Chapter IX: Once More on Japan and France1

The French and the Japanese have some sort of resemblance in their character, and therefore they are not wholly antagonistic to each other by nature. France once committed a great error, it is true, together with another country, in backing Russia against Japan after the Sino-Japanese war, but Japan has forgiven her for it, and has even forgotten it long since. It therefore mainly depends on France if the friendly relationship subsisting between her and Japan shall be maintained.

There are two things which we have to examine in this connection: first, the question of Indo-China; second, the effect of the Franco-Russian alliance upon Far Eastern affairs.

Much has been talked about Japan's having designs upon Indo-China. It is, in truth, nothing more than a resuscitation in part of the old bogey of the Yellow Peril. According to that bogey, Japan is to pick quarrels with every civilised nation, and is ultimately to swallow up the whole world. Nothing can be more absurd than that; but at times it has been made use of by the Russians and Russophiles with a certain amount of success. To me it appears almost amazing that so great a psychological incongruity should exist simultaneously in the minds of some of the Occidentals, in that, while they exhibit almost unreasonable contempt of the Orientals on the one hand, they give credit for almost superhuman potentiality to the same people on the other. Whatever this may be, the question of Indo-China resolves itself into this:

The yellow peril alarmists began to talk about Japan as being intent upon seizing Indo-China. The Colonial party of France has utilised this theme for the promotion of its own object, and the Russophiles have utilised it for inciting the public to hate and detest Japan in favour of Russia. Surely an act of gross injustice and cowardice! For, as a matter of fact, on the part of Japan there is no such intention whatever. Indo-China is very different from Korea and Manchuria in respect of its relative position to Japan. There is nothing worth mentioning politically, strategically, historically, or economically in the mutual relations between Japan and Indo-China. All this I have shown in the utmost detail in an article which I have contributed and published in a well-known French review. Sensible French people have now begun to see the truth of it, so that they have almost ceased to pay serious attention to the false alarms of the yellow peril agitators. Indeed, the France of to-day appears to be very different from the France of this time last year. The lapse of one year has been sufficient to disclose many falsehoods by which the public was once taken in. It has also disclosed the relative merit of Russia and Japan in many things. Which government--the Russian or the Japanese--is the more enlightened? Which troops--the Russian or the Japanese--are more humane and orderly? Which people--Russia or Japan--is more compact as a nation? Which of them--Russia or Japan--has better ethics and morality? In which of them--Russia or Japan--are laws better administered and more loyally adhered to? In which of them--Russia or Japan--are philanthropical works, such as the Red Cross Society, better organised and more honestly carried out? Above all, in which of them--Russia or Japan--does the justice of its cause in the present war lie? All these things have now become very widely known to the public, hence the difference of their attitude. I do not think France ever will be foolish enough to stretch forward her fists against Japan on account of the yellow peril bogey concerning Indo-China. I am rather in hope that the day will come when those Russophiles will repent the mistake they made when they abused Japan contrary to the dictates of justice and equity.

The second question, namely, the effect of the Franco-Russian alliance upon Far Eastern affairs, is rather a delicate one to discuss. On the whole, however, I can say this:

Considering the delicate position in which she is placed, France has managed things well to the extent that we have not much to complain of (except one important matter, which I will elucidate presently). True it is that she has made many unfair accusations against us with regard to the commencement of the war and also with regard to the yellow peril bogey, but then the same, if not a harsher thing, has also been done or said in some other quarters where we might have expected more impartiality. Her general conduct as a neutral has not been very satisfactory. But then we remember that in some other quarters also very bitter pills were given us to swallow, altogether beyond our reasonable anticipation. We put up with all this unfairness, because we are quite confident that sooner or later the time will come when the world will clearly see how undeserving we are of such calumny.

The important exception I made above is the question of French neutrality concerning the treatment of the Baltic Fleet. In this respect Japan has grave reasons to complain of what France has been doing. As the whole world knows, the Russian Fleet has been obtaining abundant facilities from France all the way along from European waters to those of the Far East. It was abusing French hospitality in Madagascar for a very long period. Japan repeated her protest, or at least called French attention from time to time. When France pleaded her innocence at Madagascar on the pretext that the fleet was outside the territorial waters of France, Japan, relying on incontestable proof to the contrary, remonstrated. France was very tardy in executing what she said she would do, but Japan showed much patience, almost beyond common endurance. The same thing began to be repeated in the waters of Indo-China, the very door of the seat of the war. However moderate and good-natured Japan may be, this was more than she could endure. This was the real cause of the strain of an event which has been recently threatening the continuance of friendly relations between France and Japan.

According to some French papers, the view is held that France has not infringed her duty as a neutral, but Japan does not coincide. The French contention is that, according to the French law of neutrality, there is no time limit for affording asylum to a belligerent ship, and therefore, whatever length of time Russian ships may spend in French waters, France is under no obligation to tell them to quit the place (so long as they are not accompanied by prizes), and also they may be supplied with victuals and even coals. Japan contends that this is not a just interpretation of the laws of nations. Japan's view may be formulated as follows:

1. The twenty-four hours rule may not be a condition universally accepted, but justice and equity demand that in its spirit it should be followed by all nations. It has already been adopted by many nations, including Russia herself; as a matter of fact, the world has come to view it as though it were already a rule universally accepted, and it behoves every civilised nation to promote its adoption, or at least a practice similar to it in spirit, for the sake of consolidating international morality, viz. justice and equity. At the time when Russian ships, after the sea-battle of August 10th last year, sought asylum in the waters of Kiao-Chow and Saigon, both the German and French authorities respectively hastened to dismantle them, because the ships would not leave the place indicated at the prescribed time; this was done in exact accordance with the spirit of international law, and in reality it amounted almost to the same thing as observing the twenty-four hours rule. Why should France now say that no time limit can be made in the case of the Baltic Fleet, which requires all the more vigilance than would the case of a few solitary ships?

