Chapter X: Part 10
This Persian missionary, Hasan-i-Sabbah by name, was born in Qum whither his father had removed from Kufa. Like his father he was a Shiʿite of the “Twelver” sect, but came under the influence of Nasir-i-Khusraw who was an active propagandist, although at the time Ismaʿilian doctrines were not making much progress in Asia. After considerable hesitation he became a proselyte of the Ismaʿilians and took the oath of allegiance to the Fatimid Khalif. In 464 he came under the notice of the overseer of the mission work in the district (_bahr_, literally, “sea”), of Isfahan, and was advised by him to make a pilgrimage to Egypt. After spending two years as assistant to the overseer of Isfahan he set out in 467 and reached Cairo in 471 where he was well received by the Chief _Daʿi_ and other leading persons, but was not allowed to have an interview with the Khalif. At the time, it appears, the court was divided into two factions over the question of the succession, the one party holding to the Khalif’s elder son Nizar, the other to a younger son named Mustali. In one place Nasir-i-Khusraw says that the Khalif told him that his elder son Nizar was to be his heir, and the succession of the older son would be in accordance with the doctrines of the sect as already proved by their adherence to Ismaʿil, the son of Jaʿfar as-Sadiq. But Badr and the chief officials were on the side of the younger son Mustali, and it was probably the knowledge that the Persian visitor was opposed to them on this question which stood in the way of a personal interview with Mustansir. After eighteen months in Egypt Hasan-i-Sabbah was forced to leave because, according to his own statement, he had provoked the suspicion of Badr. So in 472 he embarked at Alexandria. His ship was wrecked on the coast of Syria, and after much wandering he at length made his way overland to Isfahan where he arrived in 473. At once he commenced propaganda amongst the Ismaʿilians in favour of Nizar as the chosen heir to the Imamate. In this work he was successful, and in 483 he obtained possession of the castle of Alamut (“the eagle’s teaching”) which he made the headquarters of his branch of the Ismaʿilian sect. As supporters of the claims of Nizar the members of this branch were known as “Nizarites,” but later the name of “Assassins” became their commoner designation. This term represents the Arabic _Hashishi_, that is to say, user of Indian hemp or the “Faqir’s herb” (_cannabis Indica_), as this was used as a means of intoxication and exaltation to arouse the members of the sect charged with peculiarly difficult duties. In a later chapter (cf. pp. 213, etc.) we shall see that these duties, the acts which are now especially associated with the term assassin, were performed by quite subordinate members of the sect; but these members entrusted with the performance of deeds of violence and daring were prepared by being worked up into a frenzy by the use of this drug whose peculiar influences are well known in the east. From 473 to the date of Mustansir’s death in 487 these “Assassins” were occupied in preaching the claims of the prince Nizar to the Imamate, but they did not definitely separate from the Ismaʿilian body or from their allegiance to the Fatimid Khalif until, at Mustansir’s death, the elder son Nizar was formally excluded from the succession, so that our further consideration of the sect is best deferred to the next reign. A large literature exists on the history of the Assassins. The most important authority is the “Adventures of our master” (_i.e._, of Hasan-i-Sabbah), a lost work included amongst the books in the great library at Alamut and examined by ʿAta Malik Juwayni before it was burned with other heretical works, and from it he makes important citations.
The longest Khalifate of Muslim history closed with the death of Mustansir on the 18th of Dhu l-Hijja, 487 (A.D. 1094), and at once the wazir al-Afdal announced the accession of the younger son al-Mustali.
XIII
THE NINTH FATIMID KHALIF, AL-MUSTALI
(A.H. 487-495 = A.D. 1094-1101)
As soon as al-Mustansir was dead the wazir al-Afdal al-Juyush entered the palace and placed Abu l-Kasim Ahmad al-Mustali, a youth of eighteen years of age and the youngest son of the late Khalif on the throne. At the same time he sent for the other sons of Mustansir who were near at hand, Nizar the eldest son, and his brothers ʿAbdullah and Ismaʿil, bidding them come quickly. As soon as they entered the room where the wazir awaited them and saw their youngest brother enthroned they were filled with indignation, and when al-Afdal bade them do homage to Mustali as the new Khalif, Nizar burst out, “I would rather be cut in pieces than do homage to one younger than myself, and moreover I possess a document in the handwriting of my father by which he names me successor, and I shall go and bring it.” At this he went out, presumably to get the document, but as he did not return the wazir sent after him, and it was found that he had left the city. Very soon afterwards he appeared at Alexandria, supported by his brother ʿAbdullah and an emir named Ibn Massal, and there he assumed the title of Khalif with the surname of al-Mustafa li-dinillah (“the chosen for God’s religion”), and received the oath of allegiance from the Alexandrians. He promised Nasir ad-Dawla Iftikin, the Turkish governor of Alexandria, that he should be wazir. As we have already seen, there was a party ready to support Nizar even before Mustansir’s death, and his claims seemed to have fair prospects of success. No doubt we may say that the sectarian supporters of the Fatimid Imamate were with him, whilst al-Afdal headed the secularist party: but there would, no doubt, be many aggrieved with the existing administration, and even perhaps remnants of those whom al-Afdal’s father had suppressed with such severity, who were ready to throw in their lot with the opposition to the wazir’s nominee in Cairo.
