Chapter XXIII: Section 18: relates to the term of copyright

The whole system provided in the Constitution is for the benefit
of the public, the intent is to accumulate for the use of the
public, matters of literature, art, and invention. The stimulus in
the way of a reward given by the public in return for these
matters is subsidiary to the main object. The reward consists in
"securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries." The objection
to the term provided in the bill is that it is unconscionably
long. It may easily amount to a hundred years or more, during
which time the public will have paid tribute to the author for
something which will be so old fashioned as to be useless to the
public when the copyright has expired.

The word "limited" in the Constitution shows that the framers of
that instrument had in mind to secure for the public certain
benefits after the time had expired. To provide such a long
copyright term as the authors seek to obtain in this bill would
practically defeat the object of the said clause of the
Constitution and the intention of its framers. I submit that it
could only be considered for a moment on the ground that it is a
matter of indifference to the public because the works so to be
protected are entirely useless in themselves. I do not think there
is any sufficient reason for lengthening the term--twenty-eight
years with an extension of fourteen years--provided by existing
law.

In another respect this section is bad in making the length of the
term dependent upon an event which is uncertain in advance, and of
which no public accessible record may be made when it occurs; that
is to say, the death of the author. I see no reason why a young
author should have longer protection than an old author, and the
provision would leave open to publishers a door of fraud by
securing copyrights for the productions of old authors in the name
of some younger person.

The objection to a long term especially applies to music which
depends almost entirely upon fashion and taste, and these soon
change and the music becomes useless to the public. In my opinion,
purely musical productions should have a relatively short term of
copyright, but I have not considered the subject sufficiently to
be justified in fixing any precise number of years.

But as to all copyrights it is my conviction that the interest of
the public unquestionably requires that they be granted for a
definite term of years, and that, if an extension is provided, the
extension should be for a fixed and definite time. It is only this
which enables the public to know, upon reading a notice of the
copyright, when the monopoly will terminate.

If for any reason it should seem wiser to make the term dependent
in its length upon the death of an author, then the continuance of
the copyright should depend upon definite evidence being filed in
the copyright office showing positively the date of death.

At the end of section 18, page 15, line 8, after "name," the words
"_Provided_, That in such published work the notice of copyright
be given as required in this act" should be inserted.

Section 19 should, in my opinion, be canceled. It is retroactive
in its character. Definite contracts have been entered into
between authors and the public with respect to matters already
copyrighted, and it would impair the obligations of those
contracts to provide any renewal or extension of such copyrights.
It has already been agreed between such authors and the public at
what time their copyrighted works shall pass into the public
domain.

Recurring to lines 3 and 4 of page 15, I submit that they should
be canceled, so that the copyright shall extend for a definite
number of years after the date of original entry. There seems to
be no sound reason for giving an author a longer copyright, longer
by a year, if he makes his entry on the 2d of January, than
another author will have who enters his copyright on the 30th of
December preceding.