Chapter I: Part 1

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.

The original text used the long-form s; this has been replaced by
the normal s in the etext.

The original text printed ‘ct’ as a ligature, and is displayed
simply as ‘ct’ character pair in the etext.

Fractions are displayed as a./b., for example 3./4., similar to
the format of the original text.

Whole numbers are always terminated with a period, as in the
original text, for example ‘about 1800. is the number of ... ’.

The pound currency sign in the text is l, which looks very similar
to the number 1, and the five occurrences have been italicized in
the etext. For example one hundred pounds is shown as 100_l._,
instead of 100l.

A superscript is denoted by ^{}, for example 1./5.^{th.}.

All changes listed in the Errata at the back of the book have been
applied to the etext.

Some other minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the
book.

A
TREATISE
OF
Taxes & Contributions.

Shewing the Nature and Measures of

{ Crown-Lands. }
{ Assessements. }
{ Customs. }
{ Poll-Moneys. }
{ Lotteries. }
{ Benevolence. }
{ Penalties. }
{ Monopolies. }
{ Offices. }
{ Tythes. }
{ Raising of Coins. }
{ Harth-Money. }
{ Excize, &c. }

With several intersperst Discourses and Digressions concerning

{ Warres. }
{ The Church. }
{ Universities. }
{ Rents & Purchases. }
{ Usury & Exchange. }
{ Banks & Lombards. }
{ Registries for Conveyances. }
{ Beggars. }
{ Ensurance. }
{ Exportation of { Money. }
{ { Wool. }
{ Free-Ports. }
{ Coins. }
{ Housing. }
{ Liberty of Conscience, &c. }

_The same being frequently applied to the present
State and Affairs of_
IRELAND.

_London_, Printed for _N. Brooke_, at the Angel in _Cornhill_. 1662.

_The Preface._

Young and vain persons, though perhaps they marry not primarily and onely on purpose to get Children, much less to get such as may be fit for some one particular vocation; yet having Children, they dispose of them as well as they can according to their respective inclinations: Even so, although I wrote these sheets but to rid my head of so many troublesome conceits, and not to apply them to the use of any one particular People or Concernment; yet now they are born, and that their Birth happened to be about the time of the _Duke of Ormond’s_ going Lord Lieutenant into _Ireland_, I thought they might be as proper for the consideration of that place, as of any other, though perhaps of effect little enough in any.

_Ireland_ is a place which must have so great an Army kept up in it, as may make the Irish desist from doing themselves or the English harm by their future Rebellions. And this great Army must occasion great and heavy Leavies upon a poor people and wasted Countrey; it is therefore not amiss that _Ireland_ should understand the nature and measure of Taxes and Contributions.

2. The Parishes of _Ireland_ do much want Regulation, by uniting and dividing them; so as to make them fit Enclosures wherein to plant the Gospel: wherefore what I have said as to the danger of supernumerary Ministers, may also be seasonable there, when the new Geograpy we expect of that Island shall have afforded means for the Regulation abovementioned.

3. The great plenty of _Ireland_ will but undo it, unless a way be found for advantageous Exportations, the which will depend upon the due measure of Custom and Excize here treated on.

4. Since _Ireland_ is under-peopled in the whole, and since the Government there can never be safe without chargeable Armies, until the major part of the Inhabitants be English, whether by carrying over these, or withdrawing the other; I think there can be no better encouragement to draw English thither, then to let them know, that the Kings Revenue being above 1./10. part of the whole Wealth, Rent, and Proceed of the Nation; that the Publick Charge in the next Age will be no more felt there then that of Tythes is here; and that as the Kings Revenue encreases, so the causes of his Expence will decrease proportionably, which is a double advantage.

6. The employing the Beggars in _England_ about mending the High-wayes, and making Rivers Navigable will make the Wool and Cattle of _Ireland_ vend the better.

7. The full understanding of the nature of Money, the effects of the various _species_ of Coins, and of their uncertain values, as also of raising or embasing them, is a learning most proper for _Ireland_, which hath been lately much and often abused for the want of it.

8. Since Lands are worth but six or seven years purchase, and yet twenty years just cross the Channel, ’twere good the people of _Ireland_ knew the reasons of it at a time when there is means of help.

Lastly, if any man hath any Notions which probably may be good for _Ireland_, he may with most advantage expose them to publick examination now, when the Duke of _Ormond_ is Chief Governour: for,

1. His Grace knows that Countrey perfectly well, as well in times and matters of Peace as War, and understands the Interests as well of particular persons, as of all and every factions and parties struggling with each other in that Kingdom; understanding withall the state of _England_, and also of several Forreign Nations, with reference to _Ireland_.

2. His Grace hath given fresh demonstration of his care of an English Interest in _Ireland_, and of his wisdom in reconciling the several cross concernments there so far as the same is possible.

3. His Graces Estate in Lands there is the greatest that ever was in _Ireland_, and consequently he is out of the danger incident to those _Proreges_, against whom _Cambden_ sayes, _Hibernia est semper querula_; there being no reason for ones getting more Land, who hath already the most of any.

4. Whereas some chief Governours who have gone into _Ireland_, chiefly to repair or raise fortunes, have withdrawn themselves again when their work hath been done, not abiding the clamors and complaints of the people afterwards: But his Grace hath given Hostages to that Nation for his good Government, and yet hath taken away aforehand all fears of the contrary.

5. His Grace dares do whatever he understands to be fitting, even to the doing of a single Subject Justice against a Confederate multitude; being above the sinister interpretations of the jealous and querulous; for his known Liberality and Magnificence shall ever keep him free from the clamor of the people, and his through-tried fidelity shall frustrate the force of any subdolous whisperings in the Ears of His Majesty.

