Chapter XI: Part II (4)

"Reaching Mahomed Akber's abode, we were shown into the room
where he lay in bed. He received us with great outward show of
courtesy, assuring us of the welfare of the Envoy and Trevor,
but there was a constraint in his manner for which I could not
account. We were shortly taken to another apartment, where we
found Skinner, who had returned, being on parole, early in the
morning. Doubt and gloom marked our meeting, and the latter was
fearfully deepened by the intelligence which we now received
from our fellow-captive of the base murder of Sir William and
Trevor. He informed us that the head of the former had been
carried about the city in triumph. We of course spent a
miserable night. The next day we were taken under a strong
guard to the house of Zuman Khan, where a council of the Khans
were being held. Here we found Captains Conolly and Airey, who
had some days previously been sent to the hurwah's house as
hostage for the performance of certain parts of the treaty
which was to have been entered into. A violent discussion took
place, in which Mahomed Akber bore the most prominent part. We
were vehemently accused of treachery, and every thing that was
bad, and told that the whole of the transactions of the night
previous had been a trick of Mahomed Akber, and Ameenoollah, to
ascertain the Envoy's sincerity. They declared that they would
now grant us no terms, save on the surrender of the whole of
the married families as hostages, all the guns, ammunition, and
treasure. At this time Conolly told me that on the preceding
day the Envoy's head had been paraded about in the court-yard;
that his and Trevor's bodies had been hung up in the public
bazar, or _chouk_; and that it was with the greatest difficulty
that the old hurwah, Zuman Khan, had saved him and Airey from
being murdered by a body of fanatics, who had attempted to rush
into the room where they were. Also, that previous to the
arrival of Lawrence, Skinner, and myself, Mahomed Akber had
been relating the events of the preceding day to the _Jeerga_
or council, and that he had unguardedly avowed having, while
endeavouring to force the Envoy either to mount on horseback or
to move more quickly, _struck_ him; and that, seeing Conolly's
eyes fastened upon him with an expression of intense
indignation, he had altered the phrase and said, 'I mean I
_pushed_ him.' After an immense deal of gabble, a proposal for
a renewal of the treaty, not, however, demanding all the guns,
was determined to be sent to the cantonments, and Skinner,
Lawrence, and myself were marched back to Akber's house,
enduring _en route_ all manner of threats and insults. Here we
were closely confined in an inner apartment, which was indeed
necessary for our safety. That evening we received a visit from
Mahomed Akber, Sultan Jan, and several other Affghans. Mahomed
Akber exhibited his double-barrelled pistols to us, which he
had worn the previous day, requesting us to put their locks to
rights, something being amiss. _Two of the barrels had been
recently discharged_, which he endeavoured in a most confused
way to account for by saying, that he had been charged by a
havildar of the escort, and had fired both barrels at him. Now
all the escort had run away without even attempting to charge,
the only man who advanced to the rescue having been a Hindoo
Jemadar of Chuprassies, who was instantly cut to pieces by the
assembled Ghazees. This defence he made without any accusation
on our part, betraying the anxiety of a liar to be believed. On
the 26th, Captain Lawrence was taken to the house of
Ameenoollah, whence he did not return to us. Captain Skinner
and myself remained in Akber's house until the 30th. During
this time we were civilly treated, and conversed with numbers
of Affghan gentlemen who came to visit us. Some of them
asserted that the Envoy had been murdered by the unruly
soldiery. Others could not deny that Akber himself was the
assassin. For two or three days we had a fellow-prisoner in
poor Sirwar Khan, who had been deceived throughout the whole
matter, and out of whom they were then endeavouring to screw
money. He, of course, was aware from his countrymen, that not
only had Akber committed the murder, but that he protested to
the Ghazees that he gloried in the deed. On one occasion a
moonshee of Major Pottinger, who had escaped from Charekhar,
named Mohun Beer, came direct from the presence of Mahomed
Akber to visit us. He told us that Mahomed Akber had begun to
see the impolicy of having murdered the Envoy, which fact he
had just avowed to him, shedding many tears, either of
pretended remorse or of real vexation at having committed
himself. On several occasions Mahomed Akber personally, and by
deputy, besought Skinner and myself to give him advice as to
how he was to extricate himself from the dilemma in which he
was placed, more than once endeavouring to excuse himself for
not having effectually protected the Envoy, by saying that Sir
William had drawn a sword-stick upon him. It seems that
meanwhile the renewed negotiations with Major Pottinger, who
had assumed the Envoy's place in cantonments, had been brought
to a head; for on the night of the 30th, Akber furnished me
with an Affghan dress, (Skinner already wore one,) and sent us
both back to cantonments. Several Affghans, with whom I fell in
afterwards, protested to me that they had seen Mahomed Akber
shoot the Envoy with his own hand; amongst them Meerza Báoodeen
Khan, who, being an old acquaintance, always retained a
sneaking kindness for the English.

"I am, my dear Eyre, yours very truly,

"C. MACKENZIE.

"Cabul, 29th July, 1842."

The negotiations were now renewed by Major Pottinger, who had been requested by General Elphinstone to assume the unenviable office of political agent and adviser.

"The additional clauses in the treaty now proposed for our
renewed acceptance were--1st. That we should leave behind our
guns, excepting six. 2nd. That we should immediately give up
all our treasures. 3d. That the hostages should be all
exchanged for married men, with their wives and families. The
difficulties of Major Pottinger's position will be readily
perceived, when it is borne in mind that he had before him the
most conclusive evidence of the late Envoy's ill-advised
intrigue with Mahomed Akber Khan, in direct violation of that
very treaty which was now once more tendered for
consideration."

