Chapter XXXI: Part III: The Present testimony stated and vindicated in its principal heads (20)

Surely (saith Solomon) oppression maketh a wise man mad, as on the other hand, a gift destroyeth the heart. Which, whensoever there is a concurrence and verification of both together, makes it very incident, and noways to be admired, that either some actions of the oppressed be censurable; or, that there be found many to censure them, either out of ignorance or prejudice, at a far off glance, which a nearer or narrower inspection of circumstances, through a prospect of charity, would not so readily condemn. When the oppression of tyrants comes to such a height and pinch of extremity, that it not only threatens a community with desolation, but induces a necessity of unavoidable dissolution, and reduces a people to such a paroxism of desperation and consternation (in respect of human deliberation bringing them to their wits end) that either they must succumb as slaves, and mancipate consciences, persons, liberties, properties, and all they are or have, to the lust of raging tyrants, and their revenging emissaries,; or surrender themselves, and their posterity, and, which is dearer, the interest of religion, to be destroyed: then it is no wonder, that they be sometimes necessitated in such an extremity, to apply extreme remedies to extremity of evils, and forced to fall upon such expedients to prevent their utter extermination, as at other times common order, and ordinary justice would make extravagant. Yea it is no marvel, though they fall into several real extravagancies, which are not to be justified nor extenuated; but rather it is to be acknowledged, as a miracle of the Lord's mercy, that in such a case they are restrained from more scandalous excesses of that nature. Yet even then, such as live at ease, free of oppression who are blinded with prejudice at the oppressed, and bribed with the indulgence and lenity of the oppressors towards themselves, will look upon these actions as transports of madness, and effects of extravagant zeal, while they weigh them only in the scales of ordinary justice, and do not ponderate them in the ballance of necessitated virtue; nor perpend the circumstances which made those extraordinary acts of judgment, which materially are lawful at all times to be executed by some, to be then necessary acts of justice to be inflicted by them in such a case. But if either the oppressors themselves, or such who are blinded and bribed with their gifts, and killed with their kindness, not only into an omission of concurring, but into a condemning of such extraordinary attempts of taking off those destroyers; or, if onlookers at a distance, would seriously consider, and ingeniously declare their opinion, in a particular application of the case to themselves, what they would do in such circumstances: I doubt not, but as charity should oblige them to be sparing of their censure, in a case whereof they have no experience; so justice, in resolving this point for themselves, would constrain them to justify such extraordinary necessitated practices for self-preservation, in preventing punishing, by destroying their destroyers, and move them rather to admire their patience, who have suffered so much and so long those beasts of prey to devour them, than to censure their precipitancies, in being constrained to endeavour to deliver themselves at last from, and put an end to their cruelty who did most annoy them. 'Yea, (as Naphtali says very well) it were impossible that rational men, after the feeling of so sore grievances, and the teaching of so many and sad experiences, should still couch under the burden, and submit themselves to the yoke of such vile apostate upstarts and bloody villains, and not rather acquit themselves like men, by pulling off these vizards, under which they mask their villanies and clack their violence; and plucking them out of that sanctuary of loyalty, and refuge of authority, which they do not more pretend than profane by all their horrid rebellions against God, and cruel murders executed upon the Lord's people, to the effect that in the righteous and deserved punishment of these wicked men, both the sin of the land might be sisted, and the fierce anger of the Lord averted,' Naph. first edit. pag. 134. Nevertheless such lawful, and, (as one would think) laudable attempts, for cutting off such monsters of nature, beasts of prey, burdens to the earth, as well as enemies to the commonwealth, are not only condemned as murders and horrid assassinations, but criminally and capitally punished as such. And upon this account, the sufferings of such, as have left a conviction upon the consciences of all that knew them, of their honesty, integrity, soundness in the principles, and seriousness of the practice of religion, have been several singular, and signally severe, and owned of the Lord, to the admiration of all spectators; some being cruelly tortured and executed to the death, for essaying such execution of judgment, as Mr. Mitchel; others for accumplishing it, as Mr. Hackston of Rathillet, and others, who avowed their accession to the cutting off that arch traitor Sharp, prelate of St. Andrews; and others, for not condemning that and the like acts of justice, though they were as innocent of the facts as the child unborn.

