Chapter XIII: Part THE SECOND: “There are two points for consideration under this

division of the subject which are of primary import, the question of
a Poor Law for Ireland mainly depending upon them. First—Whether the
workhouse system can be safely and effectively established in
Ireland; and secondly—Whether a machinery can be there established
for their government, such as exists in the English unions.

“In my inquiries with regard to these points, I endeavoured to exercise
a care and vigilance proportioned to their importance. The inquiry
was entered upon under an apprehension that the workhouse would be
less efficient in Ireland, than experience had shown it to be in
England; and that it would probably be applicable to the able-bodied
in a limited degree only, if applicable to them at all. I was
doubtful also, whether it would be practicable to control any
considerable number of the able-bodied in a workhouse—whether the
proneness of the Irish peasantry to outrage and insubordination
would not, as had often been represented, lead them to break through
all restraint, and perhaps demolish the building, and commit other
acts of violence. The probability of such outrage is strongly
insisted upon by the Commissioners of Inquiry, and the same argument
was urged upon me by some persons with whom I communicated in
Dublin. In the progress of my inquiries however, I soon found reason
for concluding that there was no ground for apprehension, either as
to the applicability of the workhouse for the purposes of relief, or
as to any danger of resistance to such a system of classification
and discipline within it, as would make it a test of destitution. In
the several ‘houses of industry’ established in Ireland, a strict
separation of the sexes is enforced, and a discipline more or less
approximating to our workhouse discipline is established. No spirits
are admitted, and on the whole, there is enough in these
institutions to render them distasteful as places of partial
restraint. Yet from no governor of a house of industry could I learn
that resistance had ever been made to their regulations, and
surprise was even expressed at my thinking it necessary to make the
inquiry. I received the same opinion from the governors of gaols. In
short, every man whom I conversed with, who had any experience of
the habits of the people, declared that the peasantry are perfectly
tractable, and never think of opposing authority, unless stimulated
by drink, or urged on by that species of combination for securing
the occupancy of land, which has become so common in certain
districts. Neither of these influences will interfere with the
establishment of a workhouse, or the regulation of its inmates, all
of whom will have sought refuge in it voluntarily, and may quit it
at any moment. As regards the security of the workhouse, therefore,
and the establishment of a system of discipline as strict as that
maintained in the English workhouses, I believe that there will be
neither danger nor difficulty.

“How far the workhouse, if established, may be relied upon as a test of
destitution and a measure of the relief to be afforded; how far it
will be effectual for the prevention of pauperism, and for
stimulating the people to exertion for their own support;—how far,
in short, the workhouse system, which has been safely and
effectually applied to dispauperise England, may be applied with
safety and efficiency to prevent pauperism in Ireland, now remains
for inquiry. The governing principle of the workhouse system is
this:—that the support which is afforded at the public charge in the
workhouse, shall on the whole be less desirable than the support
obtained by independent exertion. To carry out this principle, it
might seem to be necessary that the inmates of a workhouse should be
in all respects worse situated—worse clothed, worse lodged, and
worse fed, than the independent labourers of the district. In fact,
however, the inmates of our English workhouses are as well clothed,
and generally better lodged and better fed than the agricultural
labourer and his family: yet the irksomeness of the discipline and
confinement, and the privation of certain enjoyments, produce such
disinclination to enter the workhouse, that experience warrants the
fullest assurance that nothing short of destitution, and that
necessity which the law contemplates as the ground for affording
relief, will induce the able-bodied labourer to seek refuge therein;
and that if driven thither by necessity, he will quit it again as
speedily as possible, and strive (generally with increased energy
and consequent success) to obtain subsistence by his own efforts.

“It would perhaps be in vain, even if it were desirable, to seek to make
the lodging, the clothing, and the diet, of the inmates of an Irish
workhouse, inferior to those of the Irish peasantry. The standard of
their mode of living is so low, that the establishment of one still
lower is difficult, and would under any circumstances be
inexpedient. In Ireland therefore, there would not perhaps be found
the same security in this respect for the efficiency of the
workhouse test, which may in some degree be operative in England.
There are countervailing circumstances in Ireland however, which
more than balance this drawback, even if it were greater than it
really is. The Irish are naturally, or by habit, a migratory people,
fond of change, hopeful, sanguine, eager for experiment. They have
never been practically limited to one spot by a law of settlement,
as has been the case with the English peasantry. They have never
been enervated by a misapplied system of parish relief. Rather than
bear the restrictions of a workhouse, the Irishman, if in possession
of health and strength, would wander the world over to obtain a
living. All the opinions I have collected from persons most
conversant with the Irish character, agree in this. Confinement of
any kind is even more irksome to an Irishman than to an Englishman.
Hence, although he might be lodged, fed, and clothed, in a
workhouse, better than he could lodge, feed, and clothe himself—he
will yet, like the Englishman, never enter the workhouse, unless
driven thither by actual necessity; and he will not then remain
there longer than that necessity exists. The test of the workhouse
is then, I think, likely to be as efficient in Ireland, as it is
proved to be in England; and if relief be there restricted to the
workhouse, it will be at once a test of destitution, and a measure
of relief, and will serve to protect the administration of a legal
provision for the destitute poor, from those evils and abuses which
followed the establishment, and led to the perversion, of the old
Poor Laws in England. I speak of the workhouse as a test of
destitution generally, without limiting its operation to age,
infirmity, or other circumstances; for independent of the difficulty
of discriminating between those who may fairly be considered as aged
and infirm, and those who are not—as well as certain other
difficulties, practical and theoretical, in the way of making any
such distinction—I have found in the state of Ireland, no sufficient
reason for departing from the principle of the English Poor Law
which recognises _destitution alone_ as the ground of relief, nor
for establishing a distinction in the one country, which does not
exist in the other.

