Chapter I

I begin with the Origin and Nature of the Representative System. This is an invention of modern times. In antiquity there were republics and democracies, but there was no Representative System. Rulers were chosen by the people, as in many Commonwealths; senators were designated by the king or by the censors, as in Rome; ambassadors or legates were sent to a Federal Council, as to the Assembly of the Amphictyons; but in no ancient state was any body of men ever constituted by the people to represent them in the administration of their internal affairs. In Athens, the people met in public assembly, and directly acted for themselves on all questions, foreign or domestic. This was possible there, as the State was small, and the Assembly seldom exceeded five thousand citizens,--a large town-meeting, or mass-meeting, we might call it,--not inaptly termed "that fierce democratie" of Athens.

But where the territory was extensive, and the population scattered and numerous, there could be no assembly of the whole body of citizens. To meet this precise difficulty the Representative System was devised. By a machinery so obvious that we are astonished it was not employed in the ancient Commonwealths, the people, though scattered and numerous, are gathered, by their chosen representatives, into a small and deliberative assembly, where, without tumult or rashness, they consider and determine all questions which concern them. In every representative body, properly constituted, the people are practically present.

Nothing is invented and perfected at the same time; and this system is no exception to the rule. In England, where it reached its earliest vigor, it has been, and still is, anomalous in character. The existing divisions of the country, composed of boroughs, cities, and counties, were summoned by the king's writ to send representatives, with little regard to equality of any kind, whether of population, taxation, or territory. Their existence as corporate units was the prevailing title. The irregular operation of the system, increasing with lapse of time, provoked a cry for Parliamentary Reform, which, after a struggle of more than fifty years, ending in a debate that occupied the House of Commons more than fifty days, was finally carried; but, though many abuses and inequalities were removed, yet the anomalous representation by counties, cities, and boroughs still continued. And this, Sir, is the English system.

Pass now to the American system. I say American system,--for to our country belongs the honor of first giving to the world the idea of a system which, discarding corporate representation, founded itself absolutely on equality. Let us acknowledge with gratitude that from England have come five great and ever memorable institutions, by which Liberty is secured: I mean the Trial by Jury,--the writ of _Habeas Corpus_,--the Representative System,--the Rules and Orders of Debate,--and, lastly, that benign principle which pronounces _that its air is too pure for a slave to breathe_: perhaps the five most important political establishments of modern times. This glory cannot be taken from the mother country. But America has added to the Representative System another principle, without which it is incomplete, and which, in the course of events, is destined, I cannot doubt, to find acceptance wherever the Representative System is employed: I mean the _principle of equality_.

Here in Massachusetts, home of the ideas out of which sprang the Revolution, this principle had its earliest expression. And it is not a little curious that this very expression was suggested by the two evils of which we now complain,--namely, a practical inequality of representation, and a too numerous House.

In the earliest days of the Colony, while the number of freemen was small and gathered in one neighborhood, there was no occasion for any representative body. All could then meet in public assembly, as at ancient Athens; in fact, they did so meet, and in this way discharged the duties of legislation. But as the freemen became scattered and numerous, it was found grievous to compel the personal attendance of the whole body, and, as a substitute, the towns were empowered, in 1634, to assemble in General Court by deputies.[10] Here was the establishment of the Representative System in Massachusetts, which has continued, without interruption, down to our day. The size of the House and the relative representation of towns have varied at different times; but the great principle of representation, by which a substitute is provided for the whole body of the people, has constantly been preserved. Still a feeling has long prevailed that the system had not yet received its final form, while, with more or less precision, has been discerned that principle of equality which is essential to its completeness.

[10] Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts, Vol. I. pp. 30,
39. Charters and General Laws of the Colony and Province of
Massachusetts Bay, Appendix, p. 713. Records of the Governor and
Company of the Massachusetts Bay, Vol. I. pp. 116-118.

Among the acts of the first General Court of the Revolution was one passed in the summer of 1775, after the Battle of Bunker Hill, "declaratory of the right of the towns and districts to elect and depute a representative or representatives to serve for and represent them in the General Court." By this act all provisions of previous acts denying to certain towns and districts the right of sending a representative were declared null and void, and every town containing thirty qualified voters was authorized to send one.[11] The immediate consequence was the two evils to which I have already referred,--namely, inequality of representation, and a too numerous House: but the whole number of representatives which aroused the complaints of that day was three hundred and five.

