Chapter VI: A Chapter on Savings Bank Frauds (2)

On the 3d of January, 1862, the announcement was made in the _Times_ newspaper that the Bilston bank had come to a sad end, and that defalcations to the amount of 8,840_l._ had been found out in the accounts of the treasurer of that bank. How these frauds, which extended over several years, were accomplished, and how they were found out, remains to be seen. We will reverse this order, and speak of the exposure first. In the spring of 1861, Mr. Tidd Pratt, the energetic Registrar of Friendly Societies--whose name indeed seems almost synonymous with such subjects--visited Bilston, and delivered a lecture on "Benefit Societies." In the course of that lecture Mr. Pratt alluded to the cognate topic of Savings Banks, and spoke of the necessity for regular accounts and regular returns in connexion with them. He then took the opportunity to refer to the "very irregular manner" in which the accounts of the bank in their own town were kept. Now, it must not be supposed that Mr. Fletcher had forgotten his returns; he was far too careful for that; he knew the penalties attaching to such neglect. It seems that both weekly and annual returns, although they were habitually and carefully "cooked," were regularly forwarded to the National Debt Office. The "Returns" to which Mr. Pratt appears to have pointed, were those called for annually by the House of Commons, with the object of improving the law of Savings Banks; and these returns, from 1855 to 1861 the factotum of the Bilston bank had constantly neglected to send. Mr. Pratt, in continuation of his statement afterwards, confessed he knew nothing of the circumstances of the bank, further "than that his suspicions were always aroused in cases where he found any accounts were not properly rendered." There can be no doubt about it, that this reference roused the "reverend defaulter" to a sense of his danger; for it subsequently transpired that not a penny was abstracted unlawfully from the bank after the week of Mr. Pratt's visit and lecture. Furthermore, not only was the culprit aroused, but the trustees were awakened to some sense of their responsibility, and very soon afterwards there was a movement amongst them for a change in the management and an overhauling of the books of the bank. In a very few weeks after Mr. Pratt's visit a new set of managers and trustees were proposed, and Mr. Fletcher was deputed to see them, and endeavour to get them to act. In July the appointments were legally made, including that of Mr. Hawkesford to the post of actuary. Then quickly followed the disclosure which indeed, sooner or later, was now inevitable. The new actuary got the books from the parsonage--the bank being held in the school-room of the church--and was not long in finding out some of the discrepancies with which they abounded. On first discovering the frauds the actuary spoke to the treasurer, who promised to confer with him about them; on finding out the magnitude of the defalcations, he again mentioned the matter, choosing an extraordinary time, not however without its significance--of a Sunday after the usual service. The clerical delinquent acknowledged his guilt, and said, "He was very sorry, but never intended to defraud the depositors of a shilling." It will be seen, however, that the fraudulent transactions were of such a nature as not to admit of any extenuation, and to render condonation of any sort impossible. The feeling produced by the disclosure was painful in the extreme, and the country spoke out with vigour on this extraordinary and merciless breach of trust. The local magnates, indeed, and the body of trustees who had allowed these frauds to run on, spoke with bated breath of the "deficiencies" of the Bilston treasurer; the _Times_, on the other hand, spoke far more in accord the with the general feeling of the country, when it characterised "this man Fletcher" as "the meanest, the most cowardly, and the most cruel of swindlers."[127] Under his manipulations, the Bilston bank was a Savings Bank in nothing but the name; there were trustees, but they were tools; rules, properly certified, but never obeyed; accounts made out and "cooked," but never checked or audited. The trustees did just what they were bid, and the real operator at the bank did just what he chose. This clergyman and magistrate was a swindler, his books a heap of lies, his balance-sheets pure fiction.

