Chapter X: Part II (3)

"Ensign Warren of the 5th native infantry at this time occupied
the commissariat fort with 100 men, and having reported that he
was very hard pressed by the enemy, and in danger of being
completely cut off, the General, either forgetful or unaware at
the moment of the important fact, that upon the possession of
this fort we were entirely dependent for provisions, and
anxious only to save the lives of men whom he believed to be in
imminent peril, hastily gave directions that a party under the
command of Captain Swayne, of H.M.'s 44th regiment, should
proceed immediately to bring off Ensign Warren and his garrison
to cantonments, abandoning the fort to the enemy. A few minutes
previously an attempt to relieve him had been made by Ensign
Gordon, with a company of the 37th native infantry and eleven
camels laden with ammunition; but the party were driven back,
and Ensign Gordon killed. Captain Swayne now accordingly
proceeded towards the spot with two companies of H.M.'s 44th;
scarcely had they issued from cantonments ere a sharp and
destructive fire was poured upon them from Mahomed Shereef's
fort which, as they proceeded, was taken up by the marksmen in
the Shah Bagh, under whose deadly aim both officers and men
suffered severely; Captains Swayne and Robinson of the 44th
being killed, and Lieutenants Hallahan, Evans, and Fortye
wounded in this disastrous business. It now seemed to the
officer, on whom the command had devolved, impracticable to
bring off Ensign Warren's party without risking the
annihilation of his own, which had already sustained so rapid
and severe a loss in officers; he therefore returned forthwith
to cantonments. In the course of the evening another attempt
was made by a party of the 5th light cavalry; but they
encountered so severe a fire from the neighbouring enclosures
as obliged them to return without effecting their desired
object, with the loss of eight troopers killed and fourteen
badly wounded. Captain Boyd, the assistant commissary-general,
having meanwhile been made acquainted with the General's
intention to give up the fort, hastened to lay before him the
disastrous consequences that would ensue from so doing. He
stated that the place contained, besides large supplies of
wheat and attah, all his stores of rum, medicine, clothing,
&c., the value of which might be estimated at four lacs of
rupees; that to abandon such valuable property would not only
expose the force to the immediate want of the necessaries of
life, but would infallibly inspire the enemy with tenfold
courage. He added that we had not above two days' supply of
provisions in cantonments, and that neither himself nor Captain
Johnson of the Shah's commissariat had any prospect of
procuring them elsewhere under existing circumstances. In
consequence of this strong representation on the part of
Captain Boyd, the General sent immediate orders to Ensign
Warren to hold out the fort to the last extremity. (Ensign
Warren, it must be remarked, denied having received this note.)
Early in the night a letter was received from him to the effect
that he believed the enemy were busily engaged in mining one of
the towers, and that such was the alarm among the sepoys that
several of them had actually made their escape over the wall to
cantonments; that the enemy were making preparations to burn
down the gate; and that, considering the temper of his men, he
did not expect to be able to hold out many hours longer, unless
reinforced without delay. In reply to this he was informed
that he would be reinforced by two A.M.

"At about nine o'clock P.M., there was an assembly of staff and
other officers at the General's house, when the Envoy came in
and expressed his serious conviction, that unless Mahomed
Shereef's fort were taken that very night, we should lose the
commissariat fort, or at all events be unable to bring out of
it provisions for the troops. The disaster of the morning
rendered the General extremely unwilling to expose his officers
and men to any similar peril; but, on the other hand, it was
urged that the darkness of the night would nullify the enemy's
fire, who would also most likely be taken unawares, as it was
not the custom of the Affghans to maintain a very strict watch
at night. A man in Captain Johnson's employ was accordingly
sent out to reconnoitre the place. He returned in a few minutes
with the intelligence that about twenty men were seated outside
the fort near the gate, smoking and talking; and, from what he
overheard of their conversation, he judged the garrison to be
very small, and unable to resist a sudden onset. The debate was
now resumed, but another hour passed and the General could not
make up his mind. A second spy was dispatched, whose report
tended to corroborate what the first had said. I was then sent
to Lieutenant Sturt, the engineer, who was nearly recovered
from his wounds, for his opinion. He at first expressed himself
in favour of an immediate attack, but, on hearing that some of
the enemy were on the watch at the gate, he judged it prudent
to defer the assault till an early hour in the morning: this
decided the General, though not before several hours had
slipped away in fruitless discussion.

"Orders were at last given for a detachment to be in readiness
at four A.M. at the Kohistan gate; and Captain Bellew,
deputy-assistant quartermaster-general, volunteered to blow
open the gate; another party of H.M.'s 44th were at the same
time to issue by a cut in the south face of the rampart, and
march simultaneously towards the commissariat fort, to
reinforce the garrison. Morning had, however, well dawned ere
the men could be got under arms; and they were on the point of
marching off, when it was reported that Ensign Warren had just
arrived in cantonments with his garrison, having evacuated the
fort. It seems that the enemy had actually set fire to the
gate; and Ensign Warren, seeing no prospect of a reinforcement,
and expecting the enemy every moment to rush in, led out his
men by a hole which he had prepared in the wall. Being called
upon in a public letter from the assistant adjutant-general to
state his reasons for abandoning his post, he replied that he
was ready to do so before a court of enquiry, which he
requested might be assembled to investigate his conduct; it was
not, however, deemed expedient to comply with his request.

