Chapter II (3)

But the Senator says it is a capitation or poll tax. Not, Sir, in the sense of the Constitution. On this I stand. It is simply a tax on a productive claim of property, or, to borrow the language of the Senator a moment ago, on an “employment.” It is nothing but that.

The Senator thinks it improper to tax slave-masters, especially when we have cotton for taxation; and he almost chides me, because yesterday I was against the cotton tax, which in his judgment is most proper. Sir, I am at a loss to find the parallel between the two cases implied in supposing that one can be a substitute for the other. They are unlike in every respect. Slaves and cotton belong to the same section of country, precisely as alligators and cotton; and that is all the parallel between them. Cotton is an agricultural product, entering into commerce and manufactures, while the manufactures made from it are important to all classes, but especially the poor. The question of its taxation involves considerations of economy and policy utterly unlike those arising on the motion to tax the claim of the slave-master. It is difficult to see how the two taxes can be confounded. One is a tax on an agricultural product; the other is a tax on an odious claim. The Senator will not say that it is an acceptable claim under the Constitution. Even if there, it is disguised under ambiguous words. Indeed, he knows well that it is offensive and repugnant to the conscience of good people. Shall not such a claim be taxed? Shall such a claim be permitted to go scot-free? Shall we run about the country, seeking class after class to visit with oppressive taxation, and, under the lead of the Senator, excuse this largest and most offensive class of all? I am at a loss to understand on what ground of principle the Senator can proceed, when he proposes this special immunity. If I use strong terms in describing slave-masters, it is because the very language of the bill suggests them, and they are in essential conformity with truth.

I believe I have answered the two objections made by the Senator from Ohio. If he made any other, it has escaped my recollection.

Mr. Sherman followed Mr. Sumner, beginning with these words:--

“I will not reply to that part of the speech of the
honorable Senator from Massachusetts in which he denounced
slaveholders. My opinions on this subject are well known.
I think that slaveholders have certain rights under the
Constitution of the United States; and while I never
could be one myself, and have as deep a repugnance to any
law which authorizes the holding of slaves as any other
man, yet, while I am here under oath, I will respect
their constitutional rights to the fullest extent. We
are bound to legislate for them, and they are entitled
to the protection of the Constitution of the United
States as fully as if they were here, all of them, to
speak for themselves; and especially I do not think it
proper or courteous to use such language, applied to a
whole class of people, when Senators on this floor are
with us, associating with us, who are included by the
appellation ‘slaveholder,’ so obnoxious to the Senator from
Massachusetts. Certainly I cannot characterize so harshly
any one who is a member of the same body with myself.”[66]

He then said that he intended “to put the proposition to tax
cotton and the proposition to tax slaves against each other,”
and that he would “propose to amend the amendment of the
Senator from Massachusetts by substituting a modified tax on
cotton,”--that “they are connected together, and the Senator
cannot disconnect them.” He then spoke of slave-masters again.

“The slaveholders of the Revolution were men of the highest
purity, of the greatest patriotism. At that time Slavery
was admitted to be an evil. They were men of gentleness, of
courtesy, of kindness, good hearts and good heads, nearly
all of them; and so are the great body of the slaveholders
with whom you are brought in contact in the Border States,
men of gentleness and kindness and courtesy.… Many of the
most gentlemanly, courteous, kind, and patriotic men that I
ever met in the world were slaveholders; and I think, that,
taken as a class, the slaveholders of the Border States
are men who are deserving of our commiseration, of our
kindness, rather than of our reproaches.… I do not choose
to select that class of men from among all the population
of the Southern States and tax them, and then to apply to
them opprobrious epithets.”[67]

Mr. Sumner felt called to speak again in reply, and said:--

The Senator from Ohio says that I propose a tax on “slaves,” and then carefully reminds me that “slaves” are persons, and therefore not, according to the Constitution, to be taxed, except by a capitation tax. Now, Sir, I have to say, in the first place, that the tax which I propose is not to be regarded as a tax on slaves. If applicable to persons, it is to the masters, and not to the slaves. It is a tax on slave-masters, as I have already said,--precisely like the tax on auctioneers, which is sustained by the Senator. It is a tax on a claim of property made by slave-masters. The Senator may call such a claim property or not, as he pleases. It is at least a claim of property, and as such I propose to tax it. Why not? The Senator admits that at other times slaves have been expressly taxed,--actually taxed in name. In the tax of 1815 there was a tax on “land _and slaves_.” The Senator does not doubt the constitutionality of such tax. Sir, I am content with this authority, which goes beyond anything that I propose, and I am not troubled by any scruple, lest, in imposing a tax on the claim of the slave-master, I recognize property in man. At most, I recognize a profitable claim, and tax it.

