Chapter X: Part II (2)

FOURTH DOCTOR.--To the same general question put to first and
second Doctor.--

_Answer._--"An exceedingly strong indication of unsoundness of
mind. A propensity to commit acts without an apparent or adequate
motive, under such circumstances, is recognised as a particular
species of insanity, called _lesion_ of the will: it has been
called moral insanity."

_Question._--"From the conversation you have had with the prisoner,
and your opportunity of observing him, what do you think of his
state of mind?"

_Answer._--"Essentially unsound: there seems a mixture of
insanity with imbecility. Laughing and crying are proofs of
imbecility--assisting me to form my opinion.... When I saw him, I
could not persuade him that there had been balls in the pistols--he
insisted that there were none. He was indifferent about his mother
when her name was mentioned. His manner was very peculiar: entirely
without acute feeling or acute consciousness--lively, brisk,
smart--perfectly natural--not as if he were acting, or making the
least pretence. The interview lasted about three quarters of an
hour."

LAST DOCTOR.--"A practising surgeon for between three and four
years. Had attended the prisoner's family."

_Question._--"What is your opinion as to his state of mind?"

_Answer._--"Decidedly that of imbecility--more imbecility than
anything: he is decidedly, in my judgment, of unsound mind.
His mother has often told me there was something exceedingly
peculiar about him, and asked me what I thought. The chief thing
that struck me was his involuntary laughing: he did not seem to
have that sufficient control over the emotions which we find in
sane individuals. In Newgate, he had great insensibility to all
impressions sought to be made on him. His mother once rebuked him
for some want of civility to me; on which he jumped up in a fury,
at the moment alarming me, and saying 'he would stick her.' I think
that was his expression."

Questioned by the Counsel for the Crown.--"I never prescribed for
the prisoner, nor recommended any course of treatment, conduct,
or diet whatever. I never gave, nor was asked for any advice. I
concluded the disease was mental--one of those weak minds which,
under little excitement, might become overthrown."

With every due consideration for these five gentlemen, as expressing themselves with undoubted sincerity and conscientiousness; with the sincerest respect for the medical profession, and a profound sense of the perplexities which its honourable and able members have to encounter in steering their course, when called upon to act in cases of alleged insanity--encountering often equally undeserved censure and peril for interfering and for not interfering--we beg to enter our stern and solemn protest on behalf of the public, and the administration of the justice, against such "_evidence_ of insanity" as we have just presented to the reader. It may really be stigmatised as "The safe committal of crime made easy to the plainest capacity." It proceeds upon paradoxes subversive of society. Moral insanity? Absurd misnomer! Call it rather "_im_moral insanity," and punish it accordingly. Is it not fearful to see well-educated men of intellect take so perverted a view of the conditions of human society--of the duties and responsibilities of its members? Absence of assignable motive an evidence of such insanity as should exempt from responsibility! Inability to resist or control a motive to commit murder a safe ground for immunity from criminal responsibility!--that "criminal responsibility which," as the present Lord Chancellor, in replying for the Crown in Oxford's case, justly remarked, "secures the very existence of society."

Let us look at another aspect of this medical evidence given on this memorable occasion. Doctor the _first_ pronounced his authoritative decision solely on the evidence given in court: influenced, it may be, by his having, many years before, been called in to attend the prisoner's father when labouring under symptoms of poisoning by laudanum. Doctor the _second_ gave merely speculative evidence, without, as it would seem, having even seen the prisoner, and founded solely on what passed at the trial. Doctor the _third_ never saw the prisoner before the trial but once, and then for "_perhaps half an hour_," on the first day of the trial, or the day before it! How potent that half hour's observation! Doctor the _fourth_ saw the prisoner with doctor the third, for "_perhaps three-quarters of an hour!_" Doctor the _fifth_ was a practising surgeon of not four years' standing--owning how "short a time he had been in practice." Let us only surrender our understandings to this queer quinary, and we arrive at a short and easy solution--very comfortable, indeed, for the young gentleman at the bar, who is doubtless filled with wonder at finding how sagaciously they saw into the thoughts which had been passing through his mind--the precise state of his feelings, views, objects, and intentions, when he fired at the Queen. But in the mean time we ask, can it be tolerated that medical gentlemen should thus usurp the province of both judge and jury? We answer, no! and shall place here on record the just and indignant rebuke of Mr Baron Alderson to a well-known medical gentleman, who had thus authoritatively announced his conclusion on the recent trial of Robert Pate.

Dr----.--"From all I have heard to-day, and from my personal
observation, I am satisfied the prisoner is of unsound mind."

BARON ALDERSON.--"Be so good, Dr ----, as not to take upon yourself
the functions of both the judge and the jury. If you can give us
the results of your scientific knowledge in this point, we shall be
glad to hear you; but while I am sitting on this bench, _I will not
permit any medical witness to usurp the functions of both the judge
and the jury_."

It fell to the lot of Sir Thomas Wilde to reply for the Crown, in Oxford's case, as in that of Frost; and he discharged the responsible duty with his usual clearness and cogency. As to the facts, irrespective of the question of insanity, a single sentence disposed of them.

"What would be the condition of society--exposed as we all are to
such attacks, and the infliction of death by such means--if, with
the evidence of previous preparation of the means; the use of balls
and pistols; inquiries as to the effect of their discharge, and
whether the party was hurt, coupled with admission, incidental and
direct, of the fact that balls were in the pistols: what would be
the state of society, if evidence like this left an assassin the
chance of escape merely because the balls could not be found?"