In 488 al-Afdal found it necessary to take the field against Nizar and his followers, but suffered a sharp repulse in the first engagement. Encouraged by this the Nizarites laid waste the country north of Cairo. Again al-Afdal prepared his forces and marched this time to Alexandria and laid siege to it. During this siege Ibn Massal had a dream in which he seemed to be riding on horseback and al-Afdal was following him on foot. He consulted an astrologer as to the meaning of this dream, and was informed that it signified the ultimate success of al-Afdal, for those who walk the earth are those who will possess it. Ibn Massal took this very seriously and thought it prudent to leave Nizar’s party, so he departed and retired to Lukk near Barqa. This defection marked the turning point of Nizar’s career for, after losing Ibn Massal and his men, his fortunes gradually declined. Convinced that resistance could not endure for long he sent out and asked al-Afdal if he would spare his life if he submitted. Receiving a favourable answer the gates of Alexandria were opened to the wazir who took possession of the city and, after putting an end to all resistance, returned to Cairo with Nizar and ʿAbdullah. Nizar’s subsequent life is totally unknown. He was either imprisoned in absolute secrecy, or put to death: stories were told of both these ends, but nothing was ever known for certain. A certain Muhammad afterwards claimed to be Nizar’s son, and had a following in Yemen: he was brought to Cairo and crucified in 523. In all probability he was an imposter.
The suppression of Nizar and his partisans meant the triumph of al-Afdal, and during the rest of Mustali’s reign the Khalif was entirely without authority in the state, and came out only as required at public functions.
The suppression of Nizar involved a definite separation between the Fatimids of Cairo and their court on the one side and the Asiatic adherents of Nizar’s Imamate on the other, and so from 488 onwards the Assassins formed a distinct sect, as much opposed to the Fatimids and their followers as to the orthodox Muslims. The founder, Hasan-i-Sabbah, had now fully organised that sect on lines which were in general outline imitated from the traditional system of the Ismaʿilians, but differed in detail. There were grades and successive stages of initiation, and the real beliefs of the higher grades were of the same pantheistic-agnostic type as in the Ismaʿilian body, and similarly the members of those upper grades were keen students of the science and philosophy which had been derived from Hellenistic tradition. When the headquarters of the sect at Alamut were finally taken they were found to contain a vast library as well as an observatory and a collection of scientific instruments. In fact we may say with confidence that the Assassins represent the highest level of scholarship and research in contemporary Asiatic Islam, if we can indeed regard them as within the Islamic fold; an island of culture and learning in the midst of reactionary orthodoxy and actual ignorance, the result of the submerging of Asiatic Islam beneath the flood of Turkish invasion. Far away in the west a purer culture was beginning to dawn in Muslim Spain, but in Asia philosophy and science were being rapidly obscured by the reactionary flood.
As organised by Hasan-i-Sabbah the Assassins appear in six grades. The highest of these was filled by the “Chief Daʿi” who recognised the Imam alone as superior on earth. So long as Mustansir lived he was regarded as the true Imam; after his death Nizar was his successor, and later on we find the Chief Daʿi claiming descent from Nizar, but this was as yet in the future. It was the same development as that which we have already observed in the history of the Shiʿite sect founded by ʿAbdullah b. Maymun. Amongst outsiders the Chief Daʿi commonly went by the name of “Sheikh of the mountain,” _i.e._, of the mountain stronghold of Alamut which formed the headquarters of the sect, and this is reproduced as “the old man of the mountain” in the records of the Crusaders. Under the Chief Daʿi were the “Senior Missionaries” (daʿi-i-kabir), each supervising a diocese or _bahr_ (“sea”), and under these were the ordinary missionaries. Thus far the organization merely reproduced that already prevalent in the Ismaʿilian propaganda. Beneath the missionaries were the ordinary members in two main grades known respectively as “companions” (rafiq) and “adherents” (lasiq), the former more fully initiated in the batimite or allegorical interpretations of doctrine than the latter. The sixth grade, theoretically the lowest, was peculiar to the Assassin sect, and consisted of “devoted ones” (fidaʿi) who do not seem to have been initiated, but were bound to a blind and unquestioning obedience which has its parallel in the discipline of the various darwish orders, but was here carried to exceptional extremes. These _fidaʿis_ were carefully trained and were especially practised in the use of various forms of disguise, after all only a more perfect refinement of the methods originally evolved by the Hashimite missionaries; but these were not disguised for the purpose of acting more efficiently as missionaries and for penetrating different communities as teachers, but solely for the purpose of carrying out the specific orders of the Chief Daʿi, and thus formed a most formidable branch of what soon became an exceptionally powerful secret society. In many cases the acts entrusted to the _fidaʿis_ were acts of murder, and it is from this that the name of “assassin” has received its peculiar meaning in most of the languages of Western Europe. The _fidaʿi_, trained to the use of disguise, sometimes as a servant, or as a merchant, or darwish, or as a Christian monk, was able to penetrate into almost any society and to strike down suddenly the victim marked out; and counted it a triumphant success if this act involved his own death as well. A deliberate effort was made to surround the sect with an atmosphere of terror; a Muslim prince would be struck down whilst he was acting as leader at prayer, or a Crusading knight as he was attending high mass at the head of his troops, or if there was not actual murder, a leader might wake up in his tent to find a message from the Assassins pinned by a dagger to the ground beside his couch, or a doctor of the law would find a similar message between the pages of the text book from which he was lecturing. All this was developed more elaborately as time went on, but already in the days of Mustali the sect had rendered itself prominent by getting rid of some leading men whom it regarded as its enemies, such as in 485 Nidhamu l-Mulk the great wazir of the Saljuq sultans, in 491 ʿAbdu r-Rahman as-Samayrami the wazir of Barkiyaruq’s mother, and in 494 Unru Bulka, the rival of Nidhamu l-Mulk and the emir of greater influence in Isfahan. The higher members of the sect were domiciled at Alamut, or in some one or other of the various mountain fortresses they secured in Northern Persia and afterwards in Syria, but adherents were found everywhere scattered through western Asia. In its development the sect of Assassins was almost entirely Asiatic, but as professed adherents of Nizar the eldest son of Mustansir, the Assassins were, at least nominally, of Egyptian origin.
