Chapter IV: Part 4

8. Secondly, In case small pieces of this Money, _viz._ pieces of two pence should happen to be raised or depressed twelve, fifteen, or sixteen _per cent._ then there will be a certain loss by reason of the fractions, which the vulgar cannot reckon: As for example, if such Money were depressed but ten, eleven, or twelve _per cent._ then the two pence piece would be worth but three half pence, which is twenty five _per cent._ and so of other proportions.

9. Thirdly, In case the Inconvenience of this Money should be so great as to necessitate a new Coinage of it, then will happen all the losses we mentioned before in melting it down by Bullioners.

10. Fourthly, If the two pence piece contained but 1./5.^{th.} part of the Silver usually in a shilling, then Dealers would have fifteen pence paid in this money for the same Commodity, for which they would take a shilling in Standard Silver.

11. Raising of Money is either the cutting the pound _Troy_ of Standard Silver into more pieces then formerly, as into above sixty, whereas heretofore the same was made but into twenty, and yet both sorts called shillings, or else calling the money already made by higher names: The reasons or pretences given for such raising are these, _viz._ That the raising of Money will bring it in, and the material thereof more plentifully; for trial whereof suppose one shilling were proclaimed to be worth two, what other effect could this have, then the raising of all Commodities unto a double price? Now if it were proclaimed, That Labourers Wages, &c. should not rise at all upon this raising of Money, then would this Act be as onely a Tax upon the said Labourers, as forcing them to lose half their wages, which would not be onely unjust but impossible, unless they could live with the said half, (which is not to be supposed) for then the Law that appoints such Wages were ill made, which should allow the Labourer but just wherewithall to live; for if you allow double, then he works but half so much as he could have done, and otherwise would; which is a loss to the Publick of the fruit of so much labour.

12. But suppose the _Quart d’ Ecus_ of _France_ commonly esteemed worth eighteen pence were raised to three shillings, then ’tis true, that all the Moneys of _England_ would be indeed _Quart d’ Ecus_ pieces; but as true, that all the English Money would be carried away, and that our _Quart d’ Ecus_ would contain but half so much Bullion as our own money did; so that raising of Money may indeed change the _species_, but with so much loss as the Forreign Pieces were raised unto, above their intrinsick value.

13. But for remedy of this, suppose we raised the _Quart d’ Ecus_ double, and prohibited the Exportation of our own money in Exchange thereof. I answer, that such a Prohibition is nugatory, and impossible to be executed; and if it were not, yet the raising of the said _species_ would but make us sell the Commodities bought with raised _Quart d’ Ecus_, in effect but at half the usual rate, which unto them that want such commodities will as well yield the full; so that abating our prices, will as well allure strangers to buy extraordinary proportions of our Commodities, as raising their money will do: But neither that, nor abating the price will make strangers use more of our Commodities then they want; for although the first year they should carry away an unuseful and superfluous proportion, yet afterwards they would take so much the less.

14. If this be true, as in substance it is, why then have so many wise States in several ancient, as well as modern times frequently practised this Artifice, as a means to draw in money into their respective Dominions?

I answer, that something is to be attributed to the stupidity and ignorance of the people, who cannot of a sudden understand this matter: for I finde many men wise enough, who though they be well informed that raising of money signifies little, yet cannot suddenly digest it. As for example, an unengaged person who had money in his purse in _England_, and should hear that a shilling was made fourteen pence in _Ireland_, would more readily run thither to buy Land then before; not suddenly apprehending, that for the same Land which he might have bought before for six years Purchase, he shall now pay seven. Nor will Sellers in _Ireland_ of a sudden apprehend cause to raise their Land proportionally, but will at least be contented to compound the business, _viz._ to sell at six and an half; and if the difference be a more ragged fraction, men under a long time will not apprehend it, nor ever be able exactly to govern their practice according to it.

15. Secondly, Although I apprehend little real difference between raising Forreign Money to double, and abating half in the price of our own Commodities, yet to sell them on a tacite condition to be paid in Forreign present Money, shall increase our money; forasmuch as between raising the money, and abasing the price, is the same difference as between selling for money and in barter, which latter is the dearer; or between selling for present money, and for time; barter resolving into the nature of uncertain time.

