Chapter II (7)

Thus far it was an individual case only which engaged his care. Another soon followed, where, through his chivalrous humanity, the intolerable wrongs of a woman kidnapped in London and transported as slave to Barbadoes, were redressed,--so far as earthly decree could go. Learning the infinite woe of Slavery, he was now aroused to broader effort. Shocked by an advertisement in a London newspaper,--such as often appeared in those days,--of "a black girl to be sold, of an excellent temper and willing disposition,"--he at once protested to the Chancellor, Lord Camden, against such things as a "notorious breach of the laws of Nature, humanity, and equity, and also of the established law, custom, and Constitution of England";[148] and in the same year, May 15, 1769, by letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, he solemnly appealed against the Slave-Trade, and thus by many years heralded the labors of Clarkson and Wilberforce. "I am myself convinced," he said, "that nothing can thrive which is in any way concerned in that unjust trade. I have known several instances which are strong proofs to me of the judgments of God, even in this world, against such a destructive and iniquitous traffic."[149] In these things he showed not only his love of justice, but his personal independence. "Although I am a _placeman_," he wrote on another occasion, "and indeed of a very inferior rank, yet I look on myself to be perfectly independent, because I have never yet been afraid to do and avow whatever I thought just and right, without the consideration of consequences to myself: for, indeed, I think it unworthy of a _man_ to be afraid of the world; and it is a point with me never to conceal my sentiments on any subject whatever, not even from my superiors in office, _when there is a probability of answering any good purpose by it_."[150]

[148] Memoirs, p. 49.

[149] Ibid., p. 45.

[150] Ibid., p. 67.

Still again was his protecting presence enlisted to save a fellow-man from bondage; and here it is necessary to note the new form of outrage. A poor African, Thomas Lewis, once a slave, was residing quietly at Chelsea, in the neighborhood of London, when he was suddenly seized by his former master, who, with the aid of two ruffians, bought for the fiendish purpose, dragged him on his back into the water, and thence into a boat lying in the Thames, when, with legs tied, and mouth gagged by a stick, he was rowed down to a ship bound for Jamaica, under a commander previously enlisted in the conspiracy, to be sold for a slave on arrival in that island. But this diabolical act, though warily contrived, did not escape notice. The cries of the victim, on his way to the boat, reached the servants of a neighboring mansion, who witnessed the deadly struggle, but did not venture a rescue. Their mistress, a retired widow, mother of the eminent naturalist and traveller, Sir Joseph Banks, on learning what had passed, instantly put forth her womanly exertion. Without the hesitation of her sex, she hurried to Granville Sharp, now known for knightly zeal to succor the distressed, laid before him the terrible story, and insisted upon vindicating the freedom of the stranger at her own expense. All honor to this woman! A simple warrant, first obtained by Sharp, was scouted by the captain, whose victim, bathed in tears, was already chained to the mast. The great writ of _Habeas Corpus_ was next invoked; and the ship, which had contumaciously proceeded on its way, was boarded in the Downs, happily within British jurisdiction, by a faithful officer, who, in the name of the King of England, unbound the African, and took him back to freedom.

A complaint was now presented against the kidnappers, who were at once indicted by the grand jury. The cause was removed to the King's Bench, and on the 20th of February, 1771, brought into court before Lord Mansfield. The defence set up, that the victim was their slave, and therefore property to be rightfully seized. Here the question was distinctly presented, whether any such property was recognized by the British Constitution? The transcendent magistrate who presided on the occasion saw the magnitude of the issue, and sought to avoid its formal determination by presenting the subordinate point, whether the claimant, supposing such property recognized, was able to prove the man to be his? The kidnappers were found guilty; but judgment against them was waived, on the recommendation of Lord Mansfield, who, be it observed, at every stage, shrank from any act by which Slavery in England should be annulled, and on this occasion avowed his "hope that the question never would be finally discussed." Sharp was justly indignant at this craven conduct, which, with all gentleness of manner, but with perfect firmness, he did not hesitate to arraign as open contempt of the true principles of the Constitution.[151]

[151] Memoirs, pp. 52-61.

Alas! it is the natural influence of Slavery to make men hard. Gorgon-like, it turns to stone. Among the judicial magistrates of the time, Lord Mansfield was not alone. His companion in contemporary fame, Blackstone, shared the petrifaction. The first edition of his incomparable Commentaries openly declared, that a slave, on coming to England, became at once a freeman; but, in a subsequent edition, after the question had been practically presented by Granville Sharp, the text was pusillanimously altered to an abandonment of this great constitutional principle; and our intrepid philanthropist hung his head with shame and anxiety, while the counsel for the Slave-Hunters triumphantly invoked this tergiversation as new authority against Freedom.[152]

[152] Memoirs, pp. 91, 92, note. The text of the first edition
(1765), as quoted by Sharp's biographer, Hoare, was as follows:
"And this spirit of liberty is so deeply implanted in our
Constitution, and rooted even in our very soil, that a Slave, or a
Negro, the moment he lands in England, falls under the protection
of the laws, and, with regard to all national rights, becomes _eo
instanti_ a freeman." As altered, the latter part was found to read
thus: " ... a negro, the moment he lands in England, falls under
the protection of the laws, and so far becomes a freeman; though
the master's right to his service may _possibly_ still continue."
Hoare remarks, that he finds this reading in the fifth edition,
1773. It appears also in an edition printed at Philadelphia so
early as 1771. And thus the text was finally left by the author,
and so remains. In the third edition, printed at Oxford in 1768,
for "_possibly_" in the last clause we have the word "probably." Of
this prior reading Hoare makes no mention.

