Chapter XIX: Part 19

I would therefore recommend such an amendment of the Constitution as
may remove all intermediate agency in the election of the President and
Vice-President. The mode may be so regulated as to preserve to each
State its present relative weight in the election, and a failure in the
first attempt may be provided for by confining the second to a choice
between the two highest candidates. In connection with such an amendment
it would seem advisable to limit the service of the Chief Magistrate to
a single term of either four or six years. If, however, it should not be
adopted, it is worthy of consideration whether a provision disqualifying
for office the Representatives in Congress on whom such an election may
have devolved would not be proper.

Although this recommendation was repeated with undiminished earnestness in several of his succeeding messages, yet the proposed amendment was never adopted and submitted to the people by Congress. The danger of a defeat of the people's choice in an election by the House of Representatives remains unprovided for in the Constitution, and would be greatly increased if the House of Representatives should assume the power arbitrarily to reject the votes of a State which might not be cast in conformity with the wishes of the majority in that body.

But if President Jackson failed to secure the amendment to the Constitution which he urged so persistently, his arguments contributed largely to the formation of party organizations, which have effectually avoided the contingency of an election by the House of Representatives. These organizations, first by a resort to the caucus system of nominating candidates, and afterwards to State and national conventions, have been successful in so limiting the number of candidates as to escape the danger of an election by the House of Representatives.

It is clear, however, that in thus limiting the number of candidates the true object and spirit of the Constitution have been evaded and defeated. It is an essential feature in our republican system of government that every citizen possessing the constitutional qualifications has a right to become a candidate for the office of President and Vice-President, and that every qualified elector has a right to cast his vote for any citizen whom he may regard as worthy of these offices. But under the party organizations which have prevailed for years these asserted rights of the people have been as effectually cut off and destroyed as if the Constitution itself had inhibited their exercise.

The danger of a defeat of the popular choice in an election by the House of Representatives is no greater than in an election made nominally by the people themselves, when by the laws of party organizations and by the constitutional provisions requiring the people to vote for electors instead of for the President or Vice-President it is made impracticable for any citizen to be a candidate except through the process of a party nomination, and for any voter to cast his suffrage for any other person than one thus brought forward through the manipulations of a nominating convention. It is thus apparent that by means of party organizations that provision of the Constitution which requires the election of President and Vice-President to be made through the electoral colleges has been made instrumental and potential in defeating the great object of conferring the choice of these officers upon the people. It may be conceded that party organizations are inseparable from republican government, and that when formed and managed in subordination to the Constitution they may be valuable safeguards of popular liberty; but when they are perverted to purposes of bad ambition they are liable to become the dangerous instruments of overthrowing the Constitution itself. Strongly impressed with the truth of these views, I feel called upon by an imperative sense of duty to revive substantially the recommendation so often and so earnestly made by President Jackson, and to urge that the amendment to the Constitution herewith presented, or some similar proposition, may be submitted to the people for their ratification or rejection.

Recent events have shown the necessity of an amendment to the Constitution distinctly defining the persons who shall discharge the duties of President of the United States in the event of a vacancy in that office by the death, resignation, or removal of both the President and Vice-President. It is clear that this should be fixed by the Constitution, and not be left to repealable enactments of doubtful constitutionality. It occurs to me that in the event of a vacancy in the office of President by the death, resignation, disability, or removal of both the President and Vice-President the duties of the office should devolve upon an officer of the executive department of the Government, rather than one connected with the legislative or judicial departments. The objections to designating either the President _pro tempore_ of the Senate or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, especially in the event of a vacancy produced by removal, are so obvious and so unanswerable that they need not be stated in detail. It is enough to state that they are both interested in producing a vacancy, and, according to the provisions of the Constitution, are members of the tribunal by whose decree a vacancy may be produced.

Under such circumstances the impropriety of designating either of these officers to succeed the President so removed is palpable. The framers of the Constitution, when they referred to Congress the settlement of the succession to the office of President in the event of a vacancy in the offices of both President and Vice-President, did not, in my opinion, contemplate the designation of any other than an officer of the executive department, on whom, in such a contingency, the powers and duties of the President should devolve. Until recently the contingency has been remote, and serious attention has not been called to the manifest incongruity between the provisions of the Constitution on this subject and the act of Congress of 1792. Having, however, been brought almost face to face with this important question, it seems an eminently proper time for us to make the legislation conform to the language, intent, and theory of the Constitution, and thus place the executive department beyond the reach of usurpation, and remove from the legislative and judicial departments every temptation to combine for the absorption of all the powers of government.