16. I say, suppose English Cloth were sold at six shillings a Yard, and French Canvas at eighteen pence the Ell, the question is, whether it were all one in order to increase Money in _England_ to raise the French Money double, or to abate half of the price of our Cloth? I think the former better, because that former way or proposition carries with it a condition of having Forreign Money in _specie_, and not Canvas in barter, between which two wayes the world generally agrees there is a difference. Wherefore if we can afford to abate half our price, but will not do it but for our neighbours money, then we gain so much as the said difference between Money and Barter amounts unto, by such raising of our Neighbours Money.

17. But the fundamental solution of this Question depends upon a real and not an imaginary way of computing the prices of Commodities; in order to which real way I premise these suppositions: First then, suppose there be in a Territory a thousand people, let these people be supposed sufficient to Till this whole Territory as to the Husbandry of Corn, which we will suppose to contain all necessaries for life, as in the Lords Prayer we suppose the word Bread doth; and let the production of a Bushel of this Corn be supposed of equal labour to that of producing an ounce of Silver. Suppose again that a tenth part of this Land, and tenth of the people, viz. an hundred of them, can produce Corn enough for the whole; suppose that the Rent of Land (found out as abovementioned) be a fourth part of the whole product, (about which proportion it really is, as we may perceive by paying a fourth Sheaf instead of Rent in some places) suppose also that whereas but an hundred are necessary for this Husbandry, yet that two hundred have taken up the Trade; and suppose that where a Bushel of Corn would suffice, yet men out of delicacy will use two, making use of the Flower onely of both. Now the Inferences from hence are;

First, That the goodness or badness, or the value of Land depends upon the greater or lesser share of the product given for it in proportion to the simple labour bestowed to raise the said Product.

Secondly, That the proportions between Corn and Silver signifie onely an artificial value, not a natural; because the comparison is between a thing naturally useful, and a thing in it self unnecessary, which (by the way) is part of the reason why there are not so great changes and leaps in the prices of Silver as of other Commodities.

Thirdly, That natural dearness and cheapness depends upon the few or more hands requisite to necessaries of Nature: As Corn is cheaper where one man produces Corn for ten, then where he can do the like but for six; and withall, according as the Climate disposes men to a necessity of spending more or less. But Political Cheapness depends upon the paucity of Supernumerary Interlopers into any Trade over and above all that are necessary, _viz._ Corn will be twice as dear where are two hundred Husbandmen to do the same work which an hundred could perform: the proportion thereof being compounded with the proportion of superfluous Expence, (_viz._ if to the cause of dearness abovementioned be added to the double Expence to what is necessary) then the natural price will appear quadrupled; and this quadruple Price is the true Political Price computed upon naturall grounds.

And this again proportioned to the common artificiall Standard Silver gives what was sought; that is, the true Price Currant.

18. But forasmuch as almost all Commodities have their Substitutes or Succedanea, and that almost all uses may be answered several wayes; and for that novelty, surprize, example of Superiours, and opinion of unexaminable effects do adde or take away from the price of things, we must adde these contingent Causes to the permanent Causes abovementioned, in the judicious foresight and computation whereof lies the excellency of a Merchant.

Now to apply this Digression, I say, that to encrease Money, it is as well necessary to know how to abate as raise, the price of Commodities, and that of Money, which was the scope of the said Digression.

19. To conclude this whole Chapter, we say, that raising or embasing of Moneys is a very pittiful and unequal way of Taxing the people; and ’tis a sign that the State sinketh, which catcheth hold on such Weeds as are accompanied with the dishonour of impressing a Princes Effigies to justifie Adulterate Commodities, and the breach of Publick Faith, such as is the calling a thing what it really is not.

CHAP. XV.

_Of Excize._

It is generally allowed by all, that men should contribute to the Publick Charge but according to the share and interest they have in the Publick Peace; that is, according to their Estates or Riches: now there are two sorts of Riches, one actual, and the other potential. A man is actually and truly rich according to what he eateth, drinketh, weareth, or any other way really and actually enjoyeth; others are but potentially or imaginatively rich, who though they have power overmuch, make little use of it; these being rather Stewards and Exchangers for the other sort, then owners for themselves.

2. Concluding therefore that every man ought to contribute according to what he taketh to himself, and actually enjoyeth. The first thing to be done is, to compute what the Total of the Expence of this Nation is by particular men upon themselves, and then what part thereof is necessary for the Publick; both which (no not the former) are so difficult as most men imagine.

