Chapter VII

Some talk on superstition--A remark on earrings--Japanese troops after the war; no fear of Chauvinism--Generals and officers--How the system of the hereditary military service was abolished and the new system was introduced--Its history--Japan after the war--Views given to the American press--Mr. Seppings-Wright and his views on the Japanese character--The Japanese navy and its history--Origin of the shipbuilding yards--The difficulty of a thorough reform in China and Russia--How Japan managed to bring about the consummation of the great reform--The feudal system was a great help--Explanation of the Japanese feudal system and the clans--The re-shuffling of the feudatories under the Tokugawa régime--Difference of grandeur of the feudatories--Exceptional formation of the Satsuma clan--Financial system of the Shogunate --Finance of the Imperial Government at the beginning of the Great Change--How the affairs of the governments of the feudatories were wound up--The old system of taxation--Thorough reform--The old notion of land tenure

I found myself once more in a very incongruous group of people whom I had met on various occasions. I noticed a number of them engaged in a lively conversation.

--'Ah! Monsieur A.,' said a lady, 'you are acquainted with many Japanese, and have been in contact with them for many years, so that you will be able to explain to me. Some say the Japanese are superstitious, others again say they are not. Which do you think true?'

--'I have known,' said Monsieur A., 'some hundreds of the Japanese, mostly young men, of course. They are extremely free from any sort of bias or superstition. I have never known people so unbiassed and so little superstitious.'

--'But,' said the lady, 'I have heard from a gentleman who was resident in Japan for some years that there existed in that country some sort of superstition. He told me, for example, that "some people disliked the number "four," because _shi_, which is four in Japanese, means also death, as far as the pronunciation is concerned. Consequently when, for instance, one gives a tip, he would give either threepence or fivepence, and not fourpence, even in the case where fourpence may be more appropriate; in other words, either less or more, to avoid the number four. And the same is generally the case when one makes a present of a number of articles which are identical, unless they are two pairs; is not that funny? In the whole world there can be nothing more natural than numbers. No one can make the four cardinal points of the compass less or more because he dislikes the number "four." The same reasoning holds good with everything.'

--'I do not think,' answered Monsieur A., 'the superstition of four is very widely believed in. But what do you say to our dislike for the number thirteen.'

--'But,' said she, 'that is a different matter. That originated with religion.'

--'Is it so?' said Monsieur A. 'I wouldn't dispute it. But let me tell you an incident I met with some time ago. I was present at a meeting of a literary association. There was a good deal of conversation on the subject of the superstition of less civilised peoples. At the refreshment-table I had to sit next an elderly lady. I placed, accidentally or not I don't remember, my knife and fork crosswise. The lady immediately noticed this, and told me quickly to alter them. I remarked that the dislike of that position of knife and fork was perhaps also a sort of superstition, whereupon the lady told me that it was not a superstition, but a tradition, and therefore it differed very much from the superstitions practised by less civilised peoples.'

--'She was right, of course,' said the lady.

--'Well, I can scarcely see any difference,' observed Monsieur A.

--'I can tell you another incident,' remarked a different gentleman. 'When an occidental missionary was once telling some women of savage tribes that their wearing rings in their noses was barbarous and unhealthy, he was asked by them how it was that his wife and daughters were wearing rings in their ears, and he had great difficulty in explaining to them that the method adopted by the civilised races for wearing rings in their ears was very different from their wearing rings in the nose.'

--'Oh!' exclaimed some ladies.

--'But stay,' said another, 'let us have some more serious talk. I wish to ask Baron Suyematsu his opinion on a few important points of which I am anxious to be informed.'

Turning to me, he said:

--'I do not entertain any wild notion of the "Yellow Peril" cry. One thing is certain, however, that your country has been winning all this time brilliant victories unprecedented in history, and there is no doubt that your success will continue to the end of the war. Don't you think after the fighting is over your army will become chauvinistic, or, in plain language, unruly, and constantly ready to pick quarrels with foreign countries.'

--'I do not think so,' I answered. 'In the first place, the discipline of our men is very good, and they are most orderly and obedient to the emperor and his government. Then, too, the very nature of the organisation of our troops makes such matters differ greatly from hereditary troops or volunteers of long service. You see by the universal system, which we have adopted, men serve in the ranks only for a limited time, and therefore in the course of a few years the old soldiers retire, and go back to their original avocations in the country or the town, as the case may be, and the new ones fill their places. While the newcomers would be inspired by the traditions of their regiments, they could not, at the same time, be personally bombastic on account of the deeds of their predecessors.'

--'But what of the generals and officers?'

--'Of them I entertain no fear of their becoming jingoes. After having undergone all the hard work, and having achieved many brilliant victories, it is only natural that generals and other officers, indeed the army itself, should win greater popularity and higher estimation in the people's minds, and it is possible that their weight may be felt indirectly in internal politics. But it would never go so far as to make any difference in our external relations with foreign countries. As a matter of fact, our generals and officers are as little inclined to meddle with general politics as they are intent on fulfilling their professional duties. Above all, as I have so often said, it is a great misconception on the part of some Occidentals to suppose the Japanese at large to be an aggressive and bellicose nation.'

--'Your army is now organised under the universal service system,' said another. 'Before the present Imperial régime came into existence you had, as I understand, a very deep-rooted hereditary system of military service. It must have been very difficult to abolish the old and substitute the new. Your Bushi were regarded as the flower of the land, and surely it was a most bold conception to substitute sons of peasants and tradesmen in their place, and to believe they would do service equally well, or better. Your statesmen must have had strong convictions to induce them to make such a radical change as the new régime. Please let us have some explanation on that point.'