The remarks of the Senator were occupied chiefly with two heads,--first, eulogy of slave-masters, and, secondly, vindication of his proposed tax on cotton. I have little to say of the Senator’s eulogy. There are two authorities on that head, which the Senator will pardon me, if I place above him: I mean Mr. Jefferson and Colonel Mason, both of our early Revolutionary days. Mr. Jefferson assures us that the whole commerce between master and slave is one of boisterous passion, tending to barbarism.[68] Colonel Mason exclaimed, in the Convention to frame the Constitution, that every slave-master is born a petty tyrant.[69] And yet, Sir, in the face of this authentic testimony, from persons who knew Slavery and all its influences, the Senator eulogizes slave-masters, and pleads for their exemption from taxation. Eulogy is for the dead. I would not add to the odium justly belonging to a tyrannical class, but I do insist that justice shall be done to their victims; and when the Senator interposes eulogy, I interpose against him the rights which have been violated. So long as men persist in such outrage, so long as they persevere in maintaining an institution which annuls the parental relation, the conjugal relation, the right to instruction, the right to the fruit of one’s own labor, and does all this merely to make men work without wages, so long as men support this unjust and irrational pretence, they must not expect soft words from me. If the Senator from Ohio finds it in his generosity to plead for slave-masters, he must excuse me, if I decline to follow him. He does not know them as well as I do, nor does he know their victims as well as I do.

The Senator dwells much on the importance of a tax on cotton. The subject was fully canvassed yesterday, and the vote of the Senate was against him. He now seeks a re-hearing out of the ordinary course. Would it not be better, if his proposition were postponed to the next stage of the bill, when it will be strictly in order? Meanwhile, in pursuance of my promise to be brief, I content myself with saying, that the desire of the Senate to tax cotton is no reason why they should refuse to tax the claim of the slave-master. The two are not in any way dependent upon each other. Let the Senator from Ohio carry his cotton tax, if the Senate agree with him. But, Sir, I insist, that, whether cotton is taxed or not, the claim of the slave-master shall not be permitted to escape. I do not say the property, but I say the claim. It ought to be taxed, not only for revenue, but also for the discouragement it will fasten upon an odious pretension, which has been to us the fountain of trouble and war.

Mr. Sherman’s motion to strike out the tax on slave-masters and
insert the tax on cotton was then lost,--Yeas 15, Nays 22.

* * * * *

Mr. Henderson, of Missouri, then moved to amend the amendment
of Mr. Sumner by adding,--

“_And provided, further_, That the tax herein prescribed
shall not be levied or collected in any State where a
system of gradual emancipation may have been adopted at the
time of the collection.”

May 29th, this was lost,--Yeas 15, Nays 20.

Then, on motion of Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Sumner’s amendment was
further modified by substituting a tax of “two” dollars,
instead of “five,” on account of each slave. Before the vote
was taken, Mr. Sumner assigned the reason for the higher rate.

The Senator from Maine [Mr. FESSENDEN] said that he had looked simply at the revenue to be obtained by a tax. But, pray, will not a larger revenue be obtained at the rate of five dollars than at the rate of two? There are the slaves,--count them, and tax them. The process is simple, with no chance of evasion. Besides, Sir, I cannot forget, nor can the Senator, that throughout our history we have heard constantly of “incidental protection.” But, if incidental protection is just and expedient, then is incidental discouragement, and the tax I propose may be sustained on this ground. We do not hesitate to tax whiskey and tobacco as luxuries, indulgences, vices. Why should we hesitate to tax the worst luxury, the worst indulgence, the worst vice of all, which is Slavery? Therefore, for a double reason, first, for the sake of revenue, and, secondly, for the sake of discouragement to Slavery, I am for the larger tax.

After further debate, the question was taken on the amendment
of Mr. Sumner as modified, and resulted, Yeas 14, Nays 22. So
the amendment was lost.

* * * * *

June 5th, at the next stage of the bill, Mr. Sumner moved his
amendment in the following form:--

“_And be it further enacted_, That every person claiming
the service or labor of any other person as a slave shall
pay a tax of two dollars on account of every person so
claimed: but in no case shall any person so claimed be sold
for the purpose of collecting the tax.”

The yeas and nays were ordered, and, being taken, resulted,
Yeas 19, Nays 16. So the amendment was agreed to.

* * * * *

June 6th, Mr. Anthony, of Rhode Island, who had voted for
the tax on slaves, moved a reconsideration, not because he
had changed his opinion, but, as he said, at the request of
Senators. This was to give an opportunity for another vote.

In the debate which ensued the amendment was assailed by Mr.
Doolittle, Mr. Browning, Mr. Cowan, and Mr. Hale. The latter
quoted the words,--

“And if we cannot alter things,
Egad, we’ll change their names, Sir,”[70]--

and insisted, that, however it might be called, it was a tax on
slaves; on which Mr. Wade remarked from his seat, “So much the
better.” Mr. Sumner said in reply:--

MR. PRESIDENT,--I presume there is no difference among Senators in desire to follow the Constitution. The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. HALE], on my right, cannot be more desirous to follow it than the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. WILMOT], on my left. In that respect they are equal. Nor do I believe that the Senator from Illinois [Mr. BROWNING], over the way, can claim any particular monopoly of such devotion. In that respect, Sir, we are all equal. Our difference is as to the meaning of the Constitution. But it is a poor argument which finds its chief force in asseverations of devotion to the Constitution. Conscious of my obligation to support it, and of my loyalty, I make no such asseverations.