"It is beyond a doubt that our feeble and ineffectual defence
of this fort, and the valuable booty it yielded, was the first
_fatal_ blow to our supremacy at Cabul, and at once determined
those chiefs--and more particularly the Kuzzilbashes--who had
hitherto remained neutral, to join in the general combination
to drive us from the country."

"_Nov_. 5.--It no sooner became generally known that the commissariat fort, upon which we were dependent for supplies, had been abandoned, than one universal feeling of indignation pervaded the garrison. Nor can I describe," says Lieutenant Eyre, "the impatience of the troops, but especially of the native portion, to be led out for its recapture--a feeling that was by no means diminished by seeing the Affghans crossing and re-crossing the road between the commissariat fort and the gate of the _Shah Bagh_, laden with the provisions upon which had depended our ability to make a protracted defence."

That the whole commissariat should have been deposited in a detached fort is extraordinary and inexcusable, but that the garrison of that fort should not have been reinforced, is even more unintelligible; and that a sufficient force was not at once sent to succour and protect it when attacked, is altogether unaccountable. General Elphinstone was disabled by his infirmities from efficiently discharging the duties that had devolved upon him, but he appears to have been ready to act upon the suggestion of others. What then were his staff about?--some of them are said to have had little difficulty or delicacy in urging their own views upon their commander. Did they not suggest to him in time the importance, the necessity, of saving the commissariat at all hazards?

At the suggestion of Lieutenant Eyre, it was determined to attempt the capture of Mahomed Shereef's fort by blowing open the gate, Mr Eyre volunteering to keep the road clear for the storming party with the guns. "The General agreed; a storming party under Major Swayne, 6th native infantry, was ordered; the powder bags were got ready, and at noon we issued from the western gate." "For twenty minutes the guns were worked under a very sharp fire from the fort;" but "Major Swayne, instead of rushing forward with his men as had been agreed, had in the mean time remained stationary, under cover of the wall by the road-side." The General, seeing that the attempt had failed, recalled the troops into cantonments.

"_Nov_. 6.--It was now determined to take the fort of Mahomed Shereef by regular breach and assault." A practicable breach was effected, and a storming party composed of one company H.M. 44th, under Ensign Raban, one ditto 5th native infantry, under Lieutenant Deas, and one ditto 37th native infantry, under Lieutenant Steer, the whole commanded by Major Griffiths, speedily carried the place. "Poor Raban was shot through the heart when conspicuously waving a flag on the summit of the breach."

As this fort adjoined the Shah Bagh, it was deemed advisable to dislodge the enemy from the latter if possible. This was partially effected, and, had advantage been taken of the opportunity to occupy the buildings of the garden gateway, "immediate re-possession could have been taken of the commissariat fort opposite, which had not yet been emptied of half its contents."

In the mean time, our cavalry were engaged in an affair with the enemy's horse, in which we appear to have had the advantage. "The officers gallantly headed their men, and encountered about an equal number of the enemy who advanced to meet them. A hand-to-hand encounter took place, which ended in the Affghan horse retreating to the plain, leaving the hill in our possession. In this affair, Captain Anderson personally engaged and slew the brother in-law of Abdoolah Khan."

But the Affghans collected from various quarters; the juzailchees,[21] under Captain Mackenzie, were driven with great loss from the Shah Bagh which they had entered; and a gun which had been employed to clear that enclosure was with difficulty saved. Our troops having been drawn up on the plain, remained prepared to receive an attack from the enemy, who gradually retired as the night closed in.

[21] Affghan riflemen.

_Nov_. 8.--An attempt was made by the enemy to mine a tower of the fort that had been taken, which they could not have done had the gate of the Shah Bagh been occupied. The chief cause of anxiety now was the empty state of the granary. Even with high bribes and liberal payment, the Envoy could not procure sufficient for daily consumption. The plan of the enemy now was to starve us out, and the chiefs exerted all their influence to prevent our being supplied.

_Nov_. 9.--The General's weak state of health rendered it necessary to relieve him from the command of the garrison, and at the earnest request of the Envoy, Brigadier Shelton was summoned from the Bala Hissar, "in the hope that, by heartily co-operating with the Envoy and General, he would strengthen their hands and rouse the sinking confidence of the troops. He entered cantonments this morning, bringing with him one H.A. gun, one mountain-train ditto, one company H.M.'s 44th, the Shah's 6th infantry, and a small supply of attah (flour.)"

"_November_ 10.--Henceforward Brigadier Shelton bore a
conspicuous part in the drama, upon the issue of which so much
depended. He had, however, from the very first, seemed to
despair of the force being able to hold out the winter at
Cabul, and strenuously advocated an immediate retreat to
Jellalabad.

"This sort of despondency proved, unhappily, very infectious.
It soon spread its baneful influence among the officers, and
was by them communicated to the soldiery. The number of
_croakers_ in garrison became perfectly frightful, lugubrious
looks and dismal prophecies being encountered every where. The
severe losses sustained by H.M.'s 44th under Captain Swayne, on
the 4th instant, had very much discouraged the men of that
regiment; and it is a lamentable fact that some of those
European soldiers, who were naturally expected to exhibit to
their native brethren in arms an example of endurance and
fortitude, were among the first to loose confidence, and give
vent to feelings of discontent at the duties imposed on them.
The evil seed, once sprung up, became more and more difficult
to eradicate, showing daily more and more how completely
demoralizing to the British soldier is the very idea of a
retreat.

