Chapter II: Part 2

By the influence of General Santana, Baez obtained his first election as President in 1849; and in 1856, contrary to a positive provision of the Constitution against a second term except after the intervention of an entire term, he managed by fraud and intrigue to obtain another lease of power. Beginning thus early his violations of the Constitution, he became an expert. But the people rose against him, and he was driven to find shelter within the walls of the city. He had never been friendly to the United States, and at this time was especially abusive. His capitulation soon followed, and after a year of usurped power he left for France. Santana succeeded to the Presidency, and under him in 1861 the country was reincorporated with Spain, amidst the prevailing enthusiasm of the people. Anxious to propitiate the different political chiefs, the Spanish Government offered Baez a major-general’s commission in the Army, on condition that he should remain in Europe, which he accepted. For some time there was peace in Dominica, when the people, under the lead of the patriot Cabral, rose against the Spanish power. During this protracted period of revolution, while the patriotism of the country was stirred to its inmost depths, the Dominican adventurer clung to his Spanish commission with its honors and emoluments, not parting with them until after the Cortes at Madrid had renounced the country and ordered its evacuation; and then, in his letter of resignation addressed to the Queen, under date of June 15, 1865, he again outraged the feelings of his countrymen by declaring his regret at the failure of annexion to Spain, and his “regard for her august person and the noble Spanish nation,” against whose arms they had been fighting for Independence. Losing his Spanish honors and emoluments, the adventurer was at once changed into a conspirator, being always a trickster, and from his European retreat began his machinations for power. Are we not told by the proverb that the Devil has a long arm?

On the disappearance of the Spanish flag, Cabral became Protector, and a National Convention was summoned to frame a Constitution and to organize a new Government. The people were largely in favor of Cabral, when armed men, in the name of Baez, and stimulated by his emissaries, overwhelmed the Assembly with violence, forcing the conspirator into power. Cabral, who seems to have been always prudent and humane, anxious to avoid bloodshed, and thinking that his considerable European residence might have improved the usurper, consented to accept a place in the Cabinet, which was inaugurated December 8, 1865. Ill-gotten power is short-lived; revolution soon began, and in the month of May, 1866, Baez, after first finding asylum in the French Consulate, fled to foreign parts.

The official journal of San Domingo, “El Monitor,” (June 2, 1866,) now before me, shows how the fugitive tyrant was regarded at this time. In the leading article it is said:--

“The administration of General Buenaventura Baez has just
fallen under the weight of a great revolution, in which figure
the principal notabilities of the country. A spontaneous
cry, which may be called national, because it has risen from
the depths of the majority, reveals the proportions of the
movement, its character, and its legitimacy.”

Then follows in the same journal a manifesto signed by the principal inhabitants of Dominica, where are set forth with much particularity the grounds of his overthrow, alleging that he became President not by the free and spontaneous choice of the people, but was imposed upon the nation by an armed movement; that he treated the chief magistracy as if it were his own patrimony, and monopolized for himself and his brothers all the lucrative enterprises of the country without regard to the public advantage; that, instead of recognizing the merit of those who had by their sacrifices served their country, he degraded, imprisoned, and banished them; that, in violation of the immunity belonging to members of the Constituent Assembly, he sent them to a most horrible prison,--and here numerous persons are named; that, without any judicial proceedings, contrary to the Constitution, and in the spirit of vengeance, he shut up many deserving men in obscure dungeons,--and here also are many names; that, since his occupation of the Presidency, he has kept the capital in constant alarm, and has established a system of terrorism in the bosom of the national representation. All this and much more will be found in this manifesto. There is also a manifesto of Cabral, assigning at still greater length reasons for the overthrow of Baez, and holding him up as the enemy of peace and union; also a manifesto by the Triumvirate constituting the Provisional Government, declaring his infractions of the Constitution; also a manifesto from the general in command at the City of San Domingo, where, after denouncing the misdeeds of one man, it says, “This man, this monster, this speculator, this tyrant, is the General Buenaventura Baez.”

Soon after the disappearance of Baez, his rival became legitimate President by the direct vote of the people, according to the requirement of the Constitution. Different numbers of the official journal now before me contain the election returns in September, 1866, where the name of General José María Cabral appears at the head of the poll. This is memorable as the first time in the history of Dominica that a question was submitted to the direct vote of the people. By that direct vote Cabral became President, and peace ensued. Since then there has been no election; so that this was last as well as first, leaving Cabral the last legitimate President.

During his enforced exile, Baez found his way to Washington. Mr. Seward declined to see him, but referred him to me. I had several conversations with him at my house. His avowed object was to obtain money and arms to aid him in the overthrow of the existing Government. Be assured, Mr. President, he obtained no encouragement from me,--although I did not hesitate to say, as I always have said, that I hoped my country would never fail to do all possible good to Dominica, extending to it a helping hand. It was at a later day that belligerent intervention began.

Meanwhile Cabral, embarrassed by financial difficulties and a dead weight of paper money, the legacy of the fugitive conspirator, turned to the United States for assistance, offering a lease of the Bay of Samana. Then spoke Baez from his retreat, denouncing what he called “the sale of his country to the United States,” adopting the most inflammatory language. By his far-reaching and unscrupulous activity a hostile force was organized, which, with the help of Salnave, the late ruler of Hayti, compelled the capitulation of Cabral, February 8, 1868. A Convention was appointed, not elected, which proceeded to nominate Baez for the term of four years, not as President, but as Dictator. Declining the latter title, the triumphant conspirator accepted that of _Gran Ciudadano_, or Grand Citizen, with unlimited powers. At the same time his enemies were driven into exile. The prisons were gorged, and the most respectable citizens were his victims. Naturally such a man would sell his country. Wanting money, he cared little how it was got. Anything for money, even his country.