Nor again, Sir, do I believe that the Senator from New Hampshire can take to himself any monopoly of praise for denying the whole offensive pretension of property in man. Is he more earnest in this denial than many other Senators? Is he more earnest than the Senator from Pennsylvania near me? Is he more earnest than myself? Has he denied it oftener in debate or public speech? To me the pretension is absurd as it is wicked. A man may as well claim property in a star as in his fellow-man. And yet, Sir, with this conviction, I cannot forget that I am here, as a Senator, to legislate with regard to existing institutions, and to see things as they are. I cannot be blind to the _fact of Slavery_. Slavery exists as a monstrous fact, an enormity, if you please, but still it exists; and as a legislator I am to act on its existence. Am I not right? Can I presume on this occasion to be guided by my inner conviction that there is no property in man, when, looking to the Slave States, I am compelled to see the great, unquestionable fact of pretended property? To my mind, it is more practical to recognize the fact, and to proceed accordingly.

The Senator from Illinois insists that this is a capitation tax, and he reads the text of the Constitution. What is a capitation tax? The precise definition in Webster’s Dictionary--if the Senator will excuse me for going to an authority which is not a law book--is “a tax or imposition upon each head or person, a poll tax.” Such is the tax with regard to which the provision of the Constitution read by the Senator was adopted. This provision is not applicable to any other tax, but simply to this special tax.

Already I have reminded the Senator that he has voted to tax auctioneers, to tax jugglers, to tax the slaughterers of cattle, and to tax lawyers. I might add other classes. I now propose that he should tax claimants of slaves, a class offensive to reason and humanity. That is all. If you look at the census of 1850,--that of 1860 is not yet published,--you will find among the different classes of our population the following: mariners, 70,000,--I will not give the hundreds; merchants, 100,000; planters, 27,000; wheelwrights, 30,000; teachers, 29,000; tailors, 52,000; overseers, 18,000; lawyers, 23,000; farmers, 2,363,000; slaveholders, 347,000.

Now, Sir, would any one say that a tax on the business of the mariner was a capitation tax? Would any one say that a tax on the business of merchants, of whom we have one hundred thousand, was a capitation tax? Would any one say that a tax on the business of the planter was a capitation tax? that a tax on the business of the wheelwright was a capitation tax? that a tax on the business of teachers was a capitation tax? that a tax on the business of tailors was a capitation tax? that a tax on the business of overseers of plantations, who apply the lash, of whom there are eighteen thousand, was a capitation tax? that a tax on lawyers, already voted by the Senator from Illinois, was a capitation tax? that a tax on farmers, if you will, of whom, happily, we have two million three hundred and sixty-three thousand, was a capitation tax? And will any one say that a tax on slave-masters, of whom, unhappily, we have three hundred and forty-seven thousand, is a capitation tax? Senators may imagine it a capitation tax, Senators may call it a capitation tax, but no imagination and no energy of assertion can make it so. It is not a capitation tax. It is a tax on the claim of the slave-master in the bones and muscles, the labor and service of his fellow-man, and, so far as the tax can have any influence, it must discredit and discourage such claim. Therefore, Sir, I say confidently that the tax is in every respect constitutional, and it is also a tax well worthy of adoption, because, at a moment when Slavery stands revealed as the very pest of our land, it will operate to discredit and discourage it.

In no other way can you obtain so much revenue so easily and so beneficently. But if you refuse to impose this tax, you concede a special immunity to a most offensive pretension, and leave those who profit by it to gather their profits without any of that burden so freely imposed upon the honest industry of the country, and upon so many classes of our citizens.

The motion to reconsider was carried,--Yeas 22, Nays 18.

The question then recurred on the amendment, and it was
lost,--Yeas 17, Nays 23.

* * * * *

This narrative shows how the effort to tax Slavery finally
failed, not on its merits, but from tenderness to slave-masters
of the Border States.

PROPER DESPATCH OF BUSINESS.

REMARKS IN THE SENATE, ON THE ORDER OF BUSINESS, MAY 30, 1862.

In the pressure of business before the Senate, it was proposed
to sit into the night on the Internal Tax Bill. Mr. Sumner
spoke against this proposition.

MR. PRESIDENT,--If I recollect aright, the Tax Bill was considered in the House of Representatives more than three weeks, and it is well known that there are rules for the limit of debate in that body which do not prevail in the Senate.

MR. HALE. But which ought to prevail here.

MR. SUMNER. They do not prevail here, and we are to take things as they are. Now, Sir, shall we limit debate? Shall we cut it off more or less? In the absence of rules by which it may be done, we are asked to do it by protracting the daily session into the night, in other words, by night sessions, and so hurrying the bill to a final vote. I do not think this advisable. The matters in question are too important for such summary process. Each day has its debate on questions of detail, which multiply as we proceed; but there are two or three questions of principle not yet considered, though already before us, including that opened yesterday by the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. ANTHONY], and another to be presented by the Senator from California [Mr. MCDOUGALL], involving a review of different systems of taxation. Is it supposed that such questions can be properly considered in a single day, or in two days, so that then we shall be ready to vote? To my mind it is not possible.

But if possible, I repeat, it is not advisable, and, believe me, Sir, I say this from no disposition to shirk business or duty here. I have not been out of my seat three minutes since this bill was taken up, nor, indeed, have I been out of my seat a half-hour since the session began. Therefore I do not fall under the judgment of the Senator from Maine [Mr. FESSENDEN] with regard to those who prefer that debate should be allowed to proceed, even at the expense of time. I am ready for work; but I think we shall all do best, if this important measure is considered without haste, if not entirely without rest, according to the customary order of business.