The foregoing historical representation of the matters of fact, doth clear the circumstances of the actions: which if ever any of that nature performed by private men without public authority, could be justified, will at least demur the condemning of them. For, the men, or rather monsters, thus removed, had not only been perjured apostates from, and conjured enemies against God, in a conspiracy with the devil, to destroy the reformation, and the remnant that professed it, affronted blasphemers, perfidious betrayers of the country, and enemies to the commonwealth, malignant incendiaries, and habitual murderers of many of the Lord's people, who, for many notorious crimes, had forfeited their lives to justice; but were insolently prosecuting their murdering designs, informing the council, and instigating them against innocent people to destroy them utterly, procuring from them bloody orders to spare none, but cut off all who might fall into their hands, and vigorously and vigilantly with all violence pursuing their murdering mandates, both in their own persons, and by villains, whom they hounded out as intelligencers to get, and to give notice where any of those people might be detected, whom they avowed, and avowed a design to destroy, when in the heat and height of their rage they were cut off. The actors were noways subject to them, nor any other way related, than declared and independent enemies are to one another, having renounced all relation to them and their masters, as magistrates and their superiors; and were in no terms of peace with them, but maintaining an hostile opposition and carrying, without cessation, arms to resist them; and when they got that advantage over them, that these enemies were seeking against them, they declared solemnly to them, and died, declaring it to the world, that they were not moved out of private revenge for personal injuries they had done against themselves; but being touched with the zeal of God, love to their country, respect to justice trampled upon by tyrants, and for saving themselves, rescuing their brethren, and preventing their murdering them, because there were none that would or could execute justice upon them legally: therefore they were forced to put forth their hands against them as enemies, with whose preservation their own could not consist. Their circumstances were such, that they were redacted to the greatest of extremities, precluding all other human possibility of preserving themselves and their brethren from the destruction intended, and declaredly resolved, and restlessly sought and prosecuted, by these murderers, being persecuted to the death by them, daily chased, hunted, way-laid, turned out of their own habitations, intercommuned, discharged and denied all harbour in any house, under the hazard of the same pains that themselves were liable to, which was death by the present law and so forced to hide in caves and dens; out of which they durst not come forth, if it were but to seek bread for themselves, without iminent danger of their lives; the country raising the hue and cry after them, whensover they were seen, whereby many were killed as soon as they were apprehended: hence they could neither escape in the land, nor by flight out of the land, passages by sea and land being stopt, and none suffered to go any where, without strict examination what they were, which was impossible for them to elude: and many other specialties of misery and danger were ingredients in their circumstances, that no words can represent to them that are altogether strangers to them. Wherefore, in such a strait and pinch of perplexity, when they could not other wise escape the fury of these firebrands, nor demur and deter the rest of them from an uncontrouled pursuit after the lives of innocents, nor otherwise avert the wrath of God against the land for the impunity of such vermine; and seeing there was no access to address themselves to magistrates, who by office are obliged to bring such villains to condign punishment; and none were found in public authority, but such as patronized and authorized them; whom in conscience they could not acknowledge, and in prudence durst not make application to them for fear of their lives; what could they do? what was left them to deliberate, but to fall upon this extraordinary course, wherein if they have stumbled into some extravagancies, as to the manner, who can think it strange, considering the case? But as that is not the debate; so as for such acts of vengeance as are peccant in the matter, and were not circumstantiate, as above rehearsed, being disowned in their public declarations, and the actors excluded from their communion, for whom I plead; it were iniquous to impute the scandal of them to that suffering people. It is only the so circumstantiate, necessitated, extraordinary execution of judgment, upon notoriously gross and grassant incendiaries, tyrants, and terrible murdering enemies, where there is no living for them, that I vindicate. And though the handling of this tender and quick-scented subject may seem odious to some, and my discourse upon it is pregnant with an oblique design to obviate such unmerited surmises, I must say, it is only the wiping off of such reproaches as reflect on religion; the vindication of preterite extraordinary practices of this nature; the investigation of present duty with respect to future emergencies; and the restraining all extravagancies incident on this Head, that I intend. However this may be exploded by this generation, as odious and uncouth doctrine; yet, in former periods of this church, it hath been maintained with courage, and asserted with confidence. How the ancient Scots, even after they received the Christian faith, served their tyrants and oppressors, how in the beginning of the reformation, the killing of the cardinal, and of David Rizio, were and are generally to this day justified, and what was the judgment and pleading of our reformers for practicing this principle against idolaters, &c. needs not be here repeated? Mr. Knox's judgment in particular is before declared, and will be further discovered, if we consider how he resented his slackness, in putting people to execute judgment in these words, insert in second part of the cloud of witnesses, p. 60. 'For God (said he) had not only given me knowledge, and a tongue to make known the impiety of the idol, but had given me credit with many, who would have put in execution God's judgments, if I would only have consented thereto: but so careful was I of the common tranquility, and loath was I to offend some, that in secret conference with zealous men, I travelled rather to slacken that fervency God had kindled in them, than to animate and encourage them to put their hands to God's work; wherein I acknowledge myself to have done most wickedly, and from the bottom of my heart I do ask God pardon, that I did not what in me lay to have suppressed that idol from the beginning.' But the preceeding historical representation doth abundantly demonstrate this is no novelty, to assert, that when the ruin of the country, suppression of religion, destruction of the remnant professing and suffering for it, and the wrath of God is threatened in, and for the impunity of idolaters and murderers, that by the law of God and man should die the death; and supposing always such as are in public office not only decline their duty, but encourage those destroyers, yea authorize them themselves, we may not only maintain defensive resistance according to our capacity, but endeavour also vindictive and, punitive force in executing judgment upon them in cases of necessity, as before circumstantiate. And I am the more confident to assert it, that what I say cannot be condemned, till first what our reformers have proven be confuted. However, to endeavour to make it somewhat clear, I shall premit some assertions, to clear the state of the question; and then give some reasons for it, when clearly stated.

First. It will be needful for clearing our way, to shew what length we may warrantably go in this matter of executing judgment, in our private capacity, in extraordinary cases of necessity, by setting down some propositions negative and positive, signifying what we disown, and what we own in this point.