6. His good acceptance of all ingenious endeavours, shall make the wise men of this Eastern _England_ be led by his Star into _Ireland_, and there present him with their choicest advices, who can most judiciously select and apply them.

Lastly, this great Person takes the great Settlement in hand, when _Ireland_ is as a white paper, when there sits a Parliament most affectionate to his Person, and capable of his Counsel, under a King curious as well as careful of Reformation; and when there is opportunity, to pass into Positive Laws whatsoever is right reason and the Law of Nature.

Wherefore by applying those Notions unto _Ireland_, I think I have harped upon the right string, and have struck whilest the Iron is hot; by publishing them now, when, if ever at all, they be useful. I would now advertise the world, that I do not think I can mend it, and that I hold it best for every mans particular quiet, to let it _vadere sicut vult_; I know well, that _res nolunt male administrari_, and that (say I what I will or can) things will have their course, nor will nature be couzened: Wherefore what I have written (as I said before) was done but to ease and deliver my self, my head having been impregnated with these things by the daily talk I hear about advancing and regulating Trade, and by the murmurs about Taxes, &c. Now whether what I have said be contemned or cavilled at, I care not, being of the same minde about this, as some thriving men are concerning the profuseness of their Children; for as they take pleasure to get even what they believe will be afterwards pissed against the wall, so do I to write, what I suspect will signifie nothing: Wherefore the race being not to the swift, &c. but time and chance happening to all men, I leave the Judgement of the whole to the Candid, of whose correction I shall never be impatient.

The Index.

_An Enumeration and description of the several Branches of
the Publick Charge._ Page 1

_The Maintenance of Governours ought to be in greater splendour
then private Callings can reach to._ Ibidem

_The honour of being trusted, and the pleasure of being feared,
is reward enough for some Offices._ p. 2

_The Pastorage of Souls ought to be a Publick Charge even upon a
Civil Account._ Ibid.

_The use of Schools and Universities, as they are a publick
charge._ 3

_The common and general Causes, which encrease and aggravate
the burthen of paying Taxes._ 4

_The Causes that excite Forreign and Offensive Wars._ Ibid.

_The Causes of Defensive and Civil Wars._ 5

_A Cause of unnecessary Ecclesiastical Charge, is the not
sizing of Parishes according to the Alterations which have been
in Religion and Trade._ 6

_That five thousand Parishes are enough for_ England _and_
Wales, _so as to give unto each but a thousand Parishioners,
and so as that none need go two miles to Church._ 7

_Antiquated Offices and overgrown Fees a Cause of unnecessary
Charge in the Government, and administration of Justice._ 8

_Registers for Conveyances of Lands and Depositories for
moveable Pawns, as also Banks of Money will lessen the Charge
of Law-suits and Writings._ 9

_How the number of such as relate to the Faculty of Medicine
may be adjusted._ 10

_How the number of Students in the Universities intending to
make Learning the way of their livelihood may be adjusted._ Ibid.

_An Use propounded for the choice Parish-Children and Foundlings,
to force on an useful Work, which hath hitherto been but
perfunctorily pursued._ Ibid.

_That the number of unnecessary Merchants and Retailers be
retrenched._ 11

_The careful Maintenance and Education of exposed Children,
and concealing their names and Families, is a matter of great
consequence._ Ibid.

_A Proposal of several Employments, for Beggars and such as
have now no Work._ 12

_Great Works of Labour though in themselves unnecessary, are
nevertheless of advantage to the Publick._ 13

_The mending of Highwayes, building Bridges and Causeys, and
the making of Rivers Navigable in_ England, _would make English
Horses an exportable Commodity, and help to vend the
Commodities of_ Ireland. Ibid.

_The Causes of unquiet bearing of Taxes_, viz. 14

_First, That the Sovereign exacts too much._ 15

_Secondly, That Assessments are unequally laid._ Ibid.

_Thirdly, That the Moneys levied are vainly expended._ Ibid.

_Fourthly, Or given to Favourites._ Ibid.

_Fifthly, Ignorance of the Number, Trade, and Wealth of the
People._ 16

_Sixthly, Obscurity about the right of imposing._ Ibid.

_Seventhly, Fewness of People._ Ibid.

_Eighthly, Scarcity of Money, and confusion of Coins._ 17

_Ninthly, That scarce an hundredth part of the Riches of this
Nation is Coined Bullion._ Ibid.

_Tenthly, The non-acceptance of Some Commodities in_ specie
_in discharge of Taxes._ Ibid.

_The Consequences of a Tax too heavy if there be too much Money
in a Nation, which may be; or if there be too little, and that
either in a State well or ill governed._ 17, 18, 19

_The first way of providing for the Publick Charge, is the
excinding or setting apart of a proportion of the Territory,
in the nature of Crown-Lands._ 20

_The second is taking away the same proportion of the Rents of
all Lands._ 21

_The Nation is happy where either of the said two wayes is
practised_ ab antiquo, _and upon original agreement, and not
exacted as a sudden contingent Surcharge upon the People._ 21

_The Owners of settled Rents bear the burthen of a Land-Tax, or
Assessment, others probably gaining thereby._ Ibid.

_A Land-Tax upon free Estates resolves into an Excise upon
Consumptions._ 22

_Assessment upon Housing more uncertain then that of Land,
Housing being of a double nature_, viz. _either an instrument
of gain, or way of expence._ Ibid.

_The heavy taxing of Housing no discouragement to new Buildings;
nor is the discouragement of new Buildings any means to prevent
the populousness of a City._ Ibid.