The day was at hand when the great philanthropist was to be vindicated, even by the lips of the great magistrate. The Slavery question could not be suppressed: the Chief Justice of England could not suppress it. Drive out Nature with a pitchfork, and still she will return. Only a few months elapsed, when a memorable case arose, which presented the question distinctly for judgment. A negro, James Somerset, whose name, in the establishment of an immortal principle, will help to keep alive the appellation of the ducal house to which it originally belonged,--was detained in irons on board a ship lying in the Thames, and bound for Jamaica. On application to Lord Mansfield in his behalf, supported by affidavits, December 3, 1771, a writ of _Habeas Corpus_ was directed to the captain of the ship, commanding him to return the body of Somerset into court, with the cause of his detention. In course of time, though somewhat tardily, the body was produced, and for cause of detention it was assigned, that he was the property of Charles Stewart, Esq., _of Virginia_, who had held him in Virginia as a slave,--that, when brought as such to London, he ran away from the service of his master, but was recovered, and finally delivered on board the ship to be carried to Jamaica, there to be sold as the slave and property of the _Virginia gentleman_.[153] As no facts were in issue here, the whole cause hinged on the Constitutionality of Slavery in England; and the great question which the Chief Justice had sought to avoid, and on which the Commentator had changed sides, was once again to be heard.

[153] Since this Address, private papers have seen the light, by
which it appears, that the claimant was cashier and paymaster of
customs in North America, and for some years previous to this
important case _resided in Boston_, where Somerset was known.
Through all the arguments he is spoken of as from Virginia, and
reference is constantly made to the laws of Virginia; nor is
this mistake astonishing, when it is understood that an orator
in Parliament once spoke of the "Island of Virginia," and nobody
corrected him.--Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings for 1863-64, p. 324:
_Villenage_, by Emory Washburn.

That the proceedings might have a solemnity in some degree corresponding to their importance, the cause was brought by Lord Mansfield before the King's Bench, where it was continued from time to time, according to the convenience of counsel and the court, running through months, and occupying different days in January, February, and May, down to the 22d June, 1772, when judgment was finally delivered. During all this period, Somerset, having recognized with sureties for his appearance in court, was left at large. To Granville Sharp he had repaired at once, and by him was kindly welcomed and effectually aided. Under the advice of this humble clerk, counsel learned in the law were retained, who were instructed by him in the grounds of defence. At his expense, too, out of his small means, the proceedings were maintained. "Money," he nobly said, "has no value but when it is well spent; and I am thoroughly convinced that no part of my little pittance of ready money can ever be better bestowed than in an honest endeavor to crush a growing oppression, which is not only shocking to humanity, but in time must prove even dangerous to the community."[154] On the other side the costs were defrayed by a subscription among the merchants. Hear this, merchants of Boston, justly jealous of the good name of your calling, and hang your heads with shame!

[154] Memoirs, p. 57.

To the glory of the English bar, the eminent counsel for the slave declined all fee for their valuable and protracted services; and here let me pause for one moment to pay them an unaffected tribute. They were five in number: Mr. Serjeant Davy, who opened the cause with the proposition, "that no man at this day _is_ or _can be_ a slave in England,"--Mr. Serjeant Glynn,--Mr. Mansfield, afterward Chief Justice of the Common Pleas,--Mr. Hargrave, and Mr. Alleyne,--each of whom was patiently heard by the Court at length. The argument of Mr. Hargrave, who early volunteered his great learning in the case, is one of the masterpieces of the bar. This was his first appearance in court; but it is well that Liberty on that day had such support. For all these gallant lawyers, champions of the Right, there is honor ever increasing, which the soul spontaneously offers, while it turns in sorrow from the counsel, only two in number, who allowed themselves to be enlisted on the side of Slavery. I know well that in Westminster Hall there are professional usages--which happily do not prevail in our country, where every such service depends purely on _contract_--by which a barrister thinks himself constrained to assume any cause properly presented to him. If this service depended on contract there, as with us, the sarcasm of Ben Jonson would be strictly applicable:--

"This fellow,
For six sols more, would plead against his Maker."[155]

[155] The Fox, Act IV. sc. 2.

But I undertake to affirm that no usage, professional or social, can give any apology for joining the pack of the Slave-Hunter. Mr. Dunning, one of the persons in this predicament, showed that he acted against his better nature.[156] The first words in his argument were: "It is incumbent on me to justify the detainer of the negro." Pray, why incumbent on him? He was then careful to show that he did not maintain any absolute property in him; and he proceeded to say, among other things, that it was his misfortune to address an audience, the greater part of which, he feared, was prejudiced the other way,--that, for himself, he would not be understood to intimate a wish in favor of Slavery, but that he was bound in duty to maintain those arguments most useful to the claimant, so far as consistent with the truth; and he concluded with this conscience-stricken appeal: "I hope, therefore, I shall not suffer in the opinion of those whose honest passions are fired at the name of Slavery; I hope I have not transgressed my duty to Humanity."[157] Clearly the lawyer had transgressed his duty to Humanity. No man can rightfully enforce a principle which violates human nature; nor can any subtilty of dialectics, any extent of erudition, or any grandeur of intellect sustain him. Notwithstanding the character for liberal principles which John Dunning acquired, and which breathes in his sensitive excuses,--notwithstanding his double fame at once in Westminster Hall and Saint Stephen's Chapel,--notwithstanding the peerage which he won,--this odious service rendered to a Slave-Hunter, calling himself a Virginia gentleman, cries in judgment against him, and will continue to cry, as time advances. (Do not start, Mr. President,--I am narrating occurrences in another hemisphere and another century.) As well undertake a Slave-Hunt in the deserts of Africa as in the streets of London. As well pursue the fugitive with the hired whip of the overseer as with the hired argument of the lawyer. As well chase him with the baying of the blood-hound as with the tongue of the advocate. It is the lawyer's clear duty to uphold _human rights_, whether in the loftiest or the lowliest; and when he undertakes to uphold a wrong outrageous as Slavery, his proper function is so far reversed that he can be aptly described only in the phrase of the Roman Church, _Advocatus Diaboli_, the Devil's Advocate.