I. What we disown, may appear in these assertions,

1. No necessity nor circumstance supposible whatsoever, can justify the murder of the righteous or innocent, or vindicate the unlawful taking away of their lives directly, or indirectly, immediately, or mediately, which in thought as well as deed we must abhor, as a horrid breach of the sixth command. The guilt whereof may be incurred several ways; as by killing them immediately, as Cain did his brother Abel; or commanded them to be killed, as Saul commanded Doeg to kill the Lord's priests; or contriving their murder, as David did Uriah's, and Jezabel Naboth's; or counselling thereunto, as the people advised the princes to the murder of Jeremiah, and all that cried crucify Jesus were murderers of Christ; or by procuring it, as Haman was guilty of the intended murder of the Jews; or concurring therein, as Joab was guilty of Uriah's death as well as David, and Judas of Christ's by betraying him; or by the patrociny thereof, defending and sparing the murderers when called, by office, to punish them, as David was guilty in not punishing Joab, Ahab in patronizing the murder of Naboth; or by consenting thereunto, as Saul consented to the death of Stephen; or by knowing and permitting, and conniving at it, as is condemned, Prov. xxiv. 11, 12. Whether this be done under colour of law, as Pilate murdered our Lord, Herod killed James; or without all colour, by absolute power, Herod the Ascalonite murdered the infants; or whether it be done by purpose, as Joab murdered Abner and Amasa; or without previous purpose yet with knowledge of the action in the perpetrating of it, as men may do in passion, when provoked beside their purpose, or in a tumult, without intending it beforehand; yet that is murder; Barrabas committed murder in the insurrection. For, as for casual killing, contrary to intention, without knowledge, that's no breach of the command. And, whatever may be said of necessitated delivering up the innocent, pursued by a potent enemy, to deliver the city from his fury; or of preferring our own life to our innocent neighbour, in a case when both cannot be preserved, and by preserving the one lawfully, the other happens to lose his life; I do not meddle with these cases. But since this is taken for granted by casuists, I infer, If it be lawful that an innocent man die in case of necessity, that others may be preserved; then much more is it lawful, that the nocent, who are guilty of murdering the righteous all these ways above specified, and actually prosecuting their murdering designs by these methods, should rather be made to die, than the righteous be destroyed. But of this sort of murder, taking away the life of the righteous, none hath the impudence to accuse that reproached people.

2. though a man kill an innocent unwittingly and willingly, besides his knowledge and against his will; yet he may be guilty of sinful homicide, if he was obliged to know that he was in hazard of it, and neglected to consider, lest a man might be killed by what he was doing: as if a man should shoot at random, when he doth not know but some may be killed thereby: or if one were hewing with an ax, which he either knew or might have known to be loose, and the head not well fastened to the helve, did not advertise those about him of it; if by flying off it happened to kill any person, he were not innocent, but if he knew not without any inadvertency, then he were guiltless, Deut. xix. 5. See Durham on 6. Com. So if a man built a house without battlements, he should bring blood upon his house, if any man fell from thence, Deut. xxii. 8. But of this the question is not.

3. Though a person be not altogether innocent, nor to be reckoned among the righteous; but suppose him wicked and profane, and engaged in an evil course, dishonourable to God, prejudicial to the church and kingdom, and very injurious to us; yet it may be murder to kill him, if he be not guilty of crimes that deserve death by the law of God: for the life of man is not subjected to the arbitrement of any, but his who is the author of life and death; it is necessary to all to obey the law, Thou shalt not kill, without exception, but such killing as is approven by the author of the law, as saith Ames. De Conscientia, cap. 31. quest. 2. Hence, this people so much reproached with extravagant actions, do abundantly clear themselves of that imputation of being of the mind to kill all that differ from them, which was the impudent forgery of the father of lies, in their informatory vindication, Head 3. 'We positively disown (say they) as horrid murder, the killing of any because of a different persuasion or opinion from us, albeit some have invidiously cast this odious calumny upon us.' And it is as clear, they that took the oath of abjuration swore a lie, when they abjured the apologetical declaration, in so far as it is asserted it was lawful to kill all employed in the king's service, when it asserted no such thing, as is shewed above Head 3. To think so much, let be to declare it, far more to practise such a thing against all that served the king, or any merely, because they served him, or because they are in a wicked course, or because they have oppressed us, were abominable: for these things simply do not make men guilty of death, to be punished capitally by men according to the law of God. But when they are stated in such opposition to us, and serve the tyrant's murdering mandates by all those ways above specified; then we may by the law of God and nature and nations, destroy, slay, and cause to perish, and avenge ourselves on them that would assault us, and are seeking our destruction: as it was lawful for the Jews to do with Haman's emissaries, Esth. viii. 11. 13. and ix. 1, 2. 5. This charge then cannot reach the case.