And, with this terse summary of the proved facts before our eyes, we ask a question of our own: What overwhelming evidence of insanity would not an intelligent and honest juryman require, to refer such a case to the category of criminal irresponsibility?

Sir Thomas Wilde vigorously and contemptuously crushed under foot the mischievous sophistries of the medical evidence.

"If eccentric acts were proof of insanity, many persons who
were wrenching knockers off doors, knocking down watchmen, and
committing similar freaks, _were laying up a stock of excuses for
the commission of crimes_!"

"The trick of laughing suddenly, without cause, was so common, that
if this were token of imbecility the lunatic asylum would overflow
with gigglers!"

"The prisoner had all along displayed a morbid desire to be talked
about; and the letters and documents produced had been written with
that feeling and object. A criminal should not be permitted to
write out for himself a certificate of lunacy!"

"Was his making no attempt to escape, a proof of an unsound mind?
If he _had_ made such an attempt, it would have been a great proof
of madness! He was surrounded on all sides by the multitude. He
took such a reasonable view of his situation, as to see that he had
no chance of escape, and gave himself up quietly!"

"The prisoner had been allowed the unrestrained use of firearms and
powder, and was well acquainted with their fatal effects on human
life. Would his mother have _trusted a madman with them_? and left
her mad son in the same house with her daughter?"

"The medical men went to Newgate _pre-disposed and pre-determined
to see a madman_."

"Suppose the prisoner unfeeling, violent, indifferent to his
own fate, and preferring notoriety to any other consideration:
what evidence did that supply of his being in a state of moral
irresponsibility?--that moral irresponsibility which secured the
very existence of society."

All this surely sounds like an irresistible appeal to good sense.

Lord Denman directed the jury with corresponding clearness and decision, and also in full conformity with the views of the Solicitor-general, and with the subsequent annunciation of the law by the judges.[19]

"If you think the prisoner was, _at the time_, labouring under any
delusion which prevented him from judging of the effects of the act
he had committed, you cannot find him guilty. He might, perhaps,
have been labouring under a delusion affecting _every_ part of his
conduct, and not directed to one object alone: if that were so at
the time of his firing, he could not be held accountable for it.
But if, though labouring under a delusion, he fired the loaded
pistols at the Queen, knowing the possible result--though forced
to the act by his morbid love of notoriety--he is responsible, and
liable to punishment."

"There may be cases of insanity, in which medical evidence as to
_physical_ symptoms is of the utmost consequence. But as to _moral
insanity_, I, for my own part, cannot admit that medical men have
at all more means of forming an opinion, in such a case, than are
possessed by gentlemen accustomed to the affairs of life, and
bringing to the subject a wide experience."

"The mere fact of the prisoner's going into the park, and raising
his hand against the Queen, is not to be taken as a proof of
insanity--particularly if we suppose that he is naturally reckless
of consequences. It is a mark, doubtless, of a mind devoid of right
judgment and of right feeling; but it would be a most dangerous
maxim, that the mere enormity of a crime should secure the
prisoner's acquittal, by being taken to establish his _insanity_.
Acts of wanton and dangerous mischief are often committed by
persons who _suppose_ that they have an adequate motive; but they
are sometimes done by those who have no adequate motive, and on
whom they can confer no advantage. A man may be charged with
slaying his father, his child, or his innocent wife, to whom he is
bound to afford protection and kindness; and it is most extravagant
to say that this man cannot be found guilty, because of the
enormity of his crime!"

The jury, thus charged with the principles of a humane and sound jurisprudence, retired, and after three quarters of an hour's absence returned with this special verdict: "We find the prisoner, Edward Oxford, guilty of discharging the contents of two pistols; but whether or not they were loaded with ball has not been satisfactorily proved to us--_he being of unsound mind at the time_." In other words, "We find that he did not fire a pistol loaded with ball because he was not of sound mind!" They were sent back, with a mild intimation that they had not sufficiently applied their minds to the true question--viz., Did the prisoner, ay or no, fire a pistol _loaded with ball_ at the Queen? The foreman, "We cannot decide the point, because there is no satisfactory evidence produced before us, to show that the pistols were loaded with bullets." They retired, to return with a verdict of "'Guilty,' or 'Not Guilty,' on the evidence." After an hour's absence they finally brought back their verdict, "Guilty, he being at the time insane!"

_Lord Denman._--"Do you acquit the prisoner, on the ground of
insanity?"

_Foreman of the Jury._--"Yes, my Lord; that is our intention."

_Lord Denman._--"Then the verdict will stand thus: 'Not Guilty, on
the ground of insanity.' The prisoner will be confined in strict
custody, as a matter of course."

"The prisoner," says Mr Townsend,[20] "walked briskly from the bar,
apparently glad that the tedious trial was over."