--'Well, roughly speaking,' I replied, 'I can only say that it was an outcome of the changed conditions of the time, but there were, of course, some circumstances which facilitated its formation. The Samurai, our hereditary military class, was the pick of the Japanese population, more refined and more intellectual than any other. Nevertheless, the long-continued peace and the effects of inheriting their occupation made them somewhat inclined towards effeminacy--in other words, less martial than their ancestors. Besides, as I have explained elsewhere, the hereditary military system has one very weak point. Such shortcomings as these were already felt before the inauguration of the new régime, and it was noticed that the best soldiers who engaged in battles before the Restoration were those organised under methods differing from the old system. Let me explain it more in detail. Chosiu was the clan which fought more battles than any other. The Chosiu troops which fought best were different kinds of voluntary regiments, consisting of bands of adventurous young men enlisted from the lowest classes of Samurai, as well as peasants and tradesmen. There was even a band which consisted of Yeta, who were afterwards emancipated and became new commoners, as I have explained elsewhere. At the time when an internal dissension broke out in Chosiu and its government was overthrown by the more radical elements under the leadership of such men as Takasugi, Kawasé, Ito, Yamagata, Inouyé and others, it was those voluntary bands just mentioned that sided with them against the troops of the government, who mostly belonged to the higher classes of the hereditary military families. Shortly after that event Kido, who was a participator of the same idea and the Senior of those men, had returned to Chosiu after an absence of about ten months as a fugitive, and had become the moving spirit of Chosiu. It was just at the time when Chosiu was on the eve of being surrounded a second time by the Shogunate troops, and it was a very critical period for the Chosiu, who had to make every preparation for fighting against great odds. At Kido's recommendation, Murata was intrusted by the prince to organise in the European style all the troops of Chosiu, including those bands. Murata (who afterwards changed his name into Omura) was originally a medical student, and had studied the Dutch language and subsequently the Dutch military system. In the early days of the new Imperial régime he occupied a high post in the Imperial Army Department, and his bronze statue is standing high in Tokio, before the shrine of warriors. But to return to my subject. Chosiu defeated the Shogunate troops on all sides. Thus in Chosiu the weakness of the hereditary military system had been practically seen very early. Most of the Shogunate troops were organised according to the old system of the Middle Ages. Many of them, being clad in heavy armour, were no match for the Chosiu troops with their light equipments. On the Shogunate side there were also some regiments which fought well, but they were those which had been organised and drilled after the European style. In that war, and the subsequent ones, it was well known that the best troops on the anti-imperialist side were also those which had been organised something like volunteer regiments and drilled after the European system. These facts will show that even before the Restoration the credit of the hereditary military system had already considerably declined. Marshal Yamagata was originally a person belonging to an insignificant class of the Chosiu Samurai, and was the leader of the most powerful band of Chosiu I have just mentioned. You may well imagine that he would not be a man to advocate the continuation of the hereditary military system. The introduction of the system of universal service founded upon the European Continental system is due to him.'

--'That goes a long way to explain the matter,' said one.

--'But do you conscientiously believe,' said another, 'that Japan will not suffer from "swollen head," and will continue to have sufficient control of herself?'

--'I do. Why not? I know it. No sooner had I landed on the American soil last year, having left Japan immediately after the outbreak of the war, than I gave my views to the American press on the then existing situation, as well as on our probable future, showing the true motives and aspirations of my country. They were widely circulated. My meaning was identical in every case, though the words and matters touched upon were not necessarily identical. I will recite you one specimen which was then published in an American weekly.

'As to our fight with Russia, we are as able to meet her army on
land as we are her fleets on the sea. We have just the same
confidence in our army as in the navy. But we would be very sorry
to be regarded by the world as only fighting men. We have been for
many years striving for the assimilation of everything materially
and mentally good that belongs to the best type of the American and
European civilisation. We aspire to be a nation, but our endeavour
for the realisation of that idea is based on a larger peaceful
acquisition of intellectual culture. We have no ambition for
territorial aggrandisement. We have not the least idea of making
any difference on account of race. We desire to govern ourselves
and advance in the world in peace--not to conquer and tyrannise
over another people. We come into the comity of nations, but that
entirely on the occidental basis of civilisation. Some people speak
of us as pagan, but the conscience of the people is perfectly free
in our country, and it is guaranteed by our constitution. We
believe in toleration and absolute liberty of religious conviction,
and I may safely say that religion is many times freer in our
country than it is in the country which is now our foe. We are
disposed to be, and earnestly wish and strive to be, liberal and
tolerant in all things. This fact, I am glad to see, is already so
widely recognised by those Americans and Europeans who are
connected with and know about such matters. We hope to advance to
that place in the world where our beautiful little country will be
a leader among the nations of the world in science, industry, arts,
and intellectual achievements, and an example of peace and harmony
towards all races, all nations, and all men.

--'I still hold the same views. I have no reason to fear that I shall have to change them after the war. It might perhaps be more interesting and convincing if you were to see what some people, other than ourselves, who are capable of giving an idea on the point, say. Mr. Seppings Wright, an English ex-naval officer and an artist, is one. He was on board one or other of the ships of Admiral Togo's fleet for many months under exceptional circumstances. He returned to England quite recently. An interesting interview with him was published in a recent number of the English press. Here is the part bearing on the subject:

'THE MOST WONDERFUL PEOPLE IN THE WORLD.

'"I gather that you formed a very high opinion of the Japanese
character?"

