Chapter XVI: Part 16

But inasmuch as the General Commanding the armies of the United States
has been appointed _ad interim_, and has notified me that he has
accepted the appointment, I have no alternative but to submit, under
protest, to superior force.

It will not escape attention that in his note of August 5 Mr. Stanton stated that he had been constrained to continue in the office, even before he was requested to resign, by considerations of a high public character. In this note of August 12 a new and different sense of public duty compels him to deny the President's right to suspend him from office without the consent of the Senate. This last is the public duty of resisting an act contrary to law, and he charges the President with violation of the law in ordering his suspension.

Mr. Stanton refers generally to the Constitution and laws of the "United States," and says that a sense of public duty "under" these compels him to deny the right of the President to suspend him from office. As to his sense of duty under the Constitution, that will be considered in the sequel. As to his sense of duty under "the laws of the United States," he certainly can not refer to the law which creates the War Department, for that expressly confers upon the President the unlimited right to remove the head of the Department. The only other law bearing upon the question is the tenure-of-office act, passed by Congress over the Presidential veto March 2, 1867. This is the law which, under a sense of public duty, Mr. Stanton volunteers to defend.

There is no provision in this law which compels any officer coming within its provisions to remain in office. It forbids removals--not resignations. Mr. Stanton was perfectly free to resign at any moment, either upon his own motion or in compliance with a request or an order. It was a matter of choice or of taste. There was nothing compulsory in the nature of legal obligation. Nor does he put his action upon that imperative ground. He says he acts under a "sense of public duty," not of legal obligation, compelling him to hold on and leaving him no choice. The public duty which is upon him arises from the respect which he owes to the Constitution and the laws, violated in his own case. He is therefore compelled by this sense of public duty to vindicate violated law and to stand as its champion.

This was not the first occasion in which Mr. Stanton, in discharge of a public duty, was called upon to consider the provisions of that law. That tenure-of-office law did not pass without notice. Like other acts, it was sent to the President for approval. As is my custom, I submitted its consideration to my Cabinet for their advice upon the question whether I should approve it or not. It was a grave question of constitutional law, in which I would, of course, rely most upon the opinion of the Attorney-General and of Mr. Stanton, who had once been Attorney-General.

Every member of my Cabinet advised me that the proposed law was unconstitutional. All spoke without doubt or reservation, but Mr. Stanton's condemnation of the law was the most elaborate and emphatic. He referred to the constitutional provisions, the debates in Congress, especially to the speech of Mr. Buchanan when a Senator, to the decisions of the Supreme Court, and to the usage from the beginning of the Government through every successive Administration, all concurring to establish the right of removal as vested by the Constitution in the President. To all these he added the weight of his own deliberate judgment, and advised me that it was my duty to defend the power of the President from usurpation and to veto the law.

I do not know when a sense of public duty is more imperative upon a head of Department than upon such an occasion as this. He acts then under the gravest obligations of law, for when he is called upon by the President for advice it is the Constitution which speaks to him. All his other duties are left by the Constitution to be regulated by statute, but this duty was deemed so momentous that it is imposed by the Constitution itself.

After all this I was not prepared for the ground taken by Mr. Stanton in his note of August 12. I was not prepared to find him compelled by a new and indefinite sense of public duty, under "the Constitution," to assume the vindication of a law which, under the solemn obligations of public duty imposed by the Constitution itself, he advised me was a violation of that Constitution. I make great allowance for a change of opinion, but such a change as this hardly falls within the limits of greatest indulgence.

Where our opinions take the shape of advice, and influence the action of others, the utmost stretch of charity will scarcely justify us in repudiating them when they come to be applied to ourselves.

But to proceed with the narrative. I was so much struck with the full mastery of the question manifested by Mr. Stanton, and was at the time so fully occupied with the preparation of another veto upon the pending reconstruction act, that I requested him to prepare the veto upon this tenure-of-office bill. This he declined, on the ground of physical disability to undergo at the time the labor of writing, but stated his readiness to furnish what aid might be required in the preparation of materials for the paper.

At the time this subject was before the Cabinet it seemed to be taken for granted that as to those members of the Cabinet who had been appointed by Mr. Lincoln their tenure of office was not fixed by the provisions of the act. I do not remember that the point was distinctly decided, but I well recollect that it was suggested by one member of the Cabinet who was appointed by Mr. Lincoln, and that no dissent was expressed.

