Chapter XVII: Book III (4)

=161.= All Greece now prepared for war—a war of twenty-seven years, which was to be marked by more calamities and horrors than Hellas had ever yet endured. On the side of Sparta fought all Peloponnesus, except Argos and Achaia, together with Megara, Bœotia, Phocis, Opuntian Locris, Ambracia, Leucadia, and Anactoria. Athens had for allies, on the mainland, Thessaly and Anactoria, with the cities of Naupactus and Platæa. There were also her tributaries on the coast of Thrace and Asia Minor, and on the Cyclades, beside her island allies, Chios, Lesbos, Corcyra, Zacynthus, and, later, Cephallenia.

[Sidenote: B. C. 431.]

=162.= Archidamus, king of Sparta, having collected his allies at the isthmus, marched into the Attic territory about the middle of June. The inhabitants quitted their fields, and with all the property they could remove, took refuge within Athens and the Piræus. Every corner and recess of the city walls became a dwelling. In the market-place, the public squares, and the precincts of the temples, temporary habitations arose, and the poorer sort found shelter in tents, huts, and even casks, placed against the Long Walls. Among this crowded population, violent debates arose concerning the conduct of the war. Great indignation was felt against Pericles for the inaction of the army, while Archidamus was ravaging the fields almost under their eyes.

But the leader had resolved to carry the war out of Attica. For this purpose a combined fleet of Athenians and Corcyræans sailed around the Peloponnesus, disembarking troops at various points to ravage the country. Two Corinthian settlements in Acarnania were captured, and the island of Cephallenia transferred its allegiance from Sparta to Athens. The Æginetans were expelled, and their island occupied by Athenian settlers. Archidamus, after five or six weeks, marched out of Attica and disbanded his army. The Athenians then put their forces in motion to punish the Megarians, whom they considered as revolted subjects. They laid waste the whole territory to the gates of the capital, and the devastations were renewed every year while the war continued.

[Sidenote: B. C. 430.]

=163.= The next spring, with a new Spartan invasion, brought a still greater calamity to the Athenians. The plague, originating in Ethiopia, had traveled along the Asiatic coasts of the Mediterranean until it reached their city, where the crowded condition of the people made it spread with frightful rapidity. A terror seized the populace, some of whom believed that their enemies had poisoned the wells, while a greater number ascribed the pestilence to the wrath of Apollo, who was the especial protector of the Dorian race.

=164.= In their passion of despair the Athenians turned against Pericles, whose cautious policy they considered as the cause of their misfortunes. Though still refusing battle, which, with the reduced numbers and exhausted spirit of the army, would have been almost certain defeat, he actively pushed his operations against the Peloponnesus. To relieve the crowded city of its mischievous elements, he fitted out a fleet and led it in person to ravage the enemy’s coasts. On his return he found the opposition stronger than ever, and an embassy had even been sent to Sparta to sue for peace. The suit had been contemptuously rejected, and the rage of the Athenians was only increased. Pericles persuaded them to persevere in the war, but his eloquence was unavailing to silence the fury of his personal enemies. By the influence of Cleon, his chief opponent, he was even accused of embezzling the public funds, and was fined to a large amount.

[Sidenote: B. C. 429.]

=165.= But the life and adversities of the great statesman were alike near their end. The plague had robbed him in of his nearest relatives. A lingering fever, following an attack of the pestilence, terminated his life. As he lay, seemingly unconscious, the friends surrounding his death-bed were rehearsing his great deeds, when the dying man interrupted them, saying, “All that you are praising was either the result of good fortune, or, in any case, common to me with many other leaders. What I chiefly pride myself upon is, that no Athenian has ever mourned on my account.”

[Sidenote: B. C. 430.]

=166.= The second Lacedæmonian foray was more destructive than the first, for the ravages extended over all Attica, even to the silver mines of Laurium. The fleet of the Peloponnesians destroyed the fisheries and commerce of Athens, and devastated the island of Zacynthus. During the following winter Potidæa surrendered, after a blockade of two years, and was occupied by a thousand Athenian colonists.

[Sidenote: B. C. 429.]

The third campaign of the Spartans was directed against Platæa. On the approach of Archidamus, the Platæans sent a solemn remonstrance, reminding him of the oath which Pausanias had sworn on the evening of their great battle, making Platæa forever sacred from invasion. The king replied that the Platæans, too, were bound by oath to labor for the independence of every Grecian state. He reminded them of their heinous crime in the slaughter of the Theban prisoners, but promised that, if they would abandon the cause of Athens and remain neutral during the war, their privileges should be respected. The Platæans refused to forsake their ancient ally, and the siege of their city began.

[Sidenote: B. C. 429-427.]

=167.= The garrison which thus defied the whole Peloponnesian army, consisted of only 480 men, but they made up in energy what they lacked in numbers. Archidamus began by shutting up every outlet of the town with a palisade of wood, then erected against this a mound of earth and stone, forming an inclined plane, up which his troops could march. The Platæans undermined the mound, which fell in, and thus defeated seventy days’ work of the whole besieging army. They also built a new wall within the old one, so that, if this were taken, the Spartans would still be no nearer the possession of the city.

Seeing that the will of the Platæans could only be subdued by famine, the allies now turned the siege into a blockade. They surrounded the city with a double wall, and roofed the intervening space, so as to afford shelter to the soldiers on duty. The Platæans thus endured a complete separation from the outer world for two years. Provisions began to fail; and, in the second year, nearly half the garrison made their escape, by climbing over the barracks and fortifications of their besiegers in the rain and darkness of a December night. The Platæans, though thus reduced in numbers, came at length to absolute starvation. A herald now appeared from the Spartan commander, requiring their submission, but promising that only the guilty should be punished. They yielded. When brought before the five Spartan judges, every man was found guilty and led to execution. The town and territory of Platæa were made over to the Thebans, who destroyed all private dwellings, and with the materials erected a huge barrack, to afford shelter to visitors, and dwellings to the serfs who cultivated the land. The city of Platæa was blotted out from the map of Greece.

