Chapter III: Part 3

“That Hayti, having the knowledge of her feebleness and of
her dignity, had taken note of the communication made in the
name of the United States; that, under present circumstances,
the Government of Hayti would not interfere in the internal
affairs of San Domingo, but the Government could not prevent
the sympathies of the Haytian people to be with the Dominican
patriots fighting against annexation.”

Who will not say that in this transaction the Black Republic appears better than the Rear-Admiral?

TWO PROPOSITIONS ESTABLISHED.

Such is the testimony, establishing beyond question the two propositions, first, that the usurper Baez was maintained in power by our Navy to enable him to carry out the sale of his country, and, secondly, that further to assure this sale the neighbor Republic of Hayti was violently menaced,--all this being in breach of Public Law, International and Constitutional.

In considering how far this conduct is a violation of International Law and of the Constitution of the United States, I begin with the former.

GREAT PRINCIPLE OF “EQUALITY OF NATIONS” VIOLATED.

International Law is to nations what the National Constitution is to our coëqual States: it is the rule by which they are governed. As among us every State and also every citizen has an interest in upholding the National Constitution, so has every nation and also every citizen an interest in upholding International Law. As well disobey the former as the latter. You cannot do so in either case without disturbing the foundations of peace and tranquillity. To insist upon the recognition of International Law is to uphold civilization in one of its essential securities. To vindicate International Law is a constant duty, which is most eminent according to the rights in jeopardy.

Foremost among admitted principles of International Law is the axiom, that all nations are equal, without distinction of population, size, or power. Nor does International Law know any distinction of color. As a natural consequence, whatever is the rule for one is the rule for all; nor can we do to a thinly-peopled, small, weak, or black nation what we would not do to a populous, large, strong, or white nation,--nor what that nation might not do to us. “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” is the plain law for all nations, as for all men. The equality of nations is the first principle of International Law, as the equality of men is the first principle in our Declaration of Independence; and you may as well assail the one as the other. As all men are equal before the Law, so are all nations.

This simple statement is enough; but since this commanding principle has been practically set aside in the operations of our Navy, I proceed to show how it is illustrated by the authorities.

The equality of nations, like the equality of men, was recognized tardily, under the growing influence of civilization. Not to the earlier writers, not even to the wonderful Grotius, whose instinct for truth was so divine, do we repair for the elucidation of this undoubted rule. Our Swiss teacher, Vattel, prompted, perhaps, by the experience of his own country, surrounded by more powerful neighbors, was the first to make it stand forth in its present character. His words, which are as remarkable for picturesque force as for juridical accuracy, state the whole case:--

“Nations composed of men, and considered as so many free
persons living together in the state of Nature, are naturally
equal, and inherit from Nature the same obligations and
rights. Power or weakness does not in this respect produce
any difference. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small
republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful
kingdom. By a necessary consequence of that equality, whatever
is lawful for one nation is equally lawful for any other, and
whatever is unjustifiable in the one is equally so in the
other.”[67]

Later authorities have followed this statement, with some slight variety of expression, but with no diminution of its force. One of the earliest to reproduce it was Sir William Scott, in one of his masterly judgments, lending to it the vivid beauty of his style:--

“A fundamental principle of Public Law is the perfect equality
and entire independence of all distinct states. Relative
magnitude creates no distinction of right; relative imbecility,
whether permanent or casual, gives no additional right to the
more powerful neighbor; and any advantage seized upon that
ground is mere usurpation. This is the great foundation of
Public Law, which it mainly concerns the peace of mankind,
both in their politic and private capacities, to preserve
inviolate.”[68]

The German Heffter states the rule more simply, but with equal force:--

“Nations, being sovereign or independent of each other, treat
together on a footing of complete equality. The most feeble
state has the same political rights as the strongest. In other
terms, each state exercises in their plenitude the rights which
result from its political existence and from its participation
in international association.”[69]

The latest English writers testify likewise. Here are the words of Phillimore:--

“The natural equality of states is the necessary companion
of their independence,--that primitive cardinal right upon
which the science of International Law is mainly built.… They
are entitled, in their intercourse with other states, to all
the rights incident to a natural equality. No other state is
entitled to encroach upon this equality by arrogating to itself
peculiar privileges or prerogatives as to the manner of their
mutual intercourse.”[70]

Twiss follows Phillimore, but gives to the rule a fresh statement:--

“The independence of a nation is absolute, and not subject to
qualification; so that nations, in respect of their intercourse
under the Common Law, are peers or equals.… Power and weakness
do not in this respect give rise to any distinction.… It
results from this equality, that whatever is lawful for
one nation is equally lawful for another, and whatever is
unjustifiable in the one is equally unjustifiable in the
other.”[71]

In our own country, Chancellor Kent, a great authority, gives the rule with perfect clearness and simplicity:--

“Nations are equal in respect to each other, and entitled to
claim equal consideration for their rights, whatever may be
their relative dimensions or strength, or however greatly they
may differ in government, religion, or manners. This perfect
equality and entire independence of all distinct states is a
fundamental principle of Public Law.”[72]

General Halleck, whose work is not surpassed by any other in practical value, while quoting especially Vattel and Sir William Scott, says with much sententiousness:--

“All sovereign states, without respect to their relative power,
are, in the eye of International Law, equal, being endowed with
the same natural rights, bound by the same duties, and subject
to the same obligations.”[73]

Thus does each authority reflect the others, while the whole together present the Equality of Nations as a guiding principle not to be neglected or dishonored.

