Chapter II: Front Matter (2)

_First._ The Florida was illegitimate and piratical in origin and conduct, being little more than a lawless gypsy of the sea,--born contrary to the Law of Nations, and living in constant defiance of that law.

_Secondly._ The Florida pretended to belong to a Rebel combination of slave-masters, now engaged in rebellion for the sake of Slavery. Though certain foreign powers, including Brazil, have conceded to this Rebel combination what are called “belligerent rights,” yet the extent of this concession is undecided. Of course, it is much less than a recognition of national independence. Every presumption must be against such a Rebel combination, having such an object. The indecent haste with which “belligerent rights” were originally conceded cannot be forgotten now; nor can we neglect the well-founded argument, that, in the absence of prize courts belonging to the pretended power, any such concession _on the ocean_ was flagrantly unjust, and, when we consider its wide-spread consequences, to be reprehended always by our Government, as it must be by impartial history. Assuming that the restitution of a ship belonging to an independent power, as to France or England, might be properly required, it does not follow that such restitution should be required in a case like the present, where the pretended owner is not an independent power, and where the ship was lawless in origin and conduct,--or, in other words, that Brazil should expect the United States to restore the Florida, that it might be handed over again to the support of a slaveholding Rebellion and to burn more ships.

* * * * *

I call attention to these considerations without expressing any final opinion. The case of Koszta, forcibly taken by an American frigate from an Austrian ship-of-war in the territorial waters of Turkey, shows how the conduct of governments is sometimes inconsistent with strict law. An explanation and apology were promptly offered to Turkey, whose neutrality had been violated; but this was all. There was no offer on our part to surrender Koszta; nor was there any demand by Turkey for his restitution. But the present case is stronger than that of Koszta.

It is well understood that the seizure of the Florida was wrong only with respect to Brazil, and not with respect to the Rebel enemy. There can be no demand, therefore, unless Brazil steps forward. Whatever is done must be in her name and at her instance. The enlightened Emperor of Brazil is of the royal house of Braganza, which reigned in Portugal when her great minister, Pombal, forbore to press the restitution of ships captured by the British in Portuguese waters. Here is a precedent of his own family, completely applicable. I venture to add that he would do an inconsiderate and unfriendly act, if he should press the restitution of a ship obnoxious not only as a public enemy, but as the piratical agent of a wicked Rebellion. Even admitting that the capture was null by the Law of Nations, yet the nature of the reparation to be demanded rests absolutely in the discretion of Brazil, and in this age no power can be justified in any exercise of discretion adverse to human freedom.

AMERICANUS.

The article was answered by an able writer in the _Advertiser_
of December 13th, who assumed that Mr. Sumner was the apologist
of seizures in neutral waters. It was also severely criticized
by Professor Goldwin Smith, then travelling among us, in a
letter which was given to the newspapers. Mr. Sumner, whose
special object was to anticipate British criticism and to
smooth the way with Brazil, said nothing until the case
was understood to be settled, when he reappeared in the
_Advertiser_ of January 17, 1865.

SUPPLEMENT.

The recent correspondence between Mr. Seward and the Brazilian Chargé d’Affaires at Washington seems to bring the case of the Florida to a close. Our Government has distinctly recognized the inviolability of territorial sovereignty, and made reparation for the original act of violence, so much discussed. The vessel itself, out of which the question arose, was no longer in existence; so that the only important point not already settled by principle and precedent was eliminated from the case. There was no vessel to be claimed on the one side or refused on the other, and nothing was said of damages on account of its loss. Of course, had the Florida belonged to Brazil, any reparation would have been incomplete which did not embrace the vessel or its value.

But Mr. Seward has been careful to exclude the assumption that the Rebels have belligerent rights on the ocean, and also the other assumption that the Florida was anything but a pirate. It is clear that the position taken on these two points must have influenced any decision with regard to the vessel itself, or damages on account of its loss.

As the case is now settled, it is unnecessary to consider objections adduced against the view presented by me in the “Advertiser” some weeks ago. What is now certain was then uncertain. The Government has spoken, and the country accepts the result. But it may not be unprofitable to return for one moment to the original discussion.

My object at that time was to furnish materials for final judgment, and especially to repel British objurgations which befogged the whole question. It was important that our national conduct should be determined calmly, according to the best principles, and with perfect knowledge of the past. But it is difficult to deal with this or any kindred question without repairing to British history. There are precedents to be shunned as well as to be followed, and both should be studied. It is strange that such an attempt should have been misunderstood. Perhaps it is stranger still that anybody should have insisted on our humble submission to the most opprobrious epithets, without reminding the objurgators of the history of their own country, bristling with incidents _having in them all that was indefensible in the Florida case without any of its exceptional circumstances_. A Roman poet exclaims:--

“Quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes?”[35]

And another authority, which will not be questioned, expressly enjoins on the censor to extract the beam from his own eye before he complains of the mote in the eye of another.

In the excess of dissent from what I said, it was even suggested that the vessel should be surrendered to Brazil,--of course as trustee of Rebel Slavery. But this was a very hasty suggestion, forgetting the piratical origin of the vessel, and forgetting the piratical slavemonger character of its pretended owners, having no _ocean_ rights. Admitting the inviolability of neutral waters, it does not follow that such a vessel could be claimed, or, if Brazil were so ill-advised as to make such a claim, that our Government could hearken to it. It was because I saw this clearly that I sought to set up a breakwater against such claim, and to prepare public opinion on the subject. It is noble in a nation to acknowledge wrong; but it is weakness to sacrifice a great cause.