"Sir William Macnaghten and his suite were altogether opposed
to Brigadier Shelton in this matter, it being in his (the
Envoy's) estimation a duty we owed the Government to retain our
post, at whatsoever risk. This difference of opinion, on a
question of such vital importance, was attended with unhappy
results, inasmuch as it deprived the General, in his hour of
need, of the strength which unanimity imparts, and produced an
uncommunicative and disheartening reserve in an emergency which
demanded the freest interchange of counsel and ideas."

On the morning of this day, large parties of the enemy's horse and foot occupied the heights to the east and to the west of the cantonments, which, it was supposed, they intended to assault. No attack was made; but "on the eastern quarter, parties of the enemy, moving down into the plain, occupied all the forts in that direction. ... At this time, not above two days' provisions remained in garrison; and it was very clear, that unless the enemy were quickly driven out from their new possession, we should soon be completely hemmed in on all sides." At the Envoy's urgent desire, he taking the entire responsibility on himself, the General ordered a force, under Brigadier Shelton, to storm the Rikabashee fort, which was within musket-shot of the cantonments, and from which a galling fire had been poured into the Mission compound by the Affghans. About noon, the troops assembled at the eastern gate; a storming party of two companies from each regiment taking the lead, preceded by Captain Bellew, who hurried forward to blow open the gate--but missing the gate, he blew open a small wicket, through which not more than two or three men could enter abreast, and these in a stooping posture. A sharp fire was kept up from the walls, and many of the bravest fell in attempting to force their entrance through the wicket; but Colonel Mackerell of the 44th, and Lieutenant Bird of the Shah's 6th infantry, with a handful of Europeans and a few sepoys, forced their way in--the garrison fled through the gate which was at the opposite side, and Colonel Mackerell and his little party closed it, securing the chain with a bayonet; but, at this moment, some Affghan horse charged round the corner--the cry of cavalry was raised--"the Europeans gave way simultaneously with the sepoys--a bugler of the 6th infantry, through mistake, sounded the retreat--and it became for a time, a scene of _sauve qui peut_." In vain did the officers endeavour to rally the men, and to lead them back to the rescue of their commanding-officer and their comrades; only one man, private Stewart of the 44th, listened to the appeal and returned.

"Let me here (says Lieutenant Eyre) do Brigadier Shelton justice: his acknowledged courage redeemed the day." After great efforts, at last he rallied them--again advancing to the attack, again they faltered. A third time did the Brigadier bring on his men to the assault, which now proved successful; but while this disgraceful scene was passing outside the fort, the enemy had forced their way into it, and had cut to pieces Colonel Mackerell and all his little party, except Lieutenant Bird, who, with one sepoy, was found in a barricaded apartment, where these two brave men had defended themselves till the return of the troops, killing above thirty of the enemy by the fire of their two muskets.

Our loss on this occasion was not less than 200 killed and wounded; but the results of this success, though dearly purchased, were important. Four neighbouring forts were immediately evacuated by the enemy, and occupied by our troops: they were found to contain 1400 maunds of grain, of which about one-half was removed into cantonments immediately; but Brigadier Shelton not having thought it prudent to place a guard for the protection of the remainder, it was carried off during the night by the Affghans. "Permanent possession was, however, taken of the Rikabashee and Zoolfikar forts, and the towers of the remainder were blown up on the following day."

It cannot fail to excite surprise, that these forts, which do not seem to have been occupied by the enemy till the 10th, were not either occupied or destroyed by the British troops before that day.

_Nov_. 13.--The enemy appeared in great force on the western heights, where, having posted two guns, they fired into cantonments with considerable precision. At the entreaty of the Envoy, it was determined to attack them--a force, under Brigadier Shelton, moved out for that purpose--the advance, under Major Thain, ascended the hill with great gallantry; "but the enemy resolutely stood their ground at the summit of the ridge, and unflinchingly received the discharge of our musketry, which, strange to say, even at the short range of ten or twelve yards, did little or no execution."

The fire of our guns, however, threw the Affghans into confusion. A charge of cavalry drove them up the hill, and the infantry advancing, carried the height, the enemy retreating along the ridge, closely followed by our troops, and abandoning their guns to us; but, owing to the misconduct of the troops, only one of them was carried away, the men refusing to advance to drag off the other, which was therefore spiked by Lieutenant Eyre, with the aid of one artilleryman.

"This was the last success our arms were destined to
experience. Henceforward it becomes my weary task to relate a
catalogue of errors, disasters, and difficulties, which,
following close upon each other, disgusted our officers,
disheartened our soldiers, and finally sunk us all into
irretrievable ruin, as though Heaven itself, by a combination
of evil circumstances, for its own inscrutable purposes, had
planned our downfall.

"_November 16th_.--The impression made by the enemy by the
action of the 13th was so far salutary, that they did not
venture to annoy us again for several days. Advantage was taken
of this respite to throw magazine supplies from time to time
into the Bala Hissar, a duty which was ably performed by
Lieutenant Walker, with a resalah of irregular horse, under
cover of night. But even in this short interval of comparative
rest, such was the wretched construction of the cantonment,
that the mere ordinary routine of garrison duty, and the
necessity of closely manning our long line of rampart both by
day and night, was a severe trial to the health and patience of
the troops; especially now that the winter began to show
symptoms of unusual severity. There seemed, indeed, every
probability of an early fall of snow, to which all looked
forward with dread, as the harbinger of fresh difficulties and
of augmented suffering.

