Chapter I (2)

“The Prussians alone have to decide as to the extent of those districts. Prussia has no further political interest in negotiating with Denmark if the latter is not content with the concessions which the former is prepared to make. Finally, only Austria has a right to demand that the matter shall be settled in any form.... If Prussia and Austria,” so concluded the Minister’s directions, “now come to an understanding as to cancelling that paragraph of the treaty--probably on the basis of further concessions on the part of Prussia--absolutely no one has any right to object.” Two articles were to be written on this subject, one for the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, in which the reference to Austria was to be omitted, and one for the _Spenersche Zeitung_, which was to contain it.

_April 12th._--The Count desires to have an article written for the _Kölnische Zeitung_, part of which he dictated to me. It ran as follows: “The _Constitutionnel_ speaks of the way in which French manners are being corrupted by foreign elements, and in this connection it mentions Princess Metternich and Madame Rimsky-Korsakow. It would require more space than we can afford to this subject to show in its true light all the ignorance and prejudice exhibited by the writer of this article, who has probably never left Paris. Princess Metternich would not act in Vienna as she is represented by the _Constitutionnel_ to have acted in Paris; and Madame Rimsky-Korsakow is not a leader of society in St. Petersburg. The contrary must be the case. Paris must be responsible if the two ladies so conduct themselves, and exercise such an influence as the French journal asserts they do. As a matter of fact the idea that Paris is the home and school of good manners is now only to be met with in other countries, in old novels, and amongst elderly people in the most remote parts of the provinces. It has long since been observed, and not in European Courts alone, that the present generation of Frenchmen do not know how to behave themselves. In other circles it has also been remarked that the young Frenchman does not compare favourably with the youth of other nations, or with those few countrymen of his own who have, far from Paris, preserved the traditions of good French society. Travellers who have visited the country at long intervals are agreed in declaring that the forms of polite intercourse, and even the conventional expressions for which the French language so long served as a model, are steadily falling into disuse. It is therefore quite conceivable that the Empress Eugénie, as a sensitive Spaniard, has been painfully affected by the tone and character of Parisian society, but it would show a lack of judgment on her part if, as stated by the _Constitutionnel_, she sought for the origin of that evil abroad. But we believe we are justified in directly contradicting that statement, as we know that the Empress has repeatedly recommended young Germans as models for the youth of France. The French show themselves to be a decadent nation, and not least in their manners. It will require generations to recover the ground they have lost. Unfortunately, so far as manners are concerned, all Europe has retrograded.”

From the 13th of April to the 28th of May I did not see the Minister. He was unwell, and left for Varzin on Easter Eve. It was said at the Ministry that his illness was of a bilious character, and was due to the mortification he felt at the conduct of the Lasker fraction, together with the fact that he had spoilt his digestion at a dinner at Camphausen’s.

On the 21st of May the Minister returned to Berlin, but it was not until seven days later that I was called to him. He then gave me the following instructions: “Brass (the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_) must not plead so strongly for the Austrians nor speak so warmly of the Government of Napoleon. In the case of Austria we have to adopt a benevolently expectant attitude, yet the appointment of Klaczko and his connection with the Ministry is for us a suspicious symptom. The appointment of Grammont to the French Foreign Office is not exactly agreeable to us. The Czechs must be treated with all possible consideration; but, on the other hand, we must deal with the Poles as with enemies.”

I afterwards asked as to his health. He said he still felt weak, and would not have left Varzin if things had not looked so critical in Parliament. As soon as matters were once more in order there, he would be off again, if possible on an early day, in order to undertake a cure with Karlsbad water, going to some seaside resort.

On being called to the Count on Whit Sunday I found him highly indignant at the statement of a correspondent of the _Kölnische Zeitung_, who reported that there was a scarcity of labour in the Spandau cartridge factory. “Therefore unusual activity in the preparation of war material!” he said. “If I were to have paid two visits to the King at Ems it would not cause so much anxiety abroad as thoughtless reports of this kind. Please go to Wehrmann and let him ascertain at the Ministry of War if they are responsible for that article, and if possible get them to insert a correction in the _Kölnische Zeitung_ or in the _Norddeutsche_, as it must appear in an influential paper.”

A diary entry on an undated slip of paper, but written in May: “Bohlen yesterday bantered Bucher about his ‘Easter mission,’ which appears to have been to Spain.”

On the 8th of June the Minister again left Berlin for Varzin.

Immediately on the commencement of the difficulties with France respecting the election to the Spanish throne of the Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern, letters and telegrams began to arrive which were forwarded by Bucher under instructions from the Chief. These consisted in part of short paragraphs and drafts of articles, as well as some complete articles which only required to be retouched in the matter of style, or to have references inserted with regard to matters of fact. These directions accumulated, but owing to the spirit and energy inspired by the consciousness that we were on the eve of great events, and that it was an honour to co-operate in the work, they were promptly dealt with, almost all being disposed of on the day of their arrival. I here reproduce some of these instructions, the order of the words and expressions in the deciphered telegrams being slightly altered, while the remainder are given exactly as they reached me.