So far the danger most threatening to the Fatimids had been the advance of the Saljuq Turks, pledged to the destruction of the Ismaʿilian heresy, from the east: but in the fourth year of Mustali’s reign a new danger appeared. This was the appearance of the Franks embarked on the First Crusade, who reached Syria in the year 490, when the Saljuq influence was already on the decline. The great Saljuq leader Tutush had died in the preceding year, and his two sons at once became rivals, the one, Duqaq, established at Damascus, the other, Rudwan, at Aleppo. Rudwan was anxious to obtain Fatimid assistance and inserted Mustali’s name in the _khutba_, but the Fatimid state regarded the Saljuqs with dread and suspicion, and was disposed to welcome the Franks as possible allies against the Turks. Jerusalem remained in Saljuq hands under the control of the sons of Ortuk b. Aksab who had governed in the name of Tutush, and they formed an outpost of the Saljuq empire which the Fatimid government regarded as its chief enemy in the east.
The Crusaders professed to be the champions of the Christian religion and declared their aim as being the deliverance of the sacred sites from the occupation of the Muslims. Before reaching Syria, however, they had made it plain that this was not to be understood in a literal sense, for they had shown marked hostility towards the Greek Church, and throughout the whole of their career they were the uncompromising enemies of all the eastern churches. No doubt this can be partly explained by a total lack of understanding or sympathy towards religious bodies whose general customs and external organisation, and more particularly whose liturgy, differed so markedly from the forms developed in the west; but the fact remains that their fellow Christians in the east soon came to regard the Crusaders with as much dislike as the Muslims. This antagonism towards the Greek and eastern churches generally was fully defined before their arrival in Syria. But in fact they were not even the champions of Latin Christianity. Some, no doubt, were sincere in their desire to rescue the Holy Land from non-Christian occupation, but for the most part they were adventurers desirous of carving out principalities in lands which they were well aware were much richer and more prosperous than their own countries in the west. From their own point of view the time at which this Crusade arrived was exceptionally promising: the Saljuq power was broken and there was a temporary lull in the migration of the virile and warlike Turkish races westwards, whilst the Muslim community was divided between ʿAbbasids and Fatimids beyond the possibility of united resistance. Twenty years earlier, or fifty years later they would certainly not have been able to establish themselves in Palestine, but just at the moment circumstances were favourable.
Arriving in Syria in A.H. 490 the Crusaders under Baldwin (or Bardawil as he appears in the Arabic writers) took the city of Edessa and then proceeded to lay siege to Antioch which fell into their hands on the 16th of Rajab 491 (20th June, 1098). News of their arrival and first successes had early reached Egypt, and al-Afdal prepared to welcome them as likely auxiliaries against the Turks: it seemed fully possible that the Franks and Fatimids might divide Western Asia between them, and such indeed would have been feasible. Under this impression al-Afdal sent an army into Palestine and wrested Jerusalem from Sokman the son of Ortuk, who held it as a part of the Saljuq empire, at the same time sending forward an embassy to the Franks welcoming them and asking to make an alliance with them. The Franks absolutely rejected these proposals and declined to accept any friendly overtures from Muslims. Very soon they proceeded to attack Jerusalem, and in the month of Shaban, 492, took it, plundering the mosques, slaughtering the Muslim population, and showing themselves hostile to orthodox and Shiʿite alike. This disillusioned al-Afdal and made it clear to him that it was impossible to expect any sort of alliance with the new-comers. After taking Jerusalem and expelling the Fatimid government the Franks elected Godfrey king of Jerusalem, a rank which he held until the following year, and during this time he did his best to introduce western customs and jurisprudence in the city as well as the Latin rite in the churches.
In the following year (493) the Franks attacked the Egyptian army before Ascalon, which now remained the only important possession of the Fatimids in Palestine. Before the battle the wazir sent an envoy with a flag of truce, but this the Franks disregarded and made an assault upon those who, according to the customary usages of war, should have been sacred. In the ordinary way such attacks made in disregard of a flag of truce, reported in practically every war, ought not to be treated too seriously by the historian: it is almost impossible, even in the best disciplined army, to make sure that no abuse of this kind shall ever occur, but in the case of the Crusaders there seems to have been a deliberate intention to treat the Muslims as outside the ordinary conventions which were more or less observed amongst Christian nations: although it must be remembered that we are dealing with times before the rise of chivalry and the humaner attitude which characterised mediaeval warfare, all more fully developed after contact with the Muslims who did much to refine Frankish manners and usages; and, moreover, the very mixed multitude loosely held together in the Crusading ranks was undisciplined even beyond the wont of those days. In the succeeding engagement the Franks defeated al-Afdal and his forces, and he was compelled to embark for Egypt. Ascalon, however, was not taken as the citizens, alarmed by the recent savagery of the Franks in Jerusalem and perceiving that they were, for the most part, simply out for booty, bribed them to leave the city alone.
Two years later (495) the Franks gained another victory over the Egyptians near Jaffa and began seriously to consider the prospect of invading Egypt.