[Sidenote: B. C. 429.]

=168.= The Athenians, with their ally Sital´ces, a Thracian chief, were warring in the north with little success. Sitalces, with an irregular but powerful host of 150,000 Thracians, invaded Macedonia with the intention of dethroning Perdiccas. The Macedonians, unable to meet him in the open field, withdrew into their fortresses, and Sitalces, who had no means for conducting sieges, retired after thirty days. Phor´mio, an Athenian captain, gained two victories, meanwhile, in the Corinthian Gulf, over a vastly superior number of Spartans. In the first engagement he had but twenty ships, to the Spartan forty-seven; in the second, without reinforcements, he met a fresh Spartan fleet of seventy-seven sail.

[Sidenote: B. C. 428.]

The fourth year of the war was marked by the revolt of Mytilene, capital of Lesbos. Envoys were sent to Sparta to implore assistance, which was willingly granted, and the Mytilenians were received into the Peloponnesian League.

=169.= In the spring of 427, the Spartan fleet advanced to Mytilene, but it arrived only to find the town in the possession of the Athenians. Nearly reduced by famine, the governor, by the advice of a Spartan envoy, had armed all the men of the lower classes for a last desperate sortie. The result was contrary to his expectations. The mass of the Mytilenian people preferred the Athenian supremacy to that of their own oligarchic government. Emboldened by their arms, they declared that they would treat directly with the Athenians, unless all their demands were granted. The governor had no choice but to open negotiations himself. The city was surrendered, and the fate of its inhabitants was left to be decided by the popular assembly in Athens, whither the ring-leaders of the revolt were sent.

=170.= A thousand Athenians assembled in the Agora to decide the fate of their prisoners. Salæ´thus, the Spartan envoy, was instantly put to death. With regard to the rest, a spirited debate ensued. Cleon the tanner, the former opponent of Pericles, took a prominent part; and in spite of more humane and moderate counsels, actually succeeded in carrying his brutal proposition, to put to the sword all the men of Mytilene, and sell the women and children into slavery. Iniquitous as such an order would be in any case, it was the more so in this, because the greater number of the Mytilenians were friendly to Athens, while the revolt had been the act of the oligarchy, who were enemies of the people. So strong had been the opposition, that Cleon feared a reversal of the sentence, and therefore had a galley instantly dispatched to Lesbos, with orders for its immediate execution.

His apprehensions were well founded. A single night’s reflection filled the better sort of Athenians with horror at the inhuman decision into which they had been hurried. They demanded a new assembly to reconsider the question; and though this was contrary to law, the _strategi_ consented and convened the citizens. In the second day’s debate the atrocious decree was rescinded. Every nerve was now strained to enable the mercy-bearing barque to overtake the messengers of death, who were a whole day’s journey in advance. The strongest oarsmen were selected, and urged to their greatest exertion by the promise of large rewards if they should arrive in time. Their food was given them while they plied the oar, and sleep was allowed them only in short intervals, and by turns. The weather proved favorable, and they arrived just as Paches, who had received the first dispatch, was preparing for its execution. The Mytilenians were saved, but the walls of their city were leveled, and its fleet surrendered to the Athenians. The island of Lesbos, with the exception of Methym´na, which had refused all share in the revolt, was divided into 3,000 parts, of which 300 were devoted to the gods, and the rest assigned by lot to Athenian settlers. The prisoners at Athens were tried for their share in the conspiracy, and put to death.

[Sidenote: B. C. 427.]

=171.= The Corcyrean prisoners who had been carried to Corinth in 432, were now sent home, in the hope that their account of the generous treatment they had received would induce their countrymen to withdraw from the Athenian alliance. They joined with the oligarchical faction to effect a revolution in Corcyra, killed the chiefs of the popular party, gained possession of the harbor, the arsenal, and the market-place, and thus, by overawing the people, obtained a vote in the assembly to maintain in future a strict neutrality. The people, however, fortified themselves in the higher parts of the town, and called to their aid the serfs from the interior of the island, to whom they promised freedom.

The oligarchists set fire to the town, but while it was burning a small Athenian squadron arrived from Naupactus, and its commander attempted, with great wisdom, to make peace between the contending parties. He had to all appearance effected this design, when a Peloponnesian fleet, more than four times as numerous as his own, appeared, under the command of Alci´das. The Athenians withdrew without loss, and Alcidas had Corcyra for the moment in his power; but with his usual want of promptness, he spent a day in ravaging the island, and, at night, beacon fires on Leucas announced the approach of an Athenian fleet outnumbering his own. Alcidas drew off before daybreak, leaving the oligarchists in the city to their fate. The next seven days were a reign of terror in Corcyra. The popular party, protected by the presence of the Athenians, abandoned itself to revenge. Civil hatred was stronger than natural affection. A father slew his own son; brothers had no pity for brothers. The aristocratic party was nearly exterminated; but five hundred escaped, and fortified themselves on Mount Isto´ne, near the capital.

[Sidenote: B. C. 426.]

=172.= The sixth year of the war opened with floods and earthquakes, which seemed an echo in nature of the moral convulsions of Greece. The plague was raging again at Athens. To appease the wrath of Apollo, a solemn purification of the isle of Delos, his birth-place, was performed in the autumn. All bodies that had been buried there were removed to a neighboring island, and the Delian festival was revived with increased magnificence. The usual Spartan invasion of Attica had been prevented this year, either by awe of the supposed wrath of the gods, or by fear of the plague; but in the seventh year of the war (B. C. 425), their king, Agis, again crossed the borders and ravaged the country. He was recalled, after fifteen days, by the news that the Athenians had established a military station on the coast of Messenia.