_July 7th, evening._--A telegram to me from Varzin: “The semi-official organs should indicate that this does not seem to be the proper time for a discussion of the succession to the Spanish throne, as the Cortes, who are alone entitled to decide the question, have not yet spoken. German Governments have always respected Spanish independence in such matters, and will do so in future, as they have no claim or authority to interfere and lay down regulations for the Spaniards. Then, in the non-official press, great surprise should be expressed at the presumption of the French, who have discussed the question very fully in the Chamber, speaking as if that assembly had a right to dispose of the Spanish throne, and apparently forgetting that such a course was as offensive to Spanish national pride as it was conducive to the encouragement of Republican tendencies. This may be safely construed into a further proof of the false direction which the personal _régime_ is taking. It would appear as if the Emperor, who has instigated this action, wanted to see the outbreak of a new war of succession.”

A letter from Bucher, which was handed to me on the evening of the 8th of July, further developed the idea contained in the last sentence of the foregoing telegram. This letter ran: “Previous to 1868 Eugénie was pleased to play the part of an obedient subject to Isabella, and since the September revolution that of a gracious protectress. She unquestionably arranged the farce of the abdication, and now, in her rage, she incites her consort and the Ministers. As a member of a Spanish party she would sacrifice the peace and welfare of Europe to the intrigues and aspirations of a corrupt dynasty.

“Please see that this theme, a new war of succession in the nineteenth century, is thoroughly threshed out in the press. The subject is inviting, especially in the hands of a correspondent disposed to draw historical parallels, and more particularly parallels _ex averso_. Have the French not had experience enough of Spain with Louis XIV. and Napoleon, and with the Duc d’Angoulême’s campaign for the execution of the decrees of the Verona Congress? Have they not excited sufficient hatred by all those wars and by the Spanish marriage of 1846?

“Bring personal influence to bear as far as possible on the editors who have been intimidated by the Stock Exchange, representing to them that if the German press takes up a timid and hesitating attitude in presence of the rhodomontades of the French, the latter will become more insolent and put forward intolerable demands in other questions affecting Germany still more closely. A cool and determined attitude, with a touch of contempt for those excited gentlemen who would like to slaughter somebody, but do not exactly know whom, would be the most fitting means for putting an end to this uproar and preventing serious complications.”

Bucher added: “Protestants were still sent to the galleys under the Spanish Government which was overthrown in 1868.”

Another communication of Bucher’s from Varzin of the same date runs: “The precedents furnished by Louis Philippe’s refusal of the Belgian throne on behalf of the Duc de Nemours in 1831, on the ground that it would create uneasiness, and by the protest which England would have entered against the marriage of the Duc de Montpensier to the sister of Queen Isabella, are neither of them very applicable, as the Prince of Hohenzollern is not a son of King William, but only a remote connection, and Spain does not border on Prussia.”

The following was a third subject received from Varzin on the same day: “Is Spain to inquire submissively at the Tuileries whether the King whom she desires to take is considered satisfactory? Is the Spanish throne a French dependency? It has already been stated in the Prussian speech from the throne that our sole desire in connection with the events in Spain was that the Spanish people should arrive at an independent decision for the maintenance of their own prosperity and power. In France, where on other occasions so much is said of national independence, the attempt of the Spanish people to decide for themselves has immediately revived the old diplomatic traditions which led to the Spanish war of succession 160 years ago.”

On the same day, the 8th of July, a telegram was also received from the Chancellor by the Secretary of State, and it was handed to me for my information. It was to the following effect: “I have now before me in the despatch of Count Solms the official text of the Duc de Grammont’s speech, and I find his language more brusque and presumptuous than I had anticipated. I am in doubt whether that is due to stupidity or the result of a decision taken beforehand. The probability of the latter alternative seems to be confirmed by the noisy demonstrations which will most likely render it impossible for them to draw back. I am reluctant to protest officially against Grammont’s speech on international grounds, but our press should attack it very severely, and this should be done in as many newspapers as possible.”

_July 9th._--A telegram from Bucher to the Secretary of State, saying that the direction to the press to deal with Grammont’s speech in very strong language is not to apply to the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_.

Another telegram of the same date to Thile, which he brought to me: “Any one intending to summon a Congress to deal with a debatable question ought not first to threaten a warlike solution in case the opposite party should not agree to his wishes.”

Further, the Secretary of State handed me a telegram from Berlin to the Chancellor, which was returned by the latter with comments. I was to get these circulated in the non-official journals. The telegram was to the effect that Grammont had stated, in reply to an interpellation by Cochery, that Prim had offered the Spanish throne to the Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern, (Remark: “He can do nothing of the kind. Only the Cortes,”) and that the Prince had accepted it. (Remark: “He will only declare himself after he has been elected.”) The Spanish people has not yet, however, expressed its wishes. (Remark: “That is the main point.”) The French Government do not recognise the negotiations in question. (Remark: “There are no negotiations excepting those between Spain and the eventual candidates for the throne.”) Grammont therefore begged that the discussion might be postponed, as it was purposeless for the moment. (Remark: “Very.”) The French Government would maintain the neutral attitude which they had observed up to the present, but would not permit a foreign Power to place a Prince upon the Spanish throne, (“Hardly any power entertains such an intention, except perhaps France,”) and endanger the honour and dignity of France. They trusted to the wisdom of the Germans, (Remark: “Has nothing to do with it,”) and to the friendship of the Spanish people. (Remark: “That is the main point.”) Should they be deceived in their hopes they would do their duty without hesitation or weakness. (Remark: “We also.”)