At this juncture al-Mustali died. At the moment, fortunately, the wazir al-Afdal was in Egypt, and on the day of his death proclaimed his son al-Amir Khalif in his place.
XIV
THE TENTH FATIMID KHALIF, AL-AMIR
(A.H. 495-524 = 1101-1131 A.D.)
At Mustali’s death al-Afdal at once proclaimed Abu ʿAli al-Mansur al-Amir bi-ahkami-llah (“the ruler by the decrees of God”), then only in his fifth year, as Khalif, retaining the government in his own hands as had now become the established custom at the Fatimid court. Al-Afdal was an able and efficient ruler, whilst the young Khalif was of the type so common in oriental courts, a mere votary of pleasure and an idler. The wazir restrained the indulgence of his tastes and kept him closely confined in the palace. Al-Amir does not seem to have been at all aggrieved at being excluded from the government, but he certainly chafed at the restrictions which the wazir considered suitable to apply to his pleasures.
The centre of interest still lies in the Crusaders who had now established a firm hold in Palestine and were threatening Egypt. In 497 they took possession of Akka (Acre), and this increased the anxiety felt in the Fatimid court. In the same year al-Afdal sent his son in command of an army to Palestine, and he was successful in inflicting a severe defeat on the Franks: many were put to flight, and Baldwin, who had succeeded Godfrey as king of Jerusalem, was compelled to hide in a haystack. The Egyptians then advanced and took Ramla and, after slaying a large number of the vanquished, sent three hundred knights prisoners to Egypt. Later in the year both sides were reinforced, the Egyptians receiving an accession of four thousand cavalry as well as the support of a fleet, but no decisive step was taken and no progress made on either side. At this time nearly all Palestine was in the hands of the Franks save the coast towns, and the struggle centered round Ramla. The Fatimids had the advantage of an alliance with Tughtegin, the Saljuq governor of Damascus, for the Turks had at last perceived that it was necessary for all Muslim powers to unite against those who had proved to be a common enemy. A battle took place between Ascalon and Jaffa, but without any important result.
Nothing of marked importance took place during the next three years, but in 502 the Franks succeeded in taking the important coast town of Tripolis on Monday, the 11th of Dhu l-Hijja. When they entered the town they plundered and slaughtered indiscriminately and seized many of the inhabitants for slaves; they destroyed the library of the college and tortured their prisoners in a barbarous manner. The Egyptian wazir had sent an army to the relief of the town, but it arrived too late to be of any service.
After the fall of Tripolis the Muslim forces centered at Tyre. In the following year (503) the Franks took Bairut, and in the year after Sidon, so that the Fatimid possessions were reduced to a precarious hold on Ramla.
Thus affairs stayed for some six years, then in 511 Baldwin attempted the invasion of Egypt. He took Farama, burning the mosques, houses, and suburbs, and then advanced to Tinnis. Near this town he was taken ill, and shortly afterwards died at al-Arish. At his death the projected invasion was abandoned and the Frankish army retired, bearing with it the king of Jerusalem’s body which was ultimately buried in the Church of the Resurrection.
Egypt had practically lost all hold upon Palestine, but yet the threatening horde of Franks was held off from Egypt itself, and this check was in no small degree creditable to the wazir al-Afdal, who meanwhile maintained a firm though not absolutely pure government at home. But gradually the Khalif became more and more restive under the severe tutelage of his wazir, and always there were intrigues of the aggrieved and the ambitious to urge him on, as well as the ever present influence of the harim which, in almost all oriental countries, is the centre of intrigues against the established powers. In 515 the Khalif began to plot definitely against his wazir, and one day as al-Afdal rode out towards the Nile he was attacked and severely wounded, so that he was carried home to die. The Khalif visited him on his death-bed and expressed great sympathy and regret for the accident which had befallen him, an accident whose real nature was perfectly well known to both: as soon as the wazir breathed his last the Khalif commenced plundering his house which was the depository of enormous wealth, and this occupied him forty days (Ibn Khall. i. 614, cf. Jamal ad-Din).
After al-Afdal’s death al-Amir appointed Muhammad b. Abi Shujaa b. al-Bataihi al-Maʾmun as wazir. This new officer was a capable financier but harsh and tyrannical, and restrained the Khalif more rigorously than his predecessor had done. He was the builder of the “grey mosque” (Jamiʿ al-Akmar), so called from its being one of the earliest buildings in which stone was used almost exclusively, and completed the “Mosque of the Elephant” (Jamiʿ al-Fil) which had been commenced by al-Afdal in 498. He held office until 518 when he was arrested and his property confiscated. Three years later, in 521, he and five of his brothers, as well as the pretender who claimed to be Nizar’s son, were put to death.