Upon the whole matter we are of opinion,--_First_, That there was very satisfactory evidence that the pistols were loaded with ball, and that the jury ought to have found their verdict accordingly. _Secondly_, If they remained of opinion, to the last, that there was no satisfactory evidence on this point, they ought unquestionably to have pronounced the prisoner Not Guilty, independently of any question as to the prisoner's state of mind. In Scotland, the jury would, in such a case, have returned a verdict of _Not Proven_; but in England, deficient evidence--_i. e._ such as leaves the jury finally in doubt--is regarded as leaving the charge unproved, &c., requiring the verdict of Not Guilty. _Thirdly_, The defence of insanity utterly failed, and the evidence offered in support of it was scarcely worthy of serious consideration. _Lastly_, It is possible that the verdict was given--though by men anxiously desirous of acting with mingled mercy and justice--under a condition of mental irresolution and confusion, and with a deficiency of moral courage. The jury either shrank from the fearful consequences of a verdict of Guilty, on a charge of high treason, and yet feared to let the prisoner loose again upon society; or there was a compromise between those who believed that there _was_, and there was _not_, sufficient evidence of the pistols having contained bullets; and also between those who were similarly divided on the subject of the prisoner's sanity. Thus stood, thus stands, the case; and Oxford has ever since been an inmate of Bedlam: though Mr Taylor, to whose work on _Medical Jurisprudence_ we have already referred, and who is a decided and able supporter of that theory of "moral insanity" to which we, in common with all the Judges, are so strongly opposed, admits expressly that, with the exception of M'Naughten's case, "there is perhaps none on record, in English jurisprudence, where the facts in support of the plea of insanity were so slight as in that of Oxford."[21]

M'NAUGHTEN'S CASE.

The case of Daniel M'Naughten, which was tried at the Old Bailey about two years and a half after that of Oxford--viz., on the 3d and 4th March 1843--cannot be approached without a shudder, as one recalls the direful deed for which he was brought to trial--the assassination of Mr Drummond, whom the murderer had mistaken for the late Sir Robert Peel! To a candid philosophical jurist, this case is one of profound interest, and of considerable difficulty. The abrupt interposition of the presiding judge, the late Chief-justice Tindal--a step very unusual on such an occasion, and especially so in the case of that signally patient and cautious judge--occasioned much remark at the time, and a general, if not almost universal expression of regret that he had not allowed a case of such magnitude to run on to the end, and so have afforded the jury the vast advantage of hearing that consummate lawyer Sir William Follett's commentary upon the case, set up in behalf of the prisoner. The unexpected issue of this dreadful case led, as has been already explained, to Parliamentary discussion, and a solemn declaration by the assembled judges of England of the true principles applicable to such cases. We shall not examine the proceedings as minutely as in the case of Oxford; but we shall endeavour to enable the thoughtful reader to apply to the leading facts the rules of law laid down by the Judges for the conduct of these critical investigations. He can then form an opinion as to what might have been the result, if those principles had been strictly adhered to, and the case had gone on to its legitimate conclusion. It will be borne in mind that, as stated at the close of our account of Oxford's case, even Mr Taylor treats the case of M'Naughten as an acquittal proceeding on facts, alleged in support of the defence of insanity, "as slight as those in Oxford's case!"

Mr Drummond, the private secretary of the late Sir Robert Peel, then prime-minister, was returning alone to his residence in Downing Street, having just quitted Drummond's banking-house at Charing Cross, in the afternoon of Friday, the 20th January 1843, when a man (Daniel M'Naughten) came close behind him, and deliberately shot him in the back with a pistol which he had been seen to take from his left breast. While Mr Drummond staggered away, and the man who had shot him was seen quickly, but deliberately, taking another pistol from his right breast with his left hand, cocking it, and then transferring it to his right hand, he was tripped up by a police officer; and a desperate struggle occurred on the ground, during which the pistol went off--providentially without injuring any one. M'Naughten strove to use his right arm against the officer, but was overpowered, the pistols taken from him, and he was led to the station house. As he went, he said, "_He_" [or "she"--the witness was uncertain which word was used] _shall not break my peace of mind any longer_." On being searched, a banker's receipt for £745, two five-pound notes, and four sovereigns, and ten copper percussion caps fitting the nipples of the pistols which he had discharged, were found on his person; while bullets exactly fitting the barrels were discovered at his lodgings. The unfortunate gentleman who had been thus assassinated, died after great suffering, on the 25th January. He had borne a strong personal resemblance to the late Sir Robert Peel; and it was beyond all doubt that it had been Sir Robert Peel whom M'Naughten thought he had shot, and had intended to shoot. On the ensuing morning, when asked if he knew whom he had shot, he replied, "It is Sir Robert Peel, is it not?" and on being reminded that what he said might be given in evidence, he replied quickly, "_But you won't use this against me?_" He had shortly before said that, when brought before the magistrate, he would "give a reason, a short one," for what he had done; and also observed, that he was an object of persecution by the Tories--that they followed him from place to place with their persecution." He appeared calm; and gave a correct and connected account of his recent travelling movements. He was the natural son of a turner at Glasgow, from which, some months previously, he had come to London, and had then paid a short visit to France. Down to the moment of his committing this appalling act, he had been a man of rigorously temperate habits; and no one with whom he lodged or associated, entertained the slightest suspicion that his reason was in any way affected--though he appeared peculiarly reserved, and even sullen, which his landlady had attributed to his being out of a situation and poor; for though punctual in his small payments, he was frugal even to parsimony. She had no idea that he possessed so large a sum as £750. During the previous fortnight, he had been observed loitering so suspiciously in the neighbourhood of Sir Robert Peel's private and official residences as to challenge inquiry, which he parried by casual observations. In the month of November previously, he had remarked to a companion, on being shown Sir Robert Peel's house in Whitehall, "D----n him! Sink him!" or words to that effect. His other remarks were perfectly rational, and his companion entertained no notion "that his mind was disordered." The following two documents in his handwriting, dated in the May and July preceding the murder, are very remarkable, as indicating great caution, shrewdness, and thrift on the part of the writer. The first was addressed to the Manager of the Glasgow Bank, and is as follows:--

"GLASGOW, _23d May 1842_.