SHUTTING UP OF COLORED SCHOOLS BY THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA.

RESOLUTION AND REMARKS IN THE SENATE, JUNE 2, 1862.

Hon. Edward Stanly was appointed by the President Provisional
Governor of North Carolina, and Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee.
The former signalized his arrival at his post by an official
movement against schools for colored children, as forbidden by
“the laws of the State,” meaning the Black Code, before the war.

Mr. Vincent Colyer, who had opened a school for colored
children at Newbern, came at once to Washington. Arriving
at the close of the day, he reported immediately to Mr.
Sumner, who without delay hurried to the Executive Mansion,
and, not finding the President there, followed him to the
War Department. Mr. Sumner related what had occurred, when
the President, with an impatience which Mr. Sumner never
encountered from him on any other occasion, exclaimed, “Do
you take me for a School-Committee-man?” Mr. Sumner replied
promptly: “Not at all; I take you for President of the United
States; and I come with a case of wrong, in attending to which
your predecessor, George Washington, if alive, might add to
his renown.” The President changed his tone, and with perfect
kindness proceeded to consider the case.

Mr. Sumner lost no time in laying it before the Senate.

June 2d, he offered the following resolution:--

“_Resolved_, That the Secretary of War be requested to
communicate to the Senate copies of any commissions
or orders from his Department undertaking to appoint
Provisional Governors in Tennessee and North Carolina, with
the instructions given to the Governors.”

By unanimous consent, the Senate proceeded to consider the
resolution, when Mr. Sumner said:--

MR. PRESIDENT,--I shall not stop to consider any question touching the power to appoint Governors of States. My object is different. It is to expose a case of peculiar interest and importance, with regard to which I have a statement worthy of confidence. From this it appears that one of the first acts of Mr. Stanly, on arrival at Newbern, North Carolina, and assuming his responsible duties as Provisional Governor, was to announce that the school there for the education of colored children, recently opened by Northern charity, must be closed, being forbidden by the laws of North Carolina, which he was instructed by the authorities at Washington to maintain. I have here an official report of this extraordinary transaction.

“In a conversation between Governor Stanly and Mr. Colyer,
the Governor stated that there was one thing in Mr. C.’s
doings, as superintendent of the poor, a question would be
raised about,--indeed, it had been already,--and that was
his (C.’s) keeping school for the blacks. ‘Of course you are
aware,’ said the Governor, ‘that the laws of the State make the
opening of such schools a criminal offence. My instructions
from Washington were, that I was to carry out the laws of
North Carolina precisely as they were administered before the
breaking out of this unhappy affair; so, if I were called upon
for a decision in the matter of your schools for the blacks, I
would have to decide against you; but at the same time I don’t
want anything done abruptly. As a man, I might do, perhaps, as
you have done; but as a Governor, I must act in my official
capacity according to my instructions, and administer the laws
as I find them.’

“A true copy.

“C. H. MENDELL,
_Clerk to Mr. Colyer_.

“NEWBERN, May 28, 1862.”

Then follows a further statement.

“Mr. C. C. Leigh, who was with General Saxton in the Oriental,
on his way to South Carolina, as confidential agent of the
National Freedmen’s Relief Association, and who has just
returned, asked Mr. Colyer what he should do. Mr. C. replied:
‘I must close the schools, as I cannot consent to continue to
place myself in a situation where I am liable to be punished
according to the laws of North Carolina.’

“Mr. Leigh is the Chairman of our Home Committee.”

If any person, in the name of the United States, has undertaken to close a school for little children, whether white or black, it is important that we should know the authority under which he assumes to act. Surely nobody here will be willing to take the responsibility for such an act. It is difficult to conceive that one of the first fruits of national victory and the reëstablishment of national power should be an enormity not easy to characterize in any terms of moderation. Jefferson tells us that in a certain contest there is no attribute of the Almighty “which can take side with us.”[71] And permit me to say, that, if, in the war unhappily existing, the military power of the United States is employed in closing schools, there is no attribute of the Almighty which must not be against us; nor can we expect any true success. Sir, in the name of the Constitution, of humanity, and of common sense, I protest against such impiety under sanction of the United States.

The proper rule of conduct is simple. It is found in the instructions, to which I referred the other day, from the British Commissioner in a conquered province of India. After indicating certain crimes to be treated with summary punishment, he proceeds to say: “All other crimes you will investigate according to the forms of justice usual in the country, modified as you may think expedient; and in all cases you will endeavor to enforce the existing laws and customs, _unless where they are clearly repugnant to reason and natural equity_.”[72] Here is the proper limitation. Anything else is unworthy of a civilized country. Whatever is clearly repugnant to reason and equity must be rejected. Surely such a thing cannot be enforced. But what can be more clearly repugnant to reason and equity than the barbarous law which an officer, in the name of the National Government, has threatened to enforce?

The resolution was agreed to.

* * * * *

June 4th, a report from the Secretary of War, in answer to
this resolution, contained a letter of appointment, dated May
19, 1862, conferring “all and singular the powers, duties,
and functions pertaining to the office of Military Governor,
including the power to establish all necessary offices and
tribunals, and suspend the writ of _Habeas Corpus_.” This was
followed, May 20th, by instructions, wherein it is said: “Upon
your wisdom and energetic action much will depend.… It is not
deemed necessary to give any specific instruction, but rather
to confide in your sound discretion to adopt such measures as
circumstances may demand. Specific instructions will be given,
when requested. You may rely upon the perfect confidence and
full support of the Department in the performance of your
duties.”[73]

STAND BY THE ADMINISTRATION.

