Chapter XII: Appendix: Nomination and Reëlection of Mr. Sumner (2)

SEC. 3. _And be it further enacted_, That the President be, and is hereby, authorized to further order the voluntary enlistment or enrolment of each and every able-bodied free male person of African descent, of the age of eighteen years and under forty-five years, within the United States, for military service, as provided by this Act, except that the monthly pay of such free persons shall be the same as that of the volunteers: _Provided_, The whole number called into the service of the United States under the provisions of this section shall not exceed one hundred thousand men.

There was no action of the Committee on this bill, and it fell
with the session.

* * * * *

February 10, 1864, more than a year later, the subject was
brought forward in the House of Representatives by Mr. Stevens,
in an amendment to the Enrolment Bill then pending, and finally
prevailed in the following terms:--

“That all able-bodied male colored persons, between the
ages of twenty and forty-five years, resident in the United
States, shall be enrolled according to the provisions of
this Act and of the Act to which this is an amendment, and
form part of the national forces; and when a slave of a
loyal master shall be drafted and mustered into the service
of the United States, his master shall have a certificate
thereof, and thereupon such slave shall be free.”[139]

IMMEDIATE EMANCIPATION, AND NOT GRADUAL.

SPEECH IN THE SENATE, ON THE BILL PROVIDING AID FOR EMANCIPATION IN MISSOURI, FEBRUARY 12, 1863.

The recommendation of President Lincoln to aid the States in
Emancipation, though urged by him, never found great favor in
Congress. Among the measures prompted by it was one introduced
into the House of Representatives by Mr. Noell, of Missouri,
entitled, “A Bill giving aid to the State of Missouri for the
purpose of securing the abolishment of Slavery in said State.”
This provided that the Government of the United States would,
upon the passage of a good and valid Act of Emancipation of
all the slaves therein, and to be irrepealable, unless by the
consent of the United States, apply the sum of ten million
dollars in United States bonds, redeemable in thirty years from
date. It passed the House by 73 yeas against 46 nays.

In the Senate, this bill was referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary, which reported a substitute, when it was recommitted
and another substitute reported, by which it was provided,
that, on the adoption of a valid law by Missouri “for the
_gradual_ or immediate emancipation of all the slaves therein,
and the exclusion of Slavery forever thereafter from said
State,” twenty million dollars in United States bonds should
be applied “to compensate for the inconveniences produced by
such change of system,” which was to take effect “on some day
not later than the fourth day of July, 1876”; but the bonds
were not to exceed ten million dollars, unless there was “full
and perfect manumission” before the fourth day of July, 1865,
nor in their aggregate were they to exceed “the sum of three
hundred dollars for each slave emancipated.”

This recognition of the principle of _Gradual_ Emancipation,
especially as a war measure, was very disagreeable to Mr.
Sumner. February 7th, he moved to strike out “seventy-six”
and insert “sixty-four,” so that the Act of Emancipation
should go into operation on the 4th of July, 1864; and here he
remarked:--

MR. PRESIDENT,--This bill, as I understand it, is a bill of peace; it is to bring back tranquillity in a disturbed State. If you ask for authority under the Constitution, I cannot doubt that it is in the War Power. It is in the power to suppress this insurrection, to put down this rebellion. But most strangely do you seek to put down this rebellion by the abolition of Slavery twenty years, or even ten years, from now. To my mind the proposition is simply ridiculous. I use strong language, because so it seems to me, and I cannot help saying it.

Sir, for the sake of our common country at this critical moment, for the sake of Missouri herself, for the sake of every slave-master in Missouri, and for the sake of every slave, I insist that Abolition shall be completed at the nearest possible day. History, reason, and common sense are uniform in this requirement, and I challenge contradiction to their concurring testimony.

The measure on its face is double, being in the alternative. It provides a certain sum in the event of Emancipation taking place within two years, and another sum if it takes place at a certain distant day. Now, Sir, I do not desire any alternative. I trust that what we do will take effect at once. I wish to see the benefit of it, especially to see it felt in the suppression of the Rebellion.

Mr. Willey, of West Virginia, said, that, in his estimation,
“it would be much better for Missouri, and for the slave, if,
instead of 1876, it was 1900”; and he was followed by Mr.
Henderson, of Missouri, on the same side. Mr. Sumner replied
briefly.

I assume that Senators are in earnest for something to put down the Rebellion. Our country, I know, is rich in resources. It can vote millions for almost any purpose; but still I doubt if the Senator from Missouri would urge Congress, at this moment, to appropriate millions, unless he expected in this way to do something very positive against the Rebellion. I assume that this is his object, and also the object of other Senators urging this measure. Is there any other object to justify, at this moment, a vote for it? Is there any Senator who will toss twenty or ten millions of money to any State, unless he is satisfied that by doing so he can help put an end to the Rebellion? On this point all must agree. Therefore do I insist on the single question, How shall we most surely help put an end to the Rebellion? If this can be best accomplished by immediate Emancipation, then must we vote accordingly. But if it is better to allow Emancipation to drag through twenty or even ten years, with the possibility of reaction, and with the certainty of controversy during all this period, and, above all, without any immediate good, then will Senators vote accordingly. Sir, I am against any such thing. I wish the measure to be effective for the object proposed, and, as I do not believe it can be effective, unless immediate, I must vote accordingly.