Bucher sent me a whole packet of sketches for articles:--

1. “If Spain records her decision to establish a government which shall be peaceful, and tolerant in religious matters, and which may be expected to be friendly to Germany, who is also devoted to peace, can it be in our interest to prevent the execution of that resolve, and for that purpose to take measures of doubtful legality? Shall we, because of a threat of war made in pursuit of an arbitrary and dynastic object, take steps to frustrate a reorganisation of Spanish affairs advantageous to Germany? Is it not rather an act of insolent presumption on the part of France to address such a demand to Germany? Obviously France lacks either the courage or the means to enforce her views at Madrid; and it appears from Grammont’s speech of the 4th of July that in her anger at what has happened in Spain she is prepared to throw herself upon Germany in a blind fit of rage. That speech is to a certain extent a declaration of war against the person of the Prince of Hohenzollern, in case he should decide to accept the offer of the Spanish people. France demands that Prussia shall undertake the office of policeman in case a German Prince who has attained _his majority_ shows a disposition to meet the wishes of the Spaniards. For a North German Government to interfere with a citizen who should wish to exercise his right to emigrate and adopt the Spanish nationality would raise a very questionable point of law from a constitutional standpoint. Even if such a power existed, the dignity of Germany would demand that it should only be applied in her own interests. The calm consideration of those interests is not in the least affected by the warlike threats of a neighbouring State, which, instead of arguments, appeals to its 400,000 soldiers. If France lays claim in this manner to the guardianship of adjoining nations, the maintenance of peace can for the latter be only a question of time, which may be decided at any moment. On Grammont’s appointment to the French Foreign Office it was feared in many quarters that the choice by the Emperor Napoleon of a statesman who was only remarkable for his personal impetuosity and his hostility to Germany indicated a desire to secure for himself greater liberty in breaking the peace. Unfortunately the haughty and aggressive tone of the Duke’s speech is not calculated to remove the apprehensions entertained at that time. He is not a minister of peace, but rather the instrument of a personal policy which shrinks from no responsibility. In itself the question as to who is to be the ruler of Spain is not one for which Germany would go to war. But the French demand that the German Government, in opposition to its own interests, should put artificial difficulties in the way of the Spaniards manifests a depth of self-conceit which scarcely any government amongst the independent States of Europe could submit to at the present day. We seek no quarrel, but if any one tries to force one upon us he will find us ready to go through with it to the bitter end.”

2. In another article (there was too much material to be disposed of in one) the following considerations were to be developed. This was not to be communicated to the official organs, but either to the _Kölnische Zeitung_ or the _Spenersche Zeitung_, while it was to be given in a curtailed form to Hahn’s _Literary Bureau_. “If the candidature of Alphonso had up to the present any prospect of success in Spain, it would have been most prejudicially affected by the foolish uproar raised in France, which stamped it with a French official character. No worse service could be done to that Prince than to represent him as a French candidate. Montpensier had already suffered under the reproach that he was a Frenchman. The Bourbons had formerly been imposed upon the Spaniards, and had proved themselves no blessing. The manner in which the succession to the throne is now discussed in France would offend a nation even less proud than the Spaniards.”

3. “Between the years 1866 and 1868, and particularly before the fall of Isabella, France schemed a great deal against Germany with Austria, Italy, and also with Spain. Those intrigues were set at nought by the Revolution of September, to which Count Bismarck referred when he said at that time in Parliament that the danger of war, which had been very imminent, had been dispelled by an unforeseen event. So long as France maintains her warlike intentions towards Germany, she will desire to see on the Spanish throne a dynasty favourable to those schemes, possibly an Ultramontane one, as in case of an attack on Germany it would make a difference of about 50,000 men to France whether she had a benevolent, or at least a neutral neighbour on the other side of the Pyrenees or one whose attitude might be suspected. It is true that France has nothing to fear directly from Spain if the French, who for the past eighty years have been unable to make up their own minds, and who cannot govern themselves, would give up the attempt to play the part of tutor to other nations. Let the period 1848-1850 in France be compared with that of 1868-1870 in Spain, and the comparison will not be to the advantage of the nation _qui marche à la tête de la civilisation_.”

4. “England is accustomed to look upon the Peninsula as a dependency of her own, and doubtless believes that her influence can be more easily made to prevail in a state of insecurity than under the rule of a powerful dynasty. It is not wise of the English to recall certain incidents of Spanish history, a course in which they are followed by the French newspapers. The Spanish version of the history of the wars against the First Napoleon is very different to the English one. In Buen Retiro every traveller is shown the site of a once prosperous porcelain manufactory, which was needlessly burned to the ground by the British allies of Spain.”