The record already considered shows how this principle has been openly defied by our Government in the treatment of the Black Republic,--first, in the menace of war by Rear-Admiral Poor, and, secondly, in the manner of the menace,--being in substance and in form. In both respects the Admiral did what he would not have done to a powerful nation, what he would not have done to any white nation, and what we should never allow any nation to do to us.

Hayti was weak, and the gallant Admiral, rowing ashore, pushed to the Executive Mansion, where, after what he called “a friendly visit,” he struck at the independence of the Black Republic, pointing from the windows of the Executive Mansion to his powerful armament, and threatening to employ it against the Haytian capital or in sinking Haytian ships. For the present I consider this unprecedented insolence only so far as it was an offence against the Equality of Nations, and here it may be tried easily. Think you that we should have done this thing to England, France, or Spain? Think you that any foreign power could have done it to us? But if right in us toward Hayti, it would be right in us toward England, France, or Spain; and it would be right in any foreign power toward us. If it were right in us toward Hayti, then might England, France, Spain, or Hayti herself do the same to us. Imagine a foreign fleet anchored off Alexandria, while the admiral, pulling ashore in his boat, hurries to the Executive Mansion, and then, after announcing a friendly visit, points to his war-ships visible from the windows, and menaces their thunder. Or to be more precise, suppose the Haytian Navy to return the compliment here in the Potomac. But just in proportion as we condemn any foreign fleet, including the Haytian Navy, doing this thing, do we condemn ourselves. The case is clear. We did not treat Hayti as our peer. The great principle of the Equality of Nations was openly set at nought.

To extenuate this plain outrage, I have heard it said, that, in our relations with Hayti, we are not bound by the same rules of conduct applicable to other nations. So I have heard; and this, indeed, is the only possible defence for the outrage. As in other days it was proclaimed that a black man had no rights which a white man was bound to respect, so this defence assumes the same thing of the Black Republic. But at last the black man has obtained Equal Rights; and so, I insist, has the Black Republic. As well deny the one as the other. By an Act of Congress, drawn by myself and approved by Abraham Lincoln in the session of 1862, diplomatic relations were established between the United States and Hayti, and the President was expressly authorized to appoint diplomatic representatives there. At first we were represented by a Commissioner and Consul-General; now it is by a Minister Resident and Consul-General. Thus, by Act of Congress and the appointment of a Minister, have we recognized the Equal Rights of Hayti in the Family of Nations, and placed the Black Republic under the safeguard of that great axiom of International Law which makes it impossible for us to do unto her what we would not allow her to do unto us. In harmony with the United States, the “Almanach de Gotha,” where is the authentic, if not official, list of nations entitled to Equal Rights, contains the name of Hayti. Thus is the Black Republic enrolled as an equal; and yet have we struck at this equality. How often have I pleaded that all men are equal before the Law! And now I plead that all nations are equal before the Law, without distinction of color.

BELLIGERENT INTERVENTION CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW.

From one violation of International Law I pass to another. The proceedings already detailed show belligerent intervention, contrary to International Law. Here my statement will be brief.

According to all the best authorities, in harmony with reason, no nation has a right to interfere by belligerent intervention in the internal affairs of another, and especially to take part in a civil feud, except under conditions which are wanting here; nor has it a right to interfere by belligerent intervention between two independent nations. The general rule imposed by modern civilization is _Non-Intervention_; but this rule is little more than a scientific expression of that saying of Philip de Comines, the famous minister of Louis the Eleventh, “Our Lord God does not wish that one nation should play the devil with another.” Not to occupy time with authorities, I content myself with some of our own country, which are clear and explicit, and I begin with George Washington, who wrote to Lafayette, under date of December 25, 1798:--

“No Government ought to interfere with the internal concerns
of another, _except for the security of what is due to
themselves_.”[74]

Wheaton lays down the same rule substantially, when he says:--

“Non-Interference is the general rule, to which cases of
justifiable interference form exceptions, _limited by the
necessity of each particular case_.”[75]

Thus does Wheaton, like Washington, found intervention in the necessity of the case. Evidently neither thought of founding it on a scheme for the acquisition of foreign territory.

