Chapter VIII: Politics (3)

"On the other hand, however, you cannot deny the soundness of the
argument that, if the responsible leaders of British naval policy
keep expressing their desire to enter into a discussion, the
refusal of Germany to do so must cause the British to believe that
we are pursuing aims far exceeding those we have openly avowed. My
somewhat fatigued brain is unable to see whether the German
contention is right or wrong. But naturally, I always look upon
things from the business man's point of view, and so I always think
it better to come to some kind of an agreement with a competitor
rather than allow him an unlimited measure of expansion. Once,
however, I have come to the conclusion that for financial or other
reasons this competitor can no longer keep pace with me, his
further existence ceases altogether to interest me.

"Thus the views of the expert on these matters and those of the
business man run counter to each other, and I am entitled to
dismiss this subject without entering upon a discussion of the
interesting and remarkable arguments which Winston Churchill put
before me last night. I cannot, however, refrain from contradicting
by a few brief words the contention that the motives which had
prompted the Haldane mission were not sincere. A conversation with
Sir Edward Grey the night before last has strengthened this
conviction of mine still further. I regard Sir Edward as a serious,
honest, and clever statesman, and I am sure you will agree with my
view that the Haldane mission has cleared the atmosphere
surrounding Anglo-German relations which had become very strained."

It may be supposed that history, in the meantime, has proved whose standpoint was the correct one: that of the business man or that of the naval expert.

Not much need be said about the subsequent development of events up to the outbreak of the war.

The above-mentioned opinion which the Chancellor held regarding Churchill's speech of March 18th, 1912, was probably arrived at on the strength of the cabled reports only. Whoever reads the full original text of the speech must fail to find anything aggressive in it, and there was no harm in admitting that it was a perfectly frank and honest statement concerning the naval rivalry of the two Powers. Among other things it contained the suggestion that a "naval holiday" should be agreed upon, i.e. both countries should abstain from building new ships for a definite period. We, at any rate, looked upon Churchill's speech as a suitable means of making people see what would be the ultimate consequences of the interminable naval armaments. I made a German translation of it which, with the aid of one of the committees for an Anglo-German understanding, I spread broadcast all over the country. However, it proved a complete failure, as there were powerful groups in both countries who contended that the efforts to reconcile the two standpoints could not lead to any positive result, and that the old injunction, _si vis pacem, para bellum_, indicated the only right solution. Only a master mind could have overcome these difficulties. But Herr v. Bethmann, as we know, considered that the problem, for inherent reasons, did not admit of any solution at all, and the Kaiser's initial enthusiasm had probably been damped by subsequent influences of a different kind. Ballin himself, in later years, ascribed the failure of the mission to the circumstance that the Kaiser and his Chancellor, between themselves only, had attempted to bring the whole matter to a successful issue instead of entrusting this task to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and to Admiral Tirpitz, the Secretary for the Navy.

An interesting sidelight on the causes which led to the failure of this last important attempt to reach an understanding is thrown by the rumours which were spread in the German Press in March, 1912, to the effect that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr v. Kiderlen, wished to resign, because he felt that he had been left too much in the dark with regard to the Anglo-German negotiations. It was also reported that the Chancellor's position had been shaken, and that Admiral Tirpitz felt dissatisfied, because the Navy Bill did not go far enough. Probably there was some vestige of truth in all these rumours, and this may have been connected with the attitude which the three gentlemen concerned had taken up towards the question of the negotiations with Great Britain.

Shortly after the visit of Lord Haldane Ballin received a letter from a personage belonging to the Kaiser's entourage in which it was said:

"The impression which has taken root with me during the many hours
which I spent as an attentive listener is that your broad-minded
scheme is being wrecked by our official circles, partly through
their clumsiness, and partly through their bureaucratic conceit,
and--which is worse--that we have failed to show ourselves worthy
of the great opportunity."