The amendment of Mr. Sumner was lost,--Yeas 11, Nays 26.

In the debate which ensued, Mr. Powell, of Kentucky, taunted
Mr. Sumner with desiring the negroes of Missouri to be “freed
quickly, so that Governor Andrew can recruit there to fill up
the Massachusetts quota.” Mr. Sumner replied: “I would have
a musket put in the hands of every one of these negroes in
Missouri.”

Mr. Sumner moved to amend by striking out “three hundred” and
inserting “two hundred” dollars, as the measure of value of a
slave. Here he said:--

I object to the enormous valuation. I object to it in the present bill, and also as a precedent. We shall be bound by it hereafter. The next bill will have this same value of three hundred dollars for each slave. I would begin by putting it at two hundred dollars, and that is my motion.

This amendment was adopted,--Yeas 19, Nays 17.

Mr. Sumner then moved to strike out the word “gradual,” so that
the money should be paid only on immediate Emancipation. Here
he remarked, that he did not understand a war measure which
was to go into effect ten years from now,--that he did not
understand a gradual war measure,--that it was an absurdity in
terms, and utterly indefensible.

The motion was lost,--Yeas 11, Nays 27.

The question then recurred on the adoption of the substitute,
when Mr. Sumner spoke as follows.

MR. PRESIDENT,--If I speak tardily in this debate, I hope for the indulgence of the Senate. Had I been able to speak earlier, I should have spoken; but, though present in the Chamber, and voting when this bill was under consideration formerly, I was at the time too much of an invalid to take an active part in the debate. In justice to myself and to the great question, I cannot be silent.

I have already voted to give Missouri twenty million dollars to secure freedom at once for her slaves, and to make her at once a Free State. I am ready to vote more, if more be needed for this good purpose; but I will not vote money to be sunk and lost in an uncertain scheme of Prospective Emancipation, where Freedom is a jack-o’-lantern, and the only certainty is the Congressional appropriation. For money paid down, Freedom must be delivered.

Notwithstanding all differences of opinion on this important question, there is much occasion for congratulation in the progress made.

Thank God, on one point the Senate is substantially united. A large majority will vote for Emancipation. This is much, both as a sign of the present and a prophecy of the future. A large majority, in the name of Congress, will offer pecuniary aid. This is a further sign and prophecy. Such a vote, and such an appropriation, will constitute an epoch. Only a few short years ago the very mention of Slavery in Congress was forbidden, and all discussion of it was stifled. Now Emancipation is an accepted watchword, while Slavery is openly denounced as a guilty thing worthy of death.

It is admitted, that now, under the exigency of war, the United States ought to coöperate with any State in the abolition of Slavery, giving it pecuniary aid; and it is proposed to apply this principle practically in Missouri. It was fit that Emancipation, destined to end the Rebellion, should begin in South Carolina, where the Rebellion began. It is also fit that the action of Congress in behalf of Emancipation should begin in Missouri, which, through the faint-hearted remissness of Congress, as late as 1820, was opened to Slavery. Had Congress at that time firmly insisted that Missouri should enter the Union as a Free State, the vast appropriation now proposed would have been saved, and, better still, this vaster civil war would have been prevented. The whole country is now paying with treasure and blood for that fatal surrender. Alas, that men should forget that God is bound by no compromise, and that, sooner or later, He will insist that justice shall be done! There is not a dollar spent, and not a life sacrificed, in this calamitous war, which does not plead against any repetition of that wicked folly. Palsied be the tongue that speaks of compromise with Slavery!

Though, happily, compromise is no longer openly mentioned, yet it insinuates itself in this debate. In former times it took the shape of barefaced concession, as in the admission of Missouri with Slavery, in the annexion of Texas with Slavery, the waiver of the prohibition of Slavery in the Territories, the atrocious bill for the reënslavement of fugitives, and the opening of Kansas to Slavery, first by the Kansas Bill, and then by the Lecompton Constitution. In each of these cases there was concession to Slavery which history records with shame, and it was by this that your wicked slaveholding conspiracy waxed confident and strong, till at last it became ripe for war.

And now it is proposed, as an agency in the suppression of the Rebellion, to make an end of Slavery. By proclamation of the President, all slaves in certain States and designated parts of States are declared free. Of course this proclamation is a war measure, rendered just and necessary by exigencies of war. As such, it is summary and instant in operation, not prospective or procrastinating. A proclamation of Prospective Emancipation would have been an absurdity,--like a proclamation of a prospective battle, where not a blow was to be struck or a cannon pointed before 1876, unless, meanwhile, the enemy desired it. What is done in war must be done promptly, except, perhaps, under the policy of defence. Gradualism is delay, and delay is the betrayal of victory. If you would be triumphant, strike quickly, let your blows be felt at once, without notice or premonition, and especially without time for resistance or debate. Time deserts all who do not appreciate its value. Strike promptly, and time becomes your invaluable ally; strike slowly, gradually, prospectively, and time goes over to the enemy.

