Chapter XIV: Introduction

Rhetoric held a position in the ancient world that the modern reader has difficulty in understanding. Democratic government, including the popular administration of justice, at a time when all discussion was necessarily oral, created an ideal condition in Athens and the other Greek states for the development of oratory. In the life of the Roman republic, too, there was enough of the popular element to make public speaking of the greatest importance. The art of rhetoric was therefore in close touch with the real interests of life. It was not merely a school discipline, but a preparation for a definite activity that held a high place in the esteem of the people, and it embodied a set of sensible ideas on public speaking in which the tendency to over-elaboration and artificiality characteristic of scholastic disciplines was kept in check by the wholesome influences that came from practical application.

With the establishment of the Roman Empire public discussion of political matters quickly disappeared, and forensic oratory for the same reason tended to decline. Thus the chief element which had given vitality to ancient rhetoric was eliminated. Roman oratory, however, died hard. It nursed itself on various pretences and shows. Much of the old interest in oratory turned back on rhetoric, which was thus exposed to a double danger, as an educational discipline that had lost connection with practical life and as a subject that had become too fashionable. When once the new influence had gained headway a strong tendency to artificiality was revealed. Rhetoric became scholastic and ridiculously overburdened with classification and terminology; it grew more lifeless as it grew more systematic. Interest then gradually subsided. Treatises grew shorter and drier, and consisted largely of long lists of terms defined without critical understanding of their meaning. The subject now held its place by the mere force of authority.

This was the state of rhetoric in Isidore’s time, and his treatment reflects the condition to which it had been reduced. He says that “it is easy for the reader to admire but impossible to understand” the books on rhetoric, and, further, that when they are laid aside “all recollection vanishes.” From a writer with this attitude little need be expected. His few miserable pages, compared with Quintilian’s interesting treatise, measure fully the decline of rhetoric during the first six centuries A.D. What Isidore gives is merely a summary, so cursory and disjointed that it frequently cannot be understood without liberal reference to the fuller treatises of his predecessors.

In Isidore’s _De Rhetorica_ practically the whole of Cassiodorus’ text-book on this subject is incorporated without acknowledgment. Two authorities, Victorinus and Cicero, are quoted,[190] but on referring to Cassiodorus it becomes plain that even here Isidore is merely copying his authority’s citation of authority. However his brief chapter on law cannot be paralleled in any extant treatise before his time and its insertion must be credited to his initiative.

[190] Isidore, _Etym._, 2, 19, 14, “Praeterea secundum Victorinum
enthymematis est altera definitio. Ex sola propositione, sicut
jam dictum est, ita constat. ‘Si tempestas vitanda est, non est
navigatio requirenda.’”

Cassiodorus, _De Rhet._ Halm, _Rhetores Latini_, p. 500.
“Praeterea secundum Victorinum enthymematis est altera definitio.
Ex sola propositione, sicut jam dictum est, ita constat
enthymema, ut est illud: ‘si tempestas vitanda est, non est
navigatio requirenda.’”

Isidore, _Etym._, 2, 9, 18. “Hunc Cicero ita facit in arte
rhetorica.”

Cass. in Halm, p. 500, 18. “Hunc Cicero facit in arte rhetorica.”

ANALYSIS[191]

[191] The analytical treatment of this subject is obviously
carried to an absurd degree. The whole activity of the orator is
analyzed into five parts: _inventio_, _dispositio_, _elocutio_
(wording), _memoria_, _pronuntiatio_. The whole subject-matter
is analyzed into three parts: deliberative, epideictic,
forensic. All court cases are analyzed from the point of view
of the defence, according to _status_, that is, according to
the nature of the leading point in the case. The speech itself
(_oratio_) is analyzed into four parts: introduction, narrative,
argument and conclusion. All cases are analyzed again according
to the psychological impression they make on the audience. All
arguments are analyzed into regular and irregular syllogisms.
Even negation, giving the lie, is analyzed into several sorts.
Rhetorical figures are analyzed elaborately.

