Chapter V: Letter IV

_Much esteemed friend_,--Your fourth number is hereby acknowledged; and though occasions for finding fault are in some measure extenuated, it still appears that you have lost the real connexion of your arguments, and have made the subject of the languages one of your main subjects, when judging from your first number, it was no more than a vestibule to the grand edifice which it was in your mind to examine.

However, you having paid more than half, we will not stand about the fraction, as long as we have a profitable object in view. You call up what you call the subject. I suppose the main subject. This you state as follows: "In regard to a revelation from God, the three propositions which you have stated answer my mind well enough, as far as they go; to which however, I would wish to add a fourth, and ask; admitting the three first particulars true.--4th. Is it reasonable to suppose, that the apostles had any other means of forming their opinions, relative to a future state, than what passed before their eyes? viz. the miracles of Christ, the circumstance attending his death, his resurrection, and the miracles wrought by themselves in his name?" I wish, in this place, to show you that your added proposition possesses no power relative to our argument which is not comprehended in the last of the three which I stated. For if it be allowed, as you propose, that my propositions are true, then you consent to the validity of the apostles' testimony respecting a future state, which granted, it makes no difference in what way the apostles come to the knowledge of futurity. When a thing is known, it is known. The means by which it is known add nothing to either side of the argument. If you allow that my argument on this subject is correct, as it seems you do, then you acknowledge that God would not endow men with the power to heal the sick and raise the dead, whose testimony concerning a future state could be justly doubted. I will not be too positive that I rightly apprehend your meaning on this subject, but as you propose to allow my three propositions, and as you make no attempt to do away my reasoning, especially on my last, I think I should not understand you according to your own proposal in any other way.

The methaphor which you use to help you away from my argument respecting the _importance_ of a revelation from God, does not appear fully adequate to the purpose for which you use it. It might not be a reasonable, a necessary disposition of property for the proposed benefactor, to give you a large estate; it might be, in the eye of reason a very improper donation, and one which would deprive legitimate heirs of what they had a right to expect from a father towards whom they had always acted with filial obedience.--But if you will make the case a parallel, and suppose you are an heir, a lawful child, and your father has a large estate to dispose of, then you will see that it is right and just, and no more than what you have reason to expect; that it is necessary, and that this necessity is the importance of the subject, you will at once see that this importance is a reason, yea an evidence that you have a right to expect it. I called on you to prove that no revelation was needed; I acknowledged that if none was necessary, a being of infinite wisdom would make none. You venture to say, that the "only evidence that reason can have of the necessity of divine revelation is its truth." It is believed, sir, that this hypothesis involves too much. It is saying that reason can discern the necessity of nothing until it obtains it, whereas the truth is evidently the other side of the assertion. We are frequently experiencing the necessity of things which we have not already attained, and by this want we are incited to use the means by which we finally obtain them.--"Ask, and ye shall receive, seek, and ye shall find, knock, and it shall be opened unto you," &c. It is believed, and no doubt it may be argued with success, that the moral and religious state of man really required a divine revelation. Never did the parched ground, the withering plant, the thirsty herds need the showers from heaven, more than man, that WORD of life which descended as the rain and distilled as the dew, when the gospel was published by a cloud of faithful witnesses, called of God for that purpose.

After acknowledging that your words admit of the construction which I gave them respecting the apostles stating no more than what was substantially true, you inform me that you meant something very different; then, sir, it seems you must mean that they stated that which is not true. And if so, why do you not prove wherein they testified falsely, which would at once cast their bands from us? By this mean you would show that their testimony is deserving of no credit.

On the subjects of your doubts, you recollected my request, that you bring forward your reasons, &c. But in room of doing this you inform me that your doubts are _involuntary_. But I wish to know if this renders it improper for you to state your reasons for doubting? You further inform me that your doubts do not amount to a confirmed unbelief. Again, I would ask if it be necessary for you to wait until you are a confirmed unbeliever before you state your reasons for doubting the truth of the testimony which Christians call divine?

By these questions you will perceive that I am waiting for you, and if I am not able to meet your arguments, I am ready on making the discovery, to acknowledge your reasoning too strong for my weak powers to manage.

Yours, &c.