But every argument for the instant carrying out of the Proclamation, every consideration in favor of despatch in war, is especially applicable to whatever is done by Congress as a war measure. In a period of peace Congress might fitly consider whether Emancipation should be immediate or prospective, and we could listen with patience to the instances adduced by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. DOOLITTLE] in favor of delay,--to the case of Pennsylvania, and to the case of New York, where slaves were tardily admitted to their birthright. Such arguments, though to my judgment of little value at any time, might then be legitimate. But now, when we are considering how to put down the Rebellion, they are not even legitimate. There is but one way to put down the Rebellion, and that is _instant action_; and all that is done, whether in the field, in the Cabinet, or in Congress, must partake of this character. Whatever is postponed for twenty years, or ten years, may seem abstractly politic or wise; but it is in no sense a war measure, nor can it contribute essentially to the suppression of the Rebellion.

I think I may assume, without contradiction, that the tender of money to Missouri for the sake of Emancipation is a war measure, to be vindicated as such under the Constitution of the United States. It is also an act of justice to an oppressed race. But it is not in this unquestionable character that it is now commended. If it were urged on no other ground, even if every consideration of philanthropy and of religion pleaded for it with rarest eloquence, I fear that it would stand but little chance in either House of Congress. Let us not disguise the truth. Except as a war measure to aid in putting down the Rebellion, this proposition could expect little hospitality here. Senators are ready to vote money--as the British Parliament voted subsidies--to supply the place of soldiers, or to remove a stronghold of the Rebellion, all of which is done by Emancipation. I do not overstate the case. Slavery is a stronghold, which through Emancipation will be removed, while every slave, if not every slave-master, becomes an ally of the Government. Therefore Emancipation is a war measure, and constitutional as the raising of armies or the occupation of hostile territory.

In vindicating Emancipation as a war measure, we must see that it is made under such conditions as to exercise a present, _instant_ influence. It must be immediate, not prospective. In proposing Prospective Emancipation, you propose a measure which can have little or no influence on the war. Abstractly Senators may prefer that Emancipation should be prospective rather than immediate; but this is not the time for the exercise of any abstract preference. Whatever is done as a war measure must be immediate, or it will cease to have this character, whatever you call it.

If I am correct in this statement,--and I do not see how it can be questioned,--then is the appropriation for Immediate Emancipation just and proper under the Constitution, while that for Prospective Emancipation is without sanction, except what it finds in the sentiments of justice and humanity.

It is proposed to vote ten million dollars to promote Emancipation ten years from now. Perhaps I am sanguine, but I cannot doubt that before the expiration of that period Slavery will die in Missouri under the awakened judgment of the people, even without the action of Congress. If our resources were infinite, we might tender this large sum by way of experiment; but with a treasury drained to the bottom, and a debt accumulating in fabulous proportions, I do not understand how we can vote millions, which, in the first place, will be of little or no service in the suppression of the Rebellion, and, in the second place, will be simply a largess in no way essential to the subversion of Slavery.

Whatever is given for Immediate Emancipation is given for the national defence, and for the safety and honor of the Republic. It will be a blow at the Rebellion. Whatever is given for Prospective Emancipation will be a gratuity to slaveholders and a tribute to Slavery. Pardon me, if I repeat what I have already said on this question: “Millions for defence, but not a cent for tribute”; millions for defence against peril, from whatever quarter it may come, but not a cent for tribute in any quarter,--especially not a cent for tribute to the loathsome tyranny of Slavery.

I know it is sometimes said that even Prospective Emancipation will help weaken the Rebellion. That it will impair the confidence in Slavery, and also its value, I cannot doubt. But it is equally clear that it will leave Slavery still alive and on its legs; and just so long as this is the case, there must be controversy and debate, with attending weakness, while Reaction perpetually lifts its crest. Instead of tranquillity, which we all seek for Missouri, we shall have contention. Instead of peace, we shall have prolonged war. Every year’s delay, ay, Sir, every week’s delay, in dealing death to Slavery leaves just so much of opportunity to the Rebellion; for so long as Slavery is allowed to exist in Missouri the Rebellion will still struggle, not without hope, for its ancient mastery. But let Slavery cease at once and all will be changed. There will be no room for controversy or debate, with attending weakness; nor can Reaction lift its crest. There will be no opportunity to the Rebellion, which must cease all effort there, when Missouri can no longer be a Slave State. Freedom will become our watchful, generous, and invincible ally, while the well-being, the happiness, the repose, and the renown of Missouri will be established forever.

* * * * *

Thus far, Sir, I have presented the argument on grounds peculiar to this case; and here I might stop. Having shown, that, as a military necessity, and for the sake of that economy which it is our duty to cultivate, Emancipation must be immediate, I need not go further. But I do not content myself here. The whole question is opened between Immediate Emancipation and Prospective Emancipation,--or, in other words, between doing right at once and doing right at some future, distant day. Procrastination is the thief, not only of time, but of virtue itself. Yet such is the nature of man that he is disposed always to delay, so that he does nothing to-day which he can put off till to-morrow. Perhaps in no single matter is this disposition more apparent than with regard to Slavery. Every consideration of humanity, justice, religion, reason, common sense, and history, all demanded the instant cessation of an intolerable wrong, without procrastination or delay. But human nature would not yield, and we have been driven to argue the question, whether an outrage, asserting property in man, denying the conjugal relation, annulling the parental relation, shutting out human improvement, and robbing its victim of all the fruits of his industry,--the whole to compel work without wages,--should be stopped instantly or gradually. It is only when we regard Slavery in its essential elements, and look at its unutterable and unquestionable atrocity, that we fully comprehend the mingled folly and wickedness of this question. If it were merely a question of economy, or a question of policy, then the Senate might properly debate whether the change should be instant or gradual; but considerations of economy and policy are all absorbed in the higher claims of justice and humanity. There is no question whether justice and humanity shall be immediate or gradual. Men are to cease at once from wrong; they are to obey the Ten Commandments instantly, and not gradually.