In harmony with Washington and Wheaton, I cite General Halleck, in his excellent work:--

“Wars of intervention are to be justified or condemned
accordingly as they are or are not undertaken _strictly as
the means of self-defence_, and self-protection against the
aggrandizements of others, and without reference to treaty
obligations; for, if wrong in themselves, the stipulations of a
treaty cannot make them right.”[76]

Then again Halleck says, in words applicable to the present case:--

“The invitation of one party to a civil war can afford no
right of foreign interference, as against the other party. The
same reasoning holds good with respect to armed intervention,
whether between belligerent states or between belligerent
parties in the same state.”[77]

Armed Intervention, or, as I would say, Belligerent Intervention, is thus defined by Halleck:--

“Armed intervention consists _in threatened or actual force_,
employed or to be employed by one state in regulating or
determining the conduct or affairs of another. Such an
employment of force is virtually _a war_, and must be justified
or condemned upon the same general principles as other
wars.”[78]

Applying these principles to existing facts already set forth, it is easy to see that the belligerent intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of Dominica, maintaining the usurper Baez in power, especially against Cabral, was contrary to acknowledged principles of International Law, and that the belligerent intervention between Dominica and Hayti was of the same character. Imagine our Navy playing the fantastic tricks on the coast of France which it played on the coasts of San Domingo, and then, still further, imagine it entering the ports of France as it entered the ports of Hayti, and you will see how utterly indefensible was its conduct. In the capital of Hayti it committed an act of war hardly less flagrant than that of England at the bombardment of Copenhagen. Happily blood was not shed, but there was an act of war. Here I refer to the authorities already cited, and challenge contradiction.

To vindicate these things, whether in Dominica or in Hayti, you must discard all acknowledged principles of International Law, and join those who, regardless of rights, rely upon arms. Grotius reminds us of Achilles, as described by Horace:--

“Rights he spurns
As things not made for him, claims all by arms”;

and he quotes Lucan also, who shows a soldier exclaiming:--

“Now, Peace and Law, I bid you both farewell.”

The old Antigonus, who, when besieging a city, laughed at a man who brought him a dissertation on Justice, and Pompey, who exclaimed, “Am I, when in arms, to think of the laws?”[79]--these seem to be the models for our Government on the coasts of San Domingo.

USURPATION OF WAR POWERS CONTRARY TO THE CONSTITUTION.

The same spirit which set at defiance great principles of International Law, installing force instead, is equally manifest in disregard of the Constitution of the United States; and here one of its most distinctive principles is struck down. By the Constitution it is solemnly announced that to Congress is given the power “to declare war.” This allotment of power was made only after much consideration, and in obedience to those popular rights consecrated by the American Revolution. In England, and in all other monarchies at the time, this power was the exclusive prerogative of the Crown, so that war was justly called “the last reason of kings.” The framers of our Constitution naturally refused to vest this kingly prerogative in the President. Kings were rejected in substance as in name. The One-Man Power was set aside, and this kingly prerogative placed under the safeguard of the people, as represented in that highest form of national life, an Act of Congress. No other provision in the Constitution is more distinctive, or more worthy of veneration. I do not go too far, when I call it an essential element of Republican Institutions, happily discovered by our fathers.

Our authoritative commentator, Judge Story, has explained the origin of this provision, and his testimony confirms the statement I have made. After remarking that the power to declare war is “not only _the highest sovereign prerogative_, but that it is in its own nature and effects so critical and calamitous that it requires the utmost deliberation and the successive review of all the councils of the nation,” the learned author remarks with singular point, that “it should be difficult in a Republic to declare war,” and that, therefore, “the coöperation of all the branches of the _legislative_ power ought upon principle to be required in this, _the highest act of legislation_”; and he even goes so far as to suggest still greater restriction, “as by requiring a concurrence of two thirds of both Houses.”[80] There is no such conservative requirement; but war can be declared only by a majority of both Houses with the approbation of the President. There must be the embodied will of the Legislative and the Executive,--in other words, of Congress and the President. Not Congress alone, without the President, can declare war; nor can the President alone, without Congress. Both must concur; and here is the triumph of Republican Institutions.

But this distinctive principle of our Constitution and new-found safeguard of popular rights has been set at nought by the President; or rather, in rushing to the goal of his desires, he has overleaped it, as if it were stubble.

In harmony with the whole transaction is the apology, which insists that the President may do indirectly what he cannot do directly,--that he may, according to old Polonius, “by indirections find directions out,”--in short, that, though he cannot declare war directly, he may indirectly. We are reminded of the unratified treaty, with its futile promise “against foreign interposition,”--that is, with the promise of the War Powers of our Government set in motion by the President alone, without an Act of Congress. Here are the precise terms:--

“The people of the Dominican Republic shall, in the shortest
possible time, express, in a manner conformable to their laws,
their will concerning the cession herein provided for; and
the United States shall, until such expression shall be had,
_protect the Dominican Republic against foreign interposition_,
in order that the national expression may be free.”[81]

Now nothing can be clearer than that this provision, introduced on the authority of the President alone, was beyond his powers, and therefore _brutum fulmen_, a mere wooden gun, until after the ratification of the treaty. Otherwise the President alone might declare war, without an Act of Congress, doing indirectly what he cannot do directly, and thus overturning that special safeguard which places under the guardianship of Congress what Story justly calls “the highest sovereign prerogative.”

Here we meet another distinctive principle of our Constitution. As the power to declare war is lodged in Congress with the concurrence of the President, so is the power to make a treaty lodged in the President with the concurrence of two thirds of the Senate. War is declared only by Congress and the President; a treaty is made only by the President and two thirds of the Senate. As the former safeguard was new, so was the latter. In England and all other monarchies at the time, the treaty-making power was a kingly prerogative, like the power to declare war. The provision in our Constitution, requiring the participation of the Senate, was another limitation of the One-Man Power, and a new contribution to Republican Institutions.