[11] Charters and General Laws of Massachusetts Bay, Appendix, pp.
796, 797.

These grievances were the occasion of a Convention of delegates from the towns of Essex County, at Ipswich, April 25, 1776, where was adopted a Memorial, afterwards presented and enforced at the bar of the House by John Lowell. In this remarkable document occurs the first development, if not the first proclamation, of the principle of equality in representation. Here, Sir, is the fountain and origin of an idea full of strength, beauty, and truth. Listen to the words of these Revolutionary fathers.

"If this representation is equal, it is perfect; as far as it
deviates from this equality, so far it is imperfect, and approaches
to that state of slavery; and the want of a just weight in
representation is an evil nearly akin to being totally destitute of
it. An inequality of representation has been justly esteemed the
cause which has in a great degree sapped the foundation of the once
admired, but now tottering, fabric of the British Empire; and we
fear, that, if a different mode of representation from the present
is not adopted in this Colony, our Constitution will not continue
to that late period of time which the glowing heart of every true
American now anticipates....

"We cannot realize that your Honors, our wise political fathers,
have adverted to the present inequality of representation in this
Colony, to the growth of the evil, or to the fatal consequences
which will probably ensue from the continuance of it.

"Each town and district in the Colony is by some late regulations
permitted to send one representative to the General Court, if
such town or district consists of thirty freeholders and other
inhabitants qualified to elect; if of one hundred and twenty,
to send two. No town is permitted to send more than two, except
the town of Boston, which may send four. There are some towns
and districts in the Colony in which there are between thirty
and forty freeholders, and other inhabitants qualified to elect,
only; there are others besides Boston in which there are more than
five hundred. The first of these may send one representative; the
latter can send only two. If these towns as to property are to
each other in the same respective proportion, is it not clear to
a mathematical demonstration that the same number of inhabitants
of equal property in the one town have but an _eighth_ part of the
weight in representation with the other?--and with what colorable
pretext? we would decently inquire."[12]

[12] From the original MS. in the Massachusetts Archives, Vol. 156.

Under the pressure of this powerful state paper the obnoxious law was repealed, and one "providing for a _more equal_ representation" substituted; but the evil was only partially remedied. Then followed an unsuccessful effort to make a Constitution in 1777-8, which failed partly through dissatisfaction with its disposal of this very question. The County of Essex was again heard in another document, now known as the "Essex Result," and among the most able and instructive in our history, from which I take the following important words.

"The rights of representation should be so equally and impartially
distributed, that the representatives should have the same views
and interests with the people at large. They should think, feel,
and act like them, and, in fine, should be an exact miniature of
their constituents. They should be, if we may use the expression,
the whole body politic, with all its property, rights, and
privileges reduced to a smaller scale, _every part being diminished
in just proportion_. To pursue the metaphor, if, in adjusting the
representation of freemen, _any ten are reduced into one, all the
other tens should be alike reduced; or, if any hundred should be
reduced to one, all the other hundreds should have just the same
reduction_."[13]

[13] Result of the Convention of Delegates holden at Ipswich, in
the County of Essex, who were deputed to take into Consideration
the Constitution and Form of Government proposed by the Convention
of the State of Massachusetts Bay, (Newburyport, 1778,) pp. 29, 30.
See also Memoir of Theophilus Parsons, by his Son, Appendix, pp.
359-402, where this remarkable paper will be found.

Mark well these words. Here is the Rule of Three, for the first time in history, applied to representation. This, Sir, is not the English system. I call it, with pride, the American system.

In another place the document proceeds as follows.

"The rights of representation should also be held sacred and
inviolable, and for this purpose representation should be fixed
upon known and easy principles; and the Constitution should
make provision that recourse should constantly be had to those
principles within a very small period of years, to rectify the
errors that will creep in through lapse of time or alteration of
situations."[14]

[14] Result, p. 33.

Then, distinctly, it proposes a system of districts, in words which I quote.

"In forming the first body of legislators, let regard be had only
to the representation of persons, not of property. This body
we call the House of Representatives. Ascertain the number of
representatives. It ought not to be so large as will induce an
enormous expense to Government, nor too unwieldy to deliberate with
coolness and attention, nor so small as to be unacquainted with
the situation and circumstances of the State. One hundred will be
large enough, and perhaps it may be too large. We are persuaded
that any number of men exceeding that cannot do business with such
expedition and propriety as a smaller number could. However, let
that at present be considered as the number. Let us have the number
of freemen in the several counties in the State, and let these
representatives be apportioned among the respective counties in
proportion to their number of freemen.... As we have the number of
freemen in the county, and the number of county representatives,
by dividing the greater by the less we have the number of freemen
entitled to send one representative. Then add as many adjoining
towns together as contain that number of freemen, or as near as may
be, and _let those towns form one district_, and proceed in this
manner through the county."[15]

[15] Result, pp. 49-51.