Senators who argue for Prospective Emancipation show themselves insensible to the true character of Slavery, or insensible to the requirements of reason. One or the other of these alternatives must be accepted.

Shall property in man be disowned immediately, or only prospectively? Reason answers, Immediately.

Shall the conjugal relation be maintained immediately, or only prospectively? Reason recoils from the wicked absurdity of the inquiry.

Shall the parental relation be recognized immediately, or only prospectively? Reason is indignant at the question.

Shall the opportunities of knowledge, including the right to read the Book of Life, be opened immediately or prospectively? Reason brands the idea of delay as impious.

Shall the fruits of his own industry be given to a fellow-man immediately or prospectively? Reason insists that every man shall have his own without postponement.

And history, thank God, speaking by examples, testifies in conformity with reason. The conclusion is irresistible. If you would contribute to the strength and honor of the Nation, if you would bless Missouri, if you would benefit the slave-master, if you would elevate the slave, and, still further, if you would afford an example which shall fortify and consecrate the Republic, making it at once citadel and temple, do not put off the day of Freedom. In this case, more than in any other, he gives twice who quickly gives.

The substitute, containing the provisions for Gradual
Emancipation, was then adopted,--Yeas 27, Nays 10,--Mr. Sumner
voting in the minority. The final question was on the passage
of the bill as amended by the insertion of the substitute, when
Mr. Sumner said:--

I shall vote for this bill on its final passage, but it will be because I know it will go back to the House of Representatives, where it can undergo consideration, and where, I trust, a bill will be at last matured that will embody the true principle which ought to govern this great question.

The bill passed,--Yeas 23, Nays 18. It went back to the House,
where it gave way to a new bill, which was lost in the closing
hours of the Thirty-Seventh Congress. Aid to States and
Compensated Emancipation soon passed out of sight.

LETTERS OF MARQUE AND REPRISAL.

SPEECHES IN THE SENATE, ON THE BILL TO AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT, IN ALL DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN WARS, TO ISSUE LETTERS OF MARQUE AND REPRISAL, FEBRUARY 14 AND 17, 1863.

At the close of the preceding session of Congress, Mr. Grimes
introduced a bill concerning Letters of Marque and Reprisal,
but he was unable to secure the action of the Senate upon it.
January 7, 1863, he again asked for its consideration, when, on
motion of Mr. Sumner, it was referred to the Committee on Naval
Affairs. January 20th, it was reported from the Committee by
Mr. Hale, with amendments. February 14th, Mr. Grimes moved to
proceed with its consideration. In opposing this motion, Mr.
Sumner said:--

MR. PRESIDENT,--It seems to me that this bill is in all respects a misconception. There is nothing now to justify letters of marque and reprisal; and when Senators say that Massachusetts is interested in their issue, I repel the suggestion. Sir, Massachusetts is interested in putting down the Rebellion. She is also interested in clearing the sea of pirates. Such is her open and unquestionable interest, and to this end she is concerned in the employment of all possible agencies consistent with the civilization of our day. Massachusetts is interested in the enlargement of the marine, national and private, and I add, also, in the present enlistment of the private marine in the national service; but this is very different from the issue of letters of marque.

…

I think the Senator from Iowa is misled by a phrase. He speaks of the militia of the sea. It is a captivating phrase, I admit; but the meaning is not entirely clear. The Senator finds it in privateers,--that is, private armed ships, belonging to private individuals, under the command of private persons, cruising against private commerce, and paid exclusively by booty. Such is his idea of a sea militia. I confess this is not very captivating to me. My idea of a sea militia is different. It is all the ships of the country, if the occasion require, under the national flag, in the service of the country as national ships, with the character of national ships, enjoying everywhere the immunities of national ships, and free from the suspicions always attaching to the privateer, wherever it appears. An enactment, authorizing the employment of the mercantile marine in the national service as part of the national navy, would be practical and reasonable. Such a marine might justly be called the militia of the sea; but I must protest against the deceptive militia of the Senator.

The bill was taken up by a vote of 31 yeas and 6 nays; but,
after ordering the printing of amendments, it was postponed.

February 17th, it was taken up again, when Mr. Sumner spoke in
reply to Mr. Grimes.

MR. PRESIDENT,--The Senator from Iowa [Mr. GRIMES], who has just taken his seat, ingeniously and elaborately vindicates a bill which, at least in one feature, is an innovation upon the original policy of our country; and, strange to say, while doing so, he pleads for what he calls our traditional policy. I, too, plead for our traditional policy, but not the policy of the Senator. And I plead also for a policy which, whether traditional or not, will provide for the national defence according to that best economy which takes counsel of prudence as well as of courage.