4. Though murderers, and such as are guilty of death by the law of God, must be punished by death; for, "he that sheddeth man's blood," &c. yet it may be murder for a man to kill another, because he thought him so criminal, and because he thought it his duty, being moved by a pretended enthusiastical impulse, in imitation of the extraordinary actions of such as were really moved by the Spirit of God. As when James and John would have commanded fire to come down to consume the Samaritans, the Lord rebuked them, saying, "Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of, for the Son of man is not come to destroy men's lives, but to save them," Luke ix. 54,--56. Such impulses had need to be well examined, for ordinarily they will be found not consistent with a gospel spirit, which is always averse from acts of cruelty. Blind zeal sometimes may incite men to fearful work: yea the persecutors have often most of that spirit, as our Lord foretels, "The time cometh, that whosoever killeth you shall think that he doth God service," John xvi. 2. Paul, in his pharisaical zeal, breathed out slaughter against the disciples. And Satan can drive men under several colours, to act such things, as he did the Boors in Germany, and John of Leyden and his followers, whose practices are deservedly detested by all that have any spark of Christianity or humanity: for if this were espoused as a principle, there would be no security for men's lives. But hence it cannot be concluded, that God may not animate some to some rare enterprizes, for the cutting off of tyrants and their bloody emissaries, incendiaries, destroyers of innocent people, and putting an end to, and stopping the career of their murders, in a time of real extreme necessity, the matter of the action being unquestionably lawful, their ends and intentions really good and commendable, there being also a deficiency of others to do the work, and themselves in some probable capacity for it. See Jus Popul. cap. 20. pag. 410. Neither can it be denied, but true zeal may sometimes incite people to such exploits for the preservation of religion and liberty, their own lives and brethren, all like to be destroyed by the impunity of beasts of prey. This will be found very consistent with a gospel spirit: and though this principle be asserted, and also put in practice; all persons, notwithstanding thereof would have sufficient security for their lives, except such as have really forfeited their lives by all law of God and man. Those that are led by impulses, may pretend the imitation of extraordinary examples, and abuse them; yet hence it will not follow, that in no case these extraordinary examples may be imitated. Shall the examples of good magistrates, executing justice on idolaters and murderers, be altogether unimitable, because tyrants abuse them; in persecuting the innocent? If this arguing were good, it would make all virtuous actions in the world unimitable; for these may be abused by pretenders. See Jus Popul. ubi supra, pag. 412. But it cannot be charged upon the sufferers upon this head, that they had nothing to give as the reasons of their actions, but pretexts of enthusiasms.

5. Though a man be really so criminal, as that he deserves death by the law of God and man; yet it may be murder to kill him, if we do not certainly know it, and can prove it, and convict him of it upon trial: for no man must be killed not indicted, or the cause unknown. Thus even magistrates may murder murderers, when they proceed against them without probation or cognition according to law, far more private persons. Thus the Abiezrites would have murdered Gideon, not only unjustly, for his duty of throwing down the altar of Baal, but illegally; because they would have had him brought out that he might die without any further trial, Judg. vi. 29, 30. So likewise the Jews that banded and bound themselves under a curse to kill Paul before he was tried, would have murdered him, not only unjustly for his duty, but illegally before he was tried, Acts xxiii. 12. But this doth not condemn the actions of those sufferers, in maintaining the necessary execution of judgment, upon persons who are notorious murderers, yea, professing a trade and prosecuting habitually a tract of continued murdering the people of the Lord.

6. Though it should be certainly known, and sufficiently proven that a man is a murderer, &c. yet it were murder for an inferior, under a relation of subjection to him, to kill him, as long as that subjection were acknowledged; for, whensoever the common and mutual right or relation, either natural, moral, civil, or religious, to the prejudice or scandal of the church, or state, or particular persons, is broken by killing any person, that is murder, though the person killed deserve to die. As if a subject should kill an acknowledged king, a son by nature or in law should kill his natural or legal father, a servant should kill his master, breaking these relations, while their right and tie were acknowledged, (as some of them must still be acknowledged as long as the correlates continue in being, to wit, that of a father is not broken by his becoming a murderer) and to the danger, detriment, and scandal of the church and state; that were properly assassination: for assassins are they, who being subject to others, either out of their own head, for their own ends, or by command of their superiors, kill their superiors, or such as they command them to kill, as Alstedius describes them, Theol. Caf. cap. 18. de homicid. reg. 55. Therefore David would not kill Saul, because he acknowledged him to be the Lord's anointed, to whom he was under a relation of subjection, and because he was his master and father in law, and because it would have tended to the hurt of the kingdom, and involved it in combustions and contentions about the succession, and prejudged his own right, as well as to the scandal of the people of God, though Saul deserved otherwise to be capitally punished. So Ishbosheth was killed by Baanah and Rechab, 2 Sam. iv. 7. so Jozachar and Jehozabad, who killed Joash, 2 Kings xii. 21. were punished as murderers, chap. xiv. 6. because they were his servants, and did assassinate him to whom they were subject: so the servants of Amon were punished by the people, as conspirators against their king and master, 2 Kings xxi. 23, 24. though Amon deserved to have been punished as well as Amaziah was. Hence generally it is observed by some; that though right be given to equals or superiors, to bring their nearest relations to condign punishment, when they turn enticers to idolatry, Deut. xiii. 6. Yet no right or law, upon any cause or occasion whatsoever, is given to inferiors, as children, &c. to punish their fathers. See Pool. Synop. Critic. in locum. However it be, this cannot condemn the taking off of notorious murderers, by the hand of such as were no way subject nor related to them; but as enemies, who, in extreme necessity, executed righteous judgment upon them, without prejudice of the true, necessary, and chief good of the church and commonwealth, or of any particular person's just right and security, as Naphtali qualifies it, pag. 12, 23. first edition.