5. Still another subject. “Very pleased with the article in the _Spenersche Zeitung_ (this was addressed to me). Please again call attention in a somewhat similar manner to the impetuosity of Grammont therein referred to. What is the real ground for all this alarm? A paragraph in the _Agence Havas_ to the effect that the affair had been settled without the concurrence of the Cortes. It is probable that the French Government itself had this paragraph inserted, and it was, moreover, concocted in complete ignorance of the Spanish Constitution and of the laws governing the election of a King. This, which was the only new feature, was a barefaced invention. It had already been mentioned in all the papers that Prim’s speech of the 11th of June referred to the Prince of Hohenzollern, and that had caused no excitement in France. Is the present agitation then a _coup monté_? Does the French Government insist upon a ‘row’? Has Louis Napoleon chosen Grammont in order to pick a quarrel with us? At any rate he has been unskilful in his treatment of this question. The general moral to be drawn as often as possible is: the French Government is, after all, not quite so shrewd as people believe. The French have succeeded in many things with the assistance of 300,000 soldiers, and owing to that success they are regarded as immensely clever. Is that really so? Circumstances show that it is not.”

_July 10th, evening._--Received further series of sketches and drafts for articles from Bucher, who acts as the mouthpiece of the Chancellor’s views and intentions.

1. For the _Spenersche_ or _Kölnische_:--“Those foreign Powers that are not concerned in the differences respecting the Spanish throne are as desirous to maintain peace as Germany herself. Their influence will, however, be neutralised by Grammont’s ill-considered threats. Should the German Governments consider the security of our frontier to be seriously threatened, they would scarcely come to a decision without convoking Parliament.”

2. “The French are running amuck like a Malay who has got into a rage and rushes through the streets dagger in hand, foaming at the mouth, stabbing every one who happens to cross his path. If France is mad enough to regard Germany as a fit object for a vicarious whipping, nothing will restrain her, and the result will be that she will herself receive a personal castigation.”

3. “The semi-official journals in Paris pretend that attention has been attracted there by the numerous cipher despatches exchanged between Berlin and Madrid, and that they have been clever enough to decipher them. We do not know whether many despatches have passed between the two capitals mentioned, but we remember a communication which was made to Parliament some time ago by Count Bismarck, according to which the cipher system of our Foreign Office is based on a vocabulary of about 20,000 words, each one of which is represented by a group of figures arbitrarily chosen. It is impossible to ‘decipher’ such a system in the same way as those based on an altered alphabet and other old methods. In order to read such a despatch, it is essential to have the vocabulary. Does the cleverness on which the Parisians pride themselves consist in having stolen the key to our ciphers? This would be in contradiction with the original statement that the Prince of Hohenzollern’s candidature first became known through a communication from Prim. It would, therefore, appear that the official press wants to clear the Government of the reproach of incapacity by a subsequent invention, acting, on the maxim that it is better to be taken for a rogue than a fool.”

4. “According to a private telegram from Paris to the _Berliner Boersen Zeitung_, our Ambassador there, together with the second Secretary of Embassy, left for Ems on receipt of a Note delivered to him immediately after the Cabinet Council at Saint Cloud. We have made inquiries in the proper quarter as to the accuracy of this report, and have received the following answer: Note delivered. ‘Not a shadow of truth. Werther’s journey was decided upon and announced in Paris long before the agitation began.’”

5. “As was already known, Prim intended this year, as on previous occasions, to visit Vichy. This would have led to a meeting between himself and the Emperor Napoleon and a discussion of the succession to the Spanish throne. It is also reported that the Prince of Hohenzollern was not indisposed to try confidentially to bring about an understanding with the Emperor. All this has been rendered impossible by the abrupt tone of the Duc de Grammont. As Prim’s visit to Vichy has long since been announced in the newspapers, and the near relationship as well as the personal friendship which hitherto existed between the Prince of Hohenzollern and the Emperor rendered both meetings probable, it is hard to avoid the suspicion that the French Government, dreading insurmountable domestic difficulties, desires to inflame French vanity in favour of a war, which would at the same time promote the dynastic views of the Empress Eugénie.”

_July 12th._--Received from Secretary Wollmann a note from Bucher in Varzin which is intended for me. It has been sent to the Secretary of State, in order that he should say whether there is any objection to its being used in the press. He has no objection, and so it goes to the newspapers. It runs as follows: “The _Imparcial_ publishes a letter from Paris to the effect that the furious article in the _Constitutionnel_ reproaching Prince Hohenzollern with his relationship to Murat, has been revised by the Emperor himself.”

In the evening the Minister returned. He is dressed in plain clothes and looks very well.

_July 13th._--Called early to the Chief. I am to wait until a statement appears in the press to the effect that the renunciation of Prince Hohenzollern was in consequence of pressure from Ems, and then to contradict it. “In the meantime (said the Minister) the _Norddeutsche_ should only say that the Prince’s present decision has not been altogether unexpected. When he accepted the throne which had been offered to him he had obviously not foreseen that his decision would occasion so much excitement in Paris. For more than thirty years past the best relations existed between Napoleon and the Hohenzollern family. Prince Leopold could not, therefore, have apprehended any antipathy to his candidature on the part of the Emperor. As his candidature suddenly became known after the Cortes had been adjourned till November, it may well have been assumed that there would be time enough in the interval to sound the Emperor as to his views. Now that this assumption (here the Chancellor began to speak more slowly as if he were dictating), which, up to the acceptance of the Crown by the Prince, was still quite legitimate, had proved to be partly erroneous, it was scarcely probable that the Prince would, on his own responsibility, be disposed to cope single handed with the storm which his decision had raised, and might yet raise, in view of the apprehensions of war of the whole European world, and the influence brought to bear upon him from London and Brussels. Even a portion of the responsibility of involving the great European nations, not only in one war, but possibly in a series of wars, would weigh very heavily upon a man who could not claim to have assumed it as part of the duty of the Royal office which he had already accepted. That was more than could well be expected of a Prince who only occupied a private position. It was the offensive tone of Grammont that alone prevented Prussia from exercising her influence with the Prince.”

