Chapter VIII: Conclusions (6)

"On examining the _Diatessaron_ as translated into Latin from this
Arabic, we find in by far the greater portion of it, from the Sermon
on the Mount to the Last Supper (§§ 30-134) that Tatian, like his
brother harmonist Ammonius, took St. Matthew as the basis of his
work ... St. Mark, as might be expected, runs parallel with St.
Matthew in the _Diatessaron_, and is in a few cases the source out
of which incidents have been incorporated. St. Luke, on the other
hand, is employed by Tatian, as also in a lesser degree is St. John,
in complete defiance of chronological order." [149:1]

This is not quite so different from the description of the _Diatessaron_ of Ammonius, which Dr. Lightfoot quotes:--

"He placed side by side with the Gospel according to Matthew the
corresponding passages of the other Evangelists, so that as a
necessary result the connection of sequence in the three was
destroyed so far as regards the order (texture) of reading." [149:2]

The next witness cited is Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrus, writing about A.D. 453, and I need not quote the well-known passage in which he describes the suppression of some 200 copies of Tatian's work in his diocese, which were in use "not only among persons belonging to his sect, but also among those who follow the Apostolic doctrine," who did not perceive the heretical purpose of a book in which the genealogies and other passages showing the Lord to have been born of the seed of David after the flesh were suppressed. It is a fact, however, which even Zahn points out, that, in the alleged _Diatessaron_ of Ephraem, these passages are not all excised, but still remain part of the text, [150:1] as they also do in the Arabic translation. This is the only definite information which we possess of the contents of the _Diatessaron_ beyond the opening words, and it does not tally with the recently discovered works.

I need not further discuss here the statement of Epiphanius that some called Tatian's _Diatessaron_ the Gospel according to the Hebrews. Epiphanius had not seen the work himself, and he leaves us in the same ignorance as to its character.

It is clear from all this that we have no detailed information regarding the _Diatessaron_ of Tatian. As Dr. Donaldson said long ago: "We should not be able to identify it, even if it did come down to us, unless it told us something reliable about itself." [150:2]

We may now come to the documents recently published. The MS. of the Armenian version of the commentary ascribed to Ephraem is dated A.D. 1195, and Moesinger declares that it is translated from the Syriac, of which it is said to retain many traces. [150:3] He states that in the judgment of the Mechitarist Fathers the translation dates from about the fifth century, [150:4] but an opinion on such a point can only be received with great caution. The name of Tatian is not mentioned as the author of the "Harmony," and the question is open as to whether the authorship of the commentary is rightly ascribed to Ephraem Syrus. In any case there can be no doubt that the Armenian work is a translation.

The Arabic work published by Ciasca, and supposed to be a version of Tatian's _Diatessaron_ itself, is derived from two manuscripts, one belonging to the Vatican Library and the other forwarded to Rome from Egypt by the Vicar Apostolic of the Catholic Copts. The latter MS. states, in notes at the beginning and end, that it is an Arabic translation of the _Diatessaron_ of Tatian, made from the Syriac by the presbyter Abû-l-Pharag Abdullah Ben-at-Tib, who is believed to have flourished in the first half of the eleventh century, and in one of these notes the name of the scribe who wrote the Syriac copy is given, which leads to the conjecture that it may have been dated about the end of the ninth century. A note in the Vatican MS. also ascribes the original work to Tatian. These notes constitute the principal or only ground for connecting Tatian's name with the "Harmony."

So little is known regarding the _Diatessaron_ of Tatian that even the language in which it was written is matter of vehement debate. The name would, of course, lead to the conclusion that it was a Greek composition, and many other circumstances support this, but the mere fact that it does not seem to have been known to Greek Fathers, and that it is very doubtful whether any of them, with the exception of Theodoret, had ever seen it, has led many critics to maintain that it was written in Syriac. Nothing but circumstantial evidence of this can be produced. This alone shows how little we really know of the original. The recently discovered works, being in Arabic and Armenian, even supposing them to be translations from the Syriac and that the _Diatessaron_ was composed in Syriac, can only indirectly represent the original, and they obviously labour under fatal disability in regard to a restoration of the text of the documents at the basis of the work. Between doubtful accuracy of rendering and evident work of revision, the original matter cannot but be seriously disfigured.

It is certain that the name of Tatian did not appear as the author of the _Diatessaron_. [152:1] This is obvious from the very nature of the composition and its object. We have met with three works of this description and it is impossible to say how many more may not have existed. As the most celebrated, by name at least, it is almost certain that, as time went on and the identity of such works was lost, the first idea of anyone meeting with such a Harmony must have been that it was the _Diatessaron_ of Tatian. What means could there be of correcting it and positively ascertaining the truth? It is not as if such a work were a personal composition, showing individuality of style and invention; but supposing it to be a harmony of Gospels already current, and consequently varying from similar harmonies merely in details of compilation and arrangement, how is it possible its authorship could remain in the least degree certain, in the absence of an arranger's name?

An illustration of all this is aptly supplied in the case of Victor of Capua, and I will allow Dr. Lightfoot himself to tell the story.

"Victor, who flourished about A.D. 545, happened to stumble upon an
anonymous Harmony or Digest of the Gospels, and began in consequence
to investigate the authorship. He found two notices in Eusebius of
such Harmonies; one in the _Epistle to Carpianus_ prefixed to the
canons, relating to the work of Ammonius; another in the
_Ecclesiastical History_, relating to that of Tatian. Assuming that
the work which he had discovered must be one or other, he decides in
favour of the latter, because it does not give St. Matthew
continuously and append the passages of the other evangelists, as
Eusebius states Ammonius to have done. All this Victor tells us in
the preface to this anonymous Harmony, which he publishes in a Latin
dress.