The Senator, with seeming triumph, asks if we can afford to declare that our whole private marine shall rot at the wharf. Clearly not, and nobody proposes to declare so, although we might as well do this as recklessly provoke war which must drive our commerce from the ocean,--if in no other way, by the increased rates of insurance. I would secure for our private marine the amplest opportunity, that it may continue without interruption to plough every sea with its keels, and that, wherever it appears, it may find its accustomed welcome. The policy of the Senator has no such promise.

All will concur in any practical measure at this time for the increase of our strength on the ocean. To this end my vote shall not be wanting. But to my mind it is clear to demonstration that the measure proposed is not practical in character, that it promises no result which cannot be reached better in another way, while it is almost sure to bring upon the country additional embarrassment. It may be bold, but I am sure it is not prudent, nor is there in it economy of any kind.

This bill is entitled, “Concerning Letters of Marque, Prizes, and Prize Goods.” The title is borrowed from the two statutes of 1812 and 1813. It is, in plain terms, a bill to authorize _Privateers_,--that is, private armed vessels licensed to cruise against the commerce of an enemy, and looking to booty for support, compensation, and salary. It is by booty that owners, officers, and crews are to be paid. Booty is the motive power and life-spring. Such is this bill on its face, without going into detail. Surely a bill of this character ought not to pass without strong reason.

Looking at the bill more closely, it is found to have two distinct features: _first_, as a new agency against the Rebellion; _secondly_, as a provision for privateers in any future war. I regard these two features as distinct. They may be considered separately. One may be right, and the other wrong. One may be adopted, and the other rejected.

So far as the bill promises substantial help in putting down the Rebellion without more than countervailing mischief, it may properly be entertained. But what can it do against the Rebellion? And where is the policy or necessity on which it is founded? If Senators think that the bill can do any good now, I am sure they listen to their hopes rather than to the evidence. Why, Sir, the Rebels, against whom you would cruise, are absolutely without commerce. Pirate ships they have, equipped in England, armed to the teeth, and unleashed upon the sea to prey upon us; but there is not a single bottom of theirs that can afford the booty which is the pay and incentive of the privateer. It would be hardly more irrational to enlist private armed ships against the King of Dahomey.

I know it is said that our navy is too small, and that more ships are needed, not only for transportation, but also to increase and strengthen the blockade, or to cruise against pirates. Very well. Hire them, and put them in commission as Government ships, with the immunities, the responsibilities, and the character of such ships. There can be no difficulty in this; and, better still, there will be no difficulty afterwards. This is simple and practical.

But, while I see no probable good from launching privateers upon the ocean to cruise against a commerce that does not exist, and to be paid by a booty that cannot be found, I see certain evils which I am anxious to avoid for the sake of my country, especially at this moment. I think that I cannot be mistaken in this anxiety.

It is well known, that, according to ancient usage and the Law of Nations, every privateer is entitled to belligerent rights, one of which is that most difficult, delicate, and dangerous right, the much disputed Right of Search. There is no Right of War with regard to which nations are more sensitive,--and no nation has been more sensitive than our own, while none has suffered more from its exercise. By virtue of this right, every licensed sea-rover is entitled on the ocean to stop and overhaul all merchant vessels under whatever flag. If he cannot capture, he can at least annoy. If he cannot make prize, he can at least make trouble, and leave behind a sting. I know not what course the great neutral powers may adopt, nor do I see how they can undertake to set aside this ancient right, even if they smart under its exercise. But when I consider that these powers have already by solemn convention--I refer, of course, to the Congress of Paris in 1856--renounced the whole system of privateers among themselves, I confess my fears that they will not witness with perfect calmness the annoyance to which their commerce will be exposed. And now, Sir, mark my prediction. Every exercise upon neutral commerce of this terrible Right of Search will be the fruitful occasion of misunderstanding, bickering, and controversy, at a moment when, if my voice could prevail, there should be nothing to interfere with that accord, harmony, and sympathy which are due from civilized states to our Republic in its great battle with Barbarism. Even if we are not encouraged to expect these things from Europe, I hope that nothing will be done by us to put impediments in their way. Justly sensitive with regard to our own rights, let us respect the sensibility of others.

It is not enough to say that we have an unquestioned right to issue letters of marque. Rights, when exercised out of season or imprudently, may be changed into wrongs. It was a maxim of ancient jurisprudence, _Sic utere tua, ut alienum non lædas_, and I think that this maxim, at least in spirit, is applicable to the present occasion. Our right may be clear; but, if its exercise would injure or annoy others, especially without corresponding advantage to ourselves, we shall do well, if we forbear to exercise it.

Thus far I have considered that part of the bill which provides for privateers against the Rebels; but I cannot quit this branch of the question without calling attention again to the scenes that must ensue, if these privateers are let loose. Picture to yourselves the ocean traversed by licensed rovers seeking prey. The Dutch admiral carried a broom at his mast-head as the boastful sign that he swept the seas. The privateer might carry a scourge. Wherever a sail appears, there is chase; the signal gun is fired, and the merchantman submits to visitation and search. Delay is the least of the consequences. Contention, irritation, humiliation ensue, all calculated to engender ill-feeling, which, beginning with individuals, may embrace country and government. I do not say that such an act, even harshly exercised upon neutral commerce, will bring upon us further war, but I would not try the experiment. The speaking-trumpet of a reckless privateer may contribute to that discord which is the herald of bloodshed itself.

