Chapter VIII: The Results of Caesar’s Invasions of Britain (15)

Caesar’s account of the events which occurred on the day after his first encounter with the Britons in 54 B.C. has been interpreted in several different ways; and yet his narrative is so clear that one would have thought it impossible to misunderstand it. After describing the first encounter, he proceeds, ‘Caesar, however, forbade them [the legionaries] to pursue the fugitives far, partly because he had no knowledge of the ground, partly because the day was far spent and he wished to have time for entrenching his camp. On the following morning he sent a light division of infantry and cavalry, in three columns, to pursue the fugitives. They had advanced a considerable distance, the rear-guard being still in sight, when some troopers from Quintus Atrius came to Caesar with the news that there had been a great storm on the preceding night, and that almost all the ships had been damaged and gone ashore.... On receiving this information, Caesar recalled the legions and cavalry, ordering them to defend themselves as they marched, and went back himself to the ships.... Although it involved great trouble and labour, he decided that the best plan would be to have all the ships hauled up and connected with the camp by one entrenchment. About ten days were spent in these operations, the troops not suspending work even in the night.’ (_Sed eos fugientes longius Caesar prosequi vetuit, et quod loci naturam ignorabat, et quod magna parte diei consumpta munitioni castrorum tempus relinqui volebat. Postridie eius diei mane tripertito milites equitesque in expeditionem misit, ut eos qui fugerant persequerentur. His aliquantum itineris progressis, cum iam extremi essent in prospectu, equites a Q. Atrio ad Caesarem venerunt, qui nuntiarent superiore nocte maxima coorta tempestate prope omnes naves adflictas atque in litus eiectas esse.... His rebus cognitis Caesar legiones equitatumque revocari atque in itinere resistere iubet, ipse ad naves revertitur ... Ipse, etsi res erat multae operae ac laboris, tamen commodissimum esse statuit omnes naves subduci et cum castris una munitione coniungi. In his rebus circiter dies X consumit ne nocturnis quidem temporibus ad laborem militum intermissis._[3453])

The camp for the construction of which Caesar wished to allow time was of course quite distinct from the one for which, on the previous day, he had selected a site near his landing-place,[3454] and was to be in the neighbourhood of the place where he had beaten the enemy, that is to say, twelve Roman miles or more from the sea.[3455] Next morning he dispatched three flying columns in pursuit of the fugitives; and his rear-guard was just visible when the messengers arrived with the news of the shipwreck. He sent a galloper to recall the pursuing columns; and, as their retreat would naturally encourage the fugitives to rally and return to the attack, they were to offer the best resistance they could as they marched back to the coast.

C. Schneider[3456] misunderstands the passage as far as misunderstanding is possible. He holds that _cum iam extremi essent in prospectu_ means ‘when the rear _of the enemy_ was just in sight’. But Caesar was not with any of the three pursuing columns, for he tells us that he sent them in pursuit: therefore, if Schneider were right, we should be forced to believe that he learned afterwards that the enemy’s rear had been just in sight. But why resort to this fanciful explanation, seeing that Caesar could by no possibility have ascertained that the rear of the fugitives was just visible to his troops at the very moment when he himself, separated from the troops, received the news of the shipwreck; and, further, that _extremi_ must grammatically refer to _his_, that is to say, the pursuing columns? It has been objected that if _extremi_ meant the Roman rear-guard, _iam_ would not have its proper meaning, ‘already’ (ἤδη). But _iam_ of course often means ‘by this time’, or ‘at length’ (nearly _tandem_). In the passage in question its sense may, I think, be illustrated by a clause in _B. G._, vii, 83, § 7,--_cum iam meridies adpropinquare videretur_ (‘at length when it was evidently near noon’). Caesar meant to say that his pursuing columns had advanced so far that by the time when the news of the shipwreck reached him the rear-guard only was in sight. Again, Schneider takes the words _in itinere resistere iubet_ to mean that Caesar ordered his troops ‘to stop in their march and halt where they were’. But, as Long[3457] points out, ‘if this is so, he returned to his ships himself (“ipse”), leaving his men in the country doing nothing for ten days. But he tells us that his soldiers were employed in making his “munitio”, and therefore they must have come back to the camp.’

So far Long is quite right; but he too makes a great mistake. He actually believes[3458] that the words _munitioni castrorum tempus relinqui volebat_ (‘he wished to leave time for entrenching his camp’) refer to the camp near the seashore, for which he had selected a site immediately after the disembarkation. In other words, he believes that Caesar compelled his troops, who had already made a night-march of twelve miles, beaten the enemy on the banks of the Stour, stormed the stronghold to which the beaten enemy had retreated, and then pursued the fugitives for some distance, to march back all the way to the camp by the seashore, entrench it, and next morning march back again twelve miles or more into the interior, and then start in pursuit of the fugitives! The legionaries were hardy fellows; but if they did all this, they must have been as breathless as the reader will be when he has got to the end of the preceding sentence. And what had the fugitives been about? If Long is right, they must have got such a start that to pursue them would have been a wild-goose chase indeed. Needless to say, what Caesar meant was simply this:--when the Britons had been dislodged from their stronghold, he would not allow his troops to pursue them far because he wished to leave time for the construction of the temporary camp in which he intended to pass the night.

Von Göler[3459] needlessly quarrels with the text of the _Commentaries_, and makes matters worse by an absurd emendation. ‘The reading _legiones equitatumque revocari atque in itinere resistere iubet_ (_B. G._, v, 11, § 1),’ he says, ‘is obviously corrupt. _Atque_ requires that the following clause should involve a climax’ (_Steigerung_). But so it does:--Caesar ‘orders the legions and cavalry to be recalled, and [not only to come back but also] to defend themselves upon the march’. In this literal translation a climax is as evident as in the emendation, to be quoted presently, which von Göler offers; and any one who is not familiar with the _Commentaries_ will find in Meusel’s _Lexicon Caesarianum_ abundant evidence that _atque_ in the passage which von Göler brands as corrupt is in accord with Caesar’s _usus loquendi_.