When it had become certain that the last attempt to reach an understanding had definitely and finally failed, the ambassador in London, Count Metternich, did not shrink from drawing the only possible conclusion from it. He had always expressed his conviction that a war between Germany and a Franco-Russian coalition would find Great Britain on the side of Germany's opponents, and his resignation--which, as usual, was explained by the state of his health--was really due to a report of his in which he stated it as his opinion that a continuation of German armaments would lead to war with Great Britain no later than 1915. It is alleged that the Kaiser added a very "ungracious" marginal note to this report. Consequently, the ambassador, who was a man of very independent character, did the only thing he could consistently do, and resigned his office. In taking this step he may have been influenced by the reception which the failure of the Haldane mission met with in Conservative circles in Great Britain, where no stone was left unturned to urge the necessity for continuing the policy of big armaments and to paint German untrustworthiness in the most glaring colours.

Count Metternich's successor was Herr v. Marschall, a gentleman whose appointment the Press and the official circles welcomed with great cordiality, and from whose considerable diplomatic abilities, which were acknowledged on all sides, an improvement of Anglo-German relations was confidently expected. It was said that the Kaiser had sent "his best man," thus demonstrating how greatly he also desired better relations. But Herr v. Marschall's activities came to a sudden end through his early death in September, 1912, and in October his place was taken by Prince Lichnowsky, whose efforts in the direction of an improvement in the relations are familiar to everyone who has read his pamphlet. Apart from the work performed by the ambassadors, great credit is also due to the activities displayed by Herr v. Kühlmann, the then Secretary to the Legation and subsequent Secretary of State. The public did not see a deal of his work, which was conducted with skill and was consistent. His close personal acquaintance with some of the leading British politicians, especially with Sir Edward Grey, enabled him to do much work for the maintenance of good relations and in the interest of European peace, particularly during the time when the post of ambassador was vacant, and also during the Balkan War. He had, moreover, a great deal to do with the drafting of the two colonial agreements dealing with the Bagdad Railway and the African problems respectively, both of which were ready for signature in the summer of 1914. The former especially may be looked upon as a proof not only that a considerable improvement had taken place in Anglo-German relations, but also that Great Britain was not inclined to adjust the guiding lines of her policy in Asia Minor exclusively in conformity with the wishes of Russia. Anybody who takes an interest in the then existing possibilities of German expansion with the consent of Great Britain and on the basis of these colonial draft agreements cannot do better than read the anonymous pamphlet entitled "_Deutsche Weltpolitik und kein Krieg_" ("German World Power and No War"), published in 1913 by Messrs. Puttkamer & Mühlbrecht, of Berlin. The author is Dr. Plehn, the then representative of the _Cologne Gazette_ in London, and it partly reflects the views of Herr v. Kühlmann.

In this connexion I should like to refer briefly to an episode which took place towards the close of 1912. The German periodicals have already discussed it, especially the _Süddeutsche Monatshafte_ in June, 1921, in a review of the reports which Count Lerchenfeld, the Bavarian minister to the Court of Berlin, had made for the information of his Government. In these reports he mentions an event to which the Kaiser had already referred in a letter to Ballin dated December 15th, 1912. The Kaiser, in commenting on the state of tension then existing between Austria and Serbia, made some significant remarks concerning the policy of Germany towards Austria-Hungary. When the relations between Vienna and Petrograd, he wrote, had assumed a dangerous character, because it was recognized that the attitude of Serbia was based on her hope of Russian support, Germany might be faced with the possibility of having to come to the assistance of Austria.