Whether the point was well taken or not did not seem to me of any consequence, for the unanimous expression of opinion against the constitutionality and policy of the act was so decided that I felt no concern, so far as the act had reference to the gentlemen then present, that I would be embarrassed in the future. The bill had not then become a law. The limitation upon the power of removal was not yet imposed, and there was yet time to make any changes. If any one of these gentlemen had then said to me that he would avail himself of the provisions of that bill in case it became a law, I should not have hesitated a moment as to his removal. No pledge was then expressly given or required. But there are circumstances when to give an expressed pledge is not necessary, and when to require it is an imputation of possible bad faith. I felt that if these gentlemen came within the purview of the bill it was as to them a dead letter, and that none of them would ever take refuge under its provisions.

I now pass to another subject. When, on the 15th of April, 1865, the duties of the Presidential office devolved upon me, I found a full Cabinet of seven members, all of them selected by Mr. Lincoln. I made no change. On the contrary, I shortly afterwards ratified a change determined upon by Mr. Lincoln, but not perfected at his death, and admitted his appointee, Mr. Harlan, in the place of Mr. Usher, who was in office at the time.

The great duty of the time was to reestablish government, law, and order in the insurrectionary States. Congress was then in recess, and the sudden overthrow of the rebellion required speedy action. This grave subject had engaged the attention of Mr. Lincoln in the last days of his life, and the plan according to which it was to be managed had been prepared and was ready for adoption. A leading feature of that plan was that it should be carried out by the Executive authority, for, so far as I have been informed, neither Mr. Lincoln nor any member of his Cabinet doubted his authority to act or proposed to call an extra session of Congress to do the work. The first business transacted in Cabinet after I became President was this unfinished business of my predecessor. A plan or scheme of reconstruction was produced which had been prepared for Mr. Lincoln by Mr. Stanton, his Secretary of War. It was approved, and at the earliest moment practicable was applied in the form of a proclamation to the State of North Carolina, and afterwards became the basis of action in turn for the other States.

Upon the examination of Mr. Stanton before the Impeachment Committee he was asked the following question:

Did any one of the Cabinet express a doubt of the power of the executive
branch of the Government to reorganize State governments which had been
in rebellion without the aid of Congress?

He answered:

None whatever. I had myself entertained no doubt of the authority of the
President to take measures for the organization of the rebel States on
the plan proposed during the vacation of Congress and agreed in the plan
specified in the proclamation in the case of North Carolina.

There is perhaps no act of my Administration for which I have been more denounced than this. It was not originated by me, but I shrink from no responsibility on that account, for the plan approved itself to my own judgment, and I did not hesitate to carry it into execution.

Thus far and upon this vital policy there was perfect accord between the Cabinet and myself, and I saw no necessity for a change. As time passed on there was developed an unfortunate difference of opinion and of policy between Congress and the President upon this same subject and upon the ultimate basis upon which the reconstruction of these States should proceed, especially upon the question of negro suffrage. Upon this point three members of the Cabinet found themselves to be in sympathy with Congress. They remained only long enough to see that the difference of policy could not be reconciled. They felt that they should remain no longer, and a high sense of duty and propriety constrained them to resign their positions. We parted with mutual respect for the sincerity of each other in opposite opinions, and mutual regret that the difference was on points so vital as to require a severance of official relations. This was in the summer of 1866. The subsequent sessions of Congress developed new complications, when the suffrage bill for the District of Columbia and the reconstruction acts of March 2 and March 23, 1867, all passed over the veto. It was in Cabinet consultations upon these bills that a difference of opinion upon the most vital points was developed. Upon these questions there was perfect accord between all the members of the Cabinet and myself, except Mr. Stanton. He stood alone, and the difference of opinion could not be reconciled. That unity of opinion which, upon great questions of public policy or administration, is so essential to the Executive was gone.

I do not claim that a head of Department should have no other opinions than those of the President. He has the same right, in the conscientious discharge of duty, to entertain and express his own opinions as has the President. What I do claim is that the President is the responsible head of the Administration, and when the opinions of a head of Department are irreconcilably opposed to those of the President in grave matters of policy and administration there is but one result which can solve the difficulty, and that is a severance of the official relation. This in the past history of the Government has always been the rule, and it is a wise one, for such differences of opinion among its members must impair the efficiency of any Administration.

I have now referred to the general grounds upon which the withdrawal or Mr. Stanton from my Administration seemed to me to be proper and necessary, but I can not omit to state a special ground, which, if it stood alone, would vindicate my action.

The sanguinary riot which occurred in the city of New Orleans on the 30th of August, 1866, justly aroused public indignation and public inquiry, not only as to those who were engaged in it, but as to those who, more or less remotely, might be held to responsibility for its occurrence. I need not remind the Senate of the effort made to fix that responsibility on the President. The charge was openly made, and again and again reiterated all through the land, that the President was warned in time, but refused to interfere.