‘As finally,’ continues von Göler, ‘one may conclude with certainty from the later substance of the narrative that all the legions returned to the shore, but the necessary express mention of the march thither is nowhere to be found in the _Commentaries_, I believe that the passage originally ran as follows:--_legiones equitatumque revocari atque in itinere persistere iubet ad naves, ipse revertitur_.’ If we may ‘conclude with certainty’ that ‘the legions returned’, why should the ‘express mention’ of their return be necessary? Heller[3460] has taken the trouble to show that the text is above suspicion.

CAESAR’S SECOND COMBAT WITH THE BRITONS IN 54 B. C.

There is a passage in Caesar’s account of his second combat with the Britons in 54 B.C. which has greatly exercised the minds of the commentators; and editors have put upon it an interpretation which soldiers will not accept. The passage runs as follows:--‘Throughout this peculiar combat, which was fought in full view of every one and actually in front of the camp, it was clear that our infantry, owing to the weight of their armour, were ill fitted to engage an enemy of this kind; for they could not pursue him when he retreated, and they dared not abandon their regular formation: it was clear too that the cavalry fought at great risk, because the enemy generally fell back on purpose, and, after drawing our men a little distance away from the legions, leaped down from their chariots and fought on foot with the odds in their favour. [On the other hand, the mode in which their cavalry fought exposed the Romans, alike in retreat and in pursuit, to an exactly similar danger.[3461]]’ (_Toto hoc in qenere pugnae cum sub oculis omnium ac pro castris dimicaretur, intellectum est nostros propter gravitatem armorum, quod neque insequi cedentes possent neque ab signis discedere auderent, minus aptos esse ad huius generis hostem, equites autem magno cum periculo proelio dimicare, propterea quod illi etiam consulto plerumque cederent et, cum paulum ab legionibus nostros removissent, ex essedis desilirent et pedibus dispari proelio contenderent._ [_Equestris autem proelii ratio et cedentibus et insequentibus par atque idem periculum inferebat_[3462]])_._ It is the last sentence which has caused all the trouble.

1. ‘After describing the difficulties of the infantry,’ says Long,[3463] ‘Caesar explains the danger to which the cavalry was exposed, when they pursued the “essedarii”, for the Britanni quitted their “esseda” and fought on foot among the Roman “equites”.... This was an unequal kind of fighting (“dispar proelium”) for the Roman “equites”. Caesar adds, that on the other hand (“autem”) the British mode of fighting from the “esseda” (“equestris proelii ratio”) was equally dangerous to his cavalry and legions in the pursuit and the retreat. This is Schneider’s explanation, and I believe that it is right. The Britanni had no cavalry: they had only “essedarii”, to whom Caesar (iv, 33) applies the term “perequitant”. It follows that “equites hostium essedariique” (c. 15) are no more than the “essedarii” (iv, 24) [in other words that Caesar, who was not a prolix writer, used four words when one would have sufficed.] In iv, 34, however, Caesar says, “peditatus equitatusque.”’ Yes, he does; and the reader will please note the significance of this admission.

The assumption upon which Long’s explanation rests, namely, that ‘the Britanni had no cavalry’, is unsupported by any evidence, and is wholly inadmissible. Caesar says that in his first campaign in Britain a party of Roman foragers were surrounded by _equitatu atque essedis_.[3464] If these words do not mean ‘cavalry _and_ chariots’, what do they mean? Warriors on horseback are depicted on ancient British coins;[3465] and the Britons certainly had cavalry as well as chariots in A.D. 61[3466] and in the time of Agricola.[3467] Besides, as von Göler points out,[3468] the charioteers could not have fought with effect unless they had been supported by cavalry. And when Long says that, according to Caesar, ‘the British mode of fighting from the “esseda” ... was equally dangerous to his cavalry and legions in the pursuit and the retreat,’ his explanation refutes itself. Caesar himself says that the legions could not pursue the charioteers; and, on the other hand, it is evident that they were not pursued by the charioteers.

2. According to von Göler,[3469] ‘by _cedentibus et insequentibus_ the chariot-fighters only can be meant’ (_Unter den_ ‘cedentibus et insequentibus’ _können nur die Wagenstreiter verstanden werden_); and, placing a comma after _par_, he translates the passage thus:--‘The mode of fighting of the [British] cavalry corresponded with that of their charioteers, whether they retreated or pursued, and brought the Roman cavalry into precisely the same danger’ (_Der Gefechtsmechanismus der_ [_britischen_] _Reiterei war aber der Fechtweise ihrer Wagenstreiter, ob sie wichen oder verfolgten, entsprechend_ [par] _und brachte die römische Reiterei gerade in jenes nachtheilige Verhältniss_[3470]). But no Latin scholar would admit that a comma could be placed after _par_, which would of course make it necessary to supply the word _erat_.

3. According to Dittenberger-Kraner,[3471] the words _equestris autem proelii ratio_, if they are genuine, can only mean, in opposition to _ex essedis ... contenderent_, the mode of fighting of the charioteers, which, while it was dangerous to the Romans when they pursued, was no less dangerous to them when they retreated. I confess that I cannot understand this comment.