"There can be no doubt that Victor was mistaken about the
authorship; for though the work is constructed on the same general
plan as Tatian's, it does not begin with John i. 1, but with Luke
i. 1, and it does contain the genealogies. It belongs, therefore,
at least in its present form, neither to Tatian nor to Ammonius."
[153:1]

How this reasoning would have fallen to the ground had the Harmonist, as he might well have done in imitation of Tatian, commenced with the words, "In the beginning was the Word"! The most instructive part is still to come, however, for although in May 1887 Dr. Lightfoot says: "There can be no doubt that Victor was mistaken about the authorship," &c., in a note now inserted at the end of the essay, after referring to the newly-discovered works, he adds: "On the relation of Victor's _Diatessaron, which seems to be shown after all not to be independent of Tatian_ ... See Hemphill's _Diatessaron_." [153:2] On turning to Professor Hemphill's work, the following passage on the point is discovered:--

"It will be remembered that Victor, Bishop of Capua, in the year
543, found a Latin Harmony or compilation of the four Gospels
without any name or title, and being a man of enquiring mind he at
once set about the task of discovering its unknown author. I have
already mentioned the way in which, from the passage of Eusebius, he
was led to ascribe his discovery to Tatian. This conclusion was
generally traversed by Church writers, and Victor was supposed to
have made a mistake. He is now, however, proved to have been a
better judge than his critics, for, as Dr. Wace was the first to
point out, a comparison of this Latin Harmony with the Ephraem
fragments demonstrates their substantial identity, as they preserve
to a wonderful degree the same order, and generally proceed _pari
passu_." [153:3]

But how about Luke i. 1 as the beginning? and the genealogies? Nothing could more clearly show the uncertainty which must always prevail about such works. Shall we one day discover that Victor was equally right about the reading _Diapente_?

I have thought it worth while to go into all this with a view of showing how little we know of the _Diatessaron_ of Tatian and, I may add, of the Commentary of Ephraem Syrus and the work on which it is based. It is not at present necessary to examine more closely the text of either of the recently published works, but, whilst leaving them to be tried by time, I may clearly state what the effect on my argument would be on the assumption made by Dr. Lightfoot that we have actually recovered the _Diatessaron_ of Tatian, and that it is composed upon a text more or less corresponding with our four Gospels. Neither in the "Harmony" itself nor in the supposed Commentary of Ephraem Syrus is the name of any of the Evangelists mentioned, and much less is there any information given as to their personality, character, or trustworthiness. If these works were, therefore, the veritable _Diatessaron_ of Tatian and the Commentary of Ephraem upon it, the Gospels would not be rendered more credible as the record of miracles nor as witnesses for the reality of Divine Revelation.

* * * * *

It may not be uninstructive if I take the liberty of quoting here some arguments of Dr. Lightfoot regarding the authenticity of the "Letter of the Smyrnaens," giving an account of the martyrdom of Polycarp. [154:1]

"The miraculous element has also been urged in some quarters as an
objection to the genuineness of the document. Yet, considering all
the circumstances of the case, we have more occasion to be surprised
at the comparative absence than at the special prominence of the
supernatural in the narrative. Compared with records of early
Christian martyrs, or with biographies of mediaeval saints, or with
notices of religious heroes at any great crisis, even in the more
recent history of the Church--as, for instance, the rise of
Jesuitism or of Wesleyanism--this document contains nothing which
ought to excite a suspicion as to its authenticity.

"The one miraculous incident, which creates a real difficulty, is
the dove issuing from the wounded side of the martyr. Yet even this
might be accounted for by an illusion, and under any circumstances
it would be quite inadequate to condemn the document as a forgery.
But it will be shown hereafter (p. 627) that there are excellent
reasons for regarding the incident as a later interpolation, which
had no place in the original document. Beyond this we have the voice
from heaven calling to Polycarp in the stadium to play the man (§ 9).
But the very simplicity of the narrative here disarms criticism.
The brethren present heard the voice, but no one saw the speaker.
This was the sole ground for the belief that it was not a human
utterance. Again, there is the arching of the fire round the martyr
like a sail swelled by the wind (§ 15). But this may be explained as
a strictly natural occurrence, and similar phenomena have been
witnessed more than once on like occasions, notably at the
martyrdoms of Savonarola and of Hooper. Again, there is the sweet
scent, as of incense, issuing from the burning pyre (§ 15); but this
phenomenon also, however we may explain it, whether from the
fragrance of the wood or in some other way, meets us constantly. In
another early record of martyrdoms, the history of the persecutions
at Vienne and Lyons, a little more than twenty years later, we are
told (Euseb. _H.E._ v. 1, § 35) that the heroic martyrs, as they
stepped forward to meet their fate, were 'fragrant with the sweet
odour of Christ, so that some persons even supposed that they had
been anointed with material ointment' ([Greek: hôste enious doxai
kai murô kosmikô kechristhai autous]). Yet there was no pyre and no
burning wood here, so that the imagination of the bystanders must
have supplied the incident. Indeed, this account of the Gallican
martyrs, indisputably written by eye-witnesses, contains many more
startling occurrences than the record of Polycarp's fate.