H. BALLOU.

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EXTRACTS No. V.

[After acknowledging the receipt of _Letters_ Nos. 3 and 4, and remarking on several parts of the reply to _Extracts_ No. 2, making some concessions, &c. as he found it necessary, the _objector_ proceeds as follows.]

"But, your final conclusion, after all, comes so near what I conceive to be the truth, that, were you as correct in every thing as you appear to be in this, I should hardly think it expedient to pursue this controversy any further. "The Christian is enabled," you say, "to hope for existence with God in an eternal state, and this is as much as our present welfare requires." Most excellent! To this proposition I cherfully assent. Yea, I would consent even to pruning it a little, which no doubt would spoil it in your view. Instead of 'this is as much as,' read, 'even this is more than,' and your proposition would stand exactly right. Again, you say,

"'I have many reasons for not believing in the general sentiment that supposes the revelation contained in the scriptures was designed to prepare men in this world for happiness in another, and that a want of a correct knowledge of this revelation here, would subject the ignorant to inconvenience in a future state. Such a sentiment is an impeachment of the wisdom and goodness of God.'

"Here again, should I admit a divine revelation, I most heartily agree with you; and also with the reasoning which follows under this proposition. For it is more consistent with reason and good sense to believe (like the fool) in the existence of no God, than to believe in a God who is either partial or cruel! If such were the general sentiment of mankind, the evils resulting from it, in my humble opinion, would not be worse than the evils which have resulted from the belief in a God of the character just mentioned. One who, according to the sentiment, has let millions, even millions of millions, of his rational creatures die ignorant of a divine revelation, when he knew without the knowledge of, and belief in, such a revelation, they must sink down into eternal ruin and misery! And, so far as a revelation respects the damned, as though it was designed to aggravate and increase their misery by increasing their sensibility, he makes known his will, by special revelation, to a few, accompanied with the gift of his holy spirit, through the divine efficacy of which, a selected and chosen number will be admitted to bliss and glory, to the utter and eternal exclusion of the millions above mentioned!!!

"If such a sentiment does not impeach the divine character, not only of partiality, but of _cruelty_, I know of nothing that could. But, Sir,

"Are you not aware that your sentiment, as above stated, which has met my approbation, on the supposition that divine revelation can be maintained, is as much opposed to the general sentiment of Christianity, as it respects this particular, as any thing which I have written or probably shall write on this subject? I presume you are aware of all this, and I hope you are prepared for its consequences. You have more to apprehend, however, from this general sentiment, than I have. You have levelled an arrow at the very seat of life of what is considered _orthodoxy_ in divinity, it is impossible but that the wound should be severly felt. For you are not insensible sir, that it is not only the general, but almost the universal sentiment of orthodoxy, from _his holiness the Pope_ down to the smallest child who has been taught to lisp the christian name, that the revelation of the gospel of Jesus Christ was designed to prepare mankind in this world for heaven and happiness in another. Hence it has been believed that those who have died ignorant of the gospel, and being at the same time born of ignorant or unbelieving parents, must be lost forever. But those who hear and reject the gospel must be still more wretched in another world. With this sentiment, however, it seems you have no more fellowship than I. Therefore, my brother, it may be well for both, but more especially for you, that the days of rigorous persecution are over. For notwithstanding orthodoxy will consider us both equally opposed to christianity at heart, yet, of the two, you will be considered the most dangerous character. I shall be considered the _open_, but you the _secret enemy_; who, under the garb of professed friendship, are doing your utmost to sap the very foundation of the christian's hope! And you will not be considered any the less dangerous for your writings, being approved in any sense, by one who has the audacity, as they will term it, to doubt of the truth, of divine revelation! Instead of discovered impious blasphemy in the honest inquiry of your friend as it will be supposed you ought to have done, and instead of threatening him with endless burnings therefor;--or for not being disposed to receive, even truth, without cautious and thorough examination, you have painted christianity in such beautiful colours that infidelity itself finds but little cause to oppose it. Should these letters therefore ever come before the public you must be prepared for the gathering storm. For should you be able to reconcile revelation with the above proposition, if reason be not fully convinced of its truth, it will find nothing to object to the principles it inculcates. However, as this is not the avowed sentiment of christians, generally speaking, you must permit me to proceed.