A sum of fourteen lacs of rupees, about L.140,000, was also demanded, which was said to be payable to the several chiefs on the promise of the late Envoy.

Major Pottinger, at a council of war convened by the General, "declared his conviction that no confidence could be placed in any treaty formed with the Affghan chiefs; that, under such circumstances, to bind the hands of the Government by promising to evacuate the country, and to restore the deposed Ameer, and to waste, moreover, so much public money merely to save our own lives and property, would be inconsistent with the duty we owed to our country and the Government we served; and that the only honourable course would be, either to hold out at Cabul, or to force our immediate retreat to Jellalabad."

"This however, the officers composing the council, one and all declared to be impracticable, owing to the want of provisions, the surrender of the surrounding forts, and the insuperable difficulties of the road at the present season." The new treaty was therefore, forthwith accepted. The demand of the chiefs, that married officers with their families should be left as hostages, was successfully resisted. Captains Drummond, Walsh, Warburton, and Webb, were accepted in their place, and on the 29th went to join Captains Conolly and Airey at the house of Nuwab Zuman Khan. Lieutenant Haughton and a portion of the sick and wounded, were sent into the city, and placed under the protection of the chiefs. "Three of the Shah's guns, with the greater portion of our treasure, were made over during the day, much to the evident disgust of the soldiery." On the following day, "the remainder of the sick went into the city, Lieutenant Evans, H.M. 44th foot, being placed in command, and Dr Campbell, 54th native infantry, with Dr Berwick of the mission, in medical charge of the whole. Two more of the Shah's guns were given up. It snowed hard the whole day."

"_January_ 5.--Affairs continued in the same unsettled state to this date. The chiefs postponed our departure from day to day on various pretexts.... Numerous cautions were received from various well-wishers, to place no confidence in the professions of the chiefs, who had sworn together to accomplish our entire destruction."

It is not our intention to offer any lengthened comments on these details. They require none. The facts, if they be correctly stated, speak for themselves; and, for reasons already referred to, we are unwilling to anticipate the result of the judicial investigation now understood to be in progress. This much, however, we may be permitted to say, that the traces of fatal disunion amongst ourselves will, we fear, be made every where apparent. It is notorious that Sir William Macnaghten and Sir Alexander Burnes were on terms the reverse of cordial. The Envoy had no confidence in the General. The General was disgusted with the authority the Envoy had assumed, even in matters exclusively military--and, debilitated by disease, was unable always to assert his authority even in his own family. The arrival of General Shelton in the cantonments does not appear to have tended to restore harmony, cordiality, or confidence, or even to have revived the drooping courage of the troops, or to have renovated the feelings of obedience, and given effect to the bonds of discipline, which had been too much relaxed. But, even after admitting all these things, much more still remains to be explained before we can account for all that has happened--before we can understand how the political authorities came to reject every evidence of approaching danger, and therefore to be quite unprepared for it when it came. Why no effort was made on the first day to put down the insurrection: Why, in the arrangements for the defence of the cantonments, the commisariat fort was neglected, and the other forts neither occupied nor destroyed: Why almost every detachment that was sent out was too small to effect its object: Why, with a force of nearly six thousand men, we should never on any one occasion have had two thousand in the field, and, as in the action at Beymaroo, only one gun: Why so many orders appear to have been disregarded; why so few were punctually obeyed.

"At last the fatal morning dawned (the 6th January) which was
to witness the departure of the Cabul force from the
cantonments in which it had endured a two months' siege.

* * * * *

"Dreary indeed was the scene over which, with drooping spirits
and dismal forebodings, we had to bend our unwilling steps.
Deep snow covered every inch of mountain and plain with one
unspotted sheet of dazzling whiteness; and so intensely bitter
was the cold, as to penetrate and defy the defences of the
warmest clothing."

Encumbered with baggage, crowded with 12,000 camp-followers, and accompanied by many helpless women and children, of all ranks and of all ages--with misery before, and death behind, and treachery all around them--with little hope of successful resistance if attacked, without tents enough to cover them, and without food or fuel for the march, 4500 fighting men, with nine guns, set out on this march of death.

At 9 A.M. the advance moved out, but was delayed for upwards of an hour at the river, having found the temporary bridge incomplete; and it was noon ere the road was clear for the main column, which, with its long train of loaded camels, continued to pour out of the gate until the evening, by which time thousands of Affghans thronged the area of the cantonment rending the air with exulting cries, and committing every kind of atrocity. Before the rearguard commenced its march it was night; but by the light of the burning buildings the Affghan marksmen laid Lieut. Hardyman, and fifty rank and file, lifeless on the snow. The order of march was soon lost; scores of sepoys and camp-followers sat down in despair to perish, and it was 2 A.M. before the rearguard reached the camp at Bygram, a distance of five miles. Here all was confusion; different regiments, with baggage, camp-followers, camels, and horses, mixed up together. The cold towards morning became more intense, and thousands were lying on the bare snow, without shelter, fire, or food. Several died during the night, amongst whom was an European conductor; and the proportion of those who escaped without frostbites was small. Yet this was but the _beginning_ of sorrows.

_January 7th_.--At 8 A.M. the force moved on in the same inextricable confusion. Already nearly half the sepoys, from sheer inability to keep their ranks, had joined the crowd of non-combatants. The rearguard was attacked, and much baggage lost, and one of the guns having been overturned, was taken by the Affghans, whose cavalry charged into the very heart of the column.