3. In the next place we must conceive, that the very perfect Idea of making a Leavy upon Consumptions, is to rate every particular Necessary, just when it is ripe for Consumption; that is to say, not to rate Corn until it be Bread, nor Wool until it be Cloth, or rather until it be a very Garment; so as the value of Wool, Cloathing, and Tayloring, even to the Thread and Needles might be comprehended; But this being perhaps too laborious to be performed, we ought to enumerate a Catalogue of Commodities both native and artificial, such whereof accompts may be most easily taken, and can bear the Office marks either on themselves, or on what contains them; being withall such, as are to be as near Consumption as possible: And then we are to compute what further labour or charge is to be bestowed on each of them, before consumption, that so an allowance be given accordingly. As for example, suppose there be an hundred pounds worth of Stript Stuff for Hangings, and an hundred pounds worth of Cloth or Stuff for the best mens Cloathes; I conceive, that the Cloth should bear a greater Excize then the said stript stuff, the one wanting nothing but tacking up, to be at its wayes end; and the other Tayloring, Thread, Silk, Needles, Thimbles, Buttons, and several other particulars: The Excise of all which must be accumulated upon the Excize of the Cloth, unless they be so great (as perhaps Buttons, Lace, or Ribbons may be) to be taxed apart, and inserted into the Catalogue abovementioned.

4. Now the things to be accumulated upon Cloth are, as near as possible, to be such particulars as are used onely to Cloth, or very rarely to any other particular, as the several sorts of peculiar trimmings; so on Corn should be accumulated the charge of grinding, bolting, yeast, &c. for the baking of it into Bread, unless, as was said before, any of these particulars can be better rated apart.

5. A Question ariseth hence, whether any Native Commodities exported ought to pay the Excize, or that what is imported in lieu of it should pay none? I answer no, because they are not spent here _in specie_; but I conceive that the Goods returned from abroad for them and spent here should pay, if the exported have not already, for so shall what we spend pay once, but not oftner. Now if Bullion be returned, then if it be coyned into Money it ought not to pay, because Money will beget other commodities which shall pay; but if the said Bullion be wrought into Plate and Utensils, or disgrost into Wire or Lace, or beaten into Fueilles, then it also ought to pay, because it is consumed and absolutely spent, as in Lace and Gilding is too notorious; and this is the reason why I think the Leavy we commonly call Customs to be unseasonable and preposterous, the same being a payment before consumption.

6. We have several times spoken of Accumulative Excize, by which we mean Taxing many things together as one: As for example, suppose the many Drugs used in Treacle or Mithridate were used onely in those Compositions, in such case by taxing any one of them, the whole number will be taxed as certainly as that one, because they all bear a certain proportion one to another: In Cloth, the Workmanship and Tools as well as the Wool may be well enough taxed, &c.

7. But some have strained this Accumulation so, as they would have all things together taxed upon some one single particular, such as they think to be nearest the Common Standard of all Expence, the principal ends of their proposition being these, _viz._

First, To disguise the name of Excize, as odious to them, that do neither know the payment of Taxes to be as indispensable as eating, and as have not considered the natural justice of this way of Excizing or proportionating.

Secondly, To avoid the trouble and charge of Collecting.

Thirdly, To bring the business _ad firmum_, and to a certainty of all which we shall speak hereafter, when we examine the several reasons for and against the way of Excize, proceeding now to the several _species_ of Accumulative Excizes propounded in the world.

8. Some propound Beer to be the only Excizable Commodity, supposing that in the proportion that men drink, they make all other Expences; which certainly will not hold, especially if Strong Beer pay quintuple unto, (as now) or any more Excize then the small: For poor Carpenters, Smiths, Feltmakers, &c. drinking twice as much Strong Beer as Gentlemen do of Small, must consequently pay ten times as much Excize. Moreover, upon the Artizans Beer is accumulated, onely a little Bread and Cheese, leathern Clothes, Neck-Beef, and Inwards twice a week, stale Fish, old Pease without Butter, &c. Whereas on the other, beside Drink, is accumulated as many more things as Nature and Art can produce; besides this way of Excizing, though it be never so well administred, is neither so equal nor so easie, nor so examinable as the simple Poll-money before spoken of, which is also but an Accumulative Excize.

9. What hath been propounded for Beer may be of Salt, Fuel, Bread, &c. and the Propositions would all labour under the same Inconveniences; for some spend more, some less of these Commodities; and sometimes Families (each whereof are propounded to be farmed, without descending to individual heads) are more numerous at sometimes then at others, according as their Estates or other Interests shall wax or wane.

