England, made vast purchases of goods in Boston, and instantly the bills vanished from circulation.

The whole history of this continental paper is a history of public and private frauds. Old specie debts were often paid in a depreciated currency, and even new contracts for a few weeks or days were often discharged with a small part of the value received. From this plenty and fluctuating state of the medium, sprung hosts of speculators and itinerant traders, who left their honest occupations for the prospect of immense gains, in a fraudulent business, that depended on no fixed principles, and the profits of which could be reduced to no certain calculations.

To increase these evils, a project was formed to fix the prices of articles, and restrain persons from giving or receiving more for any commodity than the price stated by authority. These regulating acts were reprobated by every man acquainted with commerce and finance; as they were intended to prevent an effect without removing the cause. To attempt to fix the value of money, while streams of bills were incessantly flowing from the treasury of the United States, was as ridiculous as an attempt to restrain the rising of water in rivers amidst showers of rain.

Notwithstanding all opposition, some States framed and attempted to enforce these regulating acts. The effect was, a momentary apparent stand in the price of articles; innumerable acts of collusion and evasion among the dishonest; numberless injuries done to the honest; and finally a total disregard of all such regulations, and the consequential contempt of laws and the authority of the magistrate.

During these fluctuations of business, occasioned by the variable value of money, people lost sight, in some measure, of the steady principles which had before governed their intercourse with each other. Speculations followed and relaxed the rigor of commercial obligations.

Industry likewise had suffered by the flood of money which had deluged the States. The prices of produce had risen in proportion to the quantity of money in circulation, and the demand for the commodities of the country. This made the acquisition of money easy, and indolence and luxury, with their train of desolating consequences, spread themselves among all descriptions of people.

But as soon as hostilities between Great Britain and America were suspended, the scene was changed. The bills emitted by Congress had long before ceased to circulate; and the specie of the country was soon drained off to pay for foreign goods, the importations of which exceeded all calculation. Within two years from the close of the war, _a scarcity of money_ was the general cry. The merchants found it impossible to collect their debts, and make punctual remittances to their creditors in Great Britain; and the consumers were driven to the necessity of retrenching their superfluities in living and of returning to their ancient habits of industry and economy.

This change was however progressiv and slow. In many of the States which suffered by the numerous debts they had contracted, and by the distresses of war, the people called aloud for emissions of paper bills to supply the deficiency of a medium. The depreciation of the continental bills, was a recent example of the ill effects of such an expedient, and the impossibility of supporting the credit of paper, was urged by the opposers of the measure as a substantial argument against adopting it. But nothing would silence the popular clamor; and many men of the first talents and eminence, united their voices with that of the populace. Paper money had formerly maintained its credit, and been of singular utility; and past experience, notwithstanding a change of circumstances, was an argument in its favor that bore down all opposition.

Pensylvania, although one of the richest States in the union, was the first to emit bills of credit, as a substitute for specie. But the revolution had removed the necessity of it, at the same time that it had destroyed the means by which its former credit had been supported. Lands, at the close of the war, were not rising in value; bills on London could not so readily be purchased, as while the province was dependent on Great Britain; the State was split into parties, one of which attempted to defeat the measures most popular with the other; and the depreciation of continental bills, with the injuries which it had done to individuals, inspired a general distrust of all public promises.

Notwithstanding a part of the money was loaned on good landed security, and the faith of that wealthy State pledged for the redemption of the whole at its nominal value, yet the advantages of specie as a medium of commerce, especially as an article of remittance to London, soon made a difference of ten per cent. between the bills of credit and specie. This difference may be considered rather as an appreciation of gold and silver, than a depreciation of paper; but its effects, in a commercial State, must be highly prejudicial. It opens the door to frauds of all kinds, and frauds are usually practised on the honest and unsuspecting, especially upon all classes of laborers.

This currency of Pensylvania is receivable in all payments at the custom house, and for certain taxes, at its nominal value; yet it has sunk to two thirds of this value, in the few commercial transactions where it is received.