After the fall of Ibn al-Bataihi the Khalif determined to act as his own wazir, and in this was assisted by the Christian monk Abu Najah b. Kanna, who undertook the department of finance. The monk’s method was to farm out the taxes to Christian collectors for a net sum of 100,000 dinars, which he paid in to the treasury. But Abu Najah made himself extremely offensive by his arrogant airs and by being the scape-goat of the harsh exactions of the collectors, the inevitable result of this system, and after a brief try the Khalif was persuaded to depose him, and he was flogged to death. Al-Amir continued, however, to act as his own wazir until his death in 524, and this made his office universally detested and justifies the custom of appointing a wazir or deputy on whom the odium of the harsher details of the executive should lie, and against whom there might be, at least in theory, an appeal to the throne. Indeed, during these years 519 to 524 the Khalif seems to have been more heartily hated than any other of his dynasty before or after. At length the end came in 524 by the hands of Ismaʿilian Assassins who had undertaken the duty of ridding the country of the tyrant. On Tuesday, the 3rd of Dhu l-Qaʿdah, the Khalif proceeded to Fustat and thence to the island of Roda, where he had built a pleasure house for a favourite Baidawi concubine. “Some persons who had plotted his death were lying there concealed with their arms ready; it being agreed among them that they should kill him as he was going up the lane through which he had to pass in order to reach the top of the hill. As he was going by them, they sprang out and fell upon him with their swords. He had then crossed the bridge and had no other escort than a few pages, courtiers, and attendants. They bore him in a boat across the Nile, and brought him still living into Cairo. The same night he was taken to the castle and there he died, leaving no posterity ... al-Amir’s conduct was detestable: oppressed the people, seized on their wealth and shed their blood: he committed with pleasure every excess which should be avoided, and regarded forbidden enjoyment as the sweetest. The people were delighted at his death” (Ibn Khall. ii. 457).
During the latter part of al-Amir’s reign the Franks continued to consolidate their kingdom in Palestine. On Monday, the 22nd of Jumada II. 518, they took Tyre, and only Ascalon remained to the Fatimids of their former possessions in Asia. About this time the Franks began to strike their own coinage, after issuing coins in the name of the Fatimid Khalif for three years.
XV
THE ELEVENTH FATIMID KHALIF, AL-HAFIZ
(A.H. 524-544 = A.D. 1131-1149.)
The Khalif al-Amir left no son, but at the time of his death one of his wives was pregnant, and it was possible that she might give birth to an heir. Under these circumstances Abu l-Maymun ʿAbdu l-Hamid al-Hafiz li-dini-llah (“the guardian of the religion of God”), son of Muhammad, one of the brothers of Mustali, and consequently cousin to the late Khalif, was declared regent, and as such received the oath of allegiance from the citizens of Cairo on the very day of al-Amir’s murder, and on the same day the wazir Abu ʿAli Ahmad, son of al-Afdal, received the oath of allegiance from the troops. The regent al-Hafiz expressed his confidence that the child about to be borne to the deceased Khalif would be a son. “No Imam of this family,” he said, “dies without leaving a male child to whom he transmits the Imamate by special declaration” (Ibn Khall. 430). Although the late Khalif’s cousin was thus declared formal regent the wazir Ahmad put him in confinement and took the whole power into his own hands, and this received the ready acquiescence of the court and of the troops and people, for everyone regarded the late experiment of the Khalif acting as his own wazir as disastrous. The new wazir ruled justly and well, and restored to each the property which had been confiscated by al-Amir, so that as a ruler he was greatly esteemed.
In other respects, however, his conduct throws a strange light on the conditions prevailing in the Fatimid state at this period. The Fatimids claimed to be not only rulers of Egypt, but the legitimate Khalifs in true descent from the Prophet, and also Imams divinely appointed as guides and teachers of Islam. The whole Fatimid state was bound up with this religious theory, although it was one which did not command the sympathy of the bulk of the subject population, and a distinct tendency had more than once appeared to discard it for frankly secular claims. Under the wazir Ahmad this theory on which the Fatimid claim rested was formally discarded by the government. Ahmad himself was a Shiʿite, but of the sect of the “Twelvers” and so a follower, not of the Fatimid Imam under whom he held office, but of the hidden and unrevealed Imam who, under the name of Muhammad al-Muntazir, had disappeared in 260. For the present, therefore, the Friday prayer in the mosques was offered for the invisible “al-Kaʾim,” and his name appeared on the coinage. To us such a condition seems almost incredible, even though during the time the titular head was merely regent and not fully recognised as Khalif. When al-Amir’s wife was delivered her child was a daughter, but for all that al-Hafiz remained simply regent until 526.
Dissatisfied with his dubious position and the restrictions imposed by the wazir Hafiz plotted against him, and Ahmad was assassinated in the “Great Garden” as he was on his way to play polo on the 15th of Muharram 526 (Dec., 1131). At his death Hafiz received the oath of allegiance as Khalif, and was acclaimed by his bodyguard, the “Young Guard,” although his reign is usually dated from the date of his cousin’s death. At this time al-Hafiz was fifty-seven years of age.
He appointed as wazir an Armenian named Yanis who had been a slave of al-Afdal, one of the Armenian mercenaries whom he had brought from Syria. Yanis turned out to be a severe and hard ruler, and in the following year he was poisoned by the Khalif’s order. In spite of the warning of al-Amir’s reign al-Hafiz then resolved to act as his own wazir, and in this he did well and was generally regarded with respect and attachment. His court was, however, divided into factions as the result of quarrels about the heirship between his two sons Hasan and Faʿiz, each supported by one of the two great bodies of negro mercenaries, the elder Hasan by the Rayhaniya regiment, the younger by the Juyushiya. At length these quarrels resulted in open warfare, and the victorious Juyushiya to the number of 10,000 assembled before the royal palace and demanded the head of the prince Hasan. The Khalif was not in a position to refuse this demand and sent for one of the court physicians, a Jew named Abu Mansur, and asked him to poison Hasan, but the Jew prudently declined the dangerous task. He then sent for a Christian physician named Ibn Kirfa who performed it, and the dead prince’s head was given to the rebels. But the Khalif never forgave Ibn Kirfa for what he had done, and before long an excuse was found to imprison the Christian physician, and in due course he was executed.