“The Federalist,” in an article written by Alexander Hamilton, thus describes the kingly prerogative:--

“The king of Great Britain is the sole and absolute
representative of the nation in all foreign transactions. He
can _of his own accord_ make treaties of peace, commerce,
alliance, and of every other description.… Every jurist of that
kingdom, and every other man acquainted with its Constitution,
knows, as an established fact, that the prerogative of making
treaties exists in the Crown in its utmost plenitude; and that
the compacts entered into by the royal authority have the most
complete legal validity and perfection, _independent of any
other sanction_.”[82]

Such was the well-known kingly prerogative which our Constitution rejected. Here let “The Federalist” speak again:--

“There is no comparison between the intended power of the
President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The
one can perform alone what the other can only do with the
concurrence of a branch of the Legislature.”[83]

Then, again, after showing that a treaty is a contract with a foreign nation, having the force of law, “The Federalist” proceeds:--

“The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted
opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to
commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind as those
which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world _to
the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as
would be a President of the United States_.”[84]

Thus does this contemporary authority testify against handing over to “the sole disposal” of the President the delicate and momentous question in the unratified treaty.

Following “The Federalist” is the eminent commentator already cited, who insists that “it is too much to expect that a free people would confide to a single magistrate, however respectable, _the sole authority_ to act conclusively, as well as exclusively, upon the subject of treaties”; and that, “however proper it may be in a monarchy, there is no American statesman but must feel that such a prerogative in an American President would be inexpedient and dangerous,”--that “it would be inconsistent with that wholesome jealousy which all republics ought to cherish of all depositaries of power”; and then he adds:--

“The check which acts upon the mind, _from the consideration
that what is done is but preliminary_, and requires the assent
of other independent minds _to give it a legal conclusiveness_,
is a restraint which awakens caution and compels to
deliberation.”[85]

The learned author then dwells with pride on the requirement of the Constitution, which, while confiding the power to the Executive Department, “guards it from serious abuse by placing it _under the ultimate superintendence of a select body of high character and high responsibility_”; and then, after remarking that “the President is the immediate author and finisher of all treaties,” he concludes, in decisive words, that “no treaty so formed _becomes binding upon the country_, unless it receives the deliberate assent of two thirds of the Senate.”[86]

Nothing can be more positive. Therefore, even at the expense of repetition, I insist, that, as the power to declare war is under the safeguard of Congress with the concurrence of the President, so is the power to make a treaty in the President with the concurrence of two thirds of the Senate,--but the act of neither becomes binding without this concurrence. Thus, on grounds of authority, as well as of reason, is it clear that the undertaking of the President to employ the War Powers without the authority of Congress was void, and every employment of these War Powers in pursuance thereof was a usurpation.

If the President were a king, with the kingly prerogative either to declare war or to make treaties, he might do what he has done; but being only President, with the limited powers established by the Constitution, he cannot do it. The assumption in the Dominican treaty is exceptional and abnormal, being absolutely without precedent. The treaty with France in 1803 for the cession of Louisiana contained no such assumption; nor did the treaty with Spain in 1819 for the cession of Florida; nor did the treaty with Mexico in 1848, by which the title to Texas and California was assured; nor did the treaty with Mexico in 1853, by which new territory was obtained; nor did the treaty with Russia in 1867 for the cession of her possessions in North America. In none of these treaties was there any such assumption of power. The Louisiana treaty stipulated that possession should be taken by the United States “immediately after the ratification of the present treaty by the President of the United States, and in case that of the First Consul shall have been previously obtained.”[87] The Florida treaty stipulated “six months after the exchange of the ratification of this treaty, or sooner, if possible.”[88] But these stipulations, by which possession on our part, with corresponding responsibilities, was adjourned till after the exchange of ratifications, were simply according to the dictate of reason, in harmony with the requirement of our Constitution.

The case of Texas had two stages: first, under an unratified treaty; and, secondly, under a Joint Resolution of Congress. What was done under the latter had the concurrence of Congress and the President; so that the inchoate title of the United States was created by Act of Congress, in plain contradiction to the present case, where the title, whatever it may be, is under an unratified treaty, _and is created by the President alone_. Here is a manifest difference, not to be forgotten.

During the pendency of the treaty, there was an attempt by John Tyler, aided by his Secretary of State, John C. Calhoun, to commit the United States to the military support of Texas. It was nothing but an attempt. There was no belligerent intervention or act of war, but only what Benton calls an “assumpsit” by Calhoun. On this “assumpsit” the veteran Senator, in the memoirs of his Thirty Years in the Senate, breaks forth in these indignant terms:--

“As to secretly lending the Army and Navy of the United States
to Texas to fight Mexico while we were at peace with her, it
would be a crime against God and man and our own Constitution,
for which heads might be brought to the block, if Presidents
and their Secretaries, like Constitutional Kings and Ministers,
should be held capitally responsible for capital crimes.”[89]

The indignant statesman, after exposing the unconstitutional charlatanry of the attempt, proceeds:--