4. Doberenz-Dinter[3472] also insist upon the opposition between _equestris autem proelii ratio_ and _ex essedis ... contenderent_, and maintain that the former refers to ‘a regular cavalry combat (on the part of the Romans)’,--_ein regelrechtes Reitertreffen (von Seiten der Römer)_. Now in the passage which ends with the words _ex essedis ... contenderent_ Caesar describes a combat between the Roman cavalry and the British charioteers, who were supported by cavalry. Therefore the editors (if I have succeeded in grasping their meaning) suppose that the ‘regular cavalry combat’ to which they allude was fought between the Roman cavalry and the British cavalry alone. This must, I think, be what they intend to convey; for, according to Mr. Peskett,[3473] who may have followed them, ‘Caesar means that when the British and Roman cavalry were engaged, the danger was equalized [_equestris autem proelii ratio et cedentibus et insequentibus par atque idem periculum inferebat_], whereas when they used chariots the Britons were at an advantage.’ But if Caesar simply meant that the British cavalry and the Roman in the (hypothetical) ‘regular cavalry combat’ were each exposed to the same danger, what is the point of the words _et cedentibus et insequentibus_? Surely retreating cavalry are in greater danger than the cavalry which has forced them to retreat and is pursuing them! I do not see how Mr. Peskett’s explanation can be got out of the Latin. And who will believe that the Britons would have used their cavalry alone when, by associating them with chariots, they ‘were at an advantage’?

5. It might possibly be suggested that the words _equestris ... inferebat_ refer to a cavalry combat between the Romans and the Britons, distinct from the combat between Roman cavalry and the British charioteers, in which the British cavalry, like that of the Germans,[3474] were associated with light infantry. But there is no evidence that the Britons had cavalry of this kind; and, as we have seen, it is certain that their cavalry acted in support of their charioteers.

6. Köchly and Rüstow[3475] offer the following explanation:--‘As the enemy were also supported by their cavalry, our men [the Romans] were exposed to the same danger, whether they advanced or retreated’ (_Da aber der Feind auch die Unterstützung seiner Reiterei hatte, so war für die unsrige die Gefahr immer dieselbe, mochte sie vorgehen oder zurückgehen_).

7. Napoleon the Third[3476] explains the matter thus:--‘Un désavantage plus grand encore existait pour les cavaliers. Les Bretons, par une fuite simulée, les attiraient loin des légions, et alors, sautant à bas de leurs chars, engageaient à pied une lutte inégale; car, toujours soutenus par leur cavalerie, ils étaient aussi dangereux dans l’attaque que dans la défense.’ These words, which appear to be virtually identical in sense with those of Köchly and Rüstow, undoubtedly give an accurate account of what took place. Apparently Köchly, Rüstow, and Napoleon do not take _par atque idem periculum_ as meaning ‘an exactly similar danger’ (to that which Caesar described in the preceding sentence, _Toto hoc ... contenderent_), but as meaning that the danger which beset the Romans was the same whether they pursued or retreated. Now the Roman infantry, as Caesar says, did not pursue; obviously therefore _et cedentibus et insequentibus_ can only refer to the Roman cavalry. I suppose then that what Köchly, Rüstow, and Napoleon meant was this:--if the Roman cavalry pursued the Britons, they were attacked by the charioteers, who jumped off their cars and fought as infantry: as soon as they retreated they were pursued by the British cavalry, and if they turned to bay the charioteers had time to mount their cars again, come up, and engage them anew. If this was what Caesar meant by _equestris ... inferebat_, his language was not lucid.

The words _equestris proelii ratio_, if they were really written by Caesar, must refer either to a combat between the Roman and the British cavalry or to a combat between the Roman cavalry and the combined British charioteers and cavalry. There is, as we have seen, no reason to suppose that a purely cavalry combat took place; and if it did, the idea that the Roman cavalry was as much in danger when it pursued as when it retreated is absurd. If we accept the other alternative, the meaning of the passage must be either (as Köchly, Rüstow, and Napoleon explain) ‘_On the other hand_, the mode in which the British _cavalry_ fought (in co-operation with the charioteers) exposed the Romans, alike in retreat and in pursuit, to exactly the same danger’; or ‘_In fact_ the nature of the combat of horse [that is to say, the combat between the Roman cavalry and the combined British charioteers and cavalry] exposed the Romans’, &c. In the former case _autem_ would be an adversative, in the latter merely a connecting particle. The passage is not in the _editio princeps_ of the _Commentaries_, and is bracketed in Meusel’s edition; and perhaps it is an interpolation.

THE COMBAT BETWEEN TREBONIUS AND THE BRITONS

‘At midday Caesar having sent three legions and all his cavalry on a foraging expedition under one of his generals, Gaius Trebonius, they [the enemy] suddenly swooped down from all points on the foragers, not hesitating to attack the ordered ranks of the legions’ (_Sed meridie cum Caesar pabulandi causa tres legiones atque omnem equitatum cum C. Trebonio legato misisset, repente ex omnibus partibus_ [hostes] _ad pabulatores advolaverunt, sic uti ab signis legionibusque non absisterent_[3477]). To a plain man these words are perfectly intelligible; and no military commentator, so far as I know, has ever found any difficulty in them: but Kraner[3478] must needs rewrite the last clause. This is what he makes of it:--_sicubi ab signis legionibusque absisterent_. So, according to Kraner, the enemy attacked the foragers at every point where they were separated from the legions. The unpractical fellow fails to perceive that, as the foragers could not forage while they were in their ranks, there was no point where they were not separated from the legions. The legions, or rather a due proportion of the cohorts which composed them, were there to protect the foragers; and of course what Caesar means is that the enemy, flushed with their easy success in driving off the foragers and compelling them to rejoin their respective cohorts, had the temerity to attack the cohorts themselves.

WHERE DID CAESAR CROSS THE THAMES?