The following is to be published in other papers: “It cannot be denied that a Spanish Government disposed to promote the cause of peace and to abstain from conspiring with France would be of considerable value to us. But if, some fourteen days ago, the Emperor Napoleon had addressed himself confidentially to Berlin, or indicated that the affair was attracting attention, Prussia, instead of adopting an indifferent attitude, would have co-operated in pacifying public opinion in Paris. The situation has been entirely altered through the aggressive tone of Grammont’s speech, and the direct demands addressed to the King, who is staying in privacy at Ems for the benefit of his health, unaccompanied by a single Minister. His Majesty rightly declined to accede to these demands. That incident has created so much indignation in Germany, that many people feel disappointed at Prince Leopold’s renunciation. At any rate, the confidence in the peaceful intentions of France has been so thoroughly shaken that it will take a considerable time to restore it. If commerce and trade have been injured by the evidence which has shown us what a den of brigands we have to deal with in France, the people of that country must fasten the responsibility on the personal _régime_ under which they at present live.”

The Minister also desires it to be incidentally remarked in the non-official press that of the South German Courts those of Munich and Carlsruhe had given the most satisfactory declarations in this affair, while on the other hand that of Stuttgart had expressed itself evasively.

Finally, I am to communicate to one of the local papers that Count Bismarck has been sent for to Ems to consult with the King as to summoning Parliament. Breaking off a cure which he was undergoing, the Chancellor has remained in Berlin in order to await there the further instructions of his Majesty, or ultimately to return to Varzin. The Count then added: “Later on I will call for you several times, as there is something more to be prepared for the _Norddeutsche_. We shall now be shortly interrupted.” The Crown Prince arrived five minutes afterwards and had a long interview with the Minister.

_July 14th._--Our newspapers to call attention to the loyal attitude of Würtemberg, “which in consequence of a misunderstanding has been represented in some journals as evasive.”

_July 15th._--I am to send the following _démenti_ to Wolf’s Telegraphic Agency for circulation: “The news published by the _Spenersche Zeitung_ respecting the opening of Parliament is not quite accurate. It was proposed a week ago by the Chancellor while in Varzin that it should be convoked as soon as the Government Bills were ready for submission to it. His Majesty shares this view, and the Federal Council has accordingly been summoned for to-morrow, Saturday, morning to consider those measures.”

In the evening the Chancellor dictated an article for the _Kreuzzeitung_ on the confusion by the public between personal and private proceedings of the King and his official acts. It ran as follows: “It appears from the Mazaredo pamphlet that the Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern informed the King at Ems of his acceptance of the offer of the Spanish throne, probably towards the end of June. His Majesty was then at Ems for the purpose of taking the waters, and certainly not with the intention of carrying on business of State, as none of his Ministers had been summoned thither. As a matter of fact, only so much has become public respecting the King’s reply to the communication of the Hereditary Prince (it was in the form of a letter written in his Majesty’s own hand) that the Sovereign was not pleased at the news, although he did not feel called upon to offer any opposition. In the whole affair no State action of any kind has been taken. This constitutional aspect of the situation does not appear to have been properly appreciated up to the present in public discussions of the question. The position of the King in his private correspondence was confounded with his position as head of the State, and it was forgotten that in the latter capacity, according to the Constitution, the co-operation of the Ministry is necessary to constitute a State action. It is only the French Cabinet that appears to have thoroughly realised this distinction, inasmuch as it brought the whole force of its diplomacy to bear upon the person of the Sovereign, who was staying at a watering-place for the sake of his health, and whose private life was not protected by the usual etiquette, in order to force him under official pressure into private negotiations which might afterwards be represented as arrangements with the Government.”

_July 19th._--About an hour after the opening of Parliament in the Royal Palace (1.45 P.M.) Le Sourd, the French Chargé d’Affaires, delivered Napoleon’s declaration of war at the Foreign Office.