ORIGIN OF THE SCHEME.

Cabral withdrew to the interior, keeping up a menace of war, while the country was indignant with the unscrupulous usurper, who for the second time obtained power by violence. Power thus obtained was naturally uncertain, and Baez soon found himself obliged to invoke foreign assistance. “Help me, Cassius, or I sink!” cried the Grand Citizen. European powers would not listen. None of them wanted his half-island,--not Spain, not France, not England. None would take it. But still the Grand Citizen cried, when at last he was relieved by an answering voice from our Republic. A young officer, inexperienced in life, ignorant of the world, untaught in the Spanish language, unversed in International Law, knowing absolutely nothing of the intercourse between nations, and unconscious of the Constitution of his country, was selected by the President to answer the cry of the Grand Citizen. I wish that I could say something better of General Babcock; but if I spoke according to the evidence, much from his own lips, the portraiture would be more painful, and his unfitness more manifest. In closest association with Baez, and with profitable concessions not easy to measure, was the American Cazneau, known as disloyal to our country, and so thoroughly suspected that the military missionary, before leaving Washington, was expressly warned against him; but like seeks like, and he at once rushed into the embrace of the selfish speculator, who boasted that “no one American had been more intimately connected with the Samana and annexation negotiations, from their inception to their close, than himself,”--and who did not hesitate to instruct Baez that it was not only his right, but duty, to keep an American citizen in prison “to serve and protect negotiations in which our President was so deeply interested,” which he denominates “the great business in hand.”[20]

By the side of Cazneau was Fabens, also a speculator and life-long intriguer, afterwards Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Baez in “the great business.” Sparing details, which would make the picture more sombre, I come at once to the conclusion. A treaty was signed by which the usurper pretended to sell his country to the United States in consideration of $1,500,000; also another treaty leasing the Bay of Samana for an annual rent of $150,000. The latter sum was paid down by the young plenipotentiary, or $100,000 in cash and $50,000 in muskets and a battery. No longer able to pocket the doubloons of Spain, the usurper sought to pocket our eagles, and not content with muskets and a battery to be used against his indignant fellow-countrymen, obtained the Navy of the United States to maintain him in his treason. It was a plot worthy of the hardened conspirator and his well-tried confederates.

OPEN INFRACTION OF THE DOMINICAN CONSTITUTION.

The case was aggravated by the open infraction of the Constitution of Dominica with which it proceeded. By that Constitution, adopted 27th September, 1866, a copy of which is now before me, it is solemnly declared that “neither the whole nor part of the territory of the Republic can ever be alienated,” while the President takes the following oath of office: “I swear by God and the Holy Gospels to observe and cause to be observed the Constitution and the Laws of the Dominican People, to respect their rights, and to maintain the National Independence.” The Constitution of 1865 had said simply, “_No part_ of the territory of the Republic can ever be alienated”; but now, as if anticipating recent events, it was declared, “_Neither the whole_ nor part,”--thus explicitly excluding the power exercised. All this was set aside while the plot went on. Even if Baez defied the Constitution of his country, our Government, in dealing with him, could not do so. In negotiation with another power, the Great Republic, which is an example to nations, cannot be insensible to the restrictions imposed by the Constitution of the contracting party; and this duty becomes stronger from the very weakness of the other side. Defied by the Dominican usurper, all these restrictions must be sacredly regarded by us. Than this nothing can be clearer in International Ethics; but the rule of Law is like that of Ethics. Ancient Rome, speaking in the text of Ulpian, says: “He who contracts with another either knows or ought to know his condition,”--_Qui cum alio contrahit vel est vel DEBET esse non ignarus conditionis ejus_;[21] and this rule has the authority of Wheaton as part of International Law.[22] Another writer gives to it this practical statement, precisely applicable to the present case: “Nevertheless, in order to make such transfer valid, the authority, whether _de facto_ or _de jure_, must be competent to bind the State. Hence the necessity of examining into and ascertaining the powers of the rulers, as the municipal constitutions of different states throw many difficulties in the way of alienations of their public property, _and particularly of their territory_.”[23] Thus, according to International Law, as expounded by American authority, was this treaty forbidden.

Treaties negotiated in violation of the Dominican Constitution and of International Law were to be maintained at all hazards, even that last terrible hazard of war; nor was Public Law in any of its forms, Constitutional or International, allowed to stand in the way. The War Powers, so carefully guarded in every Republican Government, and so jealously defended against the One-Man Power, were instantly seized, in open violation of the Constitution of the United States, which was as little regarded as that of Dominica, while the Law of Nations in its most commanding principles was set at defiance: all of which appears too plainly on the facts.

ALLEGATIONS IN FORMER SPEECH NOW REPEATED.

When last I had the honor of addressing the Senate on this grave question, you will remember, Sir, my twofold allegation: first, that the usurper Baez was maintained in power by our Navy to enable him to carry out the sale of his country; and, secondly, that further to assure this sale the neighbor Republic of Hayti was violently menaced by an admiral of our fleet,--both acts being unquestionable breaches of Public Law, Constitutional and International. That these allegations were beyond question, at least by our Government, I knew well at the time, for I had the official evidence on my table; but I was unable to use it. Since then it has been communicated to the Senate. What I then asserted on my own authority I now present on documentary evidence. My witnesses are the officers of the Government and their official declarations. Let the country judge if I was not right in every word that I then employed. And still further, let the country judge if the time has not come to cry “Halt!” in this business, which already has the front of war.