'"They are," said Mr. Seppings-Wright, with animation, "the most
wonderful people in the world. I make no exception. Neither the
statesmen nor the peoples of Europe have yet learned to estimate
the Japanese at their true value. They are destined to play a
magnificent rôle in the future development of the world. At present
people are talking of their courage, their great military
qualities. These are, indeed, now sufficiently self-evident. I rate
the Japanese army above any other army in the world. As for the
navy, I cannot use language too strong to express my admiration for
it. Yet what most impressed me was not the personal bravery of the
Japanese soldier and sailor, or the splendid organisation of their
naval and military forces, it was the character of the
people--their unique simplicity, their chivalrous courtesy, their
kindness of heart, their sweetness of disposition, their
unaggressiveness. They have none of the lust of conquest for
conquest's sake. They have never fought save to protect their
territory or their vital interests--but they have never been
beaten. Chinese, Koreans, and now Russians--they have resisted all,
and beaten all in turn; and now that they have proved their right
to be regarded as one of the Great Powers of the world, their
influence will, I am convinced, be all on the side of peace and
peaceful development."

'"You make the Japanese out to be a new variety of the human race?"

'"No, not a new variety--an old variety--a variety untainted by the
commercialism of European civilisation. They have not yet learned
the creed of individualism--of every man for himself. They will lay
down their lives cheerfully and willingly for their country--for
their emperor, who is almost a god in their eyes, since he embodies
their fatherland. What new traits they may develop I cannot pretend
to say."

'WHAT JAPAN CAN STILL DO.

'"It would be strange," I interrupted, "if, after the unbroken
series of victories they have won on land and sea, they did not
develop some symptom of 'swelled head'?"

--'I saw not the slightest sign of that. Very rarely you see even
incipient symptoms in an individual. Their great successes have not
apparently turned their heads in the least. They began this war in
the most absolute confidence of victory. They can, if need be, do
much more than they have done. No one knows the number of men Oyama
has in Manchuria--no one, that is, outside the Government and the
Headquarters' Staff.'"

--'Of the navy,' said another, 'it is truly amazing that you should have such an efficient one, which you have built up in the course of no more than two or three decades. Assiduous and energetic as you must have been, there must have been some other circumstances which have helped you in arriving at that result, or at least I cannot think otherwise when I reflect calmly on the matter.'

--'Your views are not far from fact,' I answered. 'It would be certainly amazing if a people who had only known perhaps canoes in a small stream, having no seafaring experience or tradition, built up a new navy as we have done. Many people have carelessly looked upon Japan as such, hence the misconception. Japan abounds in history and traditions of the sea from the dawn of her history. Our fleets often made distant expeditions, and fought battles far out of our own waters. The ships were, no doubt, rude and primitive compared with the modern ones. From the model of a warship made about three hundred years ago, which I have seen in a temple not far from Tokio, I think that our ships of those days were not much inferior to those of the West of a corresponding time. From the period when foreign intercourse was suspended, the construction of large ships was prohibited, be it a warship or a merchantman. The country was in perfect peace, and the navy was in use even less than the army, and this, therefore, is why such an enormous difference between the European system and ours had come into existence. Nevertheless, some feudal lords whose seats were situated on the sea-coast had a certain number of retainers specially destined for seafaring purposes. And, moreover, Japan being a country surrounded by the sea on all sides, merchantmen and fishing boats, rude as they were, were abundant; hence the stock of sailors has never been wanting. With the new advent of the Western nations to the Far East some fifty years ago, with their "black ships," the country awoke to the necessity of having strong ships, and the Shogunate, jealous as it was in the ascendency of the feudal lords, abolished the prohibition against building large ships. Towards the later years of the Shogunate it possessed a small but creditable navy in the European style. Many feudal lords also possessed some kind of Western ships, several of them possessing eight or nine ships. Of course, many of these ships were only corvettes, or schooners, or ordinary commercial steamers, but they were all used by those lords and manned chiefly by their retainers, and were called their navy. They differed from ordinary merchantmen. These ships were mostly bought from Western merchants; a few were the presents of the Western monarchs to the Shogun; some were constructed in Japan. The earliest steamship constructed in Japan was a steam-launch built about 1862 in the province of Ise for the Prince of Chosiu. It was navigated from there to Hagi, the old capital of Chosiu, on the coast of the Japan Sea. I do not know what became of it after that, but the fact that it navigated that distance would show that the Japanese were already gaining some capacity for building steamships after the European style. When the Shogun submitted to the Imperial order and vacated the castle of Tokio, the navy of the Shogunate, declining to share the fate of the Shogun, raised anchor and fled to Hakodate under the leadership of Yenomoto. Several of the best ships were lost by storm and some in fighting, and practically no ship was left of the revolting fleets. With the submission of Yenomoto and his participators, the country regained a complete peace. Then began the construction of the new navy. The feudal lords presented to the Imperial government their ships, most of which had already done their service during the preceding war. Most of the officers and sailors took service under the Imperial government just as they were. Many men who were engaged in naval affairs under the Shogunate were given suitable positions under the new government; even Yenomoto, the chief of the rebel fleet, was made an admiral after he had been pardoned. The navy being more expensive in every way than the army, we had more difficulty in its development; but in one way or another the Imperial government has exerted its energy until we have obtained the navy of the present moment. It has required much patience and ingenuity from both technical and political points of view, but somehow or other we have managed so far. I may add a few words more. In the early days of the Imperial government a large number of English naval officers were engaged by our government, who did much service in the organisation of our navy, for which we feel much indebtedness. I may also add that later on Monsieur Bertin of France, whom we have engaged for some years, has also done much service in the matter.'

--'You now have several shipbuilding yards, both governmental and private,' said one, 'and you can construct big ships yourselves. How was it brought about at first?'