North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, had recourse to the same wretched expedient to supply themselves with money; not reflecting that industry, frugality, and good commercial laws are the only means of turning the balance of trade in favor of a country, and that this balance is the only permanent source of solid wealth and ready money. But the bills they emitted shared a worse fate than those of Pensylvania; they expelled almost all the circulating cash from the States; they lost a great part of their nominal value; they impoverished the merchants, and embarrassed the planters.

The State of Virginia had too much wisdom to emit bills; but tolerated a practice among the inhabitants of cutting dollars and smaller pieces of silver, in order to prevent it from leaving the State. This pernicious practice prevailed also in Georgia.[48]

[48] A dollar was usually cut in five pieces, and each passed
by toll for a quarter; so that the man who cut it gained a
quarter, or rather a fifth. If the State should recoin this
silver, it must lose a fifth.

Maryland escaped the calamity of a paper currency. The house of delegates brought forward a bill for the emission of bills of credit to a large amount; but the senate firmly and successfully resisted the pernicious scheme. The opposition between the two houses was violent and tumultuous; it threatened the State with anarchy; but the question was carried to the people, and the good sense of the senate finally prevailed.

New Jersey is situated between two or the largest commercial towns in America, and consequently drained of specie. This State also emitted a large sum in bills of credit, which served to pay the interest of the public debt; but the currency depreciated, as in other States.

Rhode Island exhibits a melancholy proof of that licentiousness and anarchy which always follows a relaxation of the moral principles. In a rage for supplying the State with money, and filling every man's pocket without obliging him to earn it by his diligence, the Legislature passed an act for making one hundred thousand pounds in bills; a sum much more than sufficient for a medium of trade in that State, even without any specie. The merchants in Newport and Providence opposed the act with firmness; their opposition added fresh vigour to the resolution of the assembly, and induced them to inforce the scheme by a legal lender of a most extraordinary nature. They passed an act, ordaining that if any creditor should refuse to take their bills, for any debt whatever, the debtor might lodge the sum due, with a justice of the peace, who should giv notice of it in the public papers; and if the creditor did not appear and receive the money within six months from the first notice, his debt should be forfeited. This act astonished all honest men, and even the promoters of paper money making in other States, and on other principles, reprobated this act of Rhode Island, as wicked and oppressiv. But the State was governed by faction. During the cry for paper money, a number of boisterous ignorant men, were elected into the Legislature, from the smaller towns in the State. Finding themselves united with a majority in opinion, they formed and executed any plan their inclination suggested; they opposed every measure that was agreeable to the mercantile interest; they not only made bad laws to suit their own wicked purposes, but appointed their own corrupt creatures to fill the judicial and executiv departments. Their money depreciated sufficiently to answer all their vile purposes in the discharge of debts; business almost totally ceased; all confidence was lost; the State was thrown into confusion at home, and was execrated abroad.

Massachusetts Bay had the good fortune, amidst her political calamities, to prevent an emission of bills of credit. New Hampshire made no paper; but in the distresses which followed her loss of business after the war, the Legislature made horses, lumber, and most articles of produce a legal tender in the fulfilment of contracts. It is doubtless unjust to oblige a creditor to receive any thing for his debt, which he had not in contemplation at the time of the contract. But as the commodities which were to be a tender by the law of New Hampshire, were of an intrinsic value, bearing some proportion to the amount of the debt, the injustice of the law was less flagrant, than that which enforced the tender of paper in Rhode Island. Indeed a similar law prevailed for some time in Massachusetts; and in Connecticut it is optional with the creditor, either to imprison the debtor, or take land on an execution, at a price to be fixed by three indifferent freeholders; provided no other means of payment shall appear to satisfy the demand. It must not however be omitted, that while the most flourishing commercial States introduced a paper medium, to the great injury of honest men, a bill for an emission of paper in Connecticut, where there is very little specie, could never command more than one eighth of the votes of the Legislature. The movers of the bill have hardly escaped ridicule; so generally is the measure reprobated as a source of fraud and public mischief.

The Legislature of New York, a State that had the least necessity and apology for making paper money, as her commercial advantages always furnish her with specie sufficient for a medium, issued a large sum in bills of credit, which support their value better than the currency of any other State. Still the paper has raised the value of specie, which is always in demand for exportation, and this difference of exchange between paper and specie, exposes commerce to most of the inconveniencies resulting from a depreciated medium.