=173.= A fleet bound for Sicily, under Eurymedon and Sophocles, had been delayed for a time by a storm, near the harbor of Pylos. The commanders selected this place for a settlement of Messenians from Naupactus, who would thus be able to communicate with their Helot kinsmen, and harass the Spartans. Demosthenes was left with five ships and two hundred soldiers, who were increased, by a reinforcement of Messenians, to a thousand men. The wrath of the Spartans was only equaled by their alarm at this infringement of their territory. Their fleet was instantly ordered from Corcyra, while Agis, with his army, marched from Attica. The long and narrow island of Sphacte´ria, which covered the entrance to the Bay of Pylos, was occupied by Thrasymel´idas, the Spartan, while his ships were sheltered in the basin which it inclosed. Demosthenes, while awaiting reinforcements, had to meet a vastly superior number with his handful of men. The attack from the sea was led by Bras´idas, one of the greatest captains whom Sparta ever produced. He fought on the prow of the foremost vessel, urging his men forward by looks and words; but he was severely wounded, and the battle ended with no advantage to the Spartans. It was renewed the second day with no better success, and the Athenians erected a trophy, which they ornamented with the shield of Brasidas.

[Sidenote: B. C. 425.]

The arrival of the Athenian fleet was followed by a severe and still more decisive battle. The victorious Athenians proceeded to blockade Sphacteria, which contained the choicest Peloponnesian troops. So serious was the crisis, that the ephors saw no escape except to sue for peace. An armistice was agreed upon, and the better spirits on both sides began to hope for a termination of the war. But the foolish vanity of Cleon and his party demanded the most extravagant terms, and the voice of reason was drowned. Hostilities re-commenced, with equal vexation to both parties. Demosthenes, fearing that the storms of winter would interrupt his blockade, resolved to make an attack upon the island, and sent to Athens explaining his position and demanding reinforcements. The report was disheartening to the Assembly, which now began to accuse Cleon for having persuaded it to let slip the occasion for an honorable peace. Cleon retorted by accusing the officers of cowardice and incapacity, and declared that, if _he_ were general, he would take Sphacteria at once! At this boast of the tanner, the whole assembly broke out into laughter, and cries, “Why don’t you go, then?” were heard on all sides. The lively spirits of the Athenians recovered with a bound from their unusual depression, and the mere joke soon grew into a purpose. Cleon tried to draw back, but the Assembly insisted. At last he engaged, with a certain number of auxiliaries added to the troops already at Pylos, to take the island in twenty days, and either kill all the Spartans upon it, or bring them in chains to Athens.

=174.= Singular as were the circumstances of Cleon’s commission, his success was equally remarkable. Demosthenes had made all ready for the attack; and to his prudence, aided by the accidental burning of the woods on Sphacteria, rather than to the generalship of Cleon, the victory was due. The Athenians, landing before daybreak, overpowered the guard at the southern end of the island, and then drew up in order of battle, sending out parties of skirmishers to provoke the enemy to a combat. The Spartan general, blinded by the light ashes raised by the march of his men, advanced, with some difficulty, over the half-burnt stumps of the trees. He was greatly outnumbered by his assailants, who harassed him from a distance with arrows, and forced him at length to retire to the extremity of the island. Here the Spartans fought again with their accustomed bravery; but a party of Messenians, who had clambered over some crags usually deemed inaccessible, appeared upon the heights above, and decided the fate of the battle. All the surviving Spartans surrendered, and Cleon and Demosthenes, setting out immediately after the battle, arrived at Athens with their prisoners within the twenty days. This victory was one of the most important that the Athenians had gained. The harbor of Pylos was strongly fortified and garrisoned with Messenian troops, for a base of operations against Laconia.

[Sidenote: B. C. 424.]

=175.= At the beginning of the eighth year the Athenians were every-where triumphant, and the Spartans, humbled and distressed, had repeatedly asked for peace. Nicias, in the early part of the year, conquered the island of Cythera, and placed garrisons in its two chief towns, which were a continual defiance of the Lacedæmonians. He then ravaged the coasts of Laconia, and captured, among other places, the town of Thyr´ea, where the Æginetans, after their expulsion from their own island, had been permitted to settle. Those of the original exiles who survived were carried to Athens and put to death. The brutalizing influences of war were more apparent every year, and these cold-blooded massacres had become almost of common occurrence.

The Spartans, about the same time, alarmed by the nearness of the Messenian garrisons of Pylos and Cythera, gave notice that those Helots who had distinguished themselves by their faithful services during the war, should be set at liberty. A large number of the bravest and ablest appeared to claim the promise. Two thousand of these were selected as worthy of emancipation, crowned with garlands, and dignified with high religious honors. But in a few days they had all disappeared, by means known only to the Spartan ephors—men unmoved, either by honor or pity, from their narrow regard to the supposed interest of the state.

[Sidenote: B. C. 424.]

=176.= The success of the Athenians did not entirely desert them in their Megarian expedition, but their attempt upon Bœotia resulted only in disaster. The chief movement was executed by Hippoc´rates, who led an army of more than 32,000 soldiers across the Bœotian frontier to Delium, a place strongly situated near Tanagra, among the cliffs of the eastern coast. Here he fortified the temple of Apollo, and placing a garrison in the works, set out for home. The Bœotians had collected a large army at Tanagra, which now moved to intercept the Athenians upon the heights of Delium. The battle commenced late in the day. The Athenian right was at first successful, but their left was borne down by the Theban phalanx. In their ranks were Socrates, the philosopher, and his pupils, Alcibi´ades and Xenophon, all destined to the highest fame in Grecian history. At length the Bœotian cavalry appeared, and decided the fortunes of the day. The Athenians fled in all directions, and only the fall of night prevented their complete destruction. Delium was taken by siege after seventeen days.