[156] A private letter from the claimant to James Murray, Esq., of
Boston, dated London, June 15, 1772, carries us back to the times,
and even to the court-room. "I am told," writes the claimant, "that
some young counsel flourished away on the side of liberty, and
acquired great honor. Dunning was dull and languid, and would have
made a much better figure on that side also." Of course he would.
After speaking of the "load of abuse thrown on L--d M----, for
hesitating to pronounce judgment in favor of freedom," the claimant
says, "Dunning has come in also for a pretty good share for taking
the wrong side." (Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings for 1863-64, pp.
323, 324.) Abolitionists had begun to be critical.

[157] Howell's State Trials, XX. 71-76.

Passing from counsel to court, we find occasion for gratitude and sorrow. The three judges, Aston, Willes, and Ashhurst, who sat at the side of Lord Mansfield, were silent through the whole proceedings, overawed, perhaps, by his commanding authority, so that he alone seems to be present. Of large intellect, and extensive studies, running into all regions of learning,--with a silver-tongued voice, and an amenity of manner which gave constant charm to his presence,--with unsurpassed professional and political experience combined,--early companion of Pope, and early competitor of Pitt,--having already once refused the post of Prime Minister, and three times refused the post of Chancellor,--he stood forth, at the period when the poor slave was brought before him, an acknowledged master of jurisprudence, and, take him for all in all, the most finished magistrate England had then produced. But his character had one fatal defect, too common on the bench. He lacked _moral firmness_,--happily not lacking in Granville Sharp. Still more, he was not naturally on the side of Liberty, as becomes a great judge, but always, by blood and instinct, on the side of prerogative and power,--an offence for which he was arraigned by his contemporary, Junius, and for which posterity will hold him to strict account. But his luminous mind, prompt to perceive the force of principles, could not resist the array of argument now marshalled for Freedom. He saw clearly that a system like Slavery could not find home under the British Constitution, _which nowhere mentions the name Slave_; and yet he shrank from the sublime conclusion. More than once he coquetted with the merchants, who had the case so much at heart, and twice ignobly suggested that the claimant might avoid the decision of the great question, fraught with Freedom or Slavery to multitudes, simply by manumitting the individual. And when at last the case could not be arrested by any device, or be longer postponed,--when judgment was inevitable,--he came to the work, not warmly or generously, but in trembling obedience to the Truth, which waited to be declared.

On other occasions, of purely commercial character, his judgments are more learned and elaborate, besides being reported with more completeness and care; but no judgment of equal significance ever fell from the great Oracle. From various sources I have sought its precise import.[158] It is remarkable for several rules, which it clearly enunciates, and which, though often assaulted, still stand as reason and as law. Of these, the first is expressed in these simple words: "If the parties will have judgment, _fiat justitia, ruat coelum_: let justice be done, whatever be the consequence." The Latin phrase which here plays such a prominent part, though of classical stamp, cannot be traced to any classical origin, and it has even been asserted that it was freshly coined by Lord Mansfield on this occasion, worthy of such commanding truth in such commanding phrase. But it is of older date, and from another mint,--though it is not too much to say, that it took its currency and authority from him. Coming from such a conservative magistrate, it is of peculiar importance. With little expansion, it says openly: To every man his natural rights; justice to all, without distinction of person, without abridgment, and without compromise. Let justice be done, though it drags down the pillars of the sky. Thus spoke the Chief Justice of England.[159]

[158] It is strange that there should be no single satisfactory
report of this memorable judgment. That usually quoted from
Howell's State Trials, Vol. XX. coll. 80-82, was copied from
Lofft, a reporter generally avoided as authority. There is another
report in Hoare's Memoirs of Sharp, pp. 89-91; also another in
Campbell's Lives of the Chief Justices, Vol. II. p. 419; and still
another, and in some respects the best, in the Appendix (No. 8) to
a tract published by Sharp in 1776, entitled "The Just Limitation
of Slavery in the Laws of God, compared with the Unbounded Claims
of the African Traders and British American Slaveholders." It is
considered and quoted in other contemporary tracts.