But, Sir, even if you think it worth while to authorize privateers against the Rebels, to cruise against an imaginary commerce, in quest of an imaginary booty, why not stop there? The measure would not be wise, but it might find seeming apology in the present condition of affairs. The bill of the Committee, and also the amendment of the Senator from Iowa, go much further. It is a general bill, authorizing privateers, not merely against the Rebels, but also against foreign nations in future wars, in the discretion of the President. I quote from the bill of the Committee.

“That, whenever war exists or has been declared between the
United States and any other nation, and during the present
Rebellion, the President of the United States is hereby
authorized to issue to private vessels of the United States
commissions or letters of marque and general reprisal, in such
form as he may think proper.”

Mark the language, “whenever war exists.” I am not ready to say that these words give the President power to declare the existence of war without the intervention of Congress; but I object to the whole clause on account of its generality. And the substitute of the Senator is obnoxious to the same objection. It says:--

“That, _in all domestic and foreign wars_, the President of the
United States is authorized to issue to private armed vessels
of the United States commissions or letters of marque and
general reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper.”

This is a general provision, by which the President is authorized to issue letters of marque, not only to aid in putting down the present Rebellion, but also “in all domestic and foreign wars” which may occur hereafter. I will not say that any such general, prospective provision, although clearly a departure from that traditional policy which the Senator professes to uphold, is positively unconstitutional; but I am sure that it is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. To me it seems obvious that the Constitution contemplated the special action of Congress on every occasion for the exercise of this power. This was the safeguard against excess or blunder. Such a power was not to be exercised hastily or inconsiderately, but with full and special consideration. It was not to be exercised all at once and in the lump, but as the exigency occurred in individual cases. And Congress, which was empowered to declare war, had the further power, in the same way and with similar solemnities, to give the war this additional feature, if, under the circumstances, it thought best. This great power was not handed over indefinitely to the President, to be wielded at will, but was lodged in Congress. If Congress is not insensible to the spirit of the Constitution, it will never hand it over to the President, as now proposed.

Even in England, where the power to declare war is lodged with the sovereign in council, it seems that in point of fact letters of marque are regulated by special Acts of Parliament on the breaking out of war. This is stated by Chitty, in his work on the Prerogatives of the Crown.

“By various statutes, _enacted during every war_, the Lord High
Admiral, or the Commissioners of the Admiralty, are empowered
to grant commissions, or, as they are also called, letters of
marque and reprisals, to the owners of ships, enabling them to
attack and take the property of his Majesty’s enemies, which
statutes contain, also, various provisions as to the prizes
captured. (See 29 George II. c. 34; 19 George III. c. 67; 43
George III. c. 160; 45 George III. c. 72.)”[140]

Obviously recognizing this principle, which is so entirely consistent with reason and that wisdom which is the strength of nations, our country thus far in its history has declined to pass any general prospective law authorizing letters of marque. This is our traditional policy, which the Senator seeks to overturn. The statute authorizing letters of marque in 1812 expired with the war. It was not general or prospective. Is there any reason now that we should depart from this policy? Is there any good to be accomplished by such departure? It is strange that at this moment, when other nations renounce privateering, we should rush forward and ostentatiously declare it part of our political system,--I might almost say, an element of our political life. Pray, if this declaration were of such importance, why has it been so long postponed? Generations, jealous guardians of all our national rights, have passed away, leaving the statute-book without any such voice. It did not occur to them that the national defence or the national honor required it. And yet the discovery is suddenly made that this is a mistake, or that our predecessors were all wrong, especially in not announcing to the world that in the event of war privateers will be let loose.

As there is no foreign war in which we are now engaged, this provision is prospective and minatory, so far as foreign nations are concerned. It is notice to avoid any question with us, under penalty of depredations by privateers. If not a menace, it is very like one. I do not know that it will be so interpreted by those to whom it is addressed, but I am sure that it can do no good; and just in proportion as it is so interpreted, it will be worse than useless. A menace is as ill-timed between nations as between individuals.

I do not dwell now on the irrational character of privateering, but I seize the occasion to declare my deliberate judgment that our country may yet find, to its cost, that this cherished weapon is a two-edged sword. A nation with an extensive commerce cannot afford to invite the hazard of its employment. Thus, in the event of war with a power inferior to ourselves in commerce, as Portugal, or Spain, or France, the increased rates of insurance would make it impossible for us to keep our ships afloat, while all our profits on the ocean would be appropriated by those nations happily still at peace. The very superiority of our commerce would be a disadvantage, inasmuch as we should be more exposed. For instance, in a war with Portugal or Spain we should stake gold against copper, and even in a war with France it would be gold against silver. If this prospect pleases, then Senators will vote for a measure which may be called _Privateering made easy; or, how to do it without Congress_.

Nor do I discuss the immorality and brutality too naturally engendered by a system whose inspiration is booty. Here I content myself with the words of General Halleck, in his excellent summary of International Law.