"More or less closely connected with the miraculous element is the
_prophetic insight_ attributed to Polycarp. But what does this
amount to? It is stated indeed that 'every word which he uttered was
accomplished and will be accomplished' (§ 16). But the future tense,
'will be accomplished,' is itself the expression of a belief, not
the statement of a fact. We may, indeed, accept this qualification
as clear testimony that, when the narrative was written, many of his
forebodings and predictions had not been fulfilled. The only example
of a prediction actually given in the narrative is the dream of his
burning pillow, which suggested to him that he would undergo
martyrdom by fire. But what more natural than this presentiment,
when persecution was raging around him and fire was a common
instrument of death? I need not stop here to discuss how far a
prescience may be vouchsafed to God's saints. Even 'old experience'
is found to be gifted with 'something like prophetic strain.' It is
sufficient to say here again that it would be difficult to point to
a single authentic biography of any Christian hero--certainly of any
Christian hero of the early centuries--of whom some incident at
least as remarkable as this prophecy, if prophecy it can be called,
is not recorded. Pontius, the disciple and biographer of Cyprian,
relates a similar intimation which preceded the martyrdom of his
master, and adds: 'Quid hac revelatione manifestius? quid hac
dignatione felicius? ante illi praedicta sunt omnia quaecunque
postmodum subsecuta sunt.' (_Vit. et Pass. Cypr._ 12, 13)" [156:1]

I am the more anxious to quote this extract from a work, written long after the essays on _Supernatural Religion_, as it presents Dr. Lightfoot in a very different light, and gives me an opportunity of congratulating him on the apparent progress of his thought towards freedom which it exhibits. I quite agree with him that the presence of supernatural or superstitious elements is no evidence against the authenticity of an early Christian writing, but the promptitude with which he sets these aside as interpolations, or explains them away into naturalism, is worthy of Professor Huxley. He now understands, without doubt, the reason why I demand such clear and conclusive evidence of miracles, and why I refuse to accept such narratives upon anonymous and insufficient testimony. In fact, he cannot complain that I feel bound to explain all alleged miraculous occurrences precisely in the way of which he has set me so good an example, and that, whilst feeling nothing but very sympathetic appreciation of the emotion which stimulated the imagination and devout reverence of early Christians to such mistakes, I resolutely refuse to believe their pious aberrations.

VIII.

CONCLUSIONS.

We have seen that Divine Revelation could only be necessary or conceivable for the purpose of communicating to us something which we could not otherwise discover, and that the truth of communications which are essentially beyond and undiscoverable by reason cannot be attested in any other way than by miraculous signs distinguishing them as Divine. It is admitted that no other testimony could justify our believing the specific Revelation which we are considering, the very substance of which is supernatural and beyond the criticism of reason, and that its doctrines, if not proved to be miraculous truths, must inevitably be pronounced "the wildest delusions." "By no rational being could a just and benevolent life be accepted as proof of such astonishing announcements."

On examining the alleged miraculous evidence for Christianity as Divine Revelation, however, we find that, even if the actual occurrence of the supposed miracles could be substantiated, their value as evidence would be destroyed by the necessary admission that miracles are not limited to one source and are not exclusively associated with truth, but are performed by various spiritual Beings, Satanic as well as Divine, and are not always evidential, but are sometimes to be regarded as delusive and for the trial of faith. As the doctrines supposed to be revealed are beyond Reason, and cannot in any sense be intelligently approved by the human intellect, no evidence which is of so doubtful and inconclusive a nature could sufficiently attest them. This alone would disqualify the Christian miracles for the duty which miracles alone are capable of performing.

The supposed miraculous evidence for the Divine Revelation, moreover, is not only without any special Divine character, being avowedly common also to Satanic agency, but it is not original either in conception or details. Similar miracles are reported long antecedently to the first promulgation of Christianity, and continued to be performed for centuries after it. A stream of miraculous pretension, in fact, has flowed through all human history, deep and broad as it has passed through the darker ages, but dwindling down to a thread as it has entered days of enlightenment. The evidence was too hackneyed and commonplace to make any impression upon those before whom the Christian miracles are said to have been performed, and it altogether failed to convince the people to whom the Revelation was primarily addressed. The selection of such evidence for such a purpose is much more characteristic of human weakness than of Divine power.

The true character of miracles is at once betrayed by the fact that their supposed occurrence has thus been confined to ages of ignorance and superstition, and that they are absolutely unknown in any time or place where science has provided witnesses fitted to appreciate and ascertain the nature of such exhibitions of supernatural power. There is not the slightest evidence that any attempt was made to investigate the supposed miraculous occurrences, or to justify the inferences so freely drawn from them, nor is there any reason to believe that the witnesses possessed, in any considerable degree, the fulness of knowledge and sobriety of judgment requisite for the purpose. No miracle has yet established its claim to the rank even of apparent reality, and all such phenomena must remain in the dim region of imagination. The test applied to the largest class of miracles, connected with demoniacal possession, discloses the falsity of all miraculous pretension.

There is no uncertainty as to the origin of belief in supernatural interference with nature. The assertion that spurious miracles have sprung up round a few instances of genuine miraculous power has not a single valid argument to support it. History clearly demonstrates that, wherever ignorance and superstition have prevailed, every obscure occurrence has been attributed to supernatural agency, and it is freely acknowledged that, under their influence, 'inexplicable' and 'miraculous' are convertible terms. On the other hand, in proportion as knowledge of natural laws has increased, the theory of supernatural interference with the order of nature has been dispelled and miracles have ceased. The effect of science, however, is not limited to the present and future, but its action is equally retrospective, and phenomena which were once ignorantly isolated from the sequence of natural cause and effect are now restored to their place in the unbroken order. Ignorance and superstition created miracles; knowledge has for ever annihilated them.