"Sir,--I hereby intimate to you, that I will require the money, ten
days from this date, which I deposited in the London Joint-Stock
Bank through you. The account is for £745. The account is dated
August 28th 1841, but is not numbered! As it would put me to some
inconvenience to give personal intimation, and then remain in
London till the eleven days' notice agreed upon has expired, I
trust this will be considered sufficient.

"Yours &c.,
"DANIEL M'NAUGHTEN."

Two months afterwards--viz., in July--he purchased the fatal pistols of a gunsmith near Glasgow, giving him very precise directions as to their make; and on the 19th of July replied to the following advertisement, which appeared in the _Spectator_ newspaper of the 16th of July:--

OPTIONAL PARTNERSHIP.--"Any gentleman having £1000 may invest
them, on the most advantageous terms, in a very genteel business
in London, attended with no risk, with the option, within a given
period, of becoming a partner, and of ultimately succeeding to the
whole business. In the mean time, security and liberal interest
will be given for the money. Apply by letter to B. B., Mr Hilton's,
Bookseller, Penton Street, Pentonville."[22] #/

M'Naughten's answer, which here follows, cannot be too closely scrutinised, and its general tone and tendency too anxiously weighed, by a dispassionate judicial mind, regard being had to the evidence hereafter to be adverted to, with reference to the alleged condition of the writer's mind, long previously to, at, and after the date of the letter.

"GLASGOW, _19th July 1842_.

"SIR,--My attention has been attracted to your advertisement in the
_Spectator_ newspaper, and as I am unemployed at present, and very
anxious to obtain some, I have been induced to write, requesting
you to state some particulars regarding the nature of the business
in which you are engaged. If immediate employment can be given
or otherwise, what sort of security will be given for the money,
and how much interest? I may mention that I have been engaged in
business on my own account for a few years, am under thirty years
of age, and of very active and sober habits.

"The capital which I possess has been acquired by the most vigilant
industry, but, unfortunately, does not amount to the exact sum
specified in your advertisement. If nothing less will do, I will be
sorry for it, but cannot help it; if otherwise, have the goodness
to write to me at your earliest convenience, and address, D. M. N.,
90, Clyde Street, Anderton's front land, top flat."[23]

He went to London during the same month; appears to have gone for about a fortnight to France, returning to Glasgow; went a second time to London in September, and resided there, in the lodgings which he had formerly occupied, down to the day on which he shot Mr Drummond. His landlady accurately described his habits, and stated that "she never thought him unsettled in his mind;" and, on the very morning of the fatal day, "did not observe anything about his manner." Such was the tenor of all the evidence offered for the prosecution--some of it stretching back to the years 1840, 1841, when he attended anatomical lectures in Glasgow. A Writer to the Signet, who also attended them, and the physician who lectured, expressly declaring that they had never seen anything in him to indicate "disordered mind," or that "he was not in his right senses."

The following was the statement which he made and signed, when examined on the charge at Bow Street. This document, like the preceding, is worthy of great consideration.

"The Tories in my native city have compelled me to do this. They
follow and persecute me wherever I go, and have entirely destroyed
my peace of mind. They followed me into France, into Scotland, and
all over England: in fact, they follow me wherever I go. I cannot
get no rest for them night or day. I cannot sleep at night, in
consequence of the course they pursue towards me. I believe they
have driven me into a consumption. I am sure I shall never be the
man I formerly was. I used to have good health and strength, but
I have not now. They have accused me of crimes of which I am not
guilty; they do everything in their power to harass and persecute
me; in fact, they wish to murder me. It can be proved by evidence.
That's all I have to say."[24]

On Thursday the 2d February--that is to say, exactly a fortnight after the murder--M'Naughten was arraigned at the Old Bailey. When called upon, in the usual manner, to say whether he was Guilty or Not Guilty, he remained silent, with his eyes directed steadily towards the bench. At length, on being authoritatively required to answer, he said, after some hesitation, "I was driven to desperation by persecution." On being told that he must answer, "Guilty," or "Not Guilty," he replied that he was guilty of _firing_. On this Lord Abinger interposed, "By that, do you mean to say you are not guilty of the remainder of the charge--that is, of _intending to murder Mr Drummond_?" The prisoner _at once_ said, "Yes;" on which Lord Abinger ordered a plea of Not Guilty to be recorded. It appears to us that there is great significance in what passed on this occasion.