"These considerations, and the manifest superiority of the Bala
Hissar as a military position, led to the early discussion of
the expediency of abandoning the cantonment, and consolidating
our forces in the above-mentioned stronghold. The Envoy himself
was, from the first, greatly in favour of this move, until
overruled by the many objections urged against it by the
military authorities; to which, as will be seen by a letter
from him presently quoted, he learned by degrees to attach some
weight himself; but to the very last it was a measure that had
many advocates, and I venture to state my own firm belief that,
had we at this time moved into the Bala Hissar, Cabul would
have been still in our possession.

"But Brigadier Shelton having firmly set his face against the
movement from the first moment of its proposition, all serious
idea of it was gradually abandoned, though it continued to the
very last a subject of common discussion."

"_Nov_. 18. Accounts were this day received from Jellalabad, that General Sale, having sallied from the town, had repulsed the enemy with considerable loss.... The hope of his return has tended much to support our spirits; our disappointment was therefore great, to learn that all expectation of aid from that quarter was at an end. Our eyes were now turned towards the Kandahar force as our last resource though an advance from that quarter seemed scarcely practicable so late in the year."

The propriety of attacking Mahomed Khan's fort, the possession of which would have opened an easy communication with the Bala Hissar, was discussed; but, on some sudden objection raised by Lieutenant Sturt of the engineers, the project was abandoned.

On the 19th, a letter was addressed by the Envoy to the General, the object of which seems not to be very apparent. He raises objections to a retreat either to Jellalabad or to the Bala Hissar, and expresses a decided objection to abandon the cantonment under any circumstances, if food can be procured; but, nevertheless, it is sufficiently evident that his hopes of successful resistance had even now become feeble, and he refers to the possibility that succours may arrive from Kandahar, or that "something might turn up in our favour."

The village of Beymaroo, (or Husbandless, from a beautiful virgin who was nursed there,) within half a mile of the cantonments, had been our chief source of supply, to which the enemy had in some measure put a stop by occupying it every morning. It was therefore determined to endeavour to anticipate them by taking possession of it before their arrival. For this purpose, a party moved out under Major Swayne of the 5th native infantry; but the Major, "it would seem, by his own account, found the village already occupied, and the entrance blocked up in such a manner that he considered it out of his power to force a passage." It does not appear that the attempt was made. Later in the day there was some skirmishing in the plain, in the course of which Lieutenant Eyre was wounded.

"It is worthy of note that Mahomed Akber Khan, second son of the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, arrived in Cabul this night (22d Nov.) from Bameean. This man was destined to exercise an evil influence over our future fortunes. The crisis of our struggle was already nigh at hand."

"_Nov_. 23.--This day decided the fate of the Cabul force." It had been determined by a council, at the special recommendation of the Envoy, that a force under Brigadier Shelton should storm the village of Beymaroo, and maintain the hill above it against any numbers of the enemy that might appear. At two A.M., the troops[22] moved out of cantonments, ascended the hill by the gorge, dragging up the gun, and moved along the ridge to a point overlooking the village. A sharp fire of grape created great confusion, and it was suggested by Captain Bellew and others to General Shelton, to storm the village, while the evident panic of the enemy lasted. To this the Brigadier did not accede.

[22] Five companies 44th; six companies 5th native infantry;
six companies 37th native infantry; 100 sappers; 2-1/2
squadrons cavalry; one gun.

When day broke, the enemy, whose ammunition had failed, were seen hurrying from the village--not 40 men remained. A storming party, under Majors Swayne and Kershaw, was ordered to carry the village; but Major Swayne missed the gate, which was open, and arrived at a barricaded wicket, which he had no means of forcing. Major Swayne was wounded, and lost some men, and was ultimately recalled. Leaving a reserve of three companies of the 37th native infantry, under Major Kershaw, at the point overhanging Beymaroo, the Brigadier moved back with the rest of the troops and the gun to the part of the hill which overlooked the gorge. It was suggested to raise a sungar or breastwork to protect the troops, for which purpose the sappers had been taken out, but it was not done. Immense numbers of the enemy, issuing from the city, had now crowned the opposite hill--in all, probably 10,000 men. Our skirmishers were kept out with great difficulty, and chiefly by the exertions and example of Colonel Oliver. The remainder of the troops were formed into two squares, and the cavalry drawn up _en masse_ immediately in their rear, and all suffered severely--the vent of the only gun became too hot to be served. A party of cavalry under Lieutenant Walker was recalled to prevent its destruction, and a demonstration of the Affghan cavalry on our right flank, which had been exposed by the recall of Lieutenant Walker, was repulsed by a fire of shrapnell, which mortally wounded a chief of consequence. The enemy surrounded the troops on three sides. The men were faint with fatigue and thirst--the Affghan skirmishers pressed on, and our's gave way. The men could not be got to charge bayonets. The enemy made a rush at the guns, the cavalry were ordered to charge, but would not follow their officers. The first square and the cavalry gave way, and were with difficulty rallied behind the second square, leaving the gun in the hands of the enemy, who immediately carried off the limber and horses. News of Abdoolah Khan's wound spread amongst the Affghans, who now retired. Our men resumed courage, and regained possession of the gun; and fresh ammunition having arrived from cantonments, it again opened on the enemy: but our cavalry would not act, and the infantry were too much exhausted and disheartened to make a forward movement, and too few in number. The whole force of the enemy came on with renewed vigour--the front of the advanced square had been literally mowed down, and most of the gallant artillerymen had fallen. The gun was scarcely limbered up preparatory to retreat, when a rush from the Ghazees broke the first square. All order was at an end, the entreaties and commands of the officers were unheeded, and an utter rout ensued down the hill towards the cantonments, the enemy's cavalry making a fearful slaughter among the unresisting fugitives. The retreat of Major Kershaw's party was cut off, and his men were nearly all destroyed. The mingled tide of flight and pursuit seemed to be about to enter the cantonments together; but the pursuers were checked by the fire of the Shah's 5th infantry and the juzailchees, and by a charge of a fresh troop of cavalry under Lieutenant Hardyman, and fifteen or twenty of his own men rallied by Lieutenant Walker, who fell in that encounter. Osman Khan, too, a chief whose men were amongst the foremost, voluntarily halted them and drew them off, "which may be reckoned, indeed, (says Lieutenant Eyre,) the chief reason why _all_ of our people who on that day went forth to battle were not destroyed." The gun and the second limber which had arrived from the cantonments, in attempting to gallop down hill, was overturned and lost. "Our loss was tremendous--the greater part of the wounded, including Colonel Oliver, having been left in the field, where they were miserably cut to pieces."[23]