7. Though the matter of the action were just, and the murderer such a person as we might punish without any breach of relative obligations, or duties; yet the manner may aggravate it to some degree of murder; if it be done secretly, when it may be execute publicly, or suddenly and precipitantly, when it may be done deliberately, without rushing upon such an action, or hurrying the murderer to eternity; as this also might have had some weight with David not to murder Saul secretly and suddenly in the cave, or when he was sleeping; so Ishbosheth, and Joash, and Amon were murdered; or if it be done subtilly, when it may be performed in more plain and fair dealing; or treacherously, under colour of friendship; or cruelly without regard to humanity; and especially when the actors are at peace with the person, whose blood they shed, as Joab shed the blood of war in peace, 1 Kings ii. 5. in killing Abner and Amasa so craftily and cruelly; and Absalom made his servants assassinate Amnon, 2 Sam. xiii. 28, 29. But this cannot be changed upon them who executed righteous judgment, as publicly, deliberately, and calmly, as the extraordinary exigence of pressing necessity, in extremity of danger, could allow, upon notorious murderers, with whom they were in open and avowed terms of hostility.

8. Though the manner also be inculpable; yet if the principle and motive of killing, even those that deserve to die, be out of malice, hatred, rage, or revenge, for private or personal injuries, it is murder. For the affection and intention doth make one and the same action of taking away the life, homicide or no homicide: Lex Rex faith, Quest. 31. Pag. 338. If a man out of hatred deliberately take away another man's life, he is in so far a murderer, but if that same man had taken away the other's life, by the flying off of his ax head, he neither hating him before, nor intending to hurt him, he is no murderer by God's express law, allowing cities of refuge for the one, and not for the other, Deut. iv. 42. Deut. xix. 4, &c. private revenge is indignity to God, whose it is to take vengeance, Deut. xxxii. 35. Rom. xii. 19. "Dearly beloved avenge not yourselves, for vengeance is the Lord's." For which cause Jacob curses Simeon and Levi their murder of the Shechemites: for in their anger they slew a man, Gen. xlix. 6, 7. So David would not put forth his hand against Saul, for his own private and personal quarrel. So Joab killed Abner, and Absalom Amnon. But this doth not make the execution of judgment, out of zeal for God, respect to righteousness, love to the nations interest, and care to preserve the persecuted people of God from imminent destruction, upon public enemies, incendiaries, that are trampling upon all these precious interests, and threatening the utter ruin of them, and in a particular manner their destruction who thus prevent them.

9. Though the motive or cause were upon a public account, yet it may be murder to have a wrong end in it; as either to intend simply the destruction of the person on whom they execute judgment, as the end to which all their action is directed, or to make their own advantage or honour the end of the action. Thus David would not kill Saul, because it might have been thought he did it to obtain the kingdom, of which he was rightful successor: and deservedly he punished the Amalekite, that brought news of his killing Saul; and Baanah and Rechab, for their killing Ishbosheth, thinking thereby to advance themselves at David's court. So also Joab murdered Amasa to secure himself in the general's place. And Jehu, though upon the matter he executed righteous judgment, his end was only himself, it is condemned as murder. But when the execution of righteous judgment is both formally intended by the actors, and natively and really doth conduce to the glory of God, the preservation of the remnant threatened to be destroyed by these murderers, the suppressing of impiety, doing of justice, turning away wrath and removing of present, and preventing of future judgments, then it may be duty, Napthtali, pag. 23. first edition.

10. Though the end also were not culpable; yet it may be murder to kill criminals by transgressing the sphere of our vocation, and usurping upon the magistrate's sword: for he, by office, is a revenger, to execute wrath upon him that doth evil, Rom. xiii. 4. none must make use of the sword of vindictive justice, but he to whom the Lord giveth it; therefore they that came to take Christ are condemned and threatened for this, Matth. xxvi. 52. "All they that take the sword, shall perish with the sword." The God of order hath assigned to every man his station and calling, within the bounds whereof he should keep, without transgressing by defect or excess, let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called, 1 Cor. vii. 20. and study to be quiet, and do his own business, 1 Thess. iv. 11. Therefore David would not kill Saul, because he would have done it beside his calling. And therefore the killing of Joash and Amon was murder, because the assassins did transgress their vocation. But when notorious incendiaries do not only transgress their vocation, but the limits of human society, and turn open enemies to God and man, destroying the innocent, making havoc of the Lord's heritage, and vaunting of their villanies, and boasting of their wickedness, and thereby bringing wrath upon the land if such effrontries of insolence should pass unpunished, and when there is no magistrate to do that work of justice, but all in that place are art and part with them, patrons and defenders of them; yea, no magistrate that can be acknowledged as a minister of God to be applied unto; in that case, it is not a transgression of our vocation, nor an usurpation upon the magistrates, where there is none, to endeavour to avert wrath, by executing righteous judgment. Otherwise, if for fear, or suspicion of the accidental hazard of private men's usurping the office, or doing of the duty of public persons, every virtuous action which may be abused, shall be utterly neglected, impiety shall quickly gain universal empire, to the extermination or all goodness, Naphtali, pag. 24. first edition. To clear this, it must be considered, that a man's calling is twofold; his particular calling, whereunto in the ordinary course of things he is regularly confined: and his general calling, not circumscribed by particular rules, which from the common obligation of the end for which all callings are institute, in the clear exigence of an extraordinary emergent, according to the general rules of righteousness, bind to an agreeable practice; therefore circumstances may sometimes so diversify actions, that what in the ordinary and undisturbed state of things would be accounted an excess of our particular calling, and an usurpation, in an extraordinary occurrence may become a necessary duty of our general calling.