The only indications which Caesar gives as to the place where he crossed the Thames are these. At an early stage of his narrative he tells us that ‘the chief command and the general direction of the campaign had been entrusted by common consent to Cassivellaunus, whose territories are separated from those of the maritime tribes by a river called the Thames, about eighty miles [or seventy-three English miles] from the sea’ (_summa imperii bellique administrandi communi consilio permissa Cassivellauno, cuius fines a maritimis civitatibus flumen dividit, quod appellatur Tamesis, a mari circiter milia passuum LXXX_[3479]). In a later chapter he describes his passage of the river. ‘Having ascertained the enemy’s plans, Caesar led his army to the Thames, into the territories of Cassivellaunus. The river can only be forded at one spot, and there with difficulty. On reaching this place, he observed that the enemy were drawn up in great force near the opposite bank of the river. The bank was fenced by sharp stakes planted along its edge; and similar stakes were fixed under water, and concealed by the river. Having learned these facts from prisoners and deserters, Caesar sent his cavalry on in front, and ordered the legions to follow them speedily; but the men advanced with such swiftness and dash, though they only had their heads above water, that the enemy, unable to withstand the combined onset of infantry and cavalry, quitted the bank and fled.’ (_Caesar, cognito consilio eorum, ad flumen Tamesim in fines Cassivellauni exercitum duxit; quod flumen uno omnino loco pedibus, atque hoc aegre, transiri potest. Eo cum venisset, animadvertit ad alteram fluminis ripam magnas esse copias hostium instructas. Ripa autem erat acutis sudibus praefixisque munita, eiusdemque generis sub aqua defixae sudes flumine tegebantur. Eis rebus cognitis a captivis perfugisque, Caesar praemisso equitatu confestim legiones subsequi iussit. Sed ea celeritate atque eo impetu milites ierunt, cum capite solo ex aqua extarent, ut hostes impetum legionum atque equitum sustinere non possent ripasque dimitterent ac se fugae mandarent_).[3480]

When Caesar says that the Thames was only fordable at one spot, he evidently means that there was only one ford available for his purpose, that is to say, only one by which he could cross the river into the territories of Cassivellaunus. When he says that these territories were separated from those of the maritime tribes by the Thames, about 80 miles from the sea, he means, I suppose, that it was 80 miles from the place where he landed to the eastern frontier of Cassivellaunus; but, according to some commentators, he reckoned the distance from the place where he landed to the point at which he crossed the river. Heller[3481] insists that his statement of the distance was based upon hearsay: I am inclined to believe that it was a rough estimate based upon the number of the marches which he made.

1. The view which has gained most adherents is that Caesar crossed the Thames at ‘Coway Stakes’, about a furlong west of Walton Bridge. It has been said that this view is based upon a ‘tradition which has certainly prevailed for many ages’;[3482] but I can find no evidence that the tradition existed before the publication of Camden’s _Britannia_; and I believe that it was created by him. Camden[3483] referred, in support of his conjecture, to a well-known passage in Bede;[3484] but Bede did not mention Coway Stakes at all. He merely said that, at the point of the river where the enemy had planted their stakes, the stakes were still to be seen, and that they were as thick as a man’s thigh and cased with lead. S. Gale[3485] affirms, in support of Camden’s view, that there is ‘a large Roman encampment ... about a mile and a half distant from the ford’. This camp, which is on St. George’s Hill, is really about two miles and three-quarters[3486] from the place where the ford is assumed to have been. It is not Roman, but British; but even if it were Roman, the fact would throw no light upon the question which we are discussing unless the camp could be proved to have been constructed by Caesar. Daines Barrington, an antiquary of the eighteenth century, made an attempt, which, at first sight, would appear completely successful, to demolish Camden’s theory.[3487] A fisherman of Shepperton, he tells us, rowed him across the river in the line along which the stakes had been planted. He illustrated his story by a sketch-plan, which shows that the stakes were at right angles with the river-banks; and, he argues, ‘such stakes could not possibly have obstructed the passage of an army.’ In reply it has been asserted that ‘the line of the ford was not transversely straight across the stream, but formed a curve nearly in a semi-circle, so that ... the stakes must have twice intercepted the passage’;[3488] but who will believe that Caesar would have attempted the passage of the river, which, as he tells us, was barely practicable, by a ford so intricate as this? A more effective answer might be based upon the fact, attested by Lord Wolseley,[3489] that fords ‘almost always run diagonally across the river’: if the ford by which Caesar crossed was no exception, stakes planted in the direction indicated by Barrington would obviously have obstructed the passage. Dr. Guest has made another and most ingenious attempt to remove the difficulty.[3490] He believes that the stakes which impeded Caesar’s advance had not been planted for the purpose of stopping him, but had existed for many years. ‘I think,’ he says, ‘the stakes formed part of what may be called a fortified ford, and were distributed so as to stop all transit ... save along a narrow passage, which would bring the passenger directly under the command of the watch, stationed on the northern bank to ... receive the toll. The shallow at Coway was probably of considerable extent, and through its whole length must have extended the line of stakes which Caesar observed on the northern bank. But there must also have been two other lines of stakes across the river to ... define the passage.’[3491] The stakes to which Barrington referred were, in Guest’s opinion, the remains of these. ‘The remaining portion,’ he continues, ‘of the shallow was, no doubt, covered with the short stakes that were “concealed by the river” ... that such was really the disposition of the stakes may, I think, be gathered, not only from the reports of the fishermen, but also from Caesar’s narrative. When he saw the Britons ranged along the northern bank with the stakes in front of them, he ordered the cavalry to pass the river, and the legions to follow them. How could either cavalry or infantry cross the river if the stakes were ranged as our antiquaries assume them to have been? ... Besides, what were the Britons doing while the Roman soldiers were removing the stakes? ... Caesar says not a word about taking the Britons in flank, nor about removing the stakes.’[3492]

It may, perhaps, be thought that Guest has succeeded in showing that the particular objection which Barrington raised against Camden’s theory is not necessarily insuperable. If, however, the stakes to which Barrington referred were the remains of those which had served, on Guest’s theory, to ‘define the passage’, the ford in question was an exception to the rule that fords ‘almost always run diagonally across the river’. Again, Guest argues that because ‘Caesar says not a word about ... removing the stakes’, therefore the Romans did not remove them. But it is needless to insist that they must have removed them, unless at the particular part of the ‘shallow’ by which they crossed there were none to remove. Guest, therefore, is obliged to make the incredible assumption that the Britons, having left intact the stakes which ‘defined the passage’, and having thus pointed out to the Romans the best way of crossing the river, were so obliging as to plant no stakes to bar this passage either in the bed of the river or on the bank, while they planted them everywhere else.