[23] In Mr Eyre's observations on this disastrous affair, he
enumerates six errors, which he says must present themselves to
the most unpractised military eye. "The first, and perhaps the
most fatal mistake of all, was the taking only one gun;" but he
admits that there was only one gun ready, and that, if the
Brigadier had waited for the second, he must have postponed the
enterprise for a day. This would probably have been the more
prudent course.

The second error was, that advantage was not taken of the panic
in the village, to storm it at once in the dark; but it appears
from his own account, that there were not more than forty men
remaining in the village when it was attacked, after daylight,
and that the chief cause of the failure of that attack, was
Major Swayne's having missed the gate, a misfortune which was,
certainly, at least as likely to have occurred in the dark.

The third was, that the sappers were not employed to raise a
breastwork for the protection of the troops. This objection
appears to be well founded.

The fourth was, that the infantry were formed into squares, to
resist the distant fire of infantry, on ground over which no
cavalry could have charged with effect. It appears to be so
utterly unintelligible that any officer should have been guilty
of so manifest an absurdity, that the circumstances seem to
require further elucidation; but that the formation was
unfortunate, is sufficiently obvious.

Fifthly, that the position chosen for the cavalry was
erroneous; and sixthly, that the retreat was too long deferred.
Both these objections appear to be just.

Thus terminated in disaster the military struggle at Cabul, and then commenced that series of negotiations not less disastrous, which led to the murder of the Envoy, to the retreat of the army, and to its ultimate annihilation. In Lieutenant Eyre's account of their military operations, we look in vain for any evidence of promptitude, vigour, or decision, skill or judgment, in the commanders; and we have abundant evidence of a lamentable want of discipline and proper spirit in the troops, especially amongst the Europeans. Instances of high personal courage and gallantry amongst the officers are numerous, and they always will be, when the occasion requires them; but if the facts of this narrative had been given without the names, no man would have recognised in it the operations of a British army.

"_Nov_. 24.--Our troops (says Eyre) had now lost all
confidence; and even such of the officers as had hitherto
indulged the hope of a favourable turn in our affairs, began at
last reluctantly to entertain gloomy forebodings as to our
future fate. Our force resembled a ship in danger of wrecking
among rocks and shoals, for want of an able pilot to guide it
safely through them. Even now, at the eleventh hour, had the
helm of affairs been grasped by a hand competent to the
important task, we might perhaps have steered clear of
destruction; but, in the absence of any such deliverer, it was
but too evident that Heaven alone could save us by some
unforeseen interposition. The spirit of the men was gone; the
influence of the officers over them declined daily; and that
boasted discipline, which alone renders a handful of our troops
superior to an irregular multitude, began fast to disappear
from among us. The enemy, on the other hand, waxed bolder every
day and every hour; nor was it long ere we got accustomed to be
bearded with impunity from under the very ramparts of our
garrison.

"Never were troops exposed to greater hardships and dangers;
yet, sad to say, never did soldiers shed their blood with less
beneficial result than during the investment of the British
lines at Cabul."

Captain Conolly now wrote from the Bala Hissar, urging an immediate retreat thither; "but the old objections were still urged against the measure by Brigadier Shelton and others," though several of the chief military, and all the political officers, approved of it. Shah Shoojah was impatient to receive them.

The door to negotiation was opened by a letter to the Envoy from Osman Khan Barukzye, a near relation of the new king, Nuwab Mahomed Zuman Khan, who had sheltered Captain Drummond in his own house since the first day of the outbreak. He took credit to himself for having checked the ardour of his followers on the preceding day, and having thus saved the British force from destruction; he declared that the chiefs only desired we should quietly evacuate the country, leaving them to govern it according to their own rules, and with a king of their own choosing. The General, on being referred to, was of opinion that the cantonments could not be defended throughout the winter, and approved of opening a negotiation on the basis of the evacuation of the country. On the 27th, two deputies were sent by the assembled chiefs to confer with Sir W. Macnaghten; but the terms they proposed were such as he could not accept. The deputies took leave of the Envoy, with the exclamation, that "we should meet again in battle." "We shall at all events meet," replied Sir William, "at the day of judgment."

At night the Envoy received a letter, proposing "that we should deliver up Shah Shoojah and all his family--lay down our arms, and make an unconditional surrender--when they might, perhaps, be induced to spare our lives, and allow us to leave the country on condition of never returning."