* * * * *

MR. HALLETT, for Wilbraham (interrupting). Will the gentleman state
who was the author of that Essex paper?

MR. SUMNER. Theophilus Parsons is the reputed author of the
document known as the "Essex Result."

MR. HALLETT. Yes, Sir, it was Theophilus Parsons who was the author
of that, and John Lowell of the other; and good old Tory doctrines
they are.

MR. SUMNER. If these be Tory doctrines, I must think well of
Toryism.

Sir, notwithstanding these appeals, sustained with unsurpassed ability, the American system failed to be adopted in the Constitution of 1780. The anomalous English system was still continued; but, as if to cover the departure from principle, it was twice declared that the representation of the people should be "founded upon the principle of equality." This declaration still continues as our guide, while the irregular operation of the existing system, with its inequalities and large numbers, is a beacon of warning.

Following closely upon these efforts in Massachusetts, this principle found an illustrious advocate in Thomas Jefferson. In his "Notes on Virginia," written in 1781, he sharply exposes the inequalities of representation;[16] and a short time afterwards, when the victory at Yorktown had rescued Virginia from invasion and secured the independence of the United Colonies, he prepared the draught of a Constitution for his native State, which, disowning the English system, and recognizing the very principle that had failed in Massachusetts, expressly provided that "the number of delegates which each county may send shall be _in proportion to the number of its qualified electors_; and the whole number of delegates for the State shall be so _proportioned to the whole number of qualified electors in it_, that they shall never exceed three hundred nor be fewer than one hundred.... If any county be reduced in its qualified electors below the number authorized to send one delegate, let it be annexed to some adjoining county."[17] This proposition, which is substantially the Rule of Three, did not find favor in Virginia, which State, like Massachusetts, was not yet prepared for such a charter of electoral equality; but it still stands as a monument at once of its author and of the true system of representation.

[16] Query XIII.

[17] Notes on Virginia, Appendix, No. II.: Works, Vol. VIII., p.
443.

The American system, though first showing itself in Massachusetts and Virginia, found its earliest practical exemplification a few years later in the Constitution of the United States. By the Articles of Confederation each State was entitled to send to Congress not less than two nor more than seven representatives, and in the determination of questions each State had one vote only. This plan was rejected by the framers of the new Constitution, and another was adopted, till then untried in the history of the world. It was declared that "representatives and direct taxes shall be _apportioned_ among the several States which may be included within this Union _according to their respective numbers_": not according to property, not according to territory, not according to any corporate rights, _but according to their respective numbers_. And this system has continued down to our day, and will continue immortal as the Union itself. Here is the Rule of Three actually incorporated into the Representative System of the United States.

An attempt has been made to render this system odious, or at least questionable, by charging upon it something of the excesses of the great French Revolution. Even if this rule had prevailed at that time in France, it would be bold to charge upon it any such consequences. But it is a mistake to suppose that it was then adopted in that country. The republican Constitution of 1791 was not founded upon numbers only, but upon numbers, territory, and taxation combined,--a mixed system, which excluded the true idea of personal equality. At the peaceful, almost bloodless, Revolution of 1848, under the lead of Lamartine, a National Assembly was convened on the simple basis of population, and one representative was allowed for every forty thousand inhabitants. Here, indeed, is the Rule of Three; but the idea originally came from our country.

MR. HALLETT. Will the gentleman for Marshfield allow me to make one
more inquiry?

MR. SUMNER. Certainly.

MR. HALLETT. Do I understand the gentleman to say that the Rule of
Three was applied to representation in the United States?

MR. SUMNER. I mean to say that the representation in the lower
House of Congress was apportioned according to numbers; and this is
the Rule of Three.