“And that no circumstance of contradiction or folly should
be wanting to crown this plot of crime and imbecility, it so
happened, that, on the same day that our new Secretary here was
giving his written assumpsit to lend the Army and Navy to fight
Mexico while we were at peace with her, the agent Murphy was
communicating to the Texan Government, in Texas, _the refusal
of Mr. Tyler, through Mr. Nelson, to do so, because of its
unconstitutionality_.”[90]

Mr. Nelson, Secretary of State _ad interim_, wrote Mr. Murphy, our Minister in Texas, under date of March 11, 1844, that “the employment of the Army or Navy against a foreign power with which the United States are at peace is not within the competency of the President.”[91]

Again Benton says:--

“The engagement to fight Mexico for Texas, while we were at
peace with Mexico, was to make war with Mexico!--_a piece of
business which belonged to the Congress_, and which should
have been referred to them, and which, on the contrary, was
concealed from them, though in session and present.”[92]

In the face of this indignant judgment, already the undying voice of history, the “assumpsit” of John C. Calhoun will not be accepted as a proper example for a Republican President. But there is not a word of that powerful utterance by which this act is forever blasted that is not strictly applicable to the “assumpsit” in the case of Dominica. If an engagement to fight Mexico for Texas, while we were at peace with Mexico, was nothing less than war with Mexico, so the present engagement to fight Hayti for Dominica, while we are at peace with Hayti, is nothing less than war with Hayti. Nor is it any the less “a crime against God and man and our own Constitution” in the case of Hayti than in the case of Mexico. But the present case is stronger than that which aroused the fervid energies of Benton. The “assumpsit” here has been followed by belligerent intervention and acts of war.

President Polk, in his Annual Message of December, 1846, paid homage to the true principle, when he announced that “the moment the terms of annexation offered by the United States were accepted by Texas, the latter became so far a part of our own country as to make it our duty to afford protection and defence.”[93] And accordingly he directed those military and naval movements which ended in war with Mexico. But it will be observed here that these movements were conditioned on the acceptance by Texas of the terms of annexion definitively proposed by the United States, while our title had been created by Act of Congress, and not by the President alone.

Therefore, according to the precedents of our history, reinforced by reason and authority, does the “assumpsit” of the treaty fail. I forbear from characterizing it. My duty is performed, if I exhibit it to the Senate.

But this story of a violated Constitution is not yet complete. Even admitting some remote infinitesimal semblance of excuse or apology during the pendency of the treaty, all of which I insist is absurd beyond question, though not entirely impossible in a quarter unused to constitutional questions and heeding them little,--conceding that the “assumpsit” inserted in the treaty by the Secretary of State had deceived the President into the idea that he possessed the kingly prerogative of declaring war at his own mere motion,--and wishing to deal most gently even with an undoubted usurpation of the kingly prerogative, so long as the Secretary of State, sworn counsellor of the President, supplied the formula for the usurpation, (and you will bear witness that I have done nothing but state the case,)--it is hard to hold back, when the same usurpation is openly prolonged after the Senate had rejected the treaty on which the exercise of the kingly prerogative was founded, and when the “assumpsit” devised by the Secretary of State had passed into the limbo of things lost on earth. Here there is no remote infinitesimal semblance of excuse or apology,--nothing,--absolutely nothing. The usurpation pivots on nonentity,--always excepting the kingly will of the President, which constitutionally is a nonentity. The great artist of Bologna, in a much admired statue, sculptured Mercury as standing on a puff of air. The President has not even a puff of air to stand on.

Nor is there any question with regard to the facts. Saying nothing of the lapse of the treaty on the 29th March, 1870, being the expiration of the period for the exchange of ratifications, I refer to its formal rejection by the Senate, June 30, 1870, which was not unknown to the President. In the order of business the rejection was communicated to him, while it became at once matter of universal notoriety. Then, by way of further fixing the President with this notice, I refer to his own admission in the Annual Message of December last, when he announces that “during the last session of Congress a treaty for the annexation of the Republic of San Domingo to the United States failed to receive the requisite two-thirds of the Senate,” and then, after denouncing the rejection as “folly,” he proceeds as follows:--

“My suggestion is, that by Joint Resolution of the two Houses
of Congress the Executive be authorized to appoint a Commission
_to negotiate a treaty with the authorities of San Domingo for
the acquisition of that island_, and that an appropriation be
made to defray the expenses of such Commission. The question
may then be determined, either by the action of the Senate
upon the treaty, or the joint action of the two Houses of
Congress upon a resolution of annexation, as in the case of the
acquisition of Texas.”

Thus by the open declaration of the President was the treaty rejected, while six months after the rejection he asks for a Commission to negotiate a new treaty, and an appropriation to defray the expenses of the Commission; and not perceiving the inapplicability of the Texas precedent, he proposes to do the deed by Joint Resolution of Congress. And yet during this intermediate period, when there was no unratified treaty extant, the same belligerent intervention has been proceeding, the same war-ships have been girdling the island with their guns, and the same naval support has been continued to the usurper Baez,--all at great cost to the country and by the diversion of our naval forces from other places of duty, while the Constitution has been dismissed out of sight like a discharged soldier.