WAR.

War, Sir, is the saddest chapter of history. It is known as “the last reason of kings.” Alas, that it should ever be the reason of a Republic! “There can be no such thing, my Lords, as a little war for a great nation,” was the exclamation of the Duke of Wellington,[24] which I heard from his own lips, as he protested against what to some seemed petty. Gathering all the vigor of his venerable form, the warrior seasoned in a hundred fights cried out, and all within the sound of his voice felt the testimony. The reason is obvious. War, whether great or little, whether on the fields of France or the island of San Domingo, is war, over which hovers not only Death, but every demon of wrath. Nor is war merely conflict on a chosen field; it is force employed by one nation against another, or in the affairs of another,--as in the direct menace to Hayti, and the intermeddling between Baez and Cabral. There may be war without battle. Hercules conquered by manifest strength the moment he appeared on the ground, so that his club rested unused. And so our Navy has thus far conquered without a shot; but its presence in the waters of Hayti and Dominica was war.

TWO SOURCES OF TESTIMONY.

All this will be found under two different heads, or in two different sources: first, what is furnished by the State Department, and, secondly, what is furnished by the Navy Department. These two Departments are witnesses, with their agents, confessing and acting. From the former we have confession; from the latter we have acts: confessions and acts all in harmony and supporting each other. I begin with the confession.

CONFESSION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

In the strange report of the Secretary of State, responsive to a resolution moved by me in the Senate, the dependence of Baez upon our Navy is confessed in various forms. Nobody can read this document without noting the confession, first from the reluctant Secretary, and then from his agent.

Referring to the correspondence of Raymond H. Perry, our Commercial Agent at San Domingo, who signed the treaties, the Secretary presents a summary, which, though obnoxious to just criticism, is a confession. According to him, the correspondence “tends to show that the presence of a United States man-of-war in the port was supposed to have _a peaceful influence_.”[25] The term “peaceful influence” is the pleonasm of the Secretary, confessing the maintenance of Baez in his usurpation. There is no such thing as stealing; “_convey_ the wise it call”; and so with the Secretary the maintenance of a usurper by our war-ships is only “a peaceful influence.” A discovery of the Secretary. But in the levity of his statement the Secretary forgets that a United States man-of-war has nothing to do within a foreign jurisdiction, and cannot exert influence there without unlawful intervention.

The Secretary alludes also to the probability of “another revolution,” of course against Baez, in the event of the failure of the annexion plot; and here is another confession of the dependence of the usurper upon our Navy.

But the correspondence of Mr. Perry, as communicated to the Senate, shows more plainly than the confession of the Secretary how completely the usurper was maintained in power by the strong arm of the United States.

The anxiety of the usurper was betrayed at an early day, even while vaunting the popular enthusiasm for annexion. In a dispatch dated at San Domingo, January 20, 1870, Mr. Perry thus reports:--

“The Nantasket left this port January 1, 1870, and we have not
heard from her since. She was to go to Puerto Plata [a port of
Dominica] and return _viâ_ Samana Bay [also in Dominica]. _We
need the protection of a man-of-war very much_, but anticipate
her return very soon.”[26]

Why the man-of-war was needed is easily inferred from what is said in the same dispatch:--

“The President tells me that it is almost impossible to prevent
the people pronouncing for annexation before the proper time.
_He prefers to await the arrival of a United States man-of-war
before their opinion is publicly expressed._”[27]

If the truth were told, the usurper felt that it was almost impossible to prevent the people from pronouncing for his overthrow, and therefore he wanted war-ships.

Then under date of February 8, 1870, Mr. Perry reports again:--

“President Baez daily remarks that the United States Government
has not kept its promises to send men-of-war to the coast. He
seems very timid and lacks energy.”[28]

The truth becomes still more apparent in the dispatch of February 20, 1870,--nearly three months after the signature of the treaties, and while they were still pending before the Senate,--where it is openly reported:--

_“If the United States ships were withdrawn, he [Baez] could
not hold the reins of this Government._ I have told him
this.”[29]

Nothing can be plainer. In other words, the usurper was maintained in power by our guns. Such was the official communication of the very agent who had signed the treaties, and who was himself an ardent annexionist. Desiring annexion, he confesses the means employed to accomplish it. How the President did not at once abandon, unfinished, treaties maintained by violence, how the Secretary of State did not at once resign rather than be a party to this transaction, is beyond comprehension.

Nor was the State Department left uninformed with regard to the distribution of this naval force. Here is the report, under date of San Domingo, March 12, 1870, while the vote was proceeding:--

“The Severn lies at this port; the Swatara left for Samana
the 9th; the Nantasket goes to Puerto Plata to-morrow, the
13th; the Yantic lies in the river in this city. Admiral Poor,
on board the Severn, is expected to remain at this port for
some time. Everything is very quiet at present throughout the
country.”[30]

Thus under the guns of our Navy was quiet maintained, while Baez, like another usurper, exclaimed, “Now, by St. Paul, the work goes bravely on!”