A practical question arises here, whether this rule should be applied to the whole body of population, including women, children, and unnaturalized foreigners, or to those only who exercise the electoral franchise,--in other words, to voters. It is probable that the rule would produce nearly similar results in both cases, as voters, except in few places, would bear a uniform proportion to the whole population. But it is easy to determine what the principle of the Representative System requires. Since its object is to provide a practical substitute for meetings of the people, it should be founded, in just proportion, on the numbers of those who, according to our Constitution, can take part in those meetings,--that is, upon the qualified voters. The representative body should be a miniature or abridgment of the electoral body,--in other words, of those allowed to participate in public affairs. If this conclusion needs authority, it may be found in the words of Mr. Madison, in the Debates on the National Constitution. "It has been very properly observed," he says, "that representation is an expedient by which the meeting of the people themselves is rendered unnecessary, _and that_ _the representatives ought, therefore, to bear a proportion to the votes which their constituents, if convened, would respectively have_."[18]

[18] Madison's Debates, July 14, 1787, Vol. II. p. 1102.

The Rule of Three, then, applied to voters, seems to me sound; but whether applied to voters or population, it is the true rule of representation, and stands on irreversible principles. In my view, it commends itself to the natural reason so obviously, so instinctively, that I do not feel disposed to dwell upon it. But since it is called in question, I shall be excused for saying a few words in its behalf. Its advantages present themselves in several aspects.

_First._ I put in the front its constant and equal operation throughout the Commonwealth. Under it, every man will have a representative each year, and every man will have the same representative power as every other man. In this respect it recognizes a darling idea of our institutions, which cannot be disowned without weakening their foundations. It gives to the great principle of human equality a new expansion and application. It makes all men, in the enjoyment of the electoral franchise, whatever their diversities of intelligence, education, or wealth, or wheresoever they may be within the borders of the Commonwealth, whether in small town or in populous city, absolutely equal at the ballot-box.

I know that there are persons, Sir, who do not hesitate to assail the whole doctrine of the equality of men, as enunciated in our Declaration of Independence and in our Bill of Rights. In this work two eminent statesmen of our own country and England have led the way.[19] But it seems to me, that, if they had chosen to comprehend the meaning of the principle, much, if not all, of their objection would have been removed. Very plain it is that men are not born equal in physical strength or in mental capacity, in beauty of form or health of body. This is apparent to all, and the difference increases with years. Diversity or inequality in these respects is the law of creation. But as God is no respecter of persons, and as all are equal in his sight, whether rich or poor, whether dwellers in cities or in fields, so are all equal in natural rights; and it is an absurd declamation--of which no gentleman in this Convention is guilty--to adduce, in argument against them, the physical or mental inequalities by which men are characterized. Now I am not prepared to class the electoral franchise among inherent, natural rights, common to the whole human family, without distinction of age, sex, or residence; but I do say, that from the equality of men, which we so proudly proclaim, we derive a just rule for its exercise. For myself, I accept this principle, and, just so far and just so soon as possible, I would be guided by it in the system of Representation. But there are other reasons still.

[19] See _ante_, Vol. II. p. 331.

_Secondly._ The Rule of Three, as applied to representation, is commended by its simplicity. It supersedes all the painful calculations to which we have been driven, the long agony of mathematics, as it was called by my friend over the way [Mr. GILES], and is as easy in application as it is just.

_Thirdly._ This rule is founded in Nature, and not in Art,--on natural bodies, and not on artificial bodies,--on men, and not on corporations,--on souls, and not on petty geographical lines. On this account it may be called a natural rule, and, when once established, will become fixed and permanent, beyond all change or desire of change.

And, _fourthly_, this rule removes, to every possible extent, those opportunities of political partiality and calculation, in the adjustment of representation, which are naturally incident to any departure from precise rule. It was beautifully said of Law by the greatest intellect of Antiquity, that it is _mind without passion_; and this very definition I would extend to a rule which, with little intervention from human will, is graduated by numbers, passionless as law itself in the conception of Aristotle. The object of free institutions is to withdraw all concerns of State, so far as practicable, from human discretion, and place them under the shield of human principles, to the end, according to the words of our Constitution, that there may be "a government of laws, and not of men." But, just in proportion as we depart from precise rule, it becomes a government of men, and not of laws.

Such considerations as these, thus briefly expressed, seem to vindicate this rule of representation. But I would not forget the arguments adduced against it. These assume two distinct forms: one founded on the character of our towns and the importance of preserving their influence; the other founded on the alleged necessity of counteracting the centralization of power in the cities. Now of these in their order.