--'Yokosuka is our oldest dockyard. It was begun when the Shogunate was already tottering. Oguri, an able man, was the finance minister of the Shogunate at the time. It was due to his efforts that the Yokosuka dockyard was constructed. It is said Oguri told his friend one day, "When one becomes a bankrupt it is desirable he should leave behind a Dozo, so Yokosuka will be the Dozo of the Shogunate when it comes to an end." "Dozo" is the name for a storehouse, constructed very solidly; with us almost every house, excepting those of the lower classes, has one or more such buildings, and it was considered an additional disgrace to a man of better class if he became a bankrupt without any such storehouse for the creditors. Oguri evidently foresaw the downfall of the Shogunate, and yet ordered the construction of the dockyard, so that it would be useful for the future rulers of Japan. Such is the early history of our dockyards on the European style, which has expanded itself in the course of time, so that we now have several shipbuilding yards, as you know.'

--'What do you say about the future of China?' said another. 'Don't you think she will also renovate herself like your country and become a formidable power.'

--'She may do so,' I answered, 'in one way or other in the course of time, but I do not think a sudden and thorough transformation of the kind that has taken place in Japan is possible in China. I do not think it is possible even in Russia, where so much movement for internal reform is going on. To begin with, they have no feudal system in existence.'

--'That sounds very odd,' said he: 'I must be enlightened on the point.'

--'Well, Japan has been swayed by a feudal system before the great change of the present régime. That fact helped our success to an extent that one cannot easily imagine. Of course, there was a possibility of procrastination of the old system, if the reform movements had miscarried; but when the winds blew in the right direction, that very fact became the most important factor in conveying our ship of state to the harbour where it wished to go. To explain in less metaphorical language: the introduction of a great political reform in a country against an existing government is most difficult. A revolution with a tremendous force like that of France must be regarded as an exceptional case, but ordinary revolutionists seldom succeed in overthrowing existing governments and introducing better and more progressive ones on a firmer basis. When, on the other hand, the existing government is only obliged to introduce some reform by external influence, the reform it introduces cannot be very radical and thorough. With our great movements previous to 1867 the matter was taken up by several powerful feudal lords. Naturally, there had been several precursory movements against the Shogunate by the bands of zealous patriots gathered here and there, but the Shogunate had no difficulty in suppressing them. The revolt against the Shogunate became grave only when some powerful feudal lords with their clans assumed an antagonistic attitude. As you know, our clans were, in fact, autonomic principalities, as far as our own country was concerned, and therefore, when a prince and his government decided to take a certain step in one way or other, it was an act of state, however small it may have been, and not the act of a gathering of private individuals. It follows, therefore, that when a great feudal lord became an open enemy of the Shogunate, his opposition was an organised power. When, therefore, Chosiu took up the cudgels against the Shogunate, the latter found a formidable foe; and when, further, Satsuma and others began to sympathise with Chosiu, the Shogunate began to totter, and in the course of a few years came to an end. If it had not been on account of the existence of a feudal system, such phenomenal change would have been most difficult. Of course, there were several other causes which gave facility to that great change. The system of the Shogunate had existed in Japan over seven hundred years, but the family which held in its hands the authority of the Shogun changed from time to time. The family which ruled Japan as Shogun for the longest time before the Tokugawa, viz. the last Shogunate, was the Ashikaga family, which lasted two hundred and forty years, with sixteen Shoguns in succession. Next to the Ashikaga family was the Hojio family, which, though not actual Shoguns, exercised the actual power of the Shogunate for one hundred and thirty-four years, with nine representatives in succession. Now Tokugawa lasted as Shogun two hundred and sixty-four years, with fifteen Shoguns; therefore Tokugawa ruled as the Shogunate longer than any other family. In the natural course of events popular imagination had already begun to think, that the time was approaching for Tokugawa to cease to be the Shogunate.

'Then, again, public opinion and sentiment were fast growing in favour of the restoration of the Imperial authority. It was a perfectly legitimate movement; it differed very widely from those cries which are generally raised in other countries at the time of revolution by the lower classes, based on the mere dissatisfaction of the conditions of existence. Add to this the great shock given by the advent to the country of the Western black ships one after the other. It was sufficient to stir up the heart and soul of the whole nation, and to prepare the way for any change or reform, provided they were good for the preservation of self-existence. Such was the tide which occasioned the convulsion of the Japanese, previous to the great change of 1867. No country, neither China nor Russia, would ever get such a splendid opportunity as this for a radical and thorough reform.

'Then again, the fact that the Imperial court had existed, and yet had had no intricate organisation, was also a great help in assisting the completion of the task. Because the Imperial court had existed, and that too from time immemorial, and it had always commanded the greatest possible reverence of the people, all the new movements knew where to rally; and because the court had not an intricate and crystallised organisation before the restoration, as the administrative government of the country, the tablet was almost blank, so that nearly all institutions could be introduced with greater facility than they would have been otherwise, the only requirements being the capacity and forethought with which the matter was to be executed.'

--'Viewed in the light you have just represented to us,' said another, 'the prospects appear to have been very bright; but there must have been a great danger of the matter miscarrying, and the anxiety felt by responsible statesmen must have been very great.'

--'Certainly it was so. But we were very fortunate. Patriotism and loyalty went far to do the greater part of the work. Suppose the different princes and their clans had been more selfish, and had begun to quarrel among themselves, perhaps with some latent intention of placing themselves in the position of the Shogunate, the country would have indeed fared very badly, and great hindrance would have been placed in the path of reform. In that respect, however, the two most powerful clans, Satsuma and Chosiu, who had the best rights to covet the Shogunate, if such a right were permissible at all, were determined above all others not to embark on such an enterprise. Their princes and statesmen all directed their whole energies to the revivification and consolidation of the Imperial authority. Satsuma and Chosiu being so disposed, all others had to follow their examples. Indeed, they had no thought of doing otherwise.'