What this same official reported to the State Department he afterward reaffirmed under oath, in his testimony before the committee of the Senate on the case of Mr. Hatch. The words were few, but decisive, touching the acts of our Navy,--“committed since we had been there, _protecting Baez from the citizens of San Domingo_.”[31]

Then, again, in a private letter to myself, under date of Bristol, Rhode Island, February 10, 1871, after stating that he had reported what the record shows to be true, “that Baez was sustained and held in power by the United States Navy,” he adds, “This fact Baez acknowledged to me.”

So that we have the confession of the Secretary of State, also the confession of his agent at San Domingo, and the confession of Baez himself, that the usurper depended for support on our Navy.

AN AMERICAN CITIZEN SACRIFICED TO HELP THE TREATY.

This drama of a usurper sustained by foreign power is illustrated by an episode, where the liberty of an American citizen was sacrificed to the consummation of the plot. It appears that Davis Hatch, of Norwalk, Connecticut, intimately known to one of the Senators of that State [Mr. FERRY] and respected by the other [Mr. BUCKINGHAM], lived in Dominica, engaged in business there, while Cabral was the legitimate President. During this time he wrote letters to a New York paper, in which he exposed the character of the conspirator Baez, then an exile. When the latter succeeded by violence in overthrowing the regular Government, one of his first acts was to arrest Mr. Hatch, on the ground that he had coöperated with Cabral. How utterly groundless was this charge appears by a letter to Baez from his own brother, governor of the province where the former resided,[32] and also by the testimony of Mr. Somers Smith, our Commercial Agent in San Domingo, who spoke and acted as became a representative of our country.[33] Read the correspondence and testimony candidly, and you will confess that the whole charge was trumped up to serve the purpose of the usurper.

Sparing all details of trial and pardon, where everything testifies against Baez, I come to the single decisive point, on which there can be no question, that, even after his formal pardon, Mr. Hatch was detained in prison by the authority of the usurper, at the special instance of Cazneau and with the connivance of Babcock, in order to prevent his influence against the treaty of annexion. The evidence is explicit and unanswerable. Gautier, the Minister of Baez, who had signed the treaty, in an official note to our representative, Mr. Raymond H. Perry, dated at San Domingo, February 19, 1870, and communicated to the State Department, says: “I desire that you will be good enough to assure his Excellency, the Secretary of State in Washington, that _the prolonged sojourn of Mr. Hatch here_ has been only to prevent his hostile action in New York.”[34] Nor is this all. Under the same date, Cazneau had the equal hardihood to write to Babcock, then at Washington, a similar version of the conspiracy, where, after denunciation of Perry as “embarrassing affairs here,” in San Domingo, by his persistency in urging the release of Mr. Hatch, he relates, that, on occasion of a recent peremptory demand of this sort in his presence, Baez replied, that Hatch “would certainly make use of his liberty to join the enemies of annexation,” and “that _a few weeks’ restraint_ would not be so inconvenient to him as his slanderous statements might become to _the success of General Grant’s policy in the Antilles_,”--and he adds, that he himself, in response to the simultaneous charge of “opposing the liberation of an innocent man,” declared, that, in his opinion, “President Baez had the right, _and ought_, to do everything in his power _to serve and protect negotiations_ in which our President was so deeply interested.”[35] All this is clear, plain, and documentary. Nor is there any drawback or deduction on account of the character of Mr. Hatch, who, according to the best testimony, is an excellent citizen, enjoying the good-will and esteem of his neighbors at home, being respected there “as much as Governor Buckingham is in Norwich,”[36]--and we all know that no higher standard can be reached.

In other days it was said that the best government is where an injury to a single citizen is resented as an injury to the whole State. Here was an American citizen, declared by our representative to be “an innocent man,” and already pardoned for the crimes falsely alleged against him, incarcerated, or, according to the polite term of the Minister of Baez, compelled to a “prolonged sojourn,” in order to assure the consummation of the plot for the acceptance of the treaty, or, in the words of Cazneau, “to serve and protect negotiations in which our President [Grant] was so deeply interested.” The cry, “I am an American citizen,” was nothing to Baez, nothing to Cazneau, nothing to Babcock. The young missionary heard the cry and answered not. Annexion was in peril. Annexion could not stand the testimony of Mr. Hatch, who would write in New York papers. Therefore was he doomed to a prison. Here again I forbear details, though at each point they testify. And yet the Great Republic, instead of spurning at once the heartless usurper who trampled on the liberty of an American citizen, and spurning the ill-omened treaty which required this sacrifice, continued to lend its strong arm in the maintenance of the trampler, while with unexampled assiduity it pressed the treaty upon a reluctant Senate.

CONFESSION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT WITH REGARD TO HAYTI.

But intervention in Dominica is only one part of the story, even according to the confession of the State Department. Side by side with Dominica on the same tempting island is the Black Republic of Hayti, with a numerous population, which more than two generations ago achieved national independence, and at a later day, by the recognition of our Government, took its place under the Law of Nations as equal and peer of the Great Republic. To all its paramount titles of Independence and Equality, sacred and unimpeachable, must be added its special character as an example of self-government, being the first in the history of the African race, and a promise of the future. Who can doubt that as such this Black Republic has a value beyond all the products of its teeming tropical soil? Like other Governments, not excepting our own, it has complications, domestic and foreign. Among the latter is chronic hostility with Dominica, arising from claims territorial and pecuniary. To these claims I refer without undertaking to consider their justice. It is enough that they exist. And here comes the wrong perpetuated by the Great Republic. In the effort to secure the much-coveted territory, our Government, not content with maintaining the usurper Baez in power, occupying the harbors of Dominica with the war-ships of the United States, sent other war-ships, being none other than our most powerful monitor, the Dictator, with the frigate Severn as consort, and with yet other monitors in their train, to menace the Black Republic by an act of war. An American admiral was found to do this thing, and an American minister, himself of African blood, was found to aid the admiral.