LETTER TO ----, JUNE 5, 1862.

This letter, after enjoying an extensive circulation in
the newspapers, was preserved as a political document in
McPherson’s “Political History of the Rebellion.”[74]

It first appeared in the _Boston Journal_,[75] with the
caption, “Senator Sumner and the President,” and with these
introductory words:--

“We are permitted to publish the following private letter
from Hon. Charles Sumner, in reply to a letter addressed
to him by a personal friend. Senator Sumner’s hearty
indorsement will not be without its influence upon those
who are impatient at what they term the Proslavery policy
of the President. At the same time there is nothing in
this indorsement which should shake the confidence of
conservative men in his wisdom and prudence.… It is
something to obtain from one who may be regarded as a
representative of this class so handsome a tribute to
the purity of the President’s motives, and so hearty an
indorsement of the correctness of his convictions and
sympathies.”

SENATE CHAMBER, June 5, 1862.

MY DEAR SIR,--Your criticism of the President is hasty. I am
confident, if you knew him as I do, you would not make it.

The President cannot be held responsible for the misfeasance of
subordinates, unless adopted, or at least tolerated, by him. And
I am sure nothing unjust or ungenerous will be tolerated, much
less adopted, by him.

I am happy to let you know that he has no sympathy with Stanly
in his absurd wickedness, closing the schools, nor, again, in
his other act of turning our camps into a hunting-ground for
slaves. He repudiates both, positively. The latter point has
occupied much of his thought, and the newspapers do not go too
far in recording his repeated declarations, which I have often
heard from his own lips, that slaves finding their way within
the national lines are never to be reënslaved. This is his
conviction, expressed without reserve.

Could you--as has been my privilege often--have seen the
President, while considering the great questions on which he has
already acted, beginning with the invitation to Emancipation in
the States, then Emancipation in the District of Columbia, and
the acknowledgment of the Independence of Hayti and Liberia, even
your zeal would be satisfied; for you would feel the sincerity
of his purpose to do what he can to carry forward the principles
of the Declaration of Independence. His whole soul was occupied,
especially by the first proposition, so peculiarly his own. In
familiar intercourse with him, I remember nothing more touching
than the earnestness and completeness with which he embraced this
idea. To his mind it was just and beneficent, while it promised
the sure end of Slavery. To me, who had already proposed a Bridge
of Gold for the retreating Fiend, it was most welcome. Proceeding
from the President, it must take its place among the great events
of history.

If disposed to be impatient at apparent short-comings, think, I
pray you, what has been done in a brief period, and from the past
discern the sure promise of the future. Knowing something of my
convictions, and of the ardor with which I maintain them, you
may, perhaps, derive assurance from my confidence. I say to you,
therefore, Stand by the Administration. If need be, help it by
word and act; but stand by it, and have faith in it.

I wish that you knew the President, and had heard the artless
expression of his convictions on those questions which concern
you so deeply. You might, perhaps, wish he were less cautious,
but you would be grateful that he is so true to all you have at
heart. Believe me, therefore, you are wrong; and I regret it
the more because of my desire to see all our friends stand firm
together.

If I write strongly, it is because I feel strongly; for my
constant and intimate intercourse with the President, beginning
with the fourth of March, not only binds me peculiarly to his
Administration, but gives me a personal as well as a political
interest in seeing that justice is done him.

Believe me, my dear Sir,

With much regard,

Ever faithfully yours,

CHARLES SUMNER.

POWER OF CONGRESS _VS._ MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF STATES.

RESOLUTIONS IN THE SENATE, JUNE 6, 1862.

Further report from North Carolina induced Mr. Sumner again to
bring the action of Mr. Stanly before the Senate, in the hope
especially of reaching the country, and also the Administration.

Whereas Edward Stanly, assuming to act under a letter from the Secretary of War, calling him Military Governor of North Carolina, a post unknown to the Constitution and laws of the Union, has undertaken, by virtue of such military authority, to surrender fugitive slaves, contrary to the intent and meaning of an Act of Congress recently adopted; also to banish an American citizen, in violation of personal rights secured by the Constitution; and also to close and suppress schools maintained by the charity of good men for the education of colored children, in defiance of every principle of morals and religion, and to the discredit of our national character: Therefore,--

1. _Resolved_, That the President of the United States be requested to cancel the letter of the Secretary of War under which Edward Stanly now assumes to act.

2. _Resolved_, That any such letter, assuming to create any person Military Governor of a State, is without sanction in the Constitution and laws, and that its effect is to subordinate the civil to the military authority, contrary to the spirit of our institutions, and in derogation of the powers of Congress, which, where a State Government falls into the hands of traitors, can be the only legitimate authority, except martial law.

Mr. Carlile, of West Virginia, objected to the consideration of
the resolutions, and they were postponed.

These resolutions presented again the question of the Power of
Congress over the Rebel States, first opened by the resolutions
of February 11, 1862.[76]

AIR-LINE RAILROAD BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK.

RESOLUTION IN THE SENATE, JUNE 9, 1862.