_Prohibition to build upon new Foundations serves onely to fix
the Ground-plot of a City._ 23

_The reason why the City of_ London _removes its Ground-plot
Westward._ Ibid.

_That ’tis probable the King of_ Englands _Palace will in
process of time be towards_ Chelsey. Ibid.

_That the present Seat of_ London _will be the greatest
Cohabitation of People ever whilst this Island is inhabited._ 24

_The nature and natural Measures of the Rent of Land, computed
in Commodities of the growth of the said Land._ Ibid.

_The Par between food or other proceed of Land, and Bullion or
Coin._ 25

_The Par between Gold and Silver._ Ibid.

_Gold and Silver are not natural Standards of the Values of
the_ τἁ χρἠϛα. 26

_The prime Denominations of the_ τἁ χρἠϛα _are but two_, viz.
_Land and Labour, as the Denominations of Money in_ England
_are Pounds, Shillings, Pence._ Ibid.

_Of the Par between Land and Labour._ Ibid.

_The reason of the number of years Purchase that Land is worth
in several Countreys._ 27

_Why Land in_ Ireland _is worth fewer years Purchase then in_
England. 27, 28

_The Description and_ Ratio formalis _of Usury._ 29

_The same of Exchange._ Ibid.

_The Measures of both._ 29, 30

_Why Usury hath been limited more then Exchange._ 30

_A Parallel between the Changes of the Price of Money, and that
of Land._ Ibid.

_How to compute and compare the Rents of Lands, in order to a
just Land-Tax or Assessment._ 31

_The intrinsick value of Land is found by Surveys of the
Quantity, Figure, and Scituation._ Ibid.

_And by the Survey of the Quality_, viz. _its aptitude to bear;
first, precious Commodities; secondly, the best of the kinde;
thirdly, most in quantity._ Ibid.

_The extrinsick or accidental value depends upon the plenty of
Money, luxurious or frugal living; the Opinions Civil, Natural,
and Religious of the People._ Ibid.

_If is necessary to these Enquiries to know how to tell the
Gold and Silver Coins of this present Age, and compare the same
with that of former times._ 32

_How to compare not onely the Money of this present Age with
that of the former, but the entire Riches of the present with
the former People._ Ibid.

_By the numbers of People, and the proportion of Money amongst
them, the accidental values of Lands are to be computed._ 33

_How to proportion the Rates of a Commodity in one place, unto
the Rates of the same in another place._ Ibid.

_That the Day-wages of Labourers and several other of the most
vulgar Tradesmen ought to be ascertain’d, and well adapted to
the changes of time._ Ibid.

_That though the difficulty of computing the contingent values
of Land be great, yet there be greater reasons for undergoing
it._ 34

_The nature of Credit, as the said word is commonly used among
Tradesmen, and otherwise._ Ibid.

_That the Sovereigns exact knowledge of the Subjects Estates
would do them no harm._ Ibid.

_A description of the Duty of Customs._ 35

_A conjecture that Customs at first were a kinde of_ præmium
_for ensurance against Pyrates._ Ibid.

_The measures of the said Duty upon exported Goods._ 36

_The inconvenience of too heavy Customs._ Ibid.

_What Commodities may be forced to pay Customs._ 37

_The measures of Customs upon imported Goods._ Ibid.

_The inconveniences of raising money, by the way of
Customs._ Ibid.

_A Proposal, that instead of Tunnage and Poundage upon shipped
Goods, a Tunnage were paid out of the ships Fraight._ 38

_Or that the Customs were taken as an Ensurance_-præmium. Ibid.

_Of prohibited Commodities in general._ Ibid.

_Of prohibiting the exportation of Money and Bullion._ 39

_The said prohibition of Money serves as a sumptuary Law._ Ibid.

_About the exportation of Wool._ Ibid.

_The lessening of our Sheep-trade, and encrease of Corn-tillage
is an expedient in this case for many reasons._ 40

_Other considerations tending to shew, that the too vehement
prohibitions of Wool may be ineffectual, or to do more harm
then good._ 41

_Of prohibiting Importations._ Ibid.

_It were better to make and raise Commodities, though to burn
them, then not to make them, or let the makers lose their
Faculty, and be idle._ Ibid.

_Of Free Ports, and in what cases they may do good or harm._ 41

_Of Poll-money, and the sorts of it._ Ibid.

_The faults of the late Poll-moneys._ 43

_Of the most simple Poll-money, where all pay alike, its
conveniencies and inconveniencies._ Ibid.

_Of Poll-money upon Titles, Offices, and Faculties._ 44

_Harth-money is of the same nature with simple Poll-money, but
both are rather Accumulative Excizes._ 45

_Grants for publick Lotteries are Taxes upon the people._ Ibid.

_Why Lotteries ought not to be allowed but by good
authority._ Ibid.

_Raising of Money by Benevolence is a real Tax._ 46

_Three cases where the way of a Benevolence may be made
good._ Ibid.

_Several reasons against it._ 46, 47

_The several species of Penalties._ 47

_A doubt whether the Penalties set down in_ Moses _Law ought to
be inflicted now._ 47

_The proper use and reason of every sort of Penalty._ 48

_Perpetual Imprisonment is a kinde of slow death._ 49

_In what case death, mutilation, imprisonment, disgrace, &c.
ought to be commuted for pecuniary mulcts._ Ibid.

_The meaning of the double and multiple Restitutions mentioned
in the Law of_ Moses. Ibid.