Guest undertakes to prove not only that Coway Stakes may, but that it must have been the spot at which Caesar crossed the Thames. ‘From the Coway Stakes,’ he says, ‘the ground rises gradually for about three miles, and then dips almost precipitously into the valley of the Wey. On the top of the hill [St. George’s Hill] is an ancient British stronghold which commands the whole valley, and as the valley certainly belonged to the Atrebates, I infer that ... this people constructed the fortress. Aubrey tells us that “a trench” went from this fortress to Walton, and gave that village its name. A dyke still runs from the ramparts towards Walton. I have traced it for more than one-third of the distance, and I have no doubt that it once reached the village ... _The ditch is towards the river_. For what purpose could this dyke have been made? The only object for which I can conceive it was made, was to bar progress along the trackway which led from the Coway Stakes eastward to the maritime states. If such were its object, we have another strong proof that the great means of access to the country of Cassivellaunus was at the spot where Camden placed it.’[3493] Nor is this all. ‘From Hurleyford,’ says Guest, ‘to the sea, a distance of nearly 100 miles, taking into account the windings of the river, there is but one place on the banks of the Thames bearing a name which indicates a ford over it.[3494] This solitary place is Halliford, at the Coway Stakes. Caesar says there was but one ford on the Thames--meaning, of course, the lower Thames, with which alone he was acquainted, and we now have but one place on its banks, the name of which points to the existence of a ford. Our topography is in perfect agreement with his statement; and, to my mind, this coincidence is almost decisive of the question.’[3495] We shall see.

2. Colonel Stoffel, by whose advice Napoleon was mainly guided in his attempts to solve the topographical problems presented by the _Commentaries_, was informed by the Thames boatmen whom he consulted that between Shepperton and London there were eight or nine fords, the most favourable of which was at Sunbury; and here accordingly the Emperor concluded that Caesar had crossed the river. Still he (or the colonel) was sagacious enough to doubt. ‘La seule chose,’ he wrote, ‘qui nous paraisse evidente, c’est que l’armee romaine n’a point passe en aval de Teddington.’[3496]

But even this conclusion rested upon a rotten foundation. The Emperor, as Guest[3497] observes, ‘reasons from the present to the past without taking any note of the changes that have occurred during 2,000 years. In the time of Caesar the river ran ... to the sea uninterruptedly. _Now_, from Teddington westward it is a canal, crossed every two or three miles by weirs and locks ... as the lock [at Teddington] did not exist in the time of Caesar, any inference drawn from the fact that the tide now ends there, is beside the question.’ And, to quote Guest again, ‘the shallow at Sunbury is a mere consequence of Sunbury weir. Remove the weir, and Caesar’s ford at Sunbury would be swept away in a twelvemonth by the natural scour of the river.’ Guest[3498] thought it probable that ‘when the river was in its natural state, spring-tides ran up the river eight or nine miles further [than they do now]--in other words, to Coway: and that the deposit which they now leave at Teddington then contributed to form the shallow over which Caesar passed.’ Mr. F. C. J. Spurrell, on the other hand, has given reasons for believing that ‘the estuary did not reach so far west as at the present day’.[3499]

3. Von Goler[3500] peremptorily decides that the ford was ‘undoubtedly at Kingston’. An English engineer, he tells us, informed him that the depth of the water there was only from 3½ to 4½ feet; and he remarks further that Kingston is just 80 Roman miles from the sea. If the engineer whom he consulted could have informed him that the depth of the water at Kingston was the same in 54 B.C. as at the time when he sounded it, his information would have been more valuable. Assuming that the tide in Caesar’s time, as now, did not flow beyond Teddington, W. H. Black may have been justified in saying that Kingston ‘presents geographically the most favourable place for crossing the Thames’ to an invader coming from the neighbourhood of Deal.[3501] But we must not assume that Caesar crossed the Thames at the place which was ‘geographically the most favourable’: he could not pick and choose; he had to cross where there was a ford, and there was only one.

It has been shown that the Thames has, at various times and at certain states of the tide, been fordable at Westminster,[3502] at Chelsea,[3503] at Old Brentford,[3504] and at Petersham;[3505] and the claims of these places have been advocated by zealous antiquaries: but, with one exception, which I shall notice presently, I do not recommend students of the _Commentaries_ to read what they have written. As Guest points out, ‘the name of Brentford had no reference to a ford over the Thames; it certainly designated the ford over the Brent by which the Roman road from London to Staines crossed the latter river.’[3506] Moreover, the fact that the Thames has occasionally been crossed on foot at various points near London proves nothing: these cases, as Guest truly says, were exceptional, and were recorded because they were exceptional; ‘Caesar,’ he concludes, ‘knew the river in its natural state, and had ... adequate means of acquiring knowledge ... he tells us distinctly that the Thames was passable on foot only in one place.’[3507]

The claims of Brentford have, however, recently been advocated by Mr. Montagu Sharpe in a pamphlet which contains some real evidence. From information supplied by Messrs. W. S. Bunting and W. Benell of the Thames Conservancy, and by Conservancy Inspector G. J. Rough, he shows that a line of stakes, of which some still remain ‘for about 400 yards below Isleworth Ferry,’ extended thirty years ago for about a mile up the river from ‘Old England’, opposite the mouth of the Brent; and that ‘no other ancient stakes have been discovered in the lower river during dredging operations’.[3508]

Except Coway Stakes and Brentford, there is no spot in the Thames valley for the identification of which with the scene of Caesar’s exploit a shred of real argument has been advanced. Guest’s arguments are of very unequal value; but the one which he founds upon the name ‘Halliford’ is worth considering, though it would be going too far to say that it is ‘almost decisive of the question’. The claim which Mr. Sharpe makes for his own discovery rests upon somewhat better grounds. [See Addenda, p. 742.]