It has occurred to me that in the event of such a vacancy the duties of President would devolve most appropriately upon some one of the heads of the several Executive Departments, and under this conviction I present for your consideration an amendment to the Constitution on this subject, with the recommendation that it be submitted to the people for their action.

Experience seems to have established the necessity of an amendment of that clause of the Constitution which provides for the election of Senators to Congress by the legislatures of the several States. It would be more consistent with the genius of our form of government if the Senators were chosen directly by the people of the several States. The objections to the election of Senators by the legislatures are so palpable that I deem it unnecessary to do more than submit the proposition for such an amendment, with the recommendation that it be opened to the people for their judgment.

It is strongly impressed on my mind that the tenure of office by the judiciary of the United States during good behavior for life is incompatible with the spirit of republican government, and in this opinion I am fully sustained by the evidence of popular judgment upon this subject in the different States of the Union.

I therefore deem it my duty to recommend an amendment to the Constitution by which the terms of the judicial officers would be limited to a period of years, and I herewith present it in the hope that Congress will submit it to the people for their decision.

The foregoing views have long been entertained by me. In 1845, in the House of Representatives, and afterwards, in 1860, in the Senate of the United States, I submitted substantially the same propositions as those to which the attention of Congress is herein invited. Time, observation, and experience have confirmed these convictions; and, as a matter of public duty and a deep sense of my constitutional obligation "to recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures as I deem necessary and expedient," I submit the accompanying propositions, and urge their adoption and submission to the judgment of the people.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

JOINT RESOLUTION proposing amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.

Whereas the fifth article of the Constitution of the United States
provides for amendments thereto in the manner following, viz:

"The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States,
shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which in either case
shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of this Constitution
when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States
or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode
of ratification may be proposed by the Congress: _Provided_, That no
amendment which may be made prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner
affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first
article, and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of
its equal suffrage in the Senate:"

Therefore,

_Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of both Houses
concurring_), That the following amendments to the Constitution of the
United States be proposed to the legislatures of the several States,
which, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States,
shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution:

"That hereafter the President and Vice-President of the United States
shall be chosen for the term of six years, by the people of the
respective States, in the manner following: Each State shall be divided
by the legislature thereof in districts, equal in number to the whole
number of Senators and Representatives to which such State may be
entitled in the Congress of the United States; the said districts to
be composed of contiguous territory, and to contain, as nearly as may
be, an equal number of persons entitled to be represented under the
Constitution, and to be laid off for the first time immediately after
the ratification of this amendment; that on the first Thursday in August
in the year 18--, and on the same day every sixth year thereafter, the
citizens of each State who possess the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures shall
meet within their respective districts and vote for a President and
Vice-President of the United States; and the person receiving the
greatest number of votes for President and the one receiving the
greatest number of votes for Vice-President in each district shall
be holden to have received one vote, which fact shall be immediately
certified by the governor of the State to each of the Senators in
Congress from such State and to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Congress of the United
States shall be in session on the second Monday in October in the year
18--, and on the same day in every sixth year thereafter; and the
President of the Senate, in the presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives, shall open all the certificates, and the votes shall
then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes for
President shall be President, if such number be equal to a majority of
the whole number of votes given; but if no person have such majority,
then a second election shall be held on the first Thursday in the month
of December then next ensuing between the persons having the two highest
numbers for the office of President, which second election shall be
conducted, the result certified, and the votes counted in the same
manner as in the first, and the person having the greatest number of
votes for President shall be President. But if two or more persons shall
have received the greatest and an equal number of votes at the second
election, then the person who shall have received the greatest number of
votes in the greatest number of States shall be President. The person
having the greatest number of votes for Vice-President at the first
election shall be Vice-President, if such number be equal to a majority
of the whole number of votes given; and if no person have such majority,
then a second election shall take place between the persons having the
two highest numbers on the same day that the second election is held for
President, and the person having the highest number of the votes for
Vice-President shall be Vice-President. But if there should happen to
be an equality of votes between the persons so voted for at the second
election, then the person having the greatest number of votes in the
greatest number of States shall be Vice-President. But when a second
election shall be necessary in the case of Vice-President and not
necessary in the case of President, then the Senate shall choose a
Vice-President from the persons having the two highest numbers in the
first election, as now prescribed in the Constitution: _Provided_,
That after the ratification of this amendment to the Constitution the
President and Vice-President shall hold their offices, respectively, for
the term of six years, and that no President or Vice-President shall be
eligible for reelection to a second term."