_Of the wayes for punishing or permitting Heterodox Believers
in Religion._ 50

_That the Sovereign may do either._ 51

_That all Pseudodoxies whatsoever may be safely muzzled from
doing harm by pecuniary mulcts._ 51, 52

_That the Sovereign by punishing them with death, mutilations,
or imprisonments, doth therein punish himself, and that too_
re infecta, _very often._ 51

_That the Pastours ought in some measure to be punished for the
errours and defections of their Flocks._ 52

_The true use of the Clergy is rather to be patterns of
Holiness, then to teach men variety of Opinions_ de rebus
divinis. 53

_The substance of all that hath been said in this whole
discourse about the Church._ Ibid.

_The abuse of Penal Laws._ 54

_Of Monopolies._ Ibid.

_The use and reason of instituting Monopolies._ 55

_A Digression about new Inventions, and the relations incident
to the Projectors of new practices._ Ibid.

_Offices instituted by the State, with Fees of their own
appointment, are of a parallel nature to Monopolies._ 56

_Why the Fees of offices were great heretofore._ Ibid.

_How offices are become as a saleable Commodity._ 57

_Why many superfluous Offices are not abolished._ Ibid.

_A description of Tythes in several particulars._ 58

_The causes why Tythes encrease._ Ibid.

_The Rent of the Lands of_ England _is but a quarter of the
Expence of the people._ 59

_The Tythes in_ England _are six times as much as they were
four hundred yeas ago._ Ibid.

_The clergy are far richer now then they were in ancient times,
and yet have less work to do._ Ibid.

_The danger of too many Church men._ 60

_How to adjust the number of Church-men and Students in
Divinity._ Ibid.

_Tythes is now no Tax or burthen upon the people._ 61

_The way of Tythes is a good pattern for a Tax._ Ibid.

_The way of paying Tythes in the City and Countrey is very
disproportionable._ 61

_The inconveniences of contributing to the Publick Charge after
the manner of Tythes._ Ibid.

_A reason why the wayes of Taxing the people are often
shifted._ 62

_The State gains in several Countreys by being the common
Cashier, Usurer, Ensurer, Monopolist, &c._ 63

_The case of the Jews (every where subject to great Taxes)
briefly stated._ 64

_The way of leavying an_ aliquot _part of mens Estates very
dangerous._ Ibid.

_Alterations in the values of Coins is a Tax upon such as live
by determined Rents, Pensions, Fees, &c._ 65

_What is embasing of Moneys, and what is not._ Ibid.

_Of Tin and Copper money, as well curiously as coursly
wrought._ Ibid.

_Of the Tokens coined by retailing Shop-keepers._ Ibid.

_What is Gold and Silver embased._ 66

_The reasons for embasing of money._ Ibid.

_Reasons against the same._ Ibid.

_What is properly raising of Money._ 67

_The effect of raising both domestick and forreign Coins._ Ibid.

_Raising of money changes the_ species _of moneys, but lessens
the Bullion._ Ibid.

_Why many wise States have raised their Moneys._ 68

_Raising of Forreign money to a double value, or abating the
price of our Native commodities to half, is not all one, but
the former is better._ 69

_The way of computing and comparing the prices of Commodities
upon natural grounds._ 69, 70

_Men are really and actually rich according to what they spend
and enjoy in their own persons._ 71

_Excize being a Tax upon such riches, is a just way by which to
defray the Publick Charge._ ibid.

_That a proportion ought to be pitched between the Expence or
Consumption of the whole Nation, and the Publick Charge
thereof._ ib.

_Commodities ought not to be taxed until they be just ripe for
Consumption._ 72

_Commodities of equal value may be unequally excised with
justice._ ibidem.

_Of accumulating the Excise of many things upon some one
thing._ ibid.

_Whether Native Commodities exported ought to pay Excize._ ibid.

_The explication of Accumulative Excise._ 73

_Reason for accumulating the Excise of all things upon some one
thing._ ibid.

_Why Beer ought not to be that one thing._ 74

_Harth or Smoak-money is an Accumulative Excize, with the
reasons for and against it._ ibid.

_Reasons in behalf of the Excize._ 75

_Of framing persons to be fit for great Trusts, as to be
Cashiers, Store-keepers, Checques, &c._ ibid.

CHAP. I.

_Of the several sorts of Publick Charges._

The Publick Charges of a State, are, _That of its Defence_ by Land and Sea, of its Peace at home and abroad, as also of its honourable vindication from the injuries of other States; all which we may call the Charge of the Militia, which commonly is in ordinary as great as any other Branch of the whole; but extraordinary, (that is, in time of War, or fear of War) is much the greatest.

2. Another branch of the Publick Charge is, the Maintenance of the Governours, Chief and Subordinate; I mean, such not onely as spend their whole time in the Execution of their respective Offices, but also who have spent much in fitting themselves as well with abilities to that end, as in begetting an opinion in their Superiours of such their ability and trustworthiness.

3. Which Maintenance of the Governours is to be in such a degree of plenty and splendour, as private Endeavours and Callings seldom reach unto: To the end, that such Governours may have the natural as well as the artificial Causes of Power to act with.

4. For if a great multitude of men should call one of their number King, unless this instituted Prince, appear in greater visible splendour then others, can reward those that obey and please him, and do the contrary to others; his Institution signifies little, even although he chance to have greater corporal or mental faculties, then any other of the number.

5. There be Offices which are but πἀρεργα, as Sheriffs, Justices of the Peace, Constables, Churchwardens, &c. which men may attend without much prejudice to their ordinary wayes of livelihood, and for which the honour of being trusted, and the pleasure of being feared, hath been thought a competent Reward.

6. Unto this head, the Charge of the administring Justice may be referred, as well between man and man, as between the whole State or Commonalty and particular members of it; as well that of righting and punishing past injuries and crimes, as of preventing the same in time to come.