[159] A British writer, giving an account of the Somerset case,
says of this maxim, that "it has found its way into use as a
classical expression, and, as no one has been able to find it in
any Latin author, it is supposed to have been of Lord Mansfield's
own coining." (Chambers's Edinburgh Journal, July 31, 1852, N. S.
Vol. XVIII. p. 71: _Slaves in Britain_.) This is a mistake. The
precise phrase will be found in Ward's "Simple Cobler of Aggawamm
in America," written in 1615, and first printed in 1647,--"It
is lesse to say, _Statuatur veritas, ruat Regnum_, than _Fiat
justitia, ruat Coelum_" (p. 14); but its origin, in substance,
if not in form, is earlier. There is little doubt that it does not
occur in any Latin author. Its Latinity is good, and might belong
to the classical period. The latter clause, _ruat coelum_, has
classical authority, as in the passage of Terence, showing that
it was a common saying in his time, "Quid si redeo ad illos _qui
aiunt_, Quid si nunc _coelum ruat_?" (Heauton., Act. IV. sc. 3.)
The idea is also Roman. On the European continent, and especially
in Germany, the maxim has another form, which is common,--_Fiat
justitia, pereat mundus_. Binder, in his _Novus Thesaurus Adagiorum
Latinorum_, (Stuttgart, 1861,) cites it in this form as _Regula
Juris_, explained as "a designation for the maxims, taken from the
_Corpus Juris_ and the works of the different ancient civilians,
which have become proverbial." In the same authority is the
hexameter verse, _Fiat justitia, pereat licet integer orbis_, from
Johannis Leibi _Studentica_ (Coburg, 1627). In England the maxim
was current in other forms. As early as February 26, 1624-5, in
a letter to the English ambassador at Holland, alluding to "the
business of Amboyne," we meet _Fiat justitia et ruat mundus_.
(Birch's Court and Times of James I., Vol. II. p. 500.) In a
speech in the House of Commons, December 22, 1640, against the
judges who pronounced in favor of ship-money, an orator says:
"If ever any nation might justifiably, we certainly may now, now
most properly, most seasonably, cry out, and cry aloud, _Vel
sacra regnet justitia vel ruat coelum_." And he concludes with
a motion, "That a special committee may be appointed to examine
the whole carriage of that extrajudicial judgment, ... and, upon
report thereof, to draw up a charge against the guilty; and then
_Lex currat, fiat justitia_. (Parl. Hist., 2d ed., London, 1763,
Vol. IX. p. 192.) In the answer of the Duke of Richmond (January
31, 1641-2) to the charge of the Commons, it is said: "_Magna est
veritas et prevalebit_. I wish it may do so in what concerns me.
_Regnet justitia et ruat coelum._" (Parl. Hist., Vol. X. p. 254.
Also, Howell's State Trials, Vol. IV. col. 116.) The first clause
of the maxim is an old law phrase, found in Law Dictionaries, and
often repeated. A letter, dated London, May 4, 1621, relating the
fine and degradation of Lord Bacon, concludes, _Fiat justitia_.
(Birch's James I., Vol. II. p. 252.) Charles I., in a letter to the
Lords, dated May 11, 1641, interceding for Strafford, said: "But
if no less than his life can satisfy my people, I must say, _Fiat
justitia_." (Parl. Hist. Vol. IX. p. 316. Howell's State Trials,
Vol. III. col. 1520.) If not classical in authority, the maxim is
not without interest from association with great events of English
history, while it is a perpetual injunction to justice. Shakespeare
gives expression to similar truth, when he says, "Be just and fear
not."

And still another rule, hardly less important or less commanding, was clearly proclaimed in these penetrating words: "I care not for the supposed _dicta_ of judges, however eminent, _if they be contrary to all principle_"; or, in other language, In vain do you invoke great names in the law, even the names of Hardwicke and Talbot, and my own learned associate, Blackstone, in behalf of an institution which defies reason and outrages justice. Human precedent is powerless against immutable principle. Thus again spoke the Chief Justice of England.

Braced by these rules, the next stages were logically easy. And here he uttered words which are like a buttress to Freedom. He declared, that, tracing Slavery to _natural principles_, it can never be supported: that is to say, Slavery is a violation of the great law of Nature, established by God himself, coextensive in space and time with the Universe. Again he proclaimed, Slavery cannot stand on any reason, moral or political, but only by virtue of _positive law_; and he clinched his conclusion by the unquestionable truth, that, in a matter so _odious_, the evidence and authority of this law must be taken strictly: in other words, a wrong like Slavery, which finds no support in natural law or in reason, can be maintained, if at all, only by some dread mandate, from some sovereign authority, irresistibly clear and incapable of a double sense, which declares in precise and unequivocal terms, that men guilty of no crime may be held as _slaves_, and be submitted to the bargains of the market-place, the hammer of the auctioneer, and the hunt of the blood-hound. Clearly no such mandate could be shown in England. After asserting the obvious truth, that rights cannot depend on any discrimination of color, and thus discarding the profane assumptions of race, while he quoted apt Roman authority,--

"Quamvis ille niger, quamvis tu candidus esses,"

the Chief Justice concluded, "And therefore let the negro be discharged." Such was this immortal judgment. I catch its last words, already resounding through the ages, with the voice of deliverance to an enslaved people.

From Westminster Hall, where he had been held so long in painful suspense, the happy freedman, with glad tidings of deliverance, hurried to his angel protector, Granville Sharp, who, though organizing and sustaining these proceedings, was restrained by unobtrusive modesty from all attendance in court, that he might in no wise irritate the Chief Justice, unfortunately prepossessed against his endeavor. And thus closed the most remarkable constitutional battle in English history, fought by a simple clerk, once apprentice to a linen-draper, against the merchants of London, backed by great names in law, and by the most exalted magistrate of the age. Like the stripling David, he went forth to the contest with only a sling and a few smooth stones from the brook; and Goliath fell prostrate. Not merely the individual slave, but upwards of fourteen thousand human beings,--four times as many slaves as could be counted throughout New England at the adoption of the National Constitution,--rejoiced in emancipation; a slave-hunt was made impossible in the streets of London; and a great principle was set up which will stand forever as a Landmark of Freedom.

This triumph, hailed at the time by the friends of human happiness with exultation and delight, was commemorated by poetry and eloquence. It prompted Cowper, in his "Task," to these touching verses:--

"Slaves cannot breathe in England; if their lungs
Receive our air, that moment they are free:
They touch our country, and their shackles fall.
That's noble, and bespeaks a nation proud
And jealous of the blessing. Spread it, then,
And let it circulate through every vein
Of all your Empire, that, where Britain's power
Is felt, mankind may feel her mercy too."