Sec. 2. _And be it further resolved_, That Article II, section I,
paragraph 6, of the Constitution of the United States shall be amended
so as to read as follows:

"In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death,
resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of said
office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President; and in the case of
the removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the President and
Vice-President, the powers and duties of said office shall devolve on
the Secretary of State for the time being, and after this officer, in
case of vacancy in that or other Department, and in the order in which
they are named, on the Secretary of the Treasury, on the Secretary of
War, on the Secretary of the Navy, on the Secretary of the Interior, on
the Postmaster-General, and on the Attorney-General; and such officer,
on whom the powers and duties of President shall devolve in accordance
with the foregoing provisions, shall then act as President until the
disability shall be removed or a President shall be elected, as is or
may be provided for by law."

Sec. 3. _And be it further resolved_, That Article I, section 3, be
amended by striking out the word "legislature," and inserting in lieu
thereof the following words, viz: "Persons qualified to vote for members
of the most numerous branch of the legislature," so as to make the third
section of said article, when ratified by three-fourths of the States,
read as follows, to wit:

"The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from
each State, chosen by the persons qualified to vote for the members of
the most numerous branch of the legislature thereof, for six years, and
each Senator shall have one vote."

Sec. 4. _And be it further resolved_, That Article III, section I, be
amended by striking out the words "good behavior," and inserting the
following words, viz: "the term of twelve years." And further, that said
article and section be amended by adding the following thereto, viz:
"And it shall be the duty of the President of the United States, within
twelve months after the ratification of this amendment by three-fourths
of all the States, as provided by the Constitution of the United States,
to divide the whole number of judges, as near as may be practicable,
into three classes. The seats of the judges of the first class shall be
vacated at the expiration of the fourth year from such classification,
of the second class at the expiration of the eighth year, and of the
third class at the expiration of the twelfth year, so that one-third may
be chosen every fourth year thereafter."

The article as amended will read as follows:

Article III.

Sec. I. The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the Congress from time to time
may ordain and establish. The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior
courts, shall hold their offices during the term of twelve years, and
shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office; and it shall
be the duty of the President of the United States, within twelve months
after the ratification of this amendment by three-fourths of all the
States, as provided by the Constitution of the United States, to divide
the whole number of judges, as near as may be practicable, into three
classes. The seats of the judges of the first class shall be vacated at
the expiration of the fourth year from such classification; of the
second class, at the expiration of the eighth year; and of the third
class, at the expiration of the twelfth year, so that one-third may be
chosen every fourth year thereafter.

WASHINGTON, D.C., _July 18, 1868_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

In compliance with the resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 13th instant, requesting "copies of all instructions, records, and correspondence connected with the commission authorized to negotiate the late treaty with the Great and Little Osage Indians, and copies of all propositions made to said commission from railroad corporations or by individuals," I transmit the accompanying communications from the Secretary of the Interior, together with the papers to which they have reference.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _July 20, 1868_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit to the Senate, in compliance with its resolution of the 9th instant, a report from the Secretary of State, communicating a copy of a paper received by me this day, purporting to be a resolution of the senate and house of representatives of the State of Alabama ratifying the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States known as Article XIV.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _July 24, 1868_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit herewith a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, inclosing a report of a board of naval officers appointed in pursuance of an act of Congress approved May 19, 1868, to select suitable locations for powder magazines.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _July 27, 1868_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 24th instant, the accompanying report[69] from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Footnote 69: Relating to absence from his post of the consul at Panama.]

VETO MESSAGES.

WASHINGTON, D.C., _March 25, 1868_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I have considered, with such care as the pressure of other duties has permitted, a bill entitled "An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to amend the judiciary act, passed the 24th of September, 1789.'" Not being able to approve all of its provisions, I herewith return it to the Senate, in which House it originated, with a brief statement of my objections.

The first section of the bill meets my approbation, as, for the purpose of protecting the rights of property from the erroneous decision of inferior judicial tribunals, it provides means for obtaining uniformity, by appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, in cases which have now become very numerous and of much public interest, and in which such remedy is not now allowed. The second section, however, takes away the right of appeal to that court in cases which involve the life and liberty of the citizen, and leaves them exposed to the judgment of numerous inferior tribunals. It is apparent that the two sections were conceived in a very different spirit, and I regret that my objections to one impose upon me the necessity of withholding my sanction from the other.