CAESAR’S PASSAGE OF THE THAMES

The excessively laconic chapter in which Caesar describes how he crossed the Thames in the face of a British force seems at first sight hard to explain. He tells us that ‘the river can only be forded at one spot, and there with difficulty’. ‘On reaching this place,’ he continues, ‘he observed that the enemy were drawn up in great force near the opposite bank of the river. The bank was fenced by sharp stakes planted along its edge; and similar stakes were fixed under water and concealed by the river. Having learned these facts from prisoners and deserters, Caesar sent his cavalry on in front, and ordered the legions to follow them speedily; but the men advanced with such swiftness and dash, though they only had their heads above water, that the enemy, unable to withstand the combined onset of infantry and cavalry, quitted the bank and fled’ (_quod flumen uno omnino loco pedibus, atque hoc aegre, transiri potest. Eo cum venisset, animadvertit ad alteram fluminis ripam magnas esse copias hostium instructas. Ripa autem erat acutis sudibus praefixisque munita, eiusdemque generis sub aqua defixae sudes flumine tegebantur. His rebus cognitis a captivis perfugisque Caesar praemisso equitatu confestim legiones subsequi iussit. Sed ea celeritate atque eo impetu milites ierunt, cum capite solo ex aqua extarent, ut hostes impetum legionum atque equitum sustinere non possent ripasque dimitterent ac se fugae mandarent_).[3509]

Von Göler[3510] explains the passage as follows:--‘he first sent his cavalry against the enemy, making them swim across the adjacent part of the river, which, though deeper, was not barricaded, and by their attack so effectually protected the passage of the infantry, which was begun immediately afterwards, that they gained time to remove the stakes’; and in a note[3511] he says, ‘Only in this way can the expression _praemisso equitatu confestim legiones subsequi iussit_ be understood, for the cavalry could by no possibility swim across or disregard the stakes or the palisade.’ This explanation, as far as it goes, is substantially identical with that of Turpin de Crissé,[3512] who supposes, further, that while part of the Roman infantry cut down the stakes in the river, they were supported by their comrades in the rear, who discharged missiles against the enemy, and, he might have added, by the auxiliary troops,--slingers and archers. Napoleon the Third[3513] hardly differs from his predecessors in suggesting that the cavalry were sent ‘_à une certaine distance en amont ou en aval_’. Mr. A. G. Peskett[3514] objects to Napoleon’s explanation on the ground that it involves a mistranslation of the word _praemittit_, which, he insists, ‘must mean that Caesar sent the cavalry across the river, ordering the infantry to follow them.’ Mr. Peskett evidently means that the infantry crossed directly in the rear of the cavalry. But, as any soldier would tell Mr. Peskett, the operation which he supposes would have been absolutely impossible; and, moreover, his rigidly literal interpretation of the word _praemisso_, which is not shared by that competent Caesarian scholar, C. Schneider, is irreconcilable with the word _sed_, which opens the next sentence. This word, as Schneider[3515] remarks, is intended to show that the infantry, in their ardour, outvied the cavalry, and crossed the river before them. The use of the word _praemisso_ may surely be defended if the cavalry were sent into the water before the infantry. Similarly it will be evident to any one who carefully reads the last two sentences in the twenty-fifth chapter of Caesar’s Fourth Book[3516] that the word _subsecuti_ cannot there mean ‘following directly in rear’. For in that case ‘the nearest ships’ (_proximis navibus_), the troops in which jumped into the sea and followed (_subsecuti_) their comrades, would have been drawn up in a second line _behind_ the other ships. If so, being in deeper water, they evidently could not have been run aground; and the soldiers who descended from them would have been drowned.

THE SITE OF CASSIVELLAUNUS’S STRONGHOLD

The indications which Caesar gives as to the geographical position of the stronghold of Cassivellaunus are of the vaguest kind. After describing his passage from the southern to the northern bank of the Thames, which brought him into the territory of Cassivellaunus, he gives the following account of his operations:--

‘Cassivellaunus, abandoning, as we have remarked above,[3517] all thoughts of regular combat, disbanded all his forces, except some four thousand charioteers, watched our line of march, and, moving a little away from the track, concealed himself in impenetrable wooded spots, and removed the cattle and inhabitants from the open country into the woods in those districts through which he had learned that we intended to march. Whenever our cavalry made a bold dash into the country to plunder and devastate, he sent his charioteers out of the woods (for he was familiar with every track and path), engaged our cavalry to their great peril, and by the terror which he thus inspired prevented them from moving far afield. Caesar had now no choice but to forbid them to move out of touch with the column of infantry, and, by ravaging the country and burning villages, to injure the enemy as far as the legionaries’ powers of endurance would allow.

‘Meanwhile the Trinovantes--about the strongest tribe in that part of the country--sent envoys to Caesar, promising to surrender and obey his commands. Mandubracius, a young chief of this tribe, whose father had been their king and had been put to death by Cassivellaunus, but who had saved his own life by flight, had gone to the Continent to join Caesar, and thrown himself upon his protection. The Trinovantes begged Caesar to protect Mandubracius from harm at the hands of Cassivellaunus and to send him to rule over his own people with full powers. Caesar sent Mandubracius, but ordered them to furnish forty hostages and grain for his army. They promptly obeyed his commands, sending hostages to the number required and also the grain.