7. A third branch of the Publick Charge is, that of the _Pastorage of mens Souls_, and the guidance of their Consciences; which, one would think (because it respects another world, and but the particular interest of each man there) should not be a publick Charge in this: Nevertheless if we consider how easie it is to elude the Laws of man, to commit unprovable crimes, to corrupt and divert Testimonies, to wrest the sense and meaning of the Laws, &c. there follows a necessity of contributing towards a publick Charge, wherewith to have men instructed in the Laws of God, that take notice of evil thoughts and designs, and much more of secret deeds, and that punisheth eternally in another world, what man can but slightly chastise in this.

8. Now those who labour in this publick Service, must also be maintained in a proportionable splendour; and must withall have the means to allure men with some kinde of reward, even in this life; forasmuch, as many heretofore followed even Christ himself but for the Loaves he gave them.

9. Another Branch is, the Charge of Schools and Universities, especially for so much as they teach above _Reading, Writing, and Arithmetick_; these being of particular use to every man, as being helps and substitutes of Memory and Reason, Reckoning being of the latter, as Writing and Reading are of the former, for whether Divinity, &c. ought to be made a private Trade, is to me a question.

10. ’Tis true, that Schools and Colledges are now for the most part but the Donations of particular men, or places where particular men spend their money and time upon their own private accounts; but no doubt it were not amiss, if the end of them were to furnish all imaginable helps unto the highest and fined Natural Wits, towards the discovery of Nature in all its operations; in which sense they ought to be a publick Charge: The which Wits should not be selected for that work, according to the fond conceits of their own Parents and Friends, (Crows that think their own Birds ever fairest) but rather by the approbation of others more impartial; such as they are, who pick from out of the Christians Children the ablest Instruments and Support of the Turkish Government. Of which Selections more hereafter.

11. Another Branch is, that of the _Maintenance of Orphans, found and exposed Children_, which also are Orphans; as also of Impotents of all sorts, and moreover such as want employment.

12. For the permitting of any to beg is a more chargeable way of maintaining them whom the law of Nature will not suffer to starve, where food may possibly be had: Besides, it is unjust to let any starve, when we think it just to limit the wages of the poor, so as they can lay up nothing against the time of their impotency and want of work.

13. A last Branch may be, the Charge of High-wayes, Navigable Rivers, Aquæducts, Bridges, Havens, and other things of universal good and concernment.

14. Other Branches may be thought on, which let other men either refer unto these, or adde over and above. For it suffices for my purpose to have for the present set down these the chief and most obvious of all the rest.

CHAP. II.

_Of the Causes which encrease and aggravate the several sorts of Publick Charges._

Having thus spoken of the several sorts of Publick Charges, we shall next consider the Causes which encrease them both in general and in particular.

Among the general Causes is, First, the unwillingness of the people to pay them; arising from an opinion, that by delay and reluctancy they may wholly avoid them, with a suspition that what is imposed is too much, or that what is collected is embezelled or ill expended, or that it is unequally leavied and assessed. All these resolving into an unnecessary Charge to collect them, and of forcing their Prince to hardships towards the people.

2. Another Cause which aggravates Taxes is, the force of paying them in money at a certain time, and not in commodities, at the most convenient seasons.

3. Thirdly, Obscurities and doubts concerning the right of imposing.

4. Fourthly, Scarcity of Money, and Confusion of Coins.

5. Fifthly, Fewness of people, especially of Labourers and Artificers.

6. Sixthly, Ignorance of the numbers, Wealth and Trade of the people, causing a needless repetition of the charge and trouble of new additional Levies, in order to amend mistakes.

7. As to particulars. The Causes of encreasing the Military Charge are the same with those that encrease Wars, or fear of Wars, which are Forreign or Civil.

8. An Offensive Forreign War is caused by many, and those very various, secret, personal distastes coloured----with publick pretences; of which we can say nothing, but that the common encouragement unto them particularly here in _England_ is a false opinion, that our Countrey is full peopled, or that if we wanted more Territory, we could take it with less charge from our neighbours, then purchase it from the _Americans_; and a mistake, that the greatness and glory of a Prince lyeth rather in the extent of his Territory, then in the number, art, and industry of his people, well united and governed. And moreover, that it is more glorious to take from others by fraud or rapine, then to gain ones self out of the bowels of the Earth and Sea.

9. Now those States are free from Forreign Offensive Wars (arising as abovesaid out of Personal and Private Causes) where the chief Governours Revenue is but small, and not sufficient to carry on such Wars, the which if they happen to be begun, and so far carryed on, as to want general Contributions, then those who have the power to impose them, do commonly enquire what private persons and Ends occasioned the War, and so fall upon the Authors, rather then contribute to the Effect; otherwise then to quench it.

10. Defensive Wars are caused from unpreparedness of the offended State for War, as when defective Stores are served into the Magazines by corrupt Officers at the rate of good; when Armies are falsely Mustered; when Souldiers are either Tenants or Servants to their Commanders, or else persons, who for their Crimes or Debts, want protection from Justice; when the Officers are ignorant of their business, and absent from their Commands; and withal afraid to punish, because unwilling to pay. Wherefore to be alwayes in a posture of War at home, is the cheapest way to keep off War from abroad.

11. The causes of Civil Wars here in _Europe_ proceed very much from Religion, _viz._ the punishing of Believers heterodox from the Authorized way, in publike and open places, before great multitudes of ignorant people, with loss of life, liberty, and limbs, rather then by well proportioned tolerable pecuniary mulcts, such as every conscientious Non-Conformist would gladly pay, and Hypocrites by refusing, discover themselves to be such.