10. Of all the Accumulative Excizes, that of Harth-money or Smoak-money seems the best; and that onely because the easiest, and clearest, and fittest to ground a certain Revenue upon; it being easie to tell the number of Harths, which remove not as Heads or Polls do: Moreover, ’tis more easie to pay a small Tax, then to alter or abrogate Harths, even though they are useless and supernumerary; nor is it possible to cover them, because most of the neighbours know them; nor in new Building will any man who gives forty shillings for making a Chimney be without it for two.

11. Here is to be noted, that a Harth-money must be but small, or else ’twill be intolerable; it being more easie for a Gentleman of a thousand pound _per annum_ to pay for an hundred Chimneys (few of their Mansion-Houses having more) then for Labourers to pay for two. Moreover, if the Land-Lord onely pay this Tax, then is it not an Accumulative Excize for all, but a particular Excize upon but one onely Commodity, namely Housing.

12. Now the Reasons for Excize are these, _viz._

First, The Natural Justice that every man should pay according to what he actually enjoyeth; upon which account this Tax is scarce forced upon any, and is very light to those, who please to be content with natural Necessaries.

Secondly, This Tax if it be not farmed, but regularly collected, engages to thrift, the onely way to enrich a Nation, as by the Dutch and Jews, and by all other men, who have come to vaste Estates by Trade, doth appear.

Thirdly, No man payes double or twice for the same thing, forasmuch as nothing can be spent but once; whereas it is frequently seen, that otherwise men pay both by the Rent of their Lands, by their Smoaks, by their Titles, and by Customs, (which all men do, though Merchants chiefly talk of it) they also pay by Benevolence and by Tythes; whereas in this way of Excize no man need pay but one way, nor but once, properly speaking.

Fifthly, By this way an excellent account may be taken of the Wealth, Growth, Trade, and strength of the Nation at all times. All which Reasons do make not for particular compoundings with Families, nor for letting the whole to farm, but for collecting it by special Officers, who having a full employment, will not be a fourth of the charge of our present many multiform Levies; for to put extraordinary trouble and hazzard upon the Countrey Officers, is a sorer Taxing of them, then to make them pay a small Reward unto practised Persons to be their Substitutes. All which are the common Objections against Excize.

13. I should here adde the manner of Collecting it, but I refer this to the practice of _Holland_; and I might also offer how men may be framed to be fit for this and other Publick Trusts, as to be Cashiers, Store-keepers, Collectors, &c. but I refer this Enquiry unto a more ample and fit occasion.

Errata.

Pag. line.
1 14 between [_who_ and _spent_] interline [_have_]
5 13 after [_want_] read [_general_] instead of [_more_]
6 19 before [_starve_] interline [_needlesly_]
6 29 before [_cause_] read [_one_] instead of [_the_]
6 30 read [_is_] instead of [_are_]
8 7 read [_them_] for [_him_]
8 8 read [_their_] for [_his_]
17 19 read [_viz._] for [_that is_]
18 3 read [τἁ χρἠϛα] instead of [τἁ χρἠσα]
20 17 read [_Excisum_] not [_Excisium_]
21 7 read [_obligees_] not [_obliges_]
22 12 read [_enhansing_] not [_exhausting_]
22 23 between [_way_ and _Land-Tax_] interline [_of a_]
22 25 deleatur [_sometimes_]
24 25 between [_Rents_ and _we_] interline [_in order to Taxes_]
28 24 between [_seldom_ and _enough_] interline [_rich_]
28 28 deleatur [_with_]
30 11 after [_hazards_] interline [_and_]
14 read [_omitted_]
27 read [_apparatus_] instead of [_appurtenances_]
32 10 after [_the_] interline [_former_]
11 after [_Land_] read [_this latter_] instead [_of the_]
33 26 deleatur [_by_]
31 between [_&c._ and _then_] interline [_could be
fertilized_]
34 36 read [_worth_] not [_work_]
36 16 after [_market_] interline [_abroad_]
37 12 read [_paribus_] not [_talibus_]
39 6 read [_conniving_] not [_coyning_]
39 32 deleatur [_as much harm_]
ibid. between [_of_ and _one_] interline [_the_]
penult. after [_Coffee_] inter [_and_]
40 2 read [_meerly_] for [_merrily_]
ult. before [_certainly_] interline [_case_]
41 13 dele [_out_]
24 read [_so or not_] instead of [_use_]
47 26 read [_on_] for [_of_]
51 3 read [_their_] for [_the_]
15 after [_Heterodox_] interline [_Believer_]
29 read [_wearing_] for [_weaving_]
53 14 read [_defect_] for [_dissent_]
54 36 between [_then_ and _is_] interline [_it_]
56 ult. after [_yet the_] interline [_said_]
57 3 read [_offices_] for [_officers_]
60 2 read [_shared_] for [_shred_]
61 15 read [_consequences_] for [_calamities_]
32 read [_an_] for [_no_]
62 1 after [_plentiful_] interline [_year_]
65 21 read [_medalls_] instead of [_a medall_]
66 10 between [_consisting_ and _great_] interline [_of_]
67 29 read [_d’ Ecus_] instead of [_d’ Esens_]
68 36 read [_abating_] for [_abasing_]
69 11 after [_former_] interline [_better_]
70 12 read [_prices_] for [_proceed_]
71 5 read [_as_] for [_the_]
75 25 read [_families_] for [_faculties_.]