I. Definition (ch. 1).
II. Chief writers (ch. 2).
III. Divisions (ch. 3).
1. _Inventio._
2. _Dispositio._
3. _Elocutio._
4. _Memoria._
5. _Pronuntiatio._
IV. The three kinds of cases (ch. 4).
1. _Deliberativum._[192]
2. _Demonstrativum._[193]
3. _Judiciale._[194]
V. The two-fold status of cases[195] (ch. 5).
1. _Rationalis._
a. _Conjectura._[196]
b. _Finis._[197]
(1) _Juridicialis._[198]
(a) _Absoluta._[199]
(b) _Assumptiva._[200]
(_a_) _Concessio._[201]
_Purgatio._[202]
_Deprecatio._[203]
(_b_) _Remotio criminis._[204]
(_c_) _Relatio criminis._[205]
(_d_) _Comparatio._[206]
(2) _Negotialis._[207]
c. _Qualitas._[208]
d. _Translatio._[209]
2. _Legalis._
a. _Scriptum et voluntas._[210]
b. _Leges contrariae._[211]
c. _Ambiguitas._[212]
d. _Collectio._[213]
e. _Definitio legalis._[214]
VI. The three-fold division of controversies[215] (ch. 6).
1. Simple.
2. Compound.
3. Complex.
VII. The four parts of a speech[216] (ch. 7).
1. _Exordium._
2. _Narratio._
3. _Argumentatio._
4. _Conclusio._
VIII. The five modes of cases[217] (ch. 8).
1. _Honestum._
2. _Admirabile._[218]
3. _Humile._
4. _Anceps._
5. _Obscurum._
IX. Argumentation (ch. 9).
1. _Inductio._
2. _Ratiocinatio._[219]
a. _Enthymema._
b. _Epicherema._
c. _Mendacium._[220]
X. Law[221] (ch. 10).
XI. The sententious saying (ch. 11).
XII. Confirmation and denial (ch. 12).
XIII. Personification and expression of character (chs. 13–14).
XIV. Kinds of subjects (ch. 15).
_Finitum._
_Infinitum._
XV. Style and diction (ch. 16).
XVI. The three ways of speaking (ch. 17).
_Humile._
_Medium._
_Grandiloquium._
XVII. Parts of a sentence (ch. 18).
XVIII. Faults to be avoided[222] (chs. 19–20).
XIX. Figures[223] (ch. 21).

[192] “In which there is discussion of what ought or ought not
to be done in regard to any of the practical affairs of life.”
2, 4, 1. The _genus deliberativum_ is divided into _suasio_ and
_dissuasio_, and each of these again, under the three headings,
_honestum_, _utile_, _possibile_.

[193] Epideictic; divided into _laus_ and _vituperatio_, 2, 4.

[194] Forensic rhetoric.

[195] Under this heading we have the chief effort of ancient
rhetoric to be helpful to the defense in cases brought before
the courts. The term _status_ meant the crucial point in a case,
and its subdivisions are intended to include the chief kinds of
crucial points upon which the advocate must base his speech. The
inference in both Isidore and Cassiodorus is that there is only
one status in a case, but Quintilian (3, 6, 21) expressly says
that there are more than one, and that the chief status in a case
“is the strongest point in it on which the whole matter chiefly
turns.”

In this section Isidore borrows from Cassiodorus almost without
change in the wording. In one case he has made a serious blunder
in copying: the subdivisions that Cassiodorus places under
_qualitas_, Isidore has placed under _finis_. (Cass., _De Rhet._,
Halm, p. 496.)

[196] “When an act that is imputed to a person is denied by
another” (2, 5, 3), and the balancing of evidence is the method
of deciding.

[197] “When it is maintained that the act that is the matter of
accusation is not that [specified], and its nature is shown by
the use of definitions.” 2, 5, 3.

[198] “In which the nature of justice and right and the abstract
grounds of reward and punishment are gone into.” 2, 5, 5.

[199] Term left undefined.

[200] “Which of itself offers no satisfactory ground for defence
but seeks for defence beyond its own limits.” 2, 5, 5.

[201] “When the accused does not deny the act but demands that it
be pardoned.” 2, 5, 6.

[202] “When the deed is confessed but guilt is denied” on the
ground of ignorance, accident, or necessity. 2, 5, 8.

[203] “When the accused confesses that he has committed the wrong
and has done so purposely, and still demands that he be pardoned,
which kind can be of very rare occurrence.” 2, 5, 8.

[204] “When the accused endeavors energetically to divert the
charge made against him from himself and his guilt to another.”
2, 5, 6.

[205] “When it is urged that there is justification because
another had committed a wrong before.” 2, 5, 7.

[206] “When some other honorable or expedient act of another is
alleged, for the accomplishing of which the act specified in the
accusation is asserted to have been done.” 2, 5, 7.

[207] “In which there is discussion of what is just in view of
civil custom and equity.” 2, 5, 5.