The dispatch of the Secretary of State instituting this act of war does not appear in his Report; but we are sufficiently enlightened by that of Mr. Bassett, our Minister Resident at Port-au-Prince, who, under date of February 17, 1870, informs the State Department in Washington that he had “transmitted to the Haytian Government notification that the United States asked and expected it to observe a strict neutrality in reference to the internal affairs of San Domingo”; and then, with superserviceable alacrity, he lets the Department know that he communicated to Commander Owen, of the Seminole, reports that “persons in authority under the Haytian Government were planning clandestinely schemes for interference in San Domingo affairs.”[37] But a moment of contrition seems to have overtaken the Minister; for he adds, that he did not regard these reports “as sufficiently reliable to make them the basis for a recommendation of _severe or extreme measures_.”[38] Pray, by what title, Mr. Minister, could you recommend any such measures, being nothing less than war against the Black Republic? By what title could you launch these great thunders? The menacing note of the Minister was acknowledged by the Black Republic without one word of submission,--as also without one word of proper resentment.[39]

The officious Minister of the Great Republic reports to the State Department that he had addressed a diplomatic note to the Black Republic, under date of February 9, 1870, where, referring to the answer of the latter, he says, “It would nevertheless have been more satisfactory and agreeable to my Government _and myself_, if you, in speaking for your Government, had felt authorized to give assurance of the neutrality asked and expected by the United States.”[40] This letter was written with the guns of the Dictator and Severn behind. It appears from the Minister’s report, that these two war-ships arrived at the capital of the Black Republic on the morning of February 9th, when the Minister, as he says, “arranged for a formal call on the Haytian Government the same day.” The Minister then records, and no blush appears on his paper, that “the Admiral availed himself of this visit to communicate, _quite pointedly_, to the President and his advisers the tenor of his instructions.”[41] This assault upon the Independence and Equality of the Black Republic will appear more fully in the Report transmitted to the Senate by the Navy Department. For the present I present the case on the confession of the State Department.

RECORD OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.

If the Report of the State Department is a confession, that of the Navy Department is an authentic record of acts flagrant and indefensible,--unless we are ready to set aside the Law of Nations and the Constitution of the United States, two paramount safeguards. Both of these are degraded in order to advance the scheme. If I called it plot, I should not err; for this term is suggested by the machination. The record is complete.

The scheme first shows itself in a letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy, under date of May 17, 1869, informing the latter that the President deems it “desirable that _a man-of-war_, commanded by a discreet and intelligent officer, should be ordered _to visit the several ports of the Dominican Republic_, and to report upon the condition of affairs in that quarter.” The Secretary adds:--

“It is also important that we should have full and accurate
information in regard to the views of the Dominican people
of all parties in regard to annexation to the United States,
or the sale or lease of the Bay of Samana, or of territory
adjacent thereto.”[42]

No invitation from the island appears,--not a word even from any of its people. The beginning is in the letter of the Secretary; and here we see how “a man-of-war” formed part of the first stage. A mere inquiry is inaugurated by “a man-of-war.” Nor was it to stop at a single place; it was to visit the several ports of the Dominican Republic.

The Secretary of the Navy obeyed. Orders were given, and under date of June 29, 1869, Rear-Admiral Hoff reports that the Nipsic, with an armament of one 11-inch and two 9-inch guns, “is to visit all the ports of the Dominican Republic.”[43] Here again is a revelation, foreshadowing the future; all the ports are to be visited by this powerful war-ship. Why? To what just end? If for negotiation, then was force, _force_, FORCE our earliest, as it has been since our constant plenipotentiary. Already we discern the contrast with Old Spain.

The loss of a screw occurred to prevent this war-breathing perambulation. The Nipsic did not go beyond Port-au-Prince; but Lieutenant-Commander Selfridge, in his report, under date of July 14, 1869, lets drop an honest judgment, which causes regret that he did not visit the whole island. Thus he wrote:--

“While my short stay in the island will not permit me to
speak with authority, it is my individual opinion, that, if the
United States should annex Hayti _on the representation of a
party_, it would be found an elephant both costly in money and
lives.”[44]

The whole case is opened when we are warned against annexion “on the representation of a party.”

Still the scheme proceeded. On the 17th July, 1869, General Babcock sailed from New York for San Domingo, as special agent of the State Department. The records of the Department, so far as communicated to the Senate, show no authority to open negotiations of any kind, much less to treat for the acquisition of this half-island. His instructions, which are dated July 13, 1869, are simply to make certain inquiries;[45] but, under the same date, the Secretary of the Navy addresses a letter to Commander Owen, of the Seminole, with an armament of one 11-inch gun and four 32-pounders, of 4,200 pounds, in which he says:--

“You will remain at Samana, or on the coast of San Domingo,
while General Babcock is there, _and give him the moral support
of your guns_.”[46]

The phrase of the Secretary is at least curious. And who is General Babcock, that on his visit the Navy is to be at his back? Nothing on this head is said. All that we know from the record is that he was to make certain inquiries, and in this business “guns” play a part. To be sure, it was their “_moral_ support” he was to have; but they were nevertheless “guns.” Thus in all times has lawless force sought to disguise itself. Before any negotiation was begun, while only a few interrogatories were ordered by the State Department, under which this missionary acted, “the moral support of guns” was ordered by the Navy Department. Here, Sir, permit me to say, is the first sign of war, being an undoubted usurpation, whether by President or Secretary. War is hostile force, and here it is ordered. But this is only a squint, compared with the open declaration which ensued. And here again we witness the contrast with Old Spain.