“But, even with these precautions, privateering is usually
accompanied by abuses and enormous excesses. The use of
privateers, or private armed vessels under letters of marque
and reprisal, has often been discussed by publicists and
text-writers on International Law, and has recently been made
the subject of diplomatic correspondence and negotiation
between the United States and the principal European powers.
The general opinion of text-writers is, that privateering,
though contrary to national policy and the more enlightened
spirit of the present age, is, nevertheless, allowable under
the general rules of International Law. _It leads to the worst
excesses and crimes, and has a most corrupting influence upon
all who engage in it_, but cannot be punished as a breach of
the Law of Nations. _The enlightened opinion of the world is
most decidedly in favor of abolishing it_, and recent events
lead to the hope that all the commercial nations of both
hemispheres will unite in no longer resorting, in time of war,
to so barbarous a practice.”[141]

There is another American authority I ought not to omit. I refer to Chancellor Kent, who in his much quoted Commentaries has recorded his judgment. If I chose to cross the ocean, I might add indefinitely to this testimony; but I confine myself to our own countrymen, so that you shall see privateering as judged by Americans. Here are the words of the great jurist.

“As a necessary precaution against abuse, the owners of
privateers are required, by the ordinances of the commercial
states, to give adequate security that they will conduct
the cruise according to the laws and usages of war and the
instructions of the Government, and that they will regard the
rights of neutrals, and bring their prizes in for adjudication.
These checks are essential to the character and safety of
maritime nations. _Privateering, under all the restrictions
which have been adopted, is very liable to abuse._ The object
is not fame or chivalric warfare, but plunder and profit. The
discipline of the crews is not apt to be of the highest order,
_and privateers are often guilty of enormous excesses, and
become the scourge of neutral commerce_. They are sometimes
manned and officered by foreigners, having no permanent
connection with the country, or interest in its cause. This was
a complaint made by the United States, in 1819, in relation to
irregularities and acts of atrocity committed by private armed
vessels sailing under the flag of Buenos Ayres. _Under the best
regulations, the business tends strongly to blunt the sense of
private right and to nourish a lawless and fierce spirit of
rapacity._”[142]

It is well known that these were the sentiments of the founders of our Republic, which, in its early treaty with Prussia, took the lead in denouncing the whole system of privateering. Is it not better to follow this example, until positive, irresistible exigencies of war compel us to depart from it? If we cannot do this, let us at least keep from affording new facilities to an offensive system. What our country denounced in other days should not now be proclaimed and glorified.

MR. GRIMES. The Senator will allow me to inquire when it was
that this nation denounced the system of privateering.

MR. SUMNER. By the treaty of 1785.

MR. GRIMES. The Prussian treaty, I suppose.

MR. SUMNER. The Prussian treaty.

MR. GRIMES. I should like to know the purport of that
denunciation. Was it not a mere stipulation that we should not
prey on the commerce of that nation?

MR. SUMNER. It was a stipulation to the effect, that, in any war between the United States and Prussia, neither party should commission privateers to depredate on the commerce of the other.

MR. GRIMES. A stipulation that I suppose this Government could
very easily make, because Prussia has no commerce.

MR. SUMNER. I wish the treaty had been such as to afford a stronger example; but it must be accepted as the judgment of our country at that time; and to my mind it is a practical denunciation of privateering, worthy of the illustrious character by whom it was negotiated, who was none other than Benjamin Franklin. But this treaty is not all. I do not forget how Jefferson wrote to France, “The benevolence of this proposition is worthy of the nation from which it comes, and our sentiments on it have been declared in the treaty to which you are pleased to refer, as well as in some others which have been proposed,”[143] thus testifying to our treaty and to his own sentiments; and, at a later day, that John Quincy Adams, in his instructions to Mr. Rush, of July 28, 1823, directing him to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain for the abolition of privateering, declared that this was “an object which has long been dear to the hearts and ardent in the aspirations of the benevolent and the wise, an object essentially congenial to the true spirit of Christianity”; and he adopted the earlier declaration of Franklin, “It is time, it is high time, for the sake of humanity, that a stop were put to this enormity.”[144]

MR. GRIMES. I am speaking now of the declaration which the
Senator has seen fit to designate as a national denunciation
of privateers, made in 1785, though the Constitution, which
was made in 1787, expressly reserved to Congress the power to
issue letters of marque and reprisal. Taking these two facts,
the treaty made in 1785 and the Constitution made in 1787, how
can it be asserted that the ancient policy of the Government is
against privateering, and that we have nationally denounced it?

MR. SUMNER. The Senator will pardon me, if I say that I know no better denunciation than that of a treaty negotiated by Franklin. A treaty is the act of the nation, and testifies to the sentiments of the nation. If the same denunciation did not find place in more important treaties, it is reasonable to suppose that it was not acceptable to the other contracting parties. It is an historic fact, that Franklin sought to embody this denunciation in the very treaty by which our independence was acknowledged, and thus to associate it with our national being.[145] Indeed, it was a standing offer from our Government to foreign powers.[146] Unquestionably the Constitution gives Congress the power to issue letters of marque, but the reason is obvious: because privateering was recognized at that time as a proper agency of war. The framers of the Constitution did not divest the government they created of a power which belonged to other governments according to the existing usage of nations. In recognizing this power, they express no opinion upon its character. For that we must go to the treaty, and to the words and efforts of Franklin, Jefferson, and John Quincy Adams, speaking and acting officially for the nation,--all but Franklin subsequent to the Constitution.

