Chapter II: Letter I

_Much esteemed friend_,--The desire you express of attempting those researches which seem necessary to promote the further attainment of moral truth, is appreciated as truly laudable; and did I feel myself adequate to your wishes, I should enjoy a peculiar felicity in complying with your request. But so far from this I am very sensible that the magnitude of the general subject which you have introduced, requires to be investigated by abilities far superior to those possessed by me, and demands a tribute from resources not within my possession. However, as you have imposed an obligation on me by the communication which is here acknowledged, I will make a feeble attempt to suggest a few reflections relative to the main subjects of your epistle, which if they do nothing more, will return merited acknowledgements and plead the necessity of calling to your assistance abilities more promising.

While I view the advances which are making in the knowledge of the arts and sciences, with the pleasure of which you speak, I am apprehensive that the propensity "to chain down the human mind to its present attainments, and thereby prevent all further improvements," relative to moral truth, may have its rise in a principle, which, so far from being inimical to man, is, in its general tendency, incalculably beneficial. No desire is entertained to justify all the zeal and all the means which are employed to prevent the free exercise of the human mind, in its researches after divine knowledge, and to retard the influx of that light which would prove unfavourable to doctrines which have little more than prescription for their support; but it seems reasonable to make a proper distinction between what may be called a salutary principle in the human mind, and a wrong application or an erroneous indulgence of it. The principle referred to, inclines us not only to hold in the highest veneration any improvements which we have made, but also to retain such acquisitions in their purity. Now it is believed that what you complain of, has its rise from the foregoing causes, and is nothing more than a wrong or an erroneous indulgence of a natural desire which in its general tendency is advantageous. Nothing is more incident to man, than to misapply his desires, and to overate his reasonable duty. But it is at the same time believed that a remedy of such defects which should consist in the destruction of those principles which are improperly acted on, would be worse than the disorder. And now the thought strikes me, that the way by which we account for the improprieties which have just been traced up to their causes, will as charitably account for what seems to incite you to aim a fatal stroke at a fabric which has its foundation in the immovable principles of our moral nature, and which, though through the wanderings of the human mind, may have not a little hay, wood and stubble, yet possess too much gold, silver and precious stones, to be forsaken as a pile of rubbish.

It gives you "pain to see what time and money, what labour and toil have been expended and are still expending in plodding over as it were an old dead letter; to learn languages which exist _no where_ only on paper, barely for the sake of reading the opinions of other men who lived in other times," &c. But you allow that all this would be necessary if "the only revelation of God to man, which was ever recorded on vellum or paper was written partly in Greek and partly in Hebrew," and that "the will of God cannot be known only through the medium of those languages." In this last particular, you express what appears very reasonable, and I presume you would be willing to consent to all this expense and toil, even if the proposition were to lose part of its importance, and it were only contended that God had actually made a revelation to man, which was written originally partly in Greek and partly in the Hebrew, without saying that he has never caused a revelation to be written originally in any other language.

A revelation from God, if it were written only in the Hebrew or Greek, would be considered of sufficient value to recompence the labour of learning the language. But you contend that this revelation, if real, can be translated into English, but, you must allow that to translate it, the original must be learned first. Will you say, that after the translation is once made, the original is of no more use? How then are future ages to determine whether they have not been imposed on? Suppose no person of the present age understood the languages in which the scriptures were first written, surely in this case, those languages would be lost beyond recovery. Suppose then it should be doubted whether our bible was not a fabrication, written originally not in Hebrew nor in Greek, but in some more modern language, how could the suggestion be refuted?

You appear to be perplexed with the disagreement of authors, as commentators, and I presume, critics on the original text; you speak on this subject, as if it were too much for patience to endure. Now, dear brother, I confess I feel very differently on this subject. I feel a devout, a religious gratitude to him whose wisdom is foolishness in the sight of too many of my fellow creatures. I view the very thing of which you complain, as that fire and crucible which have preserved the written testimony from any considerable corruptions. This is a subject on which volumes might be written to the instruction and edification of the disciples of Jesus.