But the “guns” of the Seminole were not enough to support the missionary in his inquiries. The Navy Department, under date of August 23, 1869, telegraphed to the commandant at Key West:--

“Direct a vessel to proceed without a moment’s delay to San
Domingo City, _to be placed at the disposal of General Babcock
while on that coast_. If not at San Domingo City, to find
him.”[47]

Here is nothing less than the terrible earnestness of war itself. Accordingly, the Tuscarora was dispatched; and the missionary finds himself changed to a commodore. Again the contrast with Old Spain!

How many days the Tuscarora took to reach the coast does not appear; but on the 4th September the famous protocol was executed by Orville E. Babcock, entitling himself “Aide-de-Camp to his Excellency, General Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States of America,” where, besides stipulating the annexion of Dominica to the United States in consideration of $1,500,000, it is further provided that “his Excellency, General Grant, President of the United States, promises, privately, to use all his influence in order that the idea of annexing the Dominican Republic to the United States may acquire such a degree of popularity among members of Congress as will be necessary for its accomplishment.”[48] Such was the work which needed so suddenly--“without a moment’s delay”--a second war-ship besides the Seminole, which was already ordered to lend “the _moral_ support of its guns.” How unlike that boast of Old Spain, that there was not a Spanish bottom in those waters!

Returning to Washington with his protocol, the missionary was now sent back with instructions to negotiate two treaties,--one for the annexion of the half-island, and the other for the lease of the Bay of Samana. By the Constitution ambassadors and other public ministers are appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; but our missionary held no such commission. How the business sped appears from the State Department. The Report of the Navy Department shows how it was sustained by force. By a letter under date of December 3, 1869, on board the ship Albany, off San Domingo, addressed to Lieutenant-Commander Bunce on board the Nantasket, the missionary, after announcing the conclusion of a treaty for the lease of Samana and other purposes, imparts this important information:--

“In this negotiation the President has guarantied to the
Dominican Republic protection from all foreign interposition
during the time specified in the treaties for submitting the
same to the people of the Dominican Republic.”

Of the absolute futility and nullity of this Presidential guaranty until after the ratification of the treaties I shall speak hereafter. Meanwhile we behold the missionary changed to plenipotentiary:--

“For this purpose the honorable Secretary of the Navy was
directed to place _three armed vessels in this harbor, subject
to my instruction_.”

Why three armed vessels? For what purpose? How unlike the boast of Old Spain! What follows reveals the menace of war:--

“I shall raise the United States flag on shore, and shall leave
a small guard with it.”

Here is nothing less than military occupation. Besides war-ships in the waters, the flag is to be raised on shore, and soldiers of the United States are to be left with it. Again the contrast with Old Spain, boasting not only that there was not a single Spanish “bottom” on the coast, but not a single Spanish soldier on the land. Then follows an order to make war:--

“Should you find any foreign intervention intended, _you will
use all your force_ to carry out to the letter the guaranties
given in the treaties.”

Nothing could be stronger. Here is war. Then comes a direct menace by the young plenipotentiary, launched at the neighboring Black Republic:--

“The Dominican Republic fears trouble from the Haytian border,
about Jacmel. You will please inform the people, in case you
are satisfied there is an intended intervention, that such
intervention, direct or indirect, will be regarded as an
unfriendly act toward the United States, _and take such steps
as you think necessary_.”[49]

The Dominican Republic fears trouble, or in other words the usurper Baez trembles for his power, and therefore the guns of our Navy are to be pointed at Hayti. Again, how little like Old Spain! And this was the way in which our negotiation began. We have heard of an “_armed_ neutrality,” and of an “_armed_ peace”; but here is an _armed_ negotiation.

The force employed in the negotiation naturally fructified in other force. Violence follows violence in new forms. Armed negotiation was changed to armed intervention, being an act of war,--all of which is placed beyond question. There is repetition and reduplication of testimony.

The swiftness of war appears in the telegram dated at the Navy Department January 29, 1870, addressed to Rear-Admiral Poor, at Key West. Here is this painful dispatch:--

“Proceed at once with the Severn and Dictator to
Port-au-Prince; communicate with our Consul there, and inform
the present Haytian authorities that this Government is
determined to protect the present Dominican Government _with
all its power_. You will then proceed to Dominica, and use
your force to give the most ample protection to the Dominican
Government _against any Power attempting to interfere with it_.
Visit Samana Bay and the capital, _and see the United States
power and authority secure there_. _There must be no failure in
this matter._ If the Haytians attack the Dominicans with their
ships, _destroy or capture them_. See that there is a proper
force at both San Domingo City and Samana.