After their successful revolt the troops elected as wazir the Armenian Bahram. But he very soon made himself unpopular by showing marked favouritism towards his fellow countrymen who, for the most part, had entered the country in the company of the Armenian Badr al-Jamali. As a result he was deposed and most of the Armenians expelled from the country. Bahram ended his life as a monk.
In 532 Rudwan was appointed wazir and was the first official in Egypt to assume the title of “king.” But he held office only for a few months, and in 534 was cast into prison.
Meanwhile the Franks had met with several checks. The Turks under Zengi defeated them at Atharib in 525, and in 539 took Edessa from them. Thus the Franks began to be threatened from the north-east, and their opponents were consciously making plans for their final subjugation or expulsion. In 541 Zengi died and was succeeded by his son Nur ad-Din, who becomes the decisive factor in the affairs of western Asia and Egypt within the course of the next few years. At this time the Franks were distinctly on the decline, and the hopes built on the foundation of Jerusalem and other Latin kingdoms in Palestine and Syria were not being realised. The West began to feel that the First Crusade had failed in its effort, and so the Second Crusade, mainly the work of St. Bernard whose aims and intentions were above question, set out in 542 and attacked Damascus in the following year, the Crusaders then marching on Jerusalem. But the Second Crusade was an immediate and marked failure. Conditions were greatly changed from what they had been when the former Crusade arrived: there was now a strong Turkish power in Syria, and this was inclined and prepared to be aggressive. The Second Crusade was necessarily a failure. The only important result of Frankish invasion was the kingdom of Jerusalem which had been the work of the First Crusade.
At this period of Egyptian history we are able to avail ourselves of the very interesting record which Osama has left of his own experiences in Syria and Egypt, a record which has been rendered accessible in the French translation of Derenbourg (_Vie d’Ousama_, Paris, 1886-93). Osama left Damascus in 538 and went to Cairo, where he was well received by al-Hafiz, who gave him a robe of honour and a house and other gifts. So long as Hafiz ruled Osama took no part in the public affairs of Egypt, but has left observations upon the course of events, but in the next reign he comes forward prominently as an adviser, and usually as an adviser of evil.
When the ex-wazir Rudwan had been ten years in prison he contrived to bore his way out through the prison walls by the help, it is said, of a rusty nail, and, joined by many of his friends, went to Gizeh intending to seize the wazirate by force. There was a great ferment in Cairo; many persons went out to join themselves with him, whilst the Khalif’s guards prepared for defence. At the head of a large band of followers he forced his way across the Nile, defeated the Khalif’s army, and marched into Cairo where he made his headquarters in the Grey Mosque. There he was joined by many of the emirs who brought supplies of men, arms, and money. The Khalif assembled his negro troops, treated them to wine and then, in a half intoxicated state, they marched out and demanded the head of Rudwan. A great tumult ensued in which the emirs, frightened by the apparent ferocity of the negro guard, left Rudwan, and his supporters were scattered. Rudwan himself was alarmed and went out of the mosque intending to escape, but his horse which should have been at the gate was missing. A young guard offered his horse, and as the ex-wazir approached to avail himself of this offer, he cut him down. Very soon the negroes came up and finished him, then “the people of Misr share the morsels of his flesh which they eat to give themselves courage” (Derenbourg: _Vie d’Ousama_, p. 212).
This took place in 543 and led to a period of general disorder, for the negro troops called out by the Khalif soon passed beyond his control, the streets became unsafe, and faction fights between the Rayhamites who were loyal to the Khalif and the Juyushites, Alexandrians, and Farhites once more broke out just as sixteen years before. Again the Juyushites were victorious, greatly to the annoyance of al-Hafiz who determined to revenge himself upon them. But this resolve he was not able to carry out as he died in 544.
Al-Hafiz was an old man at the time of his decease, fully seventy-six years, and for some time had been in failing health suffering from colic. It is said that Shirmah the Daylamite, or else Musa an-Nasran, made for him a drum of seven metals, each welded at the moment when the appropriate planet was in the ascendant, and that this drum when beaten relieved the wind from which the Khalif suffered. After his death this drum was preserved in the treasury, but was incautiously tapped by a Turkish soldier at the time of Sala d-Din’s conquest, and that he, astonished at the surprising result produced, dropped it and it broke to pieces.
The writer Abu Salih describes Hafiz as particularly well disposed towards the Christians, and especially fond of visiting the gardens of some of the monasteries near Cairo, where he showed his goodwill by many gifts and acts of kindness. He even visited the Christian churches, but was careful to enter backwards lest the stooping necessitated by the low door-ways might appear to be an act of reverence to the cross which stood within.
XVI
THE TWELFTH FATIMID KHALIF, AZ-ZAFIR
(A.H. 543-549 = A.D. 1149-1154)
At the death of Hafiz in October, 1149, _i.e._, A.H. 543, his youngest son Abu Mansur Ismaʿil az-Zafir li-ʾAdai dini-llah (“the conqueror of the enemies of God’s religion”) was proclaimed Khalif in accordance with the late sovereign’s orders. The new Khalif was then only sixteen years of age, frivolous in his tastes, and much given to the society of concubines and to listening to vocal music. One of his first acts was to select Najm ad-Din b. Masal as his chief minister, thus displacing the Emir Sayf ad-Din Abu l-Hasan ʿAli as-Sallar, whom he sent to a provincial administration. This new minister Ibn Masal was a native of Lukk, near Barqa, where he and his father had been horse breakers and falconers.