11. Though it were no usurpation beyond our calling; yet it may be murder, to kill any without the call of God in a case of necessity, either in the immediate defence of life, or though it be in the remote when the hazard is unavoidable. Every thing must have God's call in its season to make it duty, so also the time of killing, Eccles. iii. 3. For want of this David would not kill Saul. Lex Rex saith excellently to this, quest. 31. pag. 329, 330. 'David might have killed Saul when he was sleeping, and when he cut off the lap of his garment, but it was unlawful for him to kill the Lord's anointed, as it is unlawful for him to kill a man because he is the image of God, Gen. ix. 6. except in case of necessity,----David having Saul in his hand, was in a remote posture of defence, the unjust invasion then was not actual, nor unavoidable, nor a necessary mean in human prudence for self preservation; for king Saul was not in an actual pursuit of the whole princes, elders, community of Israel: Saul did but seek the life of one man David, and that not for religion, or a national pretended offence, and therefore he could not, in conscience, put hands on the Lord's anointed: but if Saul had actually invaded David for his life, David might, in that case, make use of Goliah's sword, (for he took not that weapon as a cypher to boast Saul) and rather kill than be killed.' Thus he. By a call here, we do not mean an express or immediate call from God, such as the prophets might have to their extraordinary executions of judgments, as Samuel and Elijah had to kill Agag and Baal's prophets; but either the allowance of man, then there is no question about it; or if that cannot be had, as in the case circumstantiate it cannot, then the providential and moral call of extreme necessity, for preservation of our lives, and preventing the murder of our brethren, may warrant an extraordinary executing of righteous judgment upon the murderers. Men may have a call to a necessary duty, neither every way mediate nor immediate, as the call of running together to quench a fire in a city, when magistrates through wickedness or negligence, will not, or do not, call people forth unto that work; they have not man's call, nor an immediate call from heaven, yet they have a lawful call from God; so they do not intrude upon the magistrates office, nor want they a call to this execution of judgment, who did materially that work for that exigent which magistrates, by office, were bound to do, being called thereto by God, by nature, and the call of inevitable necessity, which knoweth no human law, and to which some divine positive laws will cede. Jus populi. chap. 20. pag. 423.

12. Though this be a principle of reason and natural justice, when all the fore mentioned circumstances are clear, that it is lawful for private persons to execute righteous judgment, upon notorious incendiaries, and murdering public enemies, in cases of necessity; yet it might be a sinful breach of the sixth command, to draw extraordinary examples of it to an ordinary practice in killing all who might be found criminal, and would deserve death by the law, as all that have served under a banner of tyranny and violence, displayed against God and his people, to the ruin of the reformation, wasting of the country, oppression of many honest families, and destruction of many innocent people, are and would be found guilty of murder; as the chief captain would have truly alledged Paul to have been a murderer, if he had been the Egyptian which made an uproar, and led out four thousand men that were murderers, Acts xxi. 58. As for the vulgar and ordinary sort of those vermine of varlets, it is of no advantage for oppressed people to foul their fingers upon them, when their slaughter would not put a stop to, but rather increase the destruction of the people of God; and were unlawful to prevent and anticipate the due and legal execution of justice, where there is any prospect or expectation of its running in its right channel. But for the chief and principal ring leaders, and common public and habitual incendiaries, and masters of the trade of murdering the Lord's people, when there is no other way of being rid of their rage, and preserving ourselves, and preventing the destruction of our brethren, we may in that case of necessity make public examples of them, in an extraordinary procedure against them, that may be most answerable to the rules of the ordinary procedure of justice, and in imitation of the heroic actions recorded and justified in the word of God, in the like extraordinary cases; which are imitable, when the matter of their actions is ordinary, that is, neither preternatural nor supernatural though the occasion was singular, just and necessary, both by divine precept, and as a mean to good and necessary ends, and when there is no other to do the work, nor any prospect of access to justice in its ordinary and orderly course, nor possibility of suspending it till that can be obtained. We need not then any other call than a spirit of holy zeal for God, and for our own and our brethrens preservation, in that pinch of extremity. We do not hold these extraordinary actions for regular and ordinary precedents, for all times and persons universally: which if people should fancy, and heed more the glory and fame of the action, than the sound and solid rule of the scriptures, they may be tempted and carried to fearful extravagancies. But they may be warrants for private persons in their doing of these things, in an extreme necessity, to which at other times they are not called. And when the Lord, with whom is the residue of the spirit, doth breathe upon his people, more or fewer, to the exciting of more than ordinary zeal, for the execution of justice upon such adversaries, we should rather ascribe glory and praise to him, whose hand is not shortened, but many times chooseth the weak and foolish things of the world to confound the mighty and the wise, than condemn his instruments for doing such things, Naph. pag. 24, 25. prior edit.