"The Slav subjects of Austria," the letter continued, "had become
very restless, and could only be brought to reason by the resolute
action of the whole Dual Monarchy against Serbia. Austria had
arrived at the cross roads, and her whole future development hung
in the balance. Either the German element would retain its
ascendancy, in which case she would remain a suitable ally, or the
Slav element would gain the upper hand, and she would cease to be
an ally altogether. If we were compelled to take up arms, we should
do so to assist Austria not only against Russian aggression, but
also against the Slavs in general, and in her efforts to remain
German. That would mean that we should have to face a racial
struggle of the Germanic element against Slav insolence. It is
beyond our power to prevent this struggle, because the future of
the Habsburg monarchy and that of our own country are both at
stake. (This was the real meaning of Bethmann's very plain
speaking.) It is therefore a question on which depends the very
existence of the Germanic race on the continent of Europe.

"It was of great importance to us that Great Britain had so far
supported the Austro-German standpoint in these matters. Now, since
a war against Russia would automatically imply a war with France as
well, it was of interest to us to know whether, in this purely
continental case, Great Britain could and would declare her
neutrality in conformity with her proposals of last February.

"On December 6th, Haldane, obviously sent by Grey, called on
Lichnowsky and explained to the dumbfounded ambassador in plain
words that, assuming Germany getting involved in war against Russia
and France, Great Britain would _not_ remain neutral, but would at
once come to the assistance of France. The reason given for this
attitude was that Britain could not and would not tolerate at any
time that we should acquire a position of continental predominance
which might easily lead to the formation of a united continent.
Great Britain could therefore never allow France to be crushed by
us. You can imagine the effect of this piece of news on the whole
of the Wilhelmstrasse. I cannot say that I was taken by surprise,
because I, as you know, have always looked upon Great Britain as an
enemy in a military sense. Still, this news has decidedly cleared
matters up, even if the result is merely of a negative character."

Ballin did not omit to ask his friend for some details concerning the visit of Lord Haldane mentioned in the Kaiser's letter, and was furnished with the following explanation by Lord Haldane himself.

Nothing had been further from his intentions, he said, than to call on Prince Lichnowsky for the express purpose of making any such declaration; and Balkan questions, to the best of his recollection, had not been touched at all. He had spent a very pleasant half-hour with the Prince, and in the course of their conversation he had seen fit to repeat the formula which had been discussed during his stay in Berlin, and which referred to Britain's interest in the preservation of the integrity of France. This, possibly, might have given rise to the misunderstanding.

Prince Lichnowsky himself, in his pamphlet entitled "My London Mission," relates the incident as follows:

"In my dispatches sent to Berlin I pointed out again and again that
Great Britain, being a commercial country, would suffer enormously
through any war between the European Powers, and would prevent it
by every means within her power. At the same time, however, she
could never tolerate the weakening or the crushing of France,
because it would disturb the Balance of Power and replace it by the
ascendancy of Germany. This view had been expressed to me by Lord
Haldane shortly after my arrival, and everybody whose opinion
counts for anything told me the same thing."

The failure of the negotiations aiming at an understanding led to a continuance of the increase in the British armaments, a concentration of the British battle fleet in the North Sea, and to that of the French fleet in the Mediterranean. The latter arrangement was looked upon in Germany as a menace directed against Italy, and produced a sharp semi-official criticism in the _Frankfurter Zeitung_. In spite of all this, however, friendly messages from London concerning the possibilities of an understanding, the "naval holiday," etc., reached Germany from time to time.

How closely Ballin clung to his favourite idea that the naval experts of both countries should come to an understanding is demonstrated by the circumstance that in 1914, when the British squadron was present during the Kiel yachting week, he tried to bring about a meeting and a personal exchange of views between Churchill and Tirpitz.

Churchill was by no means disinclined to come to Germany for this purpose, but unfortunately the desire was expressed by the German side, and especially by the Kaiser, that the British Government should make an official inquiry whether his visit would be welcomed. The Government, however, was not disposed to do so, and the whole thing fell through, although Churchill sent word that, if Tirpitz really wanted to see him, he would find means to bring about such a meeting.

Thus the last attempt at an understanding had resulted in failure, and before any further efforts in the same direction could be made, Europe had been overtaken by its fate.