By telegrams from the lieutenant-governor and attorney-general of Louisiana, dated the 27th and 28th of August, I was advised that a body of delegates claiming to be a constitutional convention were about to assemble in New Orleans; that the matter was before the grand jury, but that it would be impossible to execute civil process without a riot; and this question was asked:

Is the military to interfere to prevent process of court?

This question was asked at a time when the civil courts were in the full exercise of their authority, and the answer sent by telegraph on the same 28th of August was this:

The military will be expected to sustain, and not to interfere with,
the proceedings of the courts.

On the same 28th of August the following telegram was sent to Mr. Stanton by Major-General Baird, then (owing to the absence of General Sheridan) in command of the military at New Orleans:

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON,
_Secretary of War_:

A convention has been called, with the sanction of Governor Wells, to
meet here on Monday. The lieutenant-governor and city authorities think
it unlawful, and propose to break it up by arresting the delegates.
I have given no orders on the subject, but have warned the parties that
I could not countenance or permit such action without instructions to
that effect from the President. Please instruct me at once by telegraph.

The 28th of August was on Saturday. The next morning, the 29th, this dispatch was received by Mr. Stanton at his residence in this city. He took no action upon it, and neither sent instructions to General Baird himself nor presented it to me for such instructions. On the next day (Monday) the riot occurred. I never saw this dispatch from General Baird until some ten days or two weeks after the riot, when, upon my call for all the dispatches, with a view to their publication, Mr. Stanton sent it to me.

These facts all appear in the testimony of Mr. Stanton before the Judiciary Committee in the impeachment investigation.

On the 30th, the day of the riot, and after it was suppressed, General Baird wrote to Mr. Stanton a long letter, from which I make the following extract:

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that a very serious riot has
occurred here to-day. I had not been applied to by the convention
for protection, but the lieutenant-governor and the mayor had freely
consulted with me, and I was so fully convinced that it was so strongly
the intent of the city authorities to preserve the peace, in order to
prevent military interference, that I did not regard an outbreak as a
thing to be apprehended. The lieutenant-governor had assured me that
even if a writ of arrest was issued by the court the sheriff would not
attempt to serve it without my permission, and for to-day they designed
to suspend it. I inclose herewith copies of my correspondence with the
mayor and of a dispatch which the lieutenant-governor claims to have
received from the President. I regret that no reply to my dispatch to
you of Saturday has yet reached me. General Sheridan is still absent
in Texas.

The dispatch of General Baird of the 28th asks for immediate instructions, and his letter of the 30th, after detailing the terrible riot which had just happened, ends with the expression of regret that the instructions which he asked for were not sent. It is not the fault or the error or the omission of the President that this military commander was left without instructions; but for all omissions, for all errors, for all failures to instruct when instruction might have averted this calamity, the President was openly and persistently held responsible. Instantly, without waiting for proof, the delinquency of the President was heralded in every form of utterance. Mr. Stanton knew then that the President was not responsible for this delinquency. The exculpation was in his power, but it was not given by him to the public, and only to the President in obedience to a requisition for all the dispatches.

No one regrets more than myself that General Baird's request was not brought to my notice. It is clear from his dispatch and letter that if the Secretary of War had given him proper instructions the riot which arose on the assembling of the convention would have been averted.

There may be those ready to say that I would have given no instructions even if the dispatch had reached me in time, but all must admit that I ought to have had the opportunity.

The following is the testimony given by Mr. Stanton before the impeachment investigation committee as to this dispatch:

Q. Referring to the dispatch of the 28th of July by General Baird, I ask
you whether that dispatch on its receipt was communicated?

A. I received that dispatch on Sunday forenoon. I examined it carefully,
and considered the question presented. I did not see that I could give
any instructions different from the line of action which General Baird
proposed, and made no answer to the dispatch.

Q. I see it stated that this was received at 10.20 p.m. Was that the
hour at which it was received by you?

A. That is the date of its reception in the telegraph office Saturday
night. I received it on Sunday forenoon at my residence. A copy of the
dispatch was furnished to the President several days afterwards, along
with all the other dispatches and communications on that subject, but it
was not furnished by me before that time. I suppose it may have been ten
or fifteen days afterwards.

Q. The President himself being in correspondence with those parties upon
the same subject, would it not have been proper to have advised him of
the reception of that dispatch?

A. I know nothing about his correspondence, and know nothing about any
correspondence except this one dispatch. We had intelligence of the riot
on Thursday morning. The riot had taken place on Monday.