It inspired Curran to a burst of eloquence, grand, and familiar to all who hear me.

"I speak in the spirit of the British law, which makes Liberty
commensurate with and inseparable from British soil,--which
proclaims even to the stranger and sojourner, the moment he sets
his foot upon British earth, that the ground on which he treads
is holy and consecrated by the genius of Universal Emancipation.
No matter in what language his doom may have been pronounced,--no
matter what complexion, incompatible with Freedom, an Indian or an
African sun may have burnt upon him,--no matter in what disastrous
battle his liberty may have been cloven down,--no matter with what
solemnities he may have been devoted upon the altar of Slavery:
the first moment he touches the sacred soil of Britain, the altar
and the god sink together in the dust, his soul walks abroad in
her own majesty, his body swells beyond the measure of his chains
that burst from around him, and he stands redeemed, regenerated,
and disenthralled by the irresistible genius of Universal
Emancipation."[160]

[160] Defence of Archibald Hamilton Rowan, January 29, 1794:
Speeches, ed. Davis, (London, 1847,) p. 182.

It was this triumph which lifted Brougham, in our own day, to one
of those vivid utterances by which truth is flashed upon unwilling
souls.

"Tell me not of rights,--talk not of the property of the planter
in his slaves. I deny the right,--I acknowledge not the property.
The principles, the feelings of our common nature rise in rebellion
against it. Be the appeal made to the understanding or to the
heart, the sentence is the same that rejects it. In vain you tell
me of laws that sanction such a claim. There is a law above all the
enactments of human codes,--the same throughout the world, the same
in all times: ... it is the law written on the heart of man by the
finger of his Maker; and by that law, unchangeable and eternal,
while men despise fraud and loathe rapine and abhor blood, they
will reject with indignation the wild and guilty fantasy that man
can hold property in man."[161]

[161] Speech on Negro Slavery, July 13, 1830: Works, Vol. X. p. 216.

Granville Sharp did not rest from labor. The Humanities are not solitary. Where one is found, there will others be also. The advocate of the slave in London was naturally the advocate of liberty for all everywhere. In this spirit he signalized himself against that scandal of the English law, the hateful system of Impressment, while he encountered no less a person than Dr. Johnson, whom he did not hesitate to charge with "plausible sophistry and important self-sufficiency, as if he supposed that the mere sound of words was capable of altering the nature of things";[162] also, against the claims of England in the controversy with her American colonies, zealously maintaining our cause in a publication, of which it is said seven thousand copies were printed in Boston[163]; also, in establishing a colony of liberated slaves at Sierra Leone, on the coast of Africa, predecessor of our more successful Liberia; and, finally, as leader, not only against the Slave-Trade, but also against Slavery itself, so that he was hailed "Father of the cause in England," and was placed at the head of the illustrious committee by which it was conducted, though his rare modesty prevented him from taking the chair to which he was unanimously elected. But no modesty could check his valiant soul in conflict with wrong. Not content with his warfare in court, he addressed Lord North, the Prime Minister, warning him in the most earnest manner to take measures for the immediate abolition of Slavery in all the British dominions, as utterly irreconcilable with the principles of the British Constitution and the established religion of the land, and solemnly declaring that "it were better for the nation that their American dominions had never existed, or even that they had sunk in the sea, than that the kingdom of Great Britain should be loaded with the horrid guilt of tolerating such abominable wickedness."[164] With similar boldness, in an elaborate work, he arraigned the doctrine of _Passive Obedience_, advanced now in favor of judicial tribunals, as once in favor of kings, and he openly affirmed, as unquestionable truth, that every public ordinance contrary to reason, justice, natural equity, or the written word of God, must be promptly rejected.[165] Other things, too, I might mention; but I am admonished that I must draw to a close. Pardon me, if I touch yet one other shining point in his career.

[162] Memoirs, p. 169.

[163] A Declaration of the People's Natural Right to a Share in the
Legislature (London, 1774). Memoirs, pp. 172, 173.

[164] Memoirs, pp. 78-80.

[165] The Law of Passive Obedience, p. 82, note.

The news of the Battle of Bunker Hill, which reached London at the end of July, 1775, found him at his desk, still a clerk in the Ordnance Office, and by position obliged to participate in the military preparations now required. He was unwilling to be concerned, even thus distantly, in what he regarded as "that unnatural business"; and though a close attendance on his office for seventeen years, to the neglect of all other worldly opportunities, made it important to him as a livelihood, yet he resolved to sacrifice it. Out of regard to his great worth and the respect he had won, he was indulged at first with leave of absence; but when hostilities in the Colonies advanced beyond any prospect of speedy accommodation, then he vacated his office. This man of charity, who lived for others, was now left without support. But he was happy in the testimony he had borne to his principles: nor was he alone. Lord Effingham, and also the eldest son of Lord Chatham, threw up commissions in the army rather than serve on the side of injustice. They were all clearly right. It is vain to suppose that any human ordinance, whether from King, Parliament, or Judicial Tribunal, can vary our moral responsibilities, or release us from obedience to God. And since no man can stand between us and God, it belongs to each conscience for itself to determine its final obligations, and where pressed to an unrighteous act,--as if to slay, or, what is equally bad, to enslave, a fellow-man charged with no crime,--then at every peril to disobey the mandate. The example of Granville Sharp on this occasion is not the least among the large legacies of wisdom and fidelity which he has left to mankind.