Mr. Pratt was sent for to examine into the state of the bank immediately after its condition became known, and it is to the account which he himself subsequently gave to the depositors that we are indebted for most of the particulars which elucidate Mr. Fletcher's mode of operation, when in the thick of his guilt. Mr. Pratt stated, that from 1848 to January, 1861, there did not appear to have been any meeting either of the trustees or managers, for the purpose, according to the rules, of auditing or settling the weekly accounts. The Rev. R. J. Heafield, a trustee and manager of the bank, confessed at the trial of Mr. Fletcher, at the Staffordshire Lent Assizes, 1862, his own culpable negligence in the following words:--"The weekly returns signed by me were prepared by Mr. Fletcher. _When I signed them, I never in any way compared them with the books._ They were presented to me either by Mr. or Mrs. Fletcher, _and I took no measures to verify their accuracy._"[128] What might not a designing man do with such a tool as this? Having subdued his trustees in this way, the rest was, as we shall see, quite easy. The books at the bank were, it is only fair to say, kept quite correctly; so were the depositors' books. According to the evidence of Mr. Pratt: "In the day-book everything was entered with scrupulous correctness; and 1200 depositors out of 1400 had brought in their books, and he did not believe an error had been discovered." Mr. Fletcher chose a somewhat simpler course of action, which we will describe. His duty as actuary of the bank required that he should furnish weekly returns of the transactions to the National Debt Commissioners: the correctness of these returns were to be checked by the treasurer, which office he of course filled _himself_. All that was necessary to the perpetration of fraud was that this actuary-treasurer should be on easy terms with his conscience, and this unfortunately was the sad state of the case. Deceive the Commissioners by falsified returns, and any amount of money, under the peculiar arrangements of this bank, might be pocketed without fear. In order to help himself to a full solution of the case, Mr. Pratt brought these returns down from London, and compared them with the bank accounts, with the following result:[129]--"The whole of the Returns he held in his hand were signed by Mr. Fletcher, as actuary and manager. In the statement dated January 1, 1859, the amount received was returned at 234_l._ On looking at the books for that day, he found it should have been 334_l._, therefore 100_l._ had been abstracted on that day [cries of 'Shame,' and sensation]. On the 8th of January, he found the payments were set down at 174_l._, whereas they had only been 74_l._, thus showing that the treasurer had put another 100_l._ in his pocket that week. In the return dated January 29, the receipts were set down at 183_l._, and the payments at 148_l._, whereas the former ought to have been 283_l._, and the latter 48_l._, thus taking to himself 200_l._ [renewed sensation]." So on through almost all the weekly accounts of three or four years. There seems to have been no other fraudulent transactions than those of this simple but abominable kind; the whole defalcation had taken place in this way, and it was made manifest that no one but the treasurer had participated in it. It is fortunate for the depositors that the frauds were found out when they were; but for the negligence in sending the required returns ordered by the House they might have been continued for an indefinite period. As it was, the assets of the bank realized in the first instance ten shillings in the pound; towards the close of 1862, another dividend of half-a-crown in the pound was paid, and since that time a third small amount has accrued to the depositors, who are never likely to be completely reimbursed of their loss. In 1862, Mr. Fletcher was tried before Baron Channell, and found guilty of "appropriating money with intent to defraud." His counsel, however, having made an able defence, characterised by the judge as being as subtle as it was ingenious, the point as to whether the prisoner was a "trustee" at the time of appropriating the money--this being one of the facts upon which the indictment was based--was reserved, and he was released on heavy bail. Into the further history of this man, the sequestration of his living by the Bishop of Lichfield for the behoof of the depositors, the repeated failures of justice in his case, his eventual imprisonment for two years, it is not befitting that we should enter, these being items of almost current police intelligence.

We can only spare a few words to tell how similar results followed in this as in previous frauds. Men declared they would put it out of the power of mortal man to deceive them in this way again. In many cases a degree of recklessness was induced in those who had been cruelly wronged, which could only have been considered excusable if they had lost their all. It is not at all unnatural, that, from what cannot but be considered a defective education, men should so act, and be so ill prepared and disinclined to look evil consequences fairly in the face: still such facts only prove the truth of what we have before urged, that the extent of money loss, through such dishonest transactions as Savings Bank frauds, is but a trifling part of the aggregate misfortune they entail upon the country. Other depositors, it is but fair to say, acted far more wisely. Induced by the counsel and persuasion of those whom they could trust in a time of need, many depositors in other banks withdrew their money, and placed it where alone they could get that security which they so much needed, and several of the Bilston depositors did the same with the sums they obtained. It was represented to them truly, that not only would Government suffer by a run upon the old banks, but, what was of far more importance, they would themselves suffer, and their second period of suffering be worse than their first. Nothing can be so palpably true as that money, completely withdrawn at such times, is oftener wasted than kept, and frugal habits rewarded after this fashion far oftener discontinued than resumed.