Such is the history of paper money thus far; a miserable substitute for real coin, in a country where the reins of government are too weak to compel the fulfilment of public engagements; and where all confidence in public faith is totally destroyed.

While the States were thus endeavoring to repair the loss of specie, by empty promises, and to support their business by shadows, rather than by reality, the British ministry formed some commercial regulations that deprived them of the profits of their trade to the West Indies and to Great Britain. Heavy duties were laid upon such articles as were remitted to the London merchants for their goods, and such were the duties upon American bottoms, that the States were almost wholly deprived of the carrying trade. A prohibition was laid upon the produce of the United States, shipped to the English West India Islands in American built vessels, and in those manned by American seamen. These restrictions fell heavy upon the eastern States, which depended much upon ship building for the support of their trade; and they materially injured the business of the other States.

Without a union that was able to form and execute a general system of commercial regulations, some of the States attempted to impose restraints upon the British trade that should indemnify the merchant for the losses he had suffered, or induce the British ministry to enter into a commercial treaty, and relax the rigor of their navigation laws. These measures however produced nothing but mischief. The States did not act in concert, and the restraints laid on the trade of one State operated to throw the business into the hands of its neighbor. Massachusetts, in her zeal to counteract the effect of the English navigation laws, laid enormous duties upon British goods imported into that State; but the other States did not adopt a similar measure; and the loss of business soon obliged that State to repeal or suspend the law. Thus when Pensylvania laid heavy duties on British goods, Delaware and New Jersey made a number of free ports to encourage the landing of goods within the limits of those States; and the duties in Pensylvania served no purpose, but to create smuggling.

Thus divided, the States began to feel their weakness. Most of the Legislatures had neglected to comply with the requisitions of Congress for furnishing the federal treasury; the resolves of Congress were disregarded; the proposition for a general import to be laid and collected by Congress was negatived first by Rhode Island, and afterwards by New York. The British troops continued, under pretence of a breach of treaty on the part of America, to hold possession of the forts on the frontiers of the States, and thus commanded the fur trade. Many of the States individually were infested with popular commotions or iniquitous tender laws, while they were oppressed with public debts; the certificates or public notes had lost most of their value, and circulated merely as the objects of speculation; Congress lost their respectability, and the United States their credit and importance.

In the midst of these calamities, a proposition was made in 1785, in the house of delegates, in Virginia, to appoint commissioners, to meet such as might be appointed in the other States, who should form a system of commercial regulations for the United States, and recommend it to the several Legislatures for adoption. Commissioners were accordingly appointed and a request was made to the Legislatures of the other States to accede to the proposition. Accordingly several of the States appointed commissioners, who met at Annapolis in the summer of 1786, to consult what measures should be taken to unite the States in some general and efficient commercial system. But as the States were not all represented, and the powers of the commissioners were, in their opinion, too limited to propose a system of regulations adequate to the purposes of government, they agreed to recommend a general convention to be held at Philadelphia the next year, with powers to frame a general plan of government for the United States. This measure appeared to the commissioners absolutely necessary. The old confederation was essentially defectiv. It was destitute of almost every principle necessary to giv effect to legislation.

It was defectiv in the article of legislating over States, instead of individuals. All history testifies that recommendations will not operate as laws, and compulsion cannot be exercised over States, without violence, war and anarchy. The confederation was also destitute of a sanction to its laws. When resolutions were passed in Congress, there was no power to compel obedience by fine, by suspension of privileges or other means. It was also destitute of a guarantee for the State governments. Had one State been invaded by its neighbor, the union was not constitutionally bound to assist in repelling the invasion, and supporting the constitution of the invaded State. The confederation was further deficient in the principle of apportioning the quotas of money to be furnished by each State; in a want of power to form commercial laws, and to raise troops for the defence and security of the union; in the equal suffrage of the States, which placed Rhode Island on a footing in Congress with Virginia; and to crown all the defects, we may add the want of a judiciary power, to define the laws of the union, and to reconcile the contradictory decisions of a number of independent judicatories.