All these cases, which are all I can think on at present, comprehending all that may any way infer the guilt of murder, I have collected; to the end I may conclude this one argument, and leave it to be considered: If this extraordinary executing of judgment, upon notorious incendiaries and murdering public enemies, by private persons, in the circumstances above declared, cannot be reduced to any case that can infer the guilt of murder; then it cannot be condemned, but justified; but this extraordinary executing of judgment, &c. cannot be reduced to any case that can infer the guilt of murder, (as will appear by the induction of all of them:) therefore, this extraordinary executing of judgment, &c. cannot be condemned, but justified.

II. In the next place, What we own may be done warrantably, in taking away the life of men without breach of the sixth command, will appear by these propositions and assertions, which will bring the matter to the present circumstantiate case.

1. It is certain, though the command be indefinitely expressed, it doth not prohibit all killing, but only that which is condemned in other explicatory commands. Our Lord Jesus, repeating this command, explains it by expressing it thus, Matth. xix. 18.--"Thou shalt not murder." And if any be lawful, it is granted by all, that is, which is unavoidable by the invincible necessity of providence, when a man following his duty doth that which beside and contrary his intention, and without any previous neglect or oversight in him, proveth the hurt and death of another, in which case he was allowed to flee to the city of refuge by the law of God. Whence if that physical necessity did justify that kind of killing, shall not a moral necessity every way inivincibly unavoidable (except we suffer ourselves and our brethren to be destroyed by beasts of prey) vindicate this kind, in an extraordinary extremity, when the murderers are protected under the sconce of pretended authority? In which case the law of God would allow deliberate murderers should be pursued by the avenger of blood, and not to have liberty to flee to these subterfuges and pretexts of authority, (mere tyranny,) but to be taken from the horns of such altars, and be put to death, as Mr. Mitchel says in vindicating his own action, in a letter dated Feb. 1674.

2. It is lawful to take the life of known and convicted murderers by public justice; yea, it is indispensibly necessary by the law of God, and no mercy nor pardon of the magistrate may interpose to spare them; for, 'Whoso killeth any person, the murderer shall be put to death by the mouth of witnesses. '--Ye shall take no satisfaction for the life of a murderer:--but he shall surely be put to death,' he was not to be admitted to the benefit of any refuge: and the reason is, 'Blood defiles the land, and the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it,' Numb. xxxv. 30, 31, 32, 33. Hence, if it be so necessary to cleanse the land, then when the magistrate is not only negligent in his duty, but turns a patron and protector of such murderers, and employs them as his emissaries to murder and destroy, it cannot be expected he should cleanse the land, for then he should free it of the burden of himself, and begin with himself: therefore then, there must be more incumbent upon private persons, touched with the zeal of God, than at another time. And as Mr. Knox, in his conference with queen Mary, says, 'They that in the fear of God execute judgment, where God hath commanded, offend not God, though kings do it not;' and adduces the examples of Samuel killing Agag, Elias killing the prophets of Baal, and of Phineas killing Zimri and Cozbi.

3. It is lawful for private persons to kill their unjust assaulters, in defending themselves against their violence, and that both in the immediate defence of our life against an immediate assault, in the instant of the assault, and also in a remote defence of ourselves, when that is as necessary as the first; and there is no other way of escaping the destruction intended by murderers, either by flight or resistance; then it is lawful to preserve ourselves by taking advantages to cut them off.

4. It is lawful in a just war to kill the enemy; yea in the defensive war of private subjects, or a part of the commonwealth, against their oppressing tyrants, as is proven, head 5. Where several of the arguments used to evince that truth will confirm this; as namely, those arguments taken from the people's power in reformation, and those taken from the hazard of partaking of others sin and judgment: for, if all the magistrates, supreme and subordinate, turn principal patrons and patterns of all abominations, and persecutors and destroyers of the people for not complying with them, then the people are not only under an obligation to resist them; but seeing otherwise they would be liable to their sin, in suffering them thus to trample on religion, and the interests of God as well as their own, in order to turn away the wrath of God, it is incumbent upon them to vindicate religion, and reform the land from these corruptions, in an endeavour to bring those malignant enemies of God, and destroyers of the people, to condign punishment, "that the heads of the people be hanged up before the Lord against the sun, the fierce anger of the Lord may be turned away from the land," Numb. xxv. 4. In this case, as Buchanan says of a tyrant, De jure regni, 'A lawful war being once undertaken with such an enemy as a tyrant is, every one out of the whole multitude of mankind may assault, with all the calamities of war, a tyrant, who is a public enemy, with whom all good men have a perpetual warfare.' And though the war be not always actually prosecute in a hostile manner, yet, as long as peace is not concluded and the war ceased, they that have the just side of the quarrel may take advantages, in removing and taking off, (not every single soldier of the contrary side, for that would contribute nothing to their prevailing in the end) but the principal instruments and promoters of the war, by whose fall the offending side would suffer great loss, and the defending would be great gainers. So Jael killing Sisera, Jabin's captain-general, is greatly commended. Now this was the case of the sufferers upon this head, as Mr. Mitchel, one of them represents it in his forecited letter, 'I being (says he) a soldier, not having laid down my arms, but still upon my own defence, having no other end or quarrel at any man--besides the prosecution of the ends of the covenant, particularly the overthrow of prelates and prelacy; and I being a declared enemy to him (that is Sharp) on that account, and he to me in like manner, I never found myself obliged--to set a centinel at his door for his safety; but as he was always to take his advantage, as it appeareth, so I of him to take any opportunity offered: moreover, we being in no terms of capitulation, but on the contrary, I, by his instigation, being excluded from all grace and favour, thought it my duty to pursue him at all occasions.'