--'It was the general spirit of the time,' said one, 'but in what way was the new Imperial government organised, and how did it begin to work? Surely the spirit of the time cannot work itself out alone; political wisdom must have played a great part in leading that spirit to the right goal.'

--'When the last Shogun resigned his authority,' I continued, 'the Imperial government on a new and firmer basis was immediately organised. In it were gathered the ablest men of the empire from all sources. Able court nobles, able feudal lords, and able Samurai of different clans, were all given suitable places side by side. There were many court nobles, with Sanjio and Iwakura at their head, who had done much in bringing about the great change. The Imperial court before the change had no military power, as you know, but the court, including the nobles, always stood in high social estimation. For that reason, as well as for their personal distinction, they were given high places in different branches of the government. Side by side with them, several feudal lords, who were endowed with personal ability, were also given high positions. After them came distinguished Samurai of different clans, to whom various positions, high and low, were assigned, according to their fame and ability. At that time there existed two appellations designating those Samurai who became officials of the Imperial government: Choshi (summoned Samurai) and Koshi (tributed Samurai)--the former meaning those Samurai who were specially summoned by the emperor to serve in his government; the latter meaning those who were taken into the Imperial service at the recommendation of the feudal lord, whose retainers they had been. Thus you can see the intelligence and ability of the different clans were gathered together around the Imperial throne, beneath which all of them, court nobles, feudal lords, and ordinary Samurai, worked together for the common good of the empire, a sight never seen before. Such disinterestedness and such avidity for ability were subsequently extended even to the men of those clans and of the fleet who had fought against the Imperialists.'

--'Very fine,' said one; 'but I should think it must have been very difficult for them to get on well together.'

--'True,' I answered; 'but when men with a vital common aim work together, putting aside self-interests, they can achieve great things. Besides, there was a centre of gravity in the political force, resulting from a combination of the preponderant influences of Satcho, viz. Satsuma and Chosiu. That centre of gravity acted the part of a pendulum or regulator in the new government, and kept all the forces working in unison. You know already that the Satcho were two powerful clans which were the chief factors in bringing about the Great Change. In addition to their natural claim to influence, they produced men of ability, far greater in number than any other clans. Naturally, therefore, Satcho men occupied more important positions than men of other clans. Next to Satcho, the clan having similar influence was Tosa. Next to Tosa, Saga came to share influence under the new government. Satcho kept their mutual harmony well together, and Tosa and Saga joined in the concert. There could be no other clans able to beat their own drums separately. Of course there was a possibility of the Satcho themselves coming into conflict, but for that the statesmen of the clans in question understood each other, and each felt a great responsibility, and accordingly did their best not to produce any discord between them. The chief representative of the Chosiu statesmen was Kido, whilst there were two such on the side of Satsuma, Saigo the elder, and Okubo. These three were popularly called the three great men of the restoration. The types of Okubo and Saigo somewhat differed one from the other, for Saigo, unlike Okubo, was more of a soldier, and represented more the military elements of Satsuma, and therefore we may say that the reins of statesmanship in the new government, as represented by the Satcho, were in the hands of Kido and Okubo. It was chiefly through their efforts that the abolition of the feudal system was ultimately brought about.'

'That part of your history,' said one, 'is a most important and interesting point for us to know. Let us be further enlightened by some of your own observations.'

'Well, the inauguration of the Imperial régime took place in 1867. In the course of a few years a disinterested opinion was mooted and soon spread amongst the lords themselves to the effect that, now that the Shogun had resigned his function and had restored his administrative authority to the Imperial government, it also behoved the lords of all the clans similarly to resign and to give up to the Imperial court the administrative authority of their clan governments, together with the lands and people they governed. With such reasoning all the feudal lords, headed by the lords of Satcho, vied one with another in voluntarily taking that step. The offer was accepted, and the lords were duly nominated the governors of the different clans. Thus the nature of the position of the lords was changed. They now became mere officials appointed by the new Imperial government, and delegated to carry out its administrative measures. This was an event which took place in 1869. In the course of another few years, viz. in 1871, the clan system was finally abolished, and the prefecture system was introduced in its place. The former lords were ordered by the emperor to reside near him in the capital, and new governors were nominated in their places, chiefly from amongst the Samurai, who were already in the government service. Of course those perfectural governments were newly organised, with suitable subordinates nominated either from amongst those who were already in government service, or from amongst local celebrities. Thus was abolished our feudal system without any murmur.'

--'That is the official history,' said one, 'but there must be also some inner history which you know of in connection with it.'

--'Well,' I answered, 'the new Imperial government was inaugurated as you have already seen. It had no regular revenue as yet; it had neither army nor navy properly belonging to it. Okubo was planning a scheme for Satsuma, by which a portion of its revenue or territory was to be given up to the Imperial government, and that other clans might also be induced to follow the example. Simultaneously with Okubo, Kido was also meditating a project for making the new Imperial administration effective. He schemed the total abolition of the feudal system, the initiation of the idea having been impressed on him by Ito. He returned from Kioto to Chosiu, and presented his views to the Prince of Chosiu, who being a person of extreme loyalty, willingly gave his assent to Kido's proposal. On the return of Kido to Kioto, Okubo gave up his own plan and immediately accepted that of Kido. The matter having been thus agreed upon between the two most influential statesmen, it soon became a question of practical politics, and was successfully carried into effect in no time, as I have already told you.'

--'Can you give me,' said one, 'some idea of the clans of the Japanese feudal system? You make use of that word, as do other writers on Japan, but to me, somehow or other, it does not appear to give a clear idea.'