Already you have seen how this belligerent intervention proceeded after the rejection of the treaty; how on the 21st July, 1870, Commodore Green reported that “a withdrawal of the protection of the United States and of the prospect of annexation at some future time would instantly lead to a revolution headed by Cabral”; how on the 28th August, 1870, Lieutenant Commander Allen reported Baez as “requesting the presence of a vessel on the north side of the island on account of an intended invasion by Cabral”; how at the same time the usurper cries out that he “deems the presence of a ship-of-war in the Bay of Manzanillo of immediate importance”; how on the 3d September, 1870, Commander Irwin reported that Baez “feared an outbreak,” and appealed to the Commander to “bring him some of his men that were at Azua,” which the obliging Commander did; how under date of September 2, 1870, the usurper, after declaring the necessity of a man-of-war at the port of San Domingo, says that “none would be more convenient than the Yantic for the facility of entering the river Ozama, owing to her size”; and how again under date of October 8, 1870, the usurper writes still another letter “to reiterate the necessity of the vessels now in that bay [Samana] coming to these southern coasts.” All these things you have seen, attesting constantly our belligerent intervention and the maintenance of Baez in power by our Navy, which became his body-guard and omnipresent upholder, and all after the rejection of the treaty. I leave them to your judgment without one word of comment, reminding you only that no President is entitled to substitute his kingly will for the Constitution of our country.

In curious confirmation of the first conclusion from the official document, the letter of Captain Temple to Mr. Wade should not be forgotten. This letter has found its way into the papers, and if not genuine, it ought to be. It purports to be dated, Tennessee, Azua Bay, February 24, 1871. Here is the first paragraph:--

“I understand that several of the gentlemen belonging to the
expedition are to start to-morrow overland for Port-au-Prince.
It may not have occurred to these gentlemen that by so doing
they will virtually place themselves in the position of spies,
and if they are taken by Cabral’s people, they can be hung to
the nearest tree by sentence of a drum-head court-martial,
according to all the rules of civilized warfare. _For they
belong to a nation that, through the orders of its Executive
to the naval vessels here, has chosen to take part in the
internal conflicts of this country_; they come directly from
the head-quarters of Cabral’s enemies; they are without arms,
uniform, or authority of any kind for being in a hostile
region. They _are_, in fact, spies. They go expressly to learn
everything connected with the enemy’s country, and their
observations are intended for publication, and thus indirectly
to be reported back to President Baez. Surely Cabral would have
a right to prevent this, if he can.”

It will be seen that the gallant Captain does not hesitate to recognize the existing rights of Cabral under the Laws of War, and to warn against any journey by members of the Commission across the island to Hayti,--as, if taken by Cabral’s people, they could be hung to the nearest tree by sentence of drum-head court-martial, “according to all the rules of civilized warfare”; and the Captain gives the reason: “For they belong to a nation that, through the orders of its Executive to the naval vessels here, has chosen to take part in the internal conflicts of this country.” Here is belligerent intervention openly recognized by the gallant Captain, and without the authority of Congress. If the gallant Captain wrote the letter, he showed himself a master of International Law whom Senators might do well to follow. If he did not write it, the instructive jest will at least relieve the weariness of this discussion.

SUMMARY.

Mr. President, as I draw to a close, allow me to repeat the very deep regret with which I make this exposure. Most gladly would I avoid it. Controversy, especially at my time of life, has no attraction for me; but I have been reared in the school of duty, and now, as of old, I cannot see wrong without trying to arrest it. I plead now, as I have often pleaded before, for Justice and Peace.

In the evidence adduced I have confined myself carefully to public documents, not travelling out of the record. Dispatches, naval orders, naval reports,--these are the unimpeachable authorities. And all these have been officially communicated to the Senate, are now printed by its order, accessible to all. On this unanswerable and cumulative testimony, where each part confirms the rest, and the whole has the harmony of truth, I present this transgression. And here it is not I who speak, but the testimony.

Thus stands the case. International Law has been violated in two of its commanding rules, one securing the Equality of Nations, and the other providing against Belligerent Intervention,--while a distinctive fundamental principle of the Constitution, by which the President is deprived of a kingly prerogative, is disregarded, and this very kingly prerogative is asserted by the President. This is the simplest statement. Looking still further at the facts, we see that all this great disobedience has for its object the acquisition of an outlying tropical island, with large promise of wealth, and that in carrying out this scheme our Republic has forcibly maintained a usurper in power that he might sell his country, and has dealt a blow at the independence of the Black Republic of Hayti, which, besides being a wrong to that Republic, was an insult to the African race. And all this has been done by kingly prerogative alone, without the authority of an Act of Congress. If such a transaction, many-headed in wrong, can escape judgment, it is difficult to see what securities remain. What other sacred rule of International Law may not be violated? What other foreign nation may not be struck at? What other belligerent menace may not be hurled? What other kingly prerogative may not be seized?

On another occasion I showed how these wrongful proceedings had been sustained by the President beyond all example, but in a corresponding spirit. Never before has there been such Presidential intervention in the Senate as we have been constrained to witness. Presidential visits to the Capitol, with appeals to Senators, have been followed by assemblies at the Executive Mansion, also with appeals to Senators; and who can measure the pressure of all kinds by himself or agents, especially through the appointing power, all to secure the consummation of this scheme? In harmony with this effort was the Presidential Message, where, while charging the Senate with “folly” in rejecting the treaty, we are gravely assured that by the proposed acquisition “our large debt abroad is ultimately to be extinguished,”--thus making San Domingo the pack-horse of our vast load.