Akber Khan said, that the force had been attacked because it had marched contrary to the wish of the chiefs. He insisted that it should halt, and promised to supply food, forage, and fuel for the troops, but demanded six more hostages, which were given. These terms having been agreed to, the firing ceased for the present, and the army encamped at Bootkhak, where the confusion was indescribable. "Night again," says Lieutenant Eyre, "closed over us, with its attendant horrors--starvation, cold, exhaustion, death."

At an early hour on the 8th the Affghans commenced firing into the camp; and as they collected in considerable numbers, Major Thain led the 44th to attack them. In this business the regiment behaved with a resolution and gallantry worthy of British soldiers. Again Akber Khan demanded hostages. Again they were given, and again the firing ceased. This seems to prove that Akber Khan had the power, if he had chosen to exert it, to restrain those tribes. Once more the living mass of men and animals was put in motion. The frost had so crippled the hands and feet of the strongest men, as to prostrate their powers and to incapacitate them for service.

The Khoord-Cabul pass, which they were about to enter, is about five miles long, shut in by lofty hills, and by precipices of 500 or 600 feet in height, whose summits approach one another in some parts to within about fifty or sixty yards. Down the centre dashed a torrent, bordered with ice, which was crossed about eight-and-twenty times.

While in this dark and narrow gorge, a hot fire was opened upon the advance, with whom were several ladies, who, seeing no other chance of safety, galloped forwards, "running the gauntlet of the enemy's bullets, which whizzed in hundreds about their ears, until they were fairly out of the pass. Providentially the whole escaped, except Lady Sale, who was slightly wounded in the arm." Several of Akber Khan's chief adherents exerted themselves in vain to restrain the Giljyes; and as the crowd moved onward into the thickest of the fire, the slaughter was fearful. Another horse-artillery gun was abandoned, and the whole of its artillerymen slain, and some of the children of the officers became prisoners. It is supposed that 3000 souls perished in the pass, amongst whom were many officers.

"On the force reaching Khoord-Cabul, snow began to fall, and
continued till morning. Only four small tents were saved, of
which one belonged to the General: two were devoted to the
ladies and children, and one was given up to the sick; but an
immense number of poor wounded wretches wandered about the camp
destitute of shelter, and perished during the night. Groans of
misery and distress assailed the ear from all quarters. We had
ascended to a still colder climate than we had left behind, and
we were without tents, fuel, or food: the snow was the only bed
for all, and of many, ere morning, it proved the
_winding-sheet_. It is only marvellous that any should have
survived that fearful night!

"_January 9th_.--Another morning dawned, awakening thousands to
increased misery; and many a wretched survivor cast looks of
envy at his comrades, who lay stretched beside him in the
quiet sleep of death. Daylight was the signal for a renewal of
that confusion which attended every movement of the force."

Many of the troops and followers moved without orders at 8 A.M., but were recalled by the General, in consequence of an arrangement with Akber Khan. "This delay, and prolongation of their sufferings in the snow, of which one more march would have carried them clear, made a very unfavourable impression on the minds of the native soldiery, who now, for the first time, began very generally to entertain the idea of deserting." And it is not to be wondered at, that the instinct of self-preservation should have led them to falter in their fealty when the condition of the whole army had become utterly hopeless.

Akber Khan now proposed that the ladies and children should be made over to his care; and, anxious to save them further suffering, the General gave his consent to the arrangement, permitting their husbands and the wounded officers to accompany them.

"Up to this time scarcely one of the ladies had tasted a meal
since leaving Cabul. Some had infants a few days old at the
breast, and were unable to stand without assistance. Others
were so far advanced in pregnancy, that, under ordinary
circumstances, a walk across a drawing-room would have been an
exertion; yet these helpless women, with their young families,
had already been obliged to rough it on the backs of camels,
and on the tops of the baggage yaboos: those who had a horse to
ride, or were capable of sitting on one, were considered
fortunate indeed. Most had been without shelter since quitting
the cantonment--their servants had nearly all deserted or been
killed--and, with the exception of Lady Macnaghten and Mrs
Trevor, they had lost all their baggage, having nothing in the
world left but the clothes on their backs; _those_, in the case
of some of the invalids, consisted of _night dresses_ in which
they had started from Cabul in their litters. Under such
circumstances, a few more hours would probably have seen some
of them stiffening corpses. The offer of Mahomed Akber was
consequently their only chance of preservation. The husbands,
better clothed and hardy, would have infinitely preferred
taking their chance with the troops; but where is the man who
would prefer his own safety, when he thought he could by his
presence assist and console those near and dear to him?

"It is not, therefore, wonderful, that from persons so
circumstanced the General's proposal should have met with
little opposition, although it was a matter of serious doubt
whether the whole were not rushing into the very jaws of death,
by placing themselves at the mercy of a man who had so lately
imbrued his hands in the blood of a British envoy, whom he had
lured to destruction by similar professions of peace and
good-will."

Anticipating an attack, the troops paraded to repel it, and it was now found that the 44th mustered only 100 files, and the native infantry regiments about sixty each. "The promises of Mahomed Akber to provide food and fuel were unfulfilled, and another night of starvation and cold consigned more victims to a miserable death."