'The word "clan,"' I replied, 'which is used in place of the Japanese word "Han," does not convey the exact meaning, as you imagine. The word "clan" in English signifies "men," whereas our word "Han" signifies more "a territorial community with its government," including lands and population, somewhat in the same sense as the word "principality" or "duchy." Then, too, the word "clan," strictly speaking, implies the meaning of a collection of families bearing the same surname, and supposed to have descended from a common ancestor, but with our word "Han" no such meaning is implied in the word itself. Every feudal lord of Japan had a large number of retainers, and it was natural that a certain number among them were descended from the same ancestors as the lord himself; but those were, after all, in a very small minority, and the overwhelming number were in nowise connected with their lord, as far as blood relationship was concerned. Thus, you can see, the word "clan" does not represent the exact meaning of the word "Han." The technical term for the acts of giving up and restoring the clan governments to the Imperial government was "Han-seki Hokwan," which meant "restoring the Han records," whereby the giving up of the territory and its population was implied.'

--'I see the difference between the term "clan" and the term "Han,"' said one, 'but I wish to know something more about the process by which the "Han" came to be formed.'

--'That question requires a long answer, because to explain in detail would amount to writing a history of the feudal system of Japan, but I will give you a succinct answer. Feudal lords originally were local celebrities, with some landed property and retainers. In the sixteenth century the country had reached the height of disorder: it was then that countless warriors appeared in the arena, all fighting their way to distinction, some on their own account, and some under the leadership of greater men. The leaders as they became greater had to enlist more followers, and the greater of those followers had in turn to enlist their own followers. These followers were generally enlisted from all sources, some being fortunate sons of mere peasants, some being masterless fighters of a former lord, whose house had become extinct, either through war, or from some other reason. Those who offered service and those who accepted it necessarily entered upon a new relationship of master and servant. The best example of this was the famous Hideyoshi and his followers. Of course, there were many who had better antecedents and pedigrees, but the process by which the cadre of their military organisation had become enlarged was similar. After the country had returned to its normal condition of peace, and those leaders became feudal lords, those followers, viz. retainers, formed their cadre of Samurai. Each lord established his government in his province, to govern the land and people under his authority, and the executive officials were appointed by him from amongst those retainers. All those feudal governments enjoyed autonomy, subject to the general control of the central government of the Shogun. There were also several feudal lords who were made such by virtue of their close relationship with the Shogun, or for their distinguished services, other than military, but the method by which their government and military cadre were formed was much the same. I may add that the word "Han" was originally Chinese, and its literal meaning is a "fence." It was used figuratively to signify an idea of protection or defence, as a fence serves to protect a house, for the central government against external aggressors.'

--'That explains very clearly,' said one, 'the difference between your "Han" and the Western "clans," but I should like to know more about the evolution of your feudal system from its earliest stage.'

--'Very well,' I answered, 'under the ancient Imperial régime, local governors were despatched from the central government. Imperial guards were taken from amongst the provincial youth, there were also several military stations, at different strategic points of the country; the soldiers having been similarly taken from the neighbouring provinces. In the course of time, first with the growth of luxury in the capital, then with the decay of the Imperial authority, the governors themselves ceased to go to their respective provinces, and deputies came to be appointed to discharge their provincial affairs for them. These deputies began to settle in the provinces and to make their functions hereditary, or local celebrities came to be appointed as deputies, often by heredity also. In the meantime, as I told you once before, a sort of hereditary warrior families gradually sprang up in the provinces. The more enfeebled the Imperial court became, the less effective the administrative authority of the Imperial government became in the distant provinces, where fighting between those warrior families was often waged without any knowledge or any recognition of the Imperial government. When, towards the end of the twelfth century, Yoritomo defeated his foes, the Taira, and made himself master of the situation, he established his seat of government at Kamakura, and began to control the whole empire. At first he did so on the pretext of keeping peace and order with Imperial sanction. He called himself, in that respect, Sotsuibushi, which means nothing else than police-master-general. He appointed new local governors, chiefly from amongst the leaders of the warrior families. The official names for these new governors differed from those instituted formerly by the Imperial government. He did not try to do away with the Imperial official organisation, which had become almost nominal, but, in fact, he introduced a new organisation in the provinces. Needless to say, these new governors soon became the real governors in all respects, though their ostensible duties at first were for police affairs in its broad sense. This was the beginning of our system of the military governments. Although there were several vicissitudes, that system in the main lasted down to the great reform of our own days. This period of the system of military power is the period called by the writers in the Western languages the "feudal period," and the system is called the "feudal system." There was, of course, much resemblance in customs and manners, and even institutions, between the European feudal system and our military system, but I do not think the words themselves convey exactly the meaning of our appellation for the system. We call the system "Hoken," which was originally Chinese. That term, which is a combination of two words, means to "create and install" and signifies an act by which some particular person is created a hereditary prince of certain districts. Thus the idea that the persons so created were only made so by the favour of the central government is implied in the term itself. I have already told you that in the sixteenth century, Japan laboured under a condition of the greatest disorder. Many feudal lords rose and fell. When the Tokugawa family assumed the Shogunate, the country was brought to a perfect peace, and that system of "Hoken" was brought to a state of perfection. It was then that a total re-shuffling, so to say, not of the cards but of the feudal lords, was effected. Many old lords retained their positions by acknowledging the supremacy of Tokugawa, but many who were the followers of Tokugawa itself, were newly created lords. The former were called "Tozama" (exterior) Daimio, and the latter were called "Fudai" (adherents) Daimio. Those who had been created, on account of blood relationship to Tokugawa, formed a somewhat different category. The tenure of the lords was not looked upon in the light of private property in its strict sense. The Shogunate freely exercised its authority, to confiscate or to transfer to another place, when political expediency demanded it, though of course such steps were taken only when some blamable action had been committed, or on the offer of some higher and better position. The feudal lords had no right to sell or alienate any portion of the land. In the early part of the Tokugawa régime, the tenure was confiscated in case of default of male heir to a deceased lord, though later on the system of adoption came to the rescue and an adopted heir was allowed to succeed.'