“If Admiral Poor is not at Key West, this dispatch must be
forwarded to him without delay.”[50]

“Proceed at once.” Mark the warlike energy. What then? Inform the Haytian Government “that this Government is determined to protect the present Dominican Government [the usurper Baez] with _all its power_.” Strong words, and vast in scope! Not only the whole Navy of the United States, but all the power of our Republic is promised to the usurper. At Dominica, where the Admiral is to go next, he is directed to use his force “to give the most ample protection to the Dominican Government [the usurper Baez] _against any Power attempting to interfere with it_.” Then comes a new direction. At Samana and the City of San Domingo “see the United States power and authority secure there.” Here is nothing less than military occupation. Pray, by what title? Mark again the warlike energy. And then giving to the war a new character, the Admiral is told: “If the Haytians attack the Dominicans with their ships, _destroy or capture them_.” Such is this many-shotted dispatch, which is like a mitrailleuse in death-dealing missives.

This belligerent intervention in the affairs of another country, with a declaration of war against the Black Republic, all without any authority from Congress, or any sanction under the Constitution, was followed by a dispatch dated January 31, 1870, to Lieutenant-Commander Allen, of the Swatara, with an armament of six 32-pounders, 4,500 pounds, and one 11-inch gun, where is the breath of war. After hurrying the ship off to the City of San Domingo, the dispatch says:--

“If you find, when you get there, that the Dominican Government
require any assistance against the enemies of that Republic,
_you will not hesitate to give it to them_.”[51]

What is this but war, at the call of the usurper Baez, against the enemies of his Government, whether domestic or foreign? Let the usurper cry out, and our flag is engaged. Our cannon must fire, it may be upon Dominicans rising against the usurper, or it may be upon Haytians warring on the usurper for their rights, or it may be upon some other foreign power claiming rights. The order is peremptory, leaving no discretion. The assistance must be rendered. “You will not hesitate to give it to them”: so says the order. On which I observe, This is war.

This was not enough. The Navy Department, by still another order, dated February 9, 1870, addressed to Commodore Green, of the ship Congress, with an armament of fourteen 9-inch guns and two 60-pounder rifles, enforces this same conduct. After mentioning the treaty, the order says:--

“While that treaty is pending, the Government of the United
States has agreed to afford countenance and assistance to the
Dominican people _against their enemies now in the island and
in revolution against the lawfully constituted Government_,
and you will use the force at your command to resist any
attempts by the enemies of the Dominican Republic to invade the
Dominican territory, _by land or sea_, so far as your power can
reach them.”[52]

Here again is belligerent intervention in Dominica, with a declaration of war against the Black Republic, included under the head “enemies of the Dominican Republic,” or perhaps it is a case of “running amuck,” according to Malay example, for the sake of the usurper Baez.

Thus much for the orders putting in motion the powers of war. I have set them forth in their precise words. Soon I shall show wherein they offend International Law and the Constitution. Meanwhile the case is not complete without showing what was done under these orders. Already the State Department has testified. The Navy Department testifies in harmony with the State Department. And here the record may be seen under two heads,--first, belligerent intervention in Dominica, and, secondly, belligerent intervention in Hayti.

BELLIGERENT INTERVENTION IN DOMINICA.

In Dominica there was constant promise of protection and constant appeal for it, with recurring incidents, showing the dependence of the usurper upon our naval force. And here I proceed according to the order of dates.

Rear-Admiral Poor, of the flag-ship Severn, reports from the City of San Domingo, under date of March 12, 1870, that the President--meaning the usurper Baez--informed him that he was obliged to keep a considerable force against Cabral and Luperon, and then added, “If annexation was delayed, it would be absolutely necessary for him to call upon the United States Government for pecuniary aid.”[53] Not content with our guns, the usurper wanted our dollars. Next Lieutenant-Commander Bunce, under date of March 21, 1870, reports from Puerto Plata that “the authorities think that the excitement has not yet passed, and that _the presence of a man-of-war here for a time will have a great moral effect_.”[54] The man-of-war becomes a preacher. The same officer, under date of March 24, 1870, reports a speech of his own at Puerto Plata, that Rear-Admiral Poor “had a heavy squadron about the island, and would drive him [Luperon] out,--probably, in doing so, _destroying the town and all the property in it_.”[55] And this was followed, March 26, 1870, by formal notice from Lieutenant-Commander Bunce to the British Vice-Consul at Puerto Plata, in these terms:--

“As to my objects here, one of them certainly is, and I desire
to accomplish it as plainly as possible, to inform the foreign
residents here, that, if any such league or party is formed
among them, and, with or without their aid, Luperon, Cabral,
or any others hostile to the Dominican Government, should get
possession of this port, _the naval forces of the United States
would retake it_, and, in so doing, the foreign residents, as
the largest property-holders, as well as the most interested in
the business of the port, would be the greatest sufferers.”[56]

Here is the menace of war. The naval forces of the United States will retake a port.

Meanwhile the work of protection proceeds. Rear-Admiral Poor reports, under date of May 7, 1870:--

“Upon my arrival there [at San Domingo City], I found it
necessary, _properly to protect the Dominican Government_,
to dispatch one of the sloops I found there to the northwest
portion of the island and the other to Puerto Plata, intending,
as soon as able to do so, to dispatch one to Samana Bay and to
station the other off San Domingo City.”[57]

Here is belligerent protection at four different points.