It is a difficult matter to define all the relations which exist between the heads of Departments and the President. The legal relations are well enough defined. The Constitution places these officers in the relation of his advisers when he calls upon them for advice. The acts of Congress go further. Take, for example, the act of 1789 creating the War Department. It provides that--

There shall be a principal officer therein to be called the Secretary
for the Department of War, who shall perform and execute such duties
as shall from time to time be enjoined on or intrusted to him by the
President of the United States; and, furthermore, the said principal
officer shall conduct the business of the said Department in such manner
as the President of the United States shall from time to time order and
instruct.

Provision is also made for the appointment of an inferior officer by the head of the Department, to be called the chief clerk, "who, whenever said principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of the United States," shall have the charge and custody of the books, records, and papers of the Department.

The legal relation is analogous to that of principal and agent. It is the President upon whom the Constitution devolves, as head of the executive department, the duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed; but as he can not execute them in person, he is allowed to select his agents, and is made responsible for their acts within just limits. So complete is this presumed delegation of authority in the relation of a head of Department to the President that the Supreme Court of the United States have decided that an order made by a head of Department is presumed to be made by the President himself.

The principal, upon whom such responsibility is placed for the acts of a subordinate, ought to be left as free as possible in the matter of selection and of dismissal. To hold him to responsibility for an officer beyond his control; to leave the question of the fitness of such an agent to be decided _for_ him and not _by_ him; to allow such a subordinate, when the President, moved by "public considerations of a high character," requests his resignation, to assume for himself an equal right to act upon his own views of "public considerations" and to make his own conclusions paramount to those of the President--to allow all this is to reverse the just order of administration and to place the subordinate above the superior.

There are, however, other relations between the President and a head of Department beyond these defined legal relations, which necessarily attend them, though not expressed. Chief among these is mutual confidence. This relation is so delicate that it is sometimes hard to say when or how it ceases. A single flagrant act may end it at once, and then there is no difficulty. But confidence may be just as effectually destroyed by a series of causes too subtle for demonstration. As it is a plant of slow growth, so, too, it may be slow in decay. Such has been the process here. I will not pretend to say what acts or omissions have broken up this relation. They are hardly susceptible of statement, and still less of formal proof. Nevertheless, no one can read the correspondence of the 5th of August without being convinced that this relation was effectually gone on both sides, and that while the President was unwilling to allow Mr. Stanton to remain in his Administration, Mr. Stanton was equally unwilling to allow the President to carry on his Administration without his presence.

In the great debate which took place in the House of Representatives in 1789, in the first organization of the principal Departments, Mr. Madison spoke as follows:

It is evidently the intention of the Constitution that the first
magistrate should be responsible for the executive department. So far,
therefore, as we do not make the officers who are to aid him in the
duties of that department responsible to him, he is not responsible
to the country. Again: Is there no danger that an officer, when he is
appointed by the concurrence of the Senate and has friends in that body,
may choose rather to risk his establishment on the favor of that branch
than rest it upon the discharge of his duties to the satisfaction of the
executive branch, which is constitutionally authorized to inspect and
control his conduct? And if it should happen that the officers connect
themselves with the Senate, they may mutually support each other, and
for want of efficacy reduce the power of the President to a mere
vapor, in which case his responsibility would be annihilated, and the
expectation of it is unjust. The high executive officers, joined in
cabal with the Senate, would lay the foundation of discord, and end in
an assumption of the executive power only to be removed by a revolution
in the Government.

Mr. Sedgwick, in the same debate, referring to the proposition that a head of Department should only be removed or suspended by the concurrence of the Senate, used this language:

But if proof be necessary, what is then the consequence? Why, in nine
cases out of ten, where the case is very clear to the mind of the
President that the man ought to be removed, the effect can not be
produced, because it is absolutely impossible to produce the necessary
evidence. Are the Senate to proceed without evidence? Some gentlemen
contend not. Then the object will be lost. Shall a man under these
circumstances be saddled upon the President who has been appointed for
no other purpose but to aid the President in performing certain duties?
Shall he be continued, I ask again, against the will of the President?
If he is, where is the responsibility? Are you to look for it in the
President, who has no control over the officer, no power to remove him
if he acts unfeelingly or unfaithfully? Without you make him responsible
you weaken and destroy the strength and beauty of your system. What is
to be done in cases which can only be known from a long acquaintance
with the conduct of an officer?

I had indulged the hope that upon the assembling of Congress Mr. Stanton would have ended this unpleasant complication according to his intimation given in his note of August 12. The duty which I have felt myself called upon to perform was by no means agreeable, but I feel that I am not responsible for the controversy or for the consequences.