And here, it seems to us,--and we mention it, though we are somewhat anticipating the subject--the country is greatly advantaged in having the new system of Savings Banks to point to. What was much wanted in previous cases was some safe place, where timid depositors might resort with their savings, and defrauded depositors go with what they had saved from the wreck.[130] In the Bilston case this privilege was largely used. The Post Office Banks broke many a fall, and they set many on their feet again who otherwise would have been hopelessly overcome by the shock. Two years before it would have been sheer mockery to have told depositors, under such circumstances as those to which we are alluding, not to make a run upon Savings Banks; they had no alternative till, in 1861, that alternative was provided. It would seem, from a memorandum before us, that the authorities of the Postal Banks, without in any way seeking to prejudice the interests of the old banks, did all that was fairly possible towards reducing the disasters which have invariably and inevitably followed previous cases of Savings Bank failures. They instructed their agents, in all cases where, owing to the depredations at Bilston, Savings Bank depositors applied for advice about withdrawing their money, to recommend continued confidence in these institutions; if, however, such depositors were bent upon withdrawing their money, then to advise that it should not be asked for in cash, but by means of a transfer certificate, which would make them depositors under the Crown. The strict fairness of these instructions may be judged by the closing injunction: "Although you may fairly inform those depositors who are alarmed at this failure, that the depositors in Post Office Savings Banks have absolute and direct Government security for their money, you must on no account do or say anything to weaken their trust in the old Savings Banks."

The last case[131] in the catalogue of this peculiar description of crimes is that which occurred at Canterbury during the year 1865. This case is indeed so recent that any lengthy description of it would scarcely be tolerated. We may well spare ourselves the trouble, for the Canterbury fraud was little else than a repetition, on a smaller scale, of the one perpetrated at Rochdale, to which we have given so much space. Nor is it a little singular that the actuary in the Rochdale case was in many respects the prototype of the Canterbury actuary: in the estimation in which both were held in their respective spheres, in their character and occupation, there are several points of close resemblance between them. In the Canterbury case we have the old story of misplaced confidence, want of check, and a constant embezzlement of considerable sums of money extending over a long series of years. The actuary and secretary of the Canterbury bank, Mr. Samuel Greaves, was for many years almost the sole responsible official; of course "he bore the highest possible character for probity and honesty": nor will it surprise any of our readers to be told that it came afterwards to be said of this man, "from his many professions he was thought incapable of such conduct as that which was proved against him." The Canterbury bank was established in 1816. Greaves's connexion with the institution dates from 1830, when he was appointed actuary at a salary of 40_l._ per annum. The salary, however, was increased from year to year, up to the time of the exposure, when it stood at the respectable figure of 200_l._ Originally a "hoyman," the actuary of course, and necessarily, engaged in other pursuits than those connected with the bank; and this circumstance, in the same way that it occurred in almost every other fraud of the kind, led to the malappropriation of the money of the bank. It was another case of partial service and partial pay, and an almost unlimited command of money, when among many other business engagements it was always possible that money might be urgently needed. Like Haworth of Rochdale, Mr. Greaves undertook several agencies, among them those for the sale of coal and porter. In 1840, it seemed, from the statements of his counsel, he began to lose money in his business, and was then, to put it in the mild form chosen at his trial, "induced to abstract some of the funds of the bank to meet his pressing difficulties." Once on the downward road, he never turned back; it was impossible to manage it. It was the old story, told with plainness by his own advocate. He took the money, with the full intention of repaying it on an early date; difficulties gathered fast around him, and still the man went on, foolishly trusting to some turn of fortune's wheel to replace him in his old position. He tried speculation, but he lost still more irretrievably; his lucky day never arrived: and at length the weight of anxiety under which the man must have laboured for twenty-five years brought him down, and with the lack of his usual vigilance came detection and exposure.