An application was then made to postpone the trial, on affidavits stating that, by the next session, matured evidence could be adduced to show the insanity of the prisoner when he shot Mr Drummond. The Attorney-general (Sir Frederick Pollock) at once humanely assented to the application, and it was granted; as also ample funds out of the £764 found on the prisoner, to prepare effectively for the defence. Let us here pause for a moment, to contrast the treatment which M'Naughten--whose undisputed act had filled the whole country with horror and indignation--received on this occasion, with that experienced by his predecessor Bellingham, thirty years before, whose case very closely resembled that of M'Naughten in some fearful points. We can with difficulty record calmly that Bellingham's counsel, fortified by strong affidavits of the prisoner's insanity, and that witnesses knowing the fact could be brought from Liverpool and elsewhere, applied in vain for a postponement of the trial, the Attorney-general of that day barbarously, and even offensively, opposing the application, which was consequently at once overruled. Within seven days' time Bellingham shot Mr Percival, was committed, _tried_--if it be not a mockery to use the word--convicted, and executed. On Monday, the 11th May 1811, Bellingham shot his unfortunate victim, and on that day week (Monday, the 18th May 1811) the assassin's dead body lay on the dissecting-table! This vindictive precipitancy affords an awful contrast to the noble temper in which M'Naughten's application was entertained by the Attorney-general, the judge, and the justly-excited country at large. It supplied the eloquent advocate, (the present Solicitor-general, Sir Alexander Cockburn) who was subsequently retained by the prisoner, with a potent weapon of defence, of which he failed not to make effective use. It is not too much to say, that all who can concur in the acquittal of M'Naughten must regard Bellingham as judicially murdered. We concur heartily with M'Naughten's advocate in the remark, that "few will read the report of Bellingham's trial without being forced to the conclusion that he was either really mad, or, at the very least, the little evidence which alone he was permitted to adduce, relative to the state of his mind, was strong enough to have entitled him to a _deliberate and thorough investigation of his case_."[25]

On Friday, March 3d, M'Naughten took his trial before the late Chief-justice Tindal, the late Mr Justice Williams, and Mr Justice Coleridge. The prosecution was conducted by the late Sir William Follett, then Solicitor-general, and the prisoner defended by the present Solicitor-general, then Mr Cockburn, Q. C. Nothing could exceed the temperate and luminous opening statement of Sir William Follett, who, in our judgment, laid down the rules of English law, applicable to the difficult and delicate subject with which he had to deal, with rigorous propriety.

"If you believe," said he, "that the prisoner at the bar, at the
time he committed this act, was not a responsible agent--that, when
he fired the pistol, he was incapable of distinguishing between
right and wrong--that he was under the influence and control of
some disease of the mind which prevented him from being conscious
that he was committing a crime--that he did not know he was
violating the law both of God and man--then, undoubtedly, he is
entitled to your acquittal. But it is my duty to tell you that
nothing short of _that_ will excuse him, upon the principles of
the English law. To excuse him, it will not be sufficient that
he laboured under partial insanity upon some subjects--that he
had a morbid delusion of mind upon some subjects, which could not
exist in a wholly sane person; that is not enough, _if_ he had
that degree of intellect which enabled him to know and distinguish
between right and wrong--if he knew what would be the effects
of his crime, and consciously committed it; and if, with that
consciousness, he _wilfully_ committed it."

The witnesses for the prosecution established a case, if unanswered, of perfect guilt; the facts of the assassination were indisputable, and the evidence of the prisoner's sanity cogent in the extreme. Mr Cockburn addressed the jury at very great length, and in a strain of sustained eloquence and power, his object being to persuade the jury "that the prisoner was labouring, at the time of committing the act, under a morbid[?] insanity, which took away from him all power of self-control, so that he was not responsible for his acts. I do not put this case forward as one of total insanity; it is a case of delusion, and I say so from sources upon which the light of science has thrown her holy beam." Those who have read what has gone before concerning Oxford's case will appreciate this observation of Mr Cockburn, and gather from it his adoption, for the purpose of that defence, of the theory of moral insanity, which he enforced and illustrated by many striking and brilliant observations, calculated to produce a deep and strong impression on the minds of the jury, such as required the utmost exertions of Sir William Follett in reply, and finally of judicial exposition to efface, if fallacious--or modify to any extent rendered necessary by inaccuracy or exaggeration. Ten witnesses, all of them from Glasgow, were called, for the purpose of establishing the fact that the prisoner had, for some eighteen months previously to January 1843, appeared to labour, and had continually represented himself as labouring, under a persuasion that he was the victim of some such indefinite, mysterious, and incessant persecution as he spoke of in his statement before the magistrate at Bow Street. We are bound to say that the force of this testimony--coming chiefly from persons above all suspicion, and in a superior rank of life--is irresistible as to the existence of such an insane delusion down to the time of his quitting Glasgow. Not a witness, however, gave evidence of his exhibiting that tendency after his last return to London, before his shooting Mr Drummond. The only mention of Sir Robert Peel's name was by one of these ten witnesses, a former fellow-lodger of the prisoner's, who told him, in July 1842, that he had heard Sir Robert Peel speak in the House of Commons; preferred his speaking to that of Lord John Russell and Mr O'Connell; and said "he thought Sir R. Peel had arrived at what Lord Byron said of him--that 'he would be something great in the state.'" Mr Cockburn asked the witness, "Did you ever, on that or any other occasion, hear him speak at all disrespectfully of Sir Robert Peel?" _Answer._--"Certainly not." One or two witnesses spoke to singularities of demeanour as early as the years 1835 and 1836. One of his landlords, in the former year, got rid of him as a lodger, "for one reason, in consequence of the infidel doctrines he maintained, and the books of such a character which he was in the habit of reading." One witness, who had succeeded him in his business, remonstrated with him, towards the end of 1842, about his notions as to being persecuted, telling him it was all imagination--that there were no such people as he supposed. He said that, "if he could once set his eyes on them, they should not be long in the land of the living," and became shortly afterwards very much excited. Sometimes he said he was "haunted by a parcel of devils following him." His landlady, seeing the brace of pistols which he had in September, just before his return to London, said--"What, in the name of God, are you doing with pistols there? He said 'he was going to shoot birds with them.' I never saw the pistols after that." He told the Commission of Police that the "persecution proceeded from the priests of the Catholic chapel in Clyde Street, who were assisted by a parcel of Jesuits." In August 1842, he told the same witness that "the police, the Jesuits, the Catholic priests, and Tories, were all leagued against him."