_January_ 10.--At break of day all was again confusion, every one hurrying to the front, and dreading above all things to be left in the rear. The Europeans were the only efficient men left, the Hindostanees having suffered so severely from the frost in their hands and feet, that few could hold a musket, much less pull a trigger. The enemy had occupied the rocks above the gorge, and thence poured a destructive fire upon the column as it slowly advanced. Fresh numbers fell at every volley. The sepoys, unable to use their arms, cast them away, and, with the followers, fled for their lives.

"The Affghans now rushed down upon their helpless and
unresisting victims sword in hand, and a general massacre took
place. The last small remnant of the native infantry regiments
were here scattered and destroyed; and the public treasure,
with all the remaining baggage, fell into the hands of the
enemy. Meanwhile, the advance, after pushing through the Tungee
with great loss, had reached Kubbur-i-Jubbar, about five miles
a-head, without more opposition. Here they halted to enable the
rear to join, but, from the few stragglers who from time to
time came up, the astounding truth was brought to light, that
of all who had that morning marched from Khoord-Cabul they were
almost the sole survivors, nearly the whole of the main and
rear columns having been cut off and destroyed. About 50
horse-artillerymen, with one twelve-pounder howitzer, 70 files
H.M.'s 44th, and 150 cavalry troopers, now composed the whole
Cabul force; but, notwithstanding the slaughter and dispersion
that had taken place, the camp-followers still formed a
considerable body."

Another remonstrance was now addressed to Akber Khan. He declared, in reply, his inability to restrain the Giljyes. As the troops entered a narrow defile at the foot of the Huft Kotul, they found it strewn with the dead bodies of their companions. A destructive fire was maintained on the troops from the heights on either side, and fresh numbers of dead and wounded lined the course of the stream. "Brigadier Shelton commanded the rear with a few Europeans, and but for his persevering energy and unflinching fortitude in repelling the assailants, it is probable the whole would have been there sacrificed." They encamped in the Tezeen valley, having lost 12,000 men since leaving Cabul; fifteen officers had been killed and wounded in this day's march.

After resting three hours, they marched, under cover of the darkness, at seven P.M. Here the last gun was abandoned, and with it Dr Cardew, whose zeal and gallantry had endeared him to the soldiers; and a little further on Dr Duff was left on the road in a state of utter exhaustion.

"Bodies of the neighbouring tribes were by this time on the
alert, and fired at random from the heights, it being
fortunately too dark for them to aim with precision; but the
panic-stricken camp-followers now resembled a herd of startled
deer, and fluctuated backwards and forwards, _en masse_, at
every shot, blocking up the entire road, and fatally retarding
the progress of the little body of soldiers who, under
Brigadier Shelton, brought up the rear.

"At Burik-àb a heavy fire was encountered by the hindmost from
some caves near the road-side, occasioning fresh disorder,
which continued all the way to Kutter-Sung, where the advance
arrived at dawn of day, and awaited the junction of the rear,
which did not take place till 8 A.M."

_January_ 11.-- ...

"From Kutter-Sung to Jugdulluk it was one continued conflict;
Brigadier Shelton, with his brave little band in the rear,
holding overwhelming numbers in check, and literally performing
wonders. But no efforts could avail to ward off the withering
fire of juzails, which from all sides assailed the crowded
column, lining the road with bleeding carcasses. About three
P.M. the advance reached Jugdulluk, and took up its position
behind some ruined walls that crowned a height by the
road-side. To show an imposing front, the officers extended
themselves in line, and Captain Grant, assistant
adjutant-general, at the same moment received a wound in the
face. From this eminence they cheered their comrades under
Brigadier Shelton in the rear, as they still struggled their
way gallantly along every foot of ground, perseveringly
followed up by their merciless enemy, until they arrived at
their ground. But even here rest was denied them; for the
Affghans, immediately occupying two hills which commanded the
position, kept up a fire from which the walls of the enclosure
afforded but a partial shelter.

"The exhausted troops and followers now began to suffer greatly
from thirst, which they were unable to satisfy. A tempting
stream trickled near the foot of the hill, but to venture down
to it was certain death. Some snow that covered the ground was
eagerly devoured, but increased, instead of alleviating, their
sufferings. The raw flesh of three bullocks, which had
fortunately been saved, was served out to the soldiers, and
ravenously swallowed."

About half-past three Akber Khan sent for Capt. Skinner, who promptly obeyed the call, hoping still to effect some arrangement for the preservation of those who survived. The men now threw themselves down, hoping for a brief repose, but the enemy poured volleys from the heights into the enclosures in rapid succession. Captain Bygrave, with about fifteen brave Europeans, sallied forth, determined to drive the enemy from the heights or perish in the attempt. They succeeded; but the enemy, who had fled before them, returned and resumed their fatal fire. At five P.M. Captain Skinner returned with a message from Akber Khan, requesting the presence of the General at a conference, and demanding Brigadier Shelton and Capt. Johnson as hostages for the surrender of Jellalabad. The troops saw the departure of these officers with despair, feeling assured that these treacherous negotiations "were preparatory to fresh sacrifices of blood." The General and his companions were received with every outward token of kindness, and they were supplied with food, but they were not permitted to return. The Sirdar put the General off with promises; and at seven P.M. on the 12th, firing being heard, it was ascertained that the troops, impatient of further delay, had actually moved off. Before their departure Captain Skinner had been treacherously shot. They had been exposed during the whole day to the fire of the enemy--"sally after sally had been made by the Europeans, bravely led by Major Thain, Captain Bygrave, and Lieutenants Wade and Macartney, but again and again the enemy returned to worry and destroy. Night came, and all further delay in such a place being useless, the whole sallied forth, determined to pursue the route to Jellalabad at all risks."