I can not give my assent to a measure which proposes to deprive any person "restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution or of any treaty or law of the United States" from the right of appeal to the highest judicial authority known to our Government. To "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity" is one of the declared objects of the Federal Constitution. To assure these, guaranties are provided in the same instrument, as well against "unreasonable searches and seizures" as against the suspensions of "the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_, * * * unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it." It was doubtless to afford the people the means of protecting and enforcing these inestimable privileges that the jurisdiction which this bill proposes to take away was conferred upon the Supreme Court of the nation. The act conferring that jurisdiction was approved on the 5th day of February, 1867, with a full knowledge of the motives that prompted its passage, and because it was believed to be necessary and right. Nothing has since occurred to disprove the wisdom and justness of the measures, and to modify it as now proposed would be to lessen the protection of the citizen from the exercise of arbitrary power and to weaken the safeguards of life and liberty, which can never be made too secure against illegal encroachments.

The bill not only prohibits the adjudication by the Supreme Court of cases in which appeals may hereafter be taken, but interdicts its jurisdiction on appeals which have already been made to that high judicial body. If, therefore, it should become a law, it will by its retroactive operation wrest from the citizen a remedy which he enjoyed at the time of his appeal. It will thus operate most harshly upon those who believe that justice has been denied them in the inferior courts.

The legislation proposed in the second section, it seems to me, is not in harmony with the spirit and intention of the Constitution. It can not fail to affect most injuriously the just equipoise of our system of Government, for it establishes a precedent which, if followed, may eventually sweep away every check on arbitrary and unconstitutional legislation. Thus far during the existence of the Government the Supreme Court of the United States has been viewed by the people as the true expounder of their Constitution, and in the most violent party conflicts its judgments and decrees have always been sought and deferred to with confidence and respect. In public estimation it combines judicial wisdom and impartiality in a greater degree than any other authority known to the Constitution, and any act which may be construed into or mistaken for an attempt to prevent or evade its decision on a question which affects the liberty of the citizens and agitates the country can not fail to be attended with unpropitious consequences. It will be justly held by a large portion of the people as an admission of the unconstitutionally of the act on which its judgment may be forbidden or forestalled, and may interfere with that willing acquiescence in its provisions which is necessary for the harmonious and efficient execution of any law.

For these reasons, thus briefly and imperfectly stated, and for others, of which want of time forbids the enumeration, I deem it my duty to withhold my assent from this bill, and to return it for the reconsideration of Congress.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., _June 20, 1868_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I return without my signature a bill entitled "An act to admit the State of Arkansas to representation in Congress."

The approval of this bill would be an admission on the part of the Executive that the "Act for the more efficient government of the rebel States," passed March 2, 1867, and the acts supplementary thereto were proper and constitutional. My opinion, however, in reference to those measures has undergone no change, but, on the contrary, has been strengthened by the results which have attended their execution. Even were this not the case, I could not consent to a bill which is based upon the assumption either that by an act of rebellion of a portion of its people the State of Arkansas seceded from the Union, or that Congress may at its pleasure expel or exclude a State from the Union, or interrupt its relations with the Government by arbitrarily depriving it of representation in the Senate and House of Representatives. If Arkansas is a State not in the Union, this bill does not admit it as a State into the Union. If, on the other hand, Arkansas is a State in the Union, no legislation is necessary to declare it entitled "to representation in Congress as one of the States of the Union." The Constitution already declares that "each State shall have at least one Representative;" that the Senate "shall be composed of two Senators from each State," and "that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate."

That instrument also makes each House "the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members," and therefore all that is now necessary to restore Arkansas in all its constitutional relations to the Government is a decision by each House upon the eligibility of those who, presenting their credentials, claim seats in the respective Houses of Congress. This is the plain and simple plan of the Constitution; and believing that had it been pursued when Congress assembled in the month of December, 1865, the restoration of the States would long since have been completed, I once again earnestly recommend that it be adopted by each House in preference to legislation, which I respectfully submit is not only of at least doubtful constitutionality, and therefore unwise and dangerous as a precedent, but is unnecessary, not so effective in its operation as the mode prescribed by the Constitution, involves additional delay, and from its terms may be taken rather as applicable to a Territory about to be admitted as one of the United States than to a State which has occupied a place in the Union for upward of a quarter of a century.

The bill declares the State of Arkansas entitled and admitted to representation in Congress as one of the States of the Union upon the following fundamental condition:

That the constitution of Arkansas shall never be so amended or changed
as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of
the right to vote who are entitled to vote by the constitution herein
recognized, except as a punishment for such crimes as are now felonies
at common law, whereof they shall have been duly convicted under laws
equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said State: _Provided_,
That any alteration of said constitution, prospective in its effect,
may be made in regard to the time and place of residence of voters.