Mr Cockburn having thus "laid a broad foundation," says Mr Townsend, "for medical theories, _upon them_ was built, by the nine physicians and surgeons who confirmed each other's theories, a goodly superstructure of undoubted insanity. Had the workings," continues Mr Townsend, sarcastically, "of the troubled brain been as distinctly visible to the eye, as the labours of bees seen through a glass hive, they could not have held the fact to be more demonstratively proved. Positive beyond the possibility of mistake, and infallible as theologians, they explained all that might appear without the aid of science inexplicable; and proved, as if they were stating undoubted facts, an irresponsible delusion."

One of the physicians attested his conviction, from an interview with the prisoner shortly before his trial, "as a matter of certainty, that M'Naughten was not responsible for his acts!" Well may Mr Townsend add, "By an excess of lenity, the counsel for the prosecution allowed these scientific witnesses to depart from the ordinary rules of evidence, _to give their own_ conclusions from the facts proved, and usurp the province of the jury."[26] After going through the evidence (if the word can be used with propriety under such circumstances) of the other medical gentlemen, Mr Townsend observes, "Each physician and surgeon, as he stepped into the witness-box, seemed anxious to surpass his predecessor in the tone of decision and certainty; each tried to draw the bow of ---- (mentioning the first physician who had been called, and who was also called in Oxford's and Pate's case, in which latter he was rebuked by Baron Alderson,[27]) and shoot, if possible, still farther into empty space." And this gentleman, Dr----, had asserted, under cross-examination by Sir William Follett, "his positive conviction that he could ascertain the nicest shade of insanity! that the shadowy trace of eccentricity, dissolving into madness, could be palpably distinguished!"[28] The last of these confident personages then was permitted to make this extraordinary statement: "I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that the prisoner is insane, and that he committed the offence in question whilst afflicted with a delusion under which he appears to have been labouring for a considerable length of time!!!"

We feel constrained to say that this appears to us, in every way, monstrous.

"Nine medical witnesses," significantly observes Mr Townsend, "had now spoken, with a wonderful unanimity of opinion, _and the court surrendered at discretion_."[29]

If such a course is to be allowed again in a court of justice, what security have any of us for life, liberty, or property?

Chief Justice Tindal here interposed, to ask Sir William Follett whether he was prepared with evidence on the part of the Crown to combat that of the medical witnesses,--

"Because, if you have not," said the Chief Justice, "we think we
are under the necessity of stopping the case. Is there any medical
evidence on the other side?"

_Sir William Follett._--"No, my Lord."[30]

_Chief-Justice Tindal._--"We feel the evidence, especially that of
the last two medical gentlemen who have been examined, and who are
strangers to both sides, and only observers of the case, to be very
strong, and sufficient to induce my learned brothers and myself to
stop the case."[31]

After this authoritative intimation from the court, in a capital case, in favour of the prisoner, it would have been obviously to the last degree inexpedient for the Solicitor-general, in his position of peculiar and great public responsibility, to "press for a verdict against the prisoner."[32] After, therefore, intimating distinctly and respectfully to the jury, that, "after the intimation he had received from the bench, he felt that he should not be properly discharging his duty to the Crown and the public, if he asked them for a verdict against the prisoner," he withdrew, in deference to "the very strong opinion entertained by the Lord Chief-Justice, and the other learned Judges present," that the evidence, especially the medical evidence, sufficed to show that the prisoner, when he shot Mr Drummond, was labouring under insanity. "_If_ he were so," added Sir William Follett, with a pointed reservation of his own opinion, "he would be entitled to his acquittal." He intimated, however, distinctly, that he adhered to "the doctrines and authorities" on which he had relied in opening the case, "as being correct law; our object being to ascertain whether the prisoner, at the time when he committed the crime, was--_at that time_--to be regarded as a responsible agent, or whether all control over himself was taken away. The learned judge, I understand, means to submit that question to you. I cannot press for a verdict against the prisoner, and it will be for you to come to your decision."

The Chief-Justice then briefly addressed the jury, offering to go through the whole evidence, if the jury deemed it necessary, which _he_ "thought to be almost unnecessary;" adding--

"I am in your hands; but if, in balancing the evidence in your
minds, you think that the prisoner was, at the time of committing
the act, capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, then
he was a responsible agent, and liable to all the penalties which
the law enforces. If not so--and if, in your judgment, the subject
should appear involved in very great difficulty--then you will
probably not take upon yourselves to find the prisoner guilty. If
that is your opinion, then you will acquit the prisoner. If you
think you ought to hear the evidence more fully, in that case I
will state it to you, and leave the case in your hands. Probably,
however, sufficient has now been laid before you, and you will say
whether you want any further information."

_Foreman of the Jury._--"We require no more, my Lord."

_Chief-Justice Tindal._--"If you find the prisoner not guilty, say
on the ground of insanity; in which case proper care will be taken
of him."

_Foreman._--"We find the prisoner not guilty, on the ground of
insanity."