All these are especially commended to us, as citizens of the United States, by the early and constant interest which he manifested in our country. By pen and personal intercession he vindicated our political rights,--and when independence was secured, his sympathies did not abate, as witness his correspondence with Adams, Jay, Franklin, and America's earliest Abolitionist, Anthony Benezet. His name became an authority here,--at the South as well as the North,--and the colleges, including Brown University, Harvard University, and William and Mary, of slaveholding Virginia, vied with each other in conferring upon him their highest academic honors. But the growing numbers of the Episcopal Church had occasion for special gratitude, only to be repaid by loyal regard for his character and life. On separation from the mother country, they were left without Episcopal head. To repair this deprivation, Granville Sharp, in published writings extensively circulated, proposed the election of bishops by the churches, and their subsequent consecration in England, as congenial to the usage of early Christians, and, after much correspondence and many impediments, enjoyed the satisfaction of presenting two bishops elect from America--one of whom was the exemplary Bishop White, of Philadelphia--to the Archbishop of Canterbury, by whom the Christian rite of laying on of hands was performed; and thus was the English Episcopacy communicated to this continent. I know not that the powerful religious denomination befriended by him in its infancy has ever sympathized with the great effort by which his name is exalted; but they should at least repel the weak imputation, so often levelled against all who are steadfast against Slavery, that their benefactor was "a man of one idea."

* * * * *

Mr. President, I have striven to keep within the open field of history and philanthropy, on neutral ground; but you would not forgive me, if, on this occasion, I forbore to adduce the most interesting testimony of Granville Sharp touching that much debated clause in our National Constitution which has been stretched to the surrender of fugitive slaves. Anterior to the Constitution, even during colonial days, he wrote, that any law which orders the arrest or rendition of fugitive slaves, or in any way tends to deprive them of legal protection, is to be deemed "a corruption, null and void in itself"; and at a later period, in an elaborate communication to the Abolition Society of Maryland,--mark, if you please, of slaveholding Maryland,--which was printed and circulated by this society, as "the production of a great and respectable name," calculated to relieve persons "embarrassed by a conflict between their principles and the obligations imposed by unwise and perhaps unconstitutional laws," he exposed the utter "illegality" of Slavery, and especially of "taking up slaves that had escaped from their masters."[166] But, in a remarkable letter to Franklin, dated January 10, 1788,--a short time after the Constitution had left the hands of the Convention, and some months before its final adoption by the people,--and which has never before been adduced, even in the thorough discussion of this question, the undaunted champion, who had not shrunk from conflict with the Chief Justice of England, openly arraigned the National Constitution. Here are his words.

"Having been always zealous for the honor of free governments, I
am the more sincerely grieved to see the new Federal Constitution
stained by the insertion of two most exceptionable clauses: the
one in direct opposition to a most humane article, ordained by
the first American Congress to be perpetually observed" (referring
to the sufferance of the slave-trade till 1808); "and the other,
in equal opposition to an express command of the Almighty, 'not
to deliver up the servant that has escaped from his master,' &c.
_Both clauses, however_, (the 9th section of the 1st article, and
the latter part of the 2d section of the 3d [4th] article,) _are so
clearly null and void by their iniquity, that it would be even a
CRIME to regard them as law_."[167]

[166] Letter to the Maryland Society for Promoting the Abolition of
Slavery, (Baltimore, 1793,) pp. 2, 3.

[167] Memoirs, p. 253.

It does not appear that Franklin ever answered this letter, in the short term of life which remained to him. But, in justice to his great name, I desire to express my conviction here, of course without argument, that this patriot philosopher never attributed to the clause, which simply provides for the surrender of fugitives from "service or labor," without the mention of _slaves_, any such meaning as it has since been made to assume. And Granville Sharp himself, in putting upon it the interpretation he did, forgot the judgment he had extorted from Lord Mansfield, affirming that any law out of which Slavery is derived must be construed _strictly_; and, stranger still, he forgot his own unanswerable argument, _that the word SLAVES is nowhere to be found in the British Constitution_. The question under the fugitive clause of our Constitution is identical with that happily settled in England.

* * * * *

In works and contemplations like these was the life of our philanthropist prolonged to a generous old age, cheered by the esteem of the good, informed by study, and elevated by an enthusiastic faith, which always saw the world as the footstool of God; and when, at last, in 1813, bending under the burden of seventy-seven winters, he gently sank away, it was felt that a man had died in whom was the greatness of goodness. Among the mourners at his grave stood William Wilberforce; and over the earthly remains of this child of lowly beginnings were now dropped the tears of a royal duke. The portals of that great Temple of Honor, where are treasured England's glories, swung open at the name of England's earliest Abolitionist. A simple tablet, from the chisel of Chantrey, representing an African slave on his knees in supplication, and also the lion and the lamb lying down together, with a suitable inscription, was placed in the Poet's Corner of Westminster Abbey, in close companionship with those stones which bear the names of Chaucer, Spenser, Shakespeare, Milton, Dryden, Goldsmith, Gray. As the Muses themselves did not disdain to watch over the grave of one who had done well on earth, so do the poets of England keep watch over the monument of Granville Sharp. Nor is his place in that goodly company without poetical title. The poet is simply _creator_; and he who was inspired to create freemen out of slaves was poet of the loftiest style. Not in the sacred Abbey only was our philanthropist commemorated. The city of London, centre of those Slave-Hunting merchants over whom his great triumph was won, now gratefully claimed part of his renown. The marble bust of England's earliest Abolitionist was installed at Guildhall, home of metropolitan justice, pomp, and hospitality, in the precise spot where once had stood the bust of Nelson, England's greatest Admiral, and beneath it was carved a simple tribute, of more perennial worth than all the trophies of Trafalgar:--

GRANVILLE SHARP,

TO WHOM ENGLAND OWES THE GLORIOUS VERDICT
OF HER HIGHEST COURT OF LAW,
THAT THE SLAVE WHO SETS HIS FOOT ON
BRITISH GROUND
BECOMES THAT INSTANT
FREE.