Towards 5 o’clock in the evening I was called to the Minister, who was in his garden. After searching for him for some time I saw him coming through one of the long shady alleys to the left which led to the entrance in the Königgrätzer Strasse. He was brandishing a big stick. His figure stood out against the yellow evening sunshine like a picture painted on a gold ground. He stopped in his walk as I came up to him, and said: “I wish you to write something in the _Kreuzzeitung_ against the Hanoverian nobles. It must come from the provinces, from a nobleman living in the country, an Old Prussian--very blunt, somewhat in this style: It is reported that certain Hanoverian nobles have endeavoured to find pilots and spies in the North Sea for French men-of-war. The arrests made within the last few days with the assistance of the military authorities are understood to be connected with this affair. The conduct of those Hanoverians is infamous, and I certainly express the sentiments of all my neighbours when I put the following questions to the Hanoverian nobles who sympathise with those traitors. Have they any doubt, I would ask them, that a man of honour could not now regard such men as entitled to demand honourable satisfaction by arms whether their unpatriotic action was or was not undertaken at the bidding of King George? Do they not, as a matter of course, consider that an affair of honour with them is altogether out of the question, and should one of them be impudent enough to propose such a thing, would they not have him turned out of the house by the servants or eject him _propriæ manu_ after having, of course, put on a pair of gloves to handle him with? Are they not convinced that such miscreants can only be properly described by the good old Prussian word _Hundsvott_ (scurvy, infamous rogues), and that their treason has branded their posterity to the third and fourth generations with indelible disgrace? I beg them to answer these questions.”

_Evening._--In an article in the _Liberté_ of the 18th instant, that paper reminds Italy that she owes her liberation to France, and that in 1866 it was France who brought about the Italian alliance with the Berlin Cabinet. It then maintains that, in view of the seriousness of approaching events, Victor Emmanuel, with truly chivalrous sentiment, has not for a moment hesitated to assure the French of his unconditional support. With reference to this article our papers should observe: “Up to the present the French have played the part of masters to the whole world, and Belgium, Spain, and the King of Prussia have in turn experienced their arrogance. Their behaviour was somewhat like that of the Sultan towards his Khedive, it was a kind of megalomania based upon the bayonet. Their presumption is now beginning to waver, so they court the assistance of those good friends whom they pretend to have placed under obligations to them.”

The Minister subsequently dictated the following, to be worked up for the German newspapers outside Berlin, such as the _Kölnische Zeitung_, and for the English and Belgium journals: “According to confidential communications from loyal Hanoverian circles, amongst other decisive factors which led the French to the declaration of war, were the reports sent to Paris by Colonel Stoffel, the Military Plenipotentiary in Berlin. Stoffel’s information was, it appears, less accurate than abundant, as none of those who supplied him with it being prepared to forego the payments they received from him merely because they had nothing to say, they occasionally invented the news of which they warranted the correctness. The Plenipotentiary had, it is said, been informed that the arming of the Prussian infantry, both as regards rifles and ammunition, was at present undergoing a thorough transformation, and that consequently a moment so favourable as the present for attacking Prussia would hardly occur again, inasmuch as on the completion of this change the Prussian armaments would have been unassailable.”[4]

2. “It now appears to be beyond all doubt that the French Government was aware of the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern for months past, that they carefully promoted it and foolishly imagined it would serve as a means of isolating Prussia and creating a division in Germany. No trustworthy information has been received as yet as to whether and how far Marshal Prim had prepared the way for this intrigue, in agreement with the Emperor Napoleon. But doubtless that point will ultimately be cleared up by history. The sudden disappearance of Spain from the political field as soon as the differences between France and Prussia broke out gives matter for reflection and suspicion. It cannot but be regarded as strange that after the zeal shown by the Spanish Government in the matter of the Hohenzollern candidature had been raised to boiling point it should have suddenly fallen below zero, and that the relations of Marshal Prim to the French Cabinet should now appear to be of the most friendly character, while the Spaniards seem no longer to feel any irritation at the interference of France in their internal affairs.”

3. “Rumours were circulated this afternoon to the effect that the former French Military Plenipotentiary, Baron Stoffel, had been insulted in the street. On closer inquiry it was ascertained that some individuals who knew Stoffel followed him in the street, and on his reaching his house struck the door with their sticks. The police intervened energetically on the first report of this matter and have taken measures to prevent a repetition of such conduct and to provide that Baron Stoffel shall not be interfered with on his departure this evening. Excesses of this description are, however, highly reprehensible, even when they are confined to words. The former representatives of France are under the protection of international law and of the honour of Germany until they have crossed the frontier.”

_July 21st._--Keudell asked me this morning if I knew Rasch, the journalist, and if I could say where he was now to be found, in Berlin or elsewhere. I replied that I had seen him in Schleswig in 1864, afterwards at a table d’hôte at the Hotel Weissberg, in the Dessauer Strasse, where he lodged at the end of February. I knew nothing more about him, but had heard that he was extremely conceited, almost to the point of madness--a political visionary who desired to convert the whole world to republicanism. I was not aware of his whereabouts in Berlin, but would make inquiries at Weissberg’s. Keudell told me to hunt him up and ask him whether he would go to Garibaldi and urge him to undertake an expedition against Rome, at the same time carrying him money from us. I pointed out that Rasch was perhaps too vain to keep his own counsel. Keudell consoled himself with the idea that he would doubtless prove a good patriot. I declined to treat with Rasch in the matter, as I could not speak to him in my own name but in that of the Foreign Office, and that could be better done by some official of higher rank, who would make a greater impression upon Rasch. Keudell seemed to recognise the justice of this view. I made inquiries and was able to report on the same evening that Rasch was staying at Weissberg’s.