RESOLVED, That the Committee on Post-Offices and Post-Roads be directed to consider the expediency of providing for an air-line railroad between Washington and New York, which shall carry the mails of the United States, and be free from all local impediments.

This resolution was objected to, and so was postponed; but its
immediate object was accomplished. The existing roads were
stimulated, and the attention of the country was called to
the idea of better communication between the two capitals of
politics and commerce. A French paper spoke of the proposed
road as “_atmospheric_.”

The resolution was renewed at the next session of Congress,
December 5, 1862, when it was agreed to.

ABOLITION AND PROHIBITION OF SLAVERY IN WEST VIRGINIA.

REMARKS IN THE SENATE, ON THE BILL FOR THE ADMISSION OF WEST VIRGINIA AS A STATE, JUNE 26, JULY 1 AND 14, 1862.

The facts essential to the comprehension of this case appear in
the debate.

MR. PRESIDENT,--The question is on the admission of West Virginia into the Union as a new State, and the following is one of the conditions, namely: “That from and after the fourth day of July, 1863, the children of all slaves born within the limits of said State shall be free.” Here is a condition which you undertake to impose. This is clear.

But, Sir, be good enough to observe that this condition recognizes Slavery during the present generation. Short as life may be, it is too long for Slavery. If it be adopted, and the bill becomes a law, a new Slave State will take its place in our Union,--it may be with but few slaves, and for the present generation only, but nevertheless a new Slave State. That, Sir, is too much.

How often have I said, and how painful that I must now repeat what all know, that it takes but little Slavery to make a Slave State with all the virus of Slavery! Now my vote shall help no new State to take a place in this Union, with Senators in this body, unless purged of this poison. Enough has our nation been disturbed, and enough has the Constitution been perverted. The time has come for the remedy. It is found in the policy of Thomas Jefferson, originally applied to the great Territory of the Northwest. Its application to a portion of his own Virginia, seeking to become a new State, will be politic, just, and conservative.

Mr. Sumner concluded by moving to strike out the words of
the condition proposed, and insert an absolute abolition and
prohibition, so that it should read, “From and after the fourth
day of July, 1863, within the limits of the State there shall
be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, otherwise than
in the punishment of crime whereof the party shall be duly
convicted.”

July 1st, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of the
bill, the pending question being the amendment of Mr. Sumner,
who made the following remarks.

Time has elapsed since this measure was before the Senate, which meanwhile has been engaged in an important debate. Therefore I shall be pardoned, if, at the expense of repetition, I recall attention to the precise question.

The bill for the admission of West Virginia provides that from and after the 4th of July, 1863, all children born of slaves shall be free, leaving the existing generation in Slavery. From statistics furnished by the honorable Senator from Virginia [Mr. WILLEY], in his elaborate speech, it appears that in West Virginia twelve thousand human beings are held in Slavery.

MR. WILLEY. That was in 1860; but it is not so now.

MR. SUMNER. There may be fewer now: call the number ten thousand. There are ten thousand slaves there, who, according to the bill, are to remain in bondage during life. Thus, for one whole generation, shall we be afflicted by another Slave State, with two slaveholding representatives in this body.

I mean to speak of this question with all possible respect for Senators on the other side. I am anxious not to introduce any topic otherwise than agreeable; but I must discharge my duty here. I cannot by my vote consent that there shall be two additional slaveholding Senators for another generation. I content myself with this declaration, without argument,--except what is found in a brief passage by Mr. Webster in this body. I refer to his speech of the 22d of December, 1845, on the admission of Texas, where he used this language:--

“In the next place, Sir, I have to say, that, while I hold,
with as much integrity, I trust, and faithfulness, as any
citizen of this country, to all the original arrangements and
compromises under which the Constitution under which we now
live was adopted, I never could, and never can, persuade myself
to be in favor of the admission of other States into the Union
as Slave States, with the inequalities which were allowed and
accorded by the Constitution to the slaveholding States then in
existence. I do not think that the Free States ever expected,
or could expect, that they would be called on to admit more
Slave States, having the unequal advantages arising to them
from the mode of apportioning representation under the existing
Constitution.…

“It will always be a question, whether the other States have
not a right (and I think they have the clearest right) to
require that the State coming into the Union should come
in upon an equality; and if the existence of Slavery be
an impediment to coming in on an equality, then the State
proposing to come in should be required to remove that
inequality by abolishing Slavery, or take the alternative of
being excluded.”[77]

Afterwards, in his famous speech of the 7th of March, 1850, he reaffirmed these principles.

“It has happened that between 1837 and this time, on various
occasions, I have expressed my entire opposition to the
admission of Slave States, or the acquisition of new Slave
Territories, to be added to the United States. I know, Sir,
no change in my own sentiments or my own purposes in that
respect.”[78]

I might quote more, but this is sufficient. Mr. Webster was against new Slave States.

I adduce these words as stating strongly at least one important ground of objection. The admission of West Virginia with a condition recognizing Slavery for a full generation will be an extension of the Slave Power and a new sanction of Slavery. I cannot consent to it, Sir; nor do I see any apology for hesitation. Our control of this matter is clear beyond reasonable doubt, and the present state of our country supplies a new motive for its exercise.