--'I understand now the nature of your feudal system,' said one; 'but it must have been a great sacrifice for the feudal lords to give up all their possessions.'

'It was so in one sense, no doubt,' I answered, 'but, as I have already told you, the lands of our feudal lords were never regarded as private properties. The Shogun had the power to dispose of those tenures, but the Shogun was supposed to have possessed that authority by the delegation of the Imperial prerogative. "Even the remotest sea coast is the emperor's land, and even the humblest creature is the emperor's subject." This was the politico-ethical maxim of China, so also in Japan. This notion had been brought into special prominence, in recent centuries, and patriotic lords and statesmen kept the maxim very vividly in their minds, especially at the time of the great change. The lords had their feudal governments in their locality. They regarded themselves as being the heads of those governments, acting for the emperor. They did not, therefore, feel so much pain as when one gives up a property which is one's own private possession in the strictest sense. Besides, the deep sentiments of loyalty and patriotism swayed them and animated them to adopt the step without any hesitation. I may also add that all the lords used to be invested with some titles of distinction, which were names of some official function of the Imperial court, and also personal ranks, resembling Western orders. These they received through the Shogunate, but the giver was the emperor. Thus you can see that the fountain of honour had always remained with the Imperial court, nay more, the Shogun himself received his function and title from the emperor.'

--'What do you mean by the re-shuffling of the feudal lords?' asked one.

--'I mean that in the early stage of the Tokugawa régime a complete rearrangement of that system, which is generally called feudal, was effected, by transferring all the old lords from one place to another and by creating new lords, to whom new localities were given to govern, whilst many of the older lords lost their possessions. By removal also, some lords were made greater and some smaller. In making that rearrangement, the Shogunate took great care to distribute the lands among the lords in such a way that a combination of several lords against the Shogunate might be impossible. Smaller lords were placed round large ones, and the more trustworthy against less trustworthy, and so on. This rearrangement or shifting I called "re-shuffling." The same thing was done even down to the last days of the Shogunate, though on a limited scale and less frequently. I can therefore say that there was no feudal lord who continued to possess the same seat from the pre-Tokugawa period. There were, however, a few exceptions, and Satsuma was the most significant example. In the earlier state of the feudal system, the lords and retainers did not necessarily reside side by side. The lords had their chief seats where they resided, but the custom of building strong castles had not yet come into existence, and their retainers lived here and there on their domains. From the middle of the sixteenth century, the custom of constructing large castles came into existence. The lords resided in the castles and the retainers lived in houses around them. This became more markedly the case when the re-shuffling of the lords was made and the lords removed, together with their retainers, from one place to another like swarms of bees. It was also at that time that the separation of the Samurai, that is, the retainers, from the ordinary avocations of the people became more thoroughly distinct. The Samurai received their annual allowance from their lords, and did not carry on any commercial business nor trouble themselves about agricultural pursuits. There was great difference of grandeur between the different feudal lords. Our usual way of estimating their relative grandeur was by measuring the reputed quantity of rice produced on their land. According to that method, the degree varied from ten thousand to one million koku. There were some two hundred and seventy lords, and their grandeur varied between those quantities. There were also many petty lords, whose produce of rice from their lands did not amount to ten thousand koku. They were called quasi-lords. Such being the variety of grandeur of the lords, large retainers of great lords often exceeded in grandeur the smaller lords.'

--'You said Satsuma was an exception. Will you explain how it was?'

--'Well, Prince Shimazu was the lord of Satsuma. The greater parts of the provinces Hiuga and Osumi were also included in his dominion. His family had been great lords in that part of the country for some seven hundred years. When the famous Hideyoshi invaded Kiusiu, and reached Satsuma, the prince, namely, the lord of Satsuma, surrendered to that great hero after several battles. Hideyoshi did not consider it politic to push the matter to extremes, so the prince retained his former position. When Tokugawa assumed the Shogunate, the prince was left undisturbed in spite of his having once taken up cudgels against Tokugawa at the famous battle of Sekigahara. His seat of government was Kagoshima, but there was scarcely any establishment worth calling a castle. A certain number of his retainers lived around his residence, but a large number of them lived in different parts of his territory, their lives being partly devoted to agriculture. Satsuma was one of the few strong clans, and its combination with Chosiu resulted, as I said before, in the restoration of the Imperial régime.'

--'Will you please explain in outline the financial system of the Shogunate, and how it was transferred to the Imperial government?' asked one.

'The Shogunate had under its immediate control territorial possessions which were roughly reckoned, in the terms of rice, eight million koku. The Shogunate was clever enough to have the lions share of the landed possessions, which included the best parts of the country, generally comprising prosperous towns, as, for instance, the city of Osaka. The expenditure of the Shogunate was maintained by the income from those territories. No feudal lord had to contribute anything to the exchequer of the Shogunate, except that they were at times ordered to undertake some public works allotted to them; for example, the reparation of some river banks or damage done to the Shogun's castle. The revenue of the Shogunate was scarcely sufficient for maintaining the Shogunate in its normal state, and towards its latter days, when the external relations and internal disturbances began to press heavily, the financial difficulty was much felt. As to the Imperial court, it had no regular revenue at all, except a comparatively trifling sum contributed by the Shogunate, which was supposed to be the equivalent to the taxes collected by the Shogun's officials in the provinces in the immediate vicinity of the Imperial seat. There was no land under the direct control of the court; even the city of Kioto itself was under the administration of the officials of the Shogunate. Consequently the Imperial court was always in a needy condition. It follows, also, that the court nobles were also in an extremely needy condition, though high in personal rank. They only received paltry annual allowances out of the Shogun's contribution, though a very few high court nobles had small landed possessions. Such being the case, it was natural that the Imperial government, when it first came into a renewed existence, should have met with much financial difficulty.'