Then, responding to the belligerent menace of his Admiral, the President makes a kindred menace by proposing nothing less than the acquisition of “the island of San Domingo,” thus adding the Black Republic to his scheme. The innocent population there were startled. Their Minister here protested. Nor is it unnatural that it should be so. Suppose the Queen of England, in her speech at the opening of Parliament, had proposed in formal terms the acquisition of the United States; or suppose Louis Napoleon, in his speech at the opening of the Chambers, during the Mexican War, while the French forces were in Mexico, had coolly proposed the acquisition of that portion of the United States adjoining Mexico and stretching to the Atlantic, and, in support of his proposition, had set forth the productiveness of the soil, the natural wealth that abounded there, and wound up by announcing that out of this might be paid the French debt abroad, which was to be saddled upon the coveted territory. Suppose such a proposition by Louis Napoleon or by the English Queen, made in formal speech to Chambers or Parliament, what would have been the feeling in our country? Nor would that feeling have been diminished by the excuse that the offensive proposition crept into the speech by accident. Whether by accident or design, it would attest small consideration for our national existence. But the Haytians love their country as we love ours; especially are they resolute for national independence. All this is shown by the reports which reach us now, even if their whole history did not attest it.

The language of the President in charging the Senate with “folly” was not according to approved precedents. Clearly this is not a proper term to be employed by one branch of the Government with regard to another, least of all by the President with regard to the Senate. Folly, Sir! Was it folly, when the Senate refused to sanction proceedings by which the Equal Rights of the Black Republic were assailed? Was it folly, not to sanction hostilities against the Black Republic without the authority of Congress? Was it folly, not to sanction belligerent intervention in a foreign country without the authority of Congress? Was it folly, not to sanction a usurpation of the War Powers under the Constitution? According to the President, all this was folly in the Senate. Let the country judge.

Thus do we discern, whether on the coasts of San Domingo or here at Washington, the same determination, with the same disregard of great principles, as also the same recklessness toward the people of Hayti, who have never injured us.

PRESENT DUTY.

In view of these things, the first subject of inquiry is not soil, climate, productiveness, and possibilities of wealth, but the exceptional and abnormal proceedings of our own Government. This inquiry is essentially preliminary in character. Before considering the treaty or any question of acquisition, we must at least put ourselves right as a nation; nor do I see how this can be done without retracing our steps, and consenting to act in subordination to International Law and the Constitution of the United States.

Beside the essential equity of such submission, and the moral dignity it would confer upon the Republic, which rises when it stoops to Law, there are two other reasons of irresistible force at this moment. I need not remind you that the Senate is now occupied in considering how to suppress lawlessness within our own borders and to save the African race from outrage. Surely our efforts at home must be weakened by the drama we are now playing abroad. Pray, Sir, with what face can we insist upon obedience to Law and respect for the African race, while we are openly engaged in lawlessness on the coasts of San Domingo and outrage upon the African race represented by the Black Republic? How can we expect to put down the Ku-Klux at the South, when we set in motion another proceeding kindred in constant insubordination to Law and Constitution? Differing in object, the two are identical in this insubordination. One strikes at national life and the other at individual life, while both strike at the African race. One molests a people, the other a community. Lawlessness is the common element. But it is difficult to see how we can condemn, with proper, whole-hearted reprobation, our own domestic Ku-Klux, with its fearful outrages, while the President puts himself at the head of a powerful and costly proceeding operating abroad in defiance of International Law and the Constitution of the United States. These are questions which I ask with sorrow, and only in obedience to that truth which is the requirement of this debate. Nor should I do otherwise than fail in justice to the occasion, if I did not declare my unhesitating conviction, that, had the President been so inspired as to bestow upon the protection of Southern Unionists, white and black, one half, nay, Sir, one quarter, of the time, money, zeal, will, personal attention, personal effort, and personal intercession, which he has bestowed on his attempt to obtain half an island in the Caribbean Sea, our Southern Ku-Klux would have existed in name only, while tranquillity reigned everywhere within our borders. [_Applause in the galleries._]

THE VICE-PRESIDENT. The Senator from Massachusetts will
suspend.--The Chair cannot consent that there shall be
manifestations of approval or disapproval in the galleries;
and he reprehends one as promptly as the other. If they are
repeated, the Chair must enforce the order of the Senate.--The
Senator from Massachusetts will resume.

MR. SUMNER. Another reason for retracing the false steps already taken will be found in our duty to the African race, of whom there are four millions within our borders, recognized as equal before the Law. To these new-found fellow-citizens, once degraded and trampled down, are we bound by every sentiment of justice; nor can we see their race dishonored anywhere through our misconduct. How vain are professions in their behalf, if we set the example of outrage! How vain to expect their sympathy and coöperation in the support of the National Government, if the President, by his own mere will, and in the plenitude of kingly prerogative, can strike at the independence of the Black Republic, and degrade it in the Family of Nations! All this is a thousand times wrong. It is a thousand times impolitic also; for it teaches the African race that they are only victims for sacrifice.