The sick and the wounded were necessarily abandoned to their fate. For some time the Giljyes seemed not to be on the alert; but in the defile, at the top of the rise, further progress was obstructed by barriers formed of prickly trees. This caused great delay, and "a terrible fire was poured in from all quarters--a massacre even worse than that of the Tunga Tarikee[24] commenced, the Affghans rushing in furiously upon the pent-up crowd of troops and followers, and committing wholesale slaughter. A miserable remnant managed to clear the barriers. Twelve officers, amongst whom was Brigadier Anquetil, were killed. Upwards of forty others succeeded in pushing through, about twelve of whom, being pretty well mounted, rode on a-head of the rest with the few remaining cavalry, intending to make the best of their way to Jellalabad."

[24] Strait of Darkness.

The country now became more open--the Europeans dispersed, in small parties under different officers. The Giljyes were too much occupied in plundering the dead to pursue them, but they were much delayed by the amiable anxiety of the men to carry on their wounded comrades. The morning of the 13th dawned as they approached Gundamuk, revealing to the enemy the insignificance of their numerical strength; and they were compelled, by the vigorous assaults of the Giljyes, to take up a defensive position on a height to the left of the road, "where they made a resolute stand, determined to sell their lives at the dearest possible price. At this time they could only muster about twenty muskets." An attempt to effect an amicable arrangement terminated in a renewal of hostilities, and "the enemy marked off man after man, and officer after officer, with unerring aim. Parties of Affghans rushed up at intervals to complete the work of extermination, but were as often driven back by the still dauntless handful of invincibles. At length, all being wounded more or less, a final onset of the enemy, sword in hand, terminated the unequal struggle and completed the dismal tragedy." Captain Souter, who was wounded, and three or four privates, were spared and led away captive. Major Griffiths and Captain Blewitt, having descended to confer with the enemy, had been previously led off. Of the twelve officers who had gone on in advance eleven were destroyed, and Dr Brydon alone of the whole Cabul force reached Jellalabad.

"Such was the memorable retreat of the British army from Cabul, which, viewed in all its circumstances--in the military conduct which preceded and brought about such a consummation, the treachery, disaster, and suffering which accompanied it--is, perhaps, without a parallel in history."

* * * * *

THE EVACUATION OF AFFGHANISTAN.

Since the day when Lord Auckland, by his famous proclamation in October 1838, "directed the assemblage of a British force for service across the Indus," we have never ceased to denounce the invasion and continued occupation of Affghanistan as equally unjust and impolitic[25]--unjust, as directed against a people whose conduct had afforded us no legitimate grounds of hostility, and against a ruler whose only offence was, that he had accepted[26] the proffer from another quarter of that support and alliance which we had denied to his earnest entreaty--and impolitic, as tending not only to plunge us into an endless succession of ruinous and unprofitable warfare, but to rouse against us an implacable spirit of enmity, in a nation which had hitherto shown every disposition to cultivate amicable relations with our Anglo-Indian Government. In all points, our anticipations have been fatally verified. After more than two years consumed in unavailing efforts to complete the reduction of the country, our army of occupation was at last overwhelmed by the universal and irresistible outbreak of an indignant and fanatic population; and the restored monarch, Shah-Shoojah, ("whose popularity throughout Affghanistan had been proved to the Governor-general by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities") perished, as soon as he lost the protection of foreign bayonets, by the hands of his outraged countrymen.[27]

[25] See the articles "Persia, Affghanistan, and India," in
Jan. 1839--"Khiva, Central Asia, and Cabul," in April
1840--"Results of our Affghan Conquests," in Aug.
1841--"Affghanistan and India," in July 1842.

[26] It now seems even doubtful whether the famous letter of
Dost Mohammed to the Emperor of Russia, which constituted the
_gravamen_ of the charge against him, was ever really written,
or at least with his concurrence.--_Vide_ "Report of the
Colonial Society on the Affghan War," p. 35.

[27] The particulars of Shah-Shoojah's fate, which were unknown
when we last referred to the subject, have been since
ascertained. After the retreat of the English from Cabul, he
remained for some time secluded in the Bala-Hissar, observing
great caution in his intercourse with the insurgent leaders;
but he was at length prevailed upon, by assurances of loyalty
and fidelity, (about the middle of April,) to quit the
fortress, in order to head an army against Jellalabad. He had
only proceeded, however, a short distance from the city, when
his litter was fired upon by a party of musketeers placed in
ambush by a Doorauni chief named Soojah-ed-Dowlah; and the king
was shot dead on the spot. Such was the ultimate fate of a
prince, the vicissitudes of whose life almost exceed the
fictions of romance, and who possessed talents sufficient, in
more tranquil times, to have given _éclat_ to his reign. During
his exile at Loodiana, he composed in Persian a curious
narrative of his past adventures, a version of part of which
appears in the 30th volume of the _Asiatic Journal_.