In the debate that ensued, Mr. Hale criticized Mr. Sumner,
quoting the story of Abraham and his aged idolatrous guest, as
given by Dr. Franklin.

“‘And God said to Abraham, Have I borne with you [him]
these fourscore years, and canst thou not bear with him
one night, who art thyself a sinner?’ Sir, in exactly
the spirit inculcated by that fable I would deal with
Slavery; and I would listen to-day as it were to the voice
of God, who asks us, Have I borne with this thing so many
generations, and cannot you bear with it dying, when it
begins on the next Fourth of July?”[79]

Mr. Wade, in the same spirit, said:--

“My friend from Massachusetts, by his proposition, strikes
this institution down at one dash. I should like to see it
go; but I must look a little to see what its effect will
be, after all.”[80]

Before the vote was taken, Mr. Carlile, of Virginia, remarked:--

“Mr. President, it is my sincere belief that this
disposition to interfere with the rights of the States,
exhibited by this Congress, has prolonged the war,--that,
if persisted in, the war becomes a war of indefinite
duration, and that the Constitutional Union our fathers
formed will be lost to us and our posterity forever.”[81]

July 14th, the question was taken on Mr. Sumner’s amendment,
which was rejected,--Yeas 11, Nays 24.

Mr. Lane, of Kansas, moved that all slaves in the State, July
4, 1863, and under the age of ten, shall be free when they
arrive at the age of twenty-one, and all slaves over ten and
under twenty-one shall be free when they arrive at the age of
twenty-five; and the amendment was adopted,--Yeas 25, Nays 12.

* * * * *

The question then occurred on the passage of the bill, when Mr.
Sumner remarked:--

I renounce the intention of presenting again the amendment you have already voted down; but it is none the less important in my judgment. I do not like to occupy the time of the Senate; but I cannot doubt that you have acted on the amendment hastily, and without full consideration. Why, Sir, it is simply the old Jeffersonian ordinance, which, when originally adopted for the great Territory of the Northwest, operated upon Slavery already there, and absolutely forbade this wrong from that time forward. In point of fact, slaves were freed by this ordinance.

I thought it well that this institute of Virginia’s son should help to redeem Virginia. It has been voted down; and now the question is presented, whether the Senate will recognize a new Slave State. True, Slavery will be for a short term only, for twenty-one years, if you please, but that is a long time for Slavery. I cannot consent to admit a new State with such a curse for twenty-one years. How little slavery it takes to make a Slave State is illustrated by Delaware, with less than eighteen hundred slaves, sending two Senators of Slavery to this Chamber. Shall we welcome two more from a State newly created by ourselves? Never, Sir, by my vote; and as the Senate sees fit to discard the effort I have made, I deem it my duty to vote against the bill.

The bill was passed,--Yeas 23, Nays 17,--Mr. Sumner voting in
the negative.

WAR POWERS OF CONGRESS: CONFISCATION AND LIBERATION.

SPEECH IN THE SENATE, ON THE HOUSE BILL FOR THE CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY AND THE LIBERATION OF SLAVES BELONGING TO REBELS, JUNE 27, 1862.

This speech is a supplement to that of May 19th, on the “Rights
of Sovereignty and Rights of War.” Its occasion is explained in
the Introduction to the latter speech.[82]

* * * * *

The New York _Independent_ published it at length, and thus
characterized it:--

“It is the most complete presentation of the question
that can be found within the same compass, and, like all
Mr. Sumner’s speeches, is distinguished for accuracy
of statement, learning, and sound principle. It is a
defence of the present position of our Government, as
defined by Act of Congress, to which every citizen owes
obedience. In efficacy, that Act will go with our armies,
as they advance, and will clear up the perplexities of
our Generals, and clear their minds of certain political
superstitions by which they have been hampered and
hindered, to the great injury of our military operations.
Let the people of Massachusetts, in particular, exult, as
they observe, in regard to this, as well as most other
leading measures of Congress, how the views of their great
Senator became, step by step, the recognized and settled
policy of the Government; and let them thank God that the
good old Bay State has such a representative, and furnishes
such a leader in this great extremity.”

MR. PRESIDENT,--Too tardily the house of a Rebel General in Virginia[83] has been taken by the Government, and set apart as a military hospital for the reception of our soldiers, wounded and maimed in battle. At least three churches here in Washington have been seized and occupied for the same purpose. All applaud these acts, which make the house more historic and the churches more sacred than ever before. But pray, Sir, under what authority is all this? Not according to any contract or agreement; not according to any “due process of law”; not even according to any statute. And yet the language of the Constitution is positive: “No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered _in any house_, without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” If it be time of peace now, then is the Constitution violated by quartering soldiers in these houses without the consent of the owner. If it be time of war now, then is the Constitution violated by quartering these soldiers in a manner not prescribed by law,--unless we are ready to admit that the provisions of the Constitution are entirely inapplicable to what is done under the military requirements of self-defence, which is a supreme law, above all other laws or constitutions devised by men. But if the Constitution, in a case where it is singularly explicit, can be disregarded without question in the exercise of the Rights of War, it is vain to invoke its provisions in other cases, where it is less explicit, in restraint of the Rights of War.