"As it respects biblical criticism, notwithstanding all I have written on the subject, if the object is what you have proposed, 'to get the understanding of the sacred text,' I have no objection to it, but, for those who have time and inclination, think it laudible. Your caution, likewise, that in our zeal to cleanse we 'take care and not destroy,' is no doubt reasonable, and I trust duly appreciated. Your method also for curing or removing unbelief is happily chosen, and is what I am now attempting, which, with your assistance, I hope to make a proper, if not a successful application.

"Although the 'validity of the evidences' of revelation was not intended to have been granted, as I have informed you in my fourth number, yet I shall not press you to argue the points till I have given you the reasons for my doubts; for these being removed, nothing more will be necessary.

"Yours &c.

A. KNEELAND."

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EXTRACTS No. VI.

[Here twelve pages or more of the objector's manuscript are omitted, as the nature of his arguments will pretty fully appear in the reply; and as he has been obliged to rescind the ground he had taken, it is not expedient to publish his remarks. That the reader may see a little of the manner, however, in which he has given up his part of the argument, the following is inserted.]

"Speaking however on the evidences of revelation, you have stated some things worthy of serious consideration; which if correct, and I cannot say but they are, give me considerable satisfaction; and are very grateful to my feelings. 'It' (faith) say you 'does not require all _possibility_ to be taken into the account: this would seem to go beyond the limits of faith and enter into the regions of certainty.'

"According to this doctrine, I may yet, perhaps, be considered a believer in divine revelation, and of course in Christianity. If 'all possibility' is not required, then certainly some _doubts_, some _possibility_ of failure, may be admited without destroying the consistency of the Christian faith.

"Here as it respects the argument, you have seemingly forclosed every thing which I shall say by way of objection; at least, you have anticipated all my arguments on this subject. For evidences and circumstances calculated to raise _doubts_ in the mind; and shewing the _possibility_ of uncertainty, are all the arguments which I have expected to produce in this case. But it may not be improper to inquire how much uncertainty, or _possibility_ of uncertainty, may I admit in my calculation without destroying the Christian faith? That there are evidences in favor of divine revelation, and, which would support it, if there were nothing to counterbalance their testimony, is a proposition which I admit, and which I think cannot be disputed. Hence I conceive it must be admitted that there is a _possibility_, at least, of its being true.--But after all, if the weight of evidence in the mind of any one should preponderate against it, I doubt whether such an one could consistently be called a believer in divine revelation.

"You have suggested that in disproving the religion of Jesus Christ, I should disprove all religion; as there can be no choice between this and any other; for if this can be proved false all may be proved false &c. or words to that effect. In this I hardly know how to understand you. So far as the religion of Christ consists in 'feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, and keeping himself unspotted from the world,' I admit, that 'in disproving the religion of Christ,' I should 'disprove all religion:' that is to say, in other words, so far as the religion of Christ is not founded on revelation, but on the relation and dependence existing between man and man, to disprove it would disprove all religion: but if the religion of Jesus Christ consists purely and exclusively in believing in a future state of existence, then disproving it would not disprove all religion. A man may be what the poet calls 'the noblest work of God' i.e. 'an honest man,' and attend to all the duties embraced in that religion which St. James calls 'pure and undefiled before God and the father,' and yet have no _opinion_, that is, no settled opinion, in regard to a future state. If a man has religion enough to be a good husband, a good neighbor, a good citizen, and can rationably enjoy all the blessings which appertain to this life, of what consequence is it to him, or to any one else, what he believes in regard to a future state? This is a question worthy of serious consideration.