And now, Sir, at the risk of repetition, I enumerate my objections to this bill.

1. It proposes to cruise against a non-existent commerce, for the sake of a non-existent booty.

2. It accords to private individuals the belligerent right of search, which must be fruitful of trouble in our relations with the great neutral powers.

3. It gives to the President, in his discretion, the power to issue letters of marque in any future wars, without any further authority of Congress, when this power should always wait for the special authority of Congress on the declaration of war.

4. It is in the nature of a menace to foreign nations, and therefore worse than useless.

5. It vitalizes and legalizes a system which civilization always accepted with reluctance, and our own country was one of the earliest and most persistent to denounce.

6. It will give us a bad name in history.

It does all this without accomplishing any substantial good. If it be said that ships are needed for transportation, or for the blockade, or in order to pursue pirates on the sea, then, I repeat, let the Government hire them. The way is easy, and it is also the way of peace. To this end I offer a substitute for the present bill, which will secure to the Government all the aid it can desire, without the disadvantage or shame of a measure which can be justified only by overruling necessity. I will read the substitute.

“That the Secretary of the Navy be authorized to hire any
vessels needed for the national service, and, if he sees fit,
to put them in charge of officers commissioned by the United
States, and to give them in every respect the character of
national ships.”

If Senators desire a militia of the seas, here it is,--a sea militia, precisely like the land militia, mustered into the service of the United States, under the command of the United States, and receiving rations and pay from the United States, instead of sea-rovers, not mustered into the national service, not under national command, and not receiving rations or pay from the nation, but cruising each for himself, according to his own will, without direction, without concert, simply according to the wild temptation of booty. Such a system on land would be rejected at once. Nobody would call it a militia. Do not sanction it now on the ocean; or, if you are disposed to sanction it, call it not a militia of the seas.

The bill was then amended, on motion of Mr. Sherman, by
limiting it to “three years from the passage of this Act.”

Mr. Sumner then moved to strike out the words “in all domestic
and foreign wars,” and to insert “to aid in putting down the
present Rebellion,” so that it would read,--

“That, _to aid in putting down the present Rebellion_, the
President of the United States is authorized to issue to
private armed vessels of the United States commissions,” &c.

On this motion he remarked:--

MR. PRESIDENT,--The question is now presented precisely, whether the Senate will confine this bill in operation to the war in which we are actually engaged for the suppression of the Rebellion, or make it prospective in character, applicable to some war in the unknown future, to some country not named, to some exigency not now understood, and therefore, in its nature, a notice or warning, if not a menace, to all countries.

This is the precise question: Shall the bill be confined to our own time, to this day, to this hour, to something we can see, to what is actually before us; or shall it be extended also to the future, to something we cannot see, to what is not actually before us, and with regard to which we can have no knowledge, unless we listen to our fears?

If the words are introduced as a menace, then are they out of place and irrational. Suppose any such words in the legislation of Great Britain or France at a moment when they might be interpreted as applicable to us, who can doubt their injurious effect upon public opinion here? A brave and intelligent people will not bend before menace, nor can any such attempt affect a well-considered national policy. All history and reason show that such conduct is more irritating than soothing. Sir, if you are in earnest, as I cannot doubt, to cultivate those relations of peace and good-will with foreign nations which are in themselves a cheap defence, you must avoid all legislation which can be misinterpreted, especially everything which looks like menace.

I cannot pretend to foresee the future. I know not that other wars may not be in store for us, that we may not be called to confront other powers, in alliance, perhaps, with our Rebels, and to make still greater efforts. All this may come; but I pray not. If it does come, then let us meet its duties and responsibilities like Senators; but do not rush forward recklessly, like the bully with his bludgeon, ready to strike wherever there is a head. I do not believe in such legislation; nor do I believe in any legislation providing new facilities for a war, or tending to produce irritation and distrust. Prepared always for the future, I would not challenge it. Preparation and provocation are widely different. Nor would I do anything out of season. There was characteristic wisdom in the remark of the venerable Chief Justice of England, Sir Matthew Hale, when he said that “we must not jump before we get to the stile.” It seems to me that Senators who are pressing this bill forget this time-honored injunction, and try to make their country take a jump prematurely.

…

You have just listened to the Senator from California [Mr. MCDOUGALL], announcing that perhaps before the next meeting of Congress there may be foreign war; and you have not forgotten his elaborate speech only the other day, when he openly challenged war with France. I ask Senators, if, at this critical moment, they are ready to follow him in his effort to carry us in that direction. For myself, I protest against it. I am heart and soul for putting down this Rebellion without playing into the hands of Rebels. Now it must be plain to all that every word calculated to draw or drive any foreign government into alliance with the Rebellion does play into the hands of Rebels. Senators may be willing to distract the attention of the country from our single object, to impair the national force, and help surrender all to the uncertainties and horrors of accumulating war. Let me not enter into their counsels. It is not my habit to shrink from responsibility; personal risks I accept willingly; but I confess anxiety that my country should not rush abroad in quest of new dangers, whose only effect will be to increase the national calamities.