And, first, of the importance of preserving our towns. Sir, I yield to no man in appreciation of the good done by these free municipalities. The able member for Erving [Mr. GRISWOLD], who began this debate, the eloquent member for Berlin [Mr. BOUTWELL], and my excellent friend of many years, the accomplished member for Manchester [Mr. DANA], in the masterly speeches which they have addressed to the Convention, attributed no good influence to the towns which I do not recognize also. With them I agree, cordially, that the towns of Massachusetts, like the municipalities of Switzerland, have been schools and nurseries of freedom,--and that in these small bodies men were early disciplined in those primal duties of citizenship, which, on a grander scale, are made the foundation of our whole political fabric. But I cannot go so far as to attribute this remarkable influence to the assumed fact, that each town by itself was entitled to a representative in the legislative body. At the time of the Revolution this was the prerogative of most towns, though not of all; but it cannot be regarded as the distinctive, essential, life-giving attribute: at most, it was only an incident.

Sir, the true glory of the towns then was, that they were organized on the principle of self-government, at a time when that principle was not generally recognized,--that each town by itself was a little republic, where the whole body of freemen were voters, with powers of local legislation, taxation, and administration, and, especially, with power to choose their own head and all subordinate magistrates. The boroughs of England have possessed the power to send a member--often two members--to Parliament; but this has not saved them from corruption; nor has any person attributed to them, though in the enjoyment of this franchise, the influence which has proceeded from our municipalities. The reason is obvious. They were organized under charters from the crown, by which local government was vested, not in the whole body of freemen, but in small councils, or select classes, originally nominated by the crown, and ever afterwards renewing themselves. No such abuse prevailed in our municipalities; and this political health at home, Sir, and not the incident of exclusive representation in a distant Legislature, has been the secret of their strength. I would cherish it ever.

This brings me, in the next place, to the objection founded on centralization of power in the cities. It is said that wealth, business, population, and talent, in multitudinous forms, all tend to the cities, and that the excessive influence of this concentrated mass, quickened by an active press, by facilities of concert, and by social appliances, ought to be counterbalanced by allotment to the towns of representative weight beyond their proportion of numbers. Now, Sir, while confessing and regretting the present predominance of the cities, I must be permitted to question the propriety of the proposed remedy. And here, differing in some respects from friends on both sides, I make an appeal for candid judgment of what I shall candidly say.

Let us deal fairly by the cities. No student of history can fail to perceive that they have performed different parts at different stages of the world. In Antiquity, they were the acknowledged centres of power, often of tyranny. In the Middle Ages, they became the home of freedom, and the bridle to feudalism. For this service they should be gratefully remembered. And now there is another change. The armed feudalism is overthrown; but it is impossible not to see that it has yielded to a commercial feudalism, whose seat is in the cities, and which, in its way, is hardly less selfish and exacting than the feudalism of the iron hand. My friend, the member for Manchester [Mr. DANA], was clearly right, when he said that the Boston of to-day is not the Boston of our fathers. Let me be understood. I make no impeachment of individuals, but simply indicate those combined influences proceeding from the potent Spirit of Trade, which, though unlike that Spirit of the Lord where is Liberty, is not inconsistent with the most enlarged munificence. I think, while confessing the abounding charities of the rich men whose eulogy we have heard more than once in this debate, it must be admitted that those pure principles which are the breath of the Republic now find their truest atmosphere in calm retreats, away from the strife of gain and the hot pavements of crowded streets. Sir, it is not only when we look upon the fields, hills, and valleys, clad in verdure, and shining with silver lake or rivulet, that we are ready to exclaim,--

"God made the country, and man made the town."

But, Sir, while maintaining these opinions, I cannot admit the argument, that the centralized power of the cities may be counteracted by degrading them in the scale of representation. This cannot be purposely done, without departing from fundamental principles, and overthrowing the presiding doctrine of personal equality. Cities are but congregations of men; and men exert influence in various ways,--by the accident of position, the accident of intelligence, the accident of property, the accident of birth, and, lastly, by the vote. It is the vote only which is not an accident; and it should be the boast of Massachusetts, that all men, whatever their accidents, are equal in their votes.

Here the hammer of the President fell, as the hour expired; but, by
unanimous consent, Mr. Sumner proceeded.

The idea of property as a check upon numbers, which on a former occasion found such favor in this hall, is now rejected in the adjustment of our representative System. And, Sir, I venture to predict that the proposition, newly broached in this Commonwealth, to restrain the cities by curtailment of their just representative power, will hereafter be as little regarded.