The queries which you state concerning a revelation's being made in one age and not in another, in one nation and not in another, in one language, and not in another, if a special revelation were necessary, &c. are not considered as very weighty objections to the doctrine of the scriptures. I believe you will allow that our species of being commenced on this earth in a different way than that by which it has been continued. But why should the Creator, create a man and a woman at one time, and not at all times when he sees fit to multiply his rational creatures? It is not only evident that God saw that the laws of procreation were sufficient to perpetuate man, and to multiply his rational offspring, but it is likewise apparent that the connexions, relations, and harmonies of society are principally built on this law. So I humbly conceive, that the continuance and propagation of a divine revelation are even as well secured by the means which have been employed for that purpose, as if the Almighty had in every age, and in every country made such a revelation, and moreover, it is likewise apparent, that the mental labours necessary in obtaining a knowledge of these divine things greatly contribute to their enjoyment, and render the christian fellowship, faith and hope peculiarly interesting and edifying. Here again I can only suggest a subject on which voluminous writings might be profitable.

You seem to entertain an idea that the historical part of the bible can be of no importance to you, as it has no connexion with your present or future happiness. You instance the particulars of Daniel's being cast into the den of lions, and Jonah's being swallowed by the fish, &c. As these are circumstances in the history of that nation which continues a comment on, and an evidence of prophesy, they are too interesting to be dispensed with. If you could produce the decree of a powerful monarch, sent into all parts of his dominions, which was occasioned by "Remus and Romulus' being nursed by a she wolf," the case would bear some marks of a parallel. Profane authors advert to such events as sufficient support of any fact which they endeavor to maintain.

I come now to your main object. Speaking in regard to the credibility of what is written by profane authors, and of that which is recorded in the scriptures, you ask--"Must not our own reason finally determine for ourselves whether or not either be true?" To this I reply in the affirmative; but then reason must have its means and its evidences. For instance, I read of the death and resurrection of the man Christ Jesus, I consider this vastly important event as it stands in connexion with the evidences which support it, and reason is the _eye_ with which I examine these evidences, and when reason is constrained to say all these circumstances could never have existed unless the fact were true, it is then I am a believer in Jesus. But if I must consider the resurrection disconnected from the evidence, reason has nothing to do with it. Please to accept these hasty remarks, not as an answer, but as suggestions which may lead to one, and as a testimony of my respect and esteem.

Yours, &c. H. BALLOU.

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EXTRACTS No. II.

"A revelation from God, let it be made in any language whatever, I am very ready to admit, must be considered of sufficient importance, not only to justify all reasonable pains to preserve it, but also to hand it down in its original purity to posterity. We owe it, not only in gratitude to the _giver_, but we owe it in justice to _future generations_, who would have just occasion to reproach us, if they could know that so valuable a treasure was put into our hands, which might have been handed down to them, and that we suffered it to perish through what must be termed by them, a _criminal neglect_.

"You will perceive, therefore, that I had no particular allusion to a revelation from God, when I spoke of translating the most valuable of ancient writings into English. No one will pretend that such translations could not be made sufficiently accurate to answer all the purposes, either of history or of the useful arts. It is admitted that the case is quite different, if there be a mystery in these writings, the truth of which depends on literary criticism, or grammatical exactness; but if these writings are nothing more than the bare opinions and discoveries of _men_, and of men too, as liable to error as ourselves, and if no one was to view them in a different light, I apprehend there would be all the confidence placed in a translation, that could with propriety be placed in the original itself. For, after all, we should try the facts by other corroborating testimony; and as to the opinions, we should judge of them only by the reasonableness and fitness of things. Although I have heard it objected to the translation of _Seneca's Morals_, that much of the beauty of the style is lost in the translation, yet I never heard it pretended but that the ideas are sufficiently clear; but the case would have been quite different if mankind had ever been taught to believe that their final and eternal salvation depended in the least degree on an exact observance of those moral principles. And I very much question whether there ever has been a translation of the bible, or even of any other work, in which the most important facts were not sufficiently apparent. If the fact can be supposed otherwise, it must be admitted that, comparatively speaking, but very few people at the present day are benefited by a revelation from God. For the great mass of mankind have to receive the bible altogether on the credit of others. And who are their guides in this case? Answer, Translators and Commentators! And as these men made no pretentions to inspiration, unless the translation is _substantially_ correct, as to matters of fact, how are the common people benefited by a revelation from God!"

[Having adverted to the previous studies in the dead languages, which are required before an admittance can be obtained in our common colleges, the objector proceeds.]