=177.= Soon after these disasters, the Athenians lost all their dominion in Thrace. Brasidas had led a small but well chosen army to the aid of Perdiccas and the Chalcidian towns. The bravery and integrity of this great general led many of the allies of Athens to forsake her party, and when he suddenly appeared before Amphipolis, that city surrendered with scarcely an attempt at resistance. Thucydides,[51] the historian, was general in that region. The Athenian party in Amphipolis sent to him for aid, but he arrived too late. For this failure, whether proceeding from necessity or carelessness, the general was sentenced to banishment, and spent his next twenty years in exile, during which he contributed more by his literary work to the glory of Greece, than he would probably have done in military command. Brasidas proceeded to the easternmost of the three Chalcidian peninsulas, and received the submission of nearly all the towns.

The Athenians were now so disheartened by their losses, that they, in turn, began to propose peace; and the Spartans, anxious for the return of their noble youths who were prisoners in Athens, were equally desirous of a treaty. To this end a year’s truce was agreed upon, in 423, to afford time for permanent negotiations. Unhappily, two days after the beginning of the truce, Scio´ne revolted from the Athenians, who demanded its restitution. The Spartans refused, and the whole year was suffered to pass away without any further efforts toward peace. At its expiration, Cleon advanced into Thrace with a fleet and army. He took the towns of Toro´ne and Galepsus, and was proceeding against Amphipolis, when a battle ensued which ended at once his life and his assumption of power. Brasidas, too, was mortally wounded, but he lived long enough to know that he was victorious.

=178.= PEACE OF NICIAS. The two great obstacles to peace were now removed, and, in the spring of 421, a treaty for fifty years, commonly called the “Peace of Nicias,” was concluded between Athens and Sparta. Some allies of the latter complained that Sparta had sacrificed their interests to her own, and formed a new league, with Argos for their head. Athens made a new alliance for a hundred years with Argos, Elis, and Mantine´a, B. C. 420.

RECAPITULATION.

In the greater Peloponnesian war (B. C. 431-404), nearly all
central and southern Greece were allied with Sparta; most
of the maritime states, with Athens. Within the latter city
were crowded most of the people of Attica, in terror of the
Spartan invasions. Great numbers died of the plague; its
most illustrious victim was Pericles. A two years’ blockade
of Platæa, by the Spartans, ended with the annihilation of
the city. The revolt of Lesbos was subdued by Athens, and
the Mytilenians were condemned to death, but the revengeful
sentence was reversed. A revolution in Corcyra resulted in
a seven days’ massacre of the aristocratic party. A solemn
purification of Delos was performed, to mitigate the plague
at Athens. The Athenians established a colony at Pylos, to
harass Laconia, and were victors in several naval battles.
Cleon, the tanner, with Demosthenes, the general, conquered the
Spartans at Sphacteria. Nicias captured Cythera, and garrisoned
its towns. The brutal character of the war was shown in the
massacre of exiled Æginetans at Athens, and of two thousand
Helots at Sparta. The disastrous battle or Delium ended the
invasion of Bœotia by the Athenians, who lost, at the same
time, all their possessions in Thrace. The Peace of Nicias was
concluded B. C. 421, and Athens made a new league with some
former allies of Sparta.

THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION.

[Sidenote: B. C. 420.]

=179.= From two previous celebrations of the Olympic Games the Athenians had been excluded, but, in the summer of this year, the Elean heralds appeared again to invite their attendance. Those who looked to see Athens poverty-stricken, from her many losses, were surprised at the magnificence of her delegates, who made the most costly display in all the processions. Alcibiades entered on the lists seven four-horse chariots, and received two olive crowns in the races. This young man was among the ablest citizens that Athens ever possessed. His genius, bravery, and quickness in emergencies might have made him her greatest benefactor; but, through his unregulated ambition and utter lack of conscience, he became the cause of her greatest calamities.

=180.= War soon broke out between the Spartans and the Argives, in which the Spartan king, Agis, won the important battle of Mantinea, B. C. 418. The oligarchical party, gaining power at Argos, cast off the alliance with Athens, and made a treaty with Sparta. But the nobles abused their power in brutal outrages upon the people, who effected another revolution and obtained possession of the city. By their request, Alcibiades came to their aid with a fleet and army. Though the Spartans and Athenians were nominally at peace, the garrison of Pylos was still committing depredations in Laconia, and Spartan privateers were seriously injuring Athenian commerce.

=181.= About this time, an embassy from Sicily besought the aid of the Athenians for the city of Egesta. It was involved in a contest with its neighbor, Selinus, which had obtained help from Syracuse. The “war of races” had, indeed, broken out twelve years before in Sicily, and the Athenians had more than once sent aid to the Ionian cities, Leonti´ni and Camari´na, against their Dorian neighbors, who had joined the Peloponnesian League. Alcibiades threw his whole influence into the cause of Egesta, hoping at once to improve his wasted fortunes with Sicilian spoils, and gratify his ambition with the glory of conquest. He even hoped, beside making Athens supreme over all the Hellenic colonies, to conquer the empire of Carthage, in the western Mediterranean.