The Statute of Limitations has been set up against some of the historic instances adduced, and the very recent date of the Congress of Paris, at the close of the Crimean War in 1856, is declared to fix the line of demarcation, marking an altered policy in Great Britain. As a lover of peace and a student of International Law, anxious for its advancement,--yielding to nobody in this regard,--I wish that such an alteration could be shown. Joyfully should I welcome it, as one of the signs of a new order of ages. Unhappily, it cannot be shown, and I feel sure that it can be brought about only by a frank exhibition of transactions demonstrating its necessity. Truth is illustrated by error, health is maintained by knowledge of disease, and crime itself is made repulsive by bringing its perpetrators to judgment.

It is an old adage of the law, that no statute of limitations runs against the sovereign,--_Nullum tempus occurrit regi_. This, of course, is for the protection of his interests. But, assuming that such a statute may be pleaded against British responsibility for historic precedents more than eight years old, there is no question with regard to what has occurred since. Here the responsibility is admitted. Now, confining ourselves to the brief period since the Crimean Peace, there are instances identical in character with those which occurred previously; and these are the more remarkable as Great Britain had not the apology of war to disturb her equanimity.

A well-informed person, writing from Berlin, furnishes the following instance, which occurred as late as 1860. “Two British men-of-war took, or at least threatened to take, the Paraguayan war-steamer Tacuaril, in the port of Buenos Ayres. They laid themselves on each side of the Paraguayan war-steamer, in order to enforce a claim which proved afterwards to be fallacious.” The writer adds, that “this case, if looked into closely, will probably serve as a counter argument, should England have anything to say on the Florida-Bahia affair.” True enough; and such is the recent judgment of a German publicist.

There is also that other historic instance which has among its incidents the suspension of diplomatic relations between Brazil and Great Britain. It began with a demand by the latter power for reparation on account of a vessel pillaged after shipwreck on the coast of Brazil, in June, 1861. This was complicated soon after by a quarrel between certain officers of a British frigate in the harbor of Rio Janeiro and a sentry on shore, which ended in taking the officers into custody. The British minister demanded reparation for these two alleged wrongs; and the British admiral, who was at hand, seized five Brazilian merchant-vessels in the harbor of Rio Janeiro, declaring that he would not release them until £6,500 had been paid on account of the pillaged vessel, and satisfaction afforded for the detention of the officers. Thus, in time of peace, without any declaration of war, the British admiral performed an act of war, like that in the case of the Florida, but without the apology of the captors of the latter vessel. In short, he undertook, within the territorial jurisdiction of Brazil, to seize, not one vessel, but five vessels,--and all these innocent, neither piratical in origin nor belonging to people without _ocean_ rights. Brazil, succumbing to superior force, paid the money demanded, and referred the question of reparation in the case of the officers to the arbitration of King Leopold of Belgium, who has since rendered judgment for the weaker power. The question of responsibility for the five innocent vessels seized within the territorial jurisdiction of Brazil was left unsettled. The mild and accomplished minister of Brazil in London, M. Carvalho Moreira, made a reclamation on this account, in a careful note, dated May 5, 1863, where he submitted, that “the English Government should express its regret at the acts which accompanied the reprisals, and declare that it had no intention to offend the dignity or to violate the territorial sovereignty of the empire,” and that it should consent to refer the question of damages to arbitration. Earl Russell declining to reopen any part of the questions between the two Governments, or to enter into any explanations, the Brazilian minister at once demanded his passports and left London. This case will be found at length in an authentic publication, which has only recently appeared.[36] I leave it, simply quoting from the work these pertinent words: “The question was with regard to the reparation and compensation which Brazil demanded from England for the seizure of her merchant-vessels and for the violation of her territorial waters.… It was, unhappily, easy to foresee the issue of this question,--England being always more disposed to demand reparation and indemnities than to accord them.”[37] Such is the recent judgment of a French publicist.

There is another case, which has not yet found its way into the books, nor did it occur after the Crimean War; but it is so very recent, and so curious, that I venture to adduce it. I am indebted for it to the Hon. John B. Alley, one of our Representatives in Congress, to whom it was communicated by one of his constituents.[38] The bark Home, of Boston, was on her way from Calcutta to Boston, when, on or about August 22, 1849, she fell in with a vessel, first supposed to be a pirate, but at last proved to be the Polka, prize to the British steamer Sharpshooter, with the crew in a starving condition. The prize-master, on coming aboard, said that the prize was taken in Port Macahé, near Cape Frio, in Brazil, for being engaged in the slave-trade; that, to escape the fire of the fort, which opened on the captors, they slipped the cable, and cut adrift the boat which was made fast astern; that at the time of the capture there was no person aboard, except a single negro; and that a midshipman with ten men was put aboard to take her to St. Helena. The famished crew were supplied by the American bark with bread, beef, water, and other small stores, for which the British Government paid, in 1852, the cost price, being all that was asked. On this case the master of the bark, in his communication to Mr. Alley, remarks: “This is another instance where a vessel was taken in a port by the British, and this in a time of profound peace; and as the fort fired on them, I presume the capture was not made by consent of the Brazilian Government.” Such is the mild conclusion of an American shipmaster, who seems to see the conduct of Great Britain in the same light as it is seen by the publicist of Germany and the publicist of France.