It is true that the Constitution ambiguously provides against certain forfeitures, as incident to an “attainder of treason”; it also positively prohibits “_ex post facto_ laws”; and it nobly declares that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” But nothing in the House bills for the confiscation of property or the liberation of slaves is obnoxious to either of these provisions. There is no attainder of treason, no _ex post facto_ law, and no taking of property without due process of law; for the judicial proceedings which these bills institute are competent for the purpose. The House bills are not criminal statutes, nor do they institute criminal proceedings. Therefore do I assert unhesitatingly that these bills are above constitutional objection. They are as constitutional as the Constitution itself. It was once said of a subtile spirit of criticism, that it would find a heresy in the Lord’s Prayer; and such a spirit, permit me to say, is needed to find anything unconstitutional in these bills.

Here I assume, as a cardinal principle of Constitutional Law, that, whatever may be the condition of slaves in the States and under State laws, they are, under the Constitution of the United States, _persons_, and not property; so that, in declaring their emancipation, Congress is not constrained by any constitutional requirements with regard to property. Whatever the claims of property, slaves are men; and I but repeat an unquestionable truth of morals, confirmed by the Declaration of Independence, when I say that there can be no property in men. Mr. Winter Davis,[84] of Baltimore, has reminded the country, that Congress, on the motion of Mr. Clay, once undertook to declare the freedom of slaves without any “due process of law”; and the present Congress, by a bill of the last session, setting free slaves actually employed in the Rebellion,[85] has done the same thing; so that the principle is completely established.

Even if the bills seemed obnoxious to certain constitutional provisions,--as they clearly are not,--this objection and every other objection will disappear, when it is understood that they are _war measures_, derived from the capacious War Powers of Congress, applicable only to public enemies, and limited in duration to the war. Considered in these aspects and with these qualifications, these bills are only an agency in the prosecution of the war, and the power to enact them is as clear as the power to raise armies or to levy taxes. An ancient historian, in words adopted by the greatest modern publicist, has told us that “war has its laws, no less than peace.”[86] These words are placed by Grotius at the head of his great work, and they embody a fundamental principle. The Rights of War are not less peculiar than the victories of war, which are so widely different from the victories of peace.

Pray, Sir, where in the Constitution is any limitation of the War Powers? Let Senators who would limit them mention a single section, line, or phrase, which even hints at any limitation. If it be constitutional to make war, to set armies in the field, to launch navies, to occupy fields and houses, to bombard cities, to kill in battle,--all without trial by jury, or any process of law, or judicial proceeding of any kind,--it is equally constitutional, as a war measure, to confiscate the property of the enemy and to liberate his slaves. Nor can it be doubted on principle, that, if the latter be unconstitutional, then are all other acts of war unconstitutional. You may condemn confiscation and liberation as impolitic, but you cannot condemn them as unconstitutional, unless, in the same breath, you condemn all other agencies of war, and resolve our present proceeding into the process of a criminal court, guarded at each step by the technicalities of the Common Law.

Sir, I speak frankly, according to my convictions, claiming nothing for myself which I do not freely accord to others. In this discussion there is no need of sharp words or of personal allusions; nor can anything be gained by misstatement of the position of another. It is easy to say that Senators who insist upon the War Powers of Congress are indifferent to the Constitution; but I do not admit that any Senator is more anxious for the Constitution than myself. The War Powers are derived from the Constitution, but, when once set in motion, are without any restraint from the Constitution; so that what is done in pursuance of them is at the same time _under_ the Constitution and _outside_ the Constitution. It is under the Constitution in its beginning and origin; it is outside the Constitution in the latitude with which it is conducted; but, whether under the Constitution or outside the Constitution, all that is done in pursuance of the War Powers is constitutional. It is easy to cry out against it; it is easy, by misapplication of the Constitution, to call it in question; but it is only by such misapplication, or by senseless cry, that its complete constitutionality can for a moment be drawn into doubt.

The language of the Constitution is plain and ample. It confers upon Congress all the specific powers incident to war, and then further authorizes it “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.” Here are the precise words:--

“The Congress shall have power … to declare war, grant letters
of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures
on land and water; to raise and support armies; … to provide
and maintain a navy; to make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces; to provide for calling
forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions; … _to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this
Constitution_ in the Government of the United States, or in any
department _or officer thereof_.”

Can language be clearer? Other parts of the Constitution may be open to question; but here is no room for question. The text is full and unequivocal. The powers are enumerated. Without stopping to consider them in detail, it will be seen that the most important are exclusively incident to a state of war, and not to a state of peace. A declaration of war is of course war, and “all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution” this declaration are called into being by the war. Rules concerning captures on land and water are from necessity dormant, till aroused by war; but when aroused, they are, like other War Powers, without check from those constitutional provisions which, just so long as peace prevails, are the boast of the citizen.

The War Powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution were well known; they had been conferred upon Congress by the earlier Articles of Confederation. The language of the latter was full and explicit with regard to captures.

“The United States in Congress assembled shall have the
sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace
and war, … of establishing rules for deciding in all cases
_what captures on land or water shall be legal_, and in what
manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service
of the United States shall be divided or appropriated, … and
establishing courts for receiving and determining finally
_appeals in all cases of captures_.”[87]

The language subsequently employed in the Constitution is identical in substance. It is evident that the framers of the Constitution had the Articles of Confederation in mind, when they vested in Congress power to “make rules concerning captures on land and water.”