"But I am off from my main subject. I will now endeavour to call up all my mental faculties, seriously to attend to a revelation from God. The idea suggested in these words is beyond all expression awfully sublime. Yea, not even the bursting of _Vesuvius_, not the _aurora-borealis_, not the forked _lightning_, not the tremendous _earthquake_, no, nor yet the greatest _phenomenon in nature_, of which the human mind can conceive, can afford such ideas of the truly sublime, as the _truth_, if it could be realized, of the above proposition. Let me not hastily reject without serious reflection, that, which of all truths, must be the most important. O help me, my dear friend, help me also, O thou who art the only source of truth, thoroughly to investigate this momentous subject! But let me not be deceived. Let me not receive for truth, that which cannot be made sufficiently clear to my understanding. There can be no more harm in _doubting_, than in _believing_, where the evidence is not clear. All that which appertains to eternal truth will remain, whether I now see it or not; and that which does not appertain to it will never be realized, although I may now be made to believe it. There can be no harm, therefore, in investigating this subject in the same way and on the same principles, as I would investigate all subjects. Although I cannot expect to offer any thing very new, yet I am disposed to examine the subject for myself, and that too, in my own way. I shall quote no authors, for I have not read but few on this subject which meet my approbation, and even them are not now by me. My own understanding is the only author to which I shall appeal. If that can be cleared of the difficulties which have fallen in its way, I am willing, yea I wish, still to believe in divine revelation.

"Here let me close my preamble, which is already made too lengthy, and come immediately to discourse 'ON DIVINE REVELATION.'

"In order to know the truth or falsity of any proposition, we must in the first place understand the terms by which the proposition is made; for without such previous knowledge, we cannot know what is meant either to be affirmed or denied. By _divine revelation_, I understand 'a communication of sacred truth,' made directly from God to man. In order for any man to know that a revelation has been made to him from God, it must be made in such a way, that neither his perception, nor his judgment or understanding, can possibly be mistaken. For, as man by his reason alone, never could have foreseen that a revelation would be made, therefore, unless it should have been made in such a way that he could not have been deceived, a rational man would be more likely to conclude that he was deceived, than that, which to him would seem more unlikely, should be true. It seems, therefore, that a revelation from God to all our conceptions of the fact, must be considered, if existing at all, as something supernatural; otherwise it could be nothing more than discovery, or a fortuitous event. Hence a revelation from God, however true, and however clear, to the person or persons to whom it was first communicated, must lose its evidence, in some degree, when it comes to be communicated by him or them to others; for, being communicated to others, although it is still revelation, yet not being received immediately from God, it cannot be accompanied with the same evidence which it was in the first place; therefore, to say the most of it, it is nothing more than the _history_ of a revelation. It is made no less true than it was before; but its truth now rests upon very different testimony.

"The principles in nature all existed, before they were discovered by man. Their being discovered, neither changed their nature, nor made them any more true. What consternation a total eclipse of the sun, or of the moon must have produced, before their cause was known? They are now viewed, especially that of the latter, among the common occurrences of nature. Yea, many of the operations of nature, which are now perfectly understood by chemists, could they be viewed by the common people, who know not their causes, they would be inclined to believe they were supernatural. At least, it would not be difficult to make them believe so, especially when this knowledge was confined to a few, and those few were so disposed. These remarks are not designed to do away the force of any arguments which may be founded on miracles; for this is no proof that miracles may not exist; but then, how is a miracle a revelation of any thing more than what is contained in the miracle itself? This is what I cannot see, but I shall have occasion to say more on this subject hereafter. It will be needless for me to object to the inferences drawn from miracles until a miracle is proven.

"If a man absolutely knows something of which I am ignorant, and informs me of it, it makes no difference to me how he come by his knowledge--it is revelation to me. It may not be divine revelation; but supposing it is, or is not, in either case, how am I to believe? Is it any thing that will admit of mathematical demonstration? If so, I shall take up with nothing short of being convinced in this way. Is it any thing which he has discovered? If so, he must give me evidence of such a discovery. Is it something to which he was an eye witness? Then the truth to me, depends for the present, entirely on his credibility. I must be convinced in the first place that he was not deceived himself, and secondly, that he has no motive in deceiving me. And evidence equally conclusive must accompany the truth of divine revelation, or it ought not, nay more, it cannot, rationally be believed. But supposing that I am convinced of the truth, and therefore believe; and I relate the same to a third person; is it equally revelation to him as it was to me? Yes, it may be so considered, in one sense, at least, for it informs him of something of which he was before ignorant, as much so as it did me, but then the truth of the fact does not rest with him on equal testimony, and therefore he is more excusable if he does not believe. If, however, he can believe all that I believe, and in addition to that, believe also in _me_, then, and not till then, he will become a believer in the same truth. But if he even suspects my veracity, it weakens in his mind, all the other testimony; and though he may still believe in the main proposition, yet he believes with less strength of evidence.