--' But how did you manage to tide over the transitory period?' asked one.

--'The troops,' I answered, 'which fought for the Imperial cause were generally supported at the expense of their own feudal clan-governments. For the current expenses, some rich merchants either contributed or advanced the necessary sum of money, and also new paper money was issued. By such means as these the government managed to carry on its affairs, and in the course of time some revenue began to accrue to the Imperial treasury from the regions which had been under the control of the Shogunate, but the sum was insignificant. It follows, therefore, that for financial reasons only some great change was necessary, and thus a double impetus was given to the idea of such men as Kido and Okubo for the abolition of the feudal system.'

--'Let us assume that the feudal system had already been abolished,' said another, 'the winding-up of the affairs of the different feudal governments, and the consolidation under a uniform system of central government must have been a very difficult and delicate matter.'

--'Yes, it was so,' I answered. 'To begin with, most of those governments had debts of all kinds which had to be liquidated, above all, their obligations for paper money floated by them. The coinage of gold and silver was the monopoly of the central government, but all the feudal lords had the privilege of circulating paper money under different forms in different clans. The actual value of this paper money in gold and silver varied according to the financial condition of the feudal government by whom it was issued, and that money was legal only in the districts which were under the jurisdiction of the lords by whose governments they were issued. You can therefore easily imagine how troublesome and inconvenient the matter must have been to travellers and traders in localities where those feudal governments stood in close proximity to each other. Then again, the lords and their retainers could not be made penniless immediately on the abolition of the feudal system. To them, therefore, certain means of support were given, in proportion to their former rank and income; that support was ultimately converted into the form of government bonds. The income thus given was not enough for many of the Samurai to support themselves and their families, and they, therefore, had to seek some new occupation to which they were not accustomed. A large number of them even lost the bonds thus given, through their incautious or incompetent management. The government had to prevent things getting into a worse condition, and to make the transition state a smooth one, if possible. For that purpose the government often had to organise for them some kind of common work, for which sometimes some special funds were given. Somehow or other, we have got through those trying times. The credit of winding-up the affairs of the feudal governments is chiefly due to Count Inouyé, who was the acting Minister of Finance at the time.

--'How did matters stand at the time with regard to the system of taxation?' asked one.

--'It was also one of the most difficult problems which the Imperial government had to solve,' I answered. 'Perhaps you know that the economical theory of the Far East had always been essentially physiocratic. Agriculture was the foundation of national existence. Commerce and industry were very little considered. Curiously enough, on that account the land had to bear public expenses almost entirely, and commerce and industry contributed almost nothing; in other words, taxes on land were the main source of public revenue. People engaged in industry and commerce paid no tax, except perhaps some trifling amount in the form of licences occasionally, and except that they were often ordered by their lords to contribute irregular sums of money to relieve their financial difficulty. The land taxes were paid, as a rule, in kind, namely, rice, but the burden of the tax-payers was by no means uniform throughout the country. There was a vague measurement expressed by the words "four public, six private," that is to say, four tenth parts of the produce was to go to the government, and the remaining six, together with any supplementary produce, was to remain in the hands of the producers. But this was by no means uniformly practised. Roughly speaking, the burden of the lands under the direct control of the Shogunate was lighter than that on the lands under the different lords. But there was much difference in the burden on the lands held by the different lords. As a matter of fact, all sorts of additional burdens, besides the pure land taxes, were instituted and levied on most lands. It was necessary for the Imperial government to unify these burdens and equalise them, as much as possible, throughout the whole country. It was also desirable to change the whole system of paying taxes in kind into a uniform system of money payment, because, in the case of the former, revenue is subject to variation on account of the condition of the harvest and the market price, besides, that system is more liable to abuse. The Imperial government undertook this tremendous work of reform. The valuation of all lands was carried out, and the system of payment in money was effected. I may here mention that, under the ancient Imperial régime, no proprietary rights were recognised in lands. The tillers of land obtained the allotments of them for life, and new allotments were made from time to time. That system, however, was not strictly enforced in the case of newly reclaimed lands, especially so in the far-off provinces. As time went on, the system entirely fell through, and hereditary proprietorship of the tillers came tacitly into existence. Nevertheless, the idea of the supreme domain of the sovereign from the points of public law and proprietary rights of the possessors from points of private law had not been brought into a very distinct light, and the vague notion had still remained that the possessors held the lands only by favour of the sovereign. As a matter of fact, in most parts of the country no rights of sale of lands were legally recognised, though the matter was widely affected by some fictitious means, such as long mortgages or long leases. This state of things was entirely changed by the reform made when the nature of the land tax was changed, as I have just described, because by that reform the full proprietary rights from the point of private law were completely recognised. I said that industrial and commercial people contributed almost nothing to the public expenses, and yet the denominations under which they had to pay something were various. Add to this numerous other miscellaneous contributions; there were several hundred different kinds of contributions, but each of these separately amounted to a very small sum, and was not worth the trouble it involved. These, therefore, were altogether abolished. Of course the government had, as time went on, to introduce some new taxes, such as the business tax, the income tax, etc., but these are the results of the progress made in our economical and financial conditions, and based on broader and more universal lines, so as to fit the altered state of the country. The annual budget, which amounted to seventy or eighty million yen before the Sino-Japanese war, amounted to some five or six hundred million yen before the Russo-Japanese war: that will perhaps show the expansion of the financial system of the country.'

--'It is very interesting,' said one; 'but let us have a cup of tea, and then continue the discussion.'