2. The so-called French law of neutrality is not in fact a law in the strict sense of the term. It is a sort of an instruction issued in the beginning of the present war by the French Minister of Marine, although based upon a similar document issued at the time of the Spanish-American war. It is immaterial whether or not it is a law in the strict sense, but we cannot deem it has a just rule if it were to be interpreted as has been done by some of the French papers. True it is that in that document no time is mentioned, but does it mean that France has to or must allow all belligerent ships to stay in her waters whatever length of time they like? Certainly not, I should think. If it is so, why should France adhere to that sort of interpretation even when its adherence is obviously contrary to justice and equity?

3. Even if we admit for a moment that the French rule as interpreted by those papers be applicable to the cases of some solitary ships seeking asylum; it is certainly not applicable to cases like that which we now have in view, because no such case as that of the Baltic Fleet has ever been within the contemplation of those who framed such a rule. As a matter of fact, however, it would be inapplicable even to the cases of a few solitary ships if it were to be interpreted in the way that was done by those journals.

4. Even admitting for a moment that the interpretation of those French journals is correct as far as the strict letter of the rule is concerned, it does not give them the right to say that their doings are _internationally_ correct. It must be known that in the laws of nations the spirit of international morality, namely, justice and equity, has greater weight than municipal laws, _lex loci_. If this were not so, how was it that England had to apologise to Russia a long time ago for an act--personal seizure of an ambassador--which had been done in a civil matter perfectly in accordance with her law? Therefore the mere fact that France has her own law of neutrality (in fact no law in a strict sense) is no defence for her doings unless its justice and equity can be maintained in the eyes of the law of nations. I may further add that the above is the _raison d'être_ why prize courts of different countries make it their theory, unlike ordinary civil or criminal courts, that they administer _prima facie_ the law of nations and not _lex loci_. It is another _raison d'être_ why matters relating to neutrality, prizes, and cognate matters are generally dealt with in the shape of instructions (in other words, interpretations of the law of nations), and not in the shape of a law of the land in the strict sense. Japan, therefore, cannot submit to the ruling of those French instructions as interpreted by those journals, inasmuch as she does not think it internationally just and equitable.

5. And, moreover, that part of the French instruction which those journals so habitually quote is not the only part which has an important bearing on the question. In the instruction it is also mentioned that no belligerent may use a French port for purposes of war (_dans un but de guerre_); and also that belligerents sojourning in such ports may not make use of them as the base of operations of any kind against the enemy. Japan's insistence is that France should adhere to that spirit. My wonder is why those French papers which try to uphold one part of the instruction should totally ignore other parts of the same instruction.

6. The theory of asylum in the case of the ships is not so rigid as the case of an army. I admit it. Japan does not demand that it should be made on the seas as rigid as it is on land. But it must never be allowed to go beyond the limit which justice and equity allow. I take the theory of asylum on the seas to be this: No neutral is justified in helping either of the combatants, but the nature of the seas is such that the neutral may give a certain grace of time to combatant vessels which seek shelter in its neutral waters, before it proceeds to dismantle,--(no immediate internment as in the case of the land force),--and it may also give them certain victuals--even a certain amount of coals--as it would also be contrary to humanity if they were to hang about, or to cause starvation of the men on board in mid-voyage on account of the mere lack of coal or food. Beyond this, the spirit of the law of nations is that a neutral ought to allow nothing. Can any one boldly assert that the theory of asylum can be applied with fairness to a case like that of the Baltic Fleet, which is far from seeking asylum, but is deliberately endeavouring to administer coups to its adversary and proceeding to the very seat of war. If he can do so, where is the justice and equity of the so-called law of nations, which the Occidentals boast of, not without just title, and claim that it forms one of the essential parts of Christian morality?

7. As to the talk about the three-mile limit of the territorial waters, there is already much divergency of opinion even amongst the jurists. To put it forth as a defence in a case like that of the Baltic Fleet affairs seems to me too puerile. The matter, however, becomes all the more grave when even that limit is not observed, and it has been constantly ignored by the Baltic Fleet.

Such are the views which we Japanese have taken in the matter. Some French journals (erroneously basing their assertions on the views I have personally expressed) say that Japan has taken up English views of international law in opposition to the Continental views, so that France ought not to yield to Japan's protest. This contention is not correct. We do not hold these views because they are English ones: we do so because they are in our opinion the only views which are _internationally_ just and equitable. We are now fighting against a foe so formidable, as the whole world knows, that to us it is a matter of life and death. We have sufficient patience and fortitude, but we cannot run the risk of sacrificing our very existence without some protest when we think that we are not being treated with justice and equity.

I am glad to add that the views we hold seem to have come at last to be shared by the more responsible part of the French amongst the governmental circle, as well as by the general public. The newspapers which are still sticking to their old contention are very few in number, and they seem to have some particular reasons of their own. I can never think a nation like France could consciously and wilfully offend against justice and equity, and the only thing we anxiously hope for is that the declaration of the French Government may be honestly and effectually followed up. Whatever may be one's intention, the drift of events often creates unlooked-for incidents, and that too often against one's will, when it is too late to avoid the consequences. Let all parties concerned be careful in this matter of vital importance.

[1] The _Deutsche Revue_, June 1905.