Chapter VIII: Predestination and Free-Will

In ‘Troylus and Cryseyde’ we find the following long passage taken from Boethius, book v. prose 2, 3.

Book iv. st. 134, vol. iv. p. 339.

(1) Syn God seth every thynge, out of doutaunce,
And hem disponeth, thorugh his ordinaunce,
In hire merites sothely for to be,
As they shul comen by predesteyné

136

(2) For som men seyn if God seth al byforne,
Ne God may not deseyved ben pardé!
Than moot it fallen, theigh men hadde it sworne,
That purveyaunce hath seyn befor to be,
Wherfor I seye, that, from eterne, if he
Hathe wiste byforn our thought ek as oure dede,
We have no fre choys, as thise clerkes rede.

137

(3) For other thoughte, nor other dede also,
Myghte nevere ben, but swich as purveyaunce,
Which may nat ben deceyved nevere moo,
Hath feled byforne, withouten ignoraunce;
For if ther myghte ben a variaunce,
To wrythen out fro Goddes purveyinge,
Ther nere no prescience of thynge comynge;

138

(4) But it were rather an opinyon
Uncertein, and no stedfast forseynge;
And certes that were an abusyon
That God shold han no parfit clere wetynge,
More than we men, that han douteous wenynge,
But swich an erroure upon God to gesse
Were fals, and foule, and wikked corsednesse.

139

(5) They seyn right thus, that thynge is nat to come,
For that the prescience hath seyne byfore
That it shal come; but they seyn that therfore
That it shal come, therfor the purveyaunce
Woot it bifore, withouten ignorance.

140

(6) And in this manere this necessité
Retourneth in his part contrarye agayn;
For nedfully byhoveth it not to be,
That thilke thynges fallen in certeyn
That ben purveyed; but nedly, as they seyne,
Bihoveth it that thynges, which that falle,
That thei in certein ben purveied alle.

141

(7) I mene as though I labourede me in this,
To enqueren which thynge cause of whiche thynge be;

(8) As, whether that the prescience of God is
The certein cause of the necessité
Of thynges that to comen ben, pardé!
Or, if necessité of thynge comynge
Be cause certein of the purveyinge.

142

(9) But now nenforce I me nat in shewynge
How the ordre of causes stant; but wel woot I
That it bihoveth that the bifallynge
Of thynges, wiste bifor certeinly,
Be necessarie, al seme it nat therby
That prescience put fallynge necessaire
To thynge to come, al falle it foule or faire.

143

(10) For, if ther sit a man yonde on a see, [seat]
Than by necessité bihoveth it,
That certes thyn opinioun soth be,
That wenest or conjectest that he sit;
And, further over, now ayeinwarde yit,
Lo right so is it on the part contrarie,
As thus,--nowe herkene, for I wol nat tarie:--

144

(11) I sey, that if the opinion of the
Be soth for that he sit, than seye I this,
That he moot sitten by necessité;
And thus necessité in either is,
For in hym nede of sittynge is, ywis,
And in the, nede of soth; and thus forsoth
Ther mot necessité ben in yow bothe.

145

(12) But thow maist seyne, the man sit nat therfore,
That thyn opinioun of his sittynge sothe is;
But rather, for the man sat there byfore,
Therfor is thyn opinioun soth, ywys;
And I seye, though the cause of soth of this
Cometh of his sittynge, yet necessité
Is interchaunged both in hym and the.

146

(13) Thus in the same wyse, out of doutaunce,
I may wel maken, as it semeth me,
My resonynge of Goddes purveiaunce,
And of the thynges that to comen be; . . .

147

(14) For although that for thynge shal come, ywys,
Therfor it is purveyed certeynly,
Nat that it cometh for it purveied is;
Yet, natheles, bihoveth it nedfully,
That thynge to come be purveied trewly;
Or elles thynges that purveied be.
That they bitiden by necessité.

148

(15) And this sufficeth right ynough, certeyn,
For to distruye oure fre choys everydele.

(1) Quæ tamen ille ab æterno cuncta prospiciens providentiæ cernit
intuitus, et suis quæque meritis prædestinata disponit. . . . .
(_Boethius_, lib. v. pr. 2.) . . . . . . . . . . . .

(2) Nam si cuncta prospicit Deus neque falli ullo modo potest,
evenire necesse est, quod providentia futurum esse præviderit.
Quare si ab æterno non facta hominum modo, sed etiam consilia
voluntatesque prænoscit, nulla erit arbitrii libertas;

(3) Neque enim vel factum aliud ullum vel quælibet existere
poterit voluntas, nisi quam nescia falli providentia divina
præsenserit. Nam si res aliorsum, quam provisæ sunt detorqueri
valent, non jam erit futuri firma præscientia;

(4) Sed opinio potius incerta; quod de Deo nefas credere judico.

(5) Aiunt enim non ideo quid esse eventurum quoniam id providentia
futurum esse prospexerit; sed e contrario potius, quoniam quid
futurum est, id divinam providentiam latere non possit.

(6) Eoque modo necessarium est hoc in contrariam relabi partem;
neque enim necesse est contingere quæ providentur, sed necesse est
quæ futura sunt provideri.

(7) Quasi vero quæ cujusque rei causa sit,

(8) Præscientiane futurorum necessitatis an futurorum necessitas
providentiæ, laboretur.

(9) At nos illud demonstrare nitamur, quoquo modo sese habeat ordo
causarum, necessarium esse eventum præscitarum rerum, etiam si
præscientia futuris rebus eveniendi necessitatem non videatur
inferre.

(10) Etenim si quispiam sedeat, opinionem quæ eum sedere conjectat
veram esse necesse est: at e converso rursus,

(11) Si de quopiam vera sit opinio quoniam sedet eum sedere
necesse est. In utroque igitur necessitas inest: in hoc quidem
sedendi, at vero in altero veritatis.

(12) Sed non idcirco quisque sedet, quoniam vera est opinio: sed
hæc potius vera est, quoniam quempiam sedere præcessit. Ita cum
causa veritatis ex altera parte procedat, inest tamen communis in
utraque necessitas.

(13) Similia de providentia futurisque rebus ratiocinari patet.

(14) Nam etiam si idcirco, quoniam futura sunt, providentur: non
vero ideo, quoniam providentur, eveniunt: nihilo minus tamen a Deo
vel ventura provideri, vel provisa evenire necesse est:

(15) Quod ad perimendam arbitrii libertatem solum satis est.

(lib. v. pr. 3.)

See _Chaucer’s Boethius_, pp. 154-6.