This detection was effected by a Mr. Abrams, the clerk of the bank, and it is from his evidence at the trial of his superior officer that we learn the actuary's mode of operation. All the cases of fraud, it seems, were identical in character, and were effected by means of claims for withdrawals only. Every deposit reaching the bank was properly received and properly accounted for. Like Haworth at Rochdale, the Canterbury actuary carefully noted those who were generally putting money into the bank, and seldom taking any out. In the case of many of these depositors he had provided himself with forged pass-books, with the deposit column always correct, but the withdrawal side manipulated according as he himself wanted money. Suppose any of the depositors came to the bank, to deposit or withdraw a sum of money; they presented themselves to the actuary, who entered in their proper bock the proper sum, but immediately substituted a forged pass-book for the purposes of the bank. The ledger clerk received a book from the actuary to copy into the ledger, and in this way the books of the bank came to tally with the forged depositors' books. All that was necessary to carry on the frauds was that the actuary should keep a strict eye on the real pass-books of the depositors, for the discrepancies would be patent, as it eventually transpired, the moment the true books were seen. Sometimes the money was obtained with less trouble. Greaves would occasionally give himself notice that a depositor wished to withdraw a certain sum of money (and this occurred several times in connexion with a person who had deposited considerably, but never withdrawn any sum), and represented that the money was entrusted to him "to keep." After the _quasi_ notice had been acted upon, he would draw a cheque for the money, and the amount would be entered in a false pass-book and copied into the ledger; the luckless depositor, with her book safely by her, being in entire ignorance of the whole transaction. The utter absence of any control on the part of the managers and trustees, as exemplified in such a mode of procedure, especially considering that it came after the case of Bilston, the agitation of the last few years, and the passing of the Act of 1863, reflected the greatest discredit upon the honorary officials of the bank, though their conduct subsequently went far to atone for their past neglect.

The case is described as having excited the most painful interest in the city of Canterbury. The actuary, an old man of seventy, was tried at the city quarter sessions in October, 1865; the trustees of the bank prosecuting him on the charge of felony. The transactions were again described, but only in brief, inasmuch as the prisoner pleaded guilty. A strong memorial was presented, signed by many clergymen and tradesmen, which, instead of asking for a mitigation of sentence solely on account of his age and infirmity, put forward the following extraordinary motive for interference: "The memorialists wish so far to relieve his character from any undue opprobrium that may attach to it, by declaring that the various business transactions they individually have had with him, have always been conducted in an honourable and satisfactory manner." At any rate, this questionable memorial may at least serve to show the estimation in which he was held by his fellow-townsmen. The prisoner was sentenced to six years' penal servitude,--six years for each of the two indictments; but, on account of his age, the years to run concurrently together.

The entire deficiency, when at length the whole of the accounts of the bank were made up, was found to be 9,300_l._ Happily the depositors, whom, so far as he knew, the actuary was mercilessly robbing, were ultimately secured against loss. The surplus fund of the bank, amounting to 3,500_l._, was applied to meet the case; the actuary gave up property to the value of 1,700_l._; a gentleman who was his surety for 400_l._ was called upon to pay that sum, and the remainder, about 3,000_l._, was subscribed by the trustees and their friends. The bank was of course stopped on the defalcations coming to light, the books were called in, and the trustees sought the advice of the Government officials, as to transferring the business to the Post Office. The stipulation in this case was, we believe, that the trustees should make good the deficiency, and that then the business of the bank, which was a large one, the deposits amounting to 150,000_l._, should be handed over to the new establishment. Every effort was made by the Post Office, in the way we have shown in the Bilston case, to stem the tide of improvidence which generally sets in at such a time, and in this case with great success.

The frauds above described have, of course, formed the principal cases,--cases which from their flagrancy and extent have either been made the subject of parliamentary investigation, or have so occupied the attention of the press as to have become grave subjects of public discussion. Besides those leading cases, there have been, as we have before hinted, a certain number that have been concealed from the public from motives which, though they may have been open to question, we cannot characterise as wholly bad or unwise. From two Returns issued at different times on motions made in the House of Commons, we are enabled to compile a complete list of those frauds that have been officially reported to the National Debt Office. The first Return embraces the period between 1844 and 1852, and the second, 1852 to 1857. The numerous frauds of which we have already spoken, or to which we have referred, occurring before 1844, and the important ones perpetrated since 1857, are not included in the following list. The gross amount of loss would have been considerably swelled had a perfect list been possible. As it is, the following table gives the name of the Bank, the amount of the Fraud, and the amount of the Loss to depositors, so far as it can be correctly ascertained:--