To justify miracles, two assumptions are made: first, an Infinite Personal God; and second, a Divine design of Revelation, the execution of which necessarily involves supernatural action. Miracles, it is argued, are not contrary to nature, or effects produced without adequate causes, but on the contrary are caused by the intervention of this Infinite Personal God for the purpose of attesting and carrying out the Divine design. Neither of the assumptions, however, can be reasonably maintained.

The assumption of an Infinite Personal God: a Being at once limited and unlimited, is a use of language to which no mode of human thought can possibly attach itself. Moreover, the assumption of a God working miracles is emphatically excluded by universal experience of the order of nature. The allegation of a specific Divine cause of miracles is further inadequate from the fact that the power of working miracles is avowedly not limited to a Personal God, but is also ascribed to other spiritual Beings, and it must, consequently, always be impossible to prove that the supposed miraculous phenomena originate with one and not with the other. On the other hand, the assumption of a Divine design of Revelation is not suggested by antecedent probability, but is derived from the very Revelation which it is intended to justify, as is likewise the assumption of a Personal God, and both are equally vicious as arguments. The circumstances which are supposed to require this Divine design, and the details of the scheme, are absolutely incredible and opposed to all the results of science. Nature does not countenance any theory of the original perfection and subsequent degradation of the human race, and the supposition of a frustrated original plan of creation, and of later impotent endeavours to correct it, is as inconsistent with Divine omnipotence and wisdom as the proposed punishment of the human race and the mode devised to save some of them are opposed to justice and morality. Such assumptions are essentially inadmissible, and totally fail to explain and justify miracles.

Whatever definition be given of miracles, such exceptional phenomena must at least be antecedently incredible. In the absence of absolute knowledge, human belief must be guided by the balance of evidence, and it is obvious that the evidence for the uniformity of the order of nature, which is derived from universal experience, must be enormously greater than can be the testimony for any alleged exception to it. On the other hand, universal experience prepares us to consider mistakes of the senses, imperfect observation and erroneous inference as not only possible, but eminently probable on the part of the witnesses of phenomena, even when they are perfectly honest and truthful, and more especially so when such disturbing causes as religious excitement and superstition are present. When the report of the original witnesses only reaches us indirectly and through the medium of tradition, the probability of error is further increased. Thus the allegation of miracles is discredited, both positively by the invariability of the order of nature, and negatively by the fallibility of human observation and testimony. The history of miraculous pretension in the world and the circumstances attending the special exhibition of it which we are examining suggest natural explanations of the reported facts which wholly remove them from the region of the supernatural.

When we proceed to examine the direct witnesses for the Christian miracles, we do not discover any exceptional circumstances neutralising the preceding considerations. On the contrary, we find that the case turns not upon miracles substantially before us, but upon the mere narratives of miracles said to have occurred over eighteen hundred years ago. It is obvious that, for such narratives to possess any real force and validity, it is essential that their character and authorship should be placed beyond all doubt. They must proceed from eye-witnesses capable of estimating aright the nature of the phenomena. Our four Gospels, however, are strictly anonymous works. The superscriptions which now distinguish them are undeniably of later origin than the works themselves and do not proceed from the composers of the Gospels. Of the writers to whom these narratives are traditionally ascribed only two are even said to have been apostles, the alleged authors of the second and third Synoptics neither having been personal followers of Jesus nor eye-witnesses of the events they describe. Under these circumstances, we are wholly dependent upon external evidence for information regarding the authorship and trustworthiness of the four canonical Gospels.

In examining this evidence, we proceeded upon clear and definite principles. Without forming or adopting any theory whatever as to the date or origin of our Gospels, we simply searched the writings of the Fathers, during a century and a half after the events in question, for information regarding the composition and character of these works and even for any certain traces of their use, although, if discovered, these could prove little beyond the mere existence of the Gospels used at the date of the writer. In the latter and minor investigation, we were guided by canons of criticism, previously laid down, which are based upon the simplest laws of evidence. We found that the writings of the Fathers, during a century and a half after the death of Jesus, are a complete blank so far as any evidence regarding the composition and character of our Gospels is concerned, unless we except the tradition preserved by Papias, after the middle of the second century, the details of which fully justify the conclusion that our first and second Synoptics, in their present form, cannot be the works said to have been composed by Matthew and Mark. There is thus no evidence whatever directly connecting any of the canonical Gospels with the writers to whom they are popularly attributed, and later tradition, of little or no value in itself, is separated by a long interval of profound silence from the epoch at which they are supposed to have been composed. With one exception, moreover, we found that, during the same century and a half, there is no certain and unmistakable trace even of the anonymous use of any of our Gospels in the early Church. This fact, of course, does not justify the conclusion that none of these Gospels was actually in existence during any part of that time, nor have we anywhere suggested such an inference, but strict examination of the evidence shows that there is no positive proof that they were. The exception to which we refer is Marcion's Gospel, which was, we think, based upon our third Synoptic, and consequently must be accepted as evidence of the existence of that work. Marcion, however, does not give the slightest information as to the authorship of the Gospel, and his charges against it of adulteration cannot be considered very favourable testimony as to its infallible character. The canonical Gospels continue to the end anonymous documents of no evidential value for miracles. They do not themselves pretend to be inspired histories, and they cannot escape from the ordinary rules of criticism. Internal evidence does not modify the inferences from external testimony. Apart from continual minor contradictions throughout the first three Gospels, it is impossible to reconcile the representations of the Synoptics with those of the fourth Gospel. They mutually destroy each other as evidence. They must be pronounced mere narratives compiled long after the events recorded, by unknown persons who were neither eye-witnesses of the alleged miraculous occurrences nor hearers of the statements they profess to report. They cannot be accepted as adequate testimony for miracles and the reality of Divine Revelation.