"The denial of revelation, much less to doubt its truth, does not render it necessary that I should do what you have proposed; neither is it my disposition to destroy if I could the peace even of an individual. Hence, I have no wish to 'demonstrate that there is no sun in a cloudy day;' but only to prove that clouds and darkness are as necessary to the well being of man as clear sunshine. Neither would I be the bearer of the 'joyless tidings that there is no clear sky in the heavens;' but only to query whether our portion of 'clear sky' is not that which reflects upon the earth; and that only during the short period of our lives? Who has a right to complain, if our blessings are circumscribed to our sphere of action? Must we enjoy nothing, because more is not allotted to our share? It is very probable there may be millions of other suns, enlightening other worlds, and systems of worlds, giving life, light and warmth to rational beings like ourselves, exceeding all imagination in number; and yet, have little of the blessings of those heavenly luminaries that falls to our enjoyment! They merly form a beautiful canopy over our heads. It is true, their greatest use to us may be that of which we are mostly ignorant; in balancing systems &c. but yet we must have some knowledge of those benefits, before me can feel grateful for them. Dost thou wish to visit them? Dost thou desire to know more concerning them than thou canst know in this state? Calm and deliberate reason would say unto the, 'Be content, O vain man! with thine own lot, and not try to soar above thy proper station!'

"The above is not designed as a reflection; it is only what I take to myself.

"You have proposed what I conceive you think is the only alternative to which I must flee, when I give up the truth of divine revelation. But may I not stop to inquire whether there is not some medium between the two extremes which you have mentioned? Must I believe that there was no such man as Jesus, or if there were, that he was an impostor; or else believe all that is stated concerning him? Must I also believe the same of the apostles or else believe them impeccable? May not even good men be honestly deceived? and being deceived, honestly lead others into an error?--That honest men do not bear 'testimony to falshood,' I admit; neither could such a principle be justified even under a 'pretence of doing good;' yet I will not undertake to say that no such _pious frauds_ have ever been practiced in the world, and even among professed christians; and how soon it was practiced after the days of the apostles, and whether or not by some even in their day, would be very difficult now to determine. Neither is it necessary I should say any thing more upon the subject, as you admit this principle 'has been practised upon by a wicked priesthood for ages!'

"In remarking on my fourth proposition, which I added to the _three_ which you had proposed, you say, 'I will not be too positive that I rightly apprehend your meaning on this subject, but as you propose to allow my three propositions, and as you make no attempt to do away my reasoning, especially on my last,' &c. Here permit me to observe, I am well persuaded you did not fully understand me, whatever you did yourself, on this subject. You will perceive, sir, both by my fourth number, and also by my fifth, that my answer to your _three propositions_ was not completed. Probably if you had waited for the whole of my answer you would have understood me much better, and also would have seen the use and propriety of my fourth proposition.

"I think, as you will perceive by my fifth number that even honest men may be mistaken. And if so, it is very important to know whether the apostles judged only from outward circumstances, or whether they had some internal evidence, called _inspiration_, by which they always knew the truth of the things whereof they affirmed. This was the object of my fourth proposition.

"That you did not fully understand me appears by your saying, 'If it be allowed that my propositions are true, then you _consent_ to the validity of the apostles' testimony respecting a future state.' If this could be allowed, it might then be admitted, that in this argument it makes no difference how the apostles come by their 'knowledge of futurity.'--But I did not know, neither do I now perceive, that my admitting the apostles to be honest men makes it necessary also to admit the validity of their 'testimony respecting a future state;' unless it can be shown that honest men are never mistaken respecting the things whereof they affirm. I admit the '_honesty_' of my good friend, in the above quoted proposition; but I can hardly be willing, purely on this account, to '_consent_' to its truth.

"As it respects an inheritance given in a WILL, &c. I have some doubts whether reason always carries things as far as you would wish to carry this metaphor to make it a parallel. Reason sometimes moves in a small circle; and that too without being unreasonable. If the benefit is said to have been absolutely made, and reason is informed of the fact, it has a right to take it for granted, that the donor had the property to give, and that it is not given to the injury of any one else. But yet he consults his own interest, and that only, when he says, 'this is very important to me, if true, yet I doubt, yea I have reasons for not believing it true.' Would any one say that such a man talketh unreasonably?

"You have called on me to prove 'that no revelation was needed;' and have acknowledged, 'that if none was necessary, a being of infinite wisdom would make none.' And at the same time you have argued very pathetically indeed to prove the necessity of a revelation; that is, if that can be called argument which grows out of a man's own feelings: A man, however, of different feelings might bring forward arguments equally energetic, and perhaps equally conclusive, but diametrically opposite.