We repeat emphatically our deep respect for the late Chief-Justice Tindal, and for his brethren who sate beside him on this momentous occasion; and we also acknowledge the weight due to the observation of Mr Townsend, that "none can form so correct an estimate of the facts proved, and their illustration by science, as those who actually saw what was going on; and the three able Judges who presided seem to have been fully impressed with the conviction that the prisoner ought not to be considered amenable to punishment for his act, being insensible, at the time he committed it, that he was violating the law of God and man."

And, again, "It is far more just and merciful to take care alike of the accused and of society, by confining in secure custody the doubtfully conscious shedder of blood, than to incur the fearful hazard of putting to death an irresponsible agent."[33] Nevertheless, we concur in the unanimous opinion of the five law lords, expressed in their places in Parliament--the Lord Chancellor, Lord Brougham, Lord Cottenham, Lord Denman, Lord Campbell--that it would have been better to let the trial proceed regularly to its conclusion. The whole facts of the case demanded, not less than the theories of the medical witnesses, that thorough sifting, and the application of that masterly and luminous practical logic, which both the Solicitor-general and the Chief-Justice were so pre-eminently capable of bestowing. If, after such a dealing with the case, an acquittal on the ground of insanity should have ensued, who could have gainsaid it? At present, see what a candid and scientific writer on medical jurisprudence--as we have several times observed, a strong favourer of the notion of moral insanity--has felt himself compelled to place permanently on record,[34] with reference to the acquittal of M'Naughten.

"When we find a man lurking for many days together in a particular
locality, having about him loaded weapons--watching a particular
individual who frequents that locality--a man who does not face
the individual and shoot him, but who coolly waits until he has an
opportunity of discharging the weapon unobserved by his victim or
others--the circumstances appear to show such a perfect adaptation
of means to ends, and such a power of controlling his actions, that
one is quite at a loss to understand why a plea of irresponsibility
should be admitted, except upon the fallacious ground that no
motive could be discovered for the act--a ground, however, which
was not allowed to prevail in the case of Courvoisier, Francis, and
the perpetrators of other atrocious crimes. Observe the lively
sense of his danger, and of his rights and interests, as an accused
person, exhibited by M'Naughten almost immediately after committing
the act--when, fearful lest an inadvertent admission should be
given in evidence against him, he said to the officer[35]--'_But
you won't use this against me?_' Note the matter-of-fact astuteness
with which he attended to his pecuniary interests in May and July;
the total absence of any evidence of the existence of his delusions
during his last sojourn in London; the presence of such proof of
careful, deliberate, and too successful perpetration, as to time,
opportunity, and means; his expression in November towards Sir
Robert Peel--'D----n him!' But, above all, is to be noted the time
when he first gives utterance to anything directly and cogently
favouring the notion on which his life depended--his insane
delusion with regard to Sir Robert Peel--viz., after he had been
for some time incarcerated in Newgate, and when he knew that he
was being examined by a physician, in order to ascertain what had
been his state of mind at the time in question! Dr Munro has there
recorded it.[36] He said--'Mr Salmond, the Procurator-Fiscal, Mr
Sheriff Bell, Mr Sheriff Alison, and _Sir Robert Peel_, might have
put a stop to this system of persecution if they would!' ... 'We
_were afraid of going out after dark for fear of assassination_:
that individuals were made to appear before him like them he had
seen in Glasgow.' ... 'That _he imagined the person at whom he
fired at Charing Cross_ to be one of the crew--a part of the system
that was destroying his health. He observed, that, _when he saw
the person at Charing Cross at whom he fired_, every feeling of
suffering which he had endured for months and years rose up at once
in his mind, and that he conceived that he should obtain peace by
killing him.'"

Surely it would have conduced--especially in the painful excitement of the public mind on the subject at the time--to the satisfactory administration of justice, if it had been allowed Sir William Follett--without his being placed in the insidious position of appearing to press unduly against a prisoner being tried for his life--to combine and contrast these various circumstances, as he, of almost all men, could have best combined and contrasted them. The jury should have had their minds solemnly and authoritatively directed to the question, for instance, whether this last observation of M'Naughten made to Dr Munro was a spontaneous, genuine indication of utterly subverted mental faculties, continuing from the moment of his shooting Mr Drummond; or an effort of anxious astuteness to give effect to the suggestion which he may have believed would save his life. And, moreover, this and other circumstances should have been accompanied by a direction to the jury, in accordance with that of Lord Denman in Oxford's case,[37] and with the following canon, subsequently laid down by the Judges in their answer to the first question proposed by the Lord Chancellor[38]--viz., "That notwithstanding the party did the act with a view, under insane delusion, of _redressing_ or _revenging some supposed grievance or injury_, he is nevertheless punishable, if he knew at the time that he was acting contrary to the law of the land." Could M'Naughten be again tried on this charge, this is the precise question which would be left to the jury. Mr Alison, in his _Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland_,[39] thus lays down the rule applicable to such cases, in commenting on that of Bellingham:--

"Unquestionably, the mere fancying a series of injuries to have
been received will not serve as an excuse for murder--for this
plain reason, that, supposing it true that such injuries had been
received, they would have furnished no excuse for the shedding of
blood. On the other hand, however, such an illusion as depriving
the pannel of the sense that _what he did was wrong_ amounts to
legal insanity, though he was perfectly aware that murder in
general was a crime."