These and many inferior defects were obvious to the commissioners, and therefore they urged a general convention, with powers to form and offer to the consideration of the States, a system of general government that should be less exceptionable. Accordingly in May, 1787, delegates from all the States, except Rhode Island, assembled at Philadelphia; and chose General Washington for their president. After four months deliberation, in which the clashing interests of the several States, appeared in all their force, the convention agreed to recommend a plan of federal government, &c.

As soon as the plan of the federal constitution was submitted to the Legislatures of the several States, they proceeded to take measures for collecting the sense of the people upon the propriety of adopting it. In the small State of Delaware, a convention was called in November, which, after a few days deliberation, ratified the constitution, without a dissenting voice.

In the convention of Pensylvania, held the same month, there was a spirited opposition to the new form of government. The debates were long and interesting. Great abilities and firmness were displayed on both sides; but, on the 13th of December, the constitution was received by two thirds of the members. The minority were dissatisfied, and with an obstinacy that ill became the representativs of a free people, published their reasons of dissent, which were calculated to inflame a party already violent, and which, in fact, produced some disturbances in the western parts of the State. But the opposition has since subsided.

In New Jersey, the convention which met in December, were unanimous in adopting the constitution; as was likewise that of Georgia.

In Connecticut there was some opposition; but the constitution was, on the 9th of January, 1788, ratified by three fourths of the votes in convention, and the minority peaceably acquiesced in the decision.

In Massachusetts, the opposition was large and respectable. The convention, consisting of more than three hundred delegates, were assembled in January, and continued their debates, with great candor and liberality, about five weeks. At length the question was carried for the constitution by a small majority, and the minority, with that manly condescension which becomes great minds, submitted to the measure, and united to support the government.

In New Hampshire, the federal cause was, for some time doubtful. The greatest number of the delegates in convention, were at first on the side of the opposition; and some, who might have had their objections removed by the discussion of the subject, instructed to reject the constitution. Altho the instructions of constituents cannot, on the true principles of representation, be binding upon a deputy, in any legislativ assembly, because his constituents are but a _part_ of the State, and have not heard the arguments and objections of the _whole_; whereas, his act is to affect the _whole_ State, and therefore is to be directed by the sense or wisdom of the whole, collected in the legislativ assembly; yet the delegates in the New Hampshire convention conceived, very erroneously, that the sense of the freemen in the towns, those little districts, where no act of legislation can be performed, imposed a restraint upon their own wills.[49] An adjournment was therefore moved, and carried. This gave the people opportunity to gain a farther knowlege of the merits of the constitution, and at the second meeting of the convention, it was ratified by a respectable majority.

[49] This pernicious opinion has prevailed in all the States,
and done infinit mischief.

In Maryland, several men of abilities appeared in the opposition, and were unremitted in their endeavors to persuade the people, that the proposed plan of government was artfully calculated to deprive them of their dearest rights; yet in convention it appeared that five sixths of the voices were in favor of it.

In South Carolina, the opposition was respectable; but two thirds of the convention appeared to advocate and vote for the constitution.

In Virginia, many of the principal characters opposed the ratification of the constitution with great abilities and industry. But after a full discussion of the subject, a small majority, of a numerous convention, appeared for its adoption.

In New York, two thirds of the delegates in convention were, at their first meeting, determined to reject the constitution. Here, therefore, the debates were the most interesting, and the event extremely doubtful. The argument was managed with uncommon address and abilities on both sides of the question. But during the session, the ninth and tenth States had acceded to the proposed plan, so that by the constitution, Congress were empowered to issue an ordinance for organizing the new government. This event placed the opposition on new ground; and the expediency of uniting with the other States; the generous motivs of conciliating all differences, and the danger of a rejection, influenced a respectable number, who were originally opposed to the constitution, to join the federal interest. The constitution was accordingly ratified by a small majority; but the ratification was accompanied here, as in Virginia, with a bill of rights, declaratory of the sense of the convention, as to certain great principles, and with a catalogue of amendments, which were to be recommended to the consideration of the new Congress, and the several State Legislatures.

North Carolina met in convention in July, to deliberate on the new constitution. After a short session they rejected it, by a majority of one hundred and seventy six, against seventy six.