5. It is lawful to kill enemies in the rescue of our brethren, when they are keeping them in bondage, and reserving them for a sacrifice to the fury of tyrants, or leading them forth to the slaughter, or in the time of acting their murdering violence upon them: then, to break prisons, beat up garrisons, surprise the murderers, and kill them in the rescue of our innocent brethren, is very lawful, according to that command, Prov. xxiv. 11, 12. and the practice of Moses, who seeing one of his brethren suffering wrong, he defended him, and avenged him that was oppressed, and slew the Egyptian, Acts vii. 24. For that is a certain truth, which Grotius faith in locum, 'the law of nature gives a right to an innocent, and to the defender of an innocent person, against the guilty offender.' Hence, It cannot but be lawful also, in a case of necessity, when both ourselves and our brethren are pursued incessantly by destroying murderers, to avenge ourselves on them, and slay them, when there is no other way to be rid of their violence.

6. It is lawful to prevent the murder of ourselves or our brethren, when no other way is left, by killing the murderers before they accomplish their wicked design, if they be habitually prosecuting it, and have many times accomplished it before. This followeth upon the other; and upon this account it had been duty for Gedaliah to have suffered Johanan to slay Ishmael, and so prevent the governor's murder, if it had been certainly known that Ishmael was sent by the king of Ammon to assassinate him, Jer. xl. 14, 15. for nothing is there objected against the lawfulness of the thing, but only it was alledged that he spoke falsely. Alftedius asserts this, Caf. de homicid. reg. 6. p. 331. It is lawful to prevent him that would assault us, and by preventing to kill him before his invasion, if it be so necessary, to prevent him, that our life cannot be otherwise defended but by preventing. And hence he justifies that saying, 'It is lawful to kill him that lieth in wait to murder,' ibid. This is all the length that the reproached sufferers, whom I am vindicating, go, in asserting this principle, as may be seen in their Informatory Vindication, Head 3. pag. 544. where they say, 'We maintain it as both righteous and rational, in defence of our lives, liberties, and religion, after an orderly and Christian manner, to endeavour, by all means lawful and possible, to defend ourselves, rescue our brethren, and prevent their murder, in a martial opposition against wicked persecutors, who are seeking to destroy them and us, and imbrue their hands in our blood, according to the true import of the Apologetical Declaration.' Which is very rational; especially considering.

7. These murderers, who are thus to be prevented, are such whom the law of God commands to be put to death, and no where allows to be spared, being public enemies to God and good men, open blasphemers, avowed idolaters, affronted adulterers, notorious murderers, habitual tyrants, suppressing religion, oppressing the innocent, and professing a trade of destroying the Lord's people. Surely, if God hath expressly in his laws provided, that blasphemers, idolaters, murderers, &c. should not be suffered to live, he never intended men daily guilty, yea, making profession of these crimes, should be allowed impunity, either by virtue of their office, or because there is none in office to execute judgment upon them; but in a case of extreme necessity, these laws will not only allow, but oblige people, daily murdered by them, for their own preservation, for vindication of religion, for purging the land of such wickedness, for turning away the wrath of God, to prevent their prosecuting their murdering designs any further, and put a stop to their persecution, by putting an end to their wicked lives: seeing, as Buchanan says, De Jure Regni, it is expresly commanded, 'to cut off wickedness and wicked men, without any exception of rank or degree; and yet in no place of sacred scripture are tyrants more spared than private persons.' Much less their bloody emissaries.

Now, seeing all these cases of killing I have collected, are justifiable in scripture, and none of the sufferers upon this head, whom I am vindicating, have exceeded in principle or practice the amount of these assertions, what is said already may have some weight to demur a censorious condemnation of them. But as the true nonconformist well observes, in answer to Dial. 7. p. 391. Seeing the consideration resulting from the concurrence of all circumstances, whereupon the right dignoscing of such deeds, when actually existent, doth mostly depend, doth more contribute to the clearing and passing a judgment on a case of this nature, when the whole contexture is exposed to certain examination, than to set down general rules directive of such practices (which yet will all justify this in question) therefore to clear the case further, all may be resolved into this state of the question.