Called to the Minister in the evening. He showed me an extract from the _National Zeitung_, and observed: “They say here that the English would not allow the French to attack Belgium. Well and good, but how does that help the Belgians if the protection comes too late? If Germany were once defeated (which God forbid!) the English would not be able to assist the Belgians in the least, but might, on the contrary, be thankful if they themselves remained safe in London.”

I am further to call attention to the “manner in which France is begging for help on all sides--that great warlike nation which makes so much parade of its victories, representing them as having always been won solely by the force of its own arms. They go begging (use that expression) to Italy, to Denmark, to Sweden, and above all to the German States, to whom they promise the same brilliant destiny which they have already prepared for Italy--political independence and financial ruin.”

Called up to the Minister again later. I am to secure the insertion of the following in the non-official German papers and in the Belgian and English press: “The English Government observe their neutrality in connection with the war that has now broken out in a liberal and conscientious spirit. They impartially permit both sides to purchase horses and munitions of war in England. It is unfortunate, however, that France alone can avail herself of this liberality, as will appear from a glance at the geographical position of the two countries and from the superiority of the French at sea. Then quote what Heffter (the book must be in the library) has to say on this kind of neutrality, and observe that the English jurists describe it more tersely as ‘fraudulent neutrality.’”

_July 23rd._--Called to the Minister five times to-day. The press should urge the prosecution and seizure of Rothan, an Alsacian who speaks German, hitherto French Chargé d’Affaires at Hamburg, who has been a zealous spy and instrument of French intrigue in North Germany, and who is now understood to be wandering along the coast between the Elbe and Ems, as also that of the ex-Hanoverian officer, Adolf von Kielmansegg, respecting whom further particulars are to be obtained from the Ministry of the Interior. The Count further wants the press to give a list of the names of the Bavarian members of Parliament who voted for the neutrality of that State in the national war, mentioning their professions but without any further remarks. “Give it first in Brass,” (_i.e._, _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_,) he added. “You will find such a list amongst the documents. The complaints as to the manner in which England understands neutrality must be continually renewed. The English Government does not forbid the export of horses, though only France can avail herself of that facility. Colliers are allowed to load at Newcastle and to supply fuel for the French men-of-war cruising in the North Sea. English cartridge factories are working for the French army under the eyes of the Government. In Germany the painful feeling has become more and more widespread that, under Lord Granville, England, while nominally maintaining neutrality, favours France in the manner in which it is really observed.”

About 11 P.M. I was again called to the Minister. The reports respecting the English coal ships to be at once sent by a Chancery attendant to Wolf’s Telegraphic Agency for circulation to the newspapers.

In this connection may be mentioned an Embassy report from London, dated the 30th of July, to the following effect: Lord Granville had asked the Ambassador if he had not stirred up the authorities in Berlin against the English Government. The reply was in the negative. The Ambassador had only carried out his instructions. Public opinion in Germany influenced the Government, just as the German press influenced public opinion. The manner in which neutrality was observed on the part of England had excited the greatest indignation in Germany. The action of the English Government, which indeed recognised that France was in the wrong, but failed to give expression to that conviction, was also bitterly resented there. Granville replied that once it had been decided to remain neutral that neutrality must be maintained in every respect. If the export of contraband of war were forbidden, the French would regard it as an act of one-sided hostility, while at the same time it would ruin English trade in the branches affected by such prohibition, and favour American manufacturers. For the present, every one in England approved of the maintenance of neutrality, and therefore in a general way no change was possible in these matters. At the same time, the English Government was ready, in case of complaints reaching them in an official way respecting any acts of illegality, to institute an inquiry into the facts and secure the punishment of the guilty parties. It did not seem impossible to prevent the supply of English coal to French men-of-war. Next Monday a Bill was to be submitted to Parliament for the amendment of the laws regulating neutrality. The report concluded as follows: “England is in many respects well disposed towards us, but will for the present remain neutral. If we make further attacks upon English public opinion through our official press in connection with these grievances, it will serve no purpose but to conjure up future difficulties. Granville is not what we might desire, but he is not prejudiced against us. He may become so, however, if he is further provoked by us. We can hardly succeed in overthrowing him, and if we did his probable successor would in all likelihood be much worse than himself.”

_July 24th._--I am instructed by the Count to send an article to the _Kölnische Zeitung_ respecting the Dutch coal question. He gave me the following information on this subject: “Holland asked us to again permit the passage of Prussian coal down the Rhine, and requested that a large transport of Rhenish coal intended for Holland should be allowed to pass the frontier. It was only to be used in factories, and the Government of the Netherlands would prohibit its re-exportation. Prussia willingly agreed to this, but shortly afterwards it was ascertained that foreign vessels were being loaded with coal in Dutch ports, and the Government of the Netherlands subsequently informed us that in promising to prevent the re-exportation they had overlooked the circumstance that their treaty with France did not permit this. Thereupon as a matter of course the export of Prussian coal to Holland was prohibited. In the interval, however, they seem to have secured a sufficient supply in Holland to provide the French fleet for a considerable time. That is a very suspicious method of observing the neutrality promised by the gentlemen at the Hague.”