“The expense of providing workhouses, will not, I apprehend, be so
considerable as has by some been anticipated. If the surface of
Ireland be divided into squares of twenty miles each, so that a
workhouse placed in the centre would be distant about ten miles from
the extremities in all directions, this would give about eighty
workhouses for the whole of Ireland. A diameter of twenty miles was
the limit prescribed for the size of unions by Gilbert’s Act, but it
was often exceeded in practice—it may however, be assumed as a
convenient size on the present occasion. In some cases, owing to the
position of towns, or other local causes, the unions will probably
be smaller; in others, especially in the thinly-peopled districts of
the west, they may be larger: but still, there is, I think, every
probability that the number of workhouses required will not greatly
exceed eighty. In aid of this number, the houses of industry, and
mendicity and other establishments, which will be unnecessary as
soon as a legal provision is made for the relief of the destitute,
will become available at probably a small expense. In some
instances, moreover, barracks, factories, or other buildings
suitable for conversion into workhouses, may perhaps be obtained on
easy terms:—but excluding all such considerations, and assuming that
instead of eighty workhouses, a hundred will be required, and that
the cost of erecting each will be about the same as for the largest
class of English workhouses, namely, about 7,000_l._—this would give
a gross outlay of 700,000_l._ for the whole of Ireland—a sum not
disproportionally large, when the nature of the object is taken into
account. If government were to advance the sum necessary for
providing the workhouses by way of loan, as has been done to the
unions in England, requiring an instalment of five per cent. of the
principal to be paid off annually out of the rates, it would make
the whole charge so easy, that it would scarcely be felt. The
payment of 35,000_l._ per annum for twenty years, with the interest
on the constantly-decreasing principal, could not be considered a
hardship on Ireland; and this is in fact the whole of the new or
additional outlay proposed: for as regards the relief of the
destitute, that would not be a new charge, the destitute classes
being now supported, although in a manner calculated to injure and
depress the general character of the people.

“As respects the means for local management in Ireland, if it were
attempted to establish a parochial machinery similar to that which
exists in England, I believe the attempt would fail. The description
of persons requisite for constituting such a machinery, will not be
found in the majority of Irish parishes. In some parts however, and
especially in the north and the east, competent individuals would be
found in many, if not in most of the parishes. If an Irish Poor Law
were established, the uniting of parishes for the purpose of
securing the benefits of combined management, is therefore more
necessary even than it was in England; and by making the unions
sufficiently large, there can be no doubt that in almost every
instance, such a board of elected guardians may be obtained as would
secure the orderly working of the union, under a due system of
supervision and control.

“In the first instance, and until a rate for the relief of the
destitute is established, the contributors to the county-cess might
be empowered to elect the guardians. But in some cases an efficient
board may not be obtainable by election, and this is most likely to
occur at the commencement, when individuals will be ill instructed
as to their duties, and when the public will perhaps have formed
erroneous notions of what is intended to be done. To meet such a
contingency, it seems essential that large general powers should be
vested in some central authority, to control and direct the
proceedings of the boards of guardians, and even to supersede their
functions altogether, whenever such supersession shall be necessary.
Power should also be given to declare unions, and to appoint paid
officers to conduct the business, under the direction of the central
authority, without the intervention of a board of guardians; and in
order to guard against mistakes to be expected on the first
introduction of an entirely new order of things, and to prevent the
mischief that might ensue from failure or misconduct at the outset,
the central authority should also, I think, be empowered to dispense
with the election of the first board of guardians, and to appoint
such persons as may appear most fit and competent to act as
guardians of the union, until the Lady-day next ensuing, or the
Lady-day twelvemonths. The number and selection of such
specially-appointed guardians to be at the discretion of the central
authority. These powers are greater than were given to the English
commissioners by the Poor Law Amendment Act: but they are, in my
opinion, necessary in the present state of Ireland. With such powers
confided to the central authority, no difficulty can arise for which
it will not be prepared; and it will, I think, be enabled to
establish the unions, and to constitute an adequate machinery for
their government throughout the whole of Ireland, with certainty and
efficiency.