Applying similar tests to the Acts of the Apostles we arrived at similar results. Acknowledged to be composed by the same author who produced the third Synoptic, that author's identity is not thereby made more clear. There is no evidence of the slightest value regarding its character, but, on the other hand, the work itself teems to such an extent with miraculous incidents and supernatural agency that the credibility of the narrative requires an extraordinary amount of attestation to secure for it any serious consideration. When the statements of the author are compared with the emphatic declarations of the Apostle Paul and with authentic accounts of the development of the early Christian Church, it becomes evident that the Acts of the Apostles, as might have been supposed, is a legendary composition of a later day, which cannot be regarded as sober and credible history, and rather discredits than tends to establish the reality of the miracles with which its pages so suspiciously abound.

The remaining books of the New Testament Canon required no separate examination, because, even if genuine, they contain no additional testimony to the reality of Divine Revelation, beyond the implied belief in such doctrines as the Incarnation and Resurrection. It is unquestionable, we suppose, that in some form or other the Apostles believed in these miracles, and the assumption that they did so supersedes the necessity for examining the authenticity of the Catholic Epistles and Apocalypse. In like manner, the recognition as genuine of four Epistles of Paul, which contain his testimony to miracles, renders it superfluous to discuss the authenticity of the other letters attributed to him.

The general belief in miraculous power and its possession by the Church is brought to a practical test in the case of the Apostle Paul. After elaborate consideration of his letters, we came to the unhesitating conclusion that, instead of establishing the reality of miracles, the unconscious testimony of Paul clearly demonstrates the facility with which erroneous inferences convert the most natural phenomena into supernatural occurrences.

As a final test, we carefully examined the whole of the evidence for the cardinal dogmas of Christianity, the Resurrection and Ascension of Jesus. First taking the four Gospels, we found that their accounts of these events are not only full of legendary matter, but even contradict and exclude each other and, so far from establishing the reality of such stupendous miracles, they show that no reliance is to be placed on the statements of the unknown authors. Taking next the testimony of Paul, which is more important as at least authentic and proceeding from an Apostle of whom we know more than of any other of the early missionaries of Christianity, we saw that it was indefinite and utterly insufficient. His so-called "circumstantial account of the testimony upon which the belief in the Resurrection rested" consists merely of vague and undetailed hearsay, differing, so far as it can be compared, from the statements in the Gospels, and without other attestation than the bare fact that it is repeated by Paul, who doubtless believed it, although he had not himself been a witness of any of the supposed appearances of the risen Jesus which he so briefly catalogues. Paul's own personal testimony to the Resurrection is limited to a vision of Jesus, of which we have no authentic details, seen many years after the alleged miracle. Considering the peculiar and highly nervous temperament of Paul, of which he himself supplies abundant evidence, there can be no hesitation in deciding that this vision was purely subjective, as were likewise, in all probability, the appearances to the excited disciples of Jesus. The testimony of Paul himself, before his imagination was stimulated to ecstatic fervour by the beauty of a spiritualised religion, was an earnest denial of the great Christian dogma, emphasised by the active persecution of those who affirmed it; and a vision, especially in the case of one so constituted, supposed to be seen many years after the fact of the Resurrection had ceased to be capable of verification, is not an argument of convincing force. We were compelled to pronounce the evidence for the Resurrection and Ascension absolutely and hopelessly inadequate to prove the reality of such stupendous miracles, which must consequently be unhesitatingly rejected. There is no reason given, or even conceivable, why allegations such as these, and dogmas affecting the religion and even the salvation of the human race, should be accepted upon evidence which would be declared totally insufficient in the case of any common question of property or title before a legal tribunal. On the contrary, the more momentous the point to be established, the more complete must be the proof required.

If we test the results at which we have arrived by general considerations, we find them everywhere confirmed and established. There is nothing original in the claim of Christianity to be regarded as Divine Revelation, and nothing new either in the doctrines said to have been revealed, or in the miracles by which it is alleged to have been distinguished. There has not been a single historical religion largely held amongst men which has not pretended to be divinely revealed, and the written books of which have not been represented as directly inspired. There is not a doctrine, sacrament, or rite of Christianity which has not substantially formed part of earlier religions; and not a single phase of the supernatural history of the Christ, from his miraculous conception, birth and incarnation to his death, resurrection, and ascension, which has not had its counterpart in earlier mythologies. Heaven and hell, with characteristic variation of details, have held an important place in the eschatology of many creeds and races. The same may be said even of the moral teaching of Christianity, the elevated precepts of which, although in a less perfect and connected form, had already suggested themselves to many noble minds and been promulgated by ancient sages and philosophers. That this Enquiry into the reality of Divine Revelation has been limited to the claim of Christianity has arisen solely from a desire to condense it within reasonable bounds, and confine it to the only Religion in connection with which it could practically interest us now.