Nicias and all the moderate party opposed the enterprise. They only prevailed in having an embassy sent to Egesta, to ascertain if its people were really able to fulfill their promise of furnishing funds for the war. The envoys were completely outwitted. In the temple of Aphrodite they saw a magnificent display of vessels which appeared to be solid gold, but were really silver-gilt. They were feasted at the houses of citizens, and were surprised by the profusion of gold and silver plate which adorned their sideboards, not suspecting that the same articles were passing from house to house, and doing repeated service in their entertainment. Sixty talents of silver were paid as a first installment, and the commissioners went home with glowing accounts of Egestan wealth.

[Sidenote: B. C. 415.]

=182.= All doubt disappeared from most minds in Athens, and Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus were appointed to lead an expedition to Sicily. The zeal of the Athenians knew no bounds. Young and old, rich and poor, alike demanded a share in the great expedition. The generals had difficulty in selecting from the throng of volunteers. The fleet was on the point of sailing, when a mysterious event threw the excited multitude into consternation. The _Hermæ_, which stood before every door in Athens, before every temple or gymnasium, and in every public square, were found one morning reduced to shapeless masses of stone. Not one escaped. The people, in an agony of superstitious horror, demanded the detection and punishment of the criminal. Suspicion fell upon Alcibiades, because he was known to have burlesqued the Eleusinian mysteries in a drunken frolic, and was supposed to be capable of any sacrilege. He indignantly denied his guilt, and demanded an immediate examination. But his enemies contrived to have it postponed until his return, thus sending him out under the burden of an unproved charge, which might be revived for his condemnation in case of disaster.

=183.= On the day appointed for the sailing of the armament, nearly the whole population of Athens accompanied the soldiers on their march at day-break to Piræus. When all were on board, the trumpet commanded silence, and the voice of the herald, in unison with that of the people, was heard in prayer. The pæan was then sung, while the officer at the prow of each vessel poured a libation from a golden goblet into the sea. At a given signal, the entire fleet slipped its cables and started at the utmost speed, each crew striving to be first at Ægina.

=184.= The whole armament of Athenians and allies mustered at Corcyra in July, 415. It numbered 136 vessels of war and 500 transports, carrying 6,300 soldiers, beside artisans and a large provision of food and arms. When the fleet approached the coast of Italy, three fast-sailing triremes were sent to notify the Egestæans of its arrival, and to learn their present condition. These rejoined the fleet at Rhegium, with the unwelcome report that the wealth of Egesta was wholly fictitious, and that thirty talents more were the extent of the aid to be expected. The three admirals were now divided in opinion. Nicias was for sailing at once to Selinus, making the best terms possible, and then returning home. Alcibiades proposed to seek new allies among the Greek cities, and with their aid to attack both Selinus and Syracuse. Lamachus urged an immediate attack upon the latter city, the greatest and wealthiest on the island. This counsel was at once the boldest and the safest, for the Syracusans were unprepared for defense, and their surrender would have decided the fate of the island; but, unhappily, Lamachus was neither rich nor influential. His plan was disregarded, and that of Alcibiades adopted.

=185.= The fleet, sailing southward, reconnoitered the defenses of Syracuse, and took possession of Catana, which became its headquarters. At this point, Alcibiades received from Athens a decree of the Assembly, requiring his return for trial. A judicial inquiry had acquitted him of the mutilation of the Hermæ, but he was still charged with profaning the Eleusinian Mysteries, by representing them at his own house for the entertainment of his friends. This was an unpardonable crime, and those noble families which had derived from their heroic or divine ancestors an especial right to officiate in the ceremonies, felt themselves grossly insulted. The public trireme which brought the summons to Alcibiades, was under special orders not to arrest him, but to suffer him to return in his own vessel. The wily general availed himself of this courtesy to effect his escape. Landing at Thurii, he eluded his pursuers, and the messengers returned to Athens without him. Here in his absence he was condemned to death, his property confiscated, and the Eumolpidæ solemnly pronounced him “accursed.”

=186.= The Athenians had spent three months in Sicily with so little effect, that the Syracusans began to regard them with contempt. Nicias, thus shamed into attempting something, spread a report that the Catanæans were inclined to expel the Athenians from their city, and thus drew a large army from Syracuse to their aid. During its absence from home, the whole Athenian fleet sailed into the Great Harbor of Syracuse, and landed a force which intrenched itself near the mouth of the Anapus. A battle followed on the return of the Syracusans, and Nicias was successful. Instead of following up this advantage, he retired into winter-quarters at Catana, and afterward at Naxos, while he sent to Athens for a supply of money, and to his Sicilian allies for a re-enforcement of men.

The Syracusans spent the winter in active preparation. They built a new wall across the peninsula, between the Bay of Thapsus and the Great Port, covering their city on the west and north-west. They sent, at the same time, to Corinth and Sparta for help, and found in the latter city an unexpected ally. Alcibiades had crossed from Italy to Greece, and had received a special invitation to Sparta. Here he indulged his spite against his countrymen by revealing all their plans, and urging the Spartans to send an army into Sicily to disconcert their movements.

[Sidenote: B. C. 414.]

=187.= With the opening of spring, Nicias commenced the siege by fortifying the heights of Epipolæ, which commanded the city. He built, also, a fort at Sy´ke, and dislodged the Syracusans from the counter-walls which they were constructing. The Athenian fleet was stationed in the Great Harbor, and the Syracusans, despairing of effectual resistance, sent messengers to arrange terms of surrender. But the brave Lamachus had been slain, and Nicias, now sole commander, was too inactive to seize the victory just within his grasp.