“In England, the county magistrates residing and acting within a union,
are _ex-officio_ members of the board of guardians. The number and
position of the magistracy in Ireland seem to require some
modification in this respect. The principle of administration
established in England by the Poor Law Amendment Act, is based
essentially upon popular representation. The guardians are elected
by the occupiers and owners of the property rated, and in the hands
of the guardians the administrative power is vested. The county
magistrates, it is true, in virtue of their office, sit and act as
members of the board; but this does not destroy its elective
character, as the number of elected so far exceeds that of the
_ex-officio_ guardians, that the popular character of the board is
maintained; whilst the presence of the magistrates, who in virtue of
their office are permanent members, and therefore connecting links
between the successive boards of elected guardians, secures a
stability and continuity of action, which, if based entirely upon
election, the board might not possess. This is the constitution of
the boards of guardians in England, and nothing can work better: but
in Ireland, the number of magistrates who would be entitled under a
similar provision to act as _ex-officio_ guardians, would in general
greatly exceed the number so qualified in England, and in some cases
might outnumber the elected guardians. If this should occur, the
elective character of the board would of course be destroyed; but
even if this should not be the case, yet any undue preponderance of
the permanent _ex-officio_ guardians would detract from the popular
character of the governing body, and lower it in the confidence of
the people. With a view therefore of keeping as nearly as possible
to the practical constitution of the English boards of guardians, I
propose in the Irish unions,—1st. That the number of _ex-officio_
guardians shall never exceed one-third the number of elected
guardians: 2dly. That immediately on the declaration of a union, the
county magistrates residing and acting within its limits, shall
nominate from among themselves a number nearest to, but not
exceeding, one-third of the elected guardians,—which magistrates so
nominated by their compeers, shall be entitled to act as
_ex-officio_ guardians of the union, until the Michaelmas
twelvemonth after such nomination: and 3dly. That at each succeeding
Michaelmas, the magistrates entitled as aforesaid, shall proceed to
a new election. These regulations will, I think, not only preserve a
due proportion in the constitution of the boards of guardians, but
also ensure the co-operation of the most efficient portion of the
magistracy in the government of the unions; as the magistrates will
doubtless nominate those members of their body who are most active
and able.

“A different practice from that established in England, seems also to be
necessary with respect to the Clergy. Under the provisions of the
Poor Law Amendment Act, ministers of religion of every denomination
are eligible for the office of guardian, elected or _ex-officio_. In
the present condition of Ireland, I fear this would be attended with
inconvenience, and might destroy the efficiency of the boards of
guardians. I therefore propose that no clergyman, or minister of any
religious denomination, shall be eligible to act either as elected
or _ex-officio_ guardian. This exclusion is not proposed from any
notion of the general unfitness of the clergy to fill the office of
guardian; but with reference solely to the present state of
religious opinion in Ireland, and to the importance of keeping the
functions of the boards of guardians free from the suspicion of
sectarian bias. If the ministers of one persuasion were to be
admitted, the ministers of every persuasion must be so; and then the
deliberations would too probably he disturbed by religious
differences. On no point have I taken more pains to arrive at a
sound conclusion than on this, being fully sensible of the
objections, on principle, to the exclusion of any class of men from
office: but the great majority of the clergy themselves with whom I
have conversed, Roman catholic and protestant, have agreed in
thinking that it will be, on the whole, inexpedient to admit any of
the ministers of religion to act as guardians; and after the fullest
consideration and inquiry, I therefore recommend that they should
all be declared ineligible.

“In England, under the provisions of the Poor Law Amendment Act, every
parish or township rated for the maintenance of its poor, and
included in a union, is entitled to return a guardian. In Ireland it
will, I think, be essential that the central authority should be
empowered to fix the limits of a union, without being restricted to
parish boundaries. It should be enabled to divide parishes, either
for the purpose of electing guardians, or for joining a portion of a
parish to one union, and another portion to another union. It should
also be empowered to consolidate parishes for the purpose of
electing one or more guardians, and likewise to form election
districts for this purpose, without reference to parochial
boundaries. And lastly, the central authority should be empowered to
add to, take from, and remodel unions, whenever such change might be
found necessary. These powers would have enabled the English Poor
Law Commissioners to make their unions more compact and convenient
than they at present are, local prejudices and local interests
having frequently compelled them to abandon the arrangement which
would have been best for the general interest. In Ireland, full
powers in these respects are, I think, indispensable for enabling
the central authority to deal with the various circumstances under
which the unions will there have to be formed. But with adequate
powers, and with such modifications as are before described, the
principle of union which has been established in England by the Poor
Law Amendment Act, may I think be advantageously extended to
Ireland; and as it has been shown that no insurmountable difficulty
exists to prevent the introduction of the workhouse as a test of
destitution—so neither will there be any insurmountable difficulty
in establishing an adequate machinery for the government of the
unions when formed.