The Envoy replied, "that these terms were too dishonourable to be entertained for a moment; and that, if they were persisted in, he must again appeal to arms, leaving the result to the God of battles."

Active hostilities were not renewed till the 1st of December, when a desperate effort was made by the enemy to gain possession of the Bala Hissar; but they were repulsed by Major Ewart with considerable slaughter. On the 4th, they cannonaded the cantonment from the Beymaroo hills, but did little mischief, and at night they made an unsuccessful attempt on Mahomed Shereef's fort. On the 5th, they completed, without opposition, the destruction of the bridge over the Cabul river. On the 6th, the garrison of Mahomed Shereef's fort disgracefully abandoned it, the men of the 44th apparently being the first to fly; and a garrison of the same regiment, in the bazar village, was with difficulty restrained from following their example. On the 7th, this post of honour was occupied by the 37th native infantry; the 44th, who had hitherto been intrusted with it, being no longer considered worthy to retain it.

It is but justice to Mr Eyre to give in his own words some remarks which he has thought it right to make, with reference to what he has recorded of the conduct of that unhappy regiment:--

"In the course of this narrative, I have been compelled by
stern truth to note down facts nearly affecting the honour and
interests of a British regiment. It may, or rather I fear it
must, inevitably happen, that my unreserved statements of the
Cabul occurrences will prove unacceptable to many, whose
private or public feelings are interested in glossing over or
suppressing the numerous errors committed and censures
deservedly incurred. But my heart tells me that no paltry
motives of rivalry or malice influence my pen; rather a sincere
and honest desire to benefit the public service, by pointing
out the rocks on which our reputation was wrecked, the means by
which our honour was sullied, and our Indian empire endangered,
as a warning to future actors in similar scenes. In a word, I
believe that more good is likely to ensue from the publication
of the whole unmitigated truth, than from a mere garbled
statement of it. A kingdom has been lost--an army slain;--and
surely, if I can show that, had we been but true to ourselves,
and had vigorous measures been adopted, the result might have
been widely different, I shall have written an instructive
lesson to rulers and subjects, to generals and armies, and
shall not have incurred in vain the disapprobation of the
self-interested or the proud."

The Envoy having again appealed to the General, again received an answer, stating the impossibility of holding out, and recommending that the Envoy should lose no time in entering into negotiations. This letter was countersigned by Brigadiers Shelton and Anquetil, and Colonel Chambers.

On the 11th December, the Envoy, accompanied by Captains Lawrence, Trevor, and Mackenzie, and a few troopers, went out by agreement to meet the chiefs on the plain towards the Seah Sung hills. A conciliatory address from the Envoy was met by professions of personal esteem and approbation of the views he had laid before them, and of gratitude for the manner in which the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan had been treated. The Envoy then read to them a sketch of the proposed treaty, which was to the following effect:--

"That the British should evacuate Affghanistan, including
Candahar, Ghuznee, Cabul, Jellalabad, and all the other
stations absolutely within the limits of the country so called;
that they should be permitted to return not only unmolested to
India, but that supplies of every description should be
afforded them in their road thither, certain men of consequence
accompanying them as hostages; that the Ameer Dost Mahomed
Khan, his family, and every Affghan now in exile for political
offences, should be allowed to return to their country; that
Shah Shoojah and his family should be allowed the option of
remaining at Cabul, or proceeding with the British troops to
Loodiana, in either case receiving from the Affghan Government
a pension of one lac of rupees per annum; that means of
transport, for the conveyance of our baggage, stores, &c.,
including that required by the royal family, in case of their
adopting the latter alternative, should be furnished by the
existing Affghan Government: that an amnesty should be granted
to all those who had made themselves obnoxious on account of
their attachment to Shah Shoojah and his allies, the British;
that all prisoners should be released; that no British force
should be ever again sent into Affghanistan, unless called for
by the Affghan government, between whom and the British nation
perpetual friendship should be established on the sure
foundation of mutual good offices."

After some objections on the part of Mahomed Akber Khan, the terms were agreed to, and it was further arranged that provisions should be supplied to our troops, and that they should evacuate the cantonment in three days.

Preparations were immediately commenced for the retreat. Arms were ordered to be distributed from the stores, now about to be abandoned, to some of the camp-followers, and such of the soldiers as might require them; and a disgraceful scene of confusion and tumult followed, which showed the fearful extent to which the army was disorganized.

The troops in the Bala Hissar were moved into cantonments, not without a foretaste of what they had to expect on their march to Jellalabad, under the safe conduct of Akber Khan.

The demands of the chiefs now rose from day to day. They refused to supply provisions until we should further assure them of our sincerity, by giving up every fort in the immediate vicinity of the cantonment. The troops were accordingly withdrawn, the forts were immediately occupied by the Affghans, and the cantonment thus placed at their mercy. On the 18th, the promised cattle for carriage had not yet been supplied, and a heavy fall of snow rendered the situation of the troops more desperate. On the 19th, the Envoy wrote an order for the evacuation of Ghuznee. On the 20th, the Envoy had another interview with the chiefs, who now demanded that a portion of the guns and ammunition should be given up. This also was agreed to. At this stage of the proceedings, Lieutenant Sturt of the engineers proposed to the General to break off the treaty, and march forthwith to Jellalabad; but the proposal was not approved. The arrangements for giving effect to the treaty were still carried on; and the Envoy again met Akber Khan and Osman Khan on the plain, when Captains Conolly and Airey were given up as hostages, and the Envoy sent his carriage and horses, and a pair of pistols, as presents to Akber Khan, who further demanded an Arab horse, the property of Captain Grant, assistant adjutant-general:--