=188.= At this point, Gylip´pus, the Spartan, arrived with only four ships on the Italian coast, and supposing that Syracuse and all Sicily were irrecoverably lost, sought only to preserve the cities on the peninsula. To his delight, he learned that the Athenians had not even completed their northern line of works around Syracuse. He hastened through the Straits of Messina, which he found unguarded, and, landing at Him´era, began to raise an army from the Dorian cities of Sicily. With these he marched to Syracuse directly over the heights of Epipolæ, which Nicias had neglected to hold. Entering the city, he sent orders to the Athenian general to leave the island within five days. Nicias disregarded the message, but the acts which followed proved that the Spartan was master of the situation. He captured the Athenian fort at Labalum, built another upon the heights of Epipolæ, and connected it with the city by a strong wall.

[Sidenote: B. C. 413.]

The Sicilian towns which had hesitated now joined the winning side. Re-enforcements arrived from Corinth, Leucas, and Ambracia; and Nicias, unable to continue the siege with his present force, withdrew to the headland of Plemmyr´ium, south of the Great Port. His ships were out of repair, his men disheartened and inclined to desert, and his own health declining. He wrote to Athens, begging that the army might be instantly re-enforced and he himself recalled. Athens was in a state of siege, for the Spartan king, Agis, was encamped at Decele´a, fourteen miles north of the city, in a position to command the whole Athenian plain. The public funds were nearly exhausted, hunger began to be felt, and the diminished number of citizens were worn out with the labor of defending the walls day and night. It was resolved, however, to re-enforce Nicias, and, at the same time, harass Sparta on her own territory. For this purpose, Char´icles was sent to plant a military station on the south coast of Laconia, similar to that of Pylos in Messenia; while Demosthenes and Eurymedon conducted a fleet and army to Sicily. The first enterprise was successful; the second was too late.

=189.= The Syracusans had been defeated in one naval battle, but in a second, lasting two days, they were completely victorious, and the Athenian ships were locked up in the extremity of the harbor. Demosthenes’ arrival with his fresh forces had some effect in checking the enemy and raising the spirits of his countrymen. Perceiving at once that Epipolæ was the vital point, he directed all his efforts to its re-capture, but without success. Seeing, now, that the siege was hopeless, he urged Nicias to return home and drive the Spartans out of Attica. But, remembering the lively hopes and the magnificent ceremonies with which the armament had set forth, Nicias could not consent to return to Athens covered with the disgrace of failure. Neither would he withdraw to Thapsus or Catana, where Demosthenes urged the advantages of an open sea and constant supplies of provisions. But, large re-enforcements arriving for Syracuse, this retreat became necessary, and the plans were so well laid that it might easily have been effected without the knowledge of the enemy.

[Sidenote: Aug. 27, 413.]

Unhappily, an eclipse of the moon occurred on the very eve of the intended movement. The imperfect astronomy of those days had not foretold the event, and the soothsayers could only conclude that Artemis, the especial guardian of Syracuse, was showing her anger against its assailants. They declared that the army must remain three times nine days in its present position. During this delay, the disconcerted plan became known to the Syracusans, who resolved to strike a blow while the enemy was within their reach. A battle by land and sea was the result. In the former, the Athenians beat off their assailants; but, in the latter, their fleet was utterly defeated and Eurymedon slain.

=190.= The Syracusans now resolved upon the total destruction of their enemy. They blocked up the Great Harbor by a line of vessels moored across its entrance. The only hope for the Athenians, perhaps for Athens itself, was to break this line, and to this end Nicias again prepared for battle. The amphitheater of hills which surround the harbor was crowded with spectators of either party, watching with anxious eyes the conflict upon which their fates depended. The water was covered with the yachts of wealthy Syracusans, ready to offer their services whenever they might be demanded. The first attack of the Athenians was upon the barrier of ships at the entrance of the harbor. It failed, and the Syracusan fleet of 76 triremes then engaged the 110 of the Athenians. The crash of the iron prows, the shouts of the combatants, and the answering groans or cheers of their friends upon the shore, filled the air with a perpetual clamor. For a long time the issue was doubtful, but, at last, the fleet of Nicias began to retreat toward the shore. A cry of despair arose from the Athenian army, answered by shouts of triumph from the pursuing vessels and the citizens on the walls.

The Athenian fleet was now reduced to sixty vessels, and the Syracusan to fifty. Nicias and Demosthenes besought their men to renew the effort to force their way out of the harbor, but their spirits were so far broken that they refused any further combat by sea. The army still numbered 40,000 men, and it was resolved to retreat by land to some friendly city, where they could defend themselves until transports should arrive. If this design had been instantly put in execution, it might have been successful; for the Syracusans had given themselves up to drunken revelries, occasioned equally by the rejoicings over their victory and by the festival of Hercules, and had no thoughts to spare for their fugitive foe. But Hermoc´rates, the most prudent of their number, resolved to prevent what he foresaw would be the Athenian movement. He sent messengers to the wall, who pretended to come from spies of Nicias within the city, and warned the generals not to move that night, as all the roads were strongly guarded. Nicias fell into the snare, and sacrificed his last hope of escape.

=191.= On the second day after the battle, the army began its march toward the interior, leaving the deserted fleet in the harbor, the dead unburied, and the wounded to the vengeance of the foe. On the third day of the march, the road lay over a steep cliff, which was guarded by a Syracusan force. Two days’ assaults upon this position were unsuccessful, and the generals took counsel during the night to turn toward the sea. Nicias, with the van, succeeded in reaching the coast; but Demosthenes lost his way, was overtaken by the enemy, and surrounded in a narrow pass, where he surrendered the shattered remnants of his army, numbering six thousand men. Nicias was now pursued, and overtaken at the river Asina´rus. Multitudes perished in the attempt to cross. Pressed closely by the army of Gylippus, the rear rushed forward upon the spears of their comrades, or were hurled down the steep banks and carried away by the current. All order was lost, and Nicias surrendered at discretion. The generals were condemned to death. The common soldiers, imprisoned in the stone-quarries, without food or shelter, suffered greater miseries than all that had preceded. A few who survived were sold as slaves, and their talents and accomplishments won, in some instances, the friendship of their masters.