Now, Sir, as I desire the suppression of the Ku-Klux wherever it shows itself, and as I seek the elevation of the African race, I insist that the Presidential scheme, which instals a new form of lawlessness on the coasts of San Domingo, and which at the same time insults the African race represented in the Black Republic, shall be arrested. I speak now against that lawlessness on the coasts of San Domingo, of which the President is the head; and I speak also for the African race, which the President has trampled down. Is there any Senator in earnest against the Ku-Klux? Let him arrest the present lawlessness on the coasts of San Domingo. Is there any Senator ready at all times to seek the elevation of the African race? Here is the occasion for his best efforts.

On the question of acquisition I say nothing to-day, only alluding to certain points involved. Sometimes it is insisted that emigrants will hurry in large numbers to this tropical island when once annexed, and thus swell its means; but this allegation forgets, that, according to the testimony of History, peaceful emigration travels with the sun on parallels of latitude, and not on meridians of longitude, mainly following the isothermal line, and not turning off at right-angles, whether North or South. Sometimes it is insisted that it will be better for the people of this island, if annexed to our Republic; but this allegation forgets the transcendent question, Whether it is better for them, better for the African race, better for Civilization, that the Black Republic should be absorbed out of sight, instead of being fostered into a successful example of self-government for the redemption of the race, not only on the Caribbean islands, but on the continent of Africa? Then, again, arises that other question, Whether we will assume the bloody hazards involved in this business, as it has been pursued, with the alternative of expenditures for war-ships and troops, causing most painful anxieties, while the land of Toussaint L’Ouverture listens to the constant whisper of Independence? And there is still that other question of debts and obligations, acknowledged and unacknowledged, with an immense claim by Hayti and an unsettled boundary, which I have already called a bloody lawsuit.

Over all is that other question, Whether we will begin a system, which, first fastening upon Dominica, must, according to the admission of the plenipotentiary Fabens made to myself, next take Hayti, and then in succession the whole tropical group of the Caribbean Sea,--so that we are now to determine if all the islands of the West Indies shall be a component part of our Republic, helping to govern us, while the African race is dispossessed of its natural home in this hemisphere. No question equal in magnitude, unless it be that of Slavery, has arisen since the days of Washington.

These questions I state only. Meanwhile to my mind there is something better than belligerent intervention and acts of war with the menace of absorption at untold cost of treasure. It is a sincere and humane effort on our part, in the spirit of peace, to reconcile Hayti and Dominica, and to establish tranquillity throughout the island. Let this be attempted, and our Republic will become an example worthy of its name and of the civilization which it represents, while Republican Institutions have new glory. The blessings of good men will attend such an effort; nor can the smile of Heaven be wanting.

And may we not justly expect the President to unite in such a measure of peace and good-will? He that ruleth his spirit is greater than he that taketh a city; and so the President, ruling his spirit in subjection to the humane principles of International Law and the Constitution of his country, will be greater than if he had taken all the islands of the sea.

The Commission appointed under the Joint Resolution visited San
Domingo, and their Report, which was favorable to the proposed
annexion, the President communicated to Congress; but no
further action was taken to carry the scheme into effect.

PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE. AN EXPLANATION IN REPLY TO AN ASSAULT.

STATEMENT PREPARED FOR PRESENTATION IN THE SENATE, MARCH, 1871.

Si rixa est, ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo tantum.
Stat contra, starique jubet; parere necesse est.
Nam quid agas, cum te furiosus cogat, et idem
Fortior?

JUVENAL, _Sat._ III. 289-92.

TO THE READER.

This statement was prepared in March, shortly after the
debate in the Senate, but was withheld at that time, from
unwillingness to take part in the controversy, while able
friends regarded the question of principle involved as above
every personal issue. Yielding at last to various pressure, Mr.
Sumner concluded to present it at the recent called session of
the Senate, but the Treaty with Great Britain and the case of
the Newspaper Correspondents were so engrossing as to leave no
time for anything else.

WASHINGTON, June, 1871.

NOTE.

With the failure of an opportunity for the presentation of the
proposed statement in the Senate Mr. Sumner’s indisposition
to appeal to the public returned with increased strength,
manifested, after printing, by limiting the communication
of copies to personal friends, with the inscription,
“Unpublished,--private and confidential,--not to go out of Mr.
----’s hands.”

Says one to whom it was thus confided: “I frequently urged him
afterwards to make it public. His reply was, in substance, that
he should not do it for personal vindication merely; that, so
far as Mr. Motley was concerned, he thought the matter stood
well enough before the public; but if the time should come when
the ends of justice required its publication, he should remove
the injunction of secrecy. While he lived I respected his
injunction. After his death I felt that justice to his memory
not only justified, but required me to make the ‘Explanation’
public.… Accordingly, after conferring with Mr. Whitelaw
Reid, of the ‘New York Tribune,’ I sent it to him, and it was
published in that journal of April 6, 1874.”--F. W. BIRD,
_Introductory_ to his pamphlet edition, Boston and New York,
1878.

The seal having been thus broken, there can obviously no longer
be question as to the propriety of including an article of such
high interest and importance in a collection of Mr. Sumner’s
Works; and it accordingly here follows in due course.

* * * * *