But Ibn Sallar was not disposed to take his deposition from office tamely, and soon assembled a band of armed supporters to help him to recover the wazirate. When the news of this revolt was brought to Cairo the Khalif assembled a council of all the emirs of the state and discussed with them the measures necessary to be taken. All professed unqualified loyalty to the Khalif’s nominee Ibn Masal, until a certain aged emir proposed that, if this profession represented their real attitude, they should join in passing a decree of death against the ex-wazir Ibn Sallar. This they unanimously refused to do. “Very well,” said the old emir, “then act accordingly.” At this the council broke up, all the emirs leaving the city and joining themselves to the party of Ibn as-Sallar. The Khalif gave large sums of money to his nominee Ibn Masal, but it was impossible to raise any supporters in Cairo. Meanwhile Ibn as-Sallar was gathering his forces at Alexandria and advanced along the left side of the Nile until he reached Giza on the 14th of Ramadan, 544, and the following day entered Cairo without meeting with any resistance and established himself in the official residence of the wazir, taking over the control of the affairs of state. At Ibn as-Sallar’s advance Ibn Masal fled, having held office only fifty days, and went to the Hawf east of the capital where, with the help of the funds supplied by the Khalif, he raised a force of supporters. As soon as he was firmly established in Cairo Ibn as-Sallar went out to deal with his rival, but Ibn Masal evaded him and took refuge in Upper Egypt whither Ibn as-Sallar followed him. A pitched battle took place at Dilas, south of Wasta, in which Ibn Masal was killed, his forces scattered, and his head cut off to be carried to Cairo as a trophy. Thus Ibn as-Sallar was left without rival, and the Khalif was compelled most reluctantly to recognise him as wazir. Naturally the young sovereign had no love towards such a minister, and almost immediately began to make plots to rid himself of him.
Although wazir under a Fatimid Khalif, Ibn as-Sallar was strictly orthodox and gave the whole of his patronage to orthodox teachers of the Shafiʿite school. This position in Alexandria gained him many adherents, and their attachment was still more secured by his foundation of a Shafiʿite college there. He continued the same attitude after his assumption of office at Cairo, so that he was regarded by the people of Egypt as an orthodox champion against the heretical Khalifate. By nature he was cruel and vindictive. An anecdote is related of him that when he was in the army in the days before he held office he had to apply to Ibn Masum, the Secretary of War, for help to defray extraordinary expenses incurred by him in the administration of the province of Gharbiya, as the result of which he found himself heavily in debt. The Secretary only replied: “By God, thy discourse entereth not my ear,” and Ibn as-Sallar left his presence full of indignation. Long afterwards, when he had risen to a high position, he made search for Ibn Masum, who hid himself fearing retaliation from the one whom he had treated contemptuously as a petitioner. At last the Secretary was found and brought before the wazir who had him lain on a board and a nail driven through his ear, Ibn as-Sallar asking him at each cry he uttered, “Doth my discourse yet enter thy ear or not?” (Ibn Khall. ii. 351).
In the plots against the wazir, az-Zafir’s chief confidant was a young man of his own age, Nasir ad-Din Nasir, the son of the general ʿAbbas who, next to the wazir, was the most powerful man in Egypt. About this time ʿAbbas was setting out with an army against the Franks taking with him his son Nasir. For a moment we must pause to consider the position of this son, the favourite of the young Khalif. Many years before, in 503 Bullara, the wife of Abu l-Futuh had come to Egypt with a child ʿAbbas. Some time afterwards the wazir as-Sallar married her, and in due course his step-son ʿAbbas grew up and became a general in the Egyptian army, and had a son, Nasir, who was brought up by his grand-mother in the house of Ibn as-Sallar. Now this youth went with the army which Ibn as-Sallar was sending against the Franks in the company of his father and the Syrian Osama. At Bilbays, on the point of quitting the land of Egypt, ʿAbbas can only talk about the delightful climate of Egypt, its many beauties, and regret that he is being exiled to the comparatively unattractive land of Syria. But Osama interrupted his discourse and asked him why, if he liked Egypt so much, did he not get rid of the wazir Ibn as-Sallar and take the wazirship himself, then he would be settled in Egypt permanently. ʿAbbas gave serious attention to these proposals and brought in his son Nasir, and the project was discussed by the three, the father ʿAbbas presumably being well aware of his son’s plotting with the Khalif against the wazir who had sheltered that son in his home and was the husband of his grand-mother. It was finally agreed that Nasir should go back to Cairo and murder the wazir. He, as an inmate of the house, would be the best able to get into his presence and do the deed without premature discovery. So the army remained at Bilbays and Nasir returned. The wazir’s house was guarded, but Nasir was well aware of the minister’s habits and went direct to the harim which was in a detached building. He had brought a small body of men with him, and together they went through the grounds to the harim, where Nasir found the wazir asleep and murdered him. As soon as the guards learned what had happened they broke out in disorder and began to search for the assassins, but Nasir and his men had made good their escape, and the household guards seem to have lacked any one to direct their plans, now the master was dead. This murder took place on the 6th of Muharram, 548.
As soon as the news was brought to ʿAbbas he returned with his forces to Cairo where he soon restored order, and was without delay invested with the office of wazir. The change does not seem to have aroused any other feelings than relief amongst the people at large, for Ibn as-Sallar had been a harsh and cruel ruler, and many had suffered for suspected partisanship with the defeated Ibn Masal. Early in his period of office he had suppressed the Khalif’s bodyguard of young men, and put most of them to death, and this had been the inauguration of an almost constant series of executions.