Unpleasant as this necessary change in my Cabinet has been to me upon personal considerations, I have the consolation to be assured that so far as the public interests are involved there is no cause for regret.

Salutary reforms have been introduced by the Secretary _ad interim_, and great reductions of expenses have been effected under his administration of the War Department, to the saving of millions to the Treasury.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _December 14, 1867_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 9th instant, I transmit herewith a copy of the papers relating to the trial by a military commission of Albert M.D.C. Lusk, of Louisiana. No action in the case has yet been taken by the President.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _December 17, 1867_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I transmit for the information of the House of Representatives a report from the Secretary of State, with an accompanying paper.[32]

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 32: Report of George H. Sharpe relative to the assassination of President Lincoln and the attempted assassination of Secretary Seward.]

WASHINGTON, _December 17, 1867_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 6th instant, concerning the International Monetary Conference held at Paris in June last, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, which is accompanied by the papers called for by the resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _December 17, 1867_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit, for the consideration of the Senate, an agreement between the diplomatic representatives of certain foreign powers in Japan, including the minister of the United States, on the one part, and plenipotentiaries on the part of the Japanese Government, relative to the settlement of Yokohama.

This instrument can not be legally binding upon the United States unless sanctioned by the Senate. There appears to be no objection to its approval.

A copy of General Van Valkenburgh's dispatch to the Secretary of State, by which the agreement was accompanied, and of the map to which it refers, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., _December 18, 1867_.

_Gentlemen of the Senate and of the House of Representatives_:

An official copy of the order issued by Major-General Winfield S. Hancock, commander of the Fifth Military District, dated headquarters in New Orleans, La., on the 29th day of November, has reached me through the regular channels of the War Department, and I herewith communicate it to Congress for such action as may seem to be proper in view of all the circumstances.

It will be perceived that General Hancock announces that he will make the law the rule of his conduct; that he will uphold the courts and other civil authorities in the performance of their proper duties, and that he will use his military power only to preserve the peace and enforce the law. He declares very explicitly that the sacred right of the trial by jury and the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_ shall not be crushed out or trodden under foot. He goes further, and in one comprehensive sentence asserts that the principles of American liberty are still the inheritance of this people and ever should be.

When a great soldier, with unrestricted power in his hands to oppress his fellow-men, voluntarily foregoes the chance of gratifying his selfish ambition and devotes himself to the duty of building up the liberties and strengthening the laws of his country, he presents an example of the highest public virtue that human nature is capable of practicing. The strongest claim of Washington to be "first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen" is founded on the great fact that in all his illustrious career he scrupulously abstained from violating the legal and constitutional rights of his fellow-citizens. When he surrendered his commission to Congress, the President of that body spoke his highest praise in saying that he had "always regarded the rights of the civil authorities through all dangers and disasters." Whenever power above the law courted his acceptance, he calmly put the temptation aside. By such magnanimous acts of forbearance he won the universal admiration of mankind and left a name which has no rival in the history of the world.

I am far from saying that General Hancock is the only officer of the American Army who is influenced by the example of Washington. Doubtless thousands of them are faithfully devoted to the principles for which the men of the Revolution laid down their lives. But the distinguished honor belongs to him of being the first officer in high command south of the Potomac, since the close of the civil war, who has given utterance to these noble sentiments in the form of a military order.

I respectfully suggest to Congress that some public recognition of General Hancock's patriotic conduct is due, if not to him, to the friends of law and justice throughout the country. Of such an act as his at such a time it is but fit that the dignity should be vindicated and the virtue proclaimed, so that its value as an example may not be lost to the nation.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _December 19, 1867_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit to the Senate, in answer to a resolution of that body of the 16th instant, a report[33] from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 33: Relating to the removal of Governor Ballard, of the Territory of Idaho.]

WASHINGTON, _December 20, 1867_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I herewith transmit to Congress a report, dated the 20th instant, with the accompanying papers, received from the Secretary of State in compliance with the requirements of the eighteenth section of the act entitled "An act to regulate the diplomatic and consular systems of the United States," approved August 18, 1856.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _December 31, 1867_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th instant, requesting information concerning alleged interference by Russian naval vessels with whaling vessels of the United States, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers referred to therein.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _January 6, 1868_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I herewith transmit to the Senate a report from the Secretary of the Treasury, containing the information requested in their resolution of the 16th ultimo, relative to the amount of United States bonds issued to the Union Pacific Railroad Company and each of its branches, including the Central Pacific Railroad Company of California.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _January 7, 1868_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of yesterday, making inquiry how many and what State legislatures have ratified the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States known as the fourteenth article.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _January 7, 1868_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

A Spanish steamer named _Nuestra Señora_ being in the harbor of Port Royal, S.C., on the 1st of December, 1861, Brigadier General T.W. Sherman, who was in command of the United States forces there, received information which he supposed justified him in seizing her, as she was on her way from Charleston to Havana with insurgent correspondence on board. The seizure was made accordingly, and during the ensuing spring the vessel was sent to New York, in order that the legality of the seizure might be tried.