RECAPITULATION.

Alcibiades sustained the credit of Athens in the Olympic Games,
carried aid to the Argives against the Spartans, and zealously
promoted the Sicilian expedition of his countrymen. On the eve
of departure he was accused of sacrilege, and after his arrival
in Sicily he was sentenced to death, and pronounced accursed.
The siege of Syracuse, notwithstanding the great efforts of
the Athenians, resulted in failure and disaster, while Athens
itself was besieged by the king of Sparta. Reinforcements, led
forth by Demosthenes, only completed the exhaustion of the
city. The Syracusans gained a naval battle in their harbor, and
captured the two Athenian armies in their retreat.

DECLINE OF ATHENS.

[Sidenote: B. C. 412.]

=192.= In the midst of private grief and national dismay, the Athenians learned that their allies were deserting them. Alcibiades was stirring up revolts in Chios, which, with Lesbos and Eubœa, implored the aid of Sparta to free them from their dependence. The two satraps of Asia Minor sent envoys to the same power, inviting her coöperation in overthrowing the Athenian empire in Asia, and pledging Persian gold for the entire expense. To the lasting shame of Sparta, she concluded a treaty at Miletus, engaging to unite with Persia in a war against Athens, and to restore to the Persian dominion all the cities and territories which it had formerly embraced. This clause was explained, in a subsequent treaty, to include not only all the islands of the Ægean, but Thessaly and Bœotia, thus yielding to the Persians the field of Platæa, and fixing, their frontier on the very border of Attica. Miletus itself was immediately surrendered to Tissaphernes.

=193.= In this general defection Samos remained faithful, and afforded a most important station for the Athenian fleet during the remaining years of the war. The Samians, warned by the example of Chios, overthrew their oligarchical government, and the democracy thus established was acknowledged by Athens as an equal and independent ally. Great preparations were now made in Athens. The reserve fund of a thousand talents, which had lain untouched since the time of Pericles, was applied to fitting out a fleet against Chios. Once more the Athenians were successful, both by sea and land. Lesbos and Clazomenæ were reconquered, the Chians defeated, and, in a battle near Miletus, the Spartans themselves were overcome. That city remained in the hands of the Persians and Lacedæmonians, but the relations between these widely contrasted allies were no longer cordial. The Spartans were ashamed of their dealings with the great enemy of Greece, and Tissaphernes was under the influence of Alcibiades. This deeply plotting Athenian persuaded the satrap that it was not the interest of Persia to allow any party in Greece to become powerful, but, rather, to let them wear each other out by mutual hostilities, and then appropriate the domains of both. This advice tended most against the Spartans, who were now so strongly reinforced that they might soon have put an end to the war. Tissaphernes, accordingly, held the Spartan fleet inactive, waiting for the Phœnicians, who were never to appear; and when this pretext would no longer avail, he applied his golden arguments to its commanders with the same effect.

=194.= Alcibiades now sought to bring the satrap into alliance with Athens; and failing in this, he tried at least to convince his countrymen at Samos that he had power to effect such an alliance, for his sole desire was to be recalled to his native city. Hating and fearing the Athenian democracy, he made one condition, however, to his intercession with the Persian, which was, that a revolution should be effected, and an oligarchical government established. The generals at Samos acceded to this plan, and Pisander was sent to Athens to organize the political clubs in favor of the revolution.

When he presented the scheme of Alcibiades in the Assembly, a great tumult arose. The people clamored against the surrender of their rights; the Eumolpidæ protested against the return of a wretch who had profaned the Mysteries. Pisander could only plead the exhaustion and the misery of the Republic; but this argument, though distasteful, was unanswerable. The people reluctantly consented to the change in the constitution, and Pisander, with ten colleagues, was sent to treat with Alcibiades. The exile well knew that he had promised more than he could perform. To save his credit, he received the eleven ambassadors in the presence of Tissaphernes, and made such extravagant demands in his name, that they themselves angrily broke up the conference and withdrew.

[Sidenote: B. C. 411.]

=195.= Though convinced that they had been cheated by Alcibiades, they had now gone too far to recede from the proposed revolution. Pisander, with five of his colleagues, returned to Athens, while the rest went about among the allies to establish oligarchies. At Athens the old offices were abolished, and a Council of Four Hundred, chiefly self-elected, held power for four months. By the aid of the army at Samos, a counter-revolution was effected, and the leaders of the oligarchy were accused of treason for their dealings with the Spartans. Most of them fled; but two, Ar´cheptol´emus and Antiphon, were tried and executed.

=196.= The remainder of the Peloponnesian war was wholly maritime, and its scene of operations was on the coast of Asia Minor. The Spartans, by long practice and close collision with their great rivals, had become nearly equal to the Athenians in naval skill. Their attention to this arm of the service was shown by the yearly appointment of the _navarchus_, an officer whose power, while it lasted, was even greater than that of the kings, for he was above the control of the ephors.

[Sidenote: B. C. 411.]

=197.= Min´darus, the Spartan commander at Miletus, becoming disgusted with the fickle policy of Tissaphernes, set sail for the Hellespont, hoping to find the other satrap more constant to the Spartan alliance. He was followed by an Athenian fleet, under Thrasyl´lus, which, though less numerous than his own, inflicted upon him a severe defeat in the strait between Sestus and Abydus. Mindarus now sent for the allied fleet at Eubœa, but in passing Mount Athos it was overtaken by a violent storm, and wholly destroyed. The Athenians followed up their advantage by the capture of Cyz´icus, which had revolted from them; and, a few weeks later, gained another great battle near Abydus, by the timely aid of Alcibiades.