12. Civil Wars are likewise caused by peoples fansying, that their own uneasie condition may be best remedied by an universal confusion; although indeed upon the upshot of such disorders they shall probably be in a worse, even although they survive and succeed, but more probably perish in the contest.

13. Moreover, the peoples believing that Forms of Government shall in a few years produce any considerable alteration as to the wealth of the Subject that the Form which is most ancient and present is not the best for the place; that any established family or person is not better then any new pretender, or even then the best Election that can be made; that Sovereignty is invisible, and that it is not certainly annexed unto some certain person or persons.

14. Causes of Civil War are also, that the Wealth of the Nation is in too few mens hands, and that no certain means are provided to keep all men from a necessity either to beg, or steal, or be Souldiers.

Moreover, the allowing Luxury in some, whilst others needlesly starve.

The dispensing of benefits upon casual and uncertain Motives, the giving vaste Emoluments to persons and parties of no certain visible merit. These are the things which cause animosities among the totter-headed multitude, who are the tinder that the sparks of a few Designers may easily inflame.

15. One Cause of Publick Charge in matters of Religion, is the not having changed the limits of Parishes and Cures with the Change of Religion from Popery, and with the Changes in Plantation and Trade. For now when the Ministers of the Gospel preach unto multitudes assembled in one place, may not Parishes be bigger? that is, may not Flocks be more numerous, then when every particular sheep was, as heretofore, drest and shorn three or four times _per annum_ by Shrift. If there be in _England_ and _Wales_ but about five millions of people, what needs more then 5000. Parishes? that is 1000. Sheep under every Shepheard. Whereas in the middling Parishes of _London_ there are about 5000. souls in each. Upon which account there needs be in _England_ and _Wales_ but a 1000. Parishes, whereas there are near 10000.

16. Now the saving of half the Parishes, would (reckoning the benefices one with another, but at 100_l._ _per Annum_ a piece) save 500000_l._ Besides, when the number of Parochial Parsons were halved, then there would need but half the present number of Byshops, Deans and Chapters, Colledges and Cathedralls, which perhaps would amount to two or three hundred thousand pounds more: And yet the Church of God would be more regularly served then now, and that without prejudice to that sacred, ancient Order of Episcopacy, and the way of their Maintenance by Tythes; and all this in a method of greater Reformation and suitableness thereunto.

18. But suppose it be said, that in some wild Countreys, a thousand people do not live in a less scope of ground then of eight miles square. To which I answer, that there are few or no such places, the largest Parishes I know, being not more capacious then of three or four miles square, in which is no difficulty, for the people to meet once a week at some central place within that scope.

19. Moreover I say, that a Curate of small Learning, if of good life, and duly Ordained, may officiate in four Chappels of Ease every Sunday; and the Preacher, who indeed should be a person of Learning and Eloquence, may preach every other Sunday in every of the said Chappels, by preaching in two of them one day, and in the other two, the other day: And this with Catechizing, and Extra-Lectures upon the Week-dayes, would perform as much as now is performed, and as much as by the blessing of God is necessary to salvation; for the yoak of Christ is easie, and his burthen light.

20. But to put an end to this doubt; I affirm, that if England and Wales were cut out in parcels of three miles square, there would be found few above four thousand such, of which to make Parishes.

21. Now if it be said, that the Alienation of these Tythes is Sacriledge; I answer, that if the same be employed to defend the Church of God against the Turke and Pope, and the Nations who adhere to them, it is not at all; or less, then to give 3./4. of the same to the Wives and Children of the Priests which were not in being when those allowances were set forth?

21. If I had not an abhorrence from propounding the lessening of the Church Means, I could say, that the retrenching part of each remaining Parsons Tythes and Emoluments, and leaving them for part, to the free Contributions of their Flocks, were a way to promote the Gospel, and to give less offence to such as think that their whole maintenance should be made in that manner.

22. I might also say, that forasmuch as there be more Males then Females in _England_, (the said disproportion _pro tanto_ hindering procreation) that it were good for the Ministers to return to their Cælibat; or that none should be Ministers, whilst they were married, it being easie among five millions of people to finde out 5000. that could and would live single, that is, one in a thousand: And then our unmarried Parson might live as well with half, as now with the whole of his Benefice.

23. Alwayes provided, that though the number of Parishes, and the measure of Benefices were lessened, yet that the same ought to be done without dammage to the present Incumbents.

24. As for lessening the Charge of Offices relating to the Government and the Law, the same will consist in abolishing the superfluous, supernumerary, and antiquated; and withall, in retrenching the Fees of others, to what the labour, art, and trust of their respective employments do require. For there be many Offices wholly executed by Deputies for small wages, whereas the Masters of them have ten times as much, although they know nothing either of what is done, or ought to be done in the business.

25. Now such Surplusages as these should be either restored unto the people who gave them unto the King, at a time when those Fees made up but a just reward for the Officer; or else the King keeping them still might take them for so much toward the Publick Charge, but not give them away to stop the importunate suits of any particular person, in whom and in all his dependants, such benefits do but cause a laziness as to the true original gain of the Nation, and themselves in particular, together with a total negligence and ignorance of the publick good.

26. Many are the particulars that might be instanced of this kinde; but my aim not being to prejudice any man in particular, I descend no lower, wishing onely that there might be an universal Reformation of what length of time hath warped awry, in which case no particular men are to be troubled; for if all suffer, none suffers, and all men would be no poorer then now they are if they should lose half their Estates; nor would they be a whit the richer if the same were doubled, the _Ratio formalis_ of Riches lying rather in proportion then quantity.

27. To lessen the charge of Universities, unto which I adde the Inns of Court, which is not much, were to lessen the number of the Students in Divinity, Law and Medicine, by lessening the use of those Professions.