"Here a very important question arises in my mind. Is divine revelation something that rests entirely on matters of _fact_; or is the most essential part, which concerns us to know, a mere matter of _opinion_? On a few moments of reflection, however, it appears that this can hardly admit of a question. For all that relates to a future, and an eternal state, must be a mere matter of opinion only; and the facts recorded in the scriptures are supposed to corroborate and substantiate those opinions. Now, as they respect matters of fact, I believe the scriptures are substantially the same in all versions, and in all languages into which they have been translated. And if so, there is no need of learning the original languages in order to become acquainted with the matters of fact recorded in the bible. We never should have seen, nor even heard, of so much controversy and biblical criticism, if the disputes had been wholly relative to matters of fact. No, all the various readings, different translations, and interpolations, have little or nothing to do with a dispute of this kind. But if the facts can he disputed, they must be disputed upon other grounds than that of biblical criticism.

"Take, for instance, the 'death and resurrection of the man Christ Jesus,' which you have mentioned; can any one suppose that there ever was, or ever will be, a translation which makes any thing more or less in favour of this fact? This is not pretended. And if not, how does a knowledge of the Greek language help me to believe this fact?

"This brings me again to my main subject; and now two very important questions arise in my mind.

"1. In relation to the facts, as stated, respecting the life, death, and resurrection of the 'man Christ Jesus;' are they positively and absolutely true?

"2. Admitting the truth of the facts, does it necessarily follow, or is there any thing which renders it certain, that, in regard to other things, neither he, nor the apostles, so called, could be mistaken? And that, in all their writings, they have stated nothing which is incorrect? That is, what certain evidence have we that the writers of the books, which being compiled, are called the New Testament, were all honest men? That they could not have been mistaken relative to the things which they have written? And that in every instance, they have written the truth?

"Respecting the first proposition, I have already observed that the truth of it does not, neither can it, depend on biblical criticism. They are either facts, which are substantially correct, or they are fabrications. The circumstantial differences between the original copies themselves, as recorded by the four Evangelists, are much greater than what can be found in all the different versions, translations, &c. that have been collated. Hence no argument can be brought against the truth of those facts from either a real or supposed difference between the translation, and their respective originals. For even if not only the original copies, but the language also in which they were originally written, should be entirely lost, it would not militate, as I can see, against the truth of the facts therein recorded.

"The translation acknowledges and affirms itself to be a _translation_ out of the 'original Greek,' together with former translations compared, &c. Now permit me to ask, is not this as good evidence of the existence of the _original Greek_, as the original Greek is of the _facts_ intended to be proved thereby? I should consider the translation of any work, which was generally known at the time of its translation, better evidence of the existence of such a work, though the original should be entirely lost, than the work itself, even in the original, could be of the existence of facts, which, if they existed at all, were known at first to but very few.

"You have suggested, sir, that if the original of the scriptures were entirely lost, future ages would not know but they had been 'imposed upon.' I think, however, you will not insist on this point, lest you should destroy an argument, which, hereafter, you may very much need. I recall my words. For this seems to imply that we are already engaged in a controversy; whereas, I trust we are both candidly in search of truth. I suspect, however, there is too much truth in your suggestion; but then its truth, instead of relieving, only increases my difficulty.

"Every one must know that when the translation of the scriptures was first made, the original not only existed, but it must have been known to others, beside the translators, who were able to detect the _fraud_, if there had been any, as to substantial matter of fact. And, in a work of so great importance, this certainly would have been the case. Hence you will at once perceive, that when the copies were few in number, and before the art of printing was discovered, fabrications and interpolations might find their way into the original scriptures with much greater facility, than could any considerable variations by an intentionally erroneous translation; especially after the work become generally known, and so highly valued, as to require a translation of it.

"As you admit that 'reason is the _eye_ by which we are to examine the evidences' which stand in support of the 'resurrection of the man Christ Jesus,' and of course, as I presume, by which we are to examine the evidences in support of all other subjects, I shall say no more upon this part of the subject until I hear your reasons for believing in the resurrection of Jesus; for this fact, as I conceive, must be considered the main hinge on which the whole Christian system rests, if it can be supported by any fact, on which it will finally turn.