By a decree of June 20, 1863, Judge Betts ordered the vessel to be restored, and by a subsequent decree, of October 15, 1863, he referred the adjustment of damages to amicable negotiations between the two Governments.

While the proceeding in admiralty was pending, the vessel was appraised and taken by the Navy Department at the valuation of $28,000, which sum that Department paid into the Treasury.

As the amount of this valuation can not legally be drawn from the Treasury without authority from Congress, I recommend an appropriation for that purpose.

It is proposed to appoint a commissioner on the part of this Government to adjust, informally in this case, with a similar commissioner on the part of Spain, the question of damages, the commissioners to name an arbiter for points upon which they may disagree. When the amount of the damages shall thus have been ascertained, application will be made to Congress for a further appropriation toward paying them.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., _January 14, 1868_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith a communication from the Secretary of War _ad interim_, with the accompanying papers, prepared in compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of March 15, 1867, requesting information in reference to contracts for ordnance projectiles and small arms.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., _January 14, 1868_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith the report made by the commissioners appointed under the act of Congress approved on the 20th day of July, 1867, entitled "An act to establish peace with certain hostile Indian tribes," together with the accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _January 14, 1868_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of yesterday, calling for information relating to the appointment of the American minister at Pekin to a diplomatic or other mission on behalf of the Chinese Government by the Emperor of China, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State upon the subject, together with the accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON CITY, _January 14, 1868_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, the following treaties, concluded at "Medicine Lodge Creek," Kansas, between the Indian tribes therein named and the United States, by their commissioners appointed by the act of Congress approved July 20, 1867, entitled "An act to establish peace with certain hostile Indian tribes," viz:

A treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche tribes, concluded October 21, 1867.

A treaty with the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache tribes, concluded October 28, 1867.

A treaty with the Arapahoe and Cheyenne tribes, dated October 28, 1867.

A letter of this date from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting said treaties, is herewith inclosed.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _January 17, 1868_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

With reference to the convention between the United States and Denmark for the cession of the islands of St. Thomas and St. John, in the West Indies, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State on the subject of the vote of St. Thomas on the question of accepting the cession.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., _January 23, 1868_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

In compliance with the request of the Senate of yesterday, I return herewith their resolution of the 21st instant, calling for information in reference to James A. Seddon, late Secretary of War of the so-called Confederate States.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _January 23, 1868_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I have received the following preamble and resolution, adopted by the Senate on the 8th instant:

Whereas Senate bill No. 141, and entitled "An act for the further
security of equal rights in the District of Columbia," having at this
present session passed both Houses of Congress, was afterwards, on the
11th day of December, 1867, duly presented to the President of the
United States for his approval and signature; and

Whereas more than ten days, exclusive of Sundays, have since elapsed in
this session without said bill having been returned, either approved or
disapproved: Therefore,

_Resolved_, That the President of the United States be requested to
inform the Senate whether said bill has been delivered to and received
by the Secretary of State, as provided by the second section of the act
of the 27th day of July, 1789.

As the act which the resolution mentions has no relevancy to the subject under inquiry, it is presumed that it was the intention of the Senate to refer to the law of the 15th September, 1789, the second section of which prescribes--

That whenever a bill, order, resolution, or vote of the Senate and
House of Representatives, having been approved and signed by the
President of the United States, or not having been returned by him with
his objections, shall become a law or take effect, it shall forthwith
thereafter be received by the said Secretary from the President; and
whenever a bill, order, resolution, or vote shall be returned by the
President with his objections, and shall, on being reconsidered, be
agreed to be passed, and be approved by two-thirds of both Houses of
Congress, and thereby become a law or take effect, it shall in such
case be received by the said Secretary from the President of the Senate
or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, in whichsoever House it
shall last have been so approved.

Inasmuch as the bill "for the further security of equal rights in the District of Columbia" has not become a law in either of the modes designated in the section above quoted, it has not been delivered to the Secretary of State for record and promulgation. The Constitution expressly declares that--

If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the
same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless
the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case
it shall not be a law.