[208] “When the nature of the case is inquired into; and since
the dispute is concerned with the real meaning and classification
of the matter at stake, this is called the _constitutio
generalis_.” 2, 5, 3. This is the general heading under which all
the sub-heads classified under _finis_ should have been placed.
Isidore made a mistake in copying from Cassiodorus, in whom the
classification is correct.

[209] “When the case depends on this, that it is not the proper
person who brings the action, or that it is not before the proper
court, at the proper time, according to the proper law, charging
the proper crime, demanding the proper punishment.” 2, 5, 4.

[210] “When the words seem to be at variance with the intention
of the writer.” 2, 5, 9.

[211] “When two or more laws are perceived to be in conflict with
one another.” 2, 5, 9.

[212] “When what is written seems to have two or more meanings.”
2, 5, 10.

[213] “When from what is written another thing also which is not
written is inferred.” 2, 5, 10.

[214] “When inquiry is made as to what is the force of a word.”
2, 5, 10.

[215] A division applying only to the _genus deliberativum_.

[216] Six are usually given. Cassiodorus has _exordium_,
_narratio_, _partitio_, _confirmatio_, _reprehensio_,
_conclusio_. Halm, _Rhetores Latini Minores_, p. 497.

[217] An analysis of cases according to the emotional effect they
are likely to have on the audience.

[218] “Ut admirentur (judices) quenquam ad defensionem eius
accedere.” Halm, 316, 34, from Sulpitius Victor.

[219] The irregular syllogism. Each sub-head is exhaustively
analyzed.

[220] Giving the lie as conclusion of an irregular syllogism.

[221] A short account of the nature of law. This sub-head is not
found in the text-books on rhetoric before Isidore’s time.

[222] In the use of letters, words, and sentences.

[223] _Figurae verborum et sententiarum._ Samples of the former
are _anadiplosis_, _paradiastole_, _antimetabole_, _exoche_;
of the latter (forty-seven in all), _coenonesis_, _parrhesia_,
_aposiopesis_, _aetiologia_, _epitrochasmus_. Cf. p. 107, note.

EXTRACTS

Chapter 1. On rhetoric and its name.

1. Rhetoric is the science of speaking well in civil questions for the purpose of persuading to what is just and good. It is called rhetoric in the Greek ἀπὸ τοῦ ῥητορίζειν, that is, from eloquence of speech. For speech among the Greeks is called ῥῆσις, and the orator ῥήτωρ.

2. Rhetoric is allied to the grammatic art. For in grammar we learn the science of speaking correctly, and in rhetoric we discover in what way to express what we have learned.

Chapter 2. On the discoverers of the art of rhetoric.

1. This discipline was invented by Gorgias, Aristotle and Hermagoras among the Greeks, and translated into Latin by Tullius and Quintilian, but with such eloquence and variety that it is easy for the reader to admire, impossible to understand.

2. For while he holds the parchment the connected discourse as it were cleaves to his memory, but presently when it is laid aside all recollection vanishes. Perfect knowledge of this discipline makes the orator.

Chapter 3. On the name of the orator and the parts of rhetoric.

1. The orator is the good man skilled in speaking. ‘The good man’ means nature, character, accomplishments (_artibus_). ‘Skilled in speaking’ means studied eloquence, which consists of five parts: invention, ordering, diction and style, memory, delivery, and the purpose, which is to persuade of something.

2. Skill in speaking consists in three things: nature, learning, practise; nature, that is, talent; learning, knowledge; practice, continuous labor. These are the things that are looked to not only in the orator but in every artist with a view to accomplishment.

Chapter 4. The three kinds of causes.

1. There are three kinds of causes: deliberative, epideictic, judicial. The deliberative kind is that in which there is a discussion as to what ought or ought not to be done in regard to any of the practical affairs of life. The epideictic, in which a character is shown to be praiseworthy or reprehensible.

2. The judicial, in which opinion as to reward or punishment with reference to an act of an individual is given.

Chapter 16. Style and diction.

2. One must use good Latin and speak to the point. He speaks good Latin who constantly uses the true and natural names of things, and is not at variance with the style and literary refinement of the present time. Let it not be enough for him to be careful of what he says, without saying it in a clear, attractive manner; nor that only, without saying what he says wittily also.

Chapter 21. On figures.

1. Speech is amplified and adorned by the use of figures. Since direct, unvaried speech creates a weariness and disgust both of speaking and hearing, it must be varied and turned into other forms, so that it may give renewed power to the speaker, and become more ornate and turn the judge from an aloof countenance and attention.

ON DIALECTIC