2. "But after all, my greatest difficulty is with my second proposition. To relate facts substantially correct, which persons have either seen or heard, requires no degree of uncommon skill, or uncommon honesty; but to state things which will absolutely take place, which are yet future, requires something more than common skill; and to state things correctly, which will take place in eternity, must, as I conceive, require nothing short of _divine wisdom_. That the evangelists have stated nothing more than what is _substantially_ correct, as it respects matters of fact, will be admitted by all: for every one knows there is a _circumstantial_ difference in their writings, both as it respects the order of time, and in several instances, as it respects matters of fact.

"If the account given us of Jesus be even substantially correct, I think there can be no reasonable doubt but that he was capable of telling his disciples every thing which it concerns us to know relative to a future state of existence.--But I have been often struck with astonishment, when reflecting on the subject, that Jesus said so little in regard to a future state! Notwithstanding he was long with his disciples, as we are told after his resurrection, and did eat and drink with them; yet, how silent he was upon the subject of eternity, and of a future and spiritual world! At the only time when we should rationally suppose that he could be a competent witness in the case, admitting his death and resurrection true, is the time when he is entirely silent as to the final and eternal state of man! Should we admit therefore that Jesus at this time was capable of declaring eternal truths, yet, as he testified nothing on the subject, nothing relative to the subject can be proved from his testimony.

"It may be said that Christ had plainly taught his disciples respecting this subject, previous to his death, and therefore it was not necessary for him to say any thing more respecting it. But a confirmation of what he had before taught, if it had been repeated after his resurrection, would have added great weight to his former testimony. We need not dwell however, upon these niceties, as the main question is not involved in them. Yet I am inclined to think that if all the words of Christ, which have been handed down to us, should be closely examined, they would be found to be much more silent on the subject of a future state than many have supposed. But the main question is, are we certain that he could not have been mistaken in the things whereof he affirmed? This question may be thought _blasphemous_: but I cannot see wherein the blasphemy consists; for I cannot help making the inquiry, in my own understanding, and as my object is to gain instruction, I put the inquiry on paper. You may say that Jesus was endowed with _divine wisdom_, and therefore could not err. That divine wisdom cannot err, I admit, but does divine wisdom secure man at all times, and under all circumstances, from mistake? If the man Christ Jesus was in fact _man_ (and that he was man, even Trinitarians admit) notwithstanding he was endowed with divine wisdom, why might he not without any dishonour to the Deity, be sometimes left to exercise only the wisdom of _man_? And to say that the wisdom of man cannot err, would be saying contrary to daily experience. I have not contended that Jesus ever erred; but I contend that he must have been liable to error, or else he was not man. And the supposition that he did not err, not even in thought or opinion, ought not to be admitted without the most conclusive testimony.

"But whatever may be the conclusion on this subject, as it respects the 'man Christ Jesus--a man approved of God,' yet what shall we say concerning the apostles? Were they also absolutely secured from error? These men, according to the confession of one of them at least, not only had been, but still were--_sinners_. Paul, notwithstanding his apostleship, still acknowledges the plague of his own heart 'I am carnal, sold under sin--when I would do good, evil is present with me--O wretched man that I am!' &c. Are such men absolutely proof against even the error of opinion? It appears to me there are too many incidents of imperfection recorded in the lives of the apostles to admit all this. Peter once rebuked his master, at another time denied him. He once objected to the voice of the spirit, and was afterwards accused by his brethren for obeying it. Paul accused Peter to his face, and also disagreed with Barnabas. And other circumstances might be named, proving them to be destitute of intuitive knowledge. Considering, therefore, all these things, how do we know but that in their zeal to do good, (for I do not consider the apostles bad men; neither do I think any the worse of Paul for either acknowledging his own faults, or detecting the dissimulation of Peter,) I say therefore, in their zeal to do good, how do we know but that they stated things relative to another world, which were only inferences, which, as they supposed, were justly drawn from what they had either seen or heard, or else what their own fruitful imagination dictated? If we are at liberty to view the apostles in this light, however highly their opinions are to be valued and respected, yet I see no occasion of investigating their writings with the eye of biblical or grammatical criticism; for after all, they are but the opinions of men like ourselves.

"But if it can be demonstrated that the opinions of the writers of the New Testament can be relied on, as containing eternal truth, without any mixture of error, then it is very important for us to know the meaning of all the words they used, not only as it respects their general import, but also the exact and particular sense in which they used them. This however cannot be done without a thorough acquaintance, not only with the Greek, but also with the Hebrew language, for they used many Hebraisms, which, with a knowledge of the Greek only, we should not be likely fully to comprehend.

"Yours, &c.

A. KNEELAND."

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