There is nothing in the history and achievements of Christianity which can be considered characteristic of a Religion Divinely revealed for the salvation of mankind. Originally said to have been communicated to a single nation, specially selected as the peculiar people of God, for whom distinguished privileges were said to be reserved, it was almost unanimously rejected by that nation at the time and it has continued to be repudiated by its descendants, with singular unanimity, to the present day. After more than eighteen centuries, this Divine scheme of salvation has not obtained even the nominal adhesion of more than a third of the human race, and if, in a census of Christendom, distinction could now be made of those who no longer seriously believe in it as Supernatural Religion, Christianity would take a much lower numerical position. Sâkya Muni, a teacher only second in nobility of character to Jesus, who, like him, proclaimed a system of elevated morality, has even now almost twice the number of followers, although his missionaries never sought converts in the West. [168:1] Considered as a scheme Divinely devised as the best, if not only, mode of redeeming the human race and saving them from eternal damnation, promulgated by God himself incarnate in human form, and completed by his own actual death upon the cross for the sins of the world, such results as these can only be regarded as practical failure, although they may not be disproportionate for a system of elevated morality.

We shall probably never be able to determine how far the great Teacher may through his own speculations or misunderstood spiritual utterances have suggested the supernatural doctrines subsequently attributed to him, and by which his whole history and system soon became transformed; but no one who attentively studies the subject can fail to be struck by the absence of such dogmas from the earlier records of his teaching. It is to the excited veneration of the followers of Jesus, however, that we owe most of the supernatural elements so characteristic of the age and people. We may look in vain even in the synoptic Gospels for the doctrines elaborated in the Pauline Epistles and the Gospel of Ephesus. The great transformation of Christianity was effected by men who had never seen Jesus, and who were only acquainted with his teaching after it had become transmuted by tradition. The fervid imagination of the East constructed Christian theology. It is not difficult to follow the development of the creeds of the Church, and it is certainly most instructive to observe the progressive boldness with which its dogmas were expanded by pious enthusiasm. The New Testament alone represents several stages of dogmatic evolution. Before his first followers had passed away the process of transformation had commenced. The disciples, who had so often misunderstood the teaching of Jesus during his life, piously distorted it after his death. His simple lessons of meekness and humility were soon forgotten. With lamentable rapidity, the elaborate structure of ecclesiastical Christianity, following stereotyped lines of human superstition and deeply coloured by Alexandrian philosophy, displaced the sublime morality of Jesus. Doctrinal controversy, which commenced amongst the very Apostles, has ever since divided the unity of the Christian body. The perverted ingenuity of successive generations of churchmen has filled the world with theological quibbles, which have naturally enough culminated of late in doctrines of Immaculate Conception and Papal Infallibility.

It is sometimes affirmed, however, that those who proclaim such conclusions not only wantonly destroy the dearest hopes of humanity, but remove the only solid basis of morality; and it is alleged that, before existing belief is disturbed, the iconoclast is bound to provide a substitute for the shattered idol. To this we may reply that speech or silence does not alter the reality of things. The recognition of Truth cannot be made dependent on consequences, or be trammelled by considerations of spurious expediency. Its declaration in a serious and suitable manner to those who are capable of judging can never be premature. Its suppression cannot be effectual, and is only a humiliating compromise with conscious imposture. In so far as morality is concerned, belief in a system of future rewards and punishments, although of an intensely degraded character, may, to a certain extent, have promoted observance of the letter of the law in darker ages and even in our own; but it may, we think, be shown that education and civilisation have done infinitely more to enforce its spirit. How far Christianity has promoted education and civilisation, we shall not here venture adequately to discuss. We may emphatically assert, however, that whatever beneficial effect Christianity has produced has been due, not to its supernatural dogmas, but to its simple morality. Dogmatic Theology, on the contrary, has retarded education and impeded science. Wherever it has been dominant, civilisation has stood still. Science has been judged and suppressed by the light of a text or a chapter of Genesis. Almost every great advance which has been made towards enlightenment has been achieved in spite of the protest or the anathema of the Church. Submissive ignorance, absolute or comparative, has been tacitly fostered as the most desirable condition of the popular mind. "Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven," has been the favourite text of Doctors of Divinity with a stock of incredible dogmas difficult of assimilation by the virile mind. Even now, the friction of theological resistance is a constant waste of intellectual power. The early enunciation of so pure a system of morality, and one so intelligible to the simple as well as profound to the wise, was of great value to the world; but, experience being once systematised and codified, if higher principles do not constrain us, society may safely be left to see morals sufficiently observed. It is true that, notwithstanding its fluctuating rules, morality has hitherto assumed the character of a Divine institution, but its sway has not, in consequence, been more real than it must be as the simple result of human wisdom and the outcome of social experience. The choice of a noble life is no longer a theological question, and ecclesiastical patents of truth and uprightness have finally expired. Morality, which has ever changed its complexion and modified its injunctions according to social requirements, will necessarily be enforced as part of human evolution, and is not dependent on religious terrorism or superstitious persuasion. If we are disposed to say: _Cui bono?_ and only practise morality, or be ruled by right principles, to gain a heaven or escape a hell, there is nothing lost, for such grudging and calculated morality is merely a spurious imitation which can as well be produced by social compulsion. But if we have ever been really penetrated by the pure spirit of morality, if we have in any degree attained that elevation of mind which instinctively turns to the true and noble and shrinks from the baser level of thought and action, we shall feel no need of the stimulus of a system of rewards and punishments in a future state which has for so long been represented as essential to Christianity.