Such instances, so recent, show how little the injunction of International Law has been regarded by Great Britain, whether before or after the Crimean War; and yet British censors have not hesitated to arraign the United States in brutal terms. I do not admit their competency to sit in judgment on us; I plead to the jurisdiction. If they would teach correct principles, they must begin by a correct example. Meanwhile the abuses for which Great Britain is responsible cannot be forgotten by those who sincerely desire a new era in International Law. I say this in no spirit of reproach or controversy, but simply to serve the cause of my country and of truth.

AMERICANUS.

RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN: THE ST. ALBANS RAID.

SPEECH IN THE SENATE, ON A BILL FOR FORTIFICATIONS AND BATTERIES ON THE LAKES, DECEMBER 19, 1864.

December 19th, Mr. Doolittle, of Wisconsin, introduced a bill
to enable the President to expend the sum of ten million
dollars, or so much thereof as might be necessary, in his
opinion, in building fortifications and floating-batteries to
defend our northern frontier and the commerce of the Lakes
against the attacks of piratical and hostile expeditions
organized in the British provinces by the enemies of the
United States; and he moved the reference of the bill to the
Committee on Finance, which, at the suggestion of Mr. Sumner,
he changed to the Committee on Foreign Relations. A debate
ensued, involving what were called the troubles on the border,
and especially the “St. Albans Raid,” when a hostile expedition
crossed from Canada into Vermont, and committed acts of
violence in that town. Mr. Sumner said:--

MR. PRESIDENT,--The question before the Senate is simply on the reference of this bill. It is a question of the order of business.

Looking at its character, it is plain that it concerns primarily and essentially our foreign relations. This circumstance gives it a peculiar interest. If it concerned only an additional levy of troops, or the building of new forts, or a change in our commercial policy, there would be no question with regard to its reference, nor would the Senator from Maryland [Mr. REVERDY JOHNSON] have followed it by remarks on the outrage at St. Albans. I assume, then, that it concerns our foreign relations, and therefore, according to the usages of the Senate, should be referred to the committee having that subject in charge.

This is all I have to say on the question of reference; but the Senate will pardon me, if I glance for one moment at the outrage to which the Senator referred. Only a few weeks ago, the village of St. Albans, in Vermont, was disturbed by a band of murderers, highwaymen, house-breakers, horse-thieves, and bank-robbers, from Canada. After breaking open the banks and obtaining a certain amount of spoil, attended by the murder of a citizen, they succeeded in making their way back to Canada, where they declared themselves agents of the Rebel Government. Such are the main facts. Now, Mr. President, does any one suppose that these agents of the Rebel Government were moved to this criminal enterprise merely by considerations of plunder?--that they risked life and everything merely to rob a bank? No such thing. Their object was much higher and more comprehensive. It was to embroil the Government of the United States with the Government of Great Britain. I cannot doubt that such was their object. To my mind it is plain as noonday.

These agents, or rather the men behind who set them on, knew the sensitiveness of our people, and how naturally they would be aroused against the foreign country where the enterprise had its origin. They saw that excitement, passion, anger on our part were inevitable, that out of these some complication or collision might ensue, and that any such complication or collision must necessarily help the Rebellion more than a victory on the field of battle. All this they saw, and acted accordingly. The whole proceeding was a trap in which to catch the Government of our country. It was hoped that in this way the Rebellion might gain that powerful British intervention which would restore its failing fortunes.

For myself, Sir, I am determined not to be caught in any such trap. There are many things Great Britain has done, since the outbreak of our Rebellion, which to my mind are most unfriendly; but I am unwilling that there should be anything on our side to furnish seeming apology for that foreign intervention so constantly menaced, and originally foreshadowed in the most hasty and utterly unjustifiable concession of ocean belligerence to Rebel Slavemongers who had not a single port or prize court. Nobody sees the wrongs we have suffered more clearly than I do; but I see other wrongs also. While never ceasing to claim all our just rights, and reminding this power always of duties plainly neglected, I cannot forget that we are engaged in a war for the suppression of a long-continued and most virulent Rebellion, which has thus far tasked our best energies. To this work let us dedicate ourselves, without arousing another enemy, through whose alliance the Rebellion may be encouraged and strengthened. Let us put down the Rebellion. Do this, and we shall do everything.

Meanwhile I trust the Senate will not be moved by passion into hasty action on any of the measures before it, but that each will be considered carefully and calmly on its merits, according to the usage of this body. This surely is the dictate of prudence, and I cannot doubt that it is the dictate of patriotism also.

Washington, in his Farewell Address, warns against “the insidious wiles of foreign influence”; but the “insidious wiles” of our Rebels, seeking to embroil us with foreign powers, are as deadly as any influence brought against us. Forewarned is forearmed. Let us be steadfast against them.

After further debate, in which Mr. Sumner considered the order
of General Dix, authorizing our troops to pursue a hostile
expedition into Canada, according to writers on International
Law, the bill was referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations, where, with other similar measures, it was allowed
to sleep.