The tottering and unsubstantial phantom of a _Doorauni kingdom_ vanished at once and for ever--and the only remaining alternative was, (as we stated the case in our number of last July,) "either to perpetrate a second act of violence and national injustice, by reconquering Affghanistan _for the vindication_ (as the phrase is) _of our military honour_, and holding it without disguise as a province of our empire--or to make the best of a bad bargain, by contenting ourselves with the occupation of a few posts on the frontier, and leaving the unhappy natives to recover, without foreign interference, from the dreadful state of anarchy into which our irruption has thrown them." Fortunately for British interests in the East, the latter course has been adopted. After a succession of brilliant military triumphs, which, in the words of Lord Ellenborough's recent proclamation, "have, in one short campaign, avenged our late disasters upon every scene of past misfortune," the evacuation of the country has been directed--not, however, before a fortunate chance had procured the liberation of _all_ the prisoners who had fallen into the power of the Affghans in January last; and ere this time, we trust, not a single British regiment remains on the bloodstained soil of Affghanistan.

The proclamation above referred to,[28] (which we have given at length at the conclusion of this article,) announcing these events, and defining the line of policy in future to be pursued by the Anglo-Indian Government, is in all respects a remarkable document. As a specimen of frankness and plain speaking, it stands unique in the history of diplomacy; and, accordingly, both its matter and its manner have been made the subjects of unqualified censure by those scribes of the Opposition press who, "content to dwell in forms for ever," have accustomed themselves to regard the mystified protocols of Lord Palmerston as the models of official style. The _Morning Chronicle_, with amusing ignorance of the state of the public mind in India, condemns the Governor-general for allowing it to become known to the natives that the abandonment of Affghanistan was in consequence of a change of policy! conceiving (we suppose) that our Indian subjects would otherwise have believed the Cabul disasters to have formed part of the original plan of the war, and to have veiled some purpose of inscrutable wisdom; while the _Globe_, (Dec. 3,) after a reluctant admission that "the policy itself of evacuating the country _may be wise_," would fain deprive Lord Ellenborough of the credit of having originated this decisive step, by an assertion that "we have discovered no proof that a permanent possession of the country beyond the Indus was contemplated by his predecessor." It would certainly have been somewhat premature in Lord Auckland to have announced his ultimate intentions on this point while the country in question was as yet but imperfectly subjugated, or when our troops were subsequently almost driven out of it; but the views of the then home Government, from which it is to be presumed that Lord Auckland received his instructions, were pretty clearly revealed in the House of Commons on the 10th of August last, by one whose authority the _Globe_, at least, will scarcely dispute--by Lord Palmerston himself. To prevent the possibility of misconstruction, we quote the words attributed to the late Foreign Secretary. After drawing the somewhat unwarrantable inference, from Sir Robert Peel's statement, "that no immediate withdrawal of our troops from Candahar and Jellalabad was contemplated," that an order had at one time been given for the abandonment of Affghanistan, he proceeds--"I do trust that her Majesty's Government will not carry into effect, either immediately or at _any_ future time, the arrangement thus contemplated. It was all very well when we were in power, and it was suited to party purposes, to run down any thing we had done, and to represent as valueless any acquisition on which we may have prided ourselves--it was all very well to raise an outcry against the Affghan expedition, and to undervalue the great advantages which the possession of the country was calculated to afford us--but I trust the Government will rise above any consideration of that sort, and that they will give the matter their fair, dispassionate, and deliberate consideration. I must say, I never was more convinced of any thing in the whole course of my life--and I may be believed when I speak my earnest conviction--that the most important interests of this country, both commercial and political, would be sacrificed, if we were to sacrifice the military possession of the country of Eastern Affghanistan." Is it in the power of words to convey a clearer admission, that the pledge embodied in Lord Auckland's manifesto--"to withdraw the British army as soon as the independence and integrity of Affghanistan should be secured by the establishment of the Shah"--was in fact mere moonshine: and the real object of the expedition was the conquest of a country advantageously situated for the defence of our Indian frontier against (as it now appears) an imaginary invader? Thus Napoleon, in December 1810, alleged "the necessity, in consequence of the new order of things which has arisen, of new guarantees for the security of my empire," as a pretext for that wholesale measure of territorial spoliation in Northern Germany, which, from the umbrage it gave Russia, proved ultimately the cause of his downfall: but it was reserved for us of the present day, to hear a _British_ minister avow and justify a violent and perfidious usurpation on the plea of political expediency. It must indeed be admitted that, in the early stages of the war, the utter iniquity of the measure met with but faint reprobation from any party in the state: the nation, dazzled by the long-disused splendours of military glory, was willing, without any very close enquiry, to take upon trust all the assertions so confidently put forth on the popularity of Shah-Shoojah, the hostile machinations of Dost Mohammed, and the philanthropic and disinterested wishes of the Indian Government for (to quote a notable phrase to which we have more than once previously referred) "_the reconstruction of the social edifice_" in Affghanistan. But now that all these subterfuges, flimsy as they were at best, have been utterly dissipated by this undisguised declaration of Lord Palmerston, that the real object of the war was to seize and hold the country on our own account, the attempt of the _Globe_ to claim for Lord Auckland the credit of having from the first contemplated a measure thus vehemently protested against and disclaimed by the late official leader of his party, is rather too barefaced to be passed over without comment.

[28] It is singular that this proclamation was issued on the
fourth anniversary of Lord Auckland's "Declaration" of Oct. 1,
1838; and from the same place, Simla.