‘As the Trinovantes had been granted protection and immunity from all injury on the part of the soldiers, the Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancalites, Bibroci, and Cassi sent embassies to Caesar and surrendered. He learned from the envoys that the stronghold of Cassivellaunus, which was protected by woods and marshes, was not far off, and that a considerable number of men and of cattle had assembled in it. The Britons apply the name of stronghold to any woodland spot, difficult of access and fortified with a rampart and trench, to which they are in the habit of resorting in order to escape a hostile raid. Caesar marched to the spot indicated with his legions, and found that the place was of great natural strength and well fortified: nevertheless he proceeded to assault it on two sides. The enemy stood their ground a short time, but could not sustain the onset of our infantry, and fled precipitately from another part of the stronghold.’ (_Cassivellaunus, ut supra demonstravimus, omni deposita spe contentionis, dimissis amplioribus copiis, milibus circiter IIII essedariorum relictis, itinera nostra servabat paulumque ex via excedebat locisque impeditis ac silvestribus sese occultabat, atque iis regionibus quibus nos iter facturos cognoverat pecora atque homines ex agris in silvas compellebat et, cum equitatus noster liberius praedandi vastandique causa se in agros eiecerat, omnibus viis notis semitisque essedarios ex silvis emittebat et magno cum periculo nostrorum equitum cum iis confligebat atque hoc metu latius vagari prohibebat. Relinquebatur ut neque longius ab agmine legionum discedi Caesar pateretur, et tantum agris vastandis incendiisque faciendis hostibus noceretur quantum labore atque itinere legionarii milites efficere poterant._

_Interim Trinovantes, prope firmissima earum regionum civitas, ex qua Mandubracius adulescens Caesaris fidem secutus ad eum in continentem_ [Galliam] _venerat, cuius pater in ea civitate regnum obtinuerat interfectusque erat a Cassivellauno, ipse fuga mortem vitaverat, legatos ad Caesarem mittunt pollicenturque sese ei dedituros atque imperata facturos: petunt ut Mandubracium ab iniuria Cassivellauni defendat atque in civitatem mittat qui praesit imperiumque obtineat. Iis Caesar imperat obsides XL frumentumque exercitui, Mandubraciumque ad eos mittit. Illi imperata celeriter fecerunt, obsides ad numerum frumentumque miserunt._

_Trinovantibus defensis atque ab omni militum iniuria prohibitis, Centimagni, Segtontiaci, Ancalites, Bibroci, Cassi legationibus missis sese Caesari dedunt. Ab iis cognoscit non longe ex eo loco oppidum Cassivellaumi abesse silvis paludibusque munitum, quo satis magnus hominum pecorisque numerus convenerit. Oppidum autem Britanni vocant, cum silvas impeditas vallo atque fossa munierunt, quo incursionis hostium vitandae causa convenire consuerunt. Eo proficiscitur cum legionibus; locum reperit egregi natura atque opere munitum; tamen hunc duabus ex partibus oppugnare contedit. Hostes paulisper morati militum nostrorum impetum non tulerunt seseque alia ex parte oppidi eiecerunt._[3518])

1. Many commentators have identified the stronghold with Verulam, or Verulamium, which was situated immediately west of St. Albans.[3519] The arguments which can be adduced in support of this view are that marshes might have been formed by the river Ver; that Verulamium, under Tasciovanus, who began to reign not later than 30 B.C., was the chief town of Catuvellauni; and that the territory of the Catuvellauni belonged to Cassivellaunus.

2. Others point to Cassiobury in Hertfordshire.[3520] Cassiobury, they argue, evidently preserves the name of the Cassi,[3521] who were as evidently subject to Cassivellaunus.

3. Von Göler[3522] remarks that, ‘judging from the configuration and nature of the terrain,’ the _oppidium_ ‘may be the hill lying on the south-western side of Wendover’. May be, or may be not; for Caesar’s vague description of ‘the configuration and nature of the terrain’ would apply to other sites as well.

4. The most interesting theory is that of T. Lewin,[3523] who maintains that the _oppidium_ was no other that London, that is to say, the settlement which many writers believe to have existed long before the Roman conquest, in the neighbourhood of Ludgate Hill. As Cassivellaunus, he argues, had conquered the Trinovantes,[3524] ‘whose western border was the Lea,’ we may assume that his dominions extended westward from that river, and comprised Middlesex and Hertford. As Caesar says that he prohibited his soldiers from plundering the Trinovantes, it is clear that, after crossing the Thames, he marched into Essex. There he learned that the _oppidum_ of Cassivellaunus was not far off; and ‘this situation answers to London’. Moreover British London, which was situated on the rising ground between Ludgate and Dowgate, and protected on the south by the marshes of the Thames, on the west by the marshes of the river Flete, and on the east by the marshes of the river Wallbrook, was just such a stronghold as Caesar described.

Who would not accept such an attractive theory if he could only give rein to his imagination? But unhappily the very existence, in 54 B.C., of British London is matter of inference and conjecture, however reasonable.[3525] And is it reasonable to assume that if the stronghold which Caesar captured had been situated on the banks of the Thames he would have neglected to mention the fact?

5. W. H. Black[3526] argues that the _oppidum_ was most probably somewhere in ‘the woody lands about Pinner, Harrow, and Cashiobury Park.’

6. The Reverend H. Jenkins[3527] maintains that it was in Essex; for, he argues, in order to fulfil the compact which he had made with the Trinovantes, Caesar’s ‘chief object, after he had crossed the Thames, must have been to lead his army into Essex’. Certainly Caesar’s army, or a part of it, must have entered the country of the Trinovantes; for, as we have seen, he would not allow his soldiers to plunder that people. Jenkins’s theory is demolished by Caesar’s statement that the stronghold belonged to Cassivellaunus, which shows that it was not in the territory of the Trinovantes. And since, immediately after the sentence in which he tells us that he prohibited his soldiers from plundering the Trinovantes, he goes on to say that the stronghold of Cassivellaunus was not far off, it is fair to conclude that it was near the common frontier of the Trinovantes and of Cassivellaunus.[3528] Of the places which fulfil this condition more can be said for Verulam than for any other; but its identity with the _oppidum_ in question has not been proved.