"I know not what evidence you wish, or what evidence would be accepted, to prove that a revelation is not necessary. Even if such were the fact, it appears to me to be hardly susceptible of proof. It may be no more difficult, however, than it is to prove that a revelation is true. I presume that nothing short of a _revelation_ would convince you that a _revelation_ is not necessary! For who but God can know what either is, or is not necessary for God to make known?

"But if arguments drawn from our feelings are admissible, hear, for once, the voice of simple nature, proclaiming in her simplicity by every thing which exists either in or around you, that a revelation is neither necessary nor useful. That every thing which can be enjoyed in life can be enjoyed equally as well, and often better, without either its knowledge or belief. That every duty, either to God or man, can be performed as well, and with the same beneficial effect. And finally that man may be brought, without either the aid, knowledge, or belief of revelation, not only to be reconciled to his conditions and station in life, but also to curtail all his _anxious_ desires to which he not only _believes_ but _knows_ there is a natural possibility of obtaining.

"If one could be brought who would solemnly testify to the truth of the above paragraph, would you believe his testimony? I presume not. But why not? Will you say it is impossible it should be true? No one can know this for a certainty, except those whose misfortune it is, if it be a misfortune not to believe in a future state of existence. If such there are, however, and yet their lives are exactly correct, their examples in society equally good, and their enjoyments apparently equally as great as other men, why should you doubt their testimony? Would you say they were _bad men_?--could you say they were _dishonest men_?--and if _honest_, according to your argument, why not believe them? I can see no inducement that any one could have to deny a revelation, if he believes it true; but I can see a very great inducement for mankind to maintain the reality of a revelation, although at the same time they may doubt its truth.

"If you doubt whether the human mind can be brought to such a state as has been mentioned above, it is only for the want of proper evidence; the fact, however, is susceptible of proof. Yea, it can be more than proved; _the happy unbeliever_ in idle tales, but believing in eternal principles, knows it for a certainty. I do not mean that he knows for a certainty, that there is no revelation, but he knows for a certainty that a belief in revelation is not absolutely necessary to a happy life. Now, if such characters exists, will you receive their own testimony in support of the above fact? If not, it will be of no use to produce them.

"In order to make a proper estimation of virtue, we should take into consideration the motives and inducements a person has to be virtuous. The virtue of some men seems to be predicated on the following principles; on the consideration that they are going to heaven and happiness in another world, while others, whom they conceive not so good as themselves are going to hell, a place of never ending torments. On this ground they can be very _pious_ also, and do a great deal for religion. At the same time they will tell you, as many have, if they believed all were to be alike happy in another world, they would then stick at no crimes to obtain their object, but would indulge themselves in all manner of gratifications, &c. Such virtue, however, I conclude does not stand very high in your estimation. No; but you would be virtuous on a more noble scale; so long as you can believe that you shall have an eternal existence with God, in a happy conscious identity, you are willing every body else should enjoy the same blessing; on supposition that this is true, or as you can believe it, you are for doing all the good in your power, and at the same time taking all the comfort you can in doing it. You are trying to make every one believe what you believe, that they may enjoy what you enjoy. But the moment this faith, and this hope of yours is gone, your virtue is gone with it; you can now do nothing, and of course enjoy nothing!

"Now compare this virtue with the virtue of one whom the christian world would call an infidel! One whose faith, and of course, hope, does not extend beyond what he knows has been the lot of some, and, as far as circumstances will admit, may be his own; and yet he is always faithful in the discharge of whatever appears to be his duty, always enjoys life, whether in prosperity or adversity, and is always, so far as it respects circumstances over which he has no control, reconciled and contented with his lot. He knows his life is uncertain, and although he has no real faith or well grounded hope beyond the present state of existence, yet the thought gives him neither anxiety nor concern. His only object is to do good; to enjoy life while it lasts, to cultivate and improve human nature for the benefit of posterity; to bear the evils and misfortunes of life with fortitude, and to be unfeignedly thankful for all the happiness of which he is made susceptible. Therefore whether his life be for a day, or for eternity, it matters not, because, for the present, it is all the same to him: his duties are the same, and his enjoyments are the same. O how happy! How inexpressibly happy, is such a state as this!