Now having spoken already of Divinity, I come next to the Law, and say; that if Registers were kept of all mens Estates in Lands, and of all the Conveyances of, and Engagements upon them; and withal if publick Loan-Banks, Lombards, or Banks of Credit upon deposited money, Plate, Jewels, Cloth, Wooll, Silke, Leather, Linnen, Mettals, and other durable Commodities, were erected, I cannot apprehend how there could be above one tenth part of the Law-suits and Writings, as now there are.

28. And moreover, if by accompt of the people, of their Land and other wealth, the number of Lawyers and Scriveners were adjusted, I cannot conceive how their should remain above one hundredth part of what now are; forasmuch as I have heard some affirm, that there be now ten times as many as are even now necessary; and that there are now ten times as many Law-suits, as upon the abovementioned Reformation, there would be. It follows therefore, that upon the whole there would not need one in a hundred of the present number of Retainers to the Law, and Offices of Justice; the occasions as well of crimes as injuries being so much retrenched.

29. As for Physicians, it is not hard by the help of the observations which have been lately made upon the Bills of Mortality, to know how many are sick in _London_ by the number of them that dye, and by the proportions of the City to finde out the same of the Countrey; and by both, by the advice of the learned Colledge of that Faculty to calculate how many Physicians were requisite for the whole Nation, and consequently, how many Students in that art to permit and encourage; and lastly, having calculated these numbers, to adoptate a proportion of Chyrurgeons, Apothecaries, and Nurses to them, and so by the whole to cut off and extinguish that infinite swarm of vain pretenders unto, and abusers of that God-like Faculty, which of all Secular Employments our Saviour himself after he began to preach engaged himself upon.

30. Moreover, if it were agreed, what number of Divines, Physicians, and Civilians (that is, of men bred in Universities) were requisite to the publick service? As suppose 13000. in the present way, and perhaps not above 6000. in that way of Retrenchment which we propound; then supposing that but one in forty dyes _per annum_, it follows that less then 350. might suffice to be sent yearly out of the Universities: Where supposing they stay five years one with another, it followeth also that about 1800. is the number of Students fit to be allowed in the Universities at a time; I mean, of such as intend to make Learning their Trade and way of Livelihood.

31. I might intimate, that if 1800. Students were enough, and that if there were 40000. Parish Children and Foundlings in _England_, it were probable that one in twenty of them might be of excellent wit and towardness.

Now since the Publick may dispose of these Children as they please, and since there is Maintenance in both Universities for above 1800. what if our Professors of Art were in this manner selected and educated? But of this but _in transitu_.

32. Hereunto may be added, that by reason of Loan Banks aforementioned, whereby the Credits and Estates of all Dealers may be known, and all the mysterious dangers of money prevented, and that by good Accompts of our growth, Manufacture, Consumption, and Importation, it might be known how many Merchants were able to mannage the Exchange of our superfluous Commodities with the same of other Countreys: And also how many Retailers are needful to make the subdistributions into every Village of this Nation, and to receive back their superfluities. Upon these grounds I presume a large proportion of these also might be retrenched, who properly and originally earn nothing from the Publick, being onely a kinde of Gamesters, that play with one another for the labours of the poor; yielding of themselves no fruit at all, otherwise then as veins and arteries, to distribute forth and back the blood and nutritive juyces of the Body Politick, namely the product of Husbandry and Manufacture.

33. Now if the numerous Offices and Fees relating to the Government, Law, and Church, and if the number of Divines, Lawyers, Physicians, Merchants, and Retailers were also lessened, all which do receive great wages for little work done to the Publick, with how much greater ease would common expences be defrayed? and with how much more equality would the same be assessed?

34. We enumerated six Branches of the Publick Charge, and have slightly spoken how four of them might be lessened; we come next to the other two Branches, whereof we shall rather recommend the augmentation.

The first of these two Branches I call, generally speaking, Care of the Poor, consisting of Receptacles for the aged, blinde, lame, &c. in health; Hospitals for noysome, chronical, curable and uncurable, inward and outward Diseases. With others for acute and contagious. Others for Orphans, sound and exposed Children; of which latter sort none should be refused, let the number be never so great, provided their names, families, and relations were well concealed: The choice of which Children being made at their being about eight or ten years old, might afford the King the fittest Instruments for all kinde of his Affairs, and be as firmly obliged to be his faithful servants as his own natural Children.

35. This is no new nor rare thing, onely the neglect of it in these Countreys, is rather to be esteemed a rare and new project: Nor is it unknown what excellent fruits there have been of this Institution, of which we shall say much more, upon another occasion hereafter.

36. When all helpless and impotent Persons were thus provided for, and the lazy and thievish restrained and punished by the Minister of Justice, it follows now, that we finde out certain constant Employments for all other indigent people, who labouring according to the Rules upon them, may require a sufficiency of food and raiment. Their Children also, (if small and impotent) as aforesaid, being provided for elsewhere.

37. But what shall these Employments be? I answer, such as were reckoned as the sixth Branch of the Publick Expence, _viz._ making all High-wayes so broad, firm, and eaven, as whereby the charge and tedium of travelling and Carriages may be greatly lessened. The cutting and scowring of Rivers into Navigable; the planting of usefull Trees for timber, delight, and fruit in convenient places.

The making of Bridges and Cawseys.

The working in Mines, Quarries, and Colleries.

The Manufactures of Iron, &c.

38. I pitch upon all these particulars, first, as works wanting in this Nation; secondly, as works of much labour, and little art; and thirdly, as introductive of new Trades into _England_, to supply that of Cloth, which we have almost totally lost.