+----------------------+--------------+----------------+------------+
| Name of Bank. | Total | Defaulters. | Depositors |
| | Defalcations.| | Loss. |
+----------------------+--------------+----------------+------------+
| _England._ | £ | | £ |
|Bradford, Wilts | 400 | Actuary | -- |
|Bromley | 932 | Actuary | -- |
|Dunmow | 16 | -- | -- |
|Highgate | 700 | Secretary | -- |
|Newport, Isle of Wight| 8,156 | Secretary | 7,850 |
|Leicester | 689 |{Clerk employed}| -- |
| | |{ by Secretary.}| |
|Mitcham | 10,000 | Actuary | -- |
|Newtown | 180 | -- | 180 |
|Ongar | 497 | Actuary | -- |
|Poole | 6,221 | Secretary | 5,663 |
|Reeth | 230 | -- | 147 |
|Rochdale | 71,715 | Actuary | 37,433 |
|Rugby | 1,438 | Secretary | -- |
|Runcorn | 98 | Actuary | -- |
|St. Helen's | 12,932 | Secretary | 6,680 |
|Southport | 200 | Actuary | -- |
|Spilsby | 3,213 | Actuary | 2,436 |
|Upper Albany Street | 250 | -- | -- |
|West London | 1,106 | Actuary | -- |
|Yoxall and Barton | 200 | Secretary | -- |
| | | | |
| _Scotland._ | | | |
|Auchterarder | 1,400 | Actuary | 430 |
|Monquhitter | 336 | -- | -- |
| | | | |
| _Ireland._ | | | |
|Kilkeel | 976 | Actuary | 976 |
|Tralee | 36,000 | Actuary | 36,000 |
|Killarney | 20,370 | Actuary | 19,105 |
|Nenagh | 832 | -- | 832 |
|Mallow | No returns. |
|Castle Townsend | No returns. |
+----------------------+--------------------------------------------+

The frauds at Hertford, Brighton, Reading, Cuffe Street, Bilston, and Canterbury, where the amounts of the defalcations are known, are left out of consideration. Thus the total amount of the frauds enumerated in the Returns, extending over thirteen years, was 179,280_l._; or if we include the Cuffe Street bank fraud, to make up for those Irish banks which sent no returns, and errors of computation, and spread the total over all the thirteen years, the average amount of defalcation was at the rate of 17,600_l._ a year; or, taking the banks mentioned in the Returns, upwards of 7,900_l._ for each involved. Doing the same with the total loss to depositors, or 117,732_l._, we find the average loss for each bank to be nearly 5,000_l._

The reader who may have followed us through this chapter, and remembers the classes to which the cheated depositors generally belonged,[132] will have some idea how much pain and suffering the amount of money so treacherously wrested out of their hands really represents. "But the evil," Mr. Gladstone well said several years ago when speaking on this very point, "that is done, is, unfortunately, not to be measured by the actual amount of money loss; there is an amount of evil such as figures can convey no idea of; and it is impossible that the public confidence in these institutions can be that which it ought to be, while these losses are liable to occur at all." This was a deficiency which Mr. Gladstone set himself to remedy immediately afterwards, and, though unable to do so at the time through the opposition of Savings Bank managers, it was not long before another system was provided which struck for ever at the root of this grievance; and for all practical purposes, and so far as it was now possible, repaired the injury which the industrious classes had suffered through the action of defective legislation, and the moral obliquity of those who had been trusted with their earnings.[133] After entering still more fully in the next chapter into the defects of the Savings Bank institution, considered purely _as a system_, and the attempts made from time to time to remedy its deficiencies, it will be time to describe how the above beneficial result was brought about.

[114] "In the case of a fraudulent actuary, especially if the bank
is carried on at the man's own house, there is no limit to the
fraud which he may commit."--_Evidence of Mr. Tidd Pratt before
the Committee of 1848._

[115] That Lynch, was no ordinary man there is abundant evidence.
The following address to the inhabitants of Tralee--which from
anybody else would be considered well meant and well expressed
advice, simply completes the burlesque in his case:--

1. "Money, as the means of procuring the necessaries
and comforts of life, is a blessing; and to be
careful of it is a duty incumbent on all."

2. "To lay by in the time of youth, and whilst we
enjoy good health, a portion of the fruits of
industry in store for future wants, is a mark of
wisdom; and considering that all are liable to
infirmities, a provision to alleviate them is of the
greatest importance."

3. "Some men by hard labour, and others by superior
skill, earn high wages; yet for want of proper
management they have nothing to reserve. Many might
be disposed to save a part of their earnings if they
knew how to set about it, _or where to place it with
safety_; whilst others who have occasionally
practiced saving, have lost what they had laid up,
_by trusting it in unsafe hands_."