Without, however, occupying ourselves further in combating the attacks of the Whig press on this proclamation, which may very well be left to stand on its own merits, we now proceed to recapitulate the course of the events which have, in a few months, so completely changed the aspect of affairs beyond the Indus. When we took leave, in July last, of the subject of the Affghan campaign, we left General Pollock, with the force which had made its way through the Khyber Pass, still stationary at Jellalabad, for want (as it was said) of camels and other means of transport: while General Nott, at Candahar, not only held his ground, but victoriously repulsed in the open field the Affghan _insurgents_, (as it is the fashion to call them,) who were headed by the prince Seifdar-Jung, son of Shah Shoojah! and General England, after his repulse on the 28th of March at the Kojuck Pass, remained motionless at Quettah. The latter officer (in consequence, as it is said, of peremptory orders from General Nott to meet him on a given day at the further side of the Pass) was the first to resume active operations; and on the 28th of April, the works at Hykulzie in the Kojuck, which had been unaccountably represented on the former occasion as most formidable defences,[29] were carried without loss or difficulty, and the force continued its march uninterrupted to Candahar. The fort of Khelat-i-Ghiljie, lying about halfway between Candahar and Ghazni, was at the sane time gallantly and successfully defended by handful of Europeans and sepoys, till relieved by the advance of a division from Candahar, which brought off the garrison, and razed the fortifications of the place. Girishk, the hereditary stronghold of the Barukzye chiefs, about eighty miles west of Candahar, was also dismantled and abandoned; and all the troops in Western Affghanistan were thus concentrated under the immediate command of General Nott, whose success in every encounter with the Affghans continued to be so decisive, that all armed opposition disappeared from the neighbourhood of Candahar; and the prince Seifdar-Jung, despairing of the cause, of which he had perhaps been from the first not a very willing supporter, came in and made his submission to the British commander.

[29] "The fieldworks _believed to be described_ in the despatch
as 'consisting of a succession of breastworks, improved by a
ditch and abattis--the latter being filled with thorns,' turned
out to be a paltry stone wall, with a cut two feet deep, and of
corresponding width, to which the designation of ditch was most
grossly misapplied.... A score or two of active men might have
completed the work in a few days."--(Letter quoted in the
_Asiatic Journal_, Sept., p. 107.) On whom the blame of these
misrepresentations should be laid--whether on the officer who
reconnoitred the ground, or on the general who wrote the
despatch--does not very clearly appear: yet the political agent
at Quettah was removed from his charge, for not having given
notice of the construction in his vicinity of works which are
now proved to have had no existence!

During the progress of these triumphant operations in Western Affghanistan, General Pollock still lay inactive at Jellalabad; and some abortive attempts were made to negotiate with the dominant party at Cabul for the release of the prisoners taken the preceding winter. Since the death of Shah-Shoojah, the throne had been nominally filled by his third son, Futteh-Jung, the only one of the princes who was on the spot; but all the real power was vested, with the rank of vizier, in the hands of Akhbar Khan, who had not only possessed himself of the Bala-Hissar and the treasure of the late king, but had succeeded in recruiting the forces of the Affghan league, by a reconciliation with Ameen-ullah Khan,[30] the original leader of the outbreak, with whom he had formerly been at variance. All efforts, however, to procure the liberation of the captives, on any other condition than the liberation of Dost Mohammed, and the evacuation of Affghanistan by the English, (as hostages for which they had originally been given,) proved fruitless; and at length, after more than four months' delay, during which several sharp affairs had taken place with advanced bodies of the Affghans, General Pollock moved forward with his whole force, on the 20th of August, against Cabul. This city had again in the mean time become a scene of tumult and disorder--the Kizilbashes or Persian inhabitants, as well as many of the native chiefs, resisting the exactions of Akhbar Khan; who, at last, irritated by the opposition to his measures, imprisoned the titular shah, Futteh-Jung, in the Bala-Hissar; whence he succeeded after a time in escaping, and made his appearance, in miserable plight, (Sept. 1,) at the British headquarters at Futtehabad, between Jellalabad and Gundamuck. The advance of the army was constantly opposed by detached bodies of the enemy, and several spirited skirmishes took place:--till, on the 13th of September, the main Affghan force, to the number of 16,000 men, under Akhbar Khan and other leaders, was descried on the heights near Tazeen, (where the slaughter of our troops had taken place in January,) at the entrance of the formidable defiles called the Huft-Kothul, or Seven Passes. It is admitted on all hands that in this last struggle, (as they believed, for independence,) the Affghans fought with most distinguished gallantry, frequently charging sword in hand upon the bayonets; but their irregular valour eventually gave way before the discipline of their opponents, and a total rout took place. The chiefs fled in various directions, "abandoning Cabul to the _avengers of British wrongs_," who entered the city in triumph on the 15th, and hoisted the British colours on the Bala-Hissar. The principal point now remaining to be effected was the rescue of the prisoners whom Akhbar Khan had carried off with him in his flight, with the intention (as was rumoured) of transporting them into Turkestan; but from this peril they were fortunately delivered by the venality of the chief to whose care they had been temporarily intrusted; and on the 21st they all reached the camp in safety, with the exception of Captain Bygrave, who was also liberated, a few days later, by the voluntary act of Akhbar himself.[31]

[30] It was this chief whose betrayal or destruction Sir
William McNaghten is accused, on the authority of General
Elphinstone's correspondence, of having meditated, on the
occasion when he met with his own fate. We hope, for the honour
of the English name, that the memory of the late Resident at
Cabul may be cleared from this heavy imputation; but he
certainly cannot be acquitted of having, by his wilful
blindness and self-sufficiency, contributed to precipitate the
catastrophe to which he himself fell a victim. In proof of this
assertion, it is sufficient to refer to the tenor of his
remarks on the letter addressed to him by Sir A. Burnes on the
affairs of Cabul, August 7, 1840, which appeared some time
since in the _Bombay Times_, and afterwards in the _Asiatic
Journal_ for October and November last.