As to the other reproach, let us ask what has actually been destroyed by such an enquiry pressed to its logical conclusion. Can Truth by any means be made less true? Can reality be melted into thin air? The Revelation not being a reality, that which has been destroyed is only an illusion, and that which is left is the Truth. Losing belief in it and its contents, we have lost absolutely nothing but that which the traveller loses when the mirage, which has displayed cool waters and green shades before him, melts swiftly away. There were no cool fountains really there to allay his thirst, no flowery meadows for his wearied limbs; his pleasure was delusion, and the wilderness is blank. Rather the mirage with its pleasant illusion, is the human cry, than the desert with its barrenness. Not so, is the friendly warning; seek not vainly in the desert that which is not there, but turn rather to other horizons and to surer hopes. Do not waste life clinging to ecclesiastical dogmas which represent no eternal verities, but search elsewhere for truth which may haply be found. What should we think of the man who persistently repulsed the persuasion that two and two make four from the ardent desire to believe that two and two make five? Whose fault is it that two and two do make four and not five? Whose folly is it that it should be more agreeable to think that two and two make five than to know that they only make four? This folly is theirs who represent the value of life as dependent on the reality of special illusions, which they have religiously adopted. To discover that a former belief is unfounded is to change nothing of the realities of existence. The sun will descend as it passes the meridian whether we believe it to be noon or not. It is idle and foolish, if human, to repine because the truth is not precisely what we thought it, and at least we shall not change reality by childishly clinging to a dream.

The argument so often employed by theologians that Divine Revelation is necessary for man, and that certain views contained in that Revelation are required by our moral consciousness, is purely imaginary and derived from the Revelation which it seeks to maintain. The only thing absolutely necessary for man is Truth; and to that, and that alone, must our moral consciousness adapt itself. Reason and experience forbid the expectation that we can acquire any knowledge otherwise than through natural channels. We might as well expect to be supernaturally nourished as supernaturally informed. To complain that we do not know all that we desire to know is foolish and unreasonable. It is tantamount to complaining that the mind of man is not differently constituted. To attain the full altitude of the Knowable, whatever that may be, should be our earnest aim, and more than this is not for humanity. We may be certain that information which is beyond the ultimate reach of Reason is as unnecessary as it is inaccessible. Man may know all that man requires to know.

We gain more than we lose by awaking to find that our Theology is human invention and our eschatology an unhealthy dream. We are freed from the incubus of base Hebrew mythology, and from doctrines of Divine government which outrage morality and set cruelty and injustice in the place of holiness. If we have to abandon cherished anthropomorphic visions of future Blessedness, the details of which are either of unseizable dimness or of questionable joy, we are at least delivered from quibbling discussions of the meaning of [Greek: aiônios], and our eternal hope is unclouded by the doubt whether mankind is to be tortured in hell for ever and a day, or for a day without the ever. At the end of life there may be no definite vista of a Heaven glowing with the light of apocalyptic imagination, but neither will there be the unutterable horror of a Purgatory or a Hell lurid with flames for the helpless victims of an unjust but omnipotent Creator. To entertain such libellous representations at all as part of the contents of "Divine Revelation," it was necessary to assert that man was incompetent to judge of the ways of the God of Revelation, and must not suppose him endowed with the perfection of human conceptions of justice and mercy, but submit to call wrong right and right wrong at the foot of an almighty Despot. But now the reproach of such reasoning is shaken from our shoulders, and returns to the Jewish superstition from which it sprang.

As myths lose their might and their influence when discovered to be baseless, the power of supernatural Christianity will doubtless pass away, but the effect of the revolution must not be exaggerated, although it cannot here be fully discussed. If the pictures which have filled for so long the horizon of the Future must vanish, no hideous blank can rightly be maintained in their place. We should clearly distinguish between what we know and know not, but as carefully abstain from characterising that which we know not as if it were really known to us. That mysterious Unknown or Unknowable is no cruel darkness, but simply an impenetrable distance into which we are impotent to glance, but which excludes no legitimate speculation and forbids no reasonable hope.

[ENDNOTES]

[1:1] Originally published in the _Fortnightly Review_, January 1, 1875.

[4:1] _On the Canon_, p. 65.

[4:2] _Ibid._ p. 61, note 2.

[4:3] At the end of this note Dr. Westcott adds, "Indeed, from the similar mode of introducing the story of the vine, which is afterwards referred to Papias, it is reasonable to conjecture that this interpretation is one from Papias' _Exposition_."

[4:4] _Reliq. Sacrae_, i. p. 10 f.

[4:5] _Lehre Pers. Christ_, i. p. 217 f., Anm. 56, p. 218, Anm, 62.

[5:1] _Theol. Jahrb. _1845, p. 593, Anm. 2; cf. 1847, p. 160, Anm. 1.

[5:2] _Synops. Evang._, Proleg. xxxi.

[5:3] _Komm. Ev. des Johannes_, p. 6 f.

[5:4] _Die Zeugn. Ev. Joh._ p. 116 f.

[5:5] _Basilides_, p. 110 f.

[5:6] _Zeitschr. für wiss. Theol._ 1867, p. 186, Anm. 1, 1868, p. 219, Anm. 4; cf. 1865, p. 334 f., "Die Evangelien," p. 339, Anm. 4.

[6:1] _Der Johann. Ursprung des viert. Evang._ 1874, p. 72.

[6:2] _Th. Stud. u. Krit._ 1866, p. 674.

[6:3] _Intro. N.T._ ii. p. 424 f.

[6:4] _Ibid._ ii. p. 372.

[8:1] The work was all printed, and I could only reprint the sheet with such alterations as could be made by omissions and changes at the part itself.

[8:2] Dr. Lightfoot makes use of my second edition.

[9:1] _Contemporary Review_, December, p. 4, n. 1; _Essays on S.R._ p. 4, n. 4.