In the next place it will be asked, who shall pay these men? I answer, every body; for if there be 1000. men in a Territory, and if 100. of these can raise necessary food and raiment for the whole 1000. If 200. more, make as much commodities, as other Nations will give either their commodities or money for, and if 400. more be employed in the ornaments, pleasure, and magnificence of the whole; if there be 200. Governours, Divines, Lawyers, Physicians, Merchants, and Retailers, making in all 900. the question is, since there is food enough for this supernumerary 100. also, how they should come by it? whether by begging, or by stealing; or whether they shall suffer themselves to starve, finding no fruit of their begging, or being taken in their stealing be put to death another way? Or whether they shall be given away to another Nation that will take them? I think ’tis plain, they ought neither to be starved, nor hanged, nor given away; now if they beg, they may pine for hunger to day, and be gorged and glutted to morrow, which will occasion Diseases and evil habits, the same may be said of stealing; moreover, perhaps they may get either by begging or stealing more then will suffice them, which will for ever after indispose them to labour, even upon the greatest occasion which may suddenly and unexpectedly happen.

39. For all these Reasons, it will be certainly the safer way to afford them the superfluity which would otherwise be lost and wasted, or wantonly spent: Or in case there be no overplus, then ’tis fit to retrench a little from the delicacy of others feeding in quantity or quality; few men spending less then double of what might suffice them as to the bare necessities of nature.

40. Now as to the work of these supernumeraries, let it be without expence of Foreign Commodities, and then ’tis no matter if it be employed to build a useless Pyramid upon _Salisbury Plain_, bring the Stones at _Stonehenge_ to _Tower-Hill_, or the like; for at worst this would keep their mindes to discipline and obedience, and their bodies to a patience of more profitable labours when need shall require it.

41. In the next place, as an instance of the usefulness of what hath been propounded, I ask what benefit will the mending of High-wayes, the building of Bridges and Cawseys, with making of Rivers navigable produce, besides the pleasure and beauty of them? To which I also answer, as an instance of the premises, that the same, together with the numerous millions of Cattle and Sheep out of _Ireland_, shall produce a vaste superfluity of English Horses, the which because they have the many excellent qualities of beauty, strength, courage, swiftness, and patience concentrated in them, beyond the Horses of other places, would be a very vendible Commodity all over _Europe_; and such as depending upon the intrinsick nature of the English Soyle could not be counterfeited, nor taken away by others. Moreover, an Horse is such a Commodity as will carry both himself and his Merchant to the Market, be the same never so distant.

CHAP. III.

_How the Causes of the unquiet bearing of Taxes may be lessened._

We have slightly gone through all the six Branches of the Publick Charge, and have (though imperfectly and in haste) shewn what would encrease, and what would abate them.

We come next to take away some of the general Causes of the unquiet bearing of Taxes, and yielding to Contributions, _viz._

2. 1. That the people think, the Sovereign askes more then he needs. To which we answer, 1. That if the Sovereign were sure to have what he wanted in due time, it were his own great dammage to draw away the money out of his Subjects hands, who by trade increase it, and to hoard it up in his own Coffers, where ’tis of no use even to himself, but lyable to be begged or vainly expended.

3. 2. Let the Tax be never so great, if it be proportionable unto all, then no man suffers the loss of any Riches by it. For men (as we said but now) if the Estates of them all were either halfed or doubled, would in both cases remain equally rich. For they would each man have his former state, dignity, and degree; and moreover, the Money leavied not going out of the Nation, the same also would remain as rich in comparison of any other Nation; onely the Riches of the Prince and People would differ for a little while, namely, until the money leavied from some, were again refunded upon the same, or other persons that paid it: In which case every man also should have his chance and opportunity to be made the better or worse by the new distribution; or if he lost by one, yet to gain by another.

4. 3. Now that which angers men most, is to be taxed above their Neighbours. To which I answer, that many times these surmizes are mistakes, many times they are chances, which in the next Tax may run more favourable; and if they be by design, yet it cannot be imagined, that it was by design of the Sovereign, but of some temporary Assessor, whose turn it may be to receive the _Talio_ upon the next occasion from the very man he has wronged.

5. 4. Men repine much, if they think the money leavyed will be expended on Entertainments, magnificent Shews, triumphal Arches, &c. To which I answer, that the same is a refunding the said moneys to the Tradesmen who work upon those things; which Trades though they seem vain and onely of ornament, yet they refund presently to the most useful; namely, to Brewers, Bakers, Taylours, Shoemakers, &c. Moreover, the Prince hath no more pleasure in these Shews and Entertainments then 100000. others of his meanest Subjects have, whom, for all their grumbling, we see to travel many miles to be spectators of these mistaken and distasted vanities.

6. 5. The people often complain, that the King bestows the money he raises from the people upon his Favourites: To which we answer; that what is given to Favourites, may at the next step or transmigration, come into our own hands, or theirs unto whom we wish well, and think do deserve it.

7. Secondly, as this man is a Favourite to day, so another, or our selves, may be hereafter; favour being of a very slippery and moveable nature, and not such a thing as we need much to envy; for the same way that----leads up an hill, leads also down the same. Besides, there is nothing in the Lawes or Customes of _England_, which excludes any the meanest mans Childe, from arriving to the highest Offices in this Kingdom, much less debars him from the Personall kindness of his Prince.

8. All these imaginations (whereunto the vulgar heads are subject) do cause a backwardness to pay, and that necessitates the Prince to severity. Now this lighting upon some poor, though stubborn, stiff-necked Refuser, charged with Wife and Children, gives the credulous great occasion to complain of Oppression, and breeds ill blood as to all other matters; feeding the ill humours already in being.