Responsibility more awful than is devolved upon all parties to the judicial investigation of this question can scarcely be imagined. A deliberate and thorough investigation of every--even the minutest--circumstance adduced, guided steadily by correct legal principles, is demanded imperiously by justice. Difficult--almost hopeless--as may be the attempt to grope into the turbid mind of a madman, to ascertain its true condition at a given moment of time, the attempt _must_ be made, a decision _must_ be pronounced--distinguishing between real and simulated imbecility or madness--between irresponsible insanity and responsible eccentricity. These are questions, we repeat, of infinite importance, of great difficulty; and the interests of the entire community, and of individual members of it, demand a steady adherence to the principles of a humane and enlightened jurisprudence. Recent dreadful instances have served to remove several sources of dangerous error, in dealing with these cases of criminal jurisprudence. No one dare now infer madness from the mere _absence of motive_, and from the _very enormity of the act committed_; nor accord immunity to the fancied victim of "_uncontrollable impulse_." That is, at all events, a point gained in favour of society. In England, at all events, we sternly repudiate this last sickly and spurious theory, which would place the innocent and virtuous entirely at the mercy of the most base and ruffianly impulses of our fallen nature. It would relax all the bonds of self-restraint, and afford a premium on the indulgence of ungovernable passions.

The recent lamentable case of Robert Pate affords a valuable illustration of the truth of these remarks; and Mr Baron Alderson's charge to the jury not only conduced to the firm administration of justice in the particular case, but was calculated to be of great and permanent public service, by dispelling the morbid and mischievous notions which have latterly prevailed, and exhibiting expressively the stern simplicity and common sense of English law. On the 27th June last, a gentleman, who had only recently sold his commission in the 10th Hussars, and was residing as a gentleman of fortune in London, suddenly struck her Majesty on the forehead a violent blow with a cane, which actually caused blood to flow! He could give no account of his reason for committing this unmanly and infamous outrage; but the defence set up for him was, simply, uncontrollable impulse; and evidence was adduced certainly showing him to be of a very eccentric character, and actuated by strange whims and delusions. He was tried on the 12th July last at the Old Bailey, before Baron Alderson, under statute 5 and 6 Vict. c. 51, § 2.[40] The indictment contained three counts, charging him with striking the Queen "with an offensive weapon--that is, a stick," with intent (1st) to injure her person; (2d) to alarm her; (3d) to break the public peace. Again came the doctors--one speaking of "some strange sudden impulse, which he was quite unable to control;" and the other confidently pronouncing the prisoner to have been insane. The jury convicted the prisoner on the first and third counts, which the Judge told them had been clearly made out by evidence, discarding the defence of insanity; and the following was the summing-up of Mr Baron Alderson, in strict accordance with the principles laid down in 1843 by the Judges[41]:--

"The law throws on the prisoner the _onus_ of proving that, at the
time the offence was committed, he was in an unsound state of mind;
and you will have to say, after hearing my explanation of the law,
whether this has been made out to your satisfaction. In the first
place, you must clearly understand that it is not because a man is
insane that he is unpunishable: and I must say, that _upon this
point there exists a very grievous delusion in the minds of medical
men_. The only insanity which excuses a man for his acts is that
species of delusion which conduced to, and drove him to commit,
_the act alleged against him_. If, for instance, a man, being under
the delusion that another man would kill him, killed that other,
for, as he supposed, his own protection, he would be unpunishable
for such an act; because it would appear that the act was done
under the delusion that he could not protect himself in any other
manner: and there the particular description of insanity conduced
to the offence. But, on the other hand, if a man has a delusion
that his head is made of glass, that will be no excuse for his
killing a man. He would know very well that, although his head were
made of glass, that was no reason why he should kill another man,
and that it was a wrong act; and he would be properly subjected to
punishment for that act. These are the principles which ought to
govern the decision of juries in such cases. They ought to have
clear proof of a formed disease of the mind--a disease existing
before the act was committed, and which made the person accused
incapable of knowing, at the time he did the act, that it was a
wrong act for him to do. This is the rule which I shall direct you
to be governed by. Try the case by this test. Did this unfortunate
gentleman know, at the time, that it was wrong to strike the
Queen on the forehead? Now, there is no doubt that he was very
eccentric in his conduct; but did that eccentricity disable him
from judging whether it was right or wrong to strike the Queen?
Is _eccentricity_ to excuse a man for any crime he may afterwards
commit? The prisoner is proved to have been perfectly well aware of
what he had done immediately afterwards, and in the interview which
he had had since with one of the medical gentlemen, he admitted
that he knew perfectly well what he had done, and ascribed his
conduct to some momentary uncontrollable impulse. The law does
not acknowledge such an impulse, if the person was aware that it
was a wrong act he was about to commit; and he is answerable for
the consequences. A man might say that he picked a pocket from
some uncontrollable impulse; and in that case, the law would have
an uncontrollable impulse to punish him for it. What evidence
is there, then, in this case to justify you in coming to the
conclusion, that when the prisoner struck the Queen he did not know
it was a wrong act--in fact, that what he was doing was wrong?--[Mr
Baron Alderson then read over the whole of the evidence for the
defence, commenting upon it as he proceeded.]--That the prisoner is
an object of commiseration is quite clear; and that he should also
have been taken better care of is equally true: but the question
you have here to decide is, Are you satisfied that, at the time,
he was suffering from a disease of the mind which rendered him
incapable of judging whether the act he committed towards the Queen
was a right or a wrong act for him to do? If you are not satisfied
of this fact, you must say that he is guilty; but if you think he
was not aware what he was about, or not capable of distinguishing
between right and wrong, you will then say that he is not guilty,
on the ground of _insanity_."