[31] The kindness and humanity which these unfortunate
_detenus_ experienced from first to last at the hands of
Akhbar, reflect the highest honour on the character of this
chief, whom it has been the fashion to hold up to execration as
a monster of perfidy and cruelty. As a contrast to this conduct
of the Affghan _barbarians_, it is worth while to refer to
Colonel Lindsay's narrative of his captivity in the dungeons of
Hyder and Tippoo, which has recently appeared in the _Asiatic
Journal_, September, December, 1842.

General Nott, meanwhile, in pursuance of his secret orders from the Supreme Government, had been making preparations for abandoning Candahar; and, on the 7th and 8th of August, the city was accordingly evacuated, both by his corps and by the division of General England--the Affghan prince, Seifdar-Jung, being left in possession of the place. The routes of the two commanders were now separated. General England, with an immense train of luggage, stores, &c., directed his march through the Kojuck Pass to Quettah, which he reached with little opposition;--while Nott, with a more lightly-equipped column, about 7000 strong, advanced by Khelat-i-Ghiljie against Ghazni. This offensive movement appears to have taken the Affghans at first by surprise; and it was not till he arrived within thirty-eight miles of Ghazni that General Nott found his progress opposed (August 30) by 12,000 men under the governor, Shams-o-deen Khan, a cousin of Mohammed Akhbar. The dispersion of this tumultuary array was apparently accomplished (as far as can be gathered from the extremely laconic despatches of the General) without much difficulty; and, on the 6th of September, after a sharp skirmish in the environs, the British once more entered Ghazni. In the city and neighbouring villages were found not fewer than 327 sepoys of the former garrison, which had been massacred to a man (according to report) immediately after the surrender; but notwithstanding this evidence of the moderation with which the Affghans had used their triumph, General Nott, (in obedience, as is said, to the _positive tenor of his instructions_,) "directed the city of Ghazni, with the citadel and the whole of its works, to be destroyed;" and this order appears, from the engineer's report, to have been rigorously carried into effect. The mace of Mamood Shah Ghaznevi, the first Moslem conqueror of Hindostan, and the famous sandal-wood portals of his tomb, (once the gates of the great Hindoo temple at Somnaut,[32]) were carried off as trophies: the ruins of Ghazni were left as a monument of British vengeance; and General Nott, resuming his march, and again routing Shams-o-deen Khan at the defiles of Myden, effected his junction with General Pollock, on the 17th of September, at Cabul; whence the united corps, together mustering 18,000 effective men, were to take the route for Hindostan through the Punjab early in October.

[32] The value still attached by the Hindoos to these relics
was shown on the conclusion of the treaty, in 1832, between
Shah-Shoojah and Runjeet Singh, previous to the Shah's last
unaided attempt to recover his throne; in which their
restoration, in case of his success, was an express
stipulation.

Such have been the principal events of the brief but brilliant campaign which has concluded the Affghan war, and which, if regarded solely in a military point of view, must be admitted to have amply vindicated the lustre of the British arms from the transient cloud cast on them by the failures and disasters of last winter.

The Affghan tragedy, however, may now, we hope, be considered as concluded, so far as related to our own participation in its crimes and calamities; but for the Affghans themselves, "left to create a government in the midst of anarchy," there can be at present little chance of even comparative tranquillity, after the total dislocation of their institutions and internal relations by the fearful torrent of war which has swept over the country. The last atonement now in our power to make, both to the people and the ruler whom we have so deeply injured, as well as the best course for our own interests, would be at once to release Dost Mohammed from the unmerited and ignominious confinement to which he has been subjected in Hindostan, and to send him back in honour to Cabul; where his own ancient partisans, as well as those of his son, would quickly rally round him; and where his presence and accustomed authority might have some effect in restraining the crowd of fierce chiefs, who will be ready to tear each other to pieces as soon as they are released from the presence of the _Feringhis_. There would thus be at least a possibility of obtaining a nucleus for the re-establishment of something like good order; while in no other quarter does there appear much prospect of a government being formed, which might be either "approved by the Affghans themselves," or "capable of maintaining friendly relations with neighbouring states." If the accounts received may be depended upon, our troops had scarcely cleared the Kojuck Pass, on their way from Candahar to the Indus, when that city became the scene of a contest between the Prince Seifdar-Jung and the Barukzye chiefs in the vicinity; and though the latter are said to have been worsted in the first instance, there can be little doubt that our departure will be the signal for the speedy return of the quondam _Sirdars_, or rulers of Candahar, (brothers of Dost Mohammed,) who have found an asylum in Persia since their expulsion in 1839, but who will scarcely neglect so favourable an opportunity for recovering their lost authority. Yet another competitor may still, perhaps, be found in the same quarter--one whose name, though sufficiently before the public a few years since, has now been almost forgotten in the strife of more mighty interests. This is Shah Kamran of Herat, the rumours of whose death or dethronement prove to have been unfounded, and who certainly would have at this moment a better chance than he has ever yet had, for regaining at least Candahar and Western Affghanistan. He was said to be on the point of making the attempt after the repulse of the Persians before Herat, just before our adoption of Shah-Shoojah; and his title to the crown is at least as good as that of the late Shah, or any of his sons. It will be strange if this prince, whose danger from Persia was the original pretext for crossing the Indus, should be the only one of all the parties concerned, whose condition underwent no ultimate change, through all the vicissitudes of the tempest which has raged around him.