=198.= In the spring of 410, Mindarus was besieging Cyzicus, and the Athenians determined to relieve it. They passed up the Hellespont in the night, and assembled at Proconnesus. Alcibiades moved toward Cyzicus with his division of the fleet, and succeeded in enticing Mindarus to a distance from the harbor, while the other two divisions stole between him and the city, and thus cut off his retreat. A battle ensued, in which Mindarus was slain, the Spartans and their Persian allies routed, and the entire Peloponnesian fleet captured, except the Syracusan ships, which Hermocrates caused to be burnt.

=199.= This victory restored to the Athenians the control of the Propontis and the trade of the Euxine. Ships laden with corn now entered Piræus, bearing relief to the hungry poor, and discouragement to King Agis, who still held the heights of Decelea, in the vain hope of starving the city into surrender.

Pharnabazus, meanwhile, was aiding the Spartans by every means in his power. He fed and clothed, armed and paid their seamen, allowed them to cut timber in the forests of Mount Ida, and build their ships at his docks of Antandros. Through his assistance, Chalcedon, on the Bosphorus, was enabled to hold out two years against Alcibiades. It surrendered at last, in 408. Selym´bria and Byzantium were taken about the same time.

=200.= These repeated successes restored the credit of Alcibiades, and, in the spring of 407, he was welcomed back to his native city. All the people met him at Piræus, with as much joy and enthusiasm as they had escorted him thither, eight years before, when sailing for the fatal expedition to Sicily. He protested his innocence before the Senate and Assembly. His sentence was reversed by acclamation, his property restored, the curse revoked, and he was made general, with unlimited powers. Before his departure, with the large fleet and army which were now at his disposal, he resolved to atone to Demeter for whatever slight had been thrown upon her by his alleged sacrilege. The sacred procession from Athens to Eleusis had been intermitted these seven years, owing to the nearness of the Spartan troops. Alcibiades now delayed his departure, in order to escort and protect the participants.

[Sidenote: B. C. 407.]

=201.= The arrival of two new officers upon the Asiatic field of war turned the scale against Athens. The one was Cyrus, a son of the Persian king; the other was Lysander, the new Spartan _navarchus_, who took command of the Peloponnesian fleet at Ephesus. These two made common cause, and together took measures for severe and unrelenting war against the Athenians. The gold which the Persian prince lavished without stint, the Spartan applied to increasing the wages of his seamen. By this well-timed liberality, he drew over great numbers of men from the opposing fleet, and rendered even those who did not desert, discontented and mutinous.

=202.= Alcibiades arrived with his fleet to find the situation less favorable than he had hoped. The Spartan troops were better paid and equipped than his own, and to raise funds he resorted to levying forced contributions on friendly states. During his absence on one of these forays, the fleet became engaged in battle with the Spartans, and was defeated with considerable loss. The Athenians began to perceive that eight years’ exile and two or three years’ good behavior, had not altered the character of the man, but that he was as dissolute, fickle, and unscrupulous as ever. They dismissed him from his command, and appointed ten generals, with Conon at their head.

[Sidenote: B. C. 406.]

=203.= At the same time that Conon arrived to take command of the Athenians, Cal´licrat´idas succeeded Lysander as _navarchus_. He found an empty treasury and a cold reception, alike from his own countrymen and the Persians, whom Lysander had purposely prejudiced against him. Cyrus refused to see or aid him. Callicratidas now took bolder counsel. He sailed to Miletus, and urged its citizens to throw off the Persian alliance. Many rich men came forward with generous contributions of money, with which he equipped fifty new triremes, and sailed to Lesbos with a fleet twice as numerous as that of the Athenians.

=204.= He had a battle with Conon in the harbor of Mytilene, in which the Athenians lost nearly half their ships, and only saved the rest by drawing them ashore under the walls of the town. Callicratidas then blockaded the city by sea and land; and Cyrus, perceiving his success, assisted him with supplies of money. Great efforts were made at Athens, as soon as the condition of Conon was known. A large fleet was sent out in a few days, and being reinforced by the allies at Samos, arrived at the south-eastern extremity of Lesbos, numbering 150 vessels. Callicratidas left fifty ships to continue the blockade, and sailed to meet his enemy.

BATTLE OF ARGINUSÆ. A long and obstinate combat followed; but Callicratidas was at length thrown overboard and drowned, and victory declared for the Athenians. The Spartans had lost seventy-seven vessels, and their fleet at Mytilene hastily withdrew, leaving the harbor open for the escape of Conon.

[Sidenote: B. C. 405.]

=205.= At the beginning of the next year, Lysander was again placed in command of the Spartan fleet. His numbers being still inferior, he avoided an engagement, but he crossed the Ægean to the coast of Attica, for a personal Consultation with Agis, and thence proceeded to the Hellespont, where he commenced the siege of Lampsacus. The Athenian fleet followed, but arrived too late to save the town. Conon stationed himself, however, at Ægos-Potami (Goat’s River), on the northern side of the channel, with the intention of bringing the Spartan to an engagement. The Athenians were upon a barren plain; while the Spartans, better situated and abundantly supplied with provisions, were in no haste to begin the battle. Alcibiades, who was living near in his own castle, saw the danger of his countrymen, and advised their generals to remove to Sestus, but his counsels were resented as impertinence; and attributing the Spartan delay to cowardice, the Athenians became every day more neglectful of discipline.

[Sidenote: B. C. 405, Sept.]