Rhode Island was doomed to be the sport of a blind and singular policy. The Legislature, in consistency with the measures which had been before pursued, did not call a convention, to collect the sense of the State upon the proposed constitution; but in an unconstitutional and absurd manner, submitted the plan of government to the consideration of the people. Accordingly it was brought before town meetings, and in most of them rejected. In some of the large towns, particularly in Newport and Providence, the people collected and resolved, with great propriety, that they could not take up the subject; and that the proposition for embracing or rejecting the federal constitution, could come before no tribunal but that of the _State_ in convention or legislature.

From the moment the proceedings of the general convention at Philadelphia transpired, the public mind was exceedingly agitated, and suspended between hope and fear, until nine States had ratified the plan of a federal government. Indeed, the anxiety continued until Virginia and New York had acceded to the system. But this did not prevent the demonstrations of joy, on the accession of each State.

On the ratification in Massachusetts, the citizens of Boston, in the elevation of their joy, formed a procession in honor of the happy event, which was novel, splendid and magnificent. This example was afterwards followed, and in some instances improved upon, in Baltimore, Charleston, Philadelphia, New Haven, Portsmouth and New York, successivly. Nothing could equal the beauty and grandeur of these exhibitions. A ship was mounted upon wheels, and drawn thro the streets; mechanics erected stages, and exhibited specimens of labor in their several occupations, as they moved along the road; flags with emblems, descriptiv of all the arts and of the federal union, were invented and displayed in honor of the government; multitudes of all ranks in life assembled to view the majestic scenes; while sobriety, joy and harmony marked the brilliant exhibitions, by which the Americans celebrated the establishment of their empire.

In March, 1789, the delegates from the eleven ratifying States, convened in New York, where convenient and elegant accommodations had been furnished by the citizens. On opening the ballots for President, it appeared that the late Commander in Chief of our armies was unanimously elected to the dignified office. This event diffused universal joy among the friends to the union.

The deliberations of the first American Legislature were marked with wisdom, spirit, and generally with candor. The establishment of a revenue and judiciary system, with other national measures; the wise appointments to offices; the promptness and energy of the executiv, with a growing popular attachment to the general government, open the fairest prospect of peace, union and prosperity to these States; a prospect that is brightened by the accession of North Carolina to the government in November, 1789.

No. XVI.

REMARKS _on the_ METHOD _of_ BURYING _the_ DEAD _among the_ NATIVS _of this_ COUNTRY; _compared with that among the ancient_ BRITONS.

Being an Extract of a Letter to the Rev. Dr. STILES, President of Yale College, dated New York, January 20, 1788.

[NOTE. _I had embraced the idea, that the remarkable fortifications on the Muskingum, might be justly ascribed to the Spaniards, under Ferdinand de Soto, who penetrated into Florida, about the year 1540; which opinion I endeavored to maintain as probably well founded, and wrote three or four letters on the subject, to Dr. Stiles, which were published in 1789. It is now very clear that my opinion was_ not _well founded; but that_ Chicaca, _which I had supposed to be Muskingum, ought to have been written_ Chicaça, _with a cedilla, as it is in the original Spanish; and pronounced_ Chikesaw. _This determins the place of Soto's winter quarters, the second year after landing, to be in the territories of the present_ Chikesaws. _Those letters, therefore, are not worth republishing; but the following extract, on a different subject, may be considered as worthy of preservation._]

But how shall we account for the mounts, caves, graves, &c. and for the contents, which evince the existence of the custom of burning the dead or their bones; can these be ascribed to the Spaniards? I presume, Sir, you will be of opinion they cannot. Capt. Heart says,[50] these graves are small mounts of earth, from some of which human bones have been taken; in one were found bones in the natural position of a man, buried nearly east and west, and a quantity of ising glass on his breast; in the other graves, the bones were irregular, some calcined by fire, others burnt only to a certain degree, so as to render them more durable; in others the mouldered bones retain their shape, without any substance; others are partly rotten and partly the remains of decayed bones; in most of the graves were found stones evidently burnt, pieces of charcoal, Indian arrows and pieces of earthen ware, which appeared to be a composition of shells and cement.

[50] Columbian Magazine for May, 1787.