I have been unable to find in the Constitution of the United States any warrant for the exercise of the authority thus claimed by Congress. In assuming the power to impose a "fundamental condition" upon a State which has been duly "admitted into the Union upon an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever," Congress asserts a right to enter a State as it may a Territory, and to regulate the highest prerogative of a free people--the elective franchise. This question is reserved by the Constitution to the States themselves, and to concede to Congress the power to regulate the subject would be to reverse the fundamental principle of the Republic and to place in the hands of the Federal Government, which is the creature of the States, the sovereignty which justly belongs to the States or the people--the true source of all political power, by whom our Federal system was created and to whose will it is subordinate.

The bill fails to provide in what manner the State of Arkansas is to signify its acceptance of the "fundamental condition" which Congress endeavors to make unalterable and irrevocable. Nor does it prescribe the penalty to be imposed should the people of the State amend or change the particular portions of the constitution which it is one of the purposes of the bill to perpetuate, but as to the consequences of such action leaves them in uncertainty and doubt. When the circumstances under which this constitution has been brought to the attention of Congress are considered, it is not unreasonable to suppose that efforts will be made to modify its provisions, and especially those in respect to which this measure prohibits any alteration. It is seriously questioned whether the constitution has been ratified by a majority of the persons who, under the act of March 2, 1867, and the acts supplementary thereto, were entitled to registration and to vote upon that issue. Section 10 of the schedule provides that--

No person disqualified from voting or registering under this
constitution shall vote for candidates for any office, nor shall be
permitted to vote for the ratification or rejection of the constitution
at the polls herein authorized.

Assumed to be in force before its adoption, in disregard of the law of Congress, the constitution undertakes to impose upon the elector other and further conditions. The fifth section of the eighth article provides that "all persons, before registering or voting," must take and subscribe an oath which, among others, contains the following clause:

That I accept the civil and political equality of all men, and agree
not to attempt to deprive any person or persons, on account of race,
color, or previous condition, of any political or civil right,
privilege, or immunity enjoyed by any other class of men.

It is well known that a very large portion of the electors in all the States, if not a large majority of all of them, do not believe in or accept the political equality of Indians, Mongolians, or negroes with the race to which they belong. If the voters in many of the States of the North and West were required to take such an oath as a test of their qualification, there is reason to believe that a majority of them would remain from the polls rather than comply with its degrading conditions. How far and to what extent this test oath prevented the registration of those who were qualified under the laws of Congress it is not possible to know, but that such was its effect, at least sufficient to overcome the small and doubtful majority in favor of this constitution, there can be no reasonable doubt. Should the people of Arkansas, therefore, desiring to regulate the elective franchise so as to make it conform to the constitutions of a large proportion of the States of the North and West, modify the provisions referred to in the "fundamental condition," what is to be the consequence? Is it intended that a denial of representation shall follow? And if so, may we not dread, at some future day, a recurrence of the troubles which have so long agitated the country? Would it not be the part of wisdom to take for our guide the Federal Constitution, rather than resort to measures which, looking only to the present, may in a few years renew, in an aggravated form, the strife and bitterness caused by legislation which has proved to be so ill timed and unfortunate?

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., _June 25, 1868_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

In returning to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, a bill entitled "An act to admit the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida to representation in Congress," I do not deem it necessary to state at length the reasons which constrain me to withhold my approval. I will not, therefore, undertake at this time to reopen the discussion upon the grave constitutional questions involved in the act of March 2, 1867, and the acts supplementary thereto, in pursuance of which it is claimed, in the preamble to this bill, these States have framed and adopted constitutions of State government. Nor will I repeat the objections contained in my message of the 20th instant, returning without my signature the bill to admit to representation the State of Arkansas, and which are equally applicable to the pending measure.

Like the act recently passed in reference to Arkansas, this bill supersedes the plain and simple mode prescribed by the Constitution for the admission to seats in the respective Houses of Senators and Representatives from the several States. It assumes authority over six States of the Union which has never been delegated to Congress, or is even warranted by previous unconstitutional legislation upon the subject of restoration. It imposes conditions which are in derogation of the equal rights of the States, and is founded upon a theory which is subversive of the fundamental principles of the Government. In the case of Alabama it violates the plighted faith of Congress by forcing upon that State a constitution which was rejected by the people, according to the express terms of an act of Congress requiring that a majority of the registered electors should vote upon the question of its ratification.