4. "The promoters of this institution are aware that
several of their neighbours, from various causes, are
unable to procure many of the comforts, if not the
necessaries of life; they are, nevertheless, fully
persuaded that many others who have the advantage of
constant employment, and are favoured with the
enjoyment of health and strength, might, by
practising laudable economy, reserve a portion of
their earnings to meet the demands which a future
pressure of bad times, sickness, old age, or an
increase of family, may bring upon them, and thereby
avoid the calamities under which so many of them
suffer."

5. "It is a great mistake to suppose that small sums
are not worth saving. By the habit of saving in
little matters, riches are acquired; farthings saved
would soon accumulate to shillings, and those to
pounds," &c. &c. &c.

[116] A Mr. Fitzgerald was the manager who generally attended and
did the current work of his office. His statement after the frauds
had come to light was, that he made the best inspection he could
of the ledgers of the bank. When asked why he never compared the
ledgers with the daily cash books, he confessed he never thought
of it, "there was the omission," "that was where the link of
investigation broke," "that was the omission which concealed the
fraud so long," and other similarly shiftless remarks.

[117] _Report of the Select Committee of 1848_.

[118] _Ibid._ (Qu. 674).

[119] Mr. Pratt's idea was to make the trustees liable in a great
measure for the deficiency, as guilty of wilful neglect or
default. The advice given as to Lynch's property was of very
questionable propriety, and very questionable, as it afterwards
appeared, in law. The money, however, was lost to the depositors
completely, and went to Lynch's relations.

[120] As usual, many persons had been allowed to deposit illegal
sums on which they had no claim. One man was shown to have taken
out 420_l_. from the Provincial Bank of Ireland, and to deposit it
all in the Killarney bank in one day.

[121] _Vide Select Committee on Savings Banks_, 1858. Evidence of
Mr. Jameson, actuary of the Perth Bank. (Qu. 2,906.)

[122] An estimable sect of Christians, they are not better known
for the zeal with which they contrive to amass and keep in their
immediate circle vast stores of wealth, than for the uprightness
and conscientiousness they generally display in the conduct of
their business. The transactions of Haworth, and another of their
black sheep who about the same time committed, or attempted to
commit murder, whilst assuming their character, is described to us
as having spread consternation and dismay through their ranks. The
way in which the Society of Friends has, as a body, taken up the
management of Savings Banks is most commendable.

[123] A great part of our information relative to the Rochdale
bank fraud is gathered from the evidence of Mr. Edward Taylor, a
worthy and intelligent tradesman of Rochdale, who was examined
before the Committee of 1858 in reference to the transactions in
question; and no one is better able to speak of them.

[124] So prevalent was this impression, that for several weeks
17_s._ 6_d._ in the pound was freely offered for Savings Bank
books in Rochdale.

[125] Evidence of Mr. Hatton, actuary of the Brighton Savings
Bank.

[126] It almost passes the bounds of credibility, and yet it
cannot be denied, that in two separate banks, where the accounts
were thus overhauled, items of money to a large amount were
repeatedly found entered in the books with nothing but a pencil!

[127] _Times_, January 17, 1862.

[128] _Midland Counties Express_, March 16, 1862.

[129] Report of the depositors' meeting, _Birmingham Daily Post_,
January 16, 1862.

[130] Or, as it was far better illustrated at the time, "It is not
enough to bring a man who has been tossed about in an unseaworthy
bark within sight of _terra firma_. We must heave him a rope, or,
if possible, run out a plank between the quay and his crazy ship's
side, on which he may safely walk across."

[131] No attempt is here made to catalogue and describe frauds not
occurring in Savings Banks proper: a chapter itself might be
written on banks for the people established and carried on under a
system of complete deception and villany. Nor have we entered into
the case of frauds in Penny Banks, such as the unfortunate case at
Birmingham.

[132] Of the Rochdale depositors, for example, 1,245 were women,
722 unmarried factory operatives, 292 married, and 231 young
girls; there were besides, 953 miners, 539 labourers, and 191
members of sick clubs.

[133] Since the above pages were in type, a deficiency has been
made public in the accounts of the Worcester Savings Bank, the
cashier, Benjamin B. Wilkins, having committed frauds to the
extent of between 4,000_l._ and 5,000_l._ On the frauds coming to
light last August the cashier decamped, and, as it now appears,
found his way to America. The trustees, having heard of him
through some channel, put the matter into the hands of the police,
who have succeeded in apprehending him, and bringing him back to
this country, and he will shortly be brought to justice.