Bucher brings me the following paragraph from the Chief, which is to be inserted in the _Spenersche Zeitung_, or some other non-official organ, and afterwards in the _North German Correspondence_: “In 1851 a literary _gamin_ in Paris was commissioned to conjure up the Red Terror in a pamphlet, which proved very useful to the President Louis Napoleon, enabling him to escape from a debtors’ prison and ascend the Imperial throne. The Duc de Grammont now tries to raise the Spanish Terror in order to save the Emperor from the necessity of accounting for the hundred millions which he diverted from the State Treasury into his private purse. The literary gentleman in question was made a Prefect. What reward can Grammont have had in view?”

_Evening._--The Minister wishes an article to be prepared for circulation in the German press describing the French and French policy under the Emperor Napoleon. This is to be first sent to the _Spenersche Zeitung_, while the Literary Bureau is to secure the insertion of the principal points in a condensed form in the Magdeburg papers and a number of the smaller journals to-morrow. The Count said (literally): “The French are not so astute as people generally think. As a nation they resemble certain individuals amongst our lower classes. They are narrow-minded and brutal,--great physical force, boastful and insolent, winning the admiration of men of their own stamp through their audacity and violence. Here in Germany the French are also considered clever by persons who do not think deeply, and their Ministers are regarded as great statesmen because of their insolent interference in the affairs of the whole world, and their desire to rule everywhere. Audacity is always impressive. People think their success is due to shrewd political calculation, but it is actually due to nothing else than the fact that they always keep 300,000 soldiers ready to back up their policy. That alone, and not their political intelligence, has enabled them to carry things with such a high hand. We must get rid of this fiction.... In political affairs the French are in the fullest sense of the word a narrow-minded nation. They have no idea how things look outside of France, and learn nothing about it in their schools. The French educational establishments, for the greater glory of France, leave their pupils in the crassest ignorance as to everything beyond her frontiers, and so they have not the slightest knowledge of their neighbours; that is the case with the Emperor, or at least he is not much better, to say nothing of Grammont, who is an ass (_Rindvieh_). Napoleon is ignorant at bottom, although he has been educated in German schools. His ‘Cæsar’ was intended to conceal that fact. He has forgotten everything. His policy was always stupid. The Crimean War was against the interests of France, which demanded an alliance or at least a good understanding with Russia. It was the same with the war in Italy. There he created a rival in the Mediterranean, North Africa, Tunis, &c., who may one day prove dangerous. The Italian people are much more gifted than the French, only less numerous. The war in Mexico and the attitude adopted in 1866 were blunders, and doubtless in storming about as they do at present the French feel conscious that they have committed another blunder.”

_July 25th._--At 11 o’clock this morning Count Bismarck and his family took the Holy Communion at their residence. He asked whether any one in our bureau desired to join them, but no one offered to do so. I was for a moment tempted, but reconsidered the matter. It might look as if I wished to recommend myself.

Copies of the Benedetti draft treaty are sent to Auber (the French Press Agency) and Heide.

_July 27th._--It is to be stated either in the _Norddeutsche_ or the _Spenersche Zeitung_ that secrecy respecting confidential communications between great States is, as a rule, more carefully observed and maintained than the public imagines. Nevertheless, the French misrepresentation of Prussia’s attitude in the affair of the candidature for the Spanish throne (in Grammont’s despatch of the 21st of July) obliged the authorities here to disregard these considerations of discretion. Benedetti’s proposal has therefore been published and it may be followed by other documents of the same description. The Count concluded his directions as follows: “We are at least entitled to tell the truth with discretion in presence of such indiscreet lies.”

Bucher brings me from the Minister the following sketch of a paragraph for the press: “The despatch of the Duc de Grammont, the full text of which now lies before us, is a desperate attempt to prove that the origin of the situation which they have themselves created was the Hohenzollern candidature, and to conceal the motive which they confessed on many other occasions--namely, the conquest by France of the left bank of the Rhine and of Belgium. The inconsistency of the whole assertion is made clear by the circumstance that the offer of the Spanish throne to the Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern was first made in a letter dated the 14th of February of the present year. Therefore, there can be no connection between this offer and the conversations in March, 1869, between Benedetti and Von Thile, which were the outcome of aspirations or proposals frequently ventilated in the press (also with reference to Prince Frederick Charles). In 1851 the President Louis Napoleon succeeded in obtaining credence both at home and abroad for certain fictions, so long as that was necessary for the attainment of his object. The fiction which is now circulated, at a somewhat late hour, to the effect that the Prince of Hohenzollern was the candidate of Prussia is refuted in advance by the fact, which has been well known for a long time, that the Prussian Government as well as the officials of the Confederation, had absolutely no knowledge of, or connection with, the Spanish proposal. It was resolutely opposed by his Majesty the King, as the head of the Hohenzollern family, until last June, when at Ems he reluctantly withdrew his opposition when it was represented to him that otherwise Spain would fall into the hands of the Republicans. We find it difficult to understand what interest the French Government can have in circulating such lies now that war has actually broken out. The attempt of the Duc de Grammont to conjure up the spectre of a restoration of Charles V.’s monarchy can only be explained by the complete isolation of the French mind. That apparition had no sooner manifested itself than it vanished before the angry contempt of public opinion, which resented being supposed capable of such credulity.”