"Late in the evening of the 22d December," (says Capt.
Mackenzie, in a letter to Lieut. Eyre,) "Capt. James Skinner,
who, after having been concealed in Cabul during the greater
part of the siege, had latterly been the guest of Mahomed
Akber, arrived in cantonments, accompanied by Mahomed Sudeeq
Khan, a first cousin of Mahomed Akber, and by Sirwar Khan, the
Arhanee merchant, who, in the beginning of the campaign, had
furnished the army with camels, and who had been much in the
confidence of Sir A. Burnes, being, in fact, one of our
stanchest friends. The two latter remained in a different
apartment, while Skinner dined with the Envoy. During dinner,
Skinner jestingly remarked that he felt as if laden with
combustibles, being charged with a message from Mahomed Akber
to the Envoy of a most portentous nature.

"Even then I remarked that the Envoy's eye glanced eagerly
towards Skinner with an expression of hope. In fact, he was
like a drowning man catching at straws. Skinner, however,
referred him to his Affghan companions, and after dinner the
four retired into a room by themselves. My knowledge of what
there took place is gained from poor Skinner's own relation, as
given during my subsequent captivity with him in Akber's house.
Mahomed Sudeeq disclosed Mahomed Akber's proposition to the
Envoy, which was, that the following day Sir William should
meet him (Mahomed Akber) and a few of his immediate friends,
viz. the chiefs of the Eastern Giljyes, outside the
cantonments, when a final agreement should be made, so as to be
fully understood by both parties; that Sir William should have
a considerable body of troops in readiness, which, on a given
signal, were to join with those of Mahomed Akber and the
Giljyes, assault and take Mahmood Khan's fort, and secure the
person of Ameenoolah. At this stage of the proposition Mahomed
Sudeeq signified that, for a certain sum of money, the head of
Ameenoolah should be presented to the Envoy; but from this Sir
William shrunk with abhorrence, declaring that it was neither
his custom nor that of his country to give a price for blood.
Mahomed Sudeeq then went on to say, that, after having subdued
the rest of the khans, the English should be permitted to
remain in the country eight months longer, so as to save their
_purdah_, (veil, or credit,) but that they were then to
evacuate Affghanistan, as if of their own accord; that Shah
Shoojah was to continue king of the country, and that Mahomed
Akber was to be his wuzeer. As a further reward for his
(Mahomed Akber's) assistance, the British Government were to
pay him thirty lacs of rupees, and four lacs of rupees per
annum during his life! To this extraordinary and wild proposal,
Sir William gave ear with an eagerness which nothing can
account for but the supposition, confirmed by many other
circumstances, that his strong mind had been harassed until it
had in some degree lost its equipoise; and he not only assented
fully to these terms, but actually gave a Persian paper to that
effect, written in his own hand, declaring as his motives that
it was not only an excellent opportunity to carry into effect
the real wishes of Government--which were to evacuate the
country with as much credit to ourselves as possible--but that
it would give England time to enter into a treaty with Russia,
defining the bounds beyond which neither were to pass in
Central Asia. So ended this fatal conference, the nature and
result of which, contrary to his usual custom, Sir William
communicated to none of those who, on all former occasions,
were fully in his confidence, viz. Trevor, Lawrence, and
myself. It seemed as if he feared that we might insist on the
impracticability of the plan, which he must have studiously
concealed from himself. All the following morning his manner
was distracted and hurried, in a way that none of us had ever
before witnessed.

* * * * *

"After breakfast, Trevor, Lawrence, and myself were summoned to
attend the Envoy during his conference with Mahomed Akber Khan.
I found him alone, when, for the first time, he disclosed to me
the nature of the transaction he was engaged in. I immediately
warned him that it was a plot against him. He replied hastily,
'A plot! let me alone for that--trust me for that!' and I
consequently offered no further remonstrance. Sir William then
arranged with General Elphinstone that the 54th regiment, under
Major Ewart, should be held in readiness for immediate service.
The Shah's 6th, and two guns, were also warned."

Sir W. Macnaghten, halting the troopers of the escort, advanced about 500 or 600 yards from the eastern rampart of the cantonment, and there awaited Akber Khan and his party:--