Gentlemen of the Mercantile Library Association,--such was Granville Sharp, and such honors England to her hero paid. And now, if it be asked, why, in enforcing the duties of the Good Merchant, I select his name, the answer is prompt. It is in him that the merchant, successor to the chivalrous knight, aiming to fulfil his whole duty, may find a truer prototype than in any stunted, though successful votary of trade, while the humble circumstances of his life seem to make him an easy example. Imitating him, commerce would thrive none the less, but goodness more. Business would not be checked, but it would cease to be pursued as the "one idea" of life. Wealth would still abound; but there would be also that solid virtue, never to be moved from truth, which, you will admit, even without the admonition of Plato, is better than all the cunning of Dædalus or all the treasures of Tantalus.[168] The hardness of heart engendered by the accursed greed of gain, and by the madness of worldly ambition, would be overcome: the perverted practice, that _Policy is the best Honesty_, would be reversed; and _Merchants would be recalled, gently, but irresistibly, to the great PRACTICAL DUTIES of this age_, and thus win the palm of true honesty, which trade alone can never bestow.

[168] Euthyphron, § 12.

"Who is the HONEST MAN?
He that doth still and strongly good pursue,
To GOD, his neighbor, and himself, most true."[169]

YOUNG MERCHANTS OF BOSTON! I have spoken to you frankly and faithfully, trusting that you would frankly and faithfully hearken to me. And now, in the benison once bestowed upon the youthful Knight, I take my leave: "Go forth! be brave, loyal, and successful!"

[169] Herbert, The Temple: _Constancy_.

WAGES OF SEAMEN IN CASE OF WRECK.

SPEECH IN THE SENATE, ON INTRODUCING A BILL TO SECURE WAGES TO
SEAMEN IN CASE OF WRECK, FEBRUARY 12, 1855.

On the 26th of December, 1854, Mr. Sumner introduced the following resolution:--

"_Resolved_, That the Committee on Commerce be directed to consider
if any legislation be needed in order to secure the wages of
merchant seamen in the case of wreck."

On the 12th of February, 1855, Mr. Sumner followed up this resolution by introducing a bill, which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, as follows:--

"_A Bill to secure Wages to Seamen in case of Wreck._

"_Be it enacted_, &c., That, in case of wreck or loss of any ship
or vessel of the United States, every seaman belonging thereto
shall be entitled to his wages up to the period of such wreck
or loss, whether such ship or vessel shall or shall not have
previously earned freight, provided such seaman shall have exerted
himself to the utmost to save the ship, cargo, and stores; and in
any trial of the question of services, the master, although a party
to the suit, shall be a competent witness on this question.

"SEC. 2. _And be it further enacted_, That every stipulation, by
which any seaman shall consent to abandon his wages, in case of
wreck or loss of the ship or vessel, or in case of the failure to
earn freight, shall be wholly void."

On this bill Mr. Sumner spoke as follows.

Mr. President,--In introducing this bill, I desire to make a brief explanation, which shall, at least, be a record of my views with regard to it.

The bill proposes an amelioration of the existing Maritime Law in respect to the wages of merchant seamen, which, so far as England is concerned, has been made already by Act of Parliament, and in our country can be accomplished only by Act of Congress.

By existing Maritime Law, the seaman's wages depend upon a technical rule, which sometimes occasions hardship. Freight is compendiously said to be the mother of wages. In conformity with this fanciful idea, wages are made to depend upon the earning of freight, unless the freight is waived by agreement of the owner, or the voyage or freight is lost by negligence, fraud, or misconduct of the owner or master, or voluntarily abandoned. In case of wreck, the sailor has simply the chance of something under the name of salvage, if the fragments saved happen to be of any value; but if the loss be total, then he is without remedy. In wrecks, which occur with melancholy frequency, on our churlish winter coast, this hardship adds even to the sorrows of disaster. Thus, as in a case which has actually arisen, a crew may commence service at Calcutta, may navigate the Indian Ocean, double the Cape of Good Hope, and bring their ship safely within sight of land, and then, by total loss of ship and cargo, from acknowledged perils of the sea, they may lose everything, even their right to wages, and may find themselves in a strange port, the prey of poverty. Nor can any merit, either throughout the protracted voyage or in the hour of peril and shipwreck, prevent the operation of this technical rule.

There is also another circumstance which constrains the poor sailor. The owner may insure his ship, and also his freight, so that he may lose nothing but the premium he pays; but the sailor is not allowed to protect himself by insurance from loss of wages: his loss is literally total.

Now this technical rule, which fastens the wages of the sailor to the fortunes of the vessel, or, in other words, makes the right dependent on the successful issue of the enterprise for which he is hired, must be considered an offshoot of Mediæval Maritime Law. It is not found in the Roman Law, nor in the maritime legislation of the Eastern Empire, nor in that early compilation which goes under the name of the Rhodian Laws. An eminent American judge, who sheds great light upon maritime jurisprudence,--I refer to the learned and able Judge Ware, of the District Court of Maine,--says, in a judicial opinion, that "it owes its origin to the necessities and peculiar hazards which maritime commerce had to encounter in the Middle Ages, when to the dangers of the winds and waves were added the more formidable perils of piracy and robbery."[170] The rule, having been thus established, was preserved in the maritime jurisprudence of Europe, when the special exigencies in which it had its birth ceased to exist. It has outlived the circumstances and excuses of its origin, and now survives to vex, oppress, and disappoint the most needy, if not the most meritorious, of all concerned in the business of the seas.