Thus ʿAbbas was made wazir, but this appointment resulted in the Khalif’s own assassination within the next few months. In the circumstances which led to this it is clear that the chief factor was a close friendship between the Khalif and the wazir’s son Nasir, and with this was the evil influence of Osama. It is said that the Khalif made overtures to Nasir to slay his father ʿAbbas, presumably intending to make the son wazir in his place; but the details of this are obscure and seem to be very much open to question. It is, however, clear that Osama took a leading part in stirring up the feelings of ʿAbbas and his son and inducing them to proceed to this murder, and it is he who definitely states that the Khalif had made overtures to Nasir to assassinate his father, and it seems likely that he says this to excuse his own bad advice.
Both the Khalif and Nasir were of exceptional beauty, of about the same age, and living in close intimacy,—so close as to provoke the scandalous comments of censorious tongues. It seems that Osama was the first to draw attention to these evil rumours. The Khalif had presented Nasir with the fief of Qaliub immediately north of Cairo, and in the presence of his father and Osama Nasir announced this in the words, “Our master has given me the province of Qaliub”: at which Osama remarked, “That is not splendid as a wedding gift.” This remark sounded offensive to ʿAbbas and his son, and in consequence they decided to slay the Khalif. Osama gives the further account that Ibn Munqidh said to ʿAbbas: “How can you endure the evil reports I hear about your son?” “What are they?” asked ʿAbbas. Osama then interposed: “People say that az-Zafir has commerce with thy son and suspect the Khalif of doing with him what one does with women.” ʿAbbas was aroused and asked indignantly, “But what can I do?” Ibn Munqidh replied, “Assassinate the Khalif, then the dishonour will be purged from thee.” Ibn Khallikan (i. 222), in his life of az-Zafir, states that ʿAbbas said to his son, “You are ruining your reputation by keeping company with az-Zafir; your familiarity with him is the subject of public talk; kill him then, for it is thus that thou wilt vindicate thy honour from these foul suspicions.”
When Nasir had made up his mind to the murder he invited the Khalif to visit him in his house in the Armourers’ Market, and there he concealed a band of confederates. On Thursday, the last day of Muharram, 549 (15th April, 1154), the Khalif went privately with a single black slave to Nasir’s house and there the conspirators fell upon him, slew him, and buried his body beneath the floor of the room; according to Osama they slew the black slave at the same time, but this does not seem to have been the case as we find the slave afterwards showing the place where the body was buried. The same night Nasir went to his father and informed him of what he had done.
Next morning ʿAbbas went to the palace and asked for the Khalif with whom, he said, he had important business. The household slaves went in search of him but could not find him either in his own rooms or in the harim, and brought the wazir word that they were unable to find where he was. At this ʿAbbas, who had remained at the palace gate, dismounted and went into the palace with a band of trusty followers and asked for the Khalif’s two brothers, Jibrila and Yusuf, who were soon brought. According to one account he bade one or the other then assume the Khalifate as the state could not go on without a head, but they declined. “For,” they said, “we have no share in the government, az-Zafir’s father disinherited us when he passed it to az-Zafir: after him it is to his son that the authority belongs” (Osama, _op. cit._). According to the much more likely account given by Ibn Khallikan ʿAbbas asked the two brothers where az-Zafir was, and they replied that he ought rather to ask his son, thus making it clear that they knew whither he had gone the night before. At once he declared, “These two are his murderers,” and at his command they were beheaded. ʿAbbas then sent for the late Khalif’s son al-Faʿiz, then aged five (or two) years, set him on his shoulder and sent for the emirs. As soon as they had assembled he said, “Here is the son of your master: his uncles have murdered his father, and I put them to death as you may perceive. What is essential now is, that the authority of this infant should be fully recognised.” The emirs reply, “We hear and obey.” They then gave a great shout which so troubled the infant on the wazir’s shoulder that he was ever afterwards subject to fits of trembling (Ibn Khall. ii. 425-6). ʿAbbas then took charge of the government, but subsequent events rather belong to the reign of al-Faʿiz.
Az-Zafir was only twenty-two years of age at his death. His tastes had been frivolous, and it would not seem that there was much reason to regret him, but the circumstances of his murder and the general detestation of ʿAbbas threw round his memory a halo of loyalty. He was the founder of a mosque known as the az-Zafiri mosque, near the Bab Zawila.
XVII
THE THIRTEENTH FATIMID KHALIF, AL-FAʿIZ
(A.H. 549-555 = A.D. 1154-1160.)
In spite of ʿAbbas’ attempt to throw the guilt of the Khalif’s murder upon his two brothers, it was well known both in the palace and in the city that the wazir was the culprit, and both were aroused to the deepest indignation. The emirs in the palace almost at once began to conspire against the wazir, and decided to appeal to as-Salih b. Ruzzik the Armenian, who was then governor of Munya Bani Kharib in Upper Egypt. The letter they sent was coloured black as a sign of their deep mourning, and with it they sent their hair cut off, the ancient Arab symbol of dire distress. As soon as as-Salih received this message he assembled the soldiers who were with him, and read the letter to them asking whether they were ready to support him. They all declared their readiness to follow his lead in avenging the Khalif’s murder and in liberating the young successor from the baleful influence which at present overshadowed the throne. With his men as-Salih then marched to Cairo. As he approached the city all the emirs and their henchmen came out to join him as well as many of the citizens, so that ʿAbbas found himself deserted. At this ʿAbbas took to flight, accompanied by his son Nasir and the evil counsellor Osama, and betook himself to Syria.
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A Short History of the Fatimid KhalifateChapter X: Part 10
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