DID _LONDINIUM_ EXIST IN CAESAR’S TIME?

The earliest mention of London occurs in the _Annals_[3529] of Tacitus, who, describing the events of the year 61, speaks of it as a busy centre of commerce. It has been argued[3530] that a settlement existed there before the Roman conquest of Britain, because the name _Londinium_ is Celtic. Lewin[3531] maintains further that if London had been founded by the Romans, it would have been a strong military post, whereas in 61, eighteen years after the invasion of Britain by Aulus Plautius, it was attacked by the Iceni and Trinovantes because it was defenceless and wealthy.[3532] ‘It must,’ he insists, ‘have attained to this height of prosperity, not under the Romans, who did not patronise it, but by the silent progress of trade, a work that could not ... have been accomplished in ... 19 years.’ ‘We know,’ he continues, referring to Dion Cassius,[3533] ‘that Camulodunum was a flourishing British city before the ... time of Plautius, and, if so, London, which enjoyed far greater advantages, must also have been a British city.’ Lewin holds that this city stood upon the hill between the river Flete and the Wallbrook. On the west was _Lud_gate, the name of which is Celtic: on the east Dowgate,--‘a corruption of the Celtic Dwrgate or water-gate.’ The river Flete, or Fleet, entered the Thames just below the site of Blackfriars Bridge; while at Dowgate, about 1,000 yards to the east, was the mouth of the Wallbrook.[3534]

Mr. W. J. Loftie[3535] finds the site of British London on the western side of the Wallbrook. In his _History of London_,[3536] however, he affirmed that the British settlement stood ‘on the eastern hill [that is to say, on the gently rising ground east of the Wallbrook], if anywhere’. Canon Isaac Taylor[3537] asserts that the British hill-fort was ‘formed by Tower Hill, Cornhill, and Ludgate Hill, and effectually protected by the Thames ... the Fleet ... the great fen of Moorfields and Finsbury’, &c. Seeing that it has been proved that ‘the great fen’ did not exist in Roman times,[3538] and that the very existence of the British hill-fort can as yet only be inferred, it is plainly useless to attempt to determine its site.

Dr. Guest[3539] holds that ‘the notion ... that a British town preceded the Roman camp [of Aulus Plautius] has no foundation ... and is inconsistent with all we know of the early geography of this part of Britain.’ ‘Such town,’ he adds, ‘could not have belonged to the Trinobantes, for it lay beyond their natural limits, nor to the settled district of the Catuvellauni, for then Caesar’s statement that the Thames divided their country from the maritime states “about eighty miles from the sea” would be grossly inaccurate.’ I cannot see the force of these arguments. ‘The notion that a British town preceded the Roman camp’ _has_ a foundation,--the solid foundation of etymology. _London_ is indisputably a Celtic name;[3540] and if London had been founded by the Romans, why should it have had a _purely_ Celtic name[3541] at all, and why should its Celtic name have outlasted _Augusta_,--the name which the Romans gave to their London? Assuming that Caesar’s statement is to be interpreted in the sense which Dr. Guest attaches to it, the distance by road of British London from Sandwich, in the neighbourhood of which Caesar landed,[3542] is 67 English miles, or nearly 73 Roman miles. Is the difference between 73 and ‘about 80’ so great as to justify the use of the words ‘grossly inaccurate’?

More recently John Richard Green has endeavoured to disprove the existence of British London.[3543] ‘Much,’ he says, ‘has been made of its name, but “Llyn-dyn” ... is as likely to be the designation of a spot as of a town on it. An almost conclusive proof, however, that no such town existed west of the [river] Fleet may be drawn from the line of the old British road from Kent (the predecessor of the Watling Street), which, instead of crossing the river as in Roman and later times at the point marked by London Bridge, passed, according to Higden, to a point opposite Westminster ... (Loftie, “Roman London”, Archaeological Journal, volume xxxiv, page 165) ... the rise of such a town [Roman London] is the best explanation of the later change in the line of this road.’

‘According to Higden!’ According to the monk of the fourteenth century who wrote the _Polychronicon_! And Higden does not so much as mention ‘the old British road from Kent’,--a road the very existence of which can only be conjectured. What he says is that ‘Watlingstrete’ crossed the Thames west of Westminster;[3544] and Mr. Loftie, to whom Green appeals, affirms that he is ‘driven to the conclusion that there was a British town’.[3545] Accepting the statement of Higden, he argues that the ‘Watlingstrete’ which is said to have crossed the Thames west of Westminster was a pre-Roman road and followed the line of Park Lane and Edgware Road. I will only add that, having failed to discover any paper worth reading about the direction of Watling Street in that part of its course which passed through or by Roman London, I consulted Professor Haverfield. ‘I know nothing satisfactory,’ he replied, ‘about the line of Watling Street, and nothing to suggest that it existed before A.D. 43.’

The very large number of palaeolithic implements which have been found in London and its environs prove that in the earliest times it was a centre of population;[3546] but it would hardly be safe to infer from the discoveries of bronze and iron tools and weapons and of British coins[3547] that the Romans found a town on the site. If there was such a town, it certainly had little political importance; for while numerous British coins issued from the mints of Verulamium and Camulodunum, not one has been discovered which bears the name of Londinium.[3548] Nevertheless it may reasonably be affirmed that London existed before the Roman conquest: first, because the same advantages that attracted the traders of Rome would also have commended themselves to those of Britain; and secondly, I repeat, because it is improbable that a Celtic name would have been given to a town which the Romans had built upon a virgin site.[3549]

THE JULIAN CALENDAR AND THE CHRONOLOGY OF CAESAR’S INVASIONS OF BRITAIN