As stated in the preamble to the resolution, the bill to which it refers was presented for my approval on the 11th day of December, 1867. On the 20th of same month, and before the expiration of the ten days after the presentation of the bill to the President, the two Houses, in accordance with a concurrent resolution adopted on the 3d [13th] of December, adjourned until the 6th of January, 1868. Congress by their adjournment thus prevented the return of the bill within the time prescribed by the Constitution, and it was therefore left in the precise condition in which that instrument positively declares a bill "shall not be a law."

If the adjournment in December did not cause the failure of this bill, because not such an adjournment as is contemplated by the Constitution in the clause which I have cited, it must follow that such was the nature of the adjournments during the past year, on the 30th day of March until the first Wednesday of July and from the 20th of July until the 21st of November. Other bills will therefore be affected by the decision which may be rendered in this case, among them one having the same title as that named in the resolution, and containing similar provisions, which, passed by both Houses in the month of July last, failed to become a law by reason of the adjournment of Congress before ten days for its consideration had been allowed the Executive.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _January 27, 1868_.

_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 22d instant, calling for a copy of the report of Abram S. Hewitt, commissioner of the United States to the Paris Universal Exhibition of 1867, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers which accompany it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _January 27, 1868_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the documents to which it refers, in relation to the formal transfer of territory from Russia to the United States in accordance with the treaty of the 30th of March last.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _January 28, 1868_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit, for the consideration of the Senate with a view to its ratification, an additional article to the treaty of navigation and commerce with Russia of the 18th of December, 1832, which additional article was concluded and signed between the plenipotentiaries of the two Governments at Washington on the 27th instant.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _February 3, 1868_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I transmit to Congress a report from the Secretary of State, suggesting the necessity for a further appropriation toward defraying the expense of employing copying clerks, with a view to enable his Department seasonably to answer certain calls for information.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _February 3, 1868_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 27th ultimo, directing the Secretary of State to furnish information in regard to the trial of John H. Surratt, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _February 3, 1868_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith a report[34] from the Secretary of State, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 28th of January.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 34: Relating to the famine in Sweden and Norway.]

WASHINGTON, _February 10, 1868_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith a communication from the Secretary of the Navy, relative to depredations upon and the future care of the reservations of lands for the "purpose of supplying timber for the Navy of the United States."

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., _February 10, 1868_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

In reply to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 1st instant, I transmit herewith a report from the Postmaster-General, in reference to the appointment of a special agent to take charge of the post-office at Penn Yan, in the State of New York.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _February 10, 1868_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, with the accompanying papers, on the subject of a transfer of the Peninsula and Bay of Samana to the United States. The advice and consent of the Senate to the transfer, upon the terms proposed in the draft of a convention with the Dominican Republic, are requested.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _February 10, 1868_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I submit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, the accompanying consular convention between the United States and the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., _February 10, 1868_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit herewith a report from the Attorney-General, prepared in compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 30th ultimo, requesting information as to the number of justices of the peace now in commission in each ward, respectively, of the city of Washington.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _February 10, 1868_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 25th of November, 1867, calling for information in relation to the trial and conviction of American citizens in Great Britain and Ireland for the two years last past, I transmit a partial report from the Secretary of State, which is accompanied by a portion of the papers called for by the resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., _February 11, 1868_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

In compliance with the resolution adopted yesterday by the House of Representatives, requesting any further correspondence the President "may have had with General U.S. Grant, in addition to that heretofore submitted, on the subject of the recent vacation by the latter of the War Office," I transmit herewith a copy of a communication addressed to General Grant on the 10th instant, together with a copy of the accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, _February 10, 1868_.

General U.S. GRANT,

_Commanding Armies of the United States, Washington, D.C._

GENERAL: The extraordinary character of your letter of the 3d instant[35] would seem to preclude any reply on my part; but the manner in which publicity has been given to the correspondence of which that letter forms a part and the grave questions which are involved induce me to take this mode of giving, as a proper sequel to the communications which have passed between us, the statements of the five members of the Cabinet who were present on the occasion of our conversation on the 14th ultimo. Copies of the letters which they have addressed to me upon the subject are accordingly herewith inclosed.

You speak of my letter of the 31st ultimo[36] as a reiteration of the "many and gross misrepresentations" contained in certain newspaper articles, and reassert the correctness of the statements contained in your communication of the 28th ultimo,[37] adding--and here I give your own words--"anything in yours in reply to it to the contrary notwithstanding."

When a controversy upon matters of fact reaches the point to which this has been brought, further assertion or denial between the immediate parties should cease, especially where upon either side it loses the character of the respectful discussion which is required by the relations in which the parties stand to each other and degenerates in tone and temper. In such a case, if there is nothing to rely upon but the opposing statements, conclusions must be drawn from those statements alone and from whatever intrinsic probabilities they afford in favor of or against either of the parties. I should not shrink from this test in this controversy; but, fortunately, it is not left to this test alone. There were five Cabinet officers present at the conversation the detail of which in my letter of the 28th [31st[37]] ultimo you allow yourself to say contains "many and gross misrepresentations." These gentlemen heard that conversation and have read my statement. They speak for themselves, and I leave the proof without a word of comment.