"Close by where some hillocks, on the further side of which
from the cantonment a carpet was spread where the snow lay
least thick, and there the khans and Sir William sat down to
hold their conference. Men talk of presentiment; I suppose it
was something of the kind which came over me, for I could
scarcely prevail upon myself to quit my horse. I did so,
however, and was invited to sit down among the Sirdars. After
the usual salutations, Mahomed Akber commenced business by
asking the Envoy if he was perfectly ready to carry into effect
the proposition of the preceding night? The Envoy replied, 'Why
not?' My attention was then called off by an old Affghan
acquaintance of mine, formerly chief of the Cabul police, by
name Gholam Moyun-ood-deen. I rose from my recumbent posture,
and stood apart with him conversing. I afterwards remembered
that my friend betrayed much anxiety as to where my pistols
were, and why I did not carry them on my person. I answered,
that although I wore my sword for form, it was not necessary to
be armed _cap-à-pie_. His discourse was also full of
extravagant compliments, I suppose for the purpose of lulling
me to sleep. At length my attention was called off from what he
was saying, by observing that a number of men, armed to the
teeth, had gradually approached to the scene of conference, and
were drawing round in a sort of circle. This Lawrence and
myself pointed out to some of the chief men, who affected at
first to drive them off with whips; but Mahomed Akber observed,
that it was of no consequence, as they were in the secret. I
again resumed my conversation with Gholam Moyun-ood-deen, when
suddenly I heard Mahomed Akber call out, 'Begeer, begeer,'
(seize! seize!) and, turning round, I saw him grasp the Envoy's
left hand, with an expression in his face of the most
diabolical ferocity. I think it was Sultan Jan who laid hold of
the Envoy's right hand. They dragged him in a stooping posture
down the hillock; the only words I heard poor Sir William utter
being, 'Az barae Khooda' (for God's sake!) I saw his face,
however, and it was full of horror and astonishment. I did not
see what became of Trevor, but Lawrence was dragged past me by
several Affghans, whom I saw wrest his weapons from him. Up to
this moment I was so engrossed in observing what was taking
place, that I actually was not aware that my own right arm was
mastered, that my urbane friend held a pistol to my temple, and
that I was surrounded by a circle of Ghazees, with drawn swords
and cocked juzails. Resistance was in vain, so, listening to
the exhortations of Gholam Moyun-ood-deen, which were enforced
by the whistling of divers bullets over my head, I hurried
through the snow with him to the place where his horse was
standing, being despoiled _en route_ of my sabre, and narrowly
escaping divers attempts made on my life. As I mounted behind
my captor, now my energetic defender, the crowd increased
around us, the cries of 'Kill the Kafir' became more vehement,
and, although we hurried on at a fast canter, it was with the
utmost difficulty Gholam Moyun-ood-deen, although assisted by
one or two friends or followers, could ward off and avoid the
sword-cuts aimed at me, the rascals being afraid to fire lest
they should kill my conductor. Indeed he was obliged to wheel
his horse round once, and taking off his turban, (the last
appeal a Mussulman can make,) to implore them for God's sake to
respect the life of his friend. At last, ascending a slippery
bank, the horse fell. My cap had been snatched off, and I now
received a heavy blow on the head from a bludgeon, which
fortunately did not quite deprive me of my senses. I had
sufficient sense left to shoot a-head of the fallen horse,
where my protector with another man joined me, and clasping me
in their arms, hurried me towards the wall of Mahomed Khan's
fort. How I reached the spot where Mahomed Akber was receiving
the gratulations of the multitude I know not, but I remember a
fanatic rushing on me, and twisting his hand in my collar until
I became exhausted from suffocation. I must do Mahomed Akber
the Justice to say, that, finding the Ghazees bent on my
slaughter, even after I had reached his stirrup, he drew his
sword and laid about him right manfully, for my conductor and
Meerza Bàoodeen Khan were obliged to press me up against the
wall, covering me with their own bodies, and protesting that no
blow should reach me but through their persons.

"Pride, however, overcame Mahomed Akber's sense of courtesy,
when he thought I was safe, for he then turned round to me, and
repeatedly said, in a tone of triumphant derision, 'Shuma
moolk-i-ma me geered!' (_You'll_ seize my country, will
you!)--he then rode off, and I was hurried towards the gate of
the fort. Here new dangers awaited me, for Moolah Momin, fresh
from the slaughter of poor Trevor, who was killed riding close
behind me--Sultan Jan having the credit of having given him the
first sabre-cut--stood here with his followers, whom he
exhorted to slay me, setting them the example by cutting
fiercely at me himself. Fortunately a gun stood between us, but
still he would have effected his purpose, had not Mahomed Shah
Khan at that instant, with some followers, come to my
assistance. These drew their swords in my defence, the chief
himself throwing his arm round my neck, and receiving on his
shoulder a cut aimed by Moollah Momin at my head. During the
bustle I pushed forward into the fort, and was immediately
taken to a sort of dungeon, where I found Lawrence safe, but
somewhat exhausted by his hideous ride and the violence he had
sustained, although unwounded. Here the Giljye chiefs, Mahomed
Shah Khan, and his brother Dost Mahomed Khan, presently joined
us, and endeavoured to cheer up our flagging spirits, assuring
us that the Envoy and Trevor were not dead, but on the contrary
quite well. They stayed with us during the afternoon, their
presence being absolutely necessary for our protection. Many
attempts were made by the fanatics to force the door to
accomplish our destruction. Others spit at us and abused us
through a small window, through which one fellow levelled a
blunderbuss at us, which was struck up by our keepers and
himself thrust back. At last Ameenoollah made his appearance,
and threatened us with instant death. Some of his people most
officiously advanced to make good his word, until pushed back
by the Giljye chiefs, who remonstrated with this iniquitous old
monster, their master, whom they persuaded to relieve us from
his hateful presence. During the afternoon, a human hand was
held up in mockery to us at the window. We said that it had
belonged to an European, but were not aware at the time that it
was actually the hand of the poor Envoy. Of all the Mahomedans
assembled in the room discussing the events of the day, one
only, an old moollah, openly and fearlessly condemned the acts
of his brethren, declaring that the treachery was abominable,
and a disgrace to Islam. At night they brought us food, and
gave us each a postheen to sleep on. At midnight we were
awakened to go to the house of Mahomed Akber in the city.
Mahomed Shah Khan then, with the meanness common to all
Affghans of rank, robbed Lawrence of his watch, while his
brother did me a similar favour. I had been plundered of my
rings and every thing else previously, by the understrappers.