For these objections, and many others that might be presented, I can not approve this bill, and therefore return it for the action of Congress required in such cases by the Federal Constitution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C., _July 20, 1868_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I have given to the joint resolution entitled "A resolution excluding from the electoral college the votes of States lately in rebellion which shall not have been reorganized" as careful examination as I have been able to bestow upon the subject during the few days that have intervened since the measure was submitted for my approval.

Feeling constrained to withhold my consent, I herewith return the resolution to the Senate, in which House it originated, with a brief statement of the reasons which have induced my action. This joint resolution is based upon the assumption that some of the States whose inhabitants were lately in rebellion are not now entitled to representation in Congress and participation in the election of President and Vice-President of the United States.

Having heretofore had occasion to give in detail my reasons for dissenting from this view, it is not necessary at this time to repeat them. It is sufficient to state that I continue strong in my conviction that the acts of secession, by which a number of the States sought to dissolve their connection with the other States and to subvert the Union, being unauthorized by the Constitution and in direct violation thereof, were from the beginning absolutely null and void. It follows necessarily that when the rebellion terminated the several States which had attempted to secede continued to be States in the Union, and all that was required to enable them to resume their relations to the Union was that they should adopt the measures necessary to their practical restoration as States. Such measures were adopted, and the legitimate result was that those States, having conformed to all the requirements of the Constitution, resumed their former relations, and became entitled to the exercise of all the rights guaranteed to them by its provisions.

The joint resolution under consideration, however, seems to assume that by the insurrectionary acts of their respective inhabitants those States forfeited their rights as such, and can never again exercise them except upon readmission into the Union on the terms prescribed by Congress. If this position be correct, it follows that they were taken out of the Union by virtue of their acts of secession, and hence that the war waged upon them was illegal and unconstitutional. We would thus be placed in this inconsistent attitude, that while the war was commenced and carried on upon the distinct ground that the Southern States, being component parts of the Union, were in rebellion against the lawful authority of the United States, upon its termination we resort to a policy of reconstruction which assumes that it was not in fact a rebellion, but that the war was waged for the conquest of territories assumed to be outside of the constitutional Union.

The mode and manner of receiving and counting the electoral votes for President and Vice-President of the United States are in plain and simple terms prescribed by the Constitution. That instrument imperatively requires that "the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted." Congress has, therefore, no power, under the Constitution, to receive the electoral votes or reject them. The whole power is exhausted when, in the presence of the two Houses, the votes are counted and the result declared. In this respect the power and duty of the President of the Senate are, under the Constitution, purely ministerial. When, therefore, the joint resolution declares that no electoral votes shall be received or counted from States that since the 4th of March, 1867, have not "adopted a constitution of State government under which a State government shall have organized," a power is assumed which is nowhere delegated to Congress, unless upon the assumption that the State governments organized prior to the 4th of March, 1867, were illegal and void.

The joint resolution, by implication at least, concedes that these States were States by virtue of their organization prior to the 4th of March, 1867, but denies to them the right to vote in the election of President and Vice-President of the United States. It follows either that this assumption of power is wholly unauthorized by the Constitution or that the States so excluded from voting were out of the Union by reason of the rebellion, and have never been legitimately restored. Being fully satisfied that they were never out of the Union, and that their relations thereto have been legally and constitutionally restored, I am forced to the conclusion that the joint resolution, which deprives them of the right to have their votes for President and Vice-President received and counted, is in conflict with the Constitution, and that Congress has no more power to reject their votes than those of the States which have been uniformly loyal to the Federal Union.

It is worthy of remark that if the States whose inhabitants were recently in rebellion were legally and constitutionally organized and restored to their rights prior to the 4th of March, 1867, as I am satisfied they were, the only legitimate authority under which the election for President and Vice-President can be held therein must be derived from the governments instituted before that period. It clearly follows that all the State governments organized in those States under act of Congress for that purpose, and under military control, are illegitimate and of no validity whatever; and in that view the votes cast in those States for President and Vice-President, in pursuance of acts passed since the 4th of March, 1867, and in obedience to the so-called reconstruction acts of Congress, can not be legally received and counted, while the only votes in those States that can be legally cast and counted will be those cast in pursuance of the laws in force in the several States prior to the legislation by Congress upon the subject of reconstruction.

I can not refrain from directing your special attention to the declaration contained in the joint resolution, that "none of the States whose inhabitants were lately in rebellion shall be entitled to representation in the electoral college," etc. If it is meant by this declaration that no State is to be allowed to vote for President and Vice-President _all_ of whose inhabitants were engaged in the late rebellion, it is apparent that no one of the States will be excluded from voting, since it is well known that in every Southern State there were many inhabitants who not only did not participate in the rebellion, but who actually took part in the suppression, or refrained from giving it any aid or countenance. I therefore conclude that the true meaning of the joint resolution is that no State a _portion_ of whose inhabitants were engaged in the rebellion shall be permitted to participate in the Presidential election, except upon the terms and conditions therein prescribed.