_FINIS._

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

All changes listed above in the Errata have been applied to the
etext.
--the change listed for page 18 line 3, changing “τἁ χρἠσα”
to “τἁ χρἠϛα”, has also been applied to the three other
occurrences in the text.
--the change listed for page 20 line 17, changing “Excisium”
to “Excisum”, has also been applied to the three other
occurrences in the text.
--the change listed for page 67 line 29, changing “d’ Esens”
to “d’ Escu” has been modified to change to “d’ Ecus”. This
change has also been applied to the four other occurrences
in the text. (Quart d’ Ecu was a French coin of this period.)
--the preposition “than” in modern English is consistently
written as “then” in the original text, and has not been
changed.

Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
the text and consultation of external sources.

Except for those changes noted below, all spellings in the text,
and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.

Preface: ‘acceptance ofall’ replaced by ‘acceptance of all’.
Pg 2: ‘Schools and Universitities,’ replaced by ‘Schools and
Universities,’.
Pg 4: ‘that enrease Wars,’ replaced by ‘that encrease Wars,’.
Pg 5: ‘Armies are fasly’ replaced by ‘Armies are falsely’.
Pg 14: ‘have slighty gone’ replaced by ‘have slightly gone’.
Pg 15: ‘mangnificent Shews’ replaced by ‘magnificent Shews’.
Pg 18: ‘superflous, no more’ replaced by ‘superfluous, no more’.
Pg 19: ‘Impisonments, according to’ replaced by ‘Imprisonments,
according to’.
Pg 26: ‘infinity of unites’ replaced by ‘infinity of unities’.
Pg 37: ‘the said Duies,’ replaced by ‘the said Duties,’.
Pg 40: ‘Intrest and of the’ replaced by ‘Interest and
advantage of the’.
Pg 41: ‘resisting of ture’ replaced by ‘resisting of Nature’.
Pg 41: ‘Merchant nor Statseman’ replaced by ‘Merchant nor
Statesman’.
Pg 43: ‘all mankiude alike;’ replaced by ‘all mankinde alike;’.
Pg 45: ‘not, bebeing rather’ replaced by ‘not, being rather’.
Pg 50: ‘parts to discoveers’ replaced by ‘parts to discoverers’.
Pg 51: ‘such a freedon’ replaced by ‘such a freedom’.
Pg 55: ‘have not throughly’ replaced by ‘have not thoroughly’.
Pg 57: ‘are thererore Taxes’ replaced by ‘are therefore Taxes’.
Pg 58: ‘for the Uniparons’ replaced by ‘for the Uniparous’.
Pg 65: ‘it hath hapned,’ replaced by ‘it hath happened,’.
Pg 68: ‘sell them on on a’ replaced by ‘sell them on a’.
Pg 71: ‘but acccording to’ replaced by ‘but according’ to.
Pg 75: ‘Seondly, This Tax’ replaced by ‘Secondly, This Tax’.
Errata: the changes noted for page 32 lines 10 and 11 do not make
sense; a “conjectured emendation”, as given in some
other reprints of this book, has been used instead;
namely, ‘after [_this_] interline [_former_]’ and
‘after [_Land,_] read [_the latter_] instead of [_that_]’.