I deem it proper before concluding this communication to notice some of the statements contained in your letter.

You say that a performance of the promises alleged to have been made by you to the President "would have involved a resistance to law and an inconsistency with the whole history of my connection with the suspension of Mr. Stanton." You then state that you had fears the President would, on the removal of Mr. Stanton, appoint someone in his place who would embarrass the Army in carrying out the reconstruction acts, and add:

"It was to prevent such an appointment that I accepted the office of Secretary of War _ad interim_, and not for the purpose of enabling you to get rid of Mr. Stanton by withholding it from him in opposition to law, or, not doing so myself, surrendering it to one who would, as the statements and assumptions in your communication plainly indicate was sought."

First of all, you here admit that from the very beginning of what you term "the whole history" of your connection with Mr. Stanton's suspension you intended to circumvent the President. It was to carry out that intent that you accepted the appointment. This was in your mind at the time of your acceptance. It was not, then, in obedience to the order of your superior, as has heretofore been supposed, that you assumed the duties of the office. You knew it was the President's purpose to prevent Mr. Stanton from resuming the office of Secretary of War, and you intended to defeat that purpose. You accepted the office, not in the interest of the President but of Mr. Stanton. If this purpose, so entertained by you, had been confined to yourself; if when accepting the office you had done so with a mental reservation to frustrate the President, it would have been a tacit deception. In the ethics of some persons such a course is allowable. But you can not stand even upon that questionable ground. The "history" of your connection with this transaction, as written by yourself, places you in a different predicament, and shows that you not only concealed your design from the President, but induced him to suppose that you would carry out his purpose to keep Mr. Stanton out of office by retaining it yourself after an attempted restoration by the Senate, so as to require Mr. Stanton to establish his right by judicial decision.

I now give that part of this "history" as written by yourself in your letter of the 28th ultimo:[38]

"Some time after I assumed the duties of Secretary of War _ad interim_ the President asked me my views as to the course Mr. Stanton would have to pursue, in case the Senate should not concur in his suspension, to obtain possession of his office. My reply was, in substance, that Mr. Stanton would have to appeal to the courts to reinstate him, illustrating my position by citing the ground I had taken in the case of the Baltimore police commissioners."

Now, at that time, as you admit in your letter of the 3d instant,[39] you held the office for the very object of defeating an appeal to the courts. In that letter you say that in accepting the office one motive was to prevent the President from appointing some other person who would retain possession, and thus make judicial proceedings necessary. You knew the President was unwilling to trust the office with anyone who would not by holding it compel Mr. Stanton to resort to the courts. You perfectly understood that in this interview, "some time" after you accepted the office, the President, not content with your silence, desired an expression of your views, and you answered him that Mr. Stanton "would have to appeal to the courts." If the President reposed confidence _before_ he knew your views, and that confidence had been violated, it might have been said he made a mistake; but a violation of confidence reposed _after_ that conversation was no mistake of his nor of yours. It is the fact only that needs be stated, that at the date of this conversation you did not intend to hold the office with the purpose of forcing Mr. Stanton into court, but did hold it then and had accepted it to prevent that course from being carried out. In other words, you said to the President, "That is the proper course," and you said to yourself, "I have accepted this office, and now hold it to defeat that course." The excuse you make in a subsequent paragraph of that letter of the 28th ultimo,[38] that afterwards you changed your views as to what would be a proper course, has nothing to do with the point now under consideration. The point is that _before_ you changed your views you had secretly determined to do the very thing which at last you did--surrender the office to Mr. Stanton. You may have changed your views as to the law, but you certainly did not change your views as to the course you had marked out for yourself from the beginning.

I will only notice one more statement in your letter of the 3d instant[39]--that the performance of the promises which it is alleged were made by you would have involved you in the resistance of law. I know of no statute that would have been violated had you, carrying out your promises in good faith, tendered your resignation when you concluded not to be made a party in any legal proceedings. You add:

"I am in a measure confirmed in this conclusion by your recent orders directing me to disobey orders from the Secretary of War, _my superior_ and your subordinate, without having countermanded his authority to issue the orders I am to disobey."

On the 24th[39] ultimo you addressed a note to the President requesting in writing an order given to you verbally five days before to disregard orders from Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War until you "knew from the President himself that they were his orders."