Meanwhile the treaty for annexion, and also the treaty for the lease of Samana, had both expired by lapse of time March 29, 1870, while the treaty for annexion was rejected by solemn vote June 30, 1870,--so that no treaty remained even as apology for the illegitimate protection which had been continued at such cost to the country. But this made no difference in the aid supplied by our Navy. Nor was the Administration here unadvised with regard to the constant dependence of the usurper. Commodore Green reports from off San Domingo City, under date of July 21, 1870:--

“I am inclined to the opinion that a withdrawal of the
protection of the United States, and of the prospect of
annexation at some future time, would instantly lead to a
revolution, headed by Cabral, who would be supported by
the enemies of the present Government, and assisted by the
Haytians.”[58]

This is followed by a report from Lieutenant-Commander Allen at Samana Bay, under date of August 28, 1870, announcing that he has received a communication from “his Excellency, President Baez, requesting the presence of a vessel on the north side of the island, on account of an intended invasion by Cabral.”[59] In the communication, which is inclosed, the usurper says that he “deems the presence of a ship-of-war in the Bay of Manzanillo of immediate importance.”[60] Cabral, it appears, was near this place. Other points are mentioned to be visited.

Then follow other reports from Commander Irwin of the Yantic, with inclosures from Baez, where the dependence of the usurper is confessed. In a letter from the Executive Mansion at San Domingo City, under date of August 30, 1870, he desires Commander Irwin to “proceed to Tortuguero de Azua for a few hours, for the purpose of transporting to this city the rest of the Dominican battalion Restauracion, as it is thought convenient by the Government.”[61] Upon which Commander Irwin, under date of September 3, 1870, remarks:--

“The President was anxious to add to the force at his disposal
in the City of San Domingo, _as he feared an outbreak_.…
I acceded to his request, … and on the 2d instant landed
sixty-five officers and men that we had brought from Azua.”[62]

Here is a confession, showing again the part played by our Navy. War-ships of the United States dance attendance on the usurper, and save him from the outbreak of the people.

Then, again, under date of September 2, 1870, the usurper declares “the necessity at present of a man-of-war in this port, and that none would be more convenient than the Yantic _for the facility of entering the river Ozama, owing to her size_.”[63] Thus not merely on the coasts, but in a river, was our Navy invoked.

But this was not enough. Under date of October 8, 1870, the usurper writes from the Executive Residence “to reiterate the necessity of the vessels now in that bay [Samana] coming to these southern coasts.”[64] And as late as January 8, 1871, Rear-Admiral Lee reports from off San Domingo City, that delay in accomplishing annexion has, among other things, “risk of insurrection,”[65]--thus attesting the dependence of the usurper upon our power. Such is the uniform story, where the cry of the usurper is like the refrain of a ballad.

BELLIGERENT INTERVENTION IN HAYTI.

The constant intervention in Dominica was supplemented by that other intervention in Hayti, when an American admiral threatened war to the Black Republic. Shame and indignation rise as we read the record. Already we know it from the State Department. Rear-Admiral Poor, under date of February 12, 1870, reports to the Navy Department his achievement. After announcing that the Severn, with an armament of fourteen 9-inch guns and one 60-pounder rifle, and the Dictator, with an armament of two 15-inch guns, arrived at Port-au-Prince the 9th instant, he narrates his call on the Provisional President of Hayti, and how, after communicating the pendency of negotiations and the determination of the Government of the United States “with its whole power” to prevent any interference on the part of the Haytian or any other Government with that of the Dominicans, (meaning the usurper Baez,) he launched this declaration:--

“Therefore, if any attack should be made upon the Dominicans
[meaning the usurper Baez] during the said negotiations, under
the Haytian or any other flag, it would be regarded as an act
of hostility to the United States flag, and would provoke
hostility in return.”

Such was his language in the Executive Mansion of the President. The Rear-Admiral reports the dignified reply of the President and Secretary of State, who said:--

“That, ‘while they were aware of their weakness, they knew
their rights, and would maintain them and their dignity as far
as they were able, and that they must be allowed to be the
judges of their own policy,’--or words to that effect.”[66]

Such words ought to have been to the Rear-Admiral more than a broadside. How poor were his great guns against this simple reproof! The Black Republic spoke well. The Rear-Admiral adds, that he learned afterward, unofficially, “that the authorities were displeased with what they considered a menace on the part of the United States, accompanied with force.” And was it not natural that they should be displeased?

All this is bad enough from the official record; but I am enabled from another source, semi-official in character, to show yet more precisely what occurred. I have a minute account drawn up by the gentleman who acted as interpreter on the occasion. The Rear-Admiral could not speak French; the President could not speak English. Instead of waiting upon the Secretary of State and making his communication to this functionary, he went at once to the Executive Mansion, with the officers of his vessel and other persons, when, after announcing to the President that he came to pay a friendly visit, he said, that, “as a sailor, he would take the same opportunity to communicate instructions received from his Government.”

The President, justly surprised, said that he was not aware that the Rear-Admiral had any official communication to make, otherwise the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would have been present, being the proper party to receive it. The Secretary of State and other members of the Provisional Government were sent for, when the Rear-Admiral proceeded to make the communication already reported, and at the same time pointing to his great war-ships in the outside harbor, plainly visible from the Executive Mansion, remarked, that it could be seen he had power enough to enforce his communication, and that besides he was expecting other forces (and in fact two other war-ships soon arrived, one of them a monitor); and then he announced, that, “if any vessels under Haytian or other flags were found in Dominican waters, _he would sink or capture them_.” Brave Rear-Admiral! The interpreter, from whose account I am drawing, says that the President felt very sorry and humiliated by this language, especially when the Rear-Admiral referred to the strong forces under his command, and he proceeded to reply:--