Assuming this to be the true construction of the resolution, the inquiry becomes pertinent, May those Northern States a portion of whose inhabitants were actually in the rebellion be prevented, at the discretion of Congress, from having their electoral votes counted? It is well known that a portion of the inhabitants of New York and a portion of the inhabitants of Virginia were alike engaged in the rebellion; yet it is equally well known that Virginia, as well as New York, was at all times during the war recognized by the Federal Government as a State in the Union--so clearly that upon the termination of hostilities it was not even deemed necessary for her restoration that a provisional governor should be appointed; yet, according to this joint resolution, the people of Virginia, unless they comply with the terms it prescribes, are denied the right of voting for President, while the people of New York, a portion of the inhabitants of which State were also in rebellion, are permitted to have their electoral votes counted without undergoing the process of reconstruction prescribed for Virginia. New York is no more a State than Virginia; the one is as much entitled to representation in the electoral college as the other. If Congress has the power to deprive Virginia of this right, it can exercise the same authority with respect to New York or any other of the States. Thus the result of the Presidential election may be controlled and determined by Congress, and the people be deprived of their right under the Constitution to choose a President and Vice-President of the United States.

If Congress were to provide by law that the votes of none of the States should be received and counted if cast for a candidate who differed in political sentiment with a majority of the two Houses, such legislation would at once be condemned by the country as an unconstitutional and revolutionary usurpation of power. It would, however, be exceedingly difficult to find in the Constitution any more authority for the passage of the joint resolution under consideration than for an enactment looking directly to the rejection of all votes not in accordance with the political preferences of a majority of Congress. No power exists in the Constitution authorizing the joint resolution or the supposed law--the only difference being that one would be more palpably unconstitutional and revolutionary than the other. Both would rest upon the radical error that Congress has the power to prescribe terms and conditions to the right of the people of the States to cast their votes for President and Vice-President.

For the reasons thus indicated I am constrained to return the joint resolution to the Senate for such further action thereon as Congress may deem necessary.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, _July 25, 1868_

_To the Senate of the United States_:

Believing that a bill entitled "An act relating to the Freedmen's Bureau, and providing for its discontinuance," interferes with the appointing power conferred by the Constitution upon the Executive, and for other reasons, which at this late period of the session time will not permit me to state, I herewith return it to the Senate, in which House it originated, without my approval.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

PROCLAMATIONS.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas in the month of July, A.D. 1861, in accepting the condition of civil war which was brought about by insurrection and rebellion in several of the States which constitute the United States, the two Houses of Congress did solemnly declare that that war was not waged on the part of the Government in any spirit of oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor for any purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of the States, but only to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution of the United States and to preserve the Union, with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired, and that so soon as those objects should be accomplished the war on the part of the Government should cease; and

Whereas the President of the United States has heretofore, in the spirit of that declaration and with the view of securing for it ultimate and complete effect, set forth several proclamations offering amnesty and pardon to persons who had been or were concerned in the aforenamed rebellion, which proclamations, however, were attended with prudential reservations and exceptions then deemed necessary and proper, and which proclamations were respectively issued on the 8th day of December, 1863, on the 26th day of March, 1864, on the 29th day of May, 1865, and on the 7th day of September, 1867; and

Whereas the said lamentable civil war has long since altogether ceased, with an acknowledgment by all the States of the supremacy of the Federal Constitution and of the Government thereunder, and there no longer exists any reasonable ground to apprehend a renewal of the said civil war, or any foreign interference, or any unlawful resistance by any portion of the people of any of the States to the Constitution and laws of the United States; and

Whereas it is desirable to reduce the standing army and to bring to a speedy termination military occupation, martial law, military tribunals, abridgment of the freedom of speech and of the press, and suspension of the privilege of _habeas corpus_ and of the right of trial by jury, such encroachments upon our free institutions in time of peace being dangerous to public liberty, incompatible with the individual rights of the citizen, contrary to the genius and spirit of our republican form of government, and exhaustive of the national resources; and