[170] _The Dawn_, Daveis, 133.

This hard rule survives with us, but not everywhere. The greatest commercial nation of the world has led the way in its abolition, and set an example to the United States. The Act of Parliament, of 7th and 8th Victoria, ch. 112, sec. 17 (at the close),--called "The Merchant Seamen's Act,"--provides that

"In all cases of wreck or loss of the ship, every surviving seaman
shall be entitled to his wages up to the period of the wreck or
loss of the ship, whether such ship _shall or shall not have
previously earned freight_: provided the seaman shall produce a
certificate from the master or chief surviving officer of the ship,
to the effect that he had exerted himself to the utmost to save the
ship, cargo, and stores."

But the sailor was not completely protected by this provision. Experience in England showed that the cunning of agents was able to introduce into the shipping articles an agreement waiving the right to wages in case of loss, which the unthrifty sailor signed, ignorant or careless of its import. To remedy this abuse, a further Act of Parliament, of 13th and 14th Victoria, ch. 93, sec. 53,--known as "The Mercantile Marine Act,"--

"No seaman shall, by reason of any agreement, forfeit his lien
upon the ship, or be deprived of any remedy for the recovery of
his wages, to which he would otherwise have been entitled; and
every stipulation which is inconsistent with any provision of this
Act, or of any other Act relating to merchant seamen, and every
stipulation by which any seaman consents _to abandon his right to
wages in the case of the loss of the ship_, or to abandon any right
which he may have or obtain in the nature of salvage, _shall be
wholly inoperative_."

The bill which I now introduce is grounded on the provisions quoted from the two Acts of the British Parliament, and contains two principles: _first_, that seamen shall be paid their wages down to the time of the loss of the ship, in case they serve faithfully to the last; and, _secondly_, that they shall not be permitted to lose their wages through any agreement in the shipping articles.

In some details I have departed from the British Act. It does not seem advisable to make the wages dependent on "a certificate from the master or chief surviving officer of the ship," but to leave the question of services open to proof in any way, according to received rules of evidence. Therefore I have said that the wages shall be paid, "_provided_ the seaman shall have exerted himself to the utmost to save the ship, cargo, and stores." The reasons for this course are clear. Masters are often part owners of American ships, and thus have a personal interest adverse to the sailor. In a mood of selfishness or recklessness, they might refuse the certificate, even though well earned. Now, in constructing a protection to the sailor, it does not seem prudent to make his wages dependent upon any such quarter. Indeed, it is hardly just to take from him the right to establish his claim before the Admiralty Court, merely because an interested master refuses a certificate, when, perhaps, plenary proof might be furnished _aliunde_. Moreover, if the question were put in control of the master, he might obtain an improper influence over the minds of the crew, inducing them even to sacrifice truth in the event of litigation between owners and underwriters.

There can be no harm in leaving the question of fact to be proved by competent witnesses, like every other question of fact: and the seamen should be competent witnesses for each other. A sagacious court will know how to weigh their testimony, should it come in conflict with that of the officers. It seems proper that the master, too, though a party to the suit,--as in the case of a libel against him _in personam_, or in a suit at Common Law,--should be competent to testify to the conduct of the libellant or plaintiff,--in other words, whether he has "exerted himself to the utmost"; and I have introduced into the bill a provision accordingly.

The British Act of 7th and 8th Victoria contains another defect. It limits the wages to "every surviving seaman." I can see no good reason why the wife and children of the sailor who has perished in the forlorn hope perhaps, in the cause of all, should be deprived of the humble wages so dearly earned by their natural protector, and thus be compelled to feel a new deprivation added to their bereavement. In the proposed bill there is no such limitation.

Beyond this brief statement, I need not on this occasion add another word. Already Congress has shown a disposition to modify the rigorous Maritime Law in some of its provisions. In 1851 it made a change in the liability of ship-owners as common carriers. But this very liability originated, to a certain extent, in the same principles from which is derived the liability of the seamen, if they fail to bring the ship and cargo to port. Ship-owners and sailors were both treated as insurers. This was in the age of force, before the contract of insurance had spread its broad protection over commerce in every sea. The seaman should share this protection. He should be treated as not necessarily either pirate or coward.

In the discussions of the Senate on the proposed change in the liability of ship-owners, it was effectively urged by my immediate predecessor, a distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, the late Robert Rantoul, Jr., that, if the United States failed to adopt that measure, the other maritime nations would have an advantage in the carrying trade. It is equally true, that, unless we adopt the measure now proposed, Great Britain will have the advantage of us in the rate of seamen's wages; for, under her existing laws, the seaman can afford to work cheaper on board a British ship than under the American flag.

The measure now proposed is of direct importance to the hundred and fifty thousand seamen constituting the mercantile marine of the United States. It also concerns the million of men constituting the mercantile marine of the civilized world, any of whom, in the vicissitudes of the sea, may find themselves in American bottoms. I commend it as a measure of enlightened philanthropy, and also of simple justice.

I ask that the bill, having been read twice, be referred to the Committee on Commerce.

The motion was agreed to.

AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.

LETTER TO A COMMITTEE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATURE,
FEBRUARY 12, 1855.

SENATE CHAMBER, February 12, 1855.