[9:2] Professor Hofstede de Groot, in advancing this passage after the example of Tischendorf, carefully distinguishes the words which he introduces, referring it to the presbyters, by placing them within brackets.

[10:1] _S.R._ ii. p. 231 f.

[10:2] _Contemporary Review_, December, p. 5 f.; _Essays on S.R._ p. 7.

[10:3] _S.R._ ii. 228 ff.

[11:1] _Wann wurden_, u.s.w., p. 73 f.

[11:2] The translation in Scholten's work is substantially the same as Tischendorf's, except that he has "promises" for "has promised," which is of no importance. Upon this, however, Scholten argues that Celsus is treated as a contemporary.

[12:1] _S.R._ ii. p. 229 ff.

[13:1] I may here briefly refer to one or two instances of translation attacked by Dr. Lightfoot. He sneers at such a rendering as [Greek: ho logos edêlou], "Scripture declares," introducing an isolated phrase from Justin Martyr (ii. 296). The slight liberty taken with the tense is surely excusable in such a case, and for the rest I may point out that Prudentius Maranus renders the words "... scripturam declarare," and Otto "... effatum declarare." They occur in reference to passages from the Old Testament quoted in controversy with a Jew. The next passage is [Greek: kata korrhês propêlakizein], which Dr. Lightfoot says is rendered "to inflict a blow on one side," but this is not the case. The phrase occurs in contrasting the words of Matt. v. 39, [Greek: all' hostis se rhapisei epi tên dexian sou siagona, strepson autô kai tên allên], with a passage in Athenagoras, [Greek: alla tois men kan kata korrhês prospêlakizosi, kai to eteron paiein parechein tês kephalês meros]. In endeavouring to convey to the English reader some idea of the linguistic difference, I rendered the latter (ii. 193), "but to those who inflict a blow on the one side, also to present the other side, _of the head_," &c., inserting the three Greek words after "side," to explain the suspension of sense, and the merging, for the sake of brevity, the double expression in the words I have italicised. Dr. Lightfoot represents the phrase as ending at "side." The passage from Tertullian was quoted almost solely for the purpose of showing the uncertainty, in so bold a writer, of the expression "videtur," for which reason, although the Latin is given below, the word was introduced into the text. It was impossible for anyone to _mistake_ the tense and meaning of "quem caederet," but I ventured to paraphrase the words and their context, instead of translating them. In this sentence, I may say, the "mutilation hypothesis" is introduced, and thereafter Tertullian proceeds to press against Marcion his charge of mutilating the Gospel of Luke, and I desired to contrast the doubt of the "videtur" with the assurance of the subsequent charge. I had imagined that no one could have doubted that Luke is represented as one of the "Commentatores."

[14:1] I altered "certainly" to "probably" in the second edition, as Dr. Lightfoot points out, in order to avoid the possibility of exaggeration; but my mind was so impressed with the certainty that I had clearly shown I was merely, for the sake of fairness, reporting the critical judgment of others, that I did not perceive the absence of the words given above.

[15:1] Dr. Lightfoot is mistaken in his ingenious conjecture of my having been misled by the "nur" of Credner; but so scrupulous a critic might have mentioned that I not only refer to Credner for this argument, but also to _De Wette_, who has "... dass er _nie_ Joh. dem Taüfer wie der Synoptiker den Beinamen [Greek: ho Baptistês] giebt" (_Einl. N.T._ p. 230), and to _Bleek_, who says, "nicht ein einziges Mal" (_Beiträge_, p. 178, and _Einl. N.T._ p. 150), which could not be misread.

[16:1] _Contemporary Review_, December, p. 15; _Essays on S.R._ p. 21 f.

[16:2] Clem. Alex. _Strom._ vii. 17-106. Dr. Westcott gives the above reference, but does not quote the passage.

[16:3] Dr. Westcott quotes the passage relative to Matthias.

[17:1] _Canon_, p. 255 f.

[17:2] The same remarks apply to the two passages, pointed out by Tischendorf, from Clement of Alexandria and Epiphanius.

[18:1] Luthardt, _Der Johann. Ursprung des viert. Evang._ 1874, p. 85 f.

[19:1] _Strom._ vii. 17, § 106.

[19:2] _Canon_, p. 255.

[19:3] _Contemporary Review_, December, p. 16 [_Essays_, p. 22].

[20:1] _Contemporary Review_, December, p. 8 [_ibid._ p. 11].

[21:1] _Contemporary Review_, p. 8 [_ibid._ p. 11].

[21:2] _A Crit. History of Chr. Lit. and Doctrine_, i. 184 f. I do not refer to the numerous authors who enforce this view.

[22:1] _Contemporary Review_, p. 8 [_ibid._ p. 11 f.]

[23:1] _Contemporary Review_, p. 8 f. [_ibid._ p. 11].

[23:2] _S.R._ i. p. 441.

[24:1] _Contemporary Review_, p. 8 f. [_ibid._ p. 12 f.]

[24:2] _S.R._ i. p. 387 ff.

[24:3] _Canon_, p. 112 f.

[24:4] _Contemporary Review_, p. 9, note [_ibid._ p. 12, n. 4].

[24:5] _S.R._ i. p. 360, note 1. Dr. Lightfoot, of course, "can hardly suppose" that "I had read the passage to which I refer."

[25:1] _Contemporary Review_, p. 9 [_ibid._ p. 13].

[26:1] _Contemporary Review_, p. 9 [_ibid._ p. 13].