Whereas it is believed that amnesty and pardon will tend to secure a complete and universal establishment and prevalence of municipal law and order in conformity with the Constitution of the United States, and to remove all appearances or presumptions of a retaliatory or vindictive policy on the part of the Government attended by unnecessary disqualifications, pains, penalties, confiscations, and disfranchisements, and, on the contrary, to promote and procure complete fraternal reconciliation among the whole people, with due submission to the Constitution and laws:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, do, by virtue of the Constitution and in the name of the people of the United States, hereby proclaim and declare, unconditionally and without reservation, to all and to every person who, directly or indirectly, participated in the late insurrection or rebellion, excepting such person or persons as may be under presentment or indictment in any court of the United States having competent jurisdiction upon a charge of treason or other felony, a full pardon and amnesty for the offense of treason against the United States or of adhering to their enemies during the late civil war, with restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves, and except also as to any property of which any person may have been legally divested under the laws of the United States.

In testimony whereof I have signed these presents with my hand and have caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.

[SEAL.]

Done at the city of Washington, the 4th day of July, A.D. 1868, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-third.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
_Secretary of State_.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas by an act of Congress entitled "An act to admit the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida to representation in Congress," passed on the 25th day of June, 1868, it is declared that it is made the duty of the President, within ten days after receiving official information of the ratification by the legislature of either of said States of a proposed amendment to the Constitution known as article fourteen, to issue a proclamation announcing that fact; and

Whereas the said act seems to be prospective; and

Whereas a paper purporting to be a resolution of the legislature of Florida adopting the amendment of the thirteenth and fourteenth articles of the Constitution of the United States was received at the Department of State on the 16th of June, 1868, prior to the passage of the act of Congress referred to, which paper is attested by the names of Horatio Jenkins, jr., as president _pro tempore_ of the senate, and W.W. Moore as speaker of the assembly, and of William L. Apthoop, as secretary of the senate, and William Forsyth Bynum, as clerk of the assembly, and which paper was transmitted to the Secretary of State in a letter dated Executive Office, Tallahassee, Fla., June 10, 1868, from Harrison Reed, who therein signs himself governor; and

Whereas on the 6th day of July, 1868, a paper was received by the President, which paper, being addressed to the President, bears date of the 4th day of July, 1868, and was transmitted by and under the name of W.W. Holden, who therein writes himself governor of the State of North Carolina, which paper certifies that the said proposed amendment, known as article fourteen, did pass the senate and house of representatives of the general assembly of North Carolina on the 2d day of July instant, and is attested by the names of John H. Boner, or Bower, as secretary of the house of representatives, and T.A. Byrnes, as secretary of the senate; and its ratification on the 4th of July, 1868, is attested by Tod R. Caldwell, as lieutenant-governor, president of the senate, and Jo. W. Holden, as speaker house of representatives:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States of America, in compliance with and execution of the act of Congress aforesaid, do issue this proclamation, announcing the fact of the ratification of the said amendment by the legislature of the State of North Carolina in the manner hereinbefore set forth.

In testimony whereof I have signed these presents with my hand and have caused the seal of the United States to be hereto affixed.

[SEAL.]

Done at the city of Washington, this 11th day of July, A.D. 1868, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-third.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
_Secretary of State_.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas by an act of Congress entitled "An act to admit the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida to representation in Congress," passed the 25th day of June, 1868, it is declared that it is made the duty of the President, within ten days after receiving official information of the ratification by the legislature of either of said States of a proposed amendment to the Constitution known as article fourteen, to issue a proclamation announcing that fact; and

Whereas on the 18th day of July, 1868, a letter was received by the President, which letter, being addressed to the President, bears date of July 15, 1868, and was transmitted by and under the name of R.K. Scott, who therein writes himself governor of South Carolina, in which letter was inclosed and received at the same time by the President a paper purporting to be a resolution of the senate and house of representatives of the general assembly of the State of South Carolina ratifying the said proposed amendment, and also purporting to have passed the two said houses, respectively, on the 7th and 9th of July, 1868, and to have been approved by the said R.K. Scott, as governor of said State, on the 15th of July, 1868, which circumstances are attested by the signatures of D.T. Corbin, as president _pro tempore_ of the senate, and of F.J. Moses, jr., as speaker of the house of representatives of said State, and of the said R.K. Scott, as governor:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States of America, in compliance with and execution of the act of Congress aforesaid, do issue this my proclamation, announcing the fact of the ratification of the said amendment by the legislature of the State of South Carolina in the manner hereinbefore set forth.

In testimony whereof I have signed these presents with my hand and have caused the seal of the United States to be hereto affixed.

[SEAL.]

Done at the city of Washington, this 18th day of July, A.D. 1868, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-third.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
_Secretary of State_.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.