TERMINATION OF THE CANADIAN RECIPROCITY TREATY.

SPEECHES IN THE SENATE, ON THE JOINT RESOLUTION GIVING NOTICE FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE CANADIAN RECIPROCITY TREATY, DECEMBER 21, 1864, JANUARY 11 AND 12, 1865.

A joint resolution passed the House of Representatives,
December 13, 1864, which, after an argumentative preamble,
authorized and requested the President of the United States to
give the British Government the notice required by the fifth
article of the Reciprocity Treaty of the 5th June, 1854, for
the termination of the same; and in the Senate the same was
duly referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

December 20, 1864, Mr. Sumner reported from the Committee the
House resolution, with the following substitute as an amendment.

“JOINT RESOLUTION providing for the termination of the
Reciprocity Treaty of fifth June, eighteen hundred and
fifty-four, between the United States and Great Britain.

“Whereas it is provided in the Reciprocity Treaty concluded
at Washington the 5th of June, 1854, between the United
States, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, of the other part, that this treaty
‘shall remain in force for ten years from the date at
which it may come into operation, and further until the
expiration of twelve months after either of the high
contracting parties shall give notice to the other of its
wish to terminate the same’; and whereas it appears, by a
proclamation of the President of the United States, bearing
date 16th March, 1855, that the treaty came into operation
on that day; and whereas, further, it is no longer for the
interests of the United States to continue the same in
force: Therefore

“_Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America, in Congress assembled_,
That notice be given of the termination of the Reciprocity
Treaty, according to the provision therein contained for
the termination of the same; and the President of the
United States is hereby charged with the communication of
such notice to the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland.”

December 21st, the joint resolution was, on motion of Mr.
Sumner, taken up for consideration, when the substitute was
adopted as an amendment. The question occurring on the passage
of the joint resolution as amended, Mr. Sumner said:--

MR. PRESIDENT,--I had originally intended, when this joint resolution came up, to review the whole subject, and to exhibit at length the history of the Reciprocity Treaty, and existing reasons for its termination. But, after the debate of a few days ago, and considering the apparent unanimity in the Senate, I feel unwilling to occupy time by any protracted remarks. They are not needed.

The people of the United States have been uneasy under the Reciprocity Treaty for several years,--I may almost say from its date. A feeling early showed itself that the treaty was more advantageous to Canada than to the United States,--that, in short, it was unilateral. This feeling has of late ripened into something like conviction. At the same time the exigencies of the present war, requiring so large an expenditure, make it unreasonable for us to continue a treaty by which the revenues of the country suffer. Such considerations have brought the public mind to its present position. The unamiable feelings manifested toward us by the people of Canada have had little influence on the question, unless, perhaps, they may conspire to make us look at it in the light of reason rather than of sentiment.

The subject of the fisheries is included in this treaty. But it is not doubted that before the termination of the treaty some arrangement can be made in regard to it, either by reciprocal legislation or by further negotiation.

The Committee, after careful consideration at a full meeting, was unanimous in its report. And as the Committee represents all parts of the country and all sentiments of the Senate, I have thought that perhaps there might be a similar unanimity among Senators. Therefore I forbear all further remarks, and ask for a vote.

On motion of Mr. Hale, of New Hampshire, the further
consideration of the question was postponed.

January 11, 1865, it was resumed, when Mr. Hale spoke against
the notice. He was followed by Mr. Sumner.

MR. PRESIDENT,--The Reciprocity Treaty has a beautiful name. It suggests at once exchange, equality, equity; and it is because it was supposed to advance these ideas practically that this treaty was originally accepted by the people of the United States. If, however, it shall appear, that, while organizing an exchange, it forgets equality and equity in any essential respect, then must a modification be made in conformity with just principles.

I mean to be brief, but I hope, though brief, to make the proper conclusion apparent. It is a question for reason, and not for passion or sentiment, and in this spirit I enter upon the discussion.

The treaty may be seen under four different heads, as it concerns, first, the fisheries,--secondly, the navigation of the St. Lawrence,--thirdly, the commerce between the United States and the British provinces,--and, fourthly, the revenue of the United States.

* * * * *

1. The fisheries have been a source of anxiety throughout our history, even from the beginning, and for several years previous to the Reciprocity Treaty they had been the occasion of mutual irritation, verging at times on positive outbreak. The treaty was followed by entire tranquillity, which has not been for a moment disturbed. This is a plain advantage not to be denied. But, so far as I have been able to examine official returns, I do not find any further evidence showing the value of the treaty in this connection, while opinions, even among those most interested in the fisheries, are divided. There are partisans for it in Gloucester, and partisans against it in Maine.

If the treaty related exclusively to the fisheries, I should not be willing to touch it,--although the circumstance that representatives of these interests differ with regard to its value may leave it open to debate. But the practical question remains, whether any seeming advantage in this respect is sufficient to counterbalance the disadvantage in other respects.