"While others are feasting their fruitful imaginations with the idle and visionary dreams of fanaticism; with a kind of chimerical heaven of which they know _nothing_, as to its certainty: this man is in heaven already: dwelling in love, he 'dwelleth in God, and God in him.'

"Do you not wish, my brother, that you could find such a character among Christians? But Christianity does not afford such a character, in _full_, nor is it possible that it ever should. Such a character, however, there may be, and when the world, or any considerable part of them can receive his testimony, he may make his appearance.

"You seem to think it may be successfully argued 'that the moral and religious state of man really required a divine revelation.' This argument, if I understand you, grows out of the ardent desires of man; which, it is admitted, would be pretty conclusive if it could be made to appear that the desires of man are never fruitless. Man, it is true, rationally desires happiness; for this is essential to his moral existence; yet, may he not, through ignorance, or from some other cause, suppose things essential to his happiness, which, in fact, are not essential, and therefore ardently desire them? But does it necessarily follow that the particular things desired in such cases are absolutely necessary? and therefore will absolutely be granted? I believe not.--And if he may be thus deceived in any one thing, why may he not be deceived in the supposed necessity of a divine revelation? It is believed that a perfect reconciliation to the present state of man; to what he is, with the prospect only of what he yet may be in this life, without either the hope or the fear of a future existence, would be infinitely better than any thing which has yet been produced by a belief in divine revelation; especially any further than a revelation is conducive to this end; and if a revelation ever was necessary, it was necessary only to reconcile man to his present state of existence. But if man can be equally reconciled without the _knowledge_, or, what amounts to the same thing, without the _belief_ of divine revelation, then the end of such a revelation is obtained.

"It seems to be expedient that I should say a few more words, 'respecting the apostles' stating no more than what was substantially true.'

"I hope, however, we shall not lose sight of the main subject in debate, by criticising on words. I say _main subject_ here, as I think there will be no occasion of saying any thing more on the subject of the _languages_ in relation to the arts and sciences.

"I am not disposed to think, sir, that you have designedly wrested the meaning of my words; nor that you are unwilling to receive my meaning when it is fully understood; and yet, having once explained on this subject, I am unable to account for your remarks.

"After my informing you that you had misconstrued me, and also stating my meaning, as I supposed, more explicitly, you have informed me that if your first construction was not my meaning, it seems that I must have meant the reverse of it, which, I must aver, is as foreign from my meaning as your first construction! For neither your former nor latter construction was in my mind when I wrote the sentence to which I allude: but a different idea from either of your constructions was in my mind, and was what I meant to state; which idea, as I conceive, is as fairly expressed by my words, and is a more just construction of them, taking into consideration the sentence which follows, than either of the ideas which you have expressed as their meaning.

"Permit me therefore to state again, that whatever might have been my opinion respecting the writings of the apostles, I did not mean to suggest, and much less to affirm in that sentence 'that they stated that which is not true!'--Neither did I mean to acknowledge in that sentence that they had stated 'no more' than what is true, at least in _substance_; but I did mean this, and this only, that admitting those things were true, all would admit that the design of the apostles was nothing _more_ than to state the truth of those things in _substance_; because all would acknowledge that they were not careful to be correct as to every _minutiae_. But as this makes nothing either for or against the main point, I wish to add no more respecting it, than simply to remark, that even if the apostles had gone on the opposite extreme of what I meant I should not think them 'deserving of _no credit_.' Supposing they had descended into _minutiae_, and related, to an exact nicety, every particular circumstance (which is exactly the reverse of what I mean to state), would they on this account have been deserving of _no credit_? I think not. Considering the time, however, which had elapsed after the facts are said to have taken place, before a history of them was given in writing, I think the evangelists are entitled to _more credit_, on the whole, than what they would have been if their testimony had borne the complexion last mentioned.

"To close this letter, which perhaps is already too long, I would here acknowledge that as I have expressed doubts in the subject of divine revelation, you have a right to hear my reasons for doubting. These I promised to give you (as I thought) at the close of my fourth number. You have informed me, verbally, that I promised to give you my _doubts_ only. If I did so, it was only a slip of the pen, to which I am too prone; it was my _reasons for doubting_, which I meant to have promised you; and in my next I shall endeavor to fulfil that promise.

"Yours, &c.

A. KNEELAND."

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