* * * * *

2. Next comes the navigation of the St. Lawrence. This plausible concession has proved to be little more than a name. It appears that during the first six years of the treaty only forty American vessels, containing 12,550 tons, passed seaward through the St. Lawrence, and during the same time only nineteen vessels, containing 5,446 tons, returned by the same open highway.[39] These are very petty amounts, when we consider the commerce on the Lakes, which in 1856 was estimated at $587,197,320,[40] or when we, consider the carrying trade between the United States and the British provinces. Take the years 1857-62, and we find that during this period the shipping of the United States clearing for the British provinces was 10,707,329 tons, and the foreign shipping clearing during this same period was 7,391,399 tons, while the shipping of the United States entering at our custom-houses from the British provinces was 10,056,183 tons, and the foreign shipping entering was 6,453,520 tons.[41] I mention these things by way of contrast. In comparison with these grand movements of value, the business we have been able to do on the St. Lawrence is trivial. It need not be considered an element in the present discussion.

* * * * *

3. The treaty may be seen next in its bearing on the commerce between the two countries. This has increased immensely; but it is difficult to say how much of this increase is due to the treaty, and how much to the natural growth of population, and the facilities of transportation in both countries. If it could be traced exclusively or in any large measure to the treaty, it would be an element not to be disregarded. But it does not follow from the occurrence of this increase _after_ the treaty that it was _on account_ of the treaty. _Post hoc, ergo propter hoc_, is too loose a rule for our Government on the present occasion.

The census of the United States and of the British provinces shows an increase of population which must not be disregarded in determining the origin of this increase of commerce.

There are also the railroads, with prompt and constant means of intercommunication, which have come into successful operation only since the treaty. It would be difficult to exaggerate the influence they have exercised in quickening and extending commerce. I cannot doubt that the railroad system of the two countries has been in itself a Reciprocity Treaty more comprehensive and equal than any written on parchment.

The extent of trade before and after the treaty is seen in a few figures.

In the three years immediately preceding the treaty the total exports to Canada and the other British provinces were $48,216,518, and the total imports were $22,588,577,--being of exports to imports in the proportion of one hundred to forty-six.

In the ten years of the treaty the total exports to Canada and the other British provinces were $256,350,931, and the total imports were $200,399,786. According to these amounts the exports were to the imports in the proportion of one hundred to seventy-eight. Taking Canada alone, we find the change in this proportion greater still. The total exports to Canada in the three years immediately preceding the treaty were $31,846,865, and the total imports were $16,589,624, being in the proportion of one hundred to fifty-two,--while the total exports to Canada alone during the ten years of the treaty were $170,371,911, and the total imports were $161,474,349, being in the proportion of one hundred to ninety-four.

I present these tables simply to lay before you the extent and nature of the change in the commerce between the two countries. I forbear embarking on the much debated inquiry as to the effect of a difference between the amount of exports and of imports, involving, as it does, the most delicate question of the balance of trade. In the comparison I am making, it is not necessary to consider it. The Reciprocity Treaty cannot be maintained or overturned on any contested principle of political economy.

* * * * *

4. I come, in the last place, to the influence of the treaty on the revenue of our country; and here the custom-house is our principal witness. The means of determining this question are found in the authentic tables published from time to time in Reports of the Treasury, and especially in the report to Congress at this session, which I have in my hand.

Looking at these tables, we find certain unanswerable points. I begin with an estimate founded on the trade before the treaty. From this it appears, that, if no treaty had been made, and the trade had increased in the same ratio as before the treaty, Canada would have paid to the United States in the ten years of the treaty at least $16,373,880, from which she has been relieved. This sum is actually lost to the revenue of the United States. In return, Canada has given up $2,650,890, being the amount it would have collected, if no treaty had been made. This vast disproportion is to the detriment of the national revenue.

Here is another illustration, derived from the tables. During the ten years of the treaty the United States have actually paid in duties to Canada alone $16,802,962, while during this same period Canada has paid in duties to the United States the very moderate sum of $930,447. Here again is vast disproportion, to the detriment of the national revenue.

The same inequality is seen in another way. During the ten years of the treaty _dutiable_ products of the United States have entered Canada and the other provinces to the amount of $84,347,019, while during this same period _dutiable_ products of Canada and the other provinces have entered the United States only to the amount of $7,750,482. During this same period _free products_ of the United States have entered Canada and the other provinces to the amount of $118,853,972, while _free products_ of Canada and the other provinces have entered the United States to the amount of $178,500,184. Here, again, is vast disproportion to the detriment of the national revenue.

Add to these various results the statement of the Secretary of the Treasury, just laid on our tables, in the following words:--

“The treaty [during the eight fiscal years 1855-63] has
released from duty a total sum of $42,333,257 in value of
goods of Canada more than of goods the produce of the United
States.”[42]

This conclusion is in substantial harmony with that reached from an independent examination of the tables.

These various illustrations show that the revenue of the United States has suffered by the treaty, and that in this important particular its advantages are not shared equally by the two countries. Here, at least, it loses title to its name.

But its onerous character has become manifest in other forms since the adoption of our system of internal revenue. I need not remind the Senate of the extent to which we have gone in seeking out objects of excise,--and there are pending propositions in the same direction, seeking new objects; but it is notorious that such taxation is always graduated with reference to the tariff on the same objects, when imported from abroad. But here the Reciprocity Treaty steps forward with imperative veto. Thus, for instance, the lumber of our country is left free from excise, though I am assured it might well bear it, simply because no countervailing tax can be imposed upon lumber from the British provinces. Had a tax of five per cent been imposed upon the lumber of our country, I am assured, by those familiar with the subject, that we should have received at least $5,000,000,--all of which is lost to our annual revenue. This is only a single illustration.

There are other ways in which the treaty and our excise system come into conflict. Practical difficulties, I am assured, have already occurred in the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This conflict is seen in the extent to which the business of the country, and even its agriculture, is taxed now. Everything is taxed. Even the farmer works now with taxed tools. These considerations, with the increased value of labor among us, must give new advantages to the productive interests of Canada as compared with ours, and tend still further to the unequal operation of the treaty. Even admitting its original equality, you cannot deny that the vicissitudes of war, in these latter days, have worked changes requiring new arrangements and adaptations.

* * * * *

Mr. President, such is the result of a candid inquiry into the operation of this treaty, as it concerns the fisheries, the navigation of the St. Lawrence, the commerce of the two countries, and the revenue of the United States. I have kept back nothing favorable to the treaty that could be adequately stated in the brief space I have allowed myself, nor have I exaggerated its unequal operation.

And now the question is, Shall this condition of things be readjusted? The treaty itself, as if anticipating this exigency, furnishes the opportunity, by expressly providing for its termination at the expiration of ten years, on notice of one year from either party. Great Britain is free to give this notice; so are the United States. Considering the present state of the country, it would seem improvident not to give the notice. We must husband our resources; nor can a foreign Government justly expect us to continue a treaty which is a drain upon our revenue. We are turning in all directions for subjects of taxation. Our own people are contributing largely in every way. Commerce, manufactures in every form, come to the assistance of the country. I know no reason why the large amounts enfranchised by this treaty should enjoy the immunity thus far conceded. An inequality which in ordinary times might escape observation becomes too apparent in the blaze of present responsibilities.

Something has been said about accompanying the proposed notice with instructions to negotiate a new treaty. This is unnecessary. A new treaty may not be advisable. It is possible that the whole matter may be settled by Congress under general laws. At all events, there is a full year from the 16th of March next in which to provide a substitute, either by diplomacy or by legislation. And this remark is applicable to the fisheries, as well as to every other interest touched by the treaty. I cannot doubt that the two contracting parties will approach the whole business in the determination to settle it on the permanent foundations of justice and equity; but the first step in this direction is the notice to terminate the existing treaty.

In the debate which ensued, Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, Mr. Collamer,
of Vermont, Mr. Morrill, of Maine, Mr. Chandler, of Michigan,
Mr. Foot, of Vermont, Mr. Doolittle, of Wisconsin, Mr.
Farwell, of Maine, Mr. Conness, of California, Mr. Wilson,
of Massachusetts, Mr. Cowan, of Pennsylvania, Mr. Riddle, of
Delaware, and Mr. Richardson, of Illinois, spoke in favor of
the notice; Mr. Ramsey, of Minnesota, Mr. Howe, of Wisconsin,
Mr. Hale, of New Hampshire, and Mr. Hendricks, of Indiana,
spoke against it.

January 12th, Mr. Sumner spoke again.

MR. PRESIDENT,--The proposition to terminate the Reciprocity Treaty has been mystified in various ways. There has been mystification because it came from the Committee on Foreign Relations, as if that committee, to which are referred all treaties and questions with foreign powers, was not the proper committee to consider it, according to the usages and traditions of the Senate. Pray, what other committee could so justly deal with it?

There has also been illusiveness in argument, by accumulation of statistics and figures without end. We have been treated to calculations, showing the increase of commerce since the treaty, and also the relative increase of exports and imports. To these calculations I am no stranger; but, after careful study, I am satisfied that it is impossible to find in them any _terra firma_ on which to stand. They are little better than quicksand, or a deceptive mirage.

In the remarks which I submitted to the Senate yesterday I declined to dwell on these calculations, for I saw, that, while involving large amounts, they were uncertain, inconclusive, and inapplicable. With one theory of political economy they seemed to point one way, and with another to point another way. If, for instance, you accept the early theory that commerce is disadvantageous where imports exceed exports, they tell against the treaty; but if you accept the opposite theory of later writers, they tell the other way. All this assumes that they are applicable. But nobody is able to show that the general increase of commerce since the treaty has been caused by the treaty. Other agencies have had their influence; and it is difficult to say what is due to them, and what to the treaty.

In this uncertainty, I prefer to rest the proposition on the simple ground that the national revenue is impaired by this treaty. Authentic figures place this beyond controversy.

I forbear now all details, and content myself with stating the indubitable conclusion. The national revenue is impaired in two ways: first, at the custom-house on our frontier, which, under the operation of the treaty, yields little or nothing, when it might yield much; and, secondly, it is impaired through the check and embarrassment the treaty causes in our internal taxation. There is failure of duties and of excise. It is not enough to say that there is a countervailing advantage in the increase of our commerce. The conclusion is none the less exact, that the national revenue is impaired. And the question is distinctly presented, whether, at this critical moment, in a period of war, when the whole country in its wealth and labor is contributing to the support of Government, any good reason can be assigned why the commerce of Canada should be exempt from contribution. Commerce elsewhere, manufactures, business, income, tea, coffee, books, all pay tribute. The tax-gatherer is everywhere except on the Canadian frontier. At home there is not an interest, hardly a sentiment, free from taxation. Surely there is nothing in the recent conduct of Canadians to make us treat them better than we treat ourselves.

There is another consideration which is decisive, even if others fail. In view of existing Public Opinion, and considering the criticisms of the treaty, it is important that our relations with Canada should be carefully revised in the light of experience. The treaty, in authorizing its termination at the end of ten years, has anticipated this very exigency. But such revision cannot be made advantageously without the proposed notice. In the case of a lease, with a right to terminate it at the end of ten years on a year’s notice, the landlord, if the character of the lease had been called in question, would not hesitate to give the notice, if for no other reason, that he might revise the terms anew on a footing of equality. For like reason we must give the notice to Great Britain. We must untie ourselves now, even if we would tie ourselves again for the future. The notice will leave us “master of the situation” to this extent at least, that we shall be free to act according to the requirements of the public good. Without this notice there will be no foothold for diplomacy or legislation; but the notice will be a foothold from which we may accomplish whatever is proper and just. The treaty may be reconsidered and then adopted anew, or it may be entirely changed, and we shall have a year for this purpose,--so that, when the Old expires, the New may begin.

The joint resolution directing the notice was adopted in the
Senate,--Yeas 33, Nays 8,--and was at once adopted by the House
of Representatives, and approved by the President January 18,
1865. It was then communicated by Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, our
minister at London, who, under date of March 17th, addressed a
note to Earl Russell, “giving formal notice of the termination
of the Reciprocity Treaty, and inclosing at the same time a
certified copy of the resolution expressing the sense of both
Houses of Congress on that subject.” Mr. Adams adds, in his
letter to Mr. Seward: “This note was delivered by the messenger
of this Legation at the Foreign Office at 2 P. M., notice of
which was entered by him on the envelope, and also reported
to me on his return. Not long afterwards I received from his
Lordship his own acknowledgment of the reception of it.”[43]

THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION AND EQUAL RIGHTS.

LETTER TO A PUBLIC MEETING IN PHILADELPHIA, DECEMBER 26, 1864.

SENATE CHAMBER, December 26, 1864.

DEAR SIR,--It will not be in my power to be present at the
celebration of the Emancipation Proclamation by the Banneker
Institute. But, wherever I may be, I shall not forget this great
and good deed.

That proclamation has done more than any military success to save
the country. It has already saved the national character. The
future historian will confess that it saved everything.

It remains for us to uphold it faithfully, so that it may not be
impaired a single jot or tittle.

In the spirit of the Proclamation, and taught by its example, we
must press forward in the work of justice to the colored race,
until abuse and outrage have ceased, and all are equal before the
law.

The astronomer, Banneker, whose honored name you bear, would be
shut out of the street cars in some of our cities; but such petty
meanness cannot last long.

Accept my best wishes, and believe me, dear Sir, faithfully
yours,

CHARLES SUMNER.

THE COMMITTEE, &c.

FREEDOM OF WIVES AND CHILDREN OF COLORED SOLDIERS.

SPEECH IN THE SENATE, ON A JOINT RESOLUTION FOR THIS PURPOSE, JANUARY 5, 1865.

As early as January 8, 1864, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts,
embodied in a bill to promote enlistments a clause declaring,
that, when any man or boy of African descent, owing service
or labor in any State, under its laws, shall be mustered into
the military or naval service of the United States, he and his
mother, wife, and children shall be forever free. This bill
was considered from time to time. March 18th, Mr. Sherman, of
Ohio, moved to postpone the bill, “with a view that we may act
upon the main proposition, the Amendment to the Constitution to
abolish Slavery in the United States.” Mr. Sumner replied: “The
Senator speaks about acting on ‘the main proposition.’ The main
proposition, Sir, is to strike Slavery wherever you can hit
it.” That session closed without final action on the question.

December 13, 1864, Mr. Wilson brought it forward again, in
a joint resolution to encourage enlistments and promote the
efficiency of the military and naval forces, by making free the
wives and children of persons who had been or might be mustered
into the service of the United States.

January 5, 1865, in the debate which ensued, Mr. Sumner said:--

MR. PRESIDENT,--Only a few days ago there was a call for three hundred thousand more troops. The country needs them, and it is the duty of Congress to supply them. To this end there must be no difficulty, impediment, or embarrassment in the way. All these must be removed. This is not all. There must be encouragement of every kind; and such is the character of the present proposition.

There can be no delay. The country cannot wait the slow action of Constitutional Amendment, as proposed by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. DOOLITTLE]. Congress must act to the extent of its power, and any neglect of power on this question would be injurious to the public interests.

All will confess the humanity of the proposition to enfranchise the families of colored persons who have borne arms for their country. All will confess the hardship of continuing them in Slavery.

But the question is asked by many, and even by the Senator from Wisconsin, What power has Congress to set the families free?

MR. DOOLITTLE. I did not ask that question.

MR. SUMNER. The question has been put again and again, and the purport of the speech of the Senator was in that sense. He argued that we were about to have a Constitutional Amendment which would supersede everything; that therefore this proposition was unnecessary, if not injurious. I so understood the argument of the Senator, and that it pointed directly to the question of power,--because I know the patriotism of the Senator too well to suppose, that, if in his opinion the power of Congress was beyond doubt, he would hesitate. I do not do the Senator injustice. I say, then, the question is asked, What power has Congress to set the families free? This is the single point on which I shall express an opinion.

My answer is, that Congress has precisely the same power to enfranchise the families that it has to enfranchise the colored soldier. The two powers are coincident, and from the same source.

It is assumed that Congress may enfranchise the colored soldier. This has been done by solemn statute, without reference to the conduct of his pretended owner. If we are asked the reason for such enfranchisement, it must be found, first, in its practical necessity, that we may secure the best service of the slaves, and, secondly, in its intrinsic justice and humanity. In brief, Government cannot be so improvident and so foolish as to seek the service of the slave at the hazard of life, without securing to him the boon of freedom. Nor, if Government were so bereft of common sense as to forego this temptation to enlistment and efficient service, can it be guilty of the unutterable meanness of using the slave in the national defence and then returning him to bondage. Therefore the slave who fights is enfranchised.

But every argument, every consideration, which pleads for the enfranchisement of the slave, pleads also for the enfranchisement of the family. There is the same practical necessity for doing it, and the same unspeakable shabbiness in not doing it.

There is no principle of law better established than this, that an acknowledged right carries with it all incidents essential to its exercise. I do not employ technical language; but I give the idea, founded in reason and the nature of things. It would be vain to confer a right or a power, if the means for its enjoyment were denied. From this simple statement the conclusion is irresistible.

In conferring upon Congress the power to create an army, the Constitution conferred therewith all the powers essential to the exercise of the principal power. If Congress can authorize the enlistment of slaves, as it indubitably can, it may at the same time authorize their enfranchisement, and by the same reason it may authorize the enfranchisement of their families,--and all this from the necessity of the case, and to prevent an intolerable baseness.

A Scottish patriot, nearly two centuries ago, exclaimed in memorable words, which I am always glad to quote, that he would give his life to serve his country, but would not do _a base thing_ to save it.[44] If there be any value in this declaration, it may be invoked, when it is deliberately argued that the National Government can create an army, and in this service can enfranchise the slave it enlists, but is impotent to enfranchise his family. I know not how we can use his right arm and ask him to shed his blood in our defence, and then hand over his wife and child to bondage. The thought is too vile. The human heart rejects the insufferable wrong.

But it is said the slave has no family. Such is the argument of Slavery. For all that he has, as well as all that he is, even wife and child, belong to another. Surely this unrighteous pretension will not be made the apology for a denial of rights. If the family of the slave be not designated by law, or by the forms of legal marriage, _then it must be ascertained by the next best evidence possible_,--that is, by cohabitation and mutual recognition as man and wife. And any uncertainty in this evidence can only be regarded as a natural incident of Slavery. As men cannot take advantage of their own wrong, so slave-masters cannot take advantage of Slavery. Any other rule would practically unite with Slavery in denying to the slave wife and child.

There is a well-known French maxim, that “it is only the first step which costs”; and here permit me to say, it is only the first stage of the argument which merits attention. Concede that the soldier may be enfranchised, and then by the same constitutional power his family may be admitted to an equal liberty. Any other conclusion would be illogical as inhuman, discreditable alike to head and heart. There is no argument, whether of reason or humanity, for the enfranchisement of the soldier, which does not plead equally for that of his family. Nay, more,--I know not how we can expect a blessing on our arms while we fail to perform this duty.

I cannot close without declaring again my opinion, that Congress at this moment is complete master of the whole subject of Slavery everywhere in the United States, even without any Constitutional Amendment. It can sweep all out of existence, precisely as it can remove any other obstruction to the national defence, and all this by virtue of a power as indisputable as the power to raise armies or to suspend the _Habeas Corpus_. Future generations will read with amazement, that a great people, when national life was assailed, hesitated to exercise a power so simple and beneficent; and this amazement will know no bounds, as they learn that Congress higgled for months on the question whether the wives and children of our colored soldiers should be admitted to freedom.

January 9th, after further debate, the joint resolution passed
the Senate,--Yeas 27, Nays 10. February 22d, it passed the
House of Representatives,--Yeas 74, Nays 63; and March 3d, it
was approved by the President.

MASSACRE OF THE CHEYENNE INDIANS.

REMARKS IN THE SENATE, ON A JOINT RESOLUTION RELATING THERETO, JANUARY 13, 1865.

January 13th, the Senate considered a joint resolution reported
by Mr. Harlan, from the Committee on Indian Affairs, in
relation to the massacre of the Cheyenne Indians. It proposed
to direct the Secretary of War to cause the suspension of all
pay and allowances to each of the members of the Third Colorado
Regiment, officers, privates, and employees, and all others
engaged in the recent attack made on the Cheyenne Indians in
their village near Fort Lyon, in the Territory of Colorado,
under the command of Colonel Chivington, until the conduct of
the colonel and the regiment, and all others engaged in that
attack, should receive the approval of the Secretary of War;
and he was to cause all ponies, blankets, money, jewels, furs,
and other property captured from the Indians, to be seized and
held for the use of the United States, or for restitution to
the Indians, if it should hereafter appear that the attack was
unjustifiable